

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

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INTRODUCTION

People, particularly young people, have repeatedly behaved in ways that are perceived as disruptive or potentially disruptive of social expectations or processes. The behavior may injure someone; deprive another of his or her property; offend the moral values of a group of people, perhaps outrageously; or be of a type that is presumed to be indicative of future, more severe problems. In the attempt to control such behavior, small, informal groups have rules; larger, more formal organizations have rules and regulations; and

society as a whole has rules, regulations, and laws. In addition to specifications of proper and improper behavior, each of these mechanisms of social control carries sanctions for failure to conform: these may be implied or explicitly stated.

Criminal Behavior and Delinquency

Criminal law is aimed at controlling the most disruptive types of behavior, and is accordingly accompanied by the most severe possible sanctions and the greatest array of protections to minimize the likelihood that they are inappropriately applied. If an adult has violated a criminal code according to the judgment of a criminal court following highly structured procedures, he or she is thought of as a criminal. Similarly, if a youth has violated a criminal code according to the judgment of a juvenile court, he or she is thought of as a juvenile delinquent. The array of differences between the operations of the criminal and the juvenile justice systems ranges from the superficial (e.g., children are not technically arrested but "taken into temporary custody") to the important (e.g., "hearings" have traditionally been far less formal in juvenile court than "trials" in criminal court, although that picture has shown some change in recent years). Elsewhere I have discussed many aspects of these processes (Binder 1979, 1984, 1987a), including the origins and philosophy of the juvenile court, the conceptual and operational differences between criminal and juvenile courts, and the history of increasing procedural protections in the juvenile court.

A survey article on juvenile delinquency surely is concerned with research and theory devoted to the various aspects of the disruptive behavior of youths. But so is an article that covers such topics as child aggressiveness, adolescent violence, and child psychopathology. The critical differentiating element between juvenile delinquency and the other topics is the element of law. While aggressive or violent behavior is definable purely on the basis of observations of the interactions among people, delinquent behavior requires for its definition the evaluation of behavior in terms of laws and actual or potential legal processes. Thus, the behavior of a youngster who murdered his father would certainly be considered violent, but it would not be delinquent if a court eventually judged him not culpable.

However, a discussion of juvenile delinquency as a behavioral or social phenomenon cannot restrict its coverage to youths who have been defined as delinquent by law and adjudicated by juvenile courts. There are two primary reasons for this state of affairs: First, the juvenile justice system is highly selective at its various stages of possible or actual processing. At the outset, many juvenile offenses are not detected or not reported if detected, and many offenders are not taken into custody (arrested) when their offenses are reported. Then, there is a filtering out at each procedural stage as youths are

handled by police officers, court intake or probation officers, prosecuting attorneys (in some states), and by the judge or referee in the adjudicatory hearing. While important for an understanding of juvenile justice as an operating social system, factors that determine the selection of particular youths rather than others for further processing are mostly irrelevant for the development of psychological theories of delinquency. These selective factors include: the alertness of possible observers of the offense, the mood of the complainant, the policy of the police department, the characteristics of arresting police officers and intake court officers in using their considerable discretion, and the general tolerance of youthful peccadilloes in the community.

The second reason for not restricting coverage of juvenile delinquency to youths so designated by law and adjudication is the variation over states (and other jurisdictional entities) in the substantive law governing juvenile misconduct. Therefore, if an article on juvenile delinquency depended on legal definition and appropriate adjudication to delineate its realm of coverage, youthful offenders with similar social histories and identical offenses might be included or excluded on the basis of the jurisdiction in which their behavior occurred.

I come now to the uncomfortable necessity of specifying coverage in positive terms. Appropriate for inclusion in a survey article like this one are all research studies and theoretical discussions of a psychological nature that focus on youths under the age of 18 who have behaved in a manner prohibited by a criminal code in the jurisdiction where it occurred. They may have indicated the behavior on a self-study questionnaire, they may have been arrested for the behavior, they may have been adjudicated in juvenile courts or convicted as criminals in criminal courts, they may have been institutionalized, or they may have been diverted from further processing in the system by referral to a mental health or similar community agency.

I conclude this section by distinguishing among the expressions "delinquency," "antisocial conduct," and "deviance." Confusion among them leads to such misleading positions as the condemnation of the practice of defining "delinquency in legal rather than psychological terms" (Arbuthnot et al 1987). As stated above, it is not possible to define juvenile delinquency in a manner independent of the laws that anchor and bound it. This does indeed create problems for psychologists who must deal with an array of behaviors woven together by the whims of legislators and jurists—in the words of Rice (1956, p. 10) the behaviors encompassed by juvenile delinquency "have about as much in common as the words quail, deliquescence, pique, and cumquat—all of which can be said to be similar because each contains the letter 'q.' " But the solution cannot be arbitrary redefinition. [A reasonable solution has been developed by Quay (1987c), who assumes that among delinquents there are identifiable subgroups that are reasonably homogeneous on certain behavioral and psychological characteristics.]

The expression "antisocial conduct," on the other hand, is used by psychologists to designate behavior that is assumed to have harmful consequences for society but is not necessarily illegal. Finally, "deviance," used mostly by sociologists, refers to behavior that violates a social norm so greatly that social control responses are mobilized. Delinquent behavior is clearly deviant from the perspective of the broader society, but it may not be deviant from the perspective of one of its subcultures. Indeed, several theorists have explained delinquent and criminal behavior in terms of conformity to subcultural norms (see e.g. Cohen 1955; Wolfgang & Ferracuti 1967).

Status Offenses, Parens Patriae, and Delinquency

In 1838, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (in the decision *Ex parte Crouse*, 4 Wharton 9), set a critical precedent in its ruling that the state had the right to take charge of the lives of children, including the right to place them in institutions, for such offenses as "incorrigibility," "viciousness," and "moral depravity." Such offenses came to be called "status offenses" because they could be committed only by people of a certain status—below the age of legal maturity. Status offenses were not included in criminal codes or the common law defining criminal acts, and so a need for a special law that applied only to children arose: that law did evolve during the 19th century. The new law was anchored in a concept derived from English Chancery law, *parens patriae*, which justified intervention on the basis that the state (formerly the king—the original expression was *pater patriae*), as superparent, had ultimate responsibility for the welfare of all children in the country.

Since decisions under *parens patriae* were presumably made by a solicitous parent for the child's benefit, the usual constitutional protections, such as the right to trial by jury, were declared unnecessary (in the *Crouse* and many subsequent decisions of state supreme courts). That *quid pro quo* notion and jurisdiction over status as well as criminal offenses were incorporated as essential elements when the first juvenile court was established by state law in Chicago in the year 1899. While the criminal court was punitive, the juvenile court was supposed to operate on behalf of the youngster in an informal manner aimed at prescribing rehabilitative measures for behavior that ranged from serious crime to insolence. Indeed, over subsequent years, such behavior as the following was proscribed for children (see Hutzler & Sestak 1977): "habitually deports himself in a manner that is injurious to himself or others" (Iowa), "persistently runs away from the home of his parents or legal guardian" (Massachusetts), and "repeatedly associates with thieves, prostitutes, pimps or procurers" (Michigan).

Incidentally, the attitude of *quid pro quo* in the juvenile court, *parens patriae* for constitutional rights, remained firmly entrenched in juvenile justice until the years 1966–1967 when the US Supreme Court entered the scene

for the first time. The feeling of the Court regarding treatment of youths in juvenile court under the *quid pro quo* notion is well summarized in the following statement from its decision *In re Gault* (387 US at 28, 1967): "Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." If that case summarized the Court's attitude, why had it taken 67 years for the Court to intervene? The answers to that question, much too complex to take on here, may be found in Binder (1984).

Status offenders are not typically considered juvenile delinquents, but a general discussion of delinquency can be expected to include references to them. Many states maintain the distinction in their codes by referring to a status offender as a "child in need of supervision" or an "incorrigible child" or "a person in need of supervision," while referring to a criminal offender as a "delinquent child" or "delinquent juvenile" or the equivalent. Other state codes include both criminal and status offenders under the expression "juvenile delinquent."

Do delinquents and status offenders differ in important ways? Does status offending predispose a youngster toward later criminal offending (a theoretical position reflected in earlier state codes that referred to status offenders as "pre-delinquents")? How much concurrent involvement can one expect in delinquent behavior and status offenses? Attempts to answer these and similar questions may be found in Thomas (1976), Weis (1980), and Murray (1983). Regardless of the answers to those questions, there are many (e.g. Abadinsky 1976; Ketchum 1977) who argue that status offenders should be removed entirely from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court (for opposing positions, see Martin & Snyder 1976; Gregory 1978). And federal legislation, starting with the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-415), has, by strong financial incentives, motivated most states to modify their codes so as to preclude, or at least reduce, the placement of status offenders in locked facilities (see Handler & Zatz 1982; Wadlington et al 1983).

THE QUESTION OF PRIMARY DISCIPLINARY AFFILIATION

Although psychologists contribute substantially in the area of juvenile delinquency both as scientists and as practitioners, the field is dominated by sociology. The dominance may be seen in prevalent theories, in published research, in the course offerings of academic departments, in the authorships of relevant monographs and textbooks, in the editorships of key journals, in the number of sessions devoted to the topic at professional meetings, and in the key individuals likely to serve on or as advisers to local and national committees and commissions devoted to dealing with delinquency as a social

problem. As obvious as this state of affairs seems to an observer in the late 1980s, a reasonable person of the 19th century very likely, and a person of the early 20th century almost certainly, would have predicted that in 1988, juvenile delinquency (or its parent construct, criminology) would be a sub-field of a discipline that focuses on the individual, like psychology or psychiatry, rather than of one that focuses on society, like sociology. Let us briefly explore how the shift came about. In our exploration, delinquency is considered equivalent to criminology during much of the 19th century since the separate focus on children as offenders is the product of that century, ending with establishment of a separate court for children in 1899 (see Binder 1984, 1987a,c).

The 19th Century and the Prominence of Psychiatry

The concept of "moral insanity" was introduced by the psychiatrist Prichard in 1835 to refer to the phenomena of disordered consciences and deviations from social norms without illusions or hallucinations. Individual factors in crime causation continued to be emphasized by other psychiatrists during the 19th century: Ray (1838) distinguished between crime on the basis of moral insanity and crime as motivated rationally; Morel (1857) explained criminal behavior in terms of degeneracy and classified types of degenerates; and Maudsley (1870) allowed for moral degeneracy but emphasized such psychological motivations for crime as overwork, overexertion, frustration, irritation, imitation, and coercion. The work in that psychiatric tradition culminated in the bioconstitutional theory of Lombroso (1876, 1912), which conceived of criminals as degenerates. According to the theory, most criminals are distinguished from noncriminals by atavistic physical characteristics such as small skull, retreating forehead, and broad cheekbones symptomatic of a reversion to the subhuman.

Early 19th-century work in the social aspects of crime, starting with the moral statisticians Guerry and Quetelet, did not gain the recognition of the psychiatric tradition. Lindesmith & Levin (1937) and Taylor et al (1973) have commented on the sociology of crime during the 19th century and its eclipse by genetic and psychological theories, particularly that of Lombroso.

The Early 20th Century and the Prominence of Psychology

American psychology came on the scene prominently early in the 20th century. Three principal forces caused it to focus directly on young offenders rather than on criminals generally. The first was the identification, toward the end of the 19th century, of adolescence as a unique stage of life in terms of general plasticity and particular vulnerability to deviant behavior. The viewpoint was represented most effectively by G. Stanley Hall who, in 1904, published his encyclopedic treatment of adolescence, including an analysis of

delinquency. The second came via the intelligence-testing movement. The intelligence tests introduced by Binet and Simon were translated and popularized by Goddard and used in many comparative studies, most particularly comparisons of delinquent and nondelinquent groups.

The final impetus that brought psychology to a prominent position in the area of juvenile delinquency resulted from the efforts of the team of psychiatrist William Healy and psychologist Augusta Bronner. As stated above, the culmination of the century-long process of differentiating juvenile offenders from adult criminals came in 1899 when the first juvenile court was established. To serve the clinical needs of the youngsters handled by that court and to further research in juvenile delinquency, the Chicago Juvenile Psychopathic Institute was founded in 1909 with Healy as its director. Bronner joined him there four years later. They continued their work with juvenile offenders when they moved from Chicago to become director and assistant director of the Judge Baker Foundation in Boston.

Psychology (with the aid of psychiatry), then, had a firm grip on juvenile delinquency in the United States during the opening decades of the 20th century. In fact, that leadership, particularly of Healy and Bronner, went virtually unchallenged until the late 1920s and early 1930's (see Fink 1938; Snodgrass 1972) when the ecological formulations regarding delinquency of the Chicago school of sociology became widely known (see Shaw 1929; Shaw & McKay 1931).

