Week 8 Article 1

Criminal Justice Policy Review 24(6) 716 –734

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461502CJP24610.1177/0887403412461502Crim inal Justice Policy ReviewMarion and Oliver

1University of Akron, Akron, OH, USA 2Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX, USA

Corresponding Author: Willard M. Oliver, Sam Houston State University, College of Criminal Justice, PO Box 2296, Huntsville, TX 77341, USA. Email: [email protected]

Going Symbolic: Presidential Use of Symbolic Rhetoric in Crime Control Policy

Nancy E. Marion1 and Willard M. Oliver2

Abstract

Research into the American Presidents’ role in crime control policy has consistently found that they rely on symbolic rhetoric in their crime speeches. The research to date, however, has been confined to qualitative analysis and has not attempted to explain why presidents engage in symbolic rhetoric when it comes to crime policy. This study assesses presidential speeches related to crime from 1948 through 2010, and employs logistic regression to estimate the effects of the independent variables on the likelihood presidents will employ symbolic rhetoric. Findings suggest public opinion, presidential election year, party affiliation, and divided government, are significant factors in the likelihood presidents will engage in symbolic politics. The article concludes with a discussion of the study’s implication for the larger body of research on presidential crime rhetoric and the federal role in crime control.

Keywords

crime control policy, executive branch, policy implications

The only thing we could do was to exercise vigorous symbolic leadership . . . With the president and attorney general as spokesmen, we could elevate the issue of crime to the level of the president.

Donald Santarelli, former Nixon Advisor

There is a general consensus that crime, as a presidential policy issue, began with President Herbert Hoover and rose to prominence with the Johnson/Goldwater debates of 1964 (Beckett & Sasson, 2000; Calder, 1993; Caplan, 1973; Cronin, Cronin, &

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Milakovich, 1981; Finckenauer, 1978; Marion 1994a, 2011; Scheingold, 1991, 1995). Whether this is a policy issue in which the federal government should be involved has been debated (Cronin et al., 1981; Dilulio, Smith, & Saiger, 1995; Heymann & Moore, 1996; Zimring & Hawkins, 1996), however, suffice it to say, crime policy is now a fixed policy area of the American presidency. So much so that, like the domestic pol- icy concept of an environmental presidency (Daynes & Sussman, 2010; Soden, 1999) or an economic presidency (Dolan, Frendreis, & Tatalovich, 2007), one author has dubbed this particular focus on crime policy as the “law & order presidency” (Oliver, 2003). Presidents have, since Johnson it would seem, used their political capital to influence both the public and Congress to obtain legislative victory in the area of crime control policy.

The primary means by which presidents engage the public and Congress on crime policy, or any policy for that matter, is through the power of speech (Cohen, 1997; Light, 1998), or, as President Theodore Roosevelt referred to it, the power of the Bully Pulpit (Strock, 2003). In more modern times, this power of speech has been called the Rhetorical Presidency (Ceaser, 1985; Ceaser, Thurow, Tulis, & Bessette, 1981; Tulis, 1987) and there is a wide-ranging body of research assessing the presidents’ ability to influence the public and Congress through this medium (Cohen, 1987; Kernell, 2006; Light, 1988). The primary method for assessing the rhetorical presidency has been through analyses of presidential speeches, assessing a president’s use of substantive or symbolic speech-making. In substantive policy making speeches, presidents offer tan- gible policy solutions, administrative and economic commitment, or guidance to bureaucratic agencies (Hinckley, 1990; Marion, 1994). In symbolic political speeches, presidents use rhetoric “in which the specific object referred to conveys a larger range of meaning, typically with emotional, moral, or psychological impact” (Hinckley, 1990, p. 7). As Hinckley (1990) points out, “this larger meaning need not be indepen- dently or factually true, but will tap ideas people want to believe in as true” (p. 7). It should also be noted that often presidents will mix their substantive policy making speeches, with symbolic references, but rarely does it work the other way.

Research in the area of federal crime control policy has found that beginning with President Herbert Hoover, presidents have widely employed the use of symbolic rhetoric (Calder, 1993). Whether on the campaign trail (Marion & Farmer, 2003; Marion & Oliver, 2012), in their executive orders (Oliver, 2001), or in their budgetary requests to Congress (Caldeira, 1983; Calderia & Cowart, 1980; Oliver & Marion, 2006, 2009), presidents engage in symbolic rhetoric when it comes to crime policy. Furthermore, in more specific crime policy areas, such as drug policy, presidents are found to engage in symbolic rhetoric (Hawdon, 2001), and an assessment of one spe- cific presidency, William J. “Bill” Clinton, research has found a pervasive use of sym- bolic speech-making related to crime (Marion, 1997). While knowing that presidents do engage in this type of rhetoric on crime is important, the reasons why they do so can have a significant impact on crime policy in America.

