Literature Review

,t

es p. w

lie ld

-w

4 ),

,. 2,

j. ),

).

ROBERT GILPIN I War and Change in World Politics 145

War and Change in World Politics ROBERT GILPIN

Professor Gilpin outlines key factors to explain the rise and decline of states, States are rational actors that seek expected benefits as exceeding expected costs. Power and the distribution of power in the international system are key explana- tory factors. Peaceful change is possible, as in the aftermath of the Cold War; however, historically, the principal mechanism of change has been through war with reordering of the international system through a peace settlement that cre- ates a new systemic equilibrium.

During the 1970s and early 1980s a series of dra- matic events signaled that international rela- tions were undergoing a significant upheaval. Long-established and seemingly stable sets of relationships and understandings were sum- marily cast aside. Political leaders, academic observers, and the celebrated "man in the street" were suddenly conscious of the fact that the energy crisis, dramatic events in the Middle East, and tensions in the Communist world were novel developments of a qualitatively different order from those of the preceding decade. These developments and many others in the political, economic, and military realms signaled far- reaching shifts in the international distribution of power, an unleashing of new sociopolitical forces, and the global realignment of diplomatic relations. Above all, these events and develop- ments revealed that the relatively stable interna- tional system that the world had known since the end of World War Il was entering a period of uncertain political changes.

Ours is not the first age in which a sudden concatenation of dramatic events has revealed underlying shifts in military power, economic interest, and political alignments. In the twenti- eth century, developments of comparable mag-

nitude had already taken place in the decades preceding World War I and World War II. This awareness of the dangers inherent in periods of political instability and rapid change causes pro- found unease and apprehension. The fear grows that events may get out of hand and the world may once again plunge itself into a global con- flagration. Scholars, journalists, and others turn to history for guidance, asking if the current pat- tern of events resembles the pattern of 1914 and 1939.1

These contemporary developments and their dangerous implications raise a number of questions regarding war and change in interna- tional relations: How and under what circum- stances does change take place at the level of international relations? What are the roles of political, economic, and technological develop- ments in producing change in international sys- tems? Wherein lies the danger of intense military conflict during periods of rapid economic and political upheaval? And, most important of all, are answers that are derived from examination of the past valid for the contemporary world? In other words, to what extent have social, eco- nomic, and technological developments such as increasing economic interdependence of nations

From Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (1981), pp. 1-15 and 39-44. Reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press.

146 ROBERT GILPIN / War and Change in World Politics

and the advent of nuclear weapons changed the role of war in the process of international politi- cal change? Is there any reason to hope that polit- ical change may be more benign in the future than it has been in the past?

The purpose of this book is to explore these issues. In this endeavor we shall seek to develop an understanding of international political change more systematic than the understanding that currently exists. We do not pretend to develop a general theory of international rela- tions that will provide an overarching explana- tory statement. Instead, we attempt to provide a framework for thinking about the problem of war and change in world politics. This intellec- tual framework is intended to be an analytical device that will help to order and explain human experience. It does not constitute a rigorous sci- entific explanation of political change. The ideas on international political change presented are generalizations based on observations of histor- ical experience rather than a set of hypotheses that have been tested scientifically by historical evidence; they are proposed as a plausible account of how international political change occurs.2

To this end we isolate and analyze the more obvious regularities and patterns associated with changes in international systems. However, we make no claim to have discovered the "laws of change" that determine when political change will occur or what course it will take. 3 On the contrary, the position taken here is that major political changes are the consequences of the conjuncture of unique and unpredictable sets of developments. However, the claim is made that it is possible to identify recurrent patterns, com- mon elements, and general tendencies in the major turning points in international history. As the distinguished economist W. Arthur Lewis put it, "The process of social change is much the same today as it was 2,000 years ago ... We can tell how change will occur if it occurs; what we cannot foresee is what change is going to occur." 4

The conception of political change pre- sented in this book, like almost all social science, is not predictive. Even economics is predictive only within a narrow range of issues. 5

Most of the alleged theories in the field of political science and in the sub-field of interna- tional relations are in fact analytical, descriptive constructs; they provide at best a conceptual framework and a set of questions that help us to analyze and explain a type of phenomenon. 6 Thus, Kenneth Waltz, in his stimulating book, Man, the State and War, provided an expla- nation of war in general terms, but not the means for predicting any particular war .7 In similar fashion, this study seeks to explain in general terms the nature of international politi- cal change.

The need for a better understanding of political change, especially international politi- cal change, was well set forth by Wilbert Moore in the latest edition of the International Encyclo- pedia of the Social Sciences: "Paradoxically, as the rate of social change has accelerated in the real world of experience, the scientific disciplines dealing with man's actions and products have tended to emphasize orderly interdependence and static continuity. "8

Moore's judgment concerning the inade- quate treatment of political change by social scientists is borne out by analyses of interna- tional-relations textbooks and theoretical works. Although there are some recent outstanding exceptions,' few of these books have addressed the problem of political change in systematic fashion. As David Easton rightly commented, "students of political life have ... been prone to forget that the really crucial problems of social research are concerned with the patterns of change."10

It is worth noting, as Joseph Schumpeter pointed out, that the natural development of any science is from static analysis to dynamic analy- sis.11 Static theory is simpler, and its propositions are easier to prove. Unfortunately, until the stat- ics of a field of inquiry are sufficiently well <level-

RO

oped and one processes and r cult if not impo dynamics. Fror study of interna and much of w! ality an effort t, teractions of pa diplomatic barg, management, et, our current undt is sufficiently we opment of a dyna lenge to the preSe

A second fa, apparent neglect, lem of political d the decline of "i realism of Hans )y of Morton Kaplar Ernst Haas, as wt theories," have o search for a gener. itics. Eac_h in its O' has sought, in th, reduce the facts o instances of genen; these ambitious ef (war, imperialism gained general ace preoccupations ol decade have been 1 to form hypothese ing limited ranges larly, to obtain <lat, In brief, the more r middle- range theOI has had the unfortu ing attention away 1 cal problems. 15

A third reason political change is ti of international n: whose intellectual , standing of the inte

pre- nee, ctive

ld of !rna- ptive ,tual us to 10n. 6

>0ok, ,q,la- t the ·•7 In in in oliti-

1g of ,oliti- !oore cyclo- 1S the e real )lines have

Jenee

aade- social erna- mrks. ading :essed matic !nted, meto social ns of

1peter of any maly- ;itions e stat- devel-

'f

ROBERT GILPIN / War and Change in World Politics 147

oped and one has a good grasp of repetitive processes and recurrent phenomena, it is diffi- cult if not impossible to proceed to the study of dynamics. From this perspective, systematic study of international relations is a young field, and much of what passes for dynamics is in re- ality an effort to understand the statics of in- teractions of particular international systems: diplomatic bargaining, alliance behavior, crisis management, etc. The question whether or not our current understanding of these static aspects is sufficiently well advanced to aid in the devel- opment of a dynamic theory poses a serious chal- lenge to the present enterprise.

A second factor that helps to explain the apparent neglect, until recent years, of the prob- lem of political change is what K. J. Holsti called the decline of "grand theory." 12 The political realism of Hans Morgenthau, the systems theory of Morton Kaplan, and the neofunctionalism of Ernst Haas, as well as numerous other "grand theories," have one element in common: the search for a general theory of international pol- itics. Each in its own way, with varying success, has sought, in the words of Morgenthau, "to reduce the facts of experience to mere specific instances of general propositions." 13 Yet none of these ambitious efforts to understand the issues ( war, imperialism, and political change) has gained general acceptance. Instead, "the major preoccupations of theorists during the past decade have been to explore specific problems, to form hypotheses or generalizations explain- ing limited ranges of phenomena, and particu- larly, to obtain data to test those hypotheses." 14 In brief, the more recent emphasis on so-called middle-range theory, though valuable in itself, has had the unfortunate consequence of divert- ing attention away from more general theoreti- cal problems. 15