The Later 20th Century and the Dominance of Sociology

But how did that challenge lead to such a complete conquest that juvenile delinquency (along with criminology generally) eventually became a subfield of sociology? [See Binder & Geis (1979), who set 1924 as the date of birth of modern criminology in the United States.] The question may be phrased more precisely in the following way: How did approaches to crime and delinquency that emphasize social causative factors and social relationships manage to achieve mastery over approaches that emphasize constructs of individual idiosyncrasies and the effects of environmental conditions on individuals? While a more extended attempt to answer questions of this sort may be found in Binder (1987c), a summary response is, first, that the work of the sociologists has been more imaginative than that of the individual-oriented scholars and, second, that the American intellectual culture is more receptive to theoretical positions that overtly blame society for an individual's (particularly a young individual's) transgressions than to those that seem to blame the individual. Related to the latter is the particular antipathy in American scholarship (and the culture generally) to notions of the born delinquent or even to the milder notion of individual predisposition toward delinquency. For particularly vehement criticisms of those and similar genetic positions,

see Lindesmith & Levin (1937), Sutherland (1951), and Taylor et al (1973), and for an interesting analysis of the relationship between the social outlook of a country and its willingness to accept formulations like "dangerous classes," see Radzinowicz (1966).

Adelson (1986, p. 44) has lamented that delinquency and criminology fall in the "territory occupied largely by sociology and such immediate neighbors as social work," and regrets the resulting diffidence of psychology. [A related position may be found in Farrington (1985), who argues that it is just as valid to focus on individual as on social factors in the prevention of delinquency.] As illustrative of the intolerance that the domination has produced, he points to the recent drubbing that Wilson & Herrnstein's (1985) *Crime and Human Nature* has received just because of its psychological orientation to explanations of crime. [Indeed, in his review of the book, the sociologist Gibbs (1985) advised sociologists with high blood pressure to approach it cautiously.] To most psychologists, the position of Wilson & Herrnstein (p. 43) that their theory of criminal behavior incorporates "both genetic predispositions and social learning" erected on the general bedrock of "modern behavioral psychology" is so obvious and simplistic that it would hardly seem worth mentioning. But an understanding of the possibility of cardiac arrest emerges when one considers the following statement, typical of those that may be found, in several variations, widely in the sociological literature: "No one is intrinsically criminal: criminality is a definition applied by individuals with the power to do so, according to illegal and extra-legal as well as legal criteria" (Turk 1969, p. 10). (Turk is a conflict theorist and was a recent president of the American Society of Criminology.) Sociologically acceptable explanations of delinquency are expected to use peer characteristics, social class, race, economic opportunities, neighborhood features, the reactive effect of the justice system, sex, and the repressive tendencies of those who make and implement the law. The use of constructs based on individual differences is not well received and may be dismissed with a deprecatory phrase like "psychologizing."

CHARACTERISTICS OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Intelligence

As stated above, Goddard introduced the Binet-Simon tests into the United States, and in the process of using them became a leading advocate of a close relationship between mental deficiency and delinquency. Among the studies mentioned in his book (1914), the percentages of the feeble-minded found among institutionalized delinquents ranged from a high of 89% to a low of 28%. By the time the sociologist Sutherland reviewed the state of knowledge of the relationship in 1931, there had been about 350 studies of the in-

telligence of delinquents in the United States. Sutherland noted that, as the tests and the testers became more sophisticated, the percentage of mental defectives in samples of institutionalized delinquents decreased. Using four periods from 1910 to 1928 he found (1931, p. 358) that the percentage of feeble-minded individuals in the median study decreased as follows: 51, 28, 21, 20. He conjectured that the downward trend would continue. Among the early problems he pointed out were the difficulty of defining just what a feeble-minded person was (some early testers defined the criterion cut-off in terms of the maximum mental age scores found in institutions for the retarded) and the likelihood that young offenders were selected for institutionalization because of their feeble-mindedness.

Several reviewers (e.g. Hirschi & Hindelang 1977; Wilson & Herrnstein 1985) remarked that Sutherland's influential negative comments led to a virtual ban in delinquency textbooks on comments about intelligence as a factor in delinquency. The reviewers noted the prestige of Sutherland within sociology as a factor in that reaction but also indicated a general receptivity in the discipline to any position that distances sociology from concepts based on individual differences.

Another milestone in the saga of intelligence and delinquency came in 1947 when Merrill reported the results of a 10-year research project that compared the characteristics of youngsters referred to a juvenile court with those of nondelinquents. On the basis of mixed results, she concluded that more delinquents referred to court are mentally defective than are school children in general, but the conclusion was presented with the following cautions: The defective child is more likely to be caught than the normal child; the defective child is less likely to have a supportive home environment, making court referral more likely; and the defective child is more likely to be a truant or school misfit, again making court referral more likely. In regard to the relationship between IQ and type of offense, one would expect forgery to be an offense of brighter youngsters, truancy and vagrancy to be offenses of duller youngsters—and Merrill so found. But most offenses involved stealing, a category where she found no relationship with IQ. [A review of studies of that era which reported on the relation between intelligence and type of crime may be seen in Metfessel & Lovell (1942).]

To illustrate other results, in their study of 105 delinquents and 105 nondelinquents who were siblings of the delinquents, Healy & Bronner (1936) found no difference in the distributions of intelligence over the two groups. However, in the three clinics where referrals by the juvenile court were sent and the research conducted, mentally defective children were not accepted. Moreover, as Hirschi & Hindelang (1977) point out, using matched siblings necessarily reduced potential differences in intelligence because of the relatively high correlation of intrafamilial intelligence. On the other hand,

Reiss & Rhodes (1961) examined over 9000 juvenile court records and found the association of IQ and offense rate to be greater than the association of rate and occupational status of head of household. A survey of research in the area by Woodward (1955) and Caplan (1965) led to the conclusion that the average IQ of delinquents was about 92—that is, about 8 points below the average of nondelinquents. But both researchers believed the difference could be accounted for by the operation of related cultural factors (particularly SES) rather than by a direct or mediated effect of intelligence.

In 1977, Hirschi & Hindelang published their important review of the literature on delinquency and intelligence and concluded (p. 576) that "IQ is related to official delinquency and that, in fact, it is as important in predicting official delinquency as social class or race." Official delinquency concerns offenses that have come to the attention of authorities—cases where action, from arrest to institutionalization, has been taken. What about the relationship of intelligence to delinquent behavior that never comes to official attention, that may never have been detected? The question moved out of the metaphysical realm as the method of assessing delinquency by the self-report method developed.

The self-report approach to assessing delinquency was introduced in a systematic manner by Short & Nye in 1957. In a questionnaire or interview a series of offenses are presented to youngsters, who indicate which offenses they have committed over a specific period. The method depends for its accuracy on two characteristics of reporting youngsters: good memory and reasonable honesty. Doubts have been expressed about both characteristics, particularly the latter in view of the phenomena being assessed (see e.g. Reiss 1975).