Crime is a highly salient issue, and presidents can draw on the rhetoric of crime to gain public support and legislative victory when the saliency of crime rises by engaging

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the problem and appearing to be tough on crime (Beckett, 1997; Marion, 1994a). In the extreme, presidents can use the power of the bully pulpit to create an issue where one does not necessarily exist. Known in the literature as creating moral panics (Garland, 2008; Hawdon, 2001), these have been evidenced in such issues as the day care abuse panic of the early 1980s (De Young, 2004), the drugs wars of the 1990s (Hawdon, 2001), and more recently, homeland security in the 2000s (Costanza & Kilburn, 2005). Still more vile is the suggestion that presidents may use the rhetoric of crime as a veiled subterfuge for racism and the enactment of racist policies such as the 100-to-1 disparity in crack versus powder cocaine (Alexander, 2012; Chambliss, 1994; Tonry, 2011; Unnever & Gabbidon, 2011). Clearly then, presidential rhetoric plays a role in the construction of crime policy in America, and many of these policies have resulted in mass incarceration, a highly punitive criminal justice system and ever- growing punitive juvenile justice system, greater community surveillance, and simply put—a number of failed policies (Beckett & Sasson, 2000; Hagan, 2010; Pratt, 2009; Simon, 2007; Tonry 2006).

As much of the rhetoric presidents engage in on crime policy is symbolic in nature, aimed at raising the saliency of the crime issue, understanding this use of symbolic rhetoric is important and has crime policy implications. While we do know from previ- ous research that presidents engage in symbolic rhetoric when it comes to crime con- trol policy (Marion, 1994a, 1994b), what we do not seem to know is why? What are those factors that cause presidents to engage in symbolic rhetoric, rather than sticking to more substantive language. Building on the past qualitative work of Marion (1994a, 1994b), this study employs quantitative methods for the first time (logistic regression), to assess why presidents go symbolic.

Symbolic Rhetoric, Presidents, and Crime Control Edelman (1964; see also 1971, 1988) was the first to write extensively on the issue of symbolic politics. He argued that every political action evokes a particular response in the receiving audience (Edelman, 1964). While some political actions result in tangible outcomes for some groups, other actions simply serve to educate, placate, or obfuscate. In other words, every action by a politician has a meaning and intent, which may be viewed as either a threat or as a reassurance (Stolz, 1983, 1992, 2007). Those actions that are intended to reassure the public that their elected officials are con- cerned with the opinions and feelings of the voters are labeled as symbolic policies (Edelman, 1964). They serve to restore the public’s confidence in elected officials that action is being taken to solve a problem and thereby induce a feeling of well-being on the part of the public. Thus symbolic policies have a reassurance function by making people feel good that their election officials are reacting to their concerns.

In the end, however, symbolic policies do not result in significant change. They are often lacking or devoid of policy substance (Shull & Ringelstein, 1989), are often not enforced (Gusfield, 1963, 1967; Oliver & Marion, 2008), and do not deliver what they promise, or seem to deliver (Anderson, 1990). As described further by Edelman

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(1964), symbolic language provides “well-publicized attention to a significant prob- lem which is never solved” (pp. 38-39). As a result, the public’s perceptions of, and reaction to, the symbolic act is more important than the content itself (Stolz, 2007). This means that when it comes to symbolic policies and action, the actual implementation of the act is less important than the fact that the act was proposed (Stolz, 1999, 2007).

Beyond the reassurance function, symbolic actions serve other functions as well. One of those is a moral educative function, whereby the laws reflect the moral consen- sus of society (Stolz, 2007). Through symbolic action, the message about what is acceptable behavior is relayed to members of society. In turn, those who are law abid- ing have their behaviors reinforced, as people associate negative consequences, such as punishment, with bad behaviors (Durkheim, 1964; Light, 1998; Marion, 1994b; Oliver & Marion, 2008; Stolz, 2007). Another function of symbolic policies is they serve to simplify complex problems and make them easy for the populace to under- stand (Edelman, 1964; Stolz, 2007). This can take a highly complex issue such as civil rights and present clear and simple solutions to intractable problems (Gusfiled, 1963; Shull & Ringelstein, 1989). Still further, symbolic rhetoric can oversimplify a problem by distorting it and making its resolution seem far easier to resolve than it is in reality (Stolz, 2007). Finally, Edelman (1964) also argued that symbolic language helps to maintain public order because people are content and pleased with the actions (lan- guage) of the policy makers. That maintaining the public order has direct relevance to the issue of crime control.