A third reason for neglect of the study of political change is the Western bias in the study of international relations. For a profession whose intellectual commitment is the under- standing of the interactions of societies, inter-

national relations as a discipline is remarkably parochial and ethnocentric. It is essentially a study of the Western state system, and a sizable fraction of the existing literature is devoted to developments since the end of World War II. Thus the profession has emphasized recent developments within that particular state sys- tem. Although there are exceptions, the practi- tioners of this discipline have not been forced to come to terms with the dynamics of this, or any other, state system. 16 As Martin Wight sug- gested, international relations lacks a tradition of political theorizing. In large measure, of course, this is because of the paucity of reliable secondary studies of non-Western systems. 17 This situation in itself is a formidable obstacle to the development of a theory of international political change.

A fourth reason for neglect of the theoreti- cal problem of political change is the widespread conviction of the futility of the task. Prevalent among historians, this view is also held by many social scientists. 18 The search for "laws of change" is held to be useless because of the uniqueness and complexity of historical events. Thus the search for generalizations or patterns in human affairs is regarded as a hopeless enterprise. Such a position, if taken at face value, denies the very possibility of a science or history of society; yet one should note its admonitions that there are no immutable laws of change and that although repetitive patterns may exist, social change is ultimately contingent on unique sets of histori- cal events.

Finally, the development of a theory of po- litical change has been inhibited by ideology and emotion. In part this is due to a conservative bias in Western social science. Most academic social scientists have a preference for stability or at least a preference for stability or at least a preference for orderly change. The idea of radi- cal changes that threaten accepted values and interests is not an appealing one. This issue is especially acute for the theorist of international political change, who must confront directly the

148 ROBERT GILPIN / War and Change in World Politics

fundamental problem of international relations: war. The inhibiting effect of this dreadful issue has been well put by John Burton in a sweeping indictment of contemporary international-rela- tions scholarship:

The chief failure of orthodoxy has been in rela- tion to change. The outstanding_ feature of real- ity is the dynamic nature of International Relations. No general theory is appropriate which cannot take into consideration the rapidly changing technological, social and political envi- ronment in which nations are required to live in peace one with the other. But the only device of fundamental change which is possible in the context of power politics is that of war, for which reason war is recognized as a legitimate instru- ment of national policy. It is not surprising that International Relations has tended to be dis- cussed in static terms, and that stability has tended to be interpreted in terms of the mainte- nance of the status quo. A dynamic approach to International Relations would immediately con- front the analyst with no alternative but to acknowledge war as the only available mecha- nism for change. 19

Burton's challenge to orthodox theory of international relations goes to the heart of the present study. In recent years theorists of in- ternational relations have tended to stress the moderating and stabilizing influences of con- temporary developments on the behavior of states, especially the increasing economic inter- dependence among nations and the destructive- ness of modern weapons. These important developments have encouraged many individu- als to believe that peaceful evolution has re- placed military conflict as the principal means of adjusting relations among nation-states in the contemporary world. This assumption has been accompanied by a belief that economic and wel- fare goals have triumphed over the traditional power and security objectives of states. Thus, many believe that the opportunity for peaceful economic intercourse and the constraints im-

posed by modern destructive warfare have served to decrease the probability of a major war.

In the present study we take a very different stance, a stance based on the assumption that the fundamental nature of international relations has not changed over the millennia. Interna- tional relations continue to be a recurring strug- gle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy. The classic history of Thucydides is as meaningful a guide to the behavior of states today as when it was written in the fifth century B.C. Yet important changes have taken place. One of the subthernes ... , in fact, is that modern statecraft and prernodern statecraft differ in significant respects, a situation first appreciated by Montesquieu, Edward Gibbon, and other earlier writers on the subject. Never- theless, we contend that the fundamentals have not been altered. For this reason, the insights of earlier writers and historical experience are con- sidered relevant to an understanding of the ways in which international systems function and change in the contemporary era.

