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Aggression and Violent Behavior 25 (2015) 95–103

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Aggression and Violent Behavior

The assumption of rational choice theory in Alfred Adler's theory of crime: Unraveling and reconciling the contradiction in Adlerian theory through synthesis and critique

Phillip Chong Ho Shon a,⁎, Shannon Barton-Bellessa b a Faculty of Social Science and Humanities, University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Oshawa, Ontario, Canada b Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, IN, United States

⁎ Corresponding author at: Faculty of Social Science Ontario Institute of Technology, Oshawa, Ontario L1H 7 8668x6516.

E-mail addresses: [email protected], pshon1@yahoo

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2015.07.004 1359-1789/© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

a b s t r a c t

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 27 January 2015 Accepted 8 July 2015 Available online 26 July 2015

Keywords: Alfred Adler Psychological theory of crime Rational choice Classical School

Alfred Adler is often introduced and discussed incorrectly as one of Freud's students and as a psychoanalytic the- orist in criminology and psychology textbooks. While thinkers such as Freud and Jung theorize about crime in tangential ways, as almost an afterthought to their accounts of neurosis and personality, Alfred Adler was one of the few pioneers in the history of psychology who had an actual theory of crime. Yet, Adler's writings on crime, its causes and assumptions have been largely overlooked in contemporary research. While Adler espoused the view that crime represents a “useless” response to the social demands of life, we argue that Adler's theory of crime presupposes a rational choice model of criminal behavior, thus mirroring the Classical School perspective on crime. This paper provides a synthesis and a critique of Alfred Adler's theory of crime.

© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Theories of crime implicitly presuppose a theory of self—a theory that provides a metaphysical account of motivation. For instance, choice theories of crime assume the rational, deliberative capacity of subjects to choose crime based on the principle of utility (Arrigo & Young, 1998). Differential theory of crime implicitly assumes a subject's (un)conscious need for approval from sources of moral au- thority as an underpinning of subjectivity (Bracher, 1993; Burgess & Akers, 1966); causal theories of crime assume the presence of an al- most universalizable, decontextualized force (e.g., self-control) that drives behavior (see Akers & Sellers, 2013). Even life-course theory assumes a positive, forward movement of a self toward social integration—unless hampered by snares—in its theory of self (see Moffitt, 1993a; Sampson & Laub, 1993). Crime can be viewed as an unnatural process that emerges when this life affirming momentum of the will is disrupted, and major turning points in life such as a strong marriage, steady employment, and military service facilitate meaningful behavioral change that work to reintegrate persons to- ward sociality (Farrington & West, 1995; Laub, Nagin, & Sampson, 1998; Laub & Sampson, 2003). A theory of self embedded in theories of crime either affirms consciousness and agency of subjects in some

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metaphysical way or vitiates their agency, rendering them as passive dopes who are controlled by extraneous forces (Milovanovic, 1997). Either way, theories of crime entail a theory of self.

Since a theory of self precedes a theory of crime, it may serve criminol- ogists well to look to their disciplinary neighbors to learn how conscious- ness, motivation, and agency have been formulated in psychology. Although psychological theories of crime have not been as dominant as the sociologically-informed theories of crime (e.g., differential association, rational choice, social disorganization, life-course) in the discipline of criminology (Laub & Sampson, 1991), they have the potential to benefit criminology in the following ways: (1) psychological theories of crime al- ready begin with a theory of self and an account of motivation in place. For instance, Freud (1938) theorized that people are motivated by the pleasure principle to satiate their physiological drives. Adler (1927a, 1927b) argued that individuals are motivated by a will-to-power which guides their prideful striving for superiority. Such accounts of theories of a self fill a glaring omission in contemporary criminological theory—a the- ory of self and a concomitant theory of motivation. People commit “crimes” for many reasons, and those reasons illuminate the variegated forms of motivation that are often tacitly presupposed in theories of crime. (2) A theory of self and its relation to society can be mined as the beginning point of a philosophically informed theory of crime and the state, for the assumptions about why people break rules lead to policies that attempt to contain and control problematic behaviors (e.g., Akers & Sellers, 2013). Consequently, criminologists have begun to argue for the need for a theory of self behind crime, criminological and criminal justice theory, as well as the self's relationship to the state as a way of buttressing

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the discipline's identity and legitimacy (Arrigo, 2008; Ferrell, 2009; Kraska, 2006).

This paper examines the works of one of the notable psychological theorists of personality and crime: Alfred Adler. There are several rea- sons why Alfred Adler's Individual Psychology and his theory of crime should be examined relative to contemporary criminological theories. First, most criminological texts fail to address psychological theories of crime and their contributions to the understanding of criminal behavior beyond the works of Freud, Jung, Fromm, or Erikson—to the virtual exclusion of Alfred Adler. Or, Alfred Adler's ideas are erroneously misrepresented as psychoanalysis, and he as one of Freud's students (Barton-Bellessa et al., 2015). It behooves us to explore and understand Adler's contribution to psychology and criminology in its own right.

Second, despite the voluminous works on personality formation, neurosis, crime, and psychotherapy, Alfred Adler's ideas are less well known when compared to his contemporaries such as Freud (1938) and Jung (1957, 1971). Importantly, Individual Psychology is imbued with its own set of metaphysical assumptions about the self (Stone, 2008) in ways that differ from psychoanalytic thinkers such as Freud and Jung (Barton-Bellessa et al., 2015). Adler is also relevant for crimi- nology as he was one of the few psychologists who had an actual theory of crime. Adler did not treat crime and criminals as tertiary topics as Freud and Jung did. For Adler, criminals, neurotics, perverts, and psy- chotics were all explained using one cogent construct (see Adler, 2002a, 2003a). Thus, rather than perpetuating inaccurate information about the works of Alfred Adler, it behooves us to fix the erroneous state of criminology and psychological theories of crime by imparting the actual views Adler espoused.

