Latin History III

I 5I.} 'I'IIII KII,I,tNG ZONE

Guatemalan forces, advised by U.S. police trainers, carried out eighty roundups

and multiple assassinations in early 1966. In March 1966, they captured about thirty insurgents, including Victor Manuel Gutierrez, a leader of the PGT and former ally of President Arbenz. Security forces interrogated, tortured, and exe-

cuted the prisoners. Judicial police subjected Guti6rrez to a torture known as /a

capucha,covering his head with a cowl and shocking him with electrical currents.

Guti6rrez apparently succumbed to a heart attack during the torture. Security

forces placed the bodies ofGuti6rrez and the other insurgents in burlap bags and

dumped them in the Pacific Ocean.ss By denying access to the corpses, security

forces intensified the grief of the victims'friends and relatives. Guatemalan secur-

ity forces had also established a new, terrifying precedent in Latin America. In the

1970s, the military and death squads in Argentina and Chile would similarly dis-

pose of the bodies of their victims, dropping them in the ocean or burying them in

the desert. The concept ofthe "disappeared," or desaparecido, would become a ter-

rifying reality in Latin America. People would vanish and security forces would

deny any knowledge of what happened. Parents throughout Latin America, like the

mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires, would spend decades vainly trying

to discover the fate of their children. Beyond "disappearing" people, Guatemalan

security forces initiated the practice of"scorched earth" tactics, destroying villages

to undermine popular support for insurgents. In October 1966, secr.rrity forces murdered eight thousand rural folk, setting tl.re stage lor far worse atrocities against

the indigenous population in the 1980s. The political right's brutality knew no bounds. In 1968, security forces murdered Rogelia Cruz Martinez, an architecture

student, leftist, and former "Miss Guatemala" who had represented her nation at

the Miss Universe contest in Long Beach, California, in 1959. In this case, the butchers publicly displayed Cruz's mutilated and raped, naked corpse.5"

The forces of the left acted violently, blowing up electrical towers, attacking

military installations, murdering government officials, robbing banks, and kid-

napping wealthy Guatelnalans for ransom. They also attacked the U.S. presence,

killing U.S. military advisors and, in Ar.rgust 1968, assassinating Ambassador

fohn Gordon Mein. But nothing in the history of Western law, philosophy, or statecraft justified the wholesale, wanton murder that the Guatemalan military

perpetrated on the population. The response to armed insurgents transcended issues of defending the state or fighting the good Cold War fight against Soviet-

or Cuban-inspired Marxism. The military, supported by elites, landed oligarchs,

and the Church hierarchy, was determined to preserve the pre-1944 status quo. John Longan, a U.S. security trainer, organized Operaci6n Limpieza- Ashe

considered the course and conduct of the operation, Longan conceded that Guatemalan security forces "will be continued to be used, as in the past, uol so much as protectors of the nation against Communist enslavcnrct.tt, but as thc

oligarchy's oppressors of legitimate sociirl change."l'7

In the words of historian Piero Glcijcscs, llrc tl.S. tovt't l itrlt'r vt'tttiott itl Guaternrla in 1954 was tlrc'irriginal sirr."'"' Il contlt'ttttt,',1 ( irt,tlt'ttt,tl,t lo ir lili'ol Irrlrror. l;or llrc tlrritctl Stirlt,s, lrorvt'vt'r', il rvottltl lrr',t sttt tlot llt r otttlttillllll'l,lli,llll

CHAPTER 4

*

War against Cuba

po. nlo.. than five decades, the United States has pursued hostile policies I toward Cuba under the leadership of Fidel Castro (1959-2008) and his brother, Raul Castro (2008- ). As of 2014, the United States has not conducted diplomatic relations with Cuba since 1961, and it has maintained the trade em- bargo it imposed on the Caribbean island in 1962. Five years after overthrowir.rg an alleged Communist governlnent in Guatemala, the United States encountered a new, threatening presence in its traditional sphere ofinfluence. Fidel Castro and his 26th of July Movement seized power in early 1959 and rapidly transformed Cuba into a radical state allied with the Soviet Union. Castro, an authoritarian populist, converted to communism and proclairncd his duty to make revolution throughout the world. The United States reacted to the Castro challenge with fury and force. Beyond isolating Cuba, diplomatically and economically, U.S. officials waged war against the island, sponsoring an invasion and authorizing sabotage and terrorism. The United States also conspired to assassinate Cuban leaders. During the first ten years of life with Fidel Castro, the United States did not suc- ceed in toppling the Castro regime, although it managed to contain the Cuban Revolution. Nonetheless, the United States remained obsessed with Castro's Cuba. The basic thrust of U.S. policy toward the rest of Latin America would be to prevent a "second Cuba" in the region.

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

Iriclel Castro ancl his band of bearded guerrilla s, los barbudo.s, rode on tanks into Ilavanir in |anuary 1959. 'Iheir triumphant entry into the capital city, which was grcctccl with wiltl, clclirious crowds, n-rarked the cuhnination of Castro's six-year strugglc agirinst <lietrrtor lrtrlgcncio llatista. Birtista l.rad used his control of the (ltrbirniun)yt()t[rnrirr;rlt'lltcislirrrtl'spoliticrrl Iilcsinccthe 1930sancl hadoccu- picrl llrt'ptt'si<lt'ttt 1'lrt'ltvr't'rr l(),10;trrtl l9,l,l. lrr 1952, llittislir irtitin scizcrl prcsi rlr'rrt iirl l)()\v('t. !V rl lr lr r', ,t t ttty ,t t t, I l,r,l i, t' i tt tl rs;rrr',ty, I lrt' r,t'tt,tl ;t ntl vit iotts llrrl islrt

60 'I'I{E KILLING ZON}i

hustled his relatives onto an arirplane as the New Year dawned and flew to the sal'ety of the Dominican Republic, the home of dictator Rafael Trujillo.

