Discussion
Jocalynne
Week3-FrozenConflictsandProblemsonRussia27sPeriphery.pptxFrozen Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space and Problems on Russia’s Periphery
Hard Targets and Intelligence
Week 3
Duggleby
The Florida State University
1
Sovereignty?
2
Let’s address that sovereignty thing again
Only states deal with sovereignty and exercise authority over territory
States have “national interests,” which drive decision-making and policy
History, Culture and Religion play a major role within a state…
So does Nationalism, Patriotism and Pride!
The United States is the only remaining true super-power following the collapse of the Soviet Union
3
What is a ‘Frozen Conflict’?
Armed conflict has ended, but no peace treaty or political resolution has resolved the tensions to the satisfaction of the different sides(1)
Russia is responsible for ALL internationally recognized ‘frozen conflicts’ that began since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991
Sovereign nations affected represent 1/3 of countries previously part of the USSR: (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia)
Russia’s response has been to send ‘peacekeepers’, but then remain in the region and ‘stoke the fire’
Moscow’s pretext and justification is the need to ‘protect’ its compatriots—ethnic Russians and Russian speakers (1)
It all begins innocently, with attempts to appeal to the geographically conflicted locals by citing common values, the Orthodox Church, culture
—leads to handing out Russian citizenship/passports(2)
Internal sovereignty is achieved, but external sovereignty is not—no international recognition.
The United States and NATO respects the sovereignty of all states affected
Agnia Grigas: Frozen Conflicts; A Took Kit for US Policymakers
Beyond Crimea, the new Russian empire
4
5
Frozen Conflicts
Ukraine and Moldova are restricting Russian military access to the breakaway territory of Transnistria, where Russia maintains about 1500 “peacekeepers”
6
Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP)
U.S. sponsored, 18-month, $64 million program aimed at increasing the capabilities of the Georgian Armed Forces and enhancing Georgia’s CT capabilities
Began in May, 2002, ultimately trained and equipped four 600-man Special Forces battalions (2 Brigades) with light weapons, vehicles and communications
Was US SOF lead in the beginning, shifting to the USMC and the British Army
GTEP ended in April 2004, but actually continued under the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program, preparing Georgian troops for operations in Iraq
3d largest troop contributor in Afghanistan in 2008. Georgia had its two U.S. trained brigades deployed at the time Russia invaded in August of that year. This was certainly a calculated strategic move by Putin
7
Georgia Frozen Conflicts
Ukraine and Moldova are restricting Russian military access to the breakaway territory of Transnistria, where Russia maintains about 1500 “peacekeepers”
8
9
10
11
Hybrid Warfare
Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyberwarfare.[1] In addition, hybrid warfare is used to describe attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, improvised explosive devices and information warfare.[2] This approach to conflicts, is a potent, complex variation of warfare.[3] Hybrid warfare can be used to describe the flexible and complex dynamics of the battlespace requiring a highly adaptable and resilient response.[
What we see in Russia now, in this hybrid approach to war, is to use all the tools they have ... to stir up problems they can then begin to exploit through their military tool,” said Breedlove, NATO’s supreme allied commander.
Irregular warfare, Informal aggression, cyber.
http://yle.fi/uutiset/cyber_security_pro_finland_under_hybrid_warfare_attack/7470050
12
13
This is OSINT, but we get notifications with more intel through sharing
14
“Sanctity of Borders.” “Lack of Respect for the Sovereignty of other Countries.” (Robert Shaw – NATO, Brussels 28 June 2017)
Ukraine
Ukraine remains at risk of domestic turmoil, which Russia could exploit to undermine Kyiv’s pro-West orientation. These factors will threaten Ukraine’s nascent economic recovery and potentially lead to changes in its foreign policy that further inflame tension between Russia and the West.
Popular frustrations with the pace of reforms, depressed standards of living, perceptions of worsening corruption, and political polarization ahead of scheduled presidential and legislative elections in 2019 could prompt early elections.
Opposition leaders will seek to capitalize on popular discontent to weaken President Petro Poroshenko and the ruling coalition ahead of elections in 2019.
The conflict in eastern Ukraine is likely to remain stalemated and marked by fluctuating levels of violence. A major offensive by either side is unlikely in 2018, although each side’s calculus could change if it sees the other as seriously challenging the status quo. Russia will continue its military, political, and economic destabilization campaign against Ukraine to stymie and, where possible, reverse Kyiv’s efforts to integrate with the EU and strengthen ties to NATO. Kyiv will strongly resist concessions to Moscow but almost certainly will not regain control of Russian-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine in 2018. Russia will modulate levels of violence to pressure Kyiv and shape negotiations in Moscow’s favor.
Russia will work to erode Western unity on sanctions and support for Kyiv, but the Kremlin is coping with sanctions at existing levels.
Russia. We expect that Russia will conduct bolder and more disruptive cyber operations during the next year, most likely using new capabilities against Ukraine. The Russian Government is likely to build on the wide range of operations it is already conducting, including disruption of Ukrainian energy- distribution networks, hack-and-leak influence operations, distributed denial-of-service attacks, and false flag operations. In the next year, Russian intelligence and security services will continue to probe US and allied critical infrastructures, as well as target the United States, NATO, and allies for insights into US policy.
15
16
so much
for sovereignty!
17
International Actions after 2014
The NATO – Russia Council in Brussels is dissolved in Brussels—Russia told to “go home.”
Civilian and Military Cooperation has ceased
Agreement still in force on paper – still functioning in a limited manner with occasional talks
G-7 member states decided that Russia is no longer welcome because meaningful discussion would not be possible with Russia at the table
U.S. – Russia security cooperation programs canceled, permanently impacted:
Russian exercises in violation of Vienna Documents by not inviting observers. No transparency
Joint Staff Talks
Naval Ship Visits
Military Exercises and Exchanges
Security Assistance and Defense Education
The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established as a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action. Within the NRC, the individual NATO member states and Russia have worked as equal partners on a wide spectrum of security issues of common interest.
The NRC was established at the NATO-Russia Summit in Rome on 28 May 2002 by the Declaration on “NATO-Russia Relations: a New Quality”. The Rome Declaration builds on the goals and principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, which remains the formal basis for NATO-Russia relations. The NRC replaced the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), a forum for consultation and cooperation created by the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.
In April 2014, following Russia’s illegal military intervention in Ukraine and its violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Alliance suspended all practical cooperation between NATO and Russia including that which took place in the framework of the NRC. However, the Alliance agreed to keep channels of communication open in the NRC and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at Ambassadorial level and above, to allow the exchange of views, first and foremost on the crisis in Ukraine.
Three meetings of the NATO-Russia Council took place in 2016 and three in 2017. The first meeting in 2018 took place on 31 May. NATO remains open to a periodic, focused and meaningful political dialogue with Russia on the basis of reciprocity, as agreed at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016.
The NATO-Russia Council has an important role to play as a forum for dialogue and information exchange, to reduce misunderstandings and increase predictability.
The 29 individual Allies and Russia are equal partners in the NRC – instead of meeting in the bilateral “NATO+1” format under the PJC.
18
NATO Allies in Europe
Russia
Russia has developed a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) that the United States has declared is in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Despite Russia’s ongoing development of other Treaty-compliant missiles with intermediate ranges, Moscow probably believes that the new GLCM provides sufficient military advantages to make it worth risking the political repercussions of violating the INF Treaty. In 2013, a senior Russian administration official stated publicly that the world had changed since the INF Treaty was signed in 1987. Other Russian officials have made statements complaining that the Treaty prohibits Russia, but not some of its neighbors, from developing and possessing ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.
19
20
Transnational Organized Crime
Use of Energy as a Weapon
Nuclear Power Plant Catastrophe
Hybrid Warfare
Other Threats
21
Non-kinetic punishment - Energy
“RUSSIA’S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO PREVENT OUTSIDE POWERS (USA, NATO) FROM INTERFERING IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS.”(3)
Dunay, Pal, When Outsiders Interfere, per Concordium
22
Two Forever Frozen?
Ukraine and Moldova are restricting Russian military access to the breakaway territory of Transnistria, where Russia maintains about 1500 “peacekeepers”
23
Two Forever Finished?
Ukraine and Moldova are restricting Russian military access to the breakaway territory of Transnistria, where Russia maintains about 1500 “peacekeepers”
24
Problems on Russia’s Periphery
2020 was a year to be remembered. In addition to the myriad challenges surrounding the pandemic, Putin and the Russian Federation faced several problems maintaining it’s sway and influence in the post-Soviet space, taking Putin by surprise by the rapid succession of crises occurring back-to-back on Russia’s periphery:
In August 2020, demonstrators in Belarus began staging weekly protests against rigged presidential elections, won “officially” by long-standing leader Alexander Lukashenko
In September 2020, the frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh thawed, and war erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan
In October 2020, violent protests led to the ouster of Putin puppet and Kyrgyz president Soornonbay Jeenbekov
Problems on Russia’s Periphery and Internal Strife
These events affected Vladimir Putin greatly, and contributed to the growing internal problems in the Russian Federation. 4 Warning Signs of Instability:
Wage Arrears: Russian workers, primarily in Siberia and the Primorsky regions are not getting paid
Russia’s Banking System: Illegal and irresponsible activity, the decline in the price of oil, more workers not getting paid and bankruptcies
Political Protests: Economic difficulties leads to social unrest. Russians not getting paid and reduced social services points directly to an inept Putin government
Purges: Political and security purges ordered by Putin—basically getting rid of political rivals. Most prominent being Alexey Navalny’s poisoning with Novichok and recent arrest
Navalny is important because he epitomizes and catalyzes growing political awareness and a perceptible sentiment for change, especially among younger Russians
Recent Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh
If the political unrest in Kyrgyzstan and Belarus tested Russia’s handling of “people power,” the outbreak of war again between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 challenged Moscow’s role as the preeminent power in the South Caucasus and threatened the Kremlin’s ability to contain hostilities between the countries
Baku (Azerbaijan) is better armed than it has been in the past due to oil revenues and a lot more defense spending on sophisticated weapons
Yerevan (Armenia), still has the backing of the Russian Federation, to include Russian bases and troops on its territory
“Russia was doing all it could to maintain ties both with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Every day of conflict in Karabakh is helping zero out Russia’s authority. There is nothing good about these conflicts for Moscow.” (Konstantin Zatulin, senior Russian lawmaker and Putin ally)
Public Discontent and Cold War-style foreign policies
Within Russia, the economic hardship caused by the pandemic has helped deepen public anger against Putin
Some analysts say that public discontent within Russia means that Putin needs to turn more of his focus to domestic issues such as economic hardship, pollution and poor health care, rather than delving into global geopolitics
Moscow is likely to continue Cold War-style confrontation with the U.S. and its allies, wielding influence through arms and energy agreements, to further its aims
In the Western Hemisphere, Russia has expanded its engagement with Venezuela, supported Cuba, and used arms sales and energy agreements to try to expand access to markets and natural resources in Latin America
“For Putin, practically his entire mission and his vision of Russian greatness and success revolve around his foreign-policy agenda. The new series of crises will very much distract Putin from domestic problems.” (Tatiana Stanovaya, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center)
Desperately seeking solidarity
The multinational response to the Skripal attack—in which 27 NATO countries expelled 123 Russian diplomats and spies—remains the single most visible rebuke to the Russian intelligence challenge and also the most powerful example of a potential systemic counter
NATO has proven to be a uniquely effective alliance precisely because of the solidarity it embodies: an attack on one member state is an attack on all
At NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit, it was decided that a ‘hybrid attack’, mainly through cyber, could potentially lead to the invocation of Article 5 and retaliation in kind or kinetically
That is a mutual commitment that even Moscow appears to take seriously, for all Western concerns about potential faint-heartedness and division
In the context of the NATO alliance, where sharing intelligence and discussing common plans are a daily necessity, member states which fail to invest in their counter-intelligence agencies put not only their own security at risk but also that of their allies
Concluding Thoughts
Russia has been the cause or enabler of every frozen conflict in the Post Soviet Space
Putin seeks multipolarity and continues to destablize the region in his near abroad
I believe there will be more, and most of the current crises will not be resolved any time soon. What might be next?
Russia is in need of some foreign policy success—aggressive foreign policies unsupported and definitely not popular with the U.S., NATO, UN
30
31
