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LocaL Government Performance and the chaLLenGes of reGionaL

PreParedness for disasters

Brian J. GerBer Louisiana State University

scott e. roBinson Texas A&M University

ABSTRACT: As is well known, most emergency incidents are managed by local governments. However, when an incident of disaster-scale occurs, the traditional model of emergency management has certain limitations. Emergency response systems are primarily designed to manage incidents locally, not to facilitate coordination across multiple jurisdictional boundaries. As a result, the threat of a catastrophic terrorist attack and of other regional-scale natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina has led to a policy demand for actual regional coordination in emergency response. In this article, we discuss the local development of regionalism in emergency management and present an approach to assessing the effectiveness of such efforts (i.e., we examine local government conditions conducive to regionalization). We discuss various strategies for assessing the push for regionalism in emergency management, including providing several regional integration performance indicators and an outline of the importance of combining assessment strategies in this area. Our results suggest that local capacity for regionalization, just as in other areas of emergency management, is largely determined by unique local characteristics, thus presenting a challenge to new policy doctrine.

KEYWORDS: disasters, emergency management, emergency response, regional coordination

This decade has seen remarkable transformations in disaster and emergency management policy in the United states. the magnitude of the terrorist attacks of 2001, coupled with the immediately perceived possibility of future terror attacks on a catastrophic scale, prompted a massive bureaucratic reorganization producing the U.s. department of homeland security (dhs). With the creation of dhs— and accompanying doctrine developments to deal with the threat of terror attacks

Public Performance & Management Review, vol. 32, no. 3, march 2009, pp. 345–371. © 2009 m.e. sharpe, inc. all rights reserved. 1530-9576/2009 $9.50 + 0.00. doi 10.2753/Pmr1530-9576320301

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and other catastrophic incidents—the federal government moved decisively away from its more traditional facilitative role in emergency management. instead it moved to a much more centralized, top–down mode of policy development, more explicitly directing state and local government actions (cigler, 2007; schneider, 2005). following the 9/11 attacks, the hurricanes of 2005, and especially the ineffective response to hurricane Katrina, enhanced further the saliency of the debate over how best to re-shape systems of preparedness for and management of disaster incidents.

in the broadest sense, the 9/11 and Katrina events have combined to raise a series of questions about how to build governmental capacity and how to design organizational change most effectively (stanton, 2006). one critical issue is building the capacity for coordinated response across multiple sites, multiple cit- ies, and even multiple states. Large-scale incidents inherently involve multiple political jurisdictions and engage response efforts across levels of government. a notable element of the new national emergency management doctrine, seen first in the national response Plan (nrP; U.s. dhs, 2004) and continued to a certain degree in the nrP’s revised form, the national response framework (nrf; U.s. dhs, 2008a), was recognition of the need for regional response capabilities.1 that is, improving emergency management on a regional basis—which can be defined as the capacity and capability for coordinated response efforts across broad geographic areas and across political jurisdictions by multiple governmental ac- tors—was conceptualized as one critical element in improving preparedness for potential disaster or catastrophic incident scenarios.

however, it is important to recognize that regionalizing preparedness at the direction of the dhs presents both political and practical challenges. the develop- ment and design of the dhs itself has been criticized on the grounds that efforts to impose centrally defined and centrally controlled national goals are potentially counterproductive given that emergency management in the United states is char- acterized by decentralized subnational policy networks (schneider, 2005; Waugh & streib, 2005; Waugh & sylves, 2002). Likewise, other political and administrative features intrinsic to american federalism, such as conflicting incentives across levels of government, do not augur well for an effective centralized management of a national homeland security policy strategy (eisinger, 2006).

not only is centralization of policy priority setting seen as potentially prob- lematic, there is debate over the particular issue of what regionalized emergency management would or should look like in practice. although the nrP included statements regarding the importance of regional response, the term was used am- biguously: at times it implied that regional responses are the domain of federal

this research was supported by a national science foundation (nsf) grant (award number 0554332, Brian J. Gerber, Principal investigator); the authors thank the nsf for this support.

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authorities—presumably through administrative units of the federal emergency management agency (fema)—but at others it referred to regional entities as distinct from federal authorities. it did not clarify, however, whether this refers to trans-state regional efforts such as those of the mid-atlantic states to prepare for a disaster in the national capital region or to trans-local regions such as those in the north texas region (which includes dallas and fort Worth) to coordinate notification systems for tornados. this ambiguity has sown conceptual confusion over the expected nature and role of subnational governments operating as regional actors. further, the nrf largely avoids clarifying what regionalism should mean in practice for state and local government by limiting itself to a general discussion of fema’s own regional response coordinating centers.

While these hurdles exist, building regional coordination capacity into pre- paredness for disaster and catastrophe is a key element of the post-9/11 national emergency management doctrine. in spite of a certain level of opaqueness, the federal government does call for improved regional response capabilities based on the imperatives of “worst case scenario” planning—a series of envisaged disaster or catastrophic incidents that would affect a broad geographic area or the entire nation (White house, 2006). But while the need for regionalization of prepared- ness activities is presumed, what is less than clearly established is a fundamental question: how well do state and local governments actually perform in meeting these newly defined policy demands?

thus, our objective in this paper is to address that question by assessing the degree to which conditions at the local government level are likely to promote regionalized preparedness. our empirical analysis is framed by providing evi- dence for the following: how well might local governments actually meet the new demand for regionalization, what factors might explain variation in such performance, and what is a useful way to actually assess performance by state and local governments in this area?

We concentrate our attention on local government performance on key indica- tors and their relevance to potential regionalization because many key functional activities relevant to homeland security fall primarily within the responsibility of local government. more important, it is precisely those local governments that have initial responsibility for first response, and, as a result, coordinating their response efforts is the bedrock mechanism of developing regional capabilities to manage disasters and catastrophes. Understanding local government performance in this area is a critical indication of how well the homeland security and emergency management doctrine that has been developed since 2001 is likely to function when future calamities occur.

We address these questions first by outlining the basic challenges of assessing emergency management performance generally. We discuss the concept of, and specific constraints attendant to, regionally coordinated emergency management involving multiple jurisdictions, including state jurisdictions. We then present a

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rationale for performance assessment of regional coordination based on a multiple assessment strategy that incorporates perspectives and assessments held by local government officials with responsibilities relevant to emergency management policy issues.

Using data gathered from a nationwide survey of city and county officials in the fall of 2006, our assessment suggests three basic insights. consistent with well-established findings in the disaster policy literature, performance is likely to be contingent on localized characteristics. insofar as performance is dependent on such characteristics, the new doctrine toward emergency management is likely to face familiar federalism-based challenges to effective implementation. second, regionalization of emergency management is a multi-dimensional construct that requires both greater conceptual elaboration and new strategies for capturing its realization in practice. finally, the mixed set of measures used here suggests insight for future efforts to improve performance measurement in the area of emergency management preparedness activities.