The first to apply the concepts of symbolic politics to a crime control issue was Gusfield (1963, 1967) in his study of the laws pertaining to Prohibition which he dubbed the symbolic crusade. In this study, he demonstrates that federal legislation outlawing the production and shipping of alcohol had elements of symbolism because it served to satisfy the Protestant White middle class by reaffirming their perceived dominance over recent immigrants, while the enforcement of the laws themselves were mostly ignored at the state and local level, and marginally enforced at the national level. Similarly, Galliher and Walker (1977) demonstrate that the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was largely symbolic for many of the same reasons. They explain that when the federal drug law was passed, every state already had created laws to outlaw the possession of the drug, and the federal mechanism was not interested in enforcing the new law. Hagan (1983) summarizes it best, when he explains that “symbolic consid- erations are important not only to the passage but also to the enforcement of law, particularly during periods of social and political change and conflict” (p. 31).

One researcher, Stolz (1983, 1985, 1992, 1995, 1999, 2005, 2007), has done exten- sive research into Congressional use of symbolic politics as it relates to crime control. In regard to the death penalty, she found Congress used symbolic rhetoric to reassure the public that something is being done to punish offenders, but in reality, executions are rarely carried out and does little to deter violent crime (Stolz, 1983). In another study, Stolz (1992) provides evidence that the federal war on drugs (in particularly the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988) are merely symbolic politics for the laws serve to reassure the public that Congress was addressing the nation’s drug problem

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but that none of the laws truly worked toward solving the drug problem in the nation. Similar studies of the Violence Against Women Act (Stolz, 1999) and the Anti-Human Trafficking laws (Stolz, 2007), have demonstrated similar symbolic functions.

Other researchers have also found that many aspects related to crime control policy have no substantive function but primarily serve as a symbolic action to the issue of crime. McCoy’s (1996) study of the exclusionary rule laws, the language related to crime as found in political party platforms (Bridgmon, & Bridgmon, 2010; Oliver & Marion, 2008, 2010), and community sex offender notification laws (Sample, Evans, & Anderson, 2011), all serve primarily a symbolic function, rather than a substantive or tangible function. While Stolz (1983, 1985, 1992, 1995, 1999, 2005, 2007) clearly shows Congress engages in symbolic politics, additional research has found that state legislatures (Galliher & Cross, 1982) and Governors (Marion, Smith, & Oliver, 2009) also employ symbolic politics when it comes to crime policy. Nowhere, however, is there more evidence of symbolic politics being employed than in the extensive research related to American presidents.

Research on presidential rhetoric indicates that presidents use political rhetoric to influence both Congress and the public (Edwards & Wood, 1999). The primary object of influencing the public is to build support for their policy proposals to influence Congress, thus creating a feedback loop. The primary objective, however, is to have Congress pass president-supported legislation, for one of the marks of a successful president is legislative victory (Kernell, 2006; Light, 1998). As presidential rhetoric is the primary means by which presidents can influence the public and Congress, the majority of the research in this area analyzes what the president says in his policy- making speeches (Ceaser, 1985; Ceaser et al., 1981; Light, 1998).

Research into the rhetorical presidency tends to divide the speeches into two cate- gories, symbolic (Ceasar, 1985; Ceasar, Thurow, Tulis, & Bessette, 1981; Elder & Cobb, 1983; Hart, 1987; Hinckley, 1990; Tulis, 1987) and substantive (Kessel, 1974, 1977; Light, 1998). Some researchers have argued that the dichotomous approach is disingenuous for the fact that much of the presidents’ speech-making does not take an either/or approach, but rather employs both types of speech (Kemp, 1981; Marshall, 1993). Regardless, there are clear signs that presidents engage in symbolic politics when it comes to policy making (Hinckley, 1990; Light, 1998) and these can be very potent political forces (Cohen, 1997; Edelman, 1964; Elder & Cobb, 1983).

Cohen (1997), in his study of both types of presidential rhetoric, found that presi- dents are less responsive to public opinion when the political rhetoric is substantive in nature. When their speeches are purely symbolic, however, presidents tends to be highly responsive to public opinion. In other words, presidents tend to employ sub- stantive rhetoric when they are pushing for a specific policy of their own. When the president has no specific policy, he tends to engage in symbolic rhetoric, telling the public what they want to hear. This is often the case with highly intractable problems that the president has difficulty in either controlling or finding solutions that satisfy the larger electorate, such as civil rights (Cohen, 1997; Shull & Ringelstein) or crime (Edwards & Wood, 1999; Scheingold, 1991, 1995).

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One of the first to point out the presidential use of symbolic politics while engaging in crime policy was Cronin et al. (1981), when they noted that both “presidents and would-be presidents used the crime issue for short-term political advantage” (p. 170). More bluntly, referring to the Johnson and future Nixon Administrations, they con- cluded that “crime in the streets as a national issue was manufactured [emphasis in original] and milked by presidential candidates, who began a sorry stream of symbolic politics rather than attending to practicalities and management in the war on crime” (Cronin et al., 1981, p. 170). Scheingold (1984, 1991) quickly followed with his own argument that politicians use street crime as a powerful symbol, because of its salient nature and ease in defining a clear-cut enemy, creating an us versus them strategy for crime control policy (p. 172). More specifically, Scheingold (1991) explains that “the politicization of crime is frequently a symbolic exercise without serious policy intentions—particularly at the national level” (p. 181). More specifically, he states it is the American president who has the greatest influence, so much so, that in another article he suggests that presidential rhetoric on crime has an influence on the public salience of crime (Scheingold, 1995).

At about the time Scheingold (1995) put forth this hypothesis, research was already beginning to bear out his ideas. Marion (1994a), in her qualitative study of political rhetoric employed by presidents from Kennedy to Clinton, found evidence that sug- gested presidents engage in symbolic language for very specific reasons. Presidents use the crime issue to enhance their electability, their popularity, and their influence over both the public and Congress. They use this rhetoric to demonstrate they are doing something about the crime problem, to educate the public on their preferred policies, to simplify complex problems, and to avoid making policy commitments they may not be able to keep. In sum, presidents from Kennedy to Clinton were found to engage in symbolic rhetoric when it came to the issue of crime.

Further research has suggested some of the nuances and outcomes regarding presi- dents’ use of symbolic rhetoric when it comes to the crime issue. There is evidence to suggest that presidents employ symbolic rhetoric on crime in their campaign speeches (Marion & Farmer, 2003; Marion & Oliver, 2012), executive orders (Oliver, 2001), and in their budgetary requests to Congress (Caldeira, 1983; Calderia & Cowart, 1980; Oliver & Marion, 2006, 2009), with the affect of influencing both the public and Congress. While these studies suggest that presidents are successful in employing symbolic rhetoric in their crime speeches, one specific area of crime policy that has been extensively research is drug policy.

One researcher, Hawdon (2001), found that presidents, through their political lan- guage, can incite moral panics as found in his assessment of presidential rhetoric related to the war on drugs (see also Jensen, Gerber, & Mosher, 2004), while Stolz (1995) found that the establishment of the position of Drug Czar in the Office of the White House served primarily as a symbolic reassurance to the public when it came to addressing the drug problem in America. Recent research (Whitford & Yates, 2003, 2009), has focused on presidential rhetoric and its ability to influence the public agenda in constructing the war on crime, finding that “presidents use symbolic rhetoric to position themselves as protectors of vulnerable populations (like children) and

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repudiators of threatening and disfavored target populations (such as drug addicts and drug kingpins)” (Whitford & Yates, 2009, p. 159).

When it comes to crime policy in America, the evidence would seem to suggest fairly clearly that presidents engage in symbolic rhetoric. While the primary purpose is perhaps to influence the public and Congress, what has not been explored in the research to date is why or, perhaps more specifically, under what circumstances do presidents choose to engage in symbolic rhetoric. We know that presidents use both types of rhetoric when it comes to crime—symbolic and substantive—and that in many cases they employ both. But what are those factors that influence a president to engage in a purely symbolic speech on crime? Understanding this process of presiden- tial decision making is important for understanding why and how presidents engage in crime control policy in America, for federal crime control policy has come to play a major role in criminal justice policy in the United States. Understanding how (and why) crime policy is made at the national level is critical to our understanding of the types of crime policy we see coming out of Washington, D.C.

Therefore, this study intends to begin filling in this gap in the literature by assessing why presidents choose to engage in symbolic crime control policy rhetoric. The pres- ent study assesses presidential speeches, from 1948 through 2010, related to crime, and codes them as consisting of either substantive and mixed rhetoric or entirely sym- bolic speeches. Thus, using this coding as a dichotomous dependent variable, it will employ logistic regression to estimate the effects of the independent variables on the likelihood that presidents will engage in wholly symbolic crime rhetoric.

Method Data

This study employed multiple sources for the dependent variable, regarding presi- dential speeches related to crime. The primary source came from The American Presidency Project (2011), which has all of the presidential papers available online in an electronically searchable archive. Other sources, for cross verification, included the U.S. Government Printing Office (2011), which maintains some of the public papers online, and finally, physical copies of the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States were also used. The American Presidency Project (2011) also provided addi- tional information regarding the President as well as Congress. Additional sources included the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports (1949-2011), the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011), Gallup Poll’s “Most Important Problem” indicator (Gallup, 1949-2011), and the H.W. Wilson database for the Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature.