In general, the self-report technique has passed various tests of reliability and validity (see particularly Hindelang et al 1981), and so it provides a means of relating intelligence to delinquency without the nuisance requirements of detection and official action. To illustrate the method, Hirschi & Hindelang (1977), using data from the research of Hirschi (1969), reported percentages of youths, over five categories of intelligence, admitting two or more delinquent acts on a self-report questionnaire. Percentages decreased as intelligence rose, for white and black males separately. For whites, twice the percentage admitted two or more delinquent acts in the lowest IQ category as in the highest category. For blacks, that ratio was 3:2. Other evidence of a relationship between intelligence and self-reported delinquency may be found in West & Farrington (1977).

On the basis of the entire array of results surveyed, those that used official records as well as those that used self-report assessments, Hirschi & Hindelang (1977, p. 577) conclude that, contrary to the predominant position in sociology ("a relation between IQ and delinquency is routinely denied in

sociological textbooks”), intelligence is at least as strongly related to delinquency as are class and race (which are “the major bases of most sociological theories of delinquency”). They do not assume that IQ has a direct effect in producing delinquency but that the effect is mediated through school performance and school adjustment. Low IQ leads to poor performance in school and a concomitant poor attitude toward school, which makes the youngster more likely to commit a delinquent act. [For a challenging response in the sociological literature to the position of Hirschi & Hindelang regarding a link between intelligence and delinquency, see Menard & Morse (1984).]

Quay (1987b) agrees that there is a substantial difference (about 8 points) between the average IQs of delinquents and nondelinquents but is not convinced that the effect is mediated through the schools. After discussing several studies using Wechsler tests (primarily WISC-R) that compared delinquents and nondelinquents on the patterning of Verbal IQ, Performance IQ, and subtests of these scales, he concluded that the 8-point difference is due primarily to the inferiority of delinquents on tests requiring verbal skills. Using that conclusion and earlier findings that school failure may actually follow antisocial behavior, he argued that lower intelligence, particularly in the verbal realm, puts a child at general disadvantage in social interactions which, in turn, leads to early troublesome, and eventually, delinquent behavior. The process encourages school failure and is, in turn, exacerbated by school failure. [See also Loeber & Stouthamer-Loeber (1987) for a summary of the evidence linking IQ, educational achievement, and delinquency.]

Learning Disabilities

Wilson & Herrnstein (1985) agree that the effect of intelligence on delinquency is not mediated by school failure. They add a supporting argument with an ironic twist, namely that such special learning disabilities as dyslexia and aphasia (which, they argue, are not correlated with intelligence) produce profound levels of failure in school, without accompanying delinquency. The irony lies in the fact that the controversy regarding the relationship between learning disabilities and delinquency is almost as great as the controversy over the relationship between intelligence and delinquency.

The impetus for the assumption of a link between learning disabilities and delinquency came, according to Murray (1976), from the world of practitioners—school counselors, court psychologists, and correctional personnel—rather than from academic research. These practicing specialists observed children with serious behavior problems, including delinquency, and noted a high rate of school failure among them for reasons other than intellectual deficit. Early studies (see e.g. Mulligan 1969) did find supporting evidence for the linkage. That was the state of knowledge during the mid-1970s when the federal government took special interest in the problems of

delinquency [as discussed at various other points in this article; and see Binder (1979); Binder & Binder (1982)]. Hope that the proclaimed association would lead to a relatively easy path toward delinquency reduction (certainly easier than eliminating poverty or social class distinctions), the US Department of Justice, through its National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (NIJJDP), commissioned several approaches to examining the possibility that learning disability leads to delinquency. In addition, the General Accounting Office (GAO) took on a study of the extent of learning problems among institutionalized delinquents, the efforts of schools to identify children with learning problems, and the extent of federal involvement in the learning-problem area.

One of the recipients of NIJJDP funding, Murray (1976), conducted a careful survey of theory and knowledge on the link between delinquency and learning disabilities and concluded that the evidence supporting the link was feeble. He answered the direct federal concern as follows (p. 65). "The notion that programs to diagnose and treat learning disabilities early will actually *prevent* delinquency is not supported by any data at all." Another recipient of NIJJDP funding was the National Center for State Courts; the assignment in this case was to obtain hard empirical data. The investigators at the National Center did so in seemingly solid cross-sectional and longitudinal studies, but the published analyses and conclusions are utterly bewildering. Zimmerman et al (1981) found no difference between the learning-disabled and normal children in actual delinquent behavior, while Dunivant (1982a, 1984) concluded that learning disability significantly increased the frequency and seriousness of delinquent behavior (as evaluated by official and self-reported measures). Zimmerman et al (1981) suggested that learning-disabled children were more likely to find themselves in the arms of the juvenile justice system because of differential selection rather than different behavior, while Dunivant (1982a, 1984) argued that the greater delinquency among the learning disabled resulted directly from accompanying cognitive and social impairments. [For an attempt at resolution of the differences, see Dunivant (1982b).]

Other indications that the issue did not die with the reports of Murray (1976) and Zimmerman et al (1981), as Wilson & Herrnstein (1985) imply, is the report, based on the GAO study, of the Comptroller General of the United States to the Senate and House of Representatives (1977), and such more recent studies as Satterfield et al (1982) and Reilly et al (1985). All argue for some association between learning disability and delinquency while recognizing that a "causal" link has not yet been established. Finally, see Post (1981) and Winter (1983) for indications of how firmly entrenched the link is among lawyers and judges. According to Post (1981, p. 61), "If the conclusion reached [after psychological testing] is that the child is suffering from a

previously undetected LD, it should serve as a complete defense [in a delinquency action].”

Personality

MULTIFACTORAL APPROACHES Healy (1915) set the stage for this approach to the study of delinquency. He considered delinquency an individual phenomenon from which one could infer clusters of causes based on types but not a general theory. Accordingly, understanding required analysis of the multitude of factors that could be studied by clinical methods. [A recent derivative of that attitude may be found in Lamson (1983).]

Such an approach was followed by Healy & Bronner (1926) in their case studies of 4000 repeat juvenile offenders in Chicago and Boston. Among the “conditions directly causative of delinquency” (pp. 179–81) they listed “adolescent instability and impulses,” “extreme social suggestibility,” and “love of adventure.” Greater methodological sophistication was shown in their report (1936) comparing the case histories of 105 juvenile offenders with those of nondelinquent siblings (see above). Almost one half of the delinquents were described as hyperactive, extremely aggressive, or excessively impulsive while not a single control was so characterized. Marked differences were also found between the groups in gregariousness, ascendant tendencies, and feelings of inferiority, where a greater proportion of delinquents showed these characteristics. The most profound difference was in the area of emotional discomfort—inner stress; 91% of the delinquents as opposed to 13% showed the disturbance, leading to the conjecture it played a major role (1936, p. 121) “in the origin and growth of their delinquent tendencies.”