Approaches to Assessing Preparedness and Response Effectiveness

the performance measurement movement has had a difficult time penetrating the emergency management field. at its heart, the challenge stems from a dif- ficulty in measuring policy outcomes for emergency preparedness. successful emergency preparedness may mean that a community suffers less of a loss than it otherwise would have. the most basic problem is that we can never observe the loss that otherwise would have been experienced. any assessment requires the comparison of the observed losses to the counterfactual losses hypothesized to have otherwise been likely.

typically, the counterfactual problem is overcome through the brute strength of large samples. the typical strategy is to approximate the counterfactual by collect- ing data on many similar situations. in a classic policy evaluation example, consider the assessment of the effect of a new law requiring all operators of motorcycles to wear helmets. We can only observe the actual fatality and injury rates after the law passes. it is impossible to know exactly the effects of a motorcycle helmet law after its adoption because we can never see what the fatality and injury rate would have been in that specific year in the absence of the law. instead, assessors use a large collection of states and years, some of which adopted the helmet law and some that did not, to estimate the mortality and injury rate in the hypothetical year without the helmet law. the assessor then compares this estimated quantity to the observed mortality and injury rate to find an estimated policy impact. the accuracy of the policy impact estimate depends on having a large sample of com- parable units on which to base the counterfactual estimate.

the expected difference strategy, relying on large samples of comparable units, is not generally possible in the case of emergency management. emergencies—

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particularly disasters—are rare and extreme events. By their nature, they defy the logic of repeated measurement. Quarterly evaluations, for example, may be appropriate for daily decision making (such as evaluating the effectiveness of repeated job training programs) because each quarter is a comparable unit for purposes of creating an accurate guess of what, say, next quarter’s evaluations should look like. this logic is difficult to justify in policy decisions related to a 50-year flood. there have not been enough 50-year floods to serve as the basis for a sample. it is often the case that emergency planners have information on only a few of such events. the rarity of emergency events (again, disasters in particular) makes this counterfactual observation problem described above all the more binding.

the measurement problem inherent in rare counterfactuals is compounded by the inter-jurisdictional nature of emergency management. emergency response calls for the collaborative mobilization of a variety of organizations, agencies, and informal groups. failure may not be easily attributable to any one actor or organization because outcomes are the joint product of many actors. for this rea- son, evaluation may be more appropriate at the network level than at the level of individual organizations, as is typical in performance management (mandell & Keast, 2007; Provan, fish, & sydow, 2007). as a result, emergency management is an area where policy outcomes are difficult to use as the basis for performance evaluation. any observed outcome could be the product of any combination of a large number of actors.

instead, the emergency management literature has focused on the evaluation of preparedness, where actions such as employee training are the relevant outputs (which, in turn, may or may not be closely related to actual outcomes).2 Understand- ing the emergency management community’s response to these difficulties requires understanding the phases of emergency management (mileti, 1999, pp. 22–23). disasters are not generally preventable. instead, emergency management involves pre-disaster preparedness and mitigation activities and post-disaster response and recovery activities. the rarity and extremity of disasters make measuring directly the effectiveness of post-disaster response and recovery efforts difficult. instead, understanding emergency management performance focuses one’s attention on behaviors where managers have more leverage—preparedness and mitigation outputs. this logic is the basis for the target capabilities List—the instrument the dhs recommends to assess community preparedness.

Within the general strategy of assessing preparedness, approaches to measuring effectiveness have varied. the simplest approach involves the subjective self- evaluation of emergency management professionals or other responsible parties. in this approach, assessors ask respondents to describe their general level of preparedness. sometimes assessors ask these questions in terms of an all-hazards conception where each respondent is asked to indicate his organization’s overall preparedness for the emergencies it faces. other times, assessors differentiate

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between disasters asking, for example, about preparedness for hurricanes or terrorist attacks. this approach is simple but has built-in biases. the resulting evaluations are clearly subjective and may be subject to social desirability bias in that emergency managers may be reluctant to report that their organization is entirely unprepared—although that might be the appropriate characterization in many cases. on the other hand, the respondents to these questions may be in the best position to offer these summary evaluations and, under traditional conditions of anonymity, may see a low rating as an opportunity to force policymakers to increase investments in emergency preparedness. furthermore, it is not clear how consistently respondents define preparedness. a well-trained respondent may be much more critical of the preparedness of her organization than a less well- trained respondent in a similarly prepared organization. such differences would create variance in the data resulting from respondent characteristics rather than from organizational characteristics. the result is a series of potential biases that are hard to predict.

the second approach focuses on the analysis of documents related to disaster preparedness (Burby, 2003). document analysis has focused on the disaster plans of various organizations and whether the plans contained state-of-the-art elements of preparedness such as communication plans, clear lines of authority, and dis- semination plans. many favor this approach as more objective than the subjective assessments of the previous strategy, but this approach also has its limits. first, col- lecting documents related to disaster preparedness is costly and time-consuming. as a result, it is a difficult technique for evaluating the preparation for a large sample of organizations. it may be better suited for internal assessments than large-N comparative assessments. equally important is the question of whether the documents reflect real preparative activities or capabilities. Well-written plans may end up unopened on the shelf of administrators facing a real emergency. this measure may then indicate an upper bound on effectiveness rather than a measure of effective preparedness itself.

the last traditional approach to measuring disaster preparedness is to focus on actual preparatory behavior. the specific behaviors assessed depend on the context of the performance assessment. at the individual level, surveys may ask individuals if they have stockpiled certain goods such as water or fuel. surveys ask emergency management professionals if they conduct specific activities such as tabletop exercises or full simulations. this is a popular approach, but it is still limited. first, such measures tend to be domain specific. this approach requires asking about different behaviors if you are assessing preparedness at a local government level, in private sector organizations, or in individual households. furthermore, the activities representing preparedness for chemical or biological events may be distinct from efforts to prepare for flooding or earthquakes. second, the behaviors tend to be quite specific and may fail to account for the diversity of preparedness activities. an organization may be relatively well prepared but not conduct the

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specific activities asked for in the measures. as a result, the organization may be mischaracterized as poorly performing in terms of disaster preparedness. third, there are ever-present concerns about respondent reliability with these questions. as in the case of subjective assessment, there may be a strong social desirability effect on the part of emergency managers to indicate that they perform generally ac- cepted preparedness behaviors. to compensate for these problems, it is essential to include a variety of behavioral questions with activities varying from low-cost (e.g., written plan preparation) to high-cost activities (e.g., full simulation exercises).3 again, these sources of bias are not in a predictable direction or of a predictable magnitude, making them very difficult to account for in assessments.