Fidel Castro (1926- ), the son of a prosperous sugar planter who had emi- grated from Spain, had led a privileged life. He was a good athlete and an excellent student, attending a preparatory school admir.ristered by Iesuit priests and then earning a larv degree fior.n tl.re University of Havantr. Castro participated in stu- der-rt politics at the university. Castro first came to international attentior.r on 26 loly 1953 when he lecl a gror.rp of 135 young rebels, students, urbau workers, and peasants in a disastrous storming of the armybarracks at Moncada, located in the Cuban city of Santiago. He received a fifteen-year sentence for his rebellion but wirs freed fron-r prison ir-r 1955 by the confident Batista. Castro ar-rd his brother Rairl fled to Mexico to plan another assault on the Batista regime. In 1956, Fidel Castro and eighty-one other rnen struggled ashore irfter their leaky ship, Granma, beached on Cuba's eastenr shore. Within a ferv days, Batista forces killed most of tl.re insurgents. The sixteen survivors, who included the Castro brothers and Arger.rtir.re revolutionary [r,rnesto "Che" Guevtrra, retreated into the Sierra Maestra, the r.r.ror-rntains of southeastern Cuba. Castro steadily rebuilt his forces to more than 1,000 men and launched hit-and-run attacks against Bastista's forces.'Ihe turn to gr"ierrilla warfare was out of necessity rather than choice. Castro had counted on a mass uprising following the landing of the Granma. Che Guevara especially designed the guerrilla warfare tactics. The determination ancl courtrge of the guerrillas inspired other Cubans, and by 1958 the insurgency had spread from rural areas into the cities. Ilatista's power and legitimacy were as rnuch under- r-nined by demonstrations and strikes conducted by professional, union, irnd stu- dent organizations as by Castro's forccs. By the end ofthe year, support for Batista had evaporated. Castrcl, an authoritariar.r, proved effective at quickly girthering porver in his on,n har.rds and overwhelming the other anti-Batista groups.l

What Castro and the 26th of July Movement intended for Cuba was initially unclear. 'fhe m:rnitbsto of tl-re movement was Castro's long, rambling, "History Will Absolve Me" speech, which he gave at his trial and subsequently rewrote in prisor.r. Castro pron-risecl agrarian and industrial reform, administrative honesty, ar-rd a liberal and progressive constitution fbr Cuba. During the two years he spent ir.r the Sierra Mirestra, Castro released letters and issued declarations that his r.novement was libertarian ar-rd democratic, but also reformist and perhaps socialistic. Those tl-roughts had been especially conveyed in a drarnatic intc'rview Castro gave to New York'flrres correspondent Herbert Matthews, who was spir- ited to Castro's mountain hideaway in F'ebruary 1957. Aithough his statements were vague and an.rbiguons, scholars do not believe that Castro was trying to deceive Cubans or the international comn.runity. Prior to 1959, Castro lackcd a clear vision for a post-Batista Cuba, and he had not comnrittccl himsclf to arr ideological doctrine.CastrowasalmostcertainlynotaMiuxisl Lcrrirrisl,rrnally ol'thc Soviet Union, rlr an agcr.rt of the inlcrnirtiorrirl(lorrrnrrrnisl rrrovt'rrrt'rrl.'llre (ltrbarr (l<lrttnttrrtisl I);rrly, rvlriclr wils ()r)('ol l,ittitt Atttr'tt,,t'', l,rtlqr'sl (,otrtrutrrtisl

l)iutics rvillr st'vt'rrlt't'rr llrorrslrrrtl rrrr'rrrllt'rs, l,rovt.l.',1 tr.',trlr',l,rrrlr.rl.rrrl lo llrt'

CHAPTF.R.I . \\/.r .rrl,rirrst Cuba 61

Fidel Castro, his brother, RaUl Castro (kneeling in front of Fidel), and other members of Castro's revolutionary staff appear in southeastern Cuba in June 1957. Castro and his followers had been fighting and organizing against the regime of Fulgencio Batista since landing in Cuba on the Granma in December 1956. Castro and his guerrilla fighters would claim credit for toppling Batista and would subsequently seize control of Cuba in January 1959. ln fact, the uprising against Batista was widespread, with many urban insurgents. (o Bettmann/CORBIS)

26th of July Movernent. Cuban Cornrnunists hnd a long history of cooperating rvith Batista. As exer.nplified in analyses published ir.r the Soviet Union's official newspaper, Pravdo, international Cor.nrnnr.rists judged Castro ir well-intentioned but naive, rornantic revolutionary.r

Like other educated Cubans, Castro held ambivalent views about the United States. He appreciated the wealth and technological prowess of the United States and wished the same for Cuba. He also enjoyed U.S. popular culture, playing birseball and following major league teallrs. Ilut Cubans resented tl.re role that the United States hircl played in Cuba's history. After assisting Cuba's struggle for ir.r- dependence in 1898, the United States attirched the Platt Arnendrneut (1901-1933) t<l the Cuban constitution, giving the United Stirtes the right to ir.rterveire militar- ily and overscc (luba's internal affairs. The United States also crcirtccl .l pcn'niur errt rnilitaly birsr', (irrirntiinamo Ilay, in Cuba. U.S. troops rcpciltcrlly lanclcrl irr irrtlcl'rcntlt'rrt ( lrrlrrr,,rrrtl I i.S. rvrrrships plicd tlrc wirtcrs irr sight ol'lluvaut's hitrhor. 'llrt'1.).S. ilnrlr,r,,r,,r,lor rv,r', rtstt,rlly r'ottsitlct'crl Iltc r;ccotttl tttosl porvt'tltrl ligrrre in (.rrlrrr, irllt.r llrt.( rrl,,rrr l,rr.,,rrlr.rrl. \\/itlr tlreil nt()n(,),titrirrrrrrlt.t.tl lrl,llrt'lrrr1,o trr'lsol U.S. rrr.rttnr',,, ll" lr\r",lur',(,un('lorlotuin,tlt'(,rtlr,t's('(()tl()ttti( lilt'. \\/illr

if;tl;'in v

J

'1

62 THE KILI,ING ZONE

approximately $900 million invested in Cuba in 1959, U.S. investors accounted

foi +O p....rrt of the country's sugar production. U.S. companies also controlled public utilities, oil rehneries, mines, railroads, and the tourist industry. cubans

iook further offense that U.S. tourists considered Havana their playground for

gambling, narcotics, ancl prostitution. The U.S. criminal underworld, "the Mafia,"

operatedfreely in Batista's Cuba. The celebrated frlm,The Godfather Part II (1974),

truthfullyportrays the sordid underside of life in Cuba in the late 1950s. Castro

took note of the popular feeling that the United States had stolen Cuba's inde-

pendence in issuing his first statement after Batista's army capitulated. In a radio

broadcast on I f anuary 1959, castro pledged: "This time, fortunately for cuba, the

revollltion will truly achieve power. It won't be as in 1895, when the Americans

came at the last hour and took over the country."l

Reforming Cuban society inevitably meant altering both Cubtr's peculiar so-

cioeconomic structure and the overwhelming U.S. presence in Cuba. Casual ob-

servers might judge Cuba a relatively prosPerous country in the 1950s' In international rankings, Cuba stood thirty-first in the world in per capita income-

an income roughly similar to that of l.atin American countries like Argentina,

Uruguay, and Venezuela. Havana was a glittering metropolis, the Malec6n was a

stunning walkway along Havana's northern shore, and tourists loved the island's

gorgeous beaches. But there were grave structural imbalances in the Cuban econ-

omy. About or.re-thircl of Cuba's labor force was employed in sugar production.