The Gluecks (1950, 1968, 1974) began their longitudinal study of 500 incarcerated juvenile offenders in the late 1930s. As a control group, they used a sample of nondelinquent boys matched on age, IQ, ethnic background, and residential neighborhood. Personality assessment was by psychiatric interview and the Rorschach test. They found the delinquents to be far less conventional, more assertive, more extraverted, less goal oriented, low in such feelings as anxiety and insecurity, less concerned about relations with others, more inclined to satisfy their needs immediately, and far more hostile and destructive.

Conger & Miller (1966) evaluated a large array of factors in their study of 184 delinquent boys and 184 matched nondelinquents. They used information available in school files about student behavior prior to the time personality tests were given in the tenth grade. The investigators found differences in personality between future delinquents and nondelinquents from the earliest school years. In general, the delinquents were egocentric, inconsiderate, demanding, anxious, uncooperative, and disrespectful. But, perhaps most

importantly, Conger & Miller (1966) found that the differences in personality between the two groups varied over social-class/IQ subgroupings. [For a more recent study on the relationship between teacher ratings and later delinquency see Magnusson et al (1983), where aggressiveness was the key indicator of later delinquency.]

The Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development started in 1961–1962 when 411 boys, born during the period 1951–1954 and living in a working-class area of London, were selected for study. The first report of the study appeared in 1969 (West), the second in 1973 (West & Farrington), and the third in 1977 (West & Farrington). The last of these was based on interviews and a test of social attitudes with 389 of the original group during the years 1971–1973, when the youths were 18 or 19 years of age. By the date of their interviews, 101 had an official conviction for one or more offenses. The personality characteristic that most differentiated the convicted delinquents from the other youths, in both interview and test results, was aggressiveness, even though the convictions were mostly for nonviolent offenses. While fighting was widely reported for all youths, the delinquents far exceeded the nondelinquents in fight frequency and intensity, the use of weapons, and the extent of brutality. The information obtained by interviewing and testing about aggressive behavior and attitudes among the delinquents was confirmed by official records, especially police reports. Like others in this category, West & Farrington's study evaluated many characteristics of the youths besides personality attributes, including drinking, smoking, gambling, use of illegal drugs, sexual activity, family relationships, participation in gang activities, employment, and leisure activities. Consideration of that array of features is of consequence in appreciating the importance of the following position (West & Farrington 1977, pp. 159–60): "Without in any way contradicting the importance of social and cultural factors in determining the incidence of delinquency, the results of the present study demonstrate, unfashionably but irrefutably, that the individual characteristics of the offender also play a large part."

COMPARISONS BASED ENTIRELY ON PERSONALITY TESTS In 1931, Courtial reported the results of a study in which 78 delinquent and 78 matched nondelinquent girls were compared using several objective personality tests. Courtial characterized the delinquents as more emotional, less controlled, poorly adjusted socially, and more individualistic. Studies over succeeding years led to the following conclusions: Delinquents in comparison with nondelinquents tend to be more sadistic and less compassionate (Hawthorne 1932), less mature emotionally (Durea 1937), less aware of the feelings of others (Reusser 1933), and more hyperactive in developmental history (Childers 1935). A thorough survey of personality (and other) differences between

delinquents and nondelinquents over the years 1930–1940 may be found in Metfessel & Lovell (1942).

The year 1950 was as significant in the realm of personality and delinquency as 1931 had been in the realm of intelligence and delinquency [see the discussion above of the article by Sutherland (1931)]. In 1950, the sociologists Schuessler & Cressey reviewed 25 years of assessing the personalities of criminals (including delinquents) by formal tests. They concluded that, owing to selective sampling, weaknesses in methodology, and inconsistencies of results over studies, there was no basis for inferring a contribution by personality to criminal behavior. Indeed, they argued, the distributions of personality characteristics over offender and nonoffender groups was so great that the use of personality-test results to predict delinquency was all but impossible.

The work of Schuessler & Cressey (1950) was updated in 1967 when Waldo & Dinitz published their review of studies relating criminality and personality over the years 1950–1965, and then again in 1977 when Tennenbaum published his review for the period 1966–1975. Over the three reviews, more than 100 different tests, objective and projective, were used in more than 250 studies. Particularly noteworthy among these was the work, based on the use of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) in the schools of Minnesota, reported by Hathaway & Monachesi (1953, 1957), Wirt & Briggs (1959), and Monachesi & Hathaway (1969). In two testings, one in 1948 and one in 1954, the MMPI was administered to over 15,000 children in the ninth grade. Police and court records were searched in succeeding years for the names of the youths who were tested. The results indicated that high scores on three scales of the MMPI, those measuring psychopathic deviancy, schizophrenia, and hypomania, were associated with later delinquency. See also Hindelang (1972) and Widom et al (1983)—but note that Rathus & Siegel (1980) found significant reductions in the correlations between MMPI scales and delinquency when control is introduced for the response set of faking (F scale).

There have been many other studies using the MMPI, usually along with other psychological and social information, in the prediction of delinquent behavior and its recurrence. An early review of this work was presented by Briggs & Wirt (1965); recent reviews may be found in Loeber & Dishion (1983) and Loeber & Stouthamer-Loeber (1987).

Another personality test used a good deal with delinquents is the California Psychological Inventory (CPI). Using the CPI, delinquents and delinquency-prone youths have been differentiated from nondelinquents and delinquency-resistant youths on the Responsibility and Socialization scales (see e.g. Hindelang 1972, and the comprehensive review by Laufer et al 1982).

PSYCHOLOGICALLY HOMOGENEOUS SUBGROUPS Despite the production of "interesting and conceptually meaningful results" in the comparisons of delinquent and nondelinquent personality profiles, Quay (1965b, p. 166) emphasized that "greater rewards will come from the detailed study of more homogeneous subgroups" of delinquents. Following that sort of reasoning, Jenkins & Glickman (1947) used a trait-clustering schema to divide institutionalized male delinquents on the basis of case records into three personality categories: unsocialized aggressive, socialized, and disturbed. A bit over two thirds of the youths could be placed in one or more of the categories. When other behavioral traits were correlated with categories, a consistency in configurations was obtained. Confirmation of those results came in a study by Quay (1964a) where factor analysis was used to determine clusters of traits derived from the case histories of institutionalized delinquents. Most of the variance was accounted for by three factors, called "unsocialized-psychopathic," "sub-cultural-socialized," and "neurotic-disturbed." In a similar study, using behavioral ratings by custodial officers rather than case history data, Quay (1964b) obtained comparable results, allowing for the fact that subcultural socialization was not measured by the behavioral ratings.