Because there is not a single best strategy for measuring performance, perfor- mance assessment should include combinations of approaches including subjec- tive assessment and behavioral assessment (and plan evaluation where feasible). the combination of these approaches may offset some of the error embedded in each approach. the key to avoiding the potential sources of bias is to use multiple measures with different sources of bias. this requires that one assess the prepared- ness level of each organization using a combination of measurement strategies. the hope is that combining measurement strategies with different sources of bias will result in the errors’ canceling out—as is assumed in the traditional prefer- ence for large samples in the expected comparison strategy (relying on the Law of Large numbers). examples of this approach include studies at the individual household level (Lindell & Perry, 2000) and the organizational level (Gillespie & streeter, 1987; Lindell & Whitney, 1995). the next section further establishes the emergence of regional preparedness before describing our application of this multi-strategy assessment of regional preparedness based on a survey of local emergency management professionals and other local officials.

Regional Disaster Response: A New Focus

to further understand the challenges of assessing emergency management perfor- mance, it is important to place the substantive demands of this policy domain into context. the traditional all-hazards framework, which refers to the comprehensive management of a broad range of potential emergencies or disasters that result from natural, technological, or other human sources, was fundamentally reoriented by the events of september 11, 2001. the most recent update to the National Strategy on Homeland Security makes clear that terrorism should be viewed as the nation’s primary hazard—at least in terms of the federal government’s responsibilities. the first sentence of the document’s overview states: “america is at war with terrorist enemies who are intent on attacking our homeland and destroying our way of life” (White house, homeland security council, 2007, p. 1). of the four stated national goals on homeland security, the first stated goal is the prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks. the strategy document declares itself the basis for

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a framework to guide national policymaking, which of course includes directing the policy and administrative structure that makes up the emergency management system in the United states.

there are two key points to be made about this development. first, changes in performance objectives have not arisen from the highly decentralized networks making up the core of the system but instead have come directly from the White house, mainly by a series of homeland security Presidential directives (hsPd) and executive orders. the source of change matters in assessing performance because those loosely connected emergency management policy networks may not be either well suited or favorably disposed to fulfilling the requirements of the new national doctrine. second, it is also essential to understand what exactly those emergency management networks are being asked to do under the new doctrine. one core task is to improve readiness for large-scale disasters or catastrophes, which entails developing (or improving) regional preparedness and regional re- sponse capabilities. We elaborate on the significance of these two points in the following discussion.

ChANgES TO NATiONAl DOCTRiNE: TERRORiSm AS A hAzARD

Perhaps most important among the documents that have defined the national approach to preparedness for emergencies and disasters have been hsPd-5 and hsPd-8. hsPd-5 tasked the secretary of dhs with developing and administering the national incident management system in 2003 and the subsequent nrP. the national incident management system, along with the nrP, formally establish a national incident management framework and a national all-hazards emergency operations plan. moreover, the President’s homeland security council within the executive office of the President (which was created via executive order no. 13260) created 15 specific all-hazards planning scenarios that all levels of govern- ment are required to utilize in preparedness activities. the importance of hsPd-8, issued in december 2003, is its requirement of a national all-hazards preparedness goal that ultimately prompted dhs to create the target capabilities List, which state and local governments are required to develop and maintain.

the nrP4 and associated documents make clear that the new doctrine is heav- ily oriented toward terror attacks as the guiding principle for the national policy reorientation. consider the 15 planning scenarios that federal, state, and local governments are supposed to use for development of response capabilities: all but 3 of those 15 scenarios identify forms of potential terrorist attacks. moreover, 5 of the 12 attacks scenarios could be plausibly described as significant enough in scale as to be characterized as a potential catastrophe.

envisaging those terror attack scenarios has profoundly important consequences for preparedness activities at all levels of government: it prompts responsible

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parties to devote more preparedness efforts to potential large-scale disasters or catastrophes. a catastrophic incident is defined in the nrP as “any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions” (U.s. dhs 2004, cat-1). Birkland (2006) noted, however, that a brightly defined division between emergencies, disasters, and catastrophes does not exist. clearly the key issue is of scale, and while some events seem fairly apparent as to categorization, Birkland argued that the definition of an event as a disaster or a catastrophe itself can be fraught with political implications (and as a consequence it is a designation choice that might be strategic).

the catastrophic incident annex of the nrP makes explicit a series of plan- ning assumptions, including the premises that catastrophic incidents will cause mass casualties and displacement; critical infrastructure will be disrupted on a large scale; large-scale evacuation, either organized or spontaneous, may occur; and the “response capabilities and resources of the local jurisdiction (to include mutual aid from surrounding jurisdictions and response support from the state) may be insufficient and quickly overwhelmed” (U.s. dhs 2004, cat-3). Un- derscoring that the federal government has placed a great deal of emphasis on major disaster and catastrophic events, dhs (2006) completed the second of a two-phase national review of national disaster preparedness across the 50 states and in the country’s largest urban areas. outside of a few exceptions (e.g., florida, which routinely confronts mass evacuations related to the hurricane hazard), the review gave mediocre to poor grades for the country as a whole in terms of actual incident preparedness and adequacy of emergency operations plans, particularly related to the issue of mass evacuations of citizens should a major disaster or catastrophic event occur.

the development, then, of this new doctrine makes a basic policy demand on the emergency management system in the United states: Preparedness for large- scale disasters and catastrophic incidents (whether from terrorism or some other hazard) means that local and state governments necessarily will have to develop or increase efforts to manage events on a regional scale. Because a disaster or catastrophe by definition is an extreme enough event to supersede both local and state resources, the policy need is one of pursuing emergency management from a regional perspective.

REgiONAl PREPAREDNESS, REgiONAl COORDiNATiON: BASiC ChAllENgES

Given the substantive content of the new national emergency response doctrine and how the federal government has chosen to evaluate state-level efforts to date (through the target capabilities List), whether subnational actors can fulfill per-

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formance expectations becomes a salient question. in general terms, the ability of any jurisdiction to cope with a disaster event, or a catastrophic event, is in large part a function of the ability of public authorities to effectively plan for and man- age a disaster event.5 it is also important to recognize the challenge of managing disaster events in the U.s. federal system. although the federal government would like to see stronger hazard mitigation and preparedness efforts at the subnational level, in part to reduce their own financial exposure, state and local governments face important disincentives to proactive management and often lack the admin- istrative capacity or commitment for effective policies (cigler, 1988, 2007; Kiefer & montjoy, 2006; may, 1985; may & Williams, 1986; Waugh, 2000; Waugh & streib, 2006). this means that state and local government frequently do not develop a level of effective disaster policy that matches their responsibilities (see Burby, 1998). Both disaster response and ultimately policy response are often episodic and reactive in nature (see Birkland, 1997; schneider, 1995).