Thus although there is obviously an important element of truth in the belief that con- temporary economic and technological devel- opment have altered relations among states, events in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in the 1970s and early 1980s force us once again to acknowledge the continuing unsolved problem of war and the role of war in the process of inter- national political change. Even more than in the past, in the last decades of the twentieth century we need to understand the relationship of war and change in the international system. Only in this way can we hope to fashion a more peaceful alternative. As E. H. Carr reminded us, this is the basic task of the study of international rela- tions: "To establish methods of peaceful change is ... the fundamental problem of international morality and of international politics. "20 But if peace were the ultimate goal of statecraft, then the solution to the problem of peaceful change would be easy. Peace may always be had by sur- render to the aggressOJr state. The real task for

R

the peaceful , and guarante of internati01

The Nature,

An internatic same reason t created; actor social structu sets of politi, interests. Bee. actors may cc the particular these social ar ative powers although socia behavior of al and punished least initially, v erful member, however, the i the balance of l as a result of ec developments. who benefit m system and wt change will see favor their inte tern will reflec1 and the interes1 Thus, a precon, a disjuncture h< and the redistr actors who wou the system.

Thls conce1 on the notion t tion of any soci, tional system, r benefits that vai operation. 21

As in the c nature of the in whose interest ai

ROBERT GILPIN / War and Change in World Politics 149

the peaceful state is to seek a peace that protects and guarantees its vital interests and its concept of international morality.

The Nature of International Political Change

An international system is established for the same reason that any social or political system is created; actors enter social relations and create social structures in order to advance particular sets of political, economic, or other types of interests. Because the interests of some of the actors may conflict with those of other actors, the particular interests that are most favored by these social arrangements tend to reflect the rel- ative powers of the actors involved. That is, although social systems impose restraints on the behavior of all actors, the behaviors rewarded and punished by the system will coincide, at least initially, with the interests of the most pow- erful members of the social system. Over time, however, the interests of individual actors and the balance of power among the actors do change as a result of economic, technological, and other developments. As a consequence, those actors who benefit most from a change in the social system and who gain the power to effect such change will seek to alter the system in ways that favor their interests. The resulting changed sys- tem will reflect the new distribution of power and the interests of its new dominant members. Thus, a precondition for political change lies in a disjuncture between the existing social system and the redistribution of power toward those actors who would benefit most from a change in the system.

This conception of political change is based on the notion that the purpose or social func- tion of any social system, including the interna- tional system, may be defined in terms of the benefits that various members derived from its operation. 21

As in the case with domestic society, the nature of the international system determines whose interest are being served by the function-

ing of the system. Changes in the system imply changes in the distribution of benefits provided to and costs imposed on individual members of the system. Thus the study of international political change must focus on the international system and especially on the efforts of political actors to change the international system in order to advance their own interests. Whether these interests are security, economic gain or ideological goals, the achievement of state objec- tives is dependent on the nature of the in- ternational system (i.e., the governance of the system, the rules of the system, the recognition of rights, etc.). As is the case in any social or po- litical system, the process of international polit- ical change ultimately reflects the efforts of individuals or groups to transform institutions and systems in order to advance their interests. Because these interests and the powers of groups ( or states) change, in time the political system will be changed in ways that will reflect these underlying shifts in interest and power. The elaboration of this approach for the understand- ing of international political change is the pur- pose of the subsequent discussion.

A Framework for Understanding International Political Change

The conceptualization of international political change to be presented [here] rests on a set of assumptions regarding the behavior of states:

I. An international system is stable (i.e., in a state of equilibrium) if no state believes it prof- itable to attempt to change the system. 2. A state will attempt to change the interna- tional system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., if there is an expected net gain). 3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and eco- nomic expansion until the marginal costs of fur- ther change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.

150 ROBERT GILPIN / War and Change in World Politics

4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo. 5. If the disequilibrium in the international sys- tem is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established.