A third path toward the determination of clusters of personality traits among delinquents has been by means of responses to questionnaire items. In an effort of that sort, Peterson et al (1961) factor-analyzed the responses (of both institutionalized delinquents and high-school students) to a large number of questionnaire items—including 33 from the MMPI that were related to delinquency. There were two distinct personality factors found: psychopathic (basically amoral and rebellious) and neurotic (of low self-esteem with moodiness and anxiety).

Two interesting and important theoretical positions well illustrate potential ultimate products of the determination of personality constellations among delinquents. First, Jessor et al (1968) measured personality variables and interrelated them to attain summarizing constructs, measured the sociocultural environment and used the results to form social constructs, then combined individual and social constructs to test and further develop a theory of deviant behavior based primarily on social-learning principles. And second, Wilson & Herrnstein (1985) presented an elaborate theory of criminal behavior based on characteristics of individuals in the use of rewards and punishments. In their approach, a boy who gets a high score on the psychopathic deviate scale of the MMPI or a low score on the socialization scale of the CPI would be more likely to commit a criminal act because he lacked inner sources of stress or punishment (guilt) to balance potential rewards.

ATTRIBUTION OF PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS In contrast to the empirical determinations of personality constellations in the preceding sec-

tions, the attributions discussed in this section stem more or less directly from theories of behavior that range in elaboration from sets of loosely interrelated constructs to the comprehensiveness of psychoanalytic theory. Indeed the comprehensiveness of psychoanalysis has led to the attribution of a broad array of personality characteristics to juvenile offenders—e.g. they are affectionless owing to early deprivation of maternal love (Bowlby 1946), they operate under the pleasure principle in the need for immediate gratification (Friedlander 1947), they have gaps or “lacunae” in their superegos (Johnson 1959), they have an unconscious need for punishment (Glover 1960), and they have intrapsychic conflicts (Abrahamsen 1960).

Other personality characteristics that have been associated with delinquents by deduction from theoretical frameworks are: high level of impulsiveness (Wilson & Herrnstein 1985); low self-esteem (Kaplan 1980); great need for stimulation (Farley & Sewell 1976; White et al 1985); the use of a wide array of mechanisms, including hyperactivity, in the avoidance of unpleasant memories (Stott 1980); and extraversion (Eysenck 1977).

A more complete discussion of this topic may be seen in Arbuthnot et al (1987) under the heading “Univariate Personality Constructs.” Critical evaluation of the constructs derived from psychoanalytic theory is contained in Feldman (1969).

THE MORE COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES

It is interesting to note at the outset of this discussion that to account for the failure of psychological methods and principles to be accepted in mainstream crime and delinquency literature, Laufer & Day (1983b) indicated various weaknesses in theorizing by psychologists. This occurs in the introduction to a book aimed at stimulating and enhancing creative psychological theory.

Classical Conditioning

The developer and leading proponent of the approach to theory via classical conditioning is Eysenck. His theory was offered in preliminary form in 1962; more current presentations are in Eysenck (1977) and Eysenck (1983). The latter summarizes the relevant theoretical material and adds references not available at the earlier writing. Unflattering comments on the theory may be found in articles by fellow Englishmen (Farrington et al 1982; Trasler 1987).

The theory's basic premise is that conscience is produced by a process of avoidance conditioning. People like parents and teachers who are responsible for socializing children punish unacceptable (including antisocial) behavior, and the pairing leads eventually to a response of pain, fear, or anxiety to the conditioned stimulus of unacceptable behavior. The thoughts preceding the

behavior become similarly conditioned, as do related thoughts by the process of generalization. The net result is a conscience that deters an individual from engaging in certain types of behavior.

Accepting such an assumption regarding the formation of conscience, delinquency can be expected to result if a child is inadequately subjected to the conditioning contingencies or if the child is resistant to conditioning. These two alternatives provide, respectively, a social and a biological basis for delinquency. The biological structure depends on an elaboration of the theory that encompasses genetic, physiological, and personality variables. It is constructed as follows. Three major personality factors are associated with delinquent behavior: extraversion, emotional instability (or neuroticism), and psychoticism [as used by Eysenck & Eysenck (1976) to encompass such characteristics as troublesomeness, cruelty, and lack of empathy]. Personality differences, particularly along the dimension introversion-extraversion, are associated with differences in conditionability, with extraverts being more resistant to conditioning than introverts. These differences arise from lower cortical arousal and higher inhibitory reaction on the part of the extraverted. Thus delinquents tend to have a personality constellation that includes extraversion and to be more difficult to condition in the process of socialization.

Moral Development—The Cognitive Developmental Approach

Moral development theory is based on the early work of Piaget (1948) and the subsequent elaborations of Kohlberg (1976). According to the theory, there are three major levels, with two stages at each level, in the development of moral judgment: the preconventional, the conventional, and the postconventional. At the preconventional level, characteristic of nonoffenders in the age range 9–11, moral standards are understood in terms of “do” and “don’t” with accompanying reward or punishment. The conventional level represents the moral understanding of the average adolescent or adult who upholds social rules and values. Only a minority of adults reach the postconventional level where concepts like universal moral principles and abstract human rights and duties enter the picture.

Assessment is accomplished by various measures of the stage at which development has ceased for a given individual—that is, of how the individual constructs the moral aspects of the environment. Delinquency is associated with moral viewpoints that are relatively primitive (immature) on a continuum that extends from crude to very sophisticated in a developing value system emphasizing views of justice, fairness, and human rights.

But is it reasonable to assume a connection between values as expressed on a test or during an interview and actual behavior on the streets? Attempts to wrestle with this issue have included studies that compare delinquents and nondelinquents on moral stage, and studies of subgroups of delinquents where

the theory predicts a particularly high likelihood of retardation in moral development. For example, Hudgins & Prentice (1973) found that adolescents with official records exhibited a lower moral-developmental level than adolescents with no records of law violation, and Jurkovic & Prentice (1977) found that psychopathic delinquents reasoned at lower moral levels than delinquents who were not psychopathic. For summaries of research that generally affirmed the relationship between moral level and delinquency despite conflicting results, see Jennings et al (1983) and Arbuthnot et al (1987). Skepticism about this relationship, and about other aspects of the theory, may be found in Kurtines & Greif (1974), Feldman (1977), and Wilson & Herrnstein (1985).

Interpersonal Maturity

Warren (1983) presents interpersonal maturity theory as a general theory of personality development with seven levels representing progress from the immaturity (in interpersonal relations) of an infant to an ideal of full social maturity. Within each level, moreover, are a number of subtypes. The importance of the theory has not been in relating delinquency to immature levels, in the manner of moral development theory, but in providing a method for assessing appropriate intervention strategies. On the other hand, Harris (1983) does argue, with supporting evidence, for a relationship between patterns of personality identified by the Interpersonal Maturity (I-level) Classification System and delinquency, and is not willing to dismiss the possibility of some relationship between stage of maturity and delinquency [as posited by the original presenters of the theory, Sullivan et al (1957)].

Despite the considerable amount of research using the I-level system in the analysis of the personalities of delinquents (see also Werner 1975; Warren & Hindelang 1979; Heide 1983), it has become known primarily as the theoretical framework for an approach to treating juvenile offenders, initiated by the Youth Authority of California. Quay (1987c), however, in one of his arguments for thinking of delinquents in terms of patterns of behavioral subtypes rather than as a legal class, does indicate the potential value of the system in more general terms.

TREATMENT

My discussion here is restricted to cases where a youth has come into contact with the juvenile justice system for a criminal or status offense. In conformity with other parts of the review, this excludes the treatment of youths for antisocial conduct (no matter how disruptive or socially harmful) that involves no violation of law. In addition, it excludes youths who are treated for behavior that is prohibited by law but where no official action by the justice

system has been taken. The recent article by Arbuthnot et al (1987) provides broader perspective, with coverage that includes treatment of youths defined purely in psychological terms as aggressive children, behavior-disordered adolescents, impulsive children, violent adolescents, and youths with conduct problems. To complete the picture even further, Lorion et al (1987) and Snyder & Patterson (1987) have written equally comprehensive articles on the methods of primary prevention, and Moffitt (1983) has discussed deterrence in terms of a learning model of punishment.

Pre-Adjudicatory Treatment

Juvenile law typically gives police broad jurisdiction in decisions about whether or not to take a youth into custody and what to do with him or her once so taken. Taken into custody, the youth may be released without further processing by the justice system. That release is usually accompanied by an admonition for future rectitude (hence the common expression "warned and released" for the process) and may also be accompanied by referral to a mental health clinic, a child guidance clinic, a family service agency, a counseling center, or an equivalent agency. Similarly, if a juvenile is referred to court intake by the police, the intake officer (usually a probation officer) may release him or her with or without admonition and with or without referral to a treatment facility. In addition, in almost all jurisdictions the youth may be put on a program of informal supervision—informal in the sense that it is not court-ordered—where a probation officer requires certain behaviors of the youth, including regular school attendance, obedience to a curfew, and participation in a treatment program at an agency to which the youth is referred [see Binder (1983) for a summary of justice-system operations and Binder & Binder (1982) for a discussion of the constitutional questions involved in such restrictions of freedom without a court hearing].

References to the use of such informal arrangements in juvenile justice occur as early as 1904 (see Wallace & Brennan 1963), just five years after the system was established; but several developments during the 1960s led to an enormous expansion of the efforts, as discussed by Binder & Binder (1982) and Binder (1988). Uppermost among these was the report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967), which recommended increased pre-adjudicatory handling of youths by means of new service bureaus established in neighborhoods. A primary goal was to move youths out of the path that leads from arrest to court hearing in order to minimize the stigmatization that, according to labeling theory, led to the escalation of delinquent careers (see in particular Lemert 1971). Labeling theory was then at a high point in its popularity in sociology, and many sociologists were on the staff of and consultants to the Commission. Since the purpose of informal handling of youths was to divert them from the justice

system, various forms of that verb were used to describe the process, and "diversion" became the widely accepted identifying noun. The federal government, following the advice of the Commission, provided a great deal of money to further what became a diversion mandate, and the enterprise flourished.

As prime providers of treatment services, and also as leading practitioners of evaluation methodology, psychologists became leaders in juvenile diversion. Moreover, since behavior-change methods were in the ascendancy when the diversion movement was taking off during the early 1970s, they became central elements in the overall enterprise. The behavioral methods brought with them a focus on the family as change agent (see Snyder & Patterson 1987), a focus that was enhanced as family therapy approaches developed. Examples of diversion efforts using these and other methods are: Baron et al (1973), Alexander & Parsons (1973), Binder et al 1976, Binder & Newkirk (1977), Quay & Love (1977), Henderson (1980), Whitaker & Severy (1984), and Binder et al (1985).

The proliferation of diversion programs brought with it considerable concern about their effectiveness, and expression of that concern in a series of generalized evaluations based on earlier evaluation reports. Unfortunately, due perhaps in part to the fulminations of Martinson that "nothing works" in corrections (Martinson 1976), the emphasis in these evaluations has been on whether or not diversion "works" rather than on, as recommended by Palmer (1976) and Binder (1977), "what works for whom and under what conditions." The point is that diversion is an essential component in the American juvenile justice system—the system simply cannot operate without the police, probation officers, and even prosecuting attorneys having the option of seeking services for youngsters without formal court processing. If the services are to include those of a psychological sort, we need more creative contributions than those shown in the many surveys from 1975 (that of Higgins) to 1987 (that of Gottschalk et al), even when they use the latest analytic fad.

Another result of the expansion of diversion services, a result not unrelated to the one just described, was a marked and persistent reaction of antipathy toward the whole undertaking by sociologists—that is, by the very group that was so centrally responsible for the expansion in the first place. Examples of the expressions of that antipathy are the arguments that diversion programs create as much delinquency by labeling as the justice system (e.g. Bullington et al 1978) and that there is too much primary prevention in diversion efforts. [The cliché "widening the net" is used as a pejorative description of the process by people like Klein (1976), implying that referral to a center for psychological services is equivalent to keeping a youngster in the justice system.]

Why all that antipathy to what, at least on the surface, seems like a benign attempt to help youngsters? Binder & Geis (1984) have analyzed the reaction in some detail and offered several explanations. Perhaps most relevant for present purposes is their argument that diversion became largely the domain of psychology in the efforts to change individuals rather than social arrangements, a shift distasteful to sociologists. A clear demonstration of the effects of that disciplinary difference may be seen in the debate between Binder (1987b) and Decker (1987).

It does appear, however, that sociologists have been less successful in stopping modern diversion than they were in launching it. See, for example, the recently reported program evaluations of Severy & Whitaker (1984) and Davidson et al (1987), and the discussions of behavioral methods in diversion by Binder & Binder (1986) and by Binder (1988). Finally, note that a leading text on behavior therapy (O'Leary & Wilson 1987) now has a chapter on juvenile delinquency, and that much of its discussion is devoted to diversion programs.

Post-Adjudicatory Treatment

If the allegations of the petition are sustained in the adjudicatory hearing of the juvenile court (the equivalent of a finding of guilty in the criminal court), the court has several dispositional alternatives (see Binder 1983), from release to parents with a recommendation for treatment, to placement in a secure institution. Under historical juvenile court philosophy, the basis of choice was rehabilitation of the youth, but that position has been undergoing considerable change in recent years (see Wadlington et al 1983). However, whether or not the pure rehabilitative ideal is maintained (see also Binder 1984), it is clear that changing behavior will remain a central mission of post-adjudicatory processing.