However, sugar production required a sizeable labor force only during the harvest

period, or zafra;most of the year, during the tiempo muerto, or "dead time," rural

workers were unen-rployed. Sugar work, combined with some government-funded

road maintenance work, provicled six hundred thousand rural workers only four

to five months of gainful ernployment a year. In the impoverished countryside,

where more thtrn 40 percent of Cubans lived, access to schools and health-care

facilities was limited. More than 40 percent of rr'rral folk could not read or write'

Afio,Cubans, who especially predominated irmong the rural proletariat, suffered

the further indignity of experiencing racial discrimination and even segregatiot-l.

Population pressllres compounded cuba's problems. Increasing at 2.5 percent a

year, the population hacl grown from 5 million in 1945 to 7 million in 1960. The

Cuban economy could not accommodate the fifty thousand young people who

were entering the work fbrce each year. Perhaps one-third of cubans were un-

employed or uuderetlploYed.'t Cubans, including Castro, blamed the United States for Cuba's poverty and

backwardness. cubans held that the constant U.S. meddling in cuban life had

fosterecl a political system that had produced only corrupt tyrants like Batista or

weak, inept rulers like Carlos Prio Socarr6s (1948-1952). Whereas they de- r1ounced U.S. interference, Cubans felt compelled to colttparc tlre ir lot to thc lile -

styles of their ricl'r ar.rd thr.t.rous uorthcrn neighbors. (ltrbir rrs, lvlro livctl :ts cltlsc rls

ninctynrilcst<lliklricla,intcrprclcdthcirsocioctotlotttit sl,llttstvillrirrtlrccottlcxt

.l'l5c Ilrritctl Slrtlcs, 161 llrt'l)6rrrirritrur llt'ptrlrlit ot Nir,tt,r1irr,r. !Vlt,tl tltrtllt'tt'tl

lo ( lttlrrttts tv,ts lltitl ( lttlr:l rv,ls sillrrili, rtttlll' |oott't llr'rrr l\11""r""r1'Ii' lllt' Pttott':'l

CHAP'fER 4. WaragainstCuba 63

U.S. state. Frustrated Cubans further held that their nation lacked the economic independer-rce that would give them the opportunity to build a prosperous soci- ety. Throughout the twentieth century, the United States cor-rtrolled Cuba's trade. Under the Sugar Act (1948), the United States reserved 55 percent of sugar con- sumption for domestic producers and 45 percent for foreign sources. Cuba was assigned a generous 70 percent ofthe foreign quota. The sugar trade represented about 80 percent of the value of Cuba's exports. In turn, 80 percent of Cuba's im- ports came from the United States. The bilateral trade arrangement gave Cubans access to U.S. consumer goods, albeit not a U.S. standard of living. Cubans fur- ther understood that the Sugar Act gave the United States enormous power over Cuban society. By altering or repealing the Sugar Act, the United States could generate chaos in Cuba. This sense ofdependence and helplessness fueled Cuban demands for change.s

Castro's agrarian reform law of April 1959 set the tone for U.S.-Cuban rela- tions. The law expropriated farmlands larger than one thousand acres, with com- pensation to be paid in Cuban bonds and based on the land's declared value for taxes in 1958. The revolutionary government vowed to create a life of equality and justice for the rural poor. Sugar barons, both foreign ar-rd domestic, had predict- ably undervalued their land in Batista's Cuba. Howls of protest from Washington, U.S. investors, and propertied Cubans seemed only to encourage the Castro gov- ernment to limit further the prerogatives of the wealthy in Cuba. Tens of thou- sands of Cubans fled the island, landing in Miami, Florida. Cuban revolutionaries also drove the criminal ur.rderworld out of Cuba, closing down the narcotics rings, brothels, and garnblir-rg dens. By the end of 1961, Castro had expropriated U.S. investments in Cuba.

Between 1959 and 1961, the Cubar-r Revolution took on the tone and shape of a Communist revolution. On I December 1961, Castro publicly declared: "I am a Marxist-Leninist, and I will continue to be a Marxist-Leninist until the last days of my life." In moving toward cornmunism, Fidel Castro joined his brother Raril and Che Guevara, both committed radicals. Castro probably concluded that communism provided solutions to Cuba's unique and pressing socioeconomic problems. The Soviet Union, given its impressive economic growth rate since 1917 and scientific triumphs in outer space in the 1950s, seemed a viable model for poor countries. As he faced domestic opposition, Castro also welcomed and em- braced Cuban Communists. Communism may have also suited Castro's authori- tarian personality. The Communist concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" would enhance Castro's drive for personal domination of Cuba. Historians of Latin Ar.ncrican history have often noted that Castro was a Latin-American type-a caudillo or strongman in the tradition of |uan Manuel de Rosas (1832-1835) of Argcntirra. Ilut (lirstro was a r:rlrrrll//o with political ideas.6

As lris glowirrli rrrtlir'irlisnr rctrpctl rnounting h<lstility fior.n thc United Statcs, (lrts(ro lrrr.rrt'tl lo llrt'Sovir'l (lrriorr Iirl lrclP. In thc 1950s, Sovict l)r'curicr Nikita lr.ltt ttsltt lrt'v lr,rtl rvitlt'nt'tl Sot'it'l r ()nl,l( l\ rvillr Asiitrt itrttl Ali itirrt rrrrliortst'rrrt'r'1iirr11 Itottt,olottt,tlirrrr llrrl llrr'\ot'tt'1,, 1,,,rt','.,lt,,rlslrrill lol;rlirr Anrt't it,t,tontr'tlin1', llrt,

64 THE KII,I,ING ZONE

overwhelming U.S. influence in the region. In 1959, Soviet leaders began to sense

the radical nature of the cuban Revolution. In April 1959, the Soviets approved

Rafl Castro's request to send Spanisir-speaking military officers to Cuba to help

reorganize the Cuban military. Remembering what happened to President )acobo

Arbenz Guzm6n of Guatemala, Cubans wanted an army loyal to the revolution. In

October 1959, the Soviets sent Alexsandr Alekseev as an unofficial envoy to discttss

establishing diplomatic relations. Alekseev, who was fluent in Spanish, served as the

Soviet ambassador in Havana from 1962 to 1968. In February 1960, at Castro's re-

quest, the Soviets held a trade fair in Cuba and signed a commercial agreement with

the Cubans, which included purchasing Cuban sugar. At least initially, the Soviet

Union was overjoyed to join the Castro-led revolution. Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978),

the first deputy premier of the Soviet Union, attended the trade fair in Cuba. As

Mikoyan recounted to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "You Americans must realize

what Cuba means to us old Bolsheviks. We have been waiting all of our lives tbr a

country to go communist without the Red Arrny. It has happened in Cuba, and it

makes us feel like boys again."7 As the 1960s progressed, the Soviets would learn to

temper their boyish enthusiasm for the Cuban Revolution.

THE CUBAN THREAT

Ficlel Castro's rapid elimination of the historic U.S. economic influence in Cuba

threatened by example the approximately $8 billion in U.S. direct ir.rvestments in

the rest of Latin America. U.S. companies had tnassive investments in strategically

vital resources such as Chilean copper and Venezuelan oil. As United Fruit Com-

pany officials had done in tl.re early 1950s in regard to Guatemala, U.S. capitalists-

cattie barons and sugar executives-bombarded presidential administrations with

livid complaints about Cuban perfidy. But in responding to the Castro threat, U.S.

officials in the Dwight Eisenhower, lohn Kenrledy, and Lyndon Johnson adminis-

trations did not regularly use the language ofproperty rights or refer to the tenets

of international capitalisrn in their public pronouncertents and private delibera-

tions about Cuba. They perceived Castro's Cuba as a direct threat to U.S. national

security in the Cold War. Destroying U.S. ecouomic influence in l.atin America

was part of the threat, but not the core of the challenge that the Cuban Revolution

presented. U.S. Ieaders vowed to destroy the Castro regirne because they feared

ihat revolutionary Cuba would spread international communism throughout the

hemisphere. On his last clay in olIce, 19 January 1961, President Eisenhower told president-elect Kennedy that "in the long-run the United States cannot allow the

Castro government to continue to exist in Cuba."8 President Kennedy accepted his

predecessor's judgment. As his administration often put it, cot-nmttnisrr.r ir.r the

Western Hemisphere imperiled the United States, impeclecl the U.S' irbility to rct

in other areas of the world, and threatened to lrecot'uc a divisivc tlotttcstic politicirl

issue. However, U.S. presiclcr-rtial irdurinistratir)lls cxilli[',('l,llt'tl llrt'tlitttllt'rs tltitl

OubirprcscntcdtotlrcLltritctl Statcsirrrrl tooliitttiottslll,tl ttrlt'tl',lltt'tl lllt't).S.tott

Ilict rvitlr ( Itrir.

CHAP'f F.R 4 . WaragainstCuba (r5

h.r early 1962, Fidel Castro, ir.r his Secor.rd Declaration of Havana, asserted thal "the duty of every revolutionary is to rnake revolution." In October 1965, Castro read aloud on television Che Guevara's farewell letter to the Cuban leadcr. Guevara, who was popularly identified with guerrilla warfare, vor,r,ed "to fighl against imperialism wherever it may be." In |anuary 1966, Cuba hosted tlrc 'fricontinental Conference, attended by five hundred delegates from the "tricuu

tinent" of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The conference created a new orgil nization, with headquarters in Havana, to support armed revolutionary activity throughout the world. ln Castro's words, "the battle will take on the most violcnl terms." In April 1962 the Tricontinental organization received a message frortt Guevara "somewhere in the world." Che Guevara was putting into practice lris commitment to armed revolutionary struggle, leading a small band of guerrillas in sor-rtheastern Bolivia. Beyond the rhetoric and resolutions and Guevara's cx ploits, Cuba served as the "Liberation Department" or "guerrilla central" for Latin American radicals. Perhaps Iifteen hundred to two thousand Latin Americans, by CIA estirnates, received political indoctrination and military training in revolu tionary Cuba ir-r the early 1960s.')

In analyzing and assessing Cuba's cor.nmitment to spreacl revolution in Latin America, a variety of issues n-rust be highlighted. In the 1960s, Cuba covertly as sisted radicals in Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and, rnost notably, Venezuela. Iu Venezuela, radicals attacked the popularly elected governmcnt of R6mul<l Bctan court (1959-1964) and tried to intimidate Venezuelans into not participating irr the Decer.nber 1963 presidential elections that lecl to the victory of Rafl l,eorri (1964-1969). Although Venezuela's Communist Party for a time perpetratecl vio lence, the chief agitators and terrorists were young mernbers of Movimietrlo rlc lzquiereda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), or MIR. Venezucla'.s guerrilla fighters, who numbered between one thousand and two thousirntl, crc ated havoc and committed unspeakable crimes in the country. The Venezuclarr government reported that more than four hundred people died in revolts in nritl 1962. But blame for death and destruction in Venezuela could not be n.rainly as cribed to Fidel Castro. A CIA study concluded that MIR members "ran their own shows," "were a home-grown revolutionary organization," and could be dcscrilrctl irs "an extreme-natior.ralist, revolutionary nationalist movement." Venczttclitlt Communists, who entered the fray in late 1962 and quit by 1965, rejectecl (laslt'o's

criticisrn of their actions, deploring "the role of revolutionary 'pope' which I;itlcl (lastro arrogates to himself." Cuba's intervention in Venezueln also did uot occu r' in a political vacuum. President Betancourt was Castro's chiel'adversa ry i n Lir t i rr Anrerica. l{e permitted ar.rti-Castro Cubans to operate I'rorir Vcuczucll. 'llrt' Vcnez.uclan presidcnt supported U.S. efforts to overthrow (lastro, cvctt ittlonrt irrg tJ.S. ollicials tlrirt lrc lirvoretl thc assirssination ol-(lrtstro, worrkl lirtitrt,.r' il, irrrtl ItclP littrl sotttt't,tt.'lo rlo lltt'itttt.r"

l'r't'sitlt'rrl l',t'l,rtrr ottt I ,rtrrl I lrt' \/t'ttt'zttt'littt rrrilitirry itntl polit c lirirtltrrrlly strl,