Dependent Variable Using the databases related to the public papers of the presidents described above, a search was conducted to find every presidential speech from 1948 through 2010

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related to crime. Although Hoover is considered the starting point for engaging in crime control policy (Calder, 1993), data limitations constrained the start date to 1948, the beginning of the post–World War II and modern era. The key words that were used to represent crime consisted of the following search terms: law, rights, justice, prohibition, corruption, jury, enforcement, prison, criminal, police, courts, pornogra- phy, obscenity, polygamy, lynching, gangs, immigration, judge, crime, narcotics, guns, drugs, judiciary, and violence. Each speech was then reviewed to ensure it mentioned the issue of crime and was then entered into a database by the date and title to avoid further duplication. Additional data was entered noting the type of speech (e.g., news conference, special message, State of the Union, etc.), the crime subjects detailed in the speech, as well as the total number of words dedicated to discussing the crime issue. The final database, ranging from January 1, 1948 to December 31, 2010, consisted of 4,119 crime-related speeches.

Each speech was then read to assess whether the president used substantive/mixed language, or whether the speech was entirely symbolic. Symbolic rhetoric is language that is devoid of any specific policy proposals or rhetoric pertaining to current legisla- tive efforts. They are designed to demonstrate action on the part of the president and elicit an emotive response from the audience. For instance, when a president speaks of adding “100,000 cops” to the streets through a grant program, that type of rhetoric is labeled substantive. When a president speaks about getting “tough on crime” and “winning the war on drugs,” that rhetoric is labeled symbolic.

Speeches were assessed by word count and the percentage of the speech that employed symbolic language. Only speeches reported to be 100% symbolic were coded as a 1 in the database for symbolic, all other speeches were coded as a 0, thus creating a dichotomous dependent variable. The lead author also took the lead on data collection for the presidential variable. When completed, 10% of the final database speeches were randomly selected by the second author and recoded for comparison. An intercoder reliability of .98% was found between the lead and second author in identifying a speech as symbolic or substantive/mixed, leading the authors to accept the reliability of the coding scheme.

Independent Variables The president-related variables in this study consisted of presidential election year, first year in office, presidential popularity, congressional election year, and divided government. Each of these variables, like the presidential speeches, were also obtained from The American Presidency Project (2011). It has often been argued that during a presidential election year, presidents will engage in more symbolic rhetoric to avoid making many policy proposals (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000; Light, 1998; Marion, 1994b; Oliver, 1998). Therefore, it is hypothesized that presidents will more likely engage in symbolic crime rhetoric in an election year. This variable was coded as a 1 = presidential election year and 0 = not a presidential election year. Additionally, presidents in their first year in office tend to experience a “honeymoon” period and

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have more latitude in the policies in which they engage, thus giving them the ability to engage in symbolic rhetoric by not having to make as many substantive policy proposals (Light, 1998). In this case, the first year in office variable is coded as 1 = first year in office and 0 = not first year in office.

Researchers have also found that both presidential party and popularity can play a role in how presidents engage the public and Congress in their speeches (Kernell, 2006; Light, 1998; Lowi, 1985; Ragsdale, 1998). It has generally been argued that crime is a Republican policy issue, and one in which they are more likely to engage in symbolic rhetoric (Cronin et al., 1981; Scheingold, 1991). Thus, for the purposes of this study, the presidential party variable was coded as 1 = Republican and 0 = Democrat. In regard to the popular presidents variable, it has been found that popular presidents are more likely to have influence over the public and Congress, and may be able to push more policy proposals, but it has also been found that they can avoid engaging in commitments, or substantive policy making, because their symbolic speeches are well received because of their popularity (Kernell, 2006; Light, 1998). Hence, it is hypothesized that the higher the favorable popularity ratings, the more likely presidents are to engage in symbolic rhetoric. This variable uses the monthly favorable rating (The American Presidency Project, 2011).

Two other variables have to do with the relationship between the president and Congress. The framers established Congressional elections in the middle of a presi- dential term, thus creating the potential for a dynamic change midway through a presi- dent’s term in office. Speeches and rhetoric on the part of the president tend to lean more symbolic during this year as a reaction to the Congressional election. In this case, the variable is coded 1 = Congressional election year and 0 = not a Congressional elec- tion year. The other variable is the difference between unified and divided govern- ment. Presidents, when their party aligns with both chambers of Congress, have far more latitude to engage in substantive policy making. However, when one or both of the chambers of Congress differ from the party of the president it is more difficult to obtain passage of legislation causing presidents to employ symbolic rhetoric as a means of coping (Brace & Hinckley, 1992; Davidson, 2000; Mayhew, 1991). For the purposes of this study, the divided government variable is coded as 1 = divided gov- ernment, where at least one chamber is controlled by the opposition party, and 0 = unified government.

The four other variables for this study are crime, media, public opinion, and unem- ployment. It is anticipated that each of these will have an impact on the president for choosing whether to engage in substantive or symbolic rhetoric having to do with crime. It is hypothesized that as the crime rate increases, when media reporting on crime rises, when public concern for crime being the most important problem facing the country rises, and when the unemployment rate increases, presidents will engage in more symbolic crime rhetoric as a response.

The crime variable uses annual Part 1 Index crimes per 100,000 population and is measured as the rate of change from 2 to 1 year prior to the speech according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports (1949-2011). Unfortunately,

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monthly crime rates do not exist, therefore, this study had to use the annual rate of change rather than the monthly measure, which would have complimented the unit of analysis for this study. The media variable is measured as the number of crime articles in major American periodicals, in the month previous to the speech, as measured by the Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature, which has been found to be a highly reli- able indicator of media attention and is highly correlated to the New York Time Index (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). The public opinion variable is measured by the Gallup Poll’s “Most Important Problem Facing the Country” survey question in which the responses related to crime (e.g., crime, violence, illicit drugs, gangs, narcotics, gun control, etc.) are totaled for the percentage reporting the issue of crime to be of con- cern. The percentage reported in the month prior to the speech, or the closest percent- age reported up to 6 months prior to the speech is utilized. Finally, the unemployment variable is measures as the unemployment rate in the month prior to the speech, as measured by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011).

Analytic Strategy Descriptive statistics were generated for all of the variables used in the study. These initial analyses present an overview of the variables and reveal basic data characteris- tics. For the dichotomous variables, the n and percentage are presented for each cat- egory, and for continuous variables, the mean and standard deviations are presented. Bivariate analysis was then conducted for diagnostic purposes to check for multicol- linearity (Menard, 2002). Next, logistic regression was used to estimate the effects of the independent variables (Congressional election, crime rates, divided government, first year in office, media, party, popularity, presidential election, public opinion, and unemployment) on the likelihood of a president employing symbolic rhetoric (Menard, 2002, 2009; Pampel, 2000).

Finally, it should be noted that for the purposes of this study, the odds ratio was then recalculated, yielding a partially standardized effect. It is assumed in logistic regression that the “b” coefficients, which represent an increase or decrease in the log odds, are inappropriate for interpretive purposes. Using the formula (b)(S) where the “b” coefficient is multiplied by the standard deviation of the predictor, it yields a par- tially standardized variable that is appropriate for interpretation (Menard, 2004). This is because all of the independent variables are regressors of the same dependent vari- able, thus allowing the effects to be ranked by strength (Menard, 2002, 2004, 2009; Pampel, 2000). It should also be noted that this can only be done on valid cases where there is no missing data. In this study, that requirement was met.

Findings Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for all of the variables employed in the study. In assessing the categorical variables in the study, descriptive statistics demonstrate that for the 4,119 crime speeches delivered from 1948 through 2010, approximately

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one third of these speeches were symbolic (31.4%), while the majority were either substantive or mixed speeches (68.5%). Most of these speeches were delivered out- side of the presidents’ first year in office (81.2%), meaning that a only a small per- centage of the total number of symbolic crime speeches were delivered in the presidents’ first year in office (18.7%). The percentage of symbolic speeches increases when assessing speeches delivered in election years (32.3%) and further increases to over half of all symbolic speeches when assessing speeches delivered in a Congressional election year (58.8%). The majority of the symbolic speeches were also found to have been delivered when presidents faced divided government (73.0%).

In assessing the continuous variables in the study, presidential popularity had a mean favorable rating of 54.4% (SD = 10.2). There were, on average, 17 crime-related news articles appearing in the major periodicals one month before each speech (SD = .19), and the crime rate averaged 4,605.3 (SD = 1,209.0) in the year before the speech was delivered. Finally, the mean unemployment rate for the month in which the speeches were delivered was 5.6% (SD = 1.42).

Bivariate analysis was conducted on the independent variables, checking for the presence of multicollinearity. The highest correlation was .82 between crime rates and

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables.