Finally, while Adler espoused a view similar to life-course theory of crime nearly a hundred years ago, he did not call his theory of crime by that name. In fact, although Adler's theory of crime tacitly suggested a life-course model, he overemphasized certain assumptions about offending on an individual level while neglecting to examine certain so- ciological aspects about crime. To date, however, few works have assessed the strengths and weaknesses of Adler's theory of crime, as well as the points of convergence and divergence in relation to contem- porary criminological theories, although a few have directly tested his theory of crime (e.g., Highland, Kern, & Curlette, 2010; Newbauer & Stone, 2010; Sweitzer, 2005). This paper attempts to fill in those short- comings in Adler's work by situating his theory relative to contempo- rary sociological and criminological theories of crime. First, this paper begins by providing an overview of Adler's theory of personality and crime. Second, it situates Adlerian theory of crime in the context of con- temporary criminological theories. Finally, this paper provides a critique of Adler's theory of crime from a process- and power-oriented frame- work of contemporary criminological perspectives. The implications for Adler's theory of crime are discussed.

2. Alfred Adler's theory of personality and crime

From the Individual Psychological perspective of Alfred Adler, neu- rotics, alcoholics, drug addicts, and “criminals” share a common bond: lack of social interest. That is, rather than conceptualizing mental health by the absence of intrapsychic conflict a la Freud, Adler (1927a, 1927b, 1931, 2007, 1917) was a proponent of examining the self's relationship to society in holistic ways, as indicated by the subjects' response to the demands of the three main tasks of life: friendship, work, and love. Ac- cording to the tenets of Individual Psychology, a person has two princi- pal ways of responding to the question of how he or she will contribute to society and fellow citizens: in socially useful or socially useless ways (Mosak & Maniacci, 1999). Mental health, in Adlerian theory, is mea- sured in terms of social utility.

Since Adler's pioneering foray into the causes of deviant behavior (see The Collected Clinical Works of Alfred Adler, vols. 1–12), his fol- lowers have extended his ideas to a variety of problematic behaviors, such as purging (Marshall & Fitch, 2006), perfectionism (Stoltz &

Ashby, 2007), binge drinking (Lewis., & Wachter, 2006), safeguarding through hesitation (Stewart, 2007), and narcissism (Boldt, 2007; Maniacci, 2007). Preceding Adler-informed works have in common the finding that individuals who engage in aberrant behaviors attempt to use their symptoms as a way of gaining a false sense of superiority over others: rather than contributing to society in socially useful and productive ways, they have chosen to evade the main tasks of life by adopting neurotic and criminal methods of reinforcing their false senses of pride.

According to the tenets of Individual Psychology, personality begins in infancy and is largely formed by the age of 5: an infant's realization of its dependence on others to meet its basic needs leads to feelings of in- feriority. Although Adler discussed several other factors that led to feel- ings of inferiority, he was emphatic about the influence of parenting style and birth order on the development of personality (see Eckstein et al., 2010). Adler's works on the psychology of birth order and its effect on the antithetical schemes of apperception and personality defects (see Adler, 2005a) can be succinctly synthesized into two principal con- structs that exemplify the consequences of a subjectively perceived and created interpretation of reality: pampering and neglect.

In a nutshell, pampered children have been trained to be dependent on others while neglected (i.e., hated, abused, maltreated) children have been raised to be “on guard” in life. Whether pampered and neglected children expect to be pampered or demand it, whether they seek the continuation of pampering or demand to be compensated for its absence as adults, the consequences of pampering and neglect lead to a particular psychology of criminality (see Adler, 2004a). First, the ex- pectation of continuation and compensation lead to discontentment and perceptions of being “shortchanged,” which leads to a sense of en- titlement that life owes something to those who have been brought up pampered or neglected (Horney, 1950); if one feels entitled to some- thing, the next step in the evolution of behavior is to forcibly take it (see Beech, Fisher, & Ward, 2005; Fisher, Beech, Carich, & Kohut, 2006; Polaschek & Gannon, 2004). Second, those who have been pampered and neglected have not sufficiently developed their levels of social inter- est; consequently, they are inconsiderate toward others and have diffi- culty establishing relationships with other people. As they have been brought up in self-centered ways, both pampered and neglected per- sons maintain styles of life that are egotistical and self-indulgent (Canter, 2000; Carich, Fisher, & Kohut, 2006; Horney, 1937). Third, be- cause they have not figured out how to relate meaningfully to others, there is a compulsion to gain a sense of superiority over them by decep- tion, guile, or force (Horney, 1945). Finally, both pampered and neglected individuals aim at escaping the responsibilities of life, society, work, and intimacy by avoiding cooperative solutions.

If neurotics and criminals share similarities in the sources of their feelings of inferiority, there are notable differences as well. Neurotics have a limited sphere of activity, and this limitation forces neurotics to control others through their symptoms. Criminals, on the other hand, possess a limited amount of cooperation and a greater degree of activity. Their striving toward superiority is not as restricted as that of neurotics. According to Adler's (2003b, 2006a) theory of crime, criminals' propen- sities toward crime are largely set by the age of 4 or 5. Children who are neglected, abused, and unwanted are likely to form a mean view of the world. They are likely to feel “shortchanged” and unloved, and to be- lieve that they have been unfairly treated by those around them. Conse- quently, their propensity toward crime is first manifested in juvenile delinquency: those children will play truant from school and associate with others who provide a sense of belonging, acceptance, and protec- tion; school administrators and teachers who punish them will only confirm the presupposed view that the world is an unjust place. Essen- tially, the preceding statements encapsulated Adler's theory of onset of crime, juvenile delinquency, and gang membership.