TREATMENT IN THE COMMUNITY As pointed out in an earlier section of this article, focus on the treatment of young offenders in the community after referral by a court dates at least to 1909 when the Chicago Juvenile Psychopathic Institute was founded. From that time until the present, mental health clinics, child guidance clinics, family service centers, counseling centers, and similar agencies have treated adjudicated delinquents by the typical array of approaches associated with them. While behavior therapy has become most prominent on the scene in recent decades, as in the case of diversion [perhaps because behavior-change specialists tend to be academicians who must publish rather than practitioners (see Binder & Binder 1983)], virtually every conceivable approach to treatment has been used over the years. For example, a quaint guidebook for the treatment of delinquents in child guidance clinics by Davidoff & Noetzel (1951) stressed individual and

group psychotherapy with distinct psychoanalytic leanings, but encouraged such ancillary techniques as occupational therapy, social casework, and special tutoring.

In 1961, California initiated an experiment aimed at testing the effectiveness of treating in the community youngsters who had been committed to its Youth Authority (CYA) by juvenile courts (see Warren 1970). It was a true experiment in that eligible boys and girls were randomly assigned to the community program or to one of the regular institutions of CYA. The experiment was called, appropriately, the Community Treatment Project (CTP). The particular treatment approach used in the community was determined by classification on the basis of the I-level system described above. CTP was eventually run in three phases, ending in 1976 (Warren 1983). The general conclusion was that the various personality types could be treated successfully in the community but that it was important to match the personalities of youths with the characteristics of settings.

The most extensively studied, best known, and most widely copied example of behavioral intervention with adjudicated youths in a community setting is Achievement Place (see Wolf et al 1976; Kirigin et al 1982; Quay 1987d). The youngsters live in a home-like environment with surrogate parents highly trained in the methods of behavior modification. The program is based on rules and consequences, using a token economy, but residents are active in the development and governance of the project. Targeted behaviors encompass the array of maintenance, academic, social, and administrative behaviors that are expected of a youth in his or her parental home, and so treatment results are anticipated to be generalizable. While the program is often presented as a model for the effective use of behavior therapy in community settings, recent studies indicate serious questions about its long-range effect on behavior (Kirigin et al 1982) and its cost-effectiveness (Weinrott et al 1982).

TREATMENT IN CUSTODIAL INSTITUTIONS According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (1985), during each day of 1985 there were about 35,000 youths in public institutions as a result of court commitments. (Approximately another 15,000 were held in detention—that is, prior to adjudication—in equally secure facilities.) Moreover, there were almost 100,000 admissions of committed juveniles to institutions in 1984, with an average stay of just over five months. Considering that rehabilitation is the uppermost theme in juvenile justice, and that there may be a constitutionally based right to treatment for young offenders (see Rubin 1985; Binder et al 1988), the demands for psychological services among the institutionalized are clearly great.

Moreover, numbers alone do not convey the enormous difficulties of the task. To approach the actual picture of complexity, one must be aware that

several developments over the past 20 years have led to the selective institutionalization of a group of youths who are most committed to crime and who have been adjudicated for the most serious offenses. Those developments include the following, all discussed above: expansion of diversionary efforts, the opening of many residential facilities like Achievement Place (other examples are the House of Umoja, VisionQuest, and Ocean Tides), the deinstitutionalization of status offenders as a result of the 1974 federal law, and the movement of juvenile court hearings from informal to adversarial, with representation by defense attorneys (see Rubin 1985). The complexity, too, is created by the widespread appeal of substituting a "just-deserts" model for the rehabilitative emphasis that has been traditionally associated with juvenile justice. That reaction stems mostly from a widespread discouragement with the promise of 1899 (when the first juvenile court was established) that the special treatment of juveniles would lead to cures, much like those achieved by medicine with diseases. The discouragement is expressed on a general level by Martinson's (1976) position that in corrections "nothing works." Implementation of a just-deserts approach may be seen in the considerable hardening of state codes dealing with juvenile offenders, including the introduction of a punitive philosophy, the shift of original jurisdiction for offenders as young as 13 from the juvenile to the criminal court, and the increased use of waivers to the criminal court even when original jurisdiction is with the juvenile court (see Flicker 1977; Davis 1980).

Quay (1987d) assessed, for juvenile corrections, the validity of the general disillusionment with treatment in institutions. In the process, he reviewed several approaches, including the use of I-level classification as the basis for assigning treatment, and their evaluations. He pointed out, as indeed several others had pointed out previously, that the issue of treatment effectiveness was unresolved because of the lack of program integrity and inadequacy of design in many of the evaluations. Moreover, he emphasized, as did Binder (1977) in the area of diversion, that many youths in institutions are being treated, and will continue to be treated, regardless of continuing outcries that nothing works. The task for psychologists is to analyze the components in the total treatment program, which includes informal staff-client interactions as well as such formal methods as Transactional Analysis, Guided Group Interaction, and Reality Therapy, and to evaluate their differential effectiveness over clients. See Ross & Gendreau (1980) and Palmer (1984) for detailed arguments about the importance of differential treatment over clients and settings.

CONCLUDING STATEMENT

Instead of a summary of previously reported material, as is usually expected at this point in a review, this concluding statement will provide a summary of

important material that was not reported above. One important omission is the empirical theory that relates constitutional factors to juvenile delinquency. What many may consider a domain that died with Lombroso, Hooton, the Gluecks, and Sheldon is actually very much alive. For example, constitutional elements occur in the theoretical positions of Eysenck (1977) and Wilson & Herrnstein (1985), and are central to the theoretical position of Cortés & Gatti (1972). Moreover, Hartl et al (1982) have presented an empirical study that strongly supports the importance of somatotype in the determination of delinquency (and to the modes of treating delinquents).

The second major omission involves biological explanations of delinquent behavior. The efforts range from twin studies aimed at the genetics of delinquency (e.g. Christiansen 1977) to studies of sex chromosome abnormalities (e.g. Kahn et al 1976) and psychophysiological reactivity (e.g. Siddle et al 1976). Comprehensive summaries of theory and research in these areas may be seen in Shah & Roth (1974), Shah (1976), Mednick & Christiansen (1977), and Trasler (1987); a bibliographic listing of biological (and other) factors in delinquency is offered in Denno & Schwartz (1985).

Finally, I did not attempt to integrate the theories of sociologists into the discussion even when there are strong psychological elements in those theories. That includes such diverse efforts as the expression of Sutherland's differential association theory in the terms of operant conditioning (Burgess & Akers 1966) and the synthesis of Hirschi's social control theory and social learning (Conger 1976).

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