Variables n % Mean SD

Symbolic speech 0 = no 2,822 68.51 1 = yes 1,297 31.48 Congressional election year 0 = no 1,696 41.18 1 = yes 2,423 58.82 Divided government 0 = no 1,109 26.92 1 = yes 3,010 73.08 First year in office 0 = no 3,347 81.26 1 = yes 772 18.74 Presidential election year 0 = no 2,788 67.79 1 = yes 1,331 32.31 Political Party 0 = Democrat 2,377 57.7 1 = Republican 1,742 42.3 Presidential popularity 54.42 10.23 Crime rate 4,605.32 1,209.03 Media 17.09 0.19 Presidential popularity 54.42 10.23 Unemployment rate 5.60 1.42

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divided government, but as these variables were not theoretically linked, the high level was not considered a threat to the model. The next highest correlation was .72, between presidential popularity and Congressional elections and from there the correlations fell precipitously.

Table 2 presents the logistic regression analysis used to estimate the effects of the independent variables on the likelihood of a president employing symbolic rhetoric and includes the recalculated partially standardized beta coefficient. Four variables were found to have significantly impacted the likelihood that presidents would engage in symbolic crime rhetoric and they were public opinion, presidential election years, political party, and divided government. Public opinion significantly impacted the likelihood presidents would engage in symbolic rhetoric (WALD = 3.59, Exp(B) = 1.006, p < .05); however, based on the partially standardized coefficient it was the weakest of the four significant variables (b*Α = .103). A presidential election year also signifi- cantly impacted the likelihood presidents would engage in symbolic rhetoric (WALD = 8.178, Exp(B) = 1.345, p < .01) and was the second weakest of the four variables based on the partially standardized coefficient (b*Α = .138). Political party also had a significant impact, although not in the hypothesized direction, but rather moving in the direction of the Democratic party (WALD = 35.173, Exp(B) = −0.273, p < .001). Political party was also the second strongest predictor based on the partially standardized coefficient (b*Α = −0.273). Finally, the variable divided government had a significant impact on the likelihood presidents would engage in symbolic crime rhet- oric (WALD = 51.370, Exp(B) = 2.005, p < .001), and its effects demonstrated the greatest relative strength of all the significant variables in the model (b*Α = 0.308).

Table 2. Logistic Regression Explaining Presidential Use of Symbolic Language (n = 4,119).

b*A b SE WALD Exp(B)

Congress election 0.048 .099 .102 0.930 1.104 Crime rates 0.000 .000 .000 1.630 1.000 Divided government 0.308 .696 .097 51.370*** 2.005 First year president 0.016 .042 .104 0.161 1.043 Media 0.051 .004 .004 1.150 1.004 Party –0.273 –.553 .093 35.173*** 0.575 Popularity 0.010 .001 .004 0.164 1.001 President election 0.138 .296 .104 8.178** 1.345 Public opinion 0.103 .006 .003 3.595* 1.006 Unemployment 0.021 .015 .031 0.230 1.015 Constant 0.794 .034 556.570*** 2.212 Nagelkerke R2 .250 –2 LL 4,958.870 Model chi-square (df) 148.683 (10)***

*p< .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

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The estimated model captured here appears to have low distinguished ability, with a moderately weak Nagelkerke R2 of .25, but because of the model’s significance, the findings still have interpretable meaning. In sum, the findings generated here suggest the variables public opinion, presidential election year, party affiliation, and divided government, increase the likelihood presidents will employ purely symbolic rhetoric in their crime speeches.

Discussion Research to date has adequately demonstrated that when it comes to crime policy in America, the so-called Law and Order Presidency engages in symbolic rhetoric to advance their crime policy agenda. What has not been considered, however, is what factors exist that increased the likelihood that presidents will choose to engage in symbolic rhetoric over more substantive policy making language. This study is the first to explore this question through a quantitative analysis to understand how crime rhetoric is employed by American presidents, and to further understand how crime policy is made at the national level.

The univariate data for this study clearly shows that presidents spend the majority, or approximately two thirds (68.5%), of their time engaging in either substantive or mixed (substantive and symbolic) language in their crime policy speeches. They do, however, engage in purely symbolic rhetorical speeches one third of the time (31.4%), demonstrating that presidents often prefer not to engage in substantive policy-making rhetoric, but rather rely on symbolic rhetoric for their crime control policy speeches. Thus it can be said that presidents do rely on symbolic politics when it comes to crime policy in accordance with the literature (Cronin et al., 1981; Hawdon, 2001; Marion, 1994a, 1994b; Marion & Farmer,, 2003; Marion & Oliver, 2012; Oliver, 2001; Scheingold, 1984, 1991, 1995).