If neurotics expect to be pampered by enlisting others to serve their needs through their symptoms, criminals exercise agency and forcibly take what they think is owed to them. According to Adler, criminals

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view the world as a hostile and dangerous place and see crime as the only way of solving their problems. Rather than taking a social route to solving the tasks of life—work, love, friendship—criminals take “shortcuts” and secure “cheap victories” by using guile and force to evade their responsibilities. Instead of diligently working to make ends meet, a criminal steals; instead of finding a lifelong monogamous partner, a criminal forcibly steals or buys sex (Canter, Bennell, Alison, & Reddy, 1998; Polaschek & Gannon, 2004); instead of forming social relationships, criminals form convenient unions for the sake of illicit gain (Katz, 1988). According to Adler, the intent to do harm through premeditated means to compensate for what has been lacking in their lives is what differentiates the logic of criminals from neurotics, drunks, and other deviant individuals.

For Adler, personality was explained as a subject's attitude—toward others, work, and life. Adler also believed in the capacity to change by stimulating one's social interest: he advocated for a change in people's attitude in gentle, caring ways in his practice as a therapist (Stein, 2008). Viewed in such a philosophical light, the decision to become in- volved in crime and to desist from it was inextricably related to a change in attitude. Therefore, Adler logically rejected any notions of an inborn criminality: “Children of the same family and the same environment can develop in entirely different ways…if criminal tendencies were an inborn defect, or irrevocably ingrained by a person's childhood environment, this fact would be quite beyond understanding. From our own point of view, however, we have no trouble understanding such a change” (Adler, 1931, 2007, pp. 169–170).

Although Adler's Individual Psychology is systematic in explaining the origins of personality, the process of change from a criminal life- style to a law-abiding one was less cogently explained: “Some criminals reform later in life, and criminal psychologists have often had difficulty in explaining how burglars, on reaching the age of thirty, may settle down and become good citizens…. Or perhaps they have already got all they wanted from crime and thus it no longer serves a purpose. Perhaps, finally, they are growing older, less suited to a criminal careernn their joints are stiff and they are no longer as nimble as they were” (Adler, 1931, 2007, pp. 169–170). That is, rather than examining the multitude of “push” and “pull” factors that are implicative in the decision to desist from crime, such as a good marriage, meaningful work, and other major turn- ing points in life (Blokland & Nieuwbeerta, 2005; Bushway, Thornberry, & Krohn, 2003; Farrington, 2007; Giordano, Cernkovich, & Rudolph, 2002; Laub & Sampson, 2003; Maruna, 1997, 2001; Warr, 1998), Adler attributed desistance to simplistic and obvious causes (e.g., stiffening joints).

Adler's definition of crime and criminals also restricts who can be de- fined as a criminal while automatically excluding others. For Adler, true criminals plan their crimes; crime is profitable and entails an intentional injury to others. This narrow definition of crime and criminals that Adler employs also minimizes the harm to society as a result of their offenses as a distinguishing criterion and unwittingly points the criminological lens at the lower classes (Reiman, 2008). Although Adler acknowledged the potential impact of structural forces such as poverty, racism, and war on the development of personality, he did not adequately examine how those factors might affect the decision to become involved in crime. Similarly, although Adler was socialistic in his thinking and outlook, he assumed a rather instrumentalist view of crime and neglected to inte- grate the political economy of crime in his theoretical endeavors. Where might Adler's theory of crime and delinquency fit amongst con- temporary criminological theories?

3. Validation of Adler's theory of crime in contemporary theories of crime

Individual-level theories attempt to explain crime as a function of personal deficits. For example, the Classical School attempts to link the causes of criminal behavior to rational thought or free will. Deterrence theories assume that individuals commit crimes after weighing the

rewards and costs (e.g., Beccaria, 1764, 2009; Clarke & Cornish, 1985). Contemporary Classical School theories, also known as opportunity the- ories (e.g., Rational Choice, Routine Activities, Lifestyle Theories), posit that crime is a choice that is made after rational calculation, although it is also influenced by opportunities to participate in illicit behavior that are present in everyday life (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Thus, in the Classical School framework, present day events and needs are more in- strumental in the decision-making processes than past experiences (Lilly, Cullen, & Ball, 2011). Theorists argue that structural variables, such as time and space, influence the commission of criminal and devi- ant acts rather than just the individual differences of offenders who are prone toward criminality (see Asbridge & Butters, 2013; Felson, 2002; Hindelang, Gottfredson, & Garofalo, 1978).

The Positivist School of thought, conversely, seeks to explain crime through individual and environmental/structural influences that pre- dispose an individual toward crime. Traditional biological theories of crime, exemplified in the work of Ceseare Lombroso, assume physical defect as a cause of crime (Beaver et al., 2009; Lombroso, Gibson, & Rafter, 2006). Modern day biological theories incorporate both biologi- cal and environmental factors that influence criminal behavior: the nu- merous causes of brain damage, trauma, and cognitive functioning (Raine, 2013); maternal smoking (Verny, 2012); alcohol (Larkby, Goldschmidt, Hanusa, & Day, 2011); drug use (Pulsifer, Butz, O'Reilly foran, & Belcher, 2008; Wright, 2011); stress (Fisher et al., 2011); birth complication (Raine, Brennan, & Mednick, 1997); and exposure to lead and other environmental toxins (Ernhart, 2006; Wright, 2011) contribute to a failure in impulse control (Moffitt, 1993b; Pincus, 2001; Tibbetts & Piquero, 1999).

Social bond theorists, on the other hand, attribute the causes of crim- inal behavior, primarily, to structural forces. According to Durkheim (1933, 1997), a state of normlessness, along with a lack of social regula- tion, emerges as societies modernize. He hypothesized that as the mode of production changed from an agricultural one to an industrial one, a radical reconfiguration of social customs, residential patterns, and norms would take place, propelling the city into a state of chaos and dis- array (Durkheim, 1951, 1979). It is this Durkheimean idea—that social bonds erode as cities develop and that eroding bonds lead to social disorganization—that has remained as the enduring legacy of the Chica- go School, which subsequent sociologists and criminologists have built upon (Massey & Denton, 1993; Pratt & Cullen, 2005; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Wilson, 1997).

If there is a central point that social ecologists have asserted to be nearly axiomatic, it is that crime, social disorganization, and high job- lessness in inner cities are largely attributable to the decline of manufacturing and industry (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Wilson, 1997). It has been noted that this pervasive joblessness caused by a dramatic decline in the manufacturing sector has been particularly acute for African-American men (Sampson, 1987). In communities that are marked by poverty, segregation, and unemployment among adult men, one is likely to see a decline in collective supervision, residential participation, and meaningful social networks (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). The effect of such civic insouciance is that a sense of com- munity erodes, and a neighborhood's capacity to regulate the behavior of its citizens informally is compromised. What emerges in its place is a code of the street that replaces that established sense of normative order (Anderson, 1999).

Robert Merton's Strain Theory viewed crime as a structurally in- duced phenomenon. Reminiscent of a Horatio Algier novel, Merton noted that Americans were taught that individuals ameliorate their po- sition from abject poverty to prosperity through hard work (Lilly et al., 2011). Merton (1938) observed that there was a tacit cultural consensus regarding the absolute standards of achievement and accomplishment (e.g., monetary wealth) as well as the normative means of their procurement (e.g., hard work, perseverance). Applying Durkheim's no- tion of anomie, Merton argued that “the social condition in which insti- tutionalized norms lost [lose] their power to regulate human needs and

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actions” (Lilly et al., 2011, p. 65) could lead to a sense of normlessness or crime. Merton also cautioned that the widespread desire for wealth could promote deviance and crime.

As Merton noted, there is an inherent contradiction in the strain model of crime, for people are free to pursue their desire for material success and encouraged to attain it, although, sometimes, without the structurally provided means to its achievement, which then fosters an environment where anomie and deviance mutually reinforce one an- other: “disassociation between culturally defined aspirations and so- cially structured means” results in crime (Merton, 1938, p. 674). Moreover, the cultural emphasis on success compels individuals to adopt whatever means to achieve it, thereby mollifying the power of in- stitutional norms to regulate behavior (Merton, 1938). It is this version of Merton's Strain Theory that has been extended through the evolution of Albert Cohen, Richard Cloward, and Lloyd Ohlin's study of gangs: they expanded Merton's work to explicate the understanding of illicit behav- ior through the development of subcultures (Cohen) and the opportu- nity (Cloward and Ohlin) to commit crime (Agnew, 1992; Lilly et al., 2011).

The most notable extension of Strain Theory evolved with Robert Agnew's development of the General Strain Theory. Agnew argued that Merton was limited in his understanding of strains that prevented individuals from achieving culturally agreed upon goals. Agnew argued that strain may exist in the following forms: “(1) prevent one from achieving positively valued goals, (2) remove or threaten to remove positively valued stimuli that one possesses, or (3) present or threaten to present one with noxious or negatively valued stimuli” (Agnew, 1992, p. 50). The final extension of anomie as strain evolved from the work of Messner and Rosenfeld (2012) with their development of Insti- tutional Anomie Theory. Although Messner and Rosenfeld concurred with Merton's notion of culture and social structure, they argued that he failed to account for the role of social institutions in supporting the acceptance and achievement of societal goals and means through any means necessary. In the United States, the pursuit of economic success above all else has led society to support the notion that all institutions such as family and education come secondary to monetary gain. Thus, the ability to informally control behavior is diminished, which then leads to increases in criminal activity (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2012).

Process-based explanations of crime point the causal lens at other macro-level factors. According to Bandura, the process of learning oc- curs in social ways. While a multitude of authors have sought to apply these concepts in both psychology and sociology, it is Bandura's pro- cesses of counterconditioning, extinction, discrimination learning, methods of rewards, and punishment through behavioral techniques, particularly operant conditioning, that have been applied to criminolo- gy (Bandura, n.d.; Bandura, 1971). The incorporation of psychological principles allowed researchers to combine both micro- (individual) and macro- (environment) level explanations. These behavioral thera- py techniques in Bandura's “social learning” theory have been expanded into criminology by Burgess and Akers (1966) through their develop- ment of Social Learning Theory which is a reformulation of Sutherland's Differential Association theory.

Sutherland, emphasizing the sociological processes at work, main- tained that criminal behavior is learned, along with specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes, in interaction with others in intimate personal groups, that a person becomes delinquent due to excess definitions favorable to law violation over unfavorable ones (Sutherland & Cressey, 1966). His theory, however, failed to ac- count for how the learning occurred other than through the process of imitation (Akers & Sellers, 2013). Burgess and Akers' Social Learning Theory retains Sutherland's principal ideas while adding how behavior is acquired, persists, and desists through behavioral mechanisms (oper- ant conditioning). Akers states that approving definitions are developed through imitation and differential reinforcement, and make the behav- ior morally desirable while neutralizing definitions excuse or justify a crime (Burgess & Akers, 1966).

In addition to the Chicago School theorists, control theorists have reintroduced Durkheim's ideas. Unlike previous efforts to explain crime as a function of the environment and the numerous influences on persons (i.e., rule-breaking), control theories seek to explain why in- dividuals conform to societal norms. Extending Durkheim's notion of social solidarity and social integration, the essence of the argument is that crime and deviance may result unless social solidarity is preserved and maintained (Lilly et al., 2011). Simply put, individuals develop the concept of primary self through intimate and frequent associations with significant others. Furthermore, communities reflecting the most distance from one another were prone to increased levels of crime. Bor- rowing from these traditions, control theorists proposed that conformi- ty could be found in acceptance of rules and regulations (Reiss, 1951); through family controls (Nye, 1958); factors that contained behaviors internally or externally (Reckless, 1967); and through techniques of neutralization used to justify behavior (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Despite the various forms of control theory, the most notable one was that put forward by Travis Hirschi (1969)—Social Bond. According to Hirschi, people are motivated to seek immediate gratification through any means possible. Although the desire to meet basic needs through illegal means is inherent in all people, thereby mirroring theological explana- tions of deviant behavior, most citizens choose to remain law abiding. Hirschi argued that four bonds—attachment, commitment, involve- ment, and belief—allowed society to maintain order. For Hirschi, crime occurs when individuals are not socialized into conventional belief systems.

