cyber attack
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cyber Attacks
Protecting National Infrastructure, 1st ed.
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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- National infrastructure
- Refers to the complex, underlying delivery and support systems for all large-scale services considered absolutely essential to a nation
- Conventional approach to cyber security not enough
- New approach needed
- Combining best elements of existing security techniques with challenges that face complex, large-scale national services
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Introduction
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.1 – National infrastructure cyber and physical attacks
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.2 – Differences between small- and large-scale cyber security
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
- Three types of malicious adversaries
- External adversary
- Internal adversary
- Supplier adversary
National Cyber Threats,
Vulnerabilities, and Attacks
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.3 – Adversaries and exploitation points in national infrastructure
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
- Three exploitation points
- Remote access
- System administration and normal usage
- Supply chain
National Cyber Threats,
Vulnerabilities, and Attacks
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The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 1 – Introduction
- Infrastructure threatened by most common security concerns:
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Theft
National Cyber Threats,
Vulnerabilities, and Attacks
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The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 1 – Introduction
Botnet Threat
- What is a botnet attack?
- The remote collection of compromised end-user machines (usually broadband-connected PCs) is used to attack a target.
- Sources of attack are scattered and difficult to identify
- Five entities that comprise botnet attack: botnet operator, botnet controller, collection of bots, botnot software drop, botnet target
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 1 – Introduction
- Five entities that comprise botnet attack:
- Botnet operator
- Botnet controller
- Collection of bots
- Botnot software drop
- Botnet target
- Distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack: bots create “cyber traffic jam”
Botnet Threat
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.4 – Sample DDOS attack from a botnet
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National Cyber Security
Methodology Components
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
- Ten basic design and operation principles:
- Deception – Discretion
- Separation – Collection
- Diversity – Correlation
- Commonality – Awareness
- Depth – Response
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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- Deliberately introducing misleading functionality or misinformation for the purpose of tricking an adversary
- Computer scientists call this functionality a honey pot
- Deception enables forensic analysis of intruder activity
- The acknowledged use of deception may be a deterrent to intruders (every vulnerability may actually be a trap)
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Deception
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.5 – Components of an interface with deception
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- Separation involves enforced access policy restrictions on users and resources in a computing environment
- Most companies use enterprise firewalls, which are complemented by the following:
- Authentication and identity management
- Logical access controls
- LAN controls
- Firewalls
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Separation
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Fig. 1.6 – Firewall enhancements for national infrastructure
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
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- Diversity is the principle of using technology and systems that are intentionally different in substantive ways.
- Diversity hard to implement
- A single software vendor tends to dominate the PC operating system business landscape
- Diversity conflicts with organizational goals of simplifying supplier and vendor relationships
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Diversity
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.7 – Introducing diversity to national infrastructure
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- Consistency involves uniform attention to security best practices across national infrastructure components
- Greatest challenge involves auditing
- A national standard is needed
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Commonality
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- Depth involves using multiple security layers to protect national infrastructure assets
- Defense layers are maximized by using a combination of functional and procedural controls
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Depth
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.8 – National infrastructure security through defense in depth
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- Discretion involves individuals and groups making good decisions to obscure sensitive information about national infrastructure
- This is not the same as “security through obscurity”
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Discretion
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- Collection involves automated gathering of system-related information about national infrastructure to enable security analysis
- Data is processed by a security information management system.
- Operational challenges
- What type of information should be collected?
- How much information should be collected?
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Collection
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.9 – Collecting national infrastructure-related security information
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- Correlation involves a specific type of analysis that can be performed on factors related to national infrastructure protection
- This type of comparison-oriented analysis is indispensable
- Past initiatives included real-time correlation of data at fusion center
- Difficult to implement
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Correlation
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Fig. 1.10 – National infrastructure high-level correlation approach
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
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- Awareness involves an organization understanding the differences between observed and normal status in national infrastructure
- Most agree on the need for awareness, but how can awareness be achieved?
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Awareness
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.11 – Real-time situation awareness process flow
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- Response involves the assurance that processes are in place to react to any security-related indicator
- Indicators should flow from the awareness layer
- Current practice in smaller corporate environments of reducing “false positives” by waiting to confirm disaster is not acceptable for national infrastructure
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Response
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Fig. 1.12 – National infrastructure security response approach
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- Commissions and groups
- Information sharing
- International cooperation
- Technical and operational costs
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Implementing the Principles Nationally
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer