PHILLY-FinalD678

Week 8, Reading Section 8.1: Introduction

I. Introduction

As an Introduction to Philosophy course will indicate, two of the greatest Philosophers were Plato and Aristotle. They asked all the right questions, and the rest of us have been providing footnotes, ever since. They were the initial, systematic theorists of Ethics and Moral Philosophy. They also argued in favor of Reason, over Emotions in making such decisions.

They based their ethical theories on certain habitual forms of behavior, they termed “virtues.” These were Knowledge and Wisdom, which Aristotle termed “intellectual virtues,” and Courage and Temperance, which he termed “moral virtues.”  An overall virtue is Justice. Another virtue is Compassion.

Week 8, Reading Section 8.2: Plato, Aristotle & Virtue, and Kant

II. Plato, Aristotle & Virtue, and Kant

Plato and Aristotle, each, had his own way of determining the definition of Virtue. Plato argued it was found in the Ideal Plane, in his Theory of the Forms. We need not go into that, here, in more depth, due to time, and due to one fact: it is Aristotle’s way of defining Virtues that has dominated the literature. His definition is multi-layered: (1) Virtue is Habitual,(2) based on the Mean between Extremes, (3) resulting in one’s leading The Good Life. For example, Courage was the Mean between foolhardiness and cowardice. Wisdom was the Mean between “know-it-all-ism” and Ignorance, etc. Habit is learned behavior, repeated, usually without thinking.

One conceptual difficulty with Aristotle’s theory is that it is circular. This can be illustrated by the following example. How do we know a “good” or “bad” person? By actions? So, a “good” person does “good” things, etc. John does “good” things; thus, John is a “good” person. But here’s where the circularity problem emerges: A “good” person does “good” things, etc. So, John  will do “good” things, because he is a “good” person, and we know he’s a “good” person, because he does “good” things.

Here are two conceptual problems with this. First, we do not have flawless, absolute Knowledge of  all  of John’s actions. Thus, for the times for which we have NO Knowledge, he might have done “bad” things. We just don’t know. Therefore, we must rely on “faith,” which, regrettably, is often “let down.”  We can’t know John is always a “good” person.

Second, we know “good” people do “bad” things, and vice versa. Does doing a “bad” thing render a “good” person “bad” and vice versa? The problem, ultimately, lies in the premise Aristotle made, which is that a person’s moral persona is made up his/her actions, only.

Nevertheless, this is Aristotle’s Theory. People, based on their Reason, should follow a Moderate, or Middle, course, by Habit. And the types of ways in which they may act, in certain contexts, are called Virtues: Knowledge, Wisdom, Temperance, Courage, Justice, and Compassion, though the first five he considered more important than Compassion.

Many centuries later, Immanuel Kant, as we have seen, addressed Ethics and Moral Philosophy. He agreed with Plato and Aristotle that Ethics should be based on Reason, rather than Hume’s Compassion-(Emotion-)based approach. But he disagreed with them on “Virtue,” in the form they conceptualized it. He argued against “habitual,” unthinking, and repetitious behavior. For an action to be moral, the Actor had to be aware of a Moral Duty/Imperative and had to identify what that Imperative was, using his Categorical Imperative.  Thus, he identified Absolute principles, as the style in which moral decisions should be made. Kant’s work has dominated Moral Philosophy discourse ever since. . . until the next section. 

Week 8, Reading Section 8.3: Recent Users of “Virtue”

III. Recent Users of “Virtue”

A funny thing happened on the way to the Twenty-first Century. . . During the Very Late-1960s and 1970s, corporate and government scandals hit the United States, once again. Lockheed, Watergate, ITT, and a number of others occurred, indicating that corporate and government ideologues had been caught, “doing bad things,” because “ends justified means.”  Since Kant’s approach was inherent in our ethical, moral, and legal discourses, many such folks went to governmentally-supported “grey-rock hotels,” for a while. . .

In response to these developments, first in the so-called “elite,” Graduate Business schools around the country, and, later, within corporate and ideological circles, a renewed interest in “virtue” appeared. These advocates, such as William Bennett, calling themselves, Virtue Ethicists, argued for a new approach, because they claimed that there were  too many, possible moral/ethical principles and choices . It was too confusing knowing what one should do. They also complained that Kant was too rigid, given to Absolutes, rendering him unrealistic and impractical in application. (British Philosopher W.D. Ross, a Post-Kantian thinker, though faithful to Kant, solved this problem, by providing his refinements of “ A priori ” duties and of resolution of conflict among competing “A priori ” duties in a situation.)

Rather, loosely based on Plato’s and Aristotle’s concepts of “Virtue,” these new advocates, including Bennett, argued that, to know what the right thing to do was, all one had to do was look at the situation, and ask: “What would the virtuous person do?” So, one would be “courageous,” if it were called for. Or one would be “wise,” if it were called for, and so on.

That all sounds plausible, until one looks at their underlying discourse, which had argued against principles. One is left with the question of standards. How does one know what courage, etc. are, without standards or basic principles? A more skeptical observer might conclude that these new “virtuecrats” did not  like  the prior principles they claimed were too numerous and confusing, and wanted to put down  their own  terms of the discourse, thus controlling it. When is a “principle”  not  a “principle”? When I say it’s not. . . And I claim it’s a “virtue.” A cynic might go farther, reflecting that Virtue Ethics came down to two rules: (1) Do what looks good in public; and (2) do what you want to, behind closed doors, so long as you can get away with it. . . .

To be fair, the Virtue Ethics folks rely on the “old virtues,” as discussed, above, to guide moral decision-making.  These are: Knowledge, Wisdom, Justice, Courage, Temperance/ Moderation, and Compassion. And, undeniably, those are good. Some folks in this field are, no doubt, sincere in their pursuits of the Old Virtues, but the difficulties cannot be denied. . .

And with the flowering of the Virtue Ethics school. . . along came the 1980s’ scandals and those of the Early-2000s. And 2008. . . Can we spell E-N-R-O-N, W-O-R-L-D-C-O-M, T–Y-C-O, or S-E-C?  And we’re sure glad you got a light sentence, Martha; we all missed you!. . . . Can I interest anyone in a “sub-prime, adjustable rate” mortgage, no strings attached?. . .

For the remainder of the Week, please reflect on the other theories that we have seen during the course. It could  be that, in reflecting upon, (re-)constructing, revising, or modifying your own systems of ethics/morals, you find that you want to pick various elements from all of them. . . That is alright, too. . . That is called Freedom of Thought. . .