Most recently, an extension of the social bond thesis contends that crime is not solely a function of youth. Instead, “crime and deviance are more likely to occur when an individual's bond to society is weak or broken” throughout a lifetime (Laub & Sampson, 2003, p. 6). In this framework, Laub and Sampson (2003) attempted to challenge the con- ventional idea that persistent offenders are distinguished by early pre- dictors, such as low socioeconomic background, residential instability, lower IQs, involvement in school problems, and early onset of criminal careers which escalates and persists into later adulthood (Piquero, Farrington, Nagin, & Moffitt, 2010; Sampson & Laub, 1993; White, Bates, & Buyske, 2001).

Developmental theories of crime have sought the causes of delin- quency at the individual level, beginning with a developmental-based typology which attempts to classify the trajectory of offending based on the onset and duration of offenses (Moffitt, Caspi, Dickson, Silva, & Stanton, 1996; Nagin, Farrington, & Moffitt, 1995; Nagin & Tremblay, 1999; Simons, Wu, Conger, & Lorenz, 1994). In this view, delinquency is delineated by temporal and personality factors that result in two pri- mary types of offenders (Moffitt, 1993a). Those who delimit their in- volvement in crime to their teenage years can be described as adolescence-limited (AL) offenders while those who begin their delin- quency in early childhood and persist through adolescence and into adulthood as life-course-persistent (LCP) offenders (Moffitt et al., 1996). According to Moffitt's (1993a, b) account, the etiology, continui- ty, and course of delinquency fundamentally differ for these two types of offenders.

Adler's theory of crime is consistent with several contemporary theories of crime on a macro- and micro-level. As the name of the psychology he founded suggests, Adler examined individuals and sought to understand their behavior on a personal level. Moreover, he attempted to understand how his patients erroneously constructed and misconstrued their position in life as a function of their distorted private logic. On such a level, Adler's theory of crime is an illustration of a micro-level theory at work, as he is primarily elaborating on the cognitive distortions that justify and excuse rule-breaking behavior prior to their occurrence (see Sykes & Matza, 1957). Moreover, the con- temporary finding that adolescents engage in crime primarily for social and existential reasons (Moffitt, 1993a), and that they naturally age out of delinquency as they enter into adulthood (Laub & Sampson, 2003) is consistent with Adler's theory of crime. Adler observed that crime is

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mostly committed by teenagers who do so to impress their friends and to “belong,” thus mirroring the main thrust of differential association, social learning, and strain theories. Furthermore, Adler also noted that juveniles aged out of delinquency once they entered adulthood and found employment, thus predicting the model of natural desistance that contemporary life-course criminologists have noted (Sampson & Laub, 2003).

Adler's clinical experience as a psychotherapist, in fact, adds one ad- ditional level of detail that contemporary criminologists have not ex- plored: what do juvenile offenders do with the profits from their offenses (i.e., theft, burglary)? Adler noted that the subjects he encoun- tered often gave away the proceeds from their crimes to their peers as a way of seeking their acceptance and approval. Adler's findings on juvenile delinquency would thus support the works of contemporary developmental criminologists (e.g., Moffitt, 1993a) and social learning theorists (Burgess & Akers, 1966). Or, more accurately, contemporary criminological research would support Adler's ideas about crime. More- over, Adler's insight into the post-offense behaviors of juvenile delin- quents would add an additional level of depth and breadth to the understanding of motivation behind criminal behavior.

Viewed on a philosophical and sociological level, Adler's principal ideas intimate a macro-level view of crime as well. Just as life-course theorists attempt to contextualize the onset, persistence, and desistance from crime throughout the life course (Piquero et al., 2010), as a func- tion of the presence and absence of meaningful social bonds, Adler too assessed mental health and crime throughout the entire life cycle, con- tingent upon a subject's fulfillment of the major tasks of life. In Adler's theoretical framework, a subject moves toward the completion and res- olution of normatively defined benchmarks throughout life: during ad- olescence a subject ought to have figured out questions of self-identity as well as how to relate to others (Erikson, 1980; Moffitt, 1993a). In early adulthood, a subject ought to have solved the question of occupa- tion; as an adult, Adler believed that subjects ought to have solved the problem of love and sex by marrying and starting a family (Erikson, 1997). Adler's ideas about the normatively delineated stages of life mir- ror and predate the dominant criminological theory—life course—by al- most a hundred years. Adler was a theorist who was ahead of his time. Yet, there were also shortcomings in his views about crime. Such short- comings in our understanding of Adler's works lead us to ask how he and subsequent Adlerian theorists of crime would reconcile Adler's the- ory of crime with contemporary literature on crime.

4. Process and power-based critique of Alfred Adler's theory of crime

The ostensible aim of criminological theory is to understand the pro- cesses by which crime occurs, with the ultimate goal of predicting and “controlling” crime (Akers & Sellers, 2013). This forecasting approach to criminological theory, however, has been criticized as being overly positivistic (Ferrell, 2004, 2009) as it overlook the crimes of the power- ful (e.g., Henry & Milovanovic, 1996). Some have argued that such an unflinching acceptance of crime as crime only serves the interests of the ruling class, that using index crimes as a measure of “crime” blindly assumes the ontological reality of crime without reflecting upon the so- cial reality of its existence (Quinney, 1970, 1977; Young, 2011).