Obviously these assumptions are abstractions from a highly complex political reality. They do not describe the actual decision processes of statesmen, but as in the case of economic theory, actors are assumed to behave as if they were guided by such a set of cost/benefit calculations. Moreover, these assumptions are not mutually exclusive; they do overlap. Assumptions 2 and 4 are mirror images of one another, assumption 2 referring to a revisionist state and assumption 4 referring to a status quo state.

On the basis of these assumptions, the con- ceptualization of international political change to be presented here seeks to comprehend a con- tinuing historical process. Because history has no starts and stops, one must break into the flow of history at a particular point. The following analy- sis of political change begins with an interna- tional system in a state of equilibrium as shown in Figure 1. An international system is in a state

System in State Differential Growth of Power of Equilibrium

Resolution of Systemic Crisis

of equilibrium if the more powerful states in the system are satisfied with the existing territorial political, and economic arrangements. Although minor changes and adjustments may take place, an equilibrium condition is one in which no powerful state ( or group) believes that a change in the system would yield additional benefits commensurate with the anticipated costs of bringing about a change in the system. 22 Al- though every state and group in the system could benefit from particular types of change, the costs involved will discourage attempts to seek a change in system. As one writer has put it, "a power equilibrium represents a stable political configuration provided there are no changes or returns to conquest." 23 Under these conditions, where no one has an incentive to change the sys- tem, the status quo may be said to be stable.

In the more traditional language of interna- tional relations, the international status quo is held to be a legitimate one, at least by the major states in the system. The meaning oflegitimacy was defined by Henry Kissinger as follows:

[Legitimacy] implies the acceptance of the frame- work of the international order by all major pow- ers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that, like Germany after the Treaty of Versailles, it expresses its dissatisfaction in a rev- olutionary foreign policy. A legitimate order does not make conflicts impossible, but it limits their

Redistribution of Power in System

• Disequilibrium

of System

FIGURE 2.1 Diagram oflntemational Political Change

RC

scope. Wan the name of which follo, sion of th Diplomacy differences t in "legitima

What this international S) tion of homeo Like any other rest; changes a1 tions are cons1 however, the co interactions am, to preserve the system. Thus, , legitimate orde, Congress of V1 conflicts and di finally collapse, economic, techn of the latter part issue oflegitima,

In every int, tinual occurrenc technological cl threaten losses fc cases these pote:r: and only increm, in order to take , take place within tern, producing equilibrium. The is, in fact, largely adjust to the d, changing politic tions. In every s; disequilibrium a taking place. In th benefits from ch, remain in a state c

If the interes principal states iJ mained constant c

the rial tgh lCe,

no 1ge fits of

Al- uld JStS

< a " , a

ical s or ms, sys-

·na- o is ajor tacy

une- )OW-

lS SO

tyof rev- does their

ROBERT GILPIN I War and Change in World Politics 151

scope. Wars may occur, but they will be fought in the name of the existing structure and the peace which follows will be justified as a better expres- sion of the "legitimate," general consensus. Diplomacy in the classic sense, the adjustment of differences through negotiations, is possible only in "legitimate international orders."24

What this quotation suggests is that an international system or order exists in a condi- tion of homeostatic or dynamic equilibrium. Like any other system, it is not completely at rest; changes at the level of interstate interac- tions are constantly taking place. In general, however, the conflicts, alliances, and diplomatic interactions among the actors in the system tend to preserve the defining characteristics of the system. Thus, as Kissinger demonstrated, the legitimate order or equilibrium created by the Congress of Vienna (1814) survived limited conflicts and diplomatic maneuvering until it finally collapsed in response to the profound economic, technological, and political upheavals of the latter part of the nineteenth century. This issue oflegitimacy will be discussed later.

In every international system there are con- tinual occurrences of political, economic, and technological changes that promise gains or threaten losses for one or another actor. In most cases these potential gains and losses are minor, and only incremental adjustments are necessary in order to take account of them. Such changes take place within the existing international sys- tem, producing a condition of homeostatic equilibrium. The relative stability of the system is, in fact, largely determined by its capacity to adjust to the demands of actors affected by changing political and environmental condi- tions. In every system, therefore, a process of disequilibrium and adjustment is constantly taking place. In the absence oflarge potential net benefits from change, the system continues to remain in a state of equilibrium.

If the interests and relative powers of the principal states in an international system re- mained constant over time, or if power relations

changed in such a way as to maintain the same relative distribution of power, the system would continue indefinitely in a state of equilibrium. However, both domestic and international de- velopments undermine the stability of the status quo. For example, shifts in domestic coalitions may necessitate redefinition of the "national interest." However, the most destabilizing factor is the tendency in an international system for the powers of member states to change at differ- ent rates because of political, economic, and technological developments. In time, the differ- ential growth in power of the various states in the system causes a fundamental redistribution of power in the system.

The concept of power is one of the most troublesome in the field of international rela- tions and, more generally) political science. Many weighty books have analyzed and elabo- rated the concept. In this book, power refers simply to the military, economic, and techno- logical capabilities of states. This defmition obviously leaves out important and intangible elements that affect the outcomes of political actions, such as public morale, qualities oflead- ership, and situational factors. It also excludes what E. H. Carr called "power over opinion." 25 These psychological and frequently incalculable aspects of power and international relations are more closely associated with the concept of prestige ....

As a consequence of the changing interests of individual states, and especially because of the differential growth in power among states, the international system moves from a condi- tion of equilibrium to one of disequilibrium. Disequilibrium is a situation in which eco- nomic, political, and technological develop- ments have increased considerably the potential benefits or decreased the potential costs to one or more states of seeking to change the interna- tional system. Forestalling one)s losses or in- creasing one's gains becomes an incentive for one or more states to attempt to change the sys- tem. Thus there develops a disjuncture between the existing international system and the paten-

152 ROBERT GILPIN / War and Change in World Politics

tial gains to particular states from a change in the international system.

The elements of this systemic disequilibrium are twofold. First, military, technological, or other changes have increased the benefits of terri- torial conquest or the benefits of changing the international system in other ways. Second, the differential growth in power among the states in the system has altered the cost of changing the system. This transformation of the benefits and/or the costs of changing the system produces an incongruity or dis juncture among the compo- nents of the system (Table 1). On the one hand, the hierarchy of prestige, the division of territory, the international division oflabor, and the rules of the system remain basically unchanged; they continue to reflect primarily the interests of the existing dominant powers and the relative power distribution that prevailed at the time of the last systemic change. On the other hand, the inter- national distribution of power has undergone a radical transformation that has weakened the foundations of the existing system. It is this dis- juncture between the several components of the system and its implications for relative gains and losses among the various states in the system that cause international political change.

This disjuncture within the existing interna- tional system involving the potential benefits and losses to particular powerful actors from a change in the system leads to a crisis in the inter- national system. Although resolution of a crisis

Table I Mechanisms of Control (Components of System)

Governmenta Authority Property rights Law Domestic economy

Dominance of great powerb Hierarchy of prestige Division of territory Rules of the system International economy

asased on distribution of power among domestic groups, coalitions, classes, etc.

bBased on distribution of power among states in the sys- tem.

through peaceful adjustment of the systemic dis- equilibrium is possible, the principal mechanism of change throughout history has been war, or what we shall call hegemonic war (i.e., a war that determines which state or states will be domi- nant and will govern the system). The peace set- tlement following such a hegemonic struggle reorders the political, territorial, and other bases of the system. Thus the cycle of change is com- pleted in that hegemonic war and the peace set- tlement create a new status quo and equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power in the sys- tem and the other components of the system.

Notes

1. Miles Kahler, "Rumors ofWar: The 1914 Analogy," Foreign Affairs 58 (1979-80), pp. 374-396.

2. However, in principle, these ideas are translatable into specific testable hypotheses. At least we would argue that this is possible for a substantial fraction of them. The carrying out of this task, or part of it, would require another volume.

3. The term "law" ... is to be interpreted as a general tendency that may be counteracted by other develop· ments. This conception oflaw is taken from Jean Baech- ler, Les Origines du Capitalisme (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1971). English edition (Oxford: Basil Black- well, 1975), p. 52.

4. W. Arthur Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 17-18.

5. F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities (New York: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 243-45.

6. Stanley Hoffmann (ed.), Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1960), p. 40.

7. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 232.

8. Wilbert E. Moore, "Social Change" in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 14, ed. by David Sills (New York: Crowell Collier and Macmillan, 1968), p. 365.

9. Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, Nations in Conflict (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975); Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdepen- dence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison- Wesley, 1979). 10. David Easton, The Political System (New York

Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 42. It is symptomatic of this continued general neglect that the Handbook of Poli·

tical Science the problem "political cha Fred I. Greer book of Poli Wesley, 1975 11. Joseph t (New York: C 12. K. J. Hol nal of Politica 13. Ibid., p. 14. Ibid., p. 15. Several revival of int North, Natio: Society (New Keohane and Hoffmann, McGraw-Hill (London: Crc ory of Intern, Wesley, I 975 interest in "gi 16. Three n International Robert G. W versity of Cal

From Politica Science Assoc

:dis- nism I, or ·that omi-

set- "ggle bases com- e set- 1rium e sys- m.

,logy,"

latable J argue ·them. require

general !velop- Baech- .ditions Black-

Growth

and the 243-45. 1-eory in ?rentice

ir (New

national ,y David 1, 1968),

itions in ; Robert erdepen- 1. Waltz, \.ddison-

w York: ic of this : of Poli-

ROBERT O. KEOHANE I Theory of World Politics 153

tical Science does not contain a section devoted to the problem of political change. Nor does the entry "political change" appear in its cumulative index. See Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Hand- book of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison- Wesley, 1975). II. Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 964. 12. K. J. Holsti, "Retreat from Utopia," Canadian Jour- nal of Political Science, Vol. 4 (1971), pp. 165-177. 13. Ibid.,p. 167. 14. Ibid., p. 171. 15. Several important books have recently indicated

revival of interest in general theory. See Choucri and North, Nations in Conflict; Hedley Bull, The Anarchic.al Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence; Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978); Ralph Pettman, State and Class (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Kenneth N. Waltz, The- ory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison- Wesley, 1979). Marxist scholars, of course, never lost interest in "grand theory." 16. Three recent exceptions are Evan Luard, Types of

International Society (New York: Free Press, 1976); Robert G. Wesson, The Imperial Order (Berkeley: Uni- versity of California Press, 1967); Martin Wight, Systems

of States, ed. Hedley Bull (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1977). 17. Martin Wight, "\r\Thy Is There No International Theory?" in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966),pp. !7-34. 18. Albert 0. Hirschman, "The Search for Paradigms

as a Hindrance to Understanding," World Politics, Vol. 22 (1970), pp. 329-43. 19. John Burton, International Relations: A General Theory (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 71-72. 20. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1951). 21. John Harsanyi, "Rational-Choice Models of Politi- cal Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories," World Politics, Vol. 21 (1969), pp. 513-38. 22. R. L. Curry Jr. and L. L Wade, A Theory of Political

Exchange (Englewood Cliffs, N.].: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 49; and Lance E. Davis and Douglass C. North, Insti- tutional Change and American Economic Growth (Cam- bridge England: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 40. 23. Trout Rader, The Economics of Feudalism (New

York: Gordon and Breach, 1971), p. 50. 24. Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 1-2. 25. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 132.

Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond

ROBERT 0. KEOHANE

The author surveys and critically evaluates the work of realists and "structural realists." Keohane argues that structural realism helps us understand world pul- itics by focusing on its systemic aspects that establish the context for state action. On the other hand, to explain state behavior and outcomes, Keohane looks not just to international political structure but also to its relation to domestic politics and decision making, internal-external interactions, and the workings of inter- national institutions.

From Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Ada W. Finifter (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983). Reprinted by permission of the APSA.