Plt'sst'tl llrc lt'ltist tr'lrr'lltotr llr'l,ttttoutl'\ \u((('ss \vils r('l)('irlc(l llrroulllrorrl Lrrlirr Anrr'rrt,r irr llrr'l')tr()', li,rrlrr,rl', l,rrl,,l llrroulilrortl lltt'rt'1iiott,,rs lrrlqlrlililrtcrl lry

66 l'tlt, lilt.LING ZONFI

tl-re Bolivian military's capture of Che Guevara's pathetic band of warriors in 1967. The melnory of Guevara's ill-fated mission creates an impression that Cubans were engaged in guerrilla warfare through the hemisphere in the 1960s. In fact, scholars have estimated that only about forty Cubans fought in Latin America during the 1960s. Cr-rban volunteers, soldiers, and doctors joined anti- colonial moverrrents in the 1960s, but in Africa, not Latin America. Between 1962 and 1964, perhaps two thousand Cubans operated in Algeria, Zaire (Congo), and Guir.rea-Bissau. This preceded the r.nassive Cuban military intervention in Angola in 1975-1976. U.S. intelligence analysts were unaware, for example, that Guevara led a column of Cuban fighters in Zaire in 1965. Cubans yearned for the heroic life and the n-rystique of guerrilla warfare. Castro further theorized that Cuba, a racially mixed, impoverished, colonized nation, shared a special empathy for African liberation movements. But the Cuban interventions also involved real- politik. The Ur-rited States waged war against Cuba. Cubans feared a U.S. invasion of the island. Castro and his advisors concluded that the United States would live

with the Cuban Revolution only when confronted with revolutionary movements lhroughout the world. As one Cuban put it, by challengir.rg "the Yankees along all tl-re patl-rs of the world," Cuba would divide their forces, "so that they wouldn't be able to descend on us (or any other country) with all their might." In Che Guevara's worcls, Cub:r's survival depended on nurturing "two, three, many Vietnatns."rr

Castro and Guevara rarely bothered to infbrm the Soviet Union about their African adventures. U.S. oificials assumed that Castro served as a surrogate for the Soviet Union ar-rd that Cuba would do the Soviets'bidding, spreading the Com- munist manifesto throughout Latin America. But Cuban-Soviet relations were filled with tensions and inconsistencies. Between 1959 and 1962, the partnership intensified, culmir.rating ir-r the Cuban agreement to allow the Soviet Union to in- stall nuclear-tipped, ballistic missiles on the island. The Soviets also became the underwriters of the Cuban Revolution, providing economic aid and vital resources like oil. But between October 1962 ard 1968, bilateral relations deteriorated. The Cubans believed that the Soviets had sacrificed Cuban security in negotiating an end to the Cuban missile crisis. They considered the noninvasion pledge that the United States gave to the Soviets worthless because the United States continued to

wage a covert war against Cuba from 1963 to 1965. In Guevara's words, the reso- lution of the r.nissile crisis represented "sad and luminous days" for the Cubans. Cuban revolutionaries had learr.red the shocking, awful truth that the Soviets were not prepared to die for either Cuba or the cause. The Soviets wanted national se- curity, economic growth, and better relations or a d6tente with the United States. From November 1962 through 1979, Soviet-American relations steadily improved, with gaudy summit meetings, nuclear-arms control agreements, cultural ex- changes, and trade treaties. From the Cuban perspective, the pursuit ofd6tente by the Soviets exposed them as cowardly imperialists.r2

The Soviets drew differer.rt lessorls from thc r.nissilc crisis.'llrt'y srrrv thc (lubrrns as curotiorral arrcl irrcsportsilrlc, rccalling llrrrt irr llrt'trttrl'.1 ol llrt'tlisis (lltslro lrltl st'rrl ir Icllt'r'to l,.lrlrrslrtlr('v r'('(()r)lnr('trrlrrrli,r lrr(('rrl)lit't'tttttlt'itt

CHAP'f ER 4 . WaragainstCuba 67

strike against the United States. This could have led to ger-reral war and the dc struction of human civilization. The Cubans had to learn to follow the Soviets' lead and remember that within the world socialist lnovement Soviet security lrarl the highest priority. In terms of Latin America, this meant not challenging tlrc United States in its traditional sphere of influence. The Soviets also wanted to maintain control over Latin America's Communist parties, which ranged in number from one hur-rdred fifty members in Panama to more than sixty tl.rou sand in Argentina. Moscow judged Latir.r Ar.nerica's revolutionary poter.rtial as dismal and advised local Communists to organize and to eschew violence and subversion. U.S. intelligence analysts ironically agreed with Moscow, rating tlrc Argentine Communist Party, the largest ir-r the Western Hemispl.rere, as "r.rot rrr.r influential political force." When Castro visited the Soviet Union in May 1963, Premier Khrushchev informed the Cuban that the Soviet Union would not sup port armed insurrection in Latin America and that Castro should not attempt to dictate the policies of Latin American Commur.rists. 'I1-re Cuban foreign ministcr would later say that Castro believed that Khrushcl.rev wanted nothing to do with Latin America and "would never send a single revolver to the region." The Sovicts took a dim view of the Tricontinental Conference and Castro's sarcastic chirrac terization of Latin American Communists as more eager to pass resolutions tharr to foment revolution. The new Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1952), erupted when he found out in 1966 that Che Guevara was in Bolivia. Brezhncv's colleague, Alexei I(osygin, delivered a stern rebuke to Castro in Havana in ntitl l96Z demanding that Cuba cease its rneddling in Latin America. Remarkably, Kosygin had just concluded a summit with President Johnson in Glassboro, Ncw Jersey, and implied to the president that he would deliver just such a messagc l() Castro. The Cold War between Cuba aird the Soviet Union continued until nr itl 1968. Castro declined to attend the fiftieth anniversary celebration in Mosc<lw ol the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917. Brezhnev cut Cuba's oil supplics. Castro ordered the arrest of Cuba's pro-Soviet Communist Party leader, Aniltirl L,scalante. Escalante would receive a fifteen-year sentence for treason.rr

Ideological blinders prever.rted U.S. officials from always grasping the csscrrct' of the Cuban-Soviet split or assessing the shortcomings of the efficacy cll'intcl national communism in Latin America. To be sure, the Cuban Revolution hirtl profound influence in Latir-r America. But Cuba's dramatic role ir.r the rcgion's history did not arise frorn Cuban support fclr anned rebellion. Latin A me licir ns the your-rg, the poor, ir-rtellectuals-admired the Cuban Revolution lrccausc ol what it accornplished within Cuba. The rnost important influcncc that (lubir cxe l ciscd in the hen-risphere was the power of its example. Like Coinmunist socictit's thror,rghout the worlcl and history, the Cubirn econol'rly floppctl, botlr irr thc l()(r0s ir ncl thcrcalt cr. 'l hc cott n l ly bcca tnc relatively poorcr a ntl st lycil tlcpcntlcrr l orr ( lrt' sttgitt'tritrlc lirr ils t't()n()nli( solvcrtcy. (ltr[ra tlatlctl ()nc l)illt'on tlrt'(ltrilt'tl Stittt's lir rtnollrt't llrr'Sot'it'l Uttiort. Iitrt rrs oltt' lristol irrrr Prrl il, ( lrrlrrt rvrrs ,rn ",tttslt'lt'stt(( ('r,\ " ( ttlr,ttt ( otttlttttltirls t tt'ttlt'tl itrr t'ti;tlil,tl i,yt s.t ir'ly, r,risirrtl lltr' tr,,tllr'sollltr'ttrt,tl1'1,,,1,rtt,l,1,'ltt,trrr1llollr<'trrsr'rvitt'rirrlrt',rlllr,t'tlrrr,rliorr,,rrrtl

68 THE KILLING ZONE

welfare. As measured in indices such as life expectancy, infant mortality rates,

and literacy, Cuba developed a society that measured well against Western indus-

trial democracies. Cuban teachers, dispatched to the countryside, reduced illit-

eracy from 24 percerfi to 4 percent in the 1960s. Cuba also did an excellent job

controlling its explosive population growth, whereas its impoverished caribbean

and Central American neighbors continued to see their populations double every

twenty years. Afro-cubans, traditionally the poorest of cubans, especially bene-

fited from this redistribution of resources.ra Admiring these accomplishments,

Latin America's masses closed their eyes to the lack of political rights in Cuba.

The island nation remained a repressive political dictatorship under Castro.

The Cuban Revolution also excited the imagination of Latin Americans be-

cause of what it accomplished outside of Cuba. Cuba became an internationally

significant nation, culturally and politically. Cuba funded artists and filmmak-

e* *ho played major roles in the cultural arena. Memorias del subdesarrollo (Memories of IJnderdevelopment), the 1968 film directed by Tonr6s Gutierrez

Alea, garnered international awards. Film historians consider it a seminal work'

The film explores how an aspiring writer, who led a privileged life, responds to

the vast social changes sweeping revolutionary Cuba. The writer's parents had

fled to Miami. Alea would later direct Cuban films that would merit Oscar nom-

inations from Hollywood. cuban athletes also starred, winning gold, silver, and

bronze at the olympics. The great Alberto )uantorena, "el caballo" (the horse),

dominated the track and field events at the L976 summer games in Montreal.

Latin Americans took further satisfaction in Cuba's prominent role at inter-

national conferences of "Third World" nations. Fidel Castro was an international

celebrity. Che Guevara became a mythic figure. Latin American leaders nor-

mally did not enjoy such status. Latin Americans also applauded Cuba's escape

from U.S. domination. Latin American intellectuals had not forgotten what had

happened to Guatemala in 1954'

TO PLAYA GIR6N (T[IE BAY OF PIGS)

U.S. leaders conceded the appeal that the Cuban Revolution had for tens of millions

of frustrated, impoverished Latin Americans. They designed the Social Progress

Trust Fund and the Alliance for Progress economic aid programs in the 1960s as a

response to demands for revolutionary change (chapter 5). Although understand-

ing that Latin Americans yearned for their place in the sun, Eisenhower, Kennedy,

u.r-d 1ohn.o., administration officials gave the highest priority to destroying the

cuban Revolution and murdering its leaders. Using a term that became wide-

spread in the twenty-first century, the United States waged "state-supported ter-

rorism" against Cuba in the 1960s.

The Eisenhower administration initially reacted in a confused aucl ttncertain

fashion to Fidel Castro ancl the 26th of |uly Movcnrcrtt. Lil<c tnosl itltcrnittitttritl

observers, thc adrninistrirtion wondcrcd wlrat (litslro bclicvctl itntl whctltcl ltc

Itltl thc Ptlwcr alttl sttPPorl lrt lithc ctlttttol ol (lttlrir' Slirlt'l)t';rirrtrttt'ttl itttitlysts

CHAPTER 4 . WaragainstCuba 69

labeled Castro "immature" and "irresponsible." The administration did not per- ceive the Castro movement as Communist. On 23 December 1958, Christian Herter, the future secretary of state, informed President Eisenhower that, al- though Communists were utilizing the movement "to some extent," "there is in- sufficient evidence on which to base a charge that the rebels are Communist dominated." In early 1959, CIA Director Allan Dulles testified to U.S. Iegislators that Castro was not a Communist agent. These assessments were accurate. None- theless, the Eisenhower administration opposed Castro taking power. In March 1958, the administration cut offarms shipment to its long-term client, Fulgencio Batista, after his U.S.-supplied air force inflicted heavy civilian casualties while bombing rebel positions. In late December, it encouraged Batista to abdicate his throne. The administration ineffectually looked for a credible, anti-Castro third force to take control of Cuba. But the administration could not temper the revo- lutionary fever that swept over Cuba.rs