The logistic regression analysis suggests some explanation why presidents are more likely to engage in purely symbolic rhetoric. The first is public opinion. As pub- lic concern that crime is the “Most Important Problem Facing the Country” rises, presidents are more likely to engage in symbolic rhetoric in their crime speeches. This is as hypothesized for as public concern increases, presidents are under more pressure to demonstrate that they are doing something about the problem, and symbolic politics allows them to demonstrate their concern and resolve without actually having to com- mit to any new policies.

The second causal factor making presidents more likely to engage in symbolic rhetoric on crime was a presidential election year. This too was as hypothesized for election years means political campaigns, and campaigns mean numerous speeches. To avoid making too many promises on the campaign trail (see Marion & Farmer, 2003; Marion & Oliver, 2012), presidents prefer to engage in symbolic rhetoric. Because extensive research has found that presidents truly do not pander to the public and do, in fact, attempt to live up to their campaign promises (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000), the less substantive policy proposals made, the less the president commits

Marion and Oliver 729

himself. Symbolic rhetoric, then, helps the president emphasize his resolve to address the problems of crime, but avoids making too many commitments he may not be able to keep.

The third influencing factor that increases the likelihood presidents will engage in symbolic politics was party although not in the direction hypothesized. As the conven- tional wisdom posits that crime is a Republican issue, it was hypothesized that Republican presidents would be more likely to engage in symbolic rhetoric. Party affiliation was found to influence the likelihood presidents would engage in symbolic politics, but it was more likely to come from the Democratic Party, rather than the Republicans. This may, perhaps, be explained by the fact that crime is a Republican issue and that since Republicans are more likely to engage in the substantive policy- making aspects because they generate public support (e.g., tougher sentencing laws, death penalty, abolishing parole, etc.), Democrats engage in symbolic rhetoric as a response mechanism. It allows them to engage in the crime policy area, to sound tough on crime, but to avoid making substantive policies that may not be received as well by the general public. That said, there is some evidence to suggest that the two most active presidents on the crime issue were, in fact, Democrats—Johnson and Clinton— (Marion, 1994a, 1997; Oliver, 2003), thus supporting recent research that found crime was not necessarily a Republican owned issue (Petrocik, 2007).

Finally, the fourth influencing factor, and considerably the strongest factor, is divided government. When presidents face divided government, where one or both chambers of the U.S. Congress is of the opposite party, as was hypothesized, presi- dents are more likely to engage in symbolic rhetoric. This is most likely because when government is divided it is more difficult for presidents to obtain legislative victory unless they greatly compromise their policy proposals. Hence, presidents are more likely to resort to symbolic rhetoric when it comes to crime, to show the American electorate that they are engaged in the crime issue, they are concerned, and they are doing something about the problem, without having to face defeat of their proposals in Congress. Thus, when presidents face divided government, crime speeches are no lon- ger a means to an end (legislation), they become the end.

Understanding that presidents engage in symbolic rhetoric and why they do so, helps us to understand how crime policy is developed and advanced at the national level. Federal crime control policy has come to play a greater role in the American criminal justice system, for as Friedman (1993) has pointed out, “the big show, the main show is now Washington, D.C.” when it comes to crime control, and that “the big gun is the president, not the governor or the mayor” (p. 263). Knowing why presi- dents are more likely to engage in symbolic politics provides us insight into how this “big gun,” this “law and order presidency,” constructs and advances criminal justice policy in America. This study provides some further clarification as to how and why presidents participate in the crime policy arena.

This study, however, is not without its limitations. Unfortunately, due to the lack of the Federal Bureau of Investigation maintaining more accurate monthly crime data, the level of analysis for crime data did not reflect the unit of analysis of the rest of the data (monthly) raising questions about the reporting of nonsignificance when it comes

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to crime. In addition, the study did not attempt to understand the greater dynamics involving the independent variables, such as understanding the specific aspects of divided government, which chamber of Congress was divided, and so forth. Future research into the specific dynamics of these variables, their relationship with the law and presidency, and assessing different types of crime policy, would better serve our understanding of crime control policy making at the federal level. Notwithstanding these limitations, however, this study is the first to assess why presidents are more likely to engage in symbolic rhetoric and enhances the growing body of literature on this important policy topic.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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Author Biographies

Nancy E. Marion is professor of political science at the University Akron, Akron, Ohio. She has published widely in the area of federal crime control policy and is co-author of The Public Policy of Crime and Criminal Justice (Prentice Hall, 2012). Her research interests include presidents, Congress, and crime policy in America.

Willard M. Oliver is professor of criminal justice at Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas. He has published widely in the area of federal crime control policy and is also co-author of The Public Policy of Crime and Criminal Justice (Prentice Hall, 2012). His research interests include presidents, Congress, and crime policy in America.