Others have argued that criminology as a discipline cannot accept the definition of crime and the research agenda mandated by the gov- ernment a priori precisely because it purports to be an independent ac- ademic activity (see Kraska, 2006). Reiman (2008) contends that the definition of harm, as measured by the index crimes, is inconsistent with the purported aim of the criminal law, that the extant laws demon- strate a bias against the poor rather than those who effectuate the greatest amount of harm (Irwin, 1985; Young, 2011). Consequently, the central question that criminology as a discipline must address first is to define the meaning of crime prior to its measurement (Ferrell, 2004). Otherwise, criminology as a discipline cannot become

independent and assume an identity as a legitimate social scientific dis- cipline (Arrigo, 2008; Kraska, 2006).

And it is precisely Adler's unflinching acceptance of the ontology of crime that can be used as grounds for criticism. Adler never questioned the definition of crime per se. In most, if not all, of Adler's published works, the definition and meaning of crime remain static: a crime is committed when an offender gains materially through property and in- terpersonal crimes. While such a materialistic view is consistent with the legal definition of crime, it is inadequate on several grounds. For instance, Adler's analysis of crime and criminals always centered on offenders' instrumental motivation rather than on their expressive as- pects. Furthermore, for a crime—even murder—to be counted as one in Adler's theoretical framework, premeditation is a necessary condition. There is little room for spontaneity, sensuality, and transactional prop- erties of offense commission in Adler's view of crime (see Ferrell, 2004; Katz, 1988; O'Malley & Mugford, 1995).

Adler's idea of crime also runs into a contradiction when the reality of crime is examined. Using homicide as an example, previous studies have shown that homicides tend to unfold in sequential and procedural ways: the offender and victim are mired in banal social intercourse be- fore a trivial altercation initializes a series of actions that culminate in a fatality (Luckenbill, 1977; Wolfgang, 1958). It is difficult to ascribe strict legal and moral culpability to offenders for their crimes when outcomes are based on chance and muddy decision-making due to inebriation, rather than to malicious intent. Such a finding would militate against imputing essentialist interpretations of personality defects (DiCataldo & Everett, 2008). Adler's theory of crime works only if the meaning and definition of crime presupposes materialist and rational assump- tions about the decision-making processes, and excludes other sociolog- ical, cultural, and emotional factors.

In addition to the acquisitive and instrumental character of crime that is embedded in Adler's theory of crime, his account also presup- poses certain assumptions about the psychology of motivation. First, Adler's account of crime presupposes the view that individuals choose to commit crimes after weighing the rewards and costs of their actions (Clarke & Cornish, 1985). This position would, essentially, turn Adler's theory of crime into a rational choice model of crime: given two equal set of alternatives to behavior, Adler's account predicts that crim- inals will choose crime because it represents the easier and less strenu- ous route. That is, rather than obtaining the desirable outcomes (e.g., wealth, love, friendship) through effort, criminals choose shortcuts (i.e., through murder, theft, and rape) as ways of circumventing ordi- nary procedures for achievement—precisely the cognitive signature of a neurotic claim turned into an entitlement (Horney, 1950)

By making such rational assumptions about crime and criminals, Adler missed the socially bounded decision-making processes of of- fenders that contemporary sociologists and criminologists have noted (Barlow & Kauzlarich, 2012; Shover & Honaker, 1992). Research has shown that murderers, robbers, and burglars do not plan their offenses or think about the rewards or adverse consequences as much as they are seduced and carried away by the social and cultural norms of their neighborhood, peers, and lifestyle, along with the situational allure of the criminal acts themselves (De Haan & Vos, 2003; Katz, 1988; Shover, 1996; Wright & Decker, 1994, 1997). Crime is better explained by the zigzag patterns of rule breaking (Matza, 1964) than in the hedonistic and economic assumption that Adler's theory of crime presupposes.

Again, using homicide as the most serious and consistent indicator of “crime,” Adler's position on crime would illustrate the shortcomings of his theory. For example, Adler never discussed the willful and malicious neglect that results in the death of another person as an instance of mur- der. Adler would have defined events like Columbine and Virginia Tech massacres as crimes. The preceding mass murders would have been de- fined as crimes in an Adlerian framework because there is a clear of- fender(s), the intent to kill is premeditated, and the victims killed were defenseless. Adler's definition of crime would have precluded

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industrial deaths that kill three or more people as criminal offenses; in cases of negligent industrial “accidents” that lead to multiple deaths, im- personal forces, rather than a culpable individual, would be seen as cul- prits due to an absence of a malicious intent to kill (Reiman, 2008). The number of deaths that occur in work sites and hospitals, if treated like crimes, would lead to exponential increases in the homicide rate (Lubaszka & Shon, 2013).

Adler's theoretical framework would also have overlooked the state's complicity and the capitalist class's interest in suppressing and defining out of crime (Quinney, 1977). Such a conclusion could be legit- imately inferred because Adler's exposition on crime and criminals al- most exclusively involved those who had deliberately stolen or killed in order to acquire a material advantage while excluding negligent deaths in industrial accidents and hospital deaths. The victims in indus- trial and workplace “accidents” would be ascribed partial responsibility as their presence at the site was a result of their own free will. Such nu- anced distinctions are defensible because certain presuppositions would already have been made that obfuscate the equivalence between the types of mass killings. Those presuppositions would diminish the harm effectuated by managerial executives by labeling one as an acci- dent while amplifying the legal and moral culpability of school shooters. In Adler's framework, there is no place for the state's role as complicit agents in the production of crime, through commission, omission, and definition.

In Adler's theory of crime (and personality), the criminal falls into two principal categories. In the first, the criminal is a consequence of a pampered upbringing: the primary caretakers have overindulged their offspring to such an extent that they feel entitled to steal, rob, and kill in order to meet their desires and wants. Such persons conflate wants with entitlement. In the second, the criminal is a consequence of abuse and neglect. Such persons have grown up in a way that they know only hostility, and as a result, carry over that hostile view of the world into their interactions with the world and the people in it. This feeling of being “shortchanged” leads to a compensatory sense of enti- tlement which justifies their harsh treatment of people. Adler's typolog- ical classification of “criminals” is not that different from his theory of personality formation.

In such a dualistic psychological view, a much more sociologically and legally nuanced analysis is not feasible, for Adler's view of crime and criminals would necessarily have to reject the similarities between a typical murder and an industrial accident that results in death, even though it could be argued that the consequences are not that different. One is simply defined as a crime while the other is not. Adler never questioned the ontological presuppositions of crime, and just accepted the definition of crime proffered by the state. Similarly, Adler would have encountered the drug users and dealers during the crack epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S. (Mauer, 1999) as examples of persons who had chosen to seek an easy way out rather than facing the social challenges of life in courageous ways (see Highland & Dabney, 2009).

Beginning in the 1980s, the punishment for possessing 5 g of crack was 5 years in prison. To receive the same amount of prison time, an of- fender had to be in possession of 500 g of powder cocaine. The U.S. Sen- tencing Commission initially noted a 100 to 1 sentencing disparity for crack and cocaine convictions. This disparity led to the burgeoning of the U.S. prison system, which initially began in the 1970s and persisted into early 21st century, propelling the U.S. as one of the most punitive society in the Western world (Mauer, 1999). This sentencing disparity can be explained by examining the users of the drugs (Alexander, 2008). The law functioned to protect the class interests of the well-to- do European Americans who primarily used powder cocaine while punishing crack users in inner cities who were poor, and almost always, persons of color (Reiman, 2008). Some have argued that this disparity in punishment and drug control policy has done more to disenfranchise minority communities of resources (Mauer & Chesney-Lind, 2002) and created near slavery-like consequences as a result of punitive social policy (Blackmon, 2008; Travis, 2002). Furthermore, mass incarceration

of African-American men has resulted in disturbances in voting patterns as a result of felon disenfranchisement laws which has challenged the very meaning of democracy (Mauer, 1999, 2002), changed the prison culture for the worse, and eroded the tenability of black families (Braman, 2002; Western, 2007). Thus, if we examine the class and racial distribution of those incarcerated in American prisons, it is easy to make the argument that the criminal justice system has worked as a way of controlling poor African Americans while protecting the interests of the wealthy European Americans (Alexander, 2008; Clear, 2002; Young, 2011).

Adler would have interpreted the practice of using and dealing drugs, and later, arrest, as confirmation that drug dealers possessed a private logic that was antithetical to social cooperation (Highland & Dabney, 2009). Adler, however, would not have examined the social, political, and economic conditions that would have led to the adoption of drug dealing as a de facto employment policy in hyper-segregated inner cities (Massey & Denton, 1993; Western, 2007; Wilson, 1997). As criminologists and sociologists have shown, making a living by sell- ing drugs represents a minimally viable way to eke out a living when other legitimate opportunities are foreclosed (Levitt & Venkatesh, 2000). On an individual level and according to the precepts of Individual Psychology, drug dealers would have been defined as “criminals.” Viewed from a contemporary sociological framework, they would have been ordinary people just trying to “get by.” Such sociological in- sights would have affected how Adler defined “crime” and “criminals”; such insights should be incorporated into contemporary Adlerian theo- ries of crime.

That Adler assumed an instrumental and materialist view of crime suggests that his account of crime shares certain parallels with other classical and rational choice theorists of crime such as Jeremy Bentham and John S. Mill, and leads to a rejection of one of the fundamental les- sons of conflict criminology. That is, by presupposing motivating princi- ples of behavior that rely upon tenets of rationalism and economic theory to explain criminal behavior, notice what view of crime and crim- inals Adler and Adlerians must, necessarily, reject. In Adler's theory of crime, criminals are not “produced” in a sociological sense, but “pro- duced” in a psychological sense as a result of parenting styles and family dynamics that plant the seeds of criminality early in life. Adler dispropor- tionately gives weight to formative years and personality development, and by doing so, misses a rudimentary lesson in crime and punishment: what gets defined as a crime and who gets defined as a criminal is not de- termined by immutable laws of nature and personality formation, but al- ways a function of power (Foucault, 1977). Crime—its definition, measurement, enforcement, prosecution, and punishment—is more linked to economics, politics, law, and power than just psychological principles (see Chambliss, 1979; Turk, 1966). That lesson is something Alfred Adler would have learned from contemporary scholars of crime and justice.

Missing this rudimentary nexus between power and crime also led Alfred Adler to conflate theory of delinquency with theory of gang for- mation. Adler viewed gang formation to be a natural outcome of juve- niles who skipped school and associated with like-minded delinquents as a way of providing a sense of belonging and acceptance. Adler went on to state that school administrators and teachers who punished them would have only confirmed the presupposed view of the world as an unjust place, thereby sustaining a siege-mentality of sorts. What Adler provided in his writing was a theory of delinquency, not a theory of gang formation. Adler got that part wrong.

Contemporary criminologists have shown that gangs are a reaction to the racial, ethnic, and economic oppression suffered at the hands of the ruling class and agents of social control (Hagedorn, 1988), that gangs are byproducts of hopelessness, economic stagnation, and repres- sive authority (Hagedorn, 2007). Joining a gang and engaging in petty and serious mischief, then, becomes one way of affirming one's place in an unjust world and social structures that have ignored the aspira- tions of young minority men (Hagedorn, 2008). Adler also would have

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missed the fact that dirty politicians, corrupt police, and gangsters are not that different, except that one group receives the protection of the legal system because its members operate it while the other becomes its target (Hagedorn, 2009). And because Adler's theory of gang forma- tion was in fact a theory of delinquency, the political economy of gang formation, persistence, and desistance too would have been overlooked. Adler was only partially correct about the individuals who join gangs; he was entirely wrong about gangs.

The complex nexus among crime, theory and power ought to be very disconcerting for psychological theorists of crime and criminology as a discipline for no other academic discipline's research agenda and ob- jects of scholarly inquiry (i.e., murder, robbery, crime) are codified in and through the law (Reiman, 2008). But that is exactly where the con- tradiction lies, for the very analytical categories pursuant to research and scholarship are constructed by those who are charged with its leg- islation and execution. The police and corrupt politicians would have to talk gangs and gangsters into existence to suit their needs (Meehan, 2000). Incorporating such a power-oriented definition and theory of crime and gangs, and the complicity of the state into Adler's definition of crime would move Alfred Adler away from a psychologically- oriented theory of crime. In order to accommodate the ideological and social reality of crime, Adler would have to incorporate sociological, po- litical, and economic realities into his account of crime. Such an accom- modation would no longer be consistent with a psychological theory of crime; it would then become an integrated theory of crime.

5. Discussion and conclusion

This paper has examined the works of one particular psychological theorist of crime: Alfred Adler. A review of Alfred Adler's theory of crime demonstrated that he rejected outright any notions of an inborn criminality. By assuming such a stance, Adler's position on crime and criminals differed from his contemporaries such as Freud and Jung. Al- though Adler acknowledged the possible influence of social forces such as racism and poverty on the development of personality, he pri- marily attributed the development of personality and crime to two prin- cipal causes in childhood: pampering and neglect. The two constructs reduce the causes of crime to essentialist forms. Furthermore, Adler's theory of personality (and crime) illustrates the underlying theory of self and account of motivation that is only implicit in criminological the- ories of crime. In Adler's theoretical framework, individuals commit crimes to achieve a sense of superiority over others in ways that are so- cially useless and harmful. Adler's psychological theory of crime there- fore provides an elegantly simple answer to the question “why do people commit crimes?” in a way that precedes the criminological ac- counts of motivation.

Although Adler was able to answer the question of why people com- mit crimes, he was inflexible about what is a crime. For Adler, a crime was defined primarily in terms of intention and harm, the offense pre- meditated against a non-consenting and defenseless victim. Rather than using that static definition of crime, this paper has used the evolu- tion of criminological theory to assess the merits of Adler's psychologi- cal theory of crime relative to the discipline that directly examines crime, its causes, correlates, prevalence, and definition. This paper has also proffered a tentative assessment of Adler's theory of crime along- side contemporary theories of crime.

We have argued that his account of crime could be classified into both macro- and micro-level theories of crime. On a macro-level, Adler's theory of crime is consistent with a life-course model of crime, for Adler assessed a person in holistic ways, interpreting his position across the life cycle in accordance with the three main tasks of life: forming friend- ships in adolescence, securing meaningful work in early adulthood, and marrying and starting a family in adulthood. Thus, Adler's exposition on crime actually predates the dominant paradigm in criminology by near- ly a hundred years. On a micro-level, we have argued that the underpin- nings of Adlerian theory is rational and economic, for his definition and

operationalization of crime entail premeditation and material gain as the exclusive criteria to be considered in the ascription of a criminal identity. Adler's theory of crime thus mirrors the stance of the Classical School of criminology when the underlying presuppositions are un- veiled. In addition to choice theories, we have argued that Adler's theory of crime is consistent with differential association and social learning theories. This paper has also provided a sociologically informed critique of Adler's theory of crime, borrowing heavily from the conflict perspec- tive within critical criminology.

Using a process and power-oriented view of crime, we have argued that Adler's definition of crime narrowly restricts those who can be de- fined as criminals, which then logically excludes other categories of criminals and crimes. As argued here, the forces that shape crime, as well as the state's response to it, have disproportionately affected per- sons of color. At the onset of industrialization, pervasive racism and labor unions prohibited African Americans and Chinese from entry into skilled and manufacturing trades, thereby excluding them from gainful employment while pushing them into underground and illegal labor markets (Loewen, 2005; Shover, 1996). When deindustrialization began, African Americans were the first to be terminated: as sociologists have shown, this exclusion from the legitimate labor market exerted se- vere consequences on crime among African American men (Sampson, 1987), their marriageability (Wilson, 1997), and the structure and ten- ability of black families (Western, 2007). Adler's definition and theory of crime would have to incorporate the enduring significance of race, pov- erty, segregation, and politics into his overall theoretical framework. Without such further elaboration on the exogenous factors related to crime, Adler's psychological theory of crime remains inert, limited in its utility and applicability, for it is unable to address the social and his- torical reality of crime (Young, 2011). Adler's creativity and originality as a theorist of crime warrants—demands—further dynamic cross- disciplinary synthesis and integration.

While this paper has provided a broad overview and critique of Adler's theory of crime, it has neglected to examine other notable short- comings in the literature. One, there is still a synthesis and a critique of the desistance process that remains unaddressed. Adler inferred some rather simplistic and obtuse conclusions about the forces that lead to desistance from crime. Future works should attempt to incorporate the current literature on desistance into Adler's account of it. Second, Adler's analysis of homicide offenders and offenses, parricide in particu- lar, has relied upon motivation that is instrumental rather than expres- sive. How might his theory of crime be altered by reanalyzing the homicide cases that he assumed to be instrumentally motivated? And finally, while investigative psychology has been proven to be an effec- tive tool for classifying, understanding, and even predicting the behav- ior of violent offenders, how might the use of such contemporary analytical tools against Adler's clinical cases affect Adler's conclusions? Such questions remain to be asked and answered.

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Phillip C. Shon is an associate professor of criminology at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology. He earned his Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from the University of Illinois (Chicago) in 2003. His research interests include parricide and other forms of murder.

Shannon M. Barton-Bellessa is a Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Indiana State University. She earned her Ph.D. (2000) in criminal justice from the University of Cincinnati after working in a private minimum security women's prison. Her research interests include community corrections, correctional officer job satisfaction, cognitive programming, and the juvenile justice system.