Within those broad limitations, several issues emerge in terms of the specific issue of preparedness for regionalized response coordination. first, the concept of region itself is not necessarily clear in its meaning in terms of policy and planning statements issued by governments at different levels. for example, the Urban areas security initiative, a component of the dhs’s major granting program, requires exercises to have a regional preparedness component. however, regional is often taken to mean incorporation of several local governments in a metro area partici- pating in the exercise, but that is only one type of regional coordination.

as a practical matter, there are at least four distinct types of regions when regional coordination is discussed as a means of improving emergency prepared- ness. first, the term can refer to intrastate regional coordination, where a state is divided into regional administrative units for emergency management purposes. second, it can refer to a specific geographic area within a state, such as multiple local governments in a metropolitan area. third, it can refer to interstate coordina- tion in a regional sense, as in several states that are likely to be affected more or less simultaneously if a disaster or catastrophe occurs. finally, although it is not typically considered in most discussions of the topic, local governments (coun- ties and cities) that lie along state boundaries can and do proactively engage in interstate coordination, though not in the formal sense of an interstate compact. that is, the practicalities of a potential emergency affecting border areas—and likely crossing state boundaries—create a strong incentive for the development of interstate professional relationships for such local emergency management personnel.

two papers produced by the heritage foundation in 2006 outline a series of limitations and obstacles to regional coordination in the way the U.s. disaster management is currently arranged, and what that means for potentially significant performance limitations should future catastrophes occur (heritage foundation,

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2006; rhodes & carafano, 2006). the obstacles identified by the heritage papers can be summarized in several basic categories.

first, the tiered emergency management system in the United states does not lend itself to preparedness for regional coordination. it is designed to accommo- date local preparedness first, and state and federal entities enter into a response situation as a means of providing additional resources and support. second, along those lines, the federal system of grants is not particularly focused on developing regional coordination preparedness. Post-9/11, grant programs like the Urban areas security initiative do indeed emphasize regional coordination efforts, but this is not a central focus of federal grants in this policy domain. Perhaps more important, without a clear delineation of the type of regional coordination desired (as previously noted), it is likely difficult to target funds in a coherent way toward the aim of regional coordination.6 third, historically there has been very little emphasis on regionally based training and exercises. While that is changing in a post-9/11 environment, there is still inadequate attention to interstate exercises for catastrophic events. this leads to a fourth point: the lack of regional offices at dhs is an additional impediment. regional offices could serve as a focal point for facilitating such interstate coordination efforts, meaning their absence limits state-level effectiveness.

there are also nontrivial legal hurdles when one considers interstate responses to a disaster or catastrophe. in key areas related to emergency response and public health, there are no standardized systems of licensing and credentialing during a crisis key emergency personnel. absent such pre-event mechanisms, efforts to credential during a crisis delays and makes response assistance efforts problematic. a sixth issue is the fact that there are no useful (or even existing) metrics to systematically evaluate the reasonable expectations of regional response resources and capabilities.

finally, although the emergency management assistance compact (emac) is a major vehicle for interstate cooperation and assistance during disasters, it is not a vehicle (at least at present) for pre-incident disaster and catastrophic pre- paredness efforts to promote regional coordination. instead, its utility lies almost entirely (with some qualifications in order) as a means of providing a framework for incident response assistance requests.7 together, these categories of constraint serve to limit the national capacity for creating regionally coordinated disaster- or catastrophic-event management systems.

Assessing local government Regional Preparedness Efforts

the preceding section indicates why regionalized preparedness and response coordination is difficult and why significant variation is likely for subnational government efforts in trying to meet that national objective. Likewise, we also

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describe the challenges in assessing emergency management performance per se. to further the discussion put forth in those two sections, we propose that local regionalization efforts can be productively analyzed by considering a combination of self-assessed and objective indicators of preparedness that are fundamental to several dimensions of regionalized emergency management.

more specifically, to account for local efforts on regionalizing emergency or disaster response, we ask the following: how do local officials assess their own government’s capacity to fulfill obligations under the nrP (doctrine awareness), how do local officials assess levels of coordination activities in their jurisdictions with other proximate jurisdictions (horizontal coordination), how do local offi- cials assess levels of preparedness across a range of event scenarios (coordinated response readiness), and what actions have local governments taken with respect to a key feature of major disasters or catastrophes—preparedness for mass evacu- ations (catastrophic incident readiness)?

variation across those four performance indicators is assessed by considering three potential explanatory factors. one is a proxy of policy need: community size. size, in terms of population, serves as a need proxy because larger cities presumably score higher on a terrorism vulnerability scale (higher density, more infrastructure targets, more symbolic value). a second explanatory factor is amount of commuter traffic into and out of a county jurisdiction (gross commuter traffic flow). this serves as a proxy for degree of community clustering, the geospatial context within which emergency management actions takes place. this measure has some degree of correlation with county population density, but it is not an exceptionally strong correlation (r = .37). While imperfect, it captures the com- munity proximity situation that respondents are facing.8 We also examine the possibility of geographic locations effects—the area of the United states where a local government official resides—to consider consistency across different parts of the country.

the data we use to address these questions are taken from a mail survey of city and county officials across the United states in cities with resident populations of at least 30,000. all american cities meeting this population threshold were stratified into one of three groups (small = 30,000 to less than 100,000; medium = 100,000 to less than 250,000; large = 250,000 or more), and sample units were selected at random within each stratum. a total of 250 cities were selected for inclusion in the sample. multiple municipal officials at both the city and county level (the county in which the sampled city is located) then constituted secondary sampling units. those officials included a mix of elected and bureaucratic officials in the following areas: government executives (city managers, mayors, county executives); first responder personnel (fire or police department heads, emergency medical services department heads); city and county emergency managers, city and county public health officials, and general administrative personnel, such as

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offices with relevant responsibilities (e.g., transportation management). the final sample frame consisted of 1,767 city and county officials. through interviews with local emergency management and other officials in several locations, a survey instrument was constructed and pre-tested in June and July 2006. individuals in the sample frame were mailed a notification letter in late august; a first wave of the survey was mailed in early september. two weeks later, a reminder postcard was mailed to the sample members, and a second wave of the survey was mailed the first week of october. a total of 725 completed, or partially completed, surveys were received for a response rate of about 41 percent.