Less than a year after Castro's triumphal entry into Havana, the United States decided it could not abide the Cuban. On 5 November 1959, Secretary Herter recommended to Eisenhower that the United States generate opposition "to the extremist, anti-American course of the Castro regime." In December; Colonel f. C. King of the CIAs Western Hemisphere Division recommended to his boss that "thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro." King used the same language that CIA officers had used in compiling assassina- tion targets of Guatemalans. Sensing that Cuba would become a domestic polit- ical issue in the upcoming presidential campaign, Vice President Richard Nixon, in late December, urged the president to focus on Cuba. The vice president had met with Castro for three hours in Washington in April 1959. At that time, Nixon believed that Castro could be saved. He considered the Cuban's ideas on eco- nomic development naive and simplistic, but came away impressed with Castro the person. Castro had those "indefinable qualities that make him a leader of tnen." Nixon further predicted that Castro "was going to be a great factor in the development of Cuba and very possibly in Latin American affairs generally." faking the patronizing tone toward Castro that had characterized the U.S. ap- proach to Cuba for sixty years, Nixon called for the United States to try "to orient him in the right direction." The Cuban Revolution's attack on both the realities and the symbols of U.S. power in Cuba undermined Nixon's hopes. Cuba's grow- ing flirtation with the Soviet Union hardened administration attitudes. By lanu- ary 1960, President Eisenhower was calling Castro a "mad man." In February, liisenhower told a senator he had received plans for clandestine action against (lastro "approximating gangsterism."r6

On 17 March 1960, President Eisenhower put the United States on a course to ovcrthrow Castro. I,liscnhowcr authorized'A Program of Covert Operation against thc (lastro llcginrc."'llrc progranr, initially budgeted at $4.4 million, included lirurrclriug it prrrprtg;t11111r olli'rrsivc, olgarriz.ing anti-(lastro forccs within Cuba, and llirirrirtg rr pirt'rrrtrililirly lonr'orrlsitlt'(lrrtrir lirr lirttrrc irclion.rT liiscnlrowcr's plarr lr:rtl Ilrccitt'tttittl<sol ltllStl(:(lliSS.'llrt'irrltnittislrittiortlropctl tolcpliryilssrrcccss

70 'fHE KILLING ZONE

in destroying the Arbenz government of Guatemirla. For the rest of tl-re year, the administration attacked Cuba. The CIA broadcast anti-Castro tirades from a radio

station on Swan Island, a dot of land offthe coast of Honduras. The administration

tried to strangle the Cuban economy, cutting off sr'tgar imports and banning ex-

ports to the island. The CIA began to train Cuban exiles in Guatemala with the mission of carrying out an amphibious invasion of Cuba. The exile army would

grow from 300 men to more than 700 by the end of the year and eventually to

1,400 men in April 1961. The CIA also took up Colonel King's proposal to "elirninate" Fidel Castro' The

agency, with the approval of Director Dulles, contacted criminal flgures interested

in carrying out "gangster action" against Castro. CIA operatives presumably cal- culated that the Mafia wanted Castro dead so that it could resume its nefarious activities in Cuba. At the gangsters' request, CIA technicians developed poison pills to place in Castro's food and drink. The CIA worked with Sam Giancana, who was on the attorney general's list of the "ten most wanted men" in America.

Giancana, a successor to Al Capone of Chicago, was the "Cosa Nostra" boss of the mob's Cuban operations.rB Finally, on 3 fanuary 1961, Presider-rt Eisenl-rower broke

diplomatic relations with Cuba. President-elect John F. Kennedy's attitude toward Cr"rba evolved rapidly. As a

senator, he denounced the Eisenhower administratior-r for supporting the Batista

regime through the 1950s. l,ike n-rany U.S. citizens, Senator Kennedy welcomed the

overthrow of Batista and hoped that Castro was a lroderate democratic reformer.

But in 1960, Kennedy seized on tl-re n-rounting teusiort with Castro and turned it into a major campaign issue. The radicalization of the Cuban Revolution and the

growing relationship between Cttba and the Soviet Union corroborated his basic

campaign issue-the United States was losing the Cold War. The president-elect received a briefing from Allen Dulles on the covert campaign against Castro. In two

meetings with Kennedy, on 6 Decernber and 19 fanuary, President llisenhower emphasized the need to oust Castro, telling the president-elect that the United States was helping the exile arrny "to the utmost" and that their training should be "continued and accelerated."r') Kennedy accepted Fliser, hower's judgment that the

Cuban Revolution posed a mortal danger to U.S. vital interests'

President Kennedy carried or.rt Eisenhower's policy. The U.S.-backed inva-

sion of Cuba took place at the Bay of Pigs on the island's southwestern shores between 17 and 19 April 1961, less than three months after Kennedy took office. Castro's forces quickly routed the 1,400-man invasion force known as "Brigade

2506." His soldiers killed l14 ar.rd captured another 1,179 of the exiles. Castro's doctors estimated his fighters suffered 3,650 casualties, including more thau 1,600 dead. Castro took personal command of the Cluban military, directecl thc counterattack, and won dornestic and internatioual prestige for having clclcated

the United States. Castro seemed a hero to n.rany [.atin Attlcricatrs. President Kennedy reccivecl prcssurc to itutltorizt'tltt'ittvitsiott. ll lrc hrttl

caltcclctl llrc invasiotl, Ilc rvottltl ltllvc lrectt rcjct tirrl', lltt' 1'l'rtts .l lltt' ttitliott's rutosl lltrslt'rl rnililirry lt'rrtk'r', (it'rrt'r'irl l)rvililrt lrisr'ttltott'r't Ilr'tvrtttltl,tlso lt,tvt'

CHAPTER 4 . WaragainstCuba 77

what Director Dulles called a "disposal" problem. The Cuban exiles trainir.rg in Guatemala would return to the United States ar.rd loudly complain to journalists and politicians thirt President Kenr.redy t'eared Castro ar-rd that he lacked the fortitude to wage Cold War. But aborting the invasion wor.rld have averted a dis- aster. Although not debated within the administration between fanuary and April 1961, there was a politically expedient way for Kennedy to relieve the pres- sure. Newspapers and journals reported about the Cuban exiles training in Guatemala. Cuban exiles in Miar.ni openly discussed the invasion plans. The president privately grumbled that Castro did not need intelliger.rce agents in the United States because "all he has to do is read our papers."20 Kennedy could have conceivably lar.nented tl.ris exposure and terminated the trtrining. Instead, he asked editors to suppress the news.

