European History Argumentative Essay

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Hanover Historical Texts Collection https://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/161mill.html

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859). Excerpts from the Original Electronic Text at Bartleby.com. (NB. Paragraph numbers apply to this excerpt, not the original source.)

Introductory

{1}The subject of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately opposed to

the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and

limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. A

question seldom stated, and hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but which profoundly

influences the practical controversies of the age by its latent presence, and is likely soon to make

itself recognised as the vital question of the future. It is so far from being new, that, in a certain

sense, it has divided mankind, almost from the remotest ages; but in the stage of progress into

which the more civilized portions of the species have now entered, it presents itself under new

conditions, and requires a different and more fundamental treatment.

{2}The struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of

history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that of Greece, Rome, and England.

But in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the

Government. By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers. The

rulers were conceived (except in some of the popular governments of Greece) as in a necessarily

antagonistic position to the people whom they ruled. They consisted of a governing One, or a

governing tribe or caste, who derived their authority from inheritance or conquest, who, at all

events, did not hold it at the pleasure of the governed, and whose supremacy men did not

venture, perhaps did not desire, to contest, whatever precautions might be taken against its

oppressive exercise. Their power was regarded as necessary, but also as highly dangerous; as a

weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no less than against external

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enemies. To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed on by

innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest,

commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon

preying upon the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual

attitude of defence against his beak and claws. The aim, therefore, of patriots was to set limits to

the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation

was what they meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a recognition

of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach

of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did infringe, specific resistance, or general

rebellion, was held to be justifiable. A second, and generally a later expedient, was the

establishment of constitutional checks, by which the consent of the community, or of a body of

some sort, supposed to represent its interests, was made a necessary condition to some of the

more important acts of the governing power. To the first of these modes of limitation, the ruling

power, in most European countries, was compelled, more or less, to submit. It was not so with

the second; and, to attain this, or when already in some degree possessed, to attain it more

completely, became everywhere the principal object of the lovers of liberty. And so long as

mankind were content to combat one enemy by another, and to be ruled by a master, on

condition of being guaranteed more or less efficaciously against his tyranny, they did not carry

their aspirations beyond this point.

{3}A time, however, came, in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think it a

necessity of nature that their governors should be an independent power, opposed in interest to

themselves. It appeared to them much better that the various magistrates of the State should be

their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure. In that way alone, it seemed, could they

have complete security that the powers of government would never be abused to their

disadvantage. By degrees this new demand for elective and temporary rulers became the

prominent object of the exertions of the popular party, wherever any such party existed; and

superseded, to a considerable extent, the previous efforts to limit the power of rulers. As the

struggle proceeded for making the ruling power emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled,

some persons began to think that too much importance had been attached to the limitation of the

power itself. That (it might seem) was a resource against rulers whose interests were habitually

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opposed to those of the people. What was now wanted was, that the rulers should be identified

with the people; that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation. The

nation did not need to be protected against its own will. There was no fear of its tyrannizing over

itself. Let the rulers be effectually responsible to it, promptly removable by it, and it could afford

to trust them with power of which it could itself dictate the use to be made. Their power was but

the nation's own power, concentrated, and in a form convenient for exercise. This mode of

thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, was common among the last generation of European

liberalism, in the Continental section of which it still apparently predominates. Those who admit

any limit to what a government may do, except in the case of such governments as they think

ought not to exist, stand out as brilliant exceptions among the political thinkers of the Continent.

A similar tone of sentiment might by this time have been prevalent in our own country, if the

circumstances which for a time encouraged it, had continued unaltered.

{4}But, in political and philosophical theories, as well as in persons, success discloses faults and

infirmities which failure might have concealed from observation. The notion, that the people

have no need to limit their power over themselves, might seem axiomatic, when popular

government was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period

of the past. Neither was that notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary aberrations as those

of the French Revolution, the worst of which were the work of an usurping few, and which, in

any case, belonged, not to the permanent working of popular institutions, but to a sudden and

convulsive outbreak against monarchical and aristocratic despotism. In time, however, a

democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface, and made itself felt as

one of the most powerful members of the community of nations; and elective and responsible

government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing

fact. It was now perceived that such phrases as "self-government," and "the power of the people

over themselves," do not express the true state of the case. The "people" who exercise the power

are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the "self-government"

spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the

people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the

people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the

people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much

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needed against this as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power

of government over individuals loses none of its importance when the holders of power are

regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. This view of

things, recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those

important classes in European society to whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse,

has had no difficulty in establishing itself; and in political speculations "the tyranny of the

majority" is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its

guard.

{5}Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread,

chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived

that when society is itself the tyrant—society collectively, over the separate individuals who

compose it—its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands

of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues

wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to

meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression,

since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape,

penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection,

therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against

the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by

other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who

dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any

individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon

the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with

individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as

indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.

. . . .

{6}The likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing

which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties

of law or opinion. And in general, those who have been in advance of society in thought and

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feeling, have left this condition of things unassailed in principle, however they may have come

into conflict with it in some of its details. They have occupied themselves rather in inquiring

what things society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether its likings or dislikings

should be a law to individuals. They preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on

the particular points on which they were themselves heretical, rather than make common cause in

defence of freedom, with heretics generally. The only case in which the higher ground has been

taken on principle and maintained with consistency, by any but an individual here and there, is

that of religious belief: a case instructive in many ways, and not least so as forming a most

striking instance of the fallibility of what is called the moral sense: for the odium theologicum, in

a sincere bigot, is one of the most unequivocal cases of moral feeling. Those who first broke the

yoke of what called itself the Universal Church, were in general as little willing to permit

difference of religious opinion as that church itself. But when the heat of the conflict was over,

without giving a complete victory to any party, and each church or sect was reduced to limit its

hopes to retaining possession of the ground it already occupied; minorities, seeing that they had

no chance of becoming majorities, were under the necessity of pleading to those whom they

could not convert, for permission to differ. It is accordingly on this battle field, almost solely,

that the rights of the individual against society have been asserted on broad grounds of principle,

and the claim of society to exercise authority over dissentients, openly controverted. The great

writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted

freedom of conscience as an indefeasible right, and denied absolutely that a human being is

accountable to others for his religious belief. Yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in

whatever they really care about, that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically

realized, except where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by

theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. In the minds of almost all religious

persons, even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves.

One person will bear with dissent in matters of church government, but not of dogma; another

can tolerate everybody, short of a Papist or an Unitarian; another, every one who believes in

revealed religion; a few extend their charity a little further, but stop at the belief in a God and in

a future state. Wherever the sentiment of the majority is still genuine and intense, it is found to

have abated little of its claim to be obeyed.

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. . . .

{7}The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely

the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the

means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public

opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or

collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.

That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a

civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical

or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because

it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of

others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him,

or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or

visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is

desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the

conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the

part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over

his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

. . . .

Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion

{8}The time, it is to be hoped, is gone by, when any defence would be necessary of the "liberty of

the press" as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we

may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified

in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what

arguments they shall be allowed to hear. This aspect of the question, besides, has been so often

and so triumphantly enforced by preceding writers, that it needs not be specially insisted on in

this place. Though the law of England, on the subject of the press, is as servile to this day as it

was in the time of the Tudors, there is little danger of its being actually put in force against

political discussion, except during some temporary panic, when fear of insurrection drives

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ministers and judges from their propriety; and, speaking generally, it is not, in constitutional

countries, to be apprehended, that the government, whether completely responsible to the people

or not, will often attempt to control the expression of opinion, except when in doing so it makes

itself the organ of the general intolerance of the public. Let us suppose, therefore, that the

government is entirely at one with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of

coercion unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice. But I deny the right of the

people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their government. The power itself

is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or

more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If

all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion,

mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power,

would be justified in silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value

except to the owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it

would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many.

But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human

race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more

than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging

error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and

livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.

{9}It is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each of which has a distinct branch

of the argument corresponding to it. We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring

to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.

{10}First: the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those

who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no

authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means

of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume

that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an

assumption of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument,

not the worse for being common.

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. . . .

{11}We have now recognised the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind (on which all

their other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of opinion,

on four distinct grounds; which we will now briefly recapitulate.

{12}First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly

know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility.

{13}Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a

portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the

whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any

chance of being supplied.

{14}Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered

to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it,

be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds.

And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost,

or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a

mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the

growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience.