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Week2.pptxThe dilemma of collective action
| All others | |||
| Join | Don’t Join | ||
| YOU | Join | 3, 3 | 0, 5 |
| Don’t Join | 5, 0 | 1, 1 |
The first number in each cell is what “YOU” receive for that action and the second number is what ‘All others” receive for that action.
Payoff Structure
People not in the group cannot be excluded from the benefits of the group (i.e. group benefits are a public good)
Why? What types of benefits might these be?
No individual’s decision to join or not affects the group’s ability to provide benefits
What will “rational” people do in the situation above?
What does this imply about collective action?
Overcoming Collective Action Problems
Selective incentives
Provide incentives for contribution (i.e. NPR tote bag)
Privileged actor/leader
One actor who incurs cost to provide the good/take action
Ethics/social norms
Make participation seem ethically “good”
Compulsion
Require taxes to be paid
Other?
All these approaches rely on changing payoffs
Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Hirschman
What is the key point of his argument? What is he trying to help readers understand?
What does each of these mean in politics?
Exit
Voice
Loyalty
How do these options differ between politics and economics?
How does the effectiveness of these options vary with how easy the other options are to use?
Key point: How to respond to organizations with which one is dissatistfied.
Exit
Voice
Loyalty
3
Tyranny of the Minority, Bishin
What is the core argument Bishin presents?
Politicians appeal to constituents based on group members/identity
Group = people with a social identity owing to a common experience that leads to shared concerns and preferences.
Politicians strategically activate the interest of groups of constituents
Groups are more easily activated
Groups provide resources to legislators: votes, money, etc
How might this perspective change the collective action dilemma?
i is an excludable benefit for joining the group What are examples? Why might that be a benefit What happens if i is sufficiently large?
| All others | |||
| Join | Don’t Join | ||
| YOU | Join | 3 + i, 3 + i | 0 + i, 5 |
| Don’t Join | 5, 0 + i | 1, 1 |
Modified collective action dilemma
Hypotheses of Tyranny of Minority
Responsiveness: legislators will vote with their sub-constituency instead of moderating to appeal to the district
Consistency: legislators’ positions on roll-call votes should remain the same as they serve their supporting sub-constituencies
Activity: legislators should be more active on issues that are important to groups in their electoral coalition
Responsiveness to public opinion
Democratic politics assumes relationship between public opinion and legislators’ actions.
Why do we expect legislators to respond to public opinion?
Why might legislators fail to respond to public opinion? Or, why might they respond unequally?
Responsiveness vs. Congruence
Decline of responsiveness
Research suggests a decline in responsiveness to public opinion. But it’s unclear why.
“The evidence on partisan news, primaries, redistricting, and a polarization of mass opinion suggests that none of these is a principal cause.” Canes-Wrone, p. 159
Considering the work by Olson, Hirschmann and Bishin can you think of reasons for the decline in responsiveness?