PERFORmANCE iNDiCATOR: DOCTRiNE AWARENESS

an initial indicator of local performance is familiarity with the response doctrine itself. this is an important indicator for two reasons: first, as donahue (2006, p. 141) noted, effective emergency response operations are predicated on multiple jurisdictions, sectors, and levels of government resolving complex coordination problems. second, as previously noted, there have been a number of doctrinal and policy changes since 2001. to resolve coordination challenges and the uncertainty associated with recent policy change, donahue pointed out that having clearly articulated and commonly understood missions, objectives, strategies, and priori- ties will help reduce frictions that typically characterize multiple actors working in complex policy spaces.

as a consequence, one way to understand this performance issue is to examine the degree to which local officials believe their government (city or county) is sufficiently ready to implement the nrP (the survey was administered prior to the revisions resulting in the nrf). respondents were asked to either agree or disagree with the following statement: “in the event of a catastrophic terrorist incident in my community, my city/county government has a clear understanding of its pro- cedural obligations under the national response Plan.” responses were made on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

table 1 presents the means score of all respondents and then treats the ques- tion responses as the dependent variable and compares scores by respondents’ city size in a one-way analysis of variance (anova). the F value for the city size comparison is statistically significant (p < .01). Given that finding, post hoc analyses were conducted to evaluate pairwise differences among the means (to determine exactly where the differences reside). the results of those comparisons are displayed in the next to last column of table 1.

the results indicate a reasonably positive local evaluation of nrP comprehen- sion. about 57 percent of respondents were higher than the scale’s midpoint, with an overall mean of 4.65, which is an indication of agreement with the statement posed. the anova results show that the mean score for officials from medium and large cities is statistically significantly higher than the mean scores for of-

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ficials for small cities (p < .01). in other words, respondents in large and medium cities are more likely to report that their city or county governments do understand their procedural obligations than are their counterparts in small cities. there is no statistically significant difference of mean scores between medium- and large- city respondents.

on the one hand, this result is intuitive insofar as the larger the city or county government, the greater the administrative capacity (all else equal) and more than likely a greater concern for terrorism as a hazard (Gerber, cohen, & stewart, 2007). the more important point is this: While it is not entirely surprising that smaller cities and counties report statistically significantly lower levels of nrP procedural comprehension, smaller cities for the purposes of this study—defined as having a residential population of between 30,000 and 100,000—are still sub- stantial communities for most areas of the country (only a relatively few densely populated notwithstanding). evidence that such communities lagged behind larger communities in reporting nrP comprehension offers a potential indication of a broader weakness in the national response system if and when major disasters or catastrophes occur. to investigate that point further, table 2 presents comparisons made on the basis of those officials with the greatest degree of need for functional or operational awareness of national response doctrine: first responder and emer- gency management officials. the t-tests presented in table 2 makes clear that those officials in smaller cities are significantly lower in their reported doctrine awareness, as compared to the national sample overall. again, this underscores the point that promoting operational knowledge of national goals is a nontrivial challenge throughout the country.

PERFORmANCE iNDiCATOR: VERTiCAl AND hORizONTAl COORDiNATiON

Just as doctrine awareness is one way to reduce barriers to coordination—through common language and assumptions—routine contacts between governments is another way to promote coordination, including regional coordination. Kapucu (2006) noted the importance of preexisting interorganizational communications systems to effective response when disasters occur. robinson, Berrett, and stone

Table 1. local Comprehension of the National Response Plan by Community Size

Response by Mean St. dev. Differences n

all 4.65 1.53 717 small 4.48 1.593 p < .01 350 medium 4.85 1.434 — 223 Large 4.83 1.468 — 127

Note: F (2,697) = 5.058; p < .01.

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(2006) offered the same finding. similarly, donahue (2006) detailed the example of the space shuttle Columbia’s disaster-recovery effort being more effective because of daily joint planning meetings of the various government agencies involved. that logic can be extended to preparedness for regional coordination planning and exercise efforts across jurisdictional lines. as a result, local of- ficials were asked to rate how well both the federal and their state government have been in facilitating regional preparedness and response efforts. specifically, respondents were asked to either agree or disagree with the following two state- ments: “federal officials at dhs (including fema) have done a good job at facilitating regional preparedness and response capability,” and “officials from my state government have done a good job at facilitating regional preparedness and response capability.” responses were made on a 7-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

comparing the responses to the two statements revealed a more positive as- sessment of local-to-state vertical interactions. the mean score of all respondents gave a slightly negative rating to federal officials with a mean score of 3.83 (which is below the scale’s midpoint), in comparison to a relatively more positive rat- ing to state-level officials. the mean score for state officials was 4.44. a simple comparison of means test reveals that the difference between these two ratings is statistically significant (p < .001).

follow-up anova comparisons to check whether these responses varied by community size revealed that while officials from larger cities and counties give slightly more negative ratings to both state and federal officials, those ratings are not statistically significantly different from small and medium communities. an obvious inference from the divergent ratings as presented is that local officials work more closely with state officials, and, hence, a more positive rating is provided. But this assessment of vertical integration does not capture horizontal coordination between other local government entities in the same geographic area.

from the local perspective, horizontal coordination presents slightly different challenges than vertical coordination. in the case of vertical coordination, the matter

Table 2. Comprehension of the NRP by Select Respondents

Response by Mean St. dev. Mean

difference Sig. n

all 4.65 1.53 — 717

emergency managers & first responders only, small cities

4.18 1.63 –.472 p < .01 197

emergency managers & first re- sponders only, medium cities

4.71 1.51 .063 p < .07 115

emergency managers & first responders only, large cities

4.86 1.48 .209 n.s. 71

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is, in part, a function of the local government receiving communication from and reacting to directives from a government with ultimately greater policymaking authority. in contrast, horizontal coordination for preparedness relies on mutual information exchanges and mutual operational efforts, as opposed to compliance and frequent one-way information flows. one way to assess performance in this regard is to measure how well city and county governments within the same county jurisdiction engaged in preparedness actions. specifically, respondents in city governments were asked to “rate the level of coordination your city govern- ment has with county officials on homeland security planning” (or the inverse, of course). again, a seven-point scale was used with higher values indicating greater coordination.

table 3 provides the mean score for all respondents on this question and then treats the question responses as the dependent variable and contrasts scores by respondents’ community size, by the community clustering proxy previously described, and by a community’s geographic location. the anova analysis is statistically significant (p < .02), and a post hoc comparison shows that officials from small-sized cities report statistically significantly lower coordination ratings than their counterparts. as we stated earlier, the community size measure serves as a policy need proxy: after the 9/11 attacks, security-related issues rose in rela- tive importance in the political discourse of urban areas (savitch, 2003). as a consequence, the model suggests that greater perceived vulnerability helped drive

Table 3. City–County Coordination Assessment: Size, Clustering, and location Effects

Response by Mean St. dev. p-value,

mean diff. n

all responses 4.84 1.57 community size effects

small 4.67 1.53 .05 347 medium 5.05 1.54 — 223 Large 4.94 1.72 — 124

F(2,690) = 4.217; p < .02; n = 694 community clustering effects

Low commuter flow 4.96 1.54 — 315 medium commuter flow 4.83 1.59 — 214 high commuter flow 4.64 1.59 .10 170

F(2,696) = 2.273; p < .10; n = 699 Geographic area effects

coastal ne 4.32 1.62 .05 78 Gulf/coastal se 4.81 1.62 — 191 central 4.87 1.64 — 258 coastal West 5.06 1.34 — 171

F(3,694) = 4.099; p < .01; n = 698

Gerber and robinson / LocaL Government Performance 361

population-dense communities to invest more effort in emergency management planning and risk assessments (eisinger, 2004).

however, when one considers the effects of the degree of potential clustering of communities, a more complex picture emerges. the clustering proxy is a measure of total commuter traffic into and out of a county jurisdiction.9 for simplicity, the measure was collapsed into three categories: medium amount of commuter traffic flow (+/– one-half standard deviation about the mean), low commuter traffic flow (lower than one-half standard deviation below the mean), and high commuter traffic flow (higher than one-half standard deviation above the mean). While the value of F for the anova is only significant at a low threshold (p < .10), the fact that the high commuter counties have the lowest coordination ratings is interesting. it at least raises the possibility that there are unique geospatial situational effects for communities that are not simply a function of community size.

to further expand on that idea, the location of respondents’ communities was also considered to see if any unique geographic area effects were discernible. We placed respondents into four geographic categories: whether they were in the coastal northeast (states in fema regions i, ii, and iii), in the coastal southeast and gulf area (states in fema regions iv and vi), the coastal west (fema regions iX and X), and central states (fema regions v, vii, and viii). the bottom third of table 3 shows that local officials in states from fema regions i, ii, and iii report statistically significantly lower levels of horizontal coordination. the coastal west has the highest overall rating, but that rating is not significantly different from the southeast or central state areas. these geographic-area effects become more pronounced and more easily discerned as we look at the next two performance indicators.

PERFORmANCE iNDiCATOR: COORDiNATED RESPONSE READiNESS

a third means of accounting for potential regionalization of emergency response is the degree to which local officials assess their current readiness for different potential terror attack scenarios; or to be more precise, to assess readiness for re- gional coordination of such a response. respondents were asked to evaluate three scenarios: the explosion of a small nuclear device in or near their community, a biological attack (e.g., airborne anthrax or ricin or intentional contamination of a food supply with botulinum toxin), and a large conventional explosion (similar to the oklahoma city bombing). respondents were asked to “rate the probable degree of regional coordination of response” to each event on a seven-point scale (ranging from limited to extensive). table 4 shows a set one-way anova model for each event, with differences displayed for community size, clustering, and geographic area effects. Looking at the top panel of the table, while officials from large cities have slightly higher ratings than their smaller city counterparts, the tests for difference effects is statistically significant only for conventional

362 PPmr / march 2009

explosions. the pattern of the highest mean rating for conventional bombings is a pattern consistent across all three incident types.

however, that picture again changes when one considers the degree to which a community (within the county level) is in proximity to other communities—a clustering effect. table 4 also shows that in each case, counties with a higher volume of commuter traffic give statistically significantly higher ratings to their degree of regionally coordinated response capacity. this, of course, is a highly intuitive result; communities in greater proximity should be expected to have higher amounts of interaction with neighboring city or county jurisdictions (mutual aid agreements for bordering communities, the need to coordinate planning for a greater degree of shared community space and utilization of similar infrastructure resources, etc.). What is interesting about the result is its contrast to the city-size

Table 4. Regionally Coordinated incident Response: Size and Clustering Effects

Response by Nuclear incident Biological incident

Conventional explosion

community size effects small 4.55 4.77 5.01

(1.64) (1.45) (1.40) medium 4.75 4.89 5.24

(1.54) (1.45) (1.24) Large 4.83 4.98 5.34

(1.56) (1.50) (1.33) F-value 1.905 1.152 3.786

p = .150 p = .317 p < .05 community clustering effects

Low commuter flow 4.40 4.62 4.94 (1.64) (1.49) (1.36)

medium commuter flow 4.86 5.03 5.27 (1.48) (1.33) (1.21)

high commuter flow 4.87 5.01 5.34 (1.63) (1.51) (1.41

F-value 7.613 6.97 6.562 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01

Geographic area effects coastal ne 4.38 4.53 4.90

(1.41) (1.34) (1.18) Gulf/coastal se 4.82 4.84 5.06

(1.61) (1.56) (1.45) central 4.53 4.79 5.06

(1.60) (1.44) (1.30) coastal west 4.80 5.06 5.44

(1.64) (1.39) (1.30) F-value 2.498 2.625 4.288

p < .06 p < .05 p < .01

Gerber and robinson / LocaL Government Performance 363

finding. the evidence displayed suggests that the community-size measure (our proxy for overall homeland security preparedness need) is potentially unrelated to the community-proximity or clustering effects.

of further interest is the fact that the gulf and southeastern coastal states and the coastal west states consistently report higher ratings than the other two geographic areas—for all three incident scenarios. one plausible interpretation is that the southeastern and western coastal areas are more prone to experience with natural hazards. a cursory look at historical distribution patterns in presidential disaster declarations suggests as much. this result then can be seen as suggesting a type of policy need–policy response match: regional coordination is most likely to occur only when local governments have strong incentives to engage in that behavior based on experience with past emergency and disaster incidents.

PERFORmANCE iNDiCATOR: DiSASTER OR CATASTROPhE READiNESS

the last performance indicator to consider is the degree of preparedness efforts undertaken for an inherently regional problem: the mass evacuation of a city or county (or greater) area. from a disaster planning standpoint, mass evacuation events present two interrelated management challenges. first, public authorities must be able to safely and effectively facilitate the removal of persons from a disaster location. second, evacuees must be accommodated in a way that mini- mizes the potential harm to evacuees and the communities receiving them during the mass egress process. Generally, the focus of planning efforts and academic research on the topic of receiving evacuees has been on sheltering issues (Phillips, 1992; Quarantelli, 1982, 1991, 1995) and has placed less attention on how local officials might fit into a model of regional event management.

this is important because, as the nrP notes, a catastrophe or large-scale di- saster that prompts population dislocation most likely will represent a regional emergency/disaster management challenge. if the scale of the precipitating event is large, it has the potential to affect multiple state and local government jurisdictions. the second-stage hurricane Katrina evacuation, which included those persons who did not or could not leave new orleans prior to Katrina’s landfall, provides a recent and nonhypothetical example of a disaster event that produced evacuees moving through the state and region as well as dispersing local residents across the United states. other events distinct from a catastrophic natural disaster also could produce massive population dislocations. a rand corporation scenario assessment of a groundburst nuclear explosion carried out by terrorists in a major U.s. port makes clear that related evacuation impacts would be national in scope (meade & molander, 2006).

Because the national planning scenarios have a significant expectation that all levels of government should be ready to accommodate large disasters or

364 PPmr / march 2009

catastrophic events, it is productive to examine what activities are occurring at the local level in this regard. as an indication that mass evacuations, which can safely be presumed to present an interjurisdictional coordination problem, may present problems during future potential catastrophes, table 5 presents frequency distribution information on local officials’ reporting whether their city or county government has taken specific steps in preparation for a mass evacuation event. respondents were asked to indicate whether their government had performed one or more of the following readiness tasks for a mass evacuation event: planning, tabletop exercises, or full field exercises. table 5 displays those frequencies along with a series of cross tabs with city size, commuter traffic, and geographic area as the independent variables. in the aggregate, the table shows that about one-fifth of the respondents indicate that they had undertaken no activities at all, and only about one-fifth had done the most demanding action of an actual field exercise.

the cross tabs for each of the individual activity indicators (multiple responses were possible) show a pattern interestingly similar to the event response ratings above: there seems to be little discernible difference when city size is taken into account, but as the chi-square values for three of the four cross tabs on commuter traffic show, there seem to be clustering effects. even more interesting is the dis- tributions themselves. Looking at the two exercise indicators (tabletops and field exercises), high and low commuter traffic flows were higher than the middle rank- ing. one interpretive possibility is that lower-density areas (suburban or exurban areas) are coordinating activities with their urban core city in a metro area (the

Table 5. mass Evacuation Preparedness Actions

Response Planning only

(%) Tabletop

exercises (%) Field

exercises (%) No actions at

all (%)

all responses 49.7 39.6 20.2 21.1 community size effects

small cities 47.4 39.5 18.9 22.7 medium cities 52.1 36.5 19.2 21.9 Large cities 52.1 44.6 25.6 14.9

test (sig χ2) p = .34 p = .34 p = .26 p = .18 community clustering effects

Low commute flow 48.1 44.2 22.9 17.7 medium commute flow 50.7 30.3 15.2 27.0 high commute flow 51.2 41.7 21.4 20.2

test (sig χ2) p = .75 p < .01 p < .08 p < .05 Geographic area effects

coastal ne 56.3 41.3 20.0 17.5 Gulf/coastal se 50.0 49.5 29.0 15.1 central 48.4 32.9 17.5 23.0 coastal west 47.6 37.1 14.7 27.1

test (sig χ2) p = .61 p < .01 p < .01 p < .05

Gerber and robinson / LocaL Government Performance 365

logic of the Urban areas security initiative program). Likewise, the most important inference from the lower third of table 5 is that the most hurricane-prone region of the country (the southeastern atlantic coast and the Gulf of mexico region) consis- tently is the highest-performing area of the country in terms of efforts at ensuring mass evacuation preparedness. While intuitive for natural hazards preparedness, it also speaks to the challenge of getting the rest of the nation to prepare for a low probability–high consequence disaster or catastrophe as specified in dhs’s national planning scenarios for homeland security.

finally, table 6 presents a distribution of responses to another indicator of preparedness for disasters or catastrophes: the ability to absorb ingress of evacuees during a mass evacuation. respondents were asked to rate, on a 7-point scale rang- ing from limited to 0, the capacity of their city or county critical infrastructure to receive a large number of evacuees from another community. as in prior analyses, the table displays three anova models, with response differences by community size, commuter traffic flow, and geographic area. in the aggregate, the results for all respondents are not terribly positive (lower than midpoint by nearly a full point on the scale). a rather intuitive result is shown in the top panel of table 6, where respondents from large cities give higher absorption ratings, suggesting greater civil infrastructure resources to handle evacuees. By way of contrast, less easily interpreted are the mean differences shown in the second anova model. it seems counterintuitive that the lower commuter traffic areas (less clustered community areas) should give higher average ratings on this measure.

Table 6. mass Evacuation Absorption Capacity: Size, Clustering, and location Effects

Response Mean St. dev. p-value, mean diff n

all responses 3.19 1.58 community size effects

small 3.03 1.52 .01 351 medium 3.23 1.54 — 223 Large 3.55 1.72 — 128

F(2,699) = 5.421; p <.01; n = 702 community clustering effects

Low commuter flow 3.31 1.54 — 321 medium commuter flow 3.20 1.55 — 216 high commuter flow 2.93 1.65 .05 170

F(2,704) = 3.158; p <.05; n = 707 Geographic area effects

coastal ne 2.89 1.69 — 82 Gulf/coastal se 3.57 1.73 .01 193 central 3.32 1.52 .05 259 coastal west 2.69 1.24 — 172

F(3,702) = 11.55; p <.01; n = 706

366 PPmr / march 2009

it is possible that there are unique geographic location effects that are relevant to the finding on clustering effects. indeed, what is most interesting about table 6 is its bottom panel. While respondents in the coastal west states had reported more positive assessments of regional coordination, on evacuee absorption they score significantly lower than the central and southeastern states (along with respondents in the northeastern part of the country). one interpretation is that these results are measuring the type of hazard incidents in the southeast and gulf area (especially hurricanes) and central states (especially flooding) that make short-term sheltering of evacuees relatively more likely. the highest rating for the gulf/southeastern coast area is consistent with the distributions displayed in table 5: actual or anticipated performance seems to be closely linked to the nature of routinely experienced natural hazards.

Concluding Observations

the role of regionalization in homeland security and emergency management is an emerging issue in the development of our national posture toward disaster and emergency preparedness. We illustrate both the momentum toward supra-local response frameworks and the difficulty in achieving well-integrated regional net- works. We utilize a multi-indicator strategy to assess preparedness performance based on subjective assessments and behavioral measures. in this, several limita- tions of our ability to measure emergency preparedness became clear.

the primary limitation of the current state of performance measurement in regional emergency response is the reliance on policy output measurement. for reasons detailed earlier, the measurement of policy outcomes of emergency preparedness is rarely possible. instead, we measured judgments of emergency response officials about their levels of preparedness and asked them to report behaviors relevant to preparedness. While these measures capture conditions that are potentially relevant to a regionalized management approach, the meaning of the linkage between judgments and reported activities is not entirely obvious. it is thought, for example, that tabletop exercises help to prepare people for emergency situations. however, prior research in this field has not actually demonstrated the degree to which—if at all—exercises contribute to actual effectiveness in re- sponding to and managing a large-scale incident. the substantive meaning of the linkage between these preparedness measures and actual, not easily measurable performance levels remains to be determined.

the second limitation was the difficulty of transferring performance measure- ment from one type of disaster to another. the list of behaviors that one would consider in a triangulation performance measurement strategy will depend on the nature of the emergency for which the community is preparing. this paper focuses on large-scale emergencies such as nuclear or radiological bomb attacks or hur-

Gerber and robinson / LocaL Government Performance 367

ricanes. these are disasters that, in various ways, commonly include a need for evacuation. other disasters would call for sheltering in place (e.g., tornadoes), and the evacuation measures would not be appropriate. this limits the external validity of the measurement strategy. a measurement strategy that works well to assess preparedness for hurricanes may not be as appropriate for assessing preparedness activities related to earthquakes. the need for differentiated measurement strategies will make the accumulation of knowledge related to best practices in emergency preparedness treacherous and likely slow.

the third challenge, common to survey-based performance measurement, is the social desirability effects in each of the measures. While the evidence presented here suggests that respondents were willing to give answers that indicated igno- rance of the nrP, the possibility exists that such survey measures will understate ignorance or negative attitudes (e.g., such as reluctance to follow the nrP). inter- preting survey-based performance measures should be approached with caution, as social desirability effects can compress the variation in the responses (toward the positive end of the scale) and differentially affect measures (especially attitude- based measures or others that would be impossible to contradict with variation).

these results, however, do provide some lessons for emergency management professionals and scholars in spite of those qualifiers. first, the momentum toward regional coordination is clear. as a nation, we are still quite far from fully regionalized emergency response systems. Local preparedness efforts still predominate. however, collaboration and consultation between local preparedness efforts are increasing—and are increasingly necessary (see, e.g., comfort & Kapucu, 2006; robinson et al., 2006). this calls for new strategies for preparedness planning as well as new strategies for measuring preparedness. second, measurement of preparedness will require a multi-strategy assessment. one cannot rely on simple measures of preparedness because of the complexity of the subject and the imprecision of each individual measure. instead, pre- paredness measurement requires a multi-faceted approach that considers the development of pro-preparedness attitudes, subjective assessments of the state of preparedness, and measures of preparedness-related behaviors. combined, these measures can tell a much more complete story about preparedness than each could tell individually. as a result, we can have more confidence in the results of multistrategy assessments.

the nature of the threats facing emergency responders is changing. new threats cross traditional jurisdictional boundaries and call for regional responses. it is becoming clear that while regional response plans are emerging, ours is still a local system of emergency response. We hope that this article helps prepared emergency management officials to better measure their progress in preparation for the diverse array of emergencies they face in providing at least an initial basis for performance assessment on regional preparedness. further, we hope that the

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discussion of issues here provides a sense of the difficulties that these regionaliza- tion efforts are likely to face.

Notes

1. the term regional has many meanings and uses. We use regional to refer to a geographic area encompassing multiple local jurisdictions (city and county governments) or multiple state boundaries. We discuss the complexity of the term in greater detail in further discussion that follows.

2. in an important illustration of the possible limits of preparedness actions such as exercises, Kiefer and montjoy (2006) noted that because of federal prompting, prior to hurricane Katrina, an active southeastern Louisiana regional disaster management network had been developed. the utility of exercising those networks, however, is not altogether straightforward; exercises may not serve a gaps-analysis function—a critical deficiency.

3. the latter two measurement strategies, documentary analysis and preparatory behav- ior assessment, correspond to what donahue and tuohy (2008) referred to as compliance assessments.

4. as previously noted, the nrP was revised into the nrf in 2008. the process was controversial both because it underscored the centralized nature of policy development under the Bush administration and because the document has been described as too broad and vague to be useful. one local emergency manager described it as a public relations document, dis- connected from post-Katrina legislation that tries to strengthen fema’s role within the dhs (hsu, 2007a). further, state and local input was minimized, and the president of the national emergency management agency at the time declared that the process of excluding such input indicated a more polarized environment between federal and state government on emergency and disaster policy than he had ever seen in his career (hsu, 2007b).

5. it is, in part, an issue of governmental leadership (robinson et al., 2006) and partly an is- sue of recruiting and motivating local nongovernmental partners (robinson & Gerber, 2007).

6. there is one major exception to this claim: the regional catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (rcPGP). the aim of rcPGP is to enhance catastrophic-event planning and to prepare and expand regional collaboration. the program describes itself as promoting resilience by funding efforts that “fix shortcomings in existing plans; build regional planning processes and planning communities; and, link operational needs identified in plans to resource allocation, including homeland security grant programs” (U.s. dhs, 2008b, p. i). however, there are two important qualifiers: first, the funding of this program is limited (at present) to the 2009 fiscal year only, and, second, the program lists 10 areas nationally as eligible. that is, program scale is limited, and it does not represent a broad national initiative.

7. it is worth noting that emac began as a regional interstate compact with the southern Governors association, primarily to offer assistance between states during disasters—especially hurricane incidents. that agreement was transformed formally into emac in 1996 (federally codified in Public Law 104–321). emac functions at its core as a cooperative interstate mutual aid agreement (along with providing guidance on intrastate mutual aid agreement processes). Preparedness on a regional scale—with the multiple levels of regionalism outlined above— requires an institutional structure that goes beyond a mutual aid compact like emac to address the constraints just outlined.

8. this measure has significance in two ways. first, it is relevant because central place theory, based on the work of geographer Walter christaller, posits that the nature of community clustering has a variety of effects, including impacts on regional economics and the spatial character of urban development and administration (see heilbrun, 1987; seninger, 1989). second, in the context of homeland security, community characteristics, including population density and community economic conditions, seem to have an impact on preparedness efforts (see Gerber et al., 2007).

9. the measure was obtained from stats indiana (www.stats.indiana.edu).

Gerber and robinson / LocaL Government Performance 369

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Brian J. Gerber is associate professor in the Stephenson Disaster Management Institute and the Public Administration Institute, Louisiana State University. His research areas include disaster management policies and practices, homeland security policy, and the effects of bureaucratic design on policy outputs and out- comes. His work has been published in Public administration review, Journal of Public administration research and theory, Policy studies Journal, Urban affairs review, and others. He can be reached at [email protected].

Scott Robinson is associate professor of Government and Public Service at the Bush School, Texas A&M University. His research focuses on the management and politics of public agencies and the dynamics of public policy—with special attention to education management and disaster preparedness. His work has been published in Policy studies Journal, review of Policy research, american review of Public administration, Political research Quarterly, Public manager, and american Journal of Political science. He can be reached at srobinson@ bushschool.tamu.edu.