President Kennedy also received misleacling advice about the invasion from key advisors, especially Richard Bissell, the CIAs deputy director of plans. Bissell rr-ret frequently with Kennedy and sent him numerous memorandums. Bissell structured his argurnents in a way to compel the president to authorize the inva- sion. Bissell assured the president that thc invasion had a good chance of over- throwing Castro or sparking a damaging civil war in Cuba. If the invasion did not go fortl-r, however, tsissell warned that Latin Americans would lose faith in the United States and that "David will again have defeated Goliath." Moreover, the failure to overthrow Castro in the near future wouid lead "to tl.re elimination of all internal and external Cuban opposition of any effective nature." When Kennedy repeatedly demanded that the U.S. role be limited in the operatior.r, llissell always assured tl.re president that tl-re invasion would succeed without overt U.S. support. Kennedy assumed that the exiles would be able to retreat into Cuban mountains ifthey could not hold and expand their beachhead at the Bay of Pigs. Bissell failed to make clear that the nearest mountains were far away and the area around the Bay of Pigs was filled with swamps.2r

The counsel that President Kennedy received was not, however, or-re sided; he received strong advice to cancel Eisenl-rower's plan. Congressional leaders like Scnator J. William F'ulbright, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Comrnit- tee, and State Department officers raised philosophical, diplornatic, and practical objections to the unprovoked invasion ofa sovereign country. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, an inveterate Cold Wirrrior, told the president that one did uot have to be a certified public accountant "to discover that 1,500 Cubans wcre not as good as 25,000 Cubans" (the size of Castro's army). Presidential aide Arthur Schlesinger dismissed the idea that the U.S. hand could be kept hidden in thc invasion. Given the long U.S. history of n-rilitary intervention in Caribbean countrics, global observers would immediately assume that the United States corrtrollccl thc (luban cxilcs.'lhc U.S. standing in the world would be harmed. As Sclrlcsirrgcr rvirlrrctl, "( lrrbrr rvill lrcconrc our I'lungary," referrir.rg tcl thc ugly Soviet irrvasiorr ol l lrrnt,,,rrf itr l()'rrr. "

lrr llrt't'rrtl, l'rt',.irlr'rrl K,'rrrrt'rl1':rrrllrolizt'rl llrc llrry ol'l)i11s irrvirsion lrt't'irrrsc lrc \\,,lnl('(l ( .,rrl ro ovr'r l lrr orYtr ,ilrrl lrr'r ,rrr,,,'lr,'l lrorrtilrl l ltt't'rilt'ltt ttt),, ottltl ,tt t orttPlrslr

172 'l lllr KILLING ZONIi that goal with a miniln.rl cost to the United States. In early April 1961, the president

dispatched Colonel fack Hawkins to Guatemala to assess the lighting abilities of

tl-re brigade. Colonel Hawkins impressed the president with his rePort, noting that

"these olficers are young, \,igorous, intelligent, and motivated with a fanatical urge

to begin btrttle." The exiles assured Hawkir.rs that once the battle began, all they

wanted was supplies and would not need direct U.S. military support'21

More than dubious reports, however, led Kennedy to give tl-re signal to ir.rvade

Cuba. He ernbraced the urass delusion that had existed in the United States sitrce

1959 abor.rt politicat lifb in Castro's Cuba. Cubans allegedly suffered under Castro

and prayecl for their deliverance. The invasion supposedly would produce a .shock" in cuba, triggering a mass uprising. Those who planr.red the Bay of Pigs

aiways understood tl-rirt the exile brigade could not conquer Cuba. As the plan-

ners noted, "the primary objective of the lbrce will be to survive and maintain its

integrity on Cuban soil." Brigade 2506 leaders predicted that thereafter thirty

thousand Cubans would rush to the side of their liberators, and Cuban soldiers

woulcl clesert Castro. CIA analysts tossed around wiidly inflated numbers, rang-

ir-rg fron.r or.re thousand to seven thousar.rd, of resistance Iighters already in Cuba.

But enemies of the Cuban Revolution were llore likely to reside ir-r Miami than in

Hirvana. Another CIA report cited a privirte survey that "less than 30 percent of

the population was still with Fidel" and "in this 30 percent of the population are

ilclucleci the r.regroes, who l'rave always followed the strong nran in Cuba, but will

not fight."rr Beyond being racist, the survey was historically ir-raccurate, because

Afro-Cubirns had lbLrght fbr the island's inclependence in the 1890s. L-r a post-

mortem report on the Bay of Pigs, the inspector general of the CIA wrote that "we

can confidently assert that the CIA had r.ro intelligence evideuce that Cubans in

significant numbers could or would join the invaders or that there was any kind

of effective and cohesive resistance movenlent under anybody's control."2:'

Historical discourse about the Bay of Pigs invasion has focused on President

Kennedy's decision not to authorize U.S. air and naval support on the day of the

invasior.r. Such a U.S.-cer.rtered approach inevitably leads scl.rolars to igtrore irn-

portant facts. The Guatelnalan intervention had taught Latin Americans, includ-

ing the Castro brothers and Che Guevara, unforgettable lessons. Castro and his

forces prepared for irn invasion. Fidel and Raul Castro built an army of trventy-

five thousirnd and a loyal, self-defense force of more than two hundred thousand

Cubans, who were arnted with weapor.rs frorn the Soviet bloc. In April 1961, one

battalion of troops patrolled every beach in Cuba. Castro's intelligence ager-rts

ar-rticipatecl an invasiou, because, just like President Kennedy, they could reacl iu

U.S. publications about the training base in Guatemala. Cuban spies presunlably

l-rad also penetrated the exile community of Miarni. Prior to the invasiot.r, (luban

security tbrces also arrested citizens on the island suspectecl of disloyirlty. lrirlally,

i1 F'iclel Castro, the Cubans hacl an cxpcrietrced ntilitary cttttttltatrtlcr lvlro lrittl

lotrght fttr three harcl ycars in the Ctrban ntrttttttititts. l',t'lirrc irrltl tltrriltti lllt' irtvit

si6p, (lastlo actctl t[ccisivcly. A plcirrvitsitttt itit sllili.t'lry llrt't'xilcs ttrr April ll' Itutltlt'slt'111't'tl(lttIrrrlititlrlitll,'s'l'rtlirrt'sl.rlllrrrllrt'r lo""r"',(:'l\ll()()l(l('l('(lltrlols

(l l l A P l'I: lL il . War agaiust Cuba 73

to be prepared to take off at a moment's notice. '[he pilots actually slept under- neath their planes. If President Kennedy had authorized additionai air strikes, the bombers would l.rave likely hit empty airfields. The Bay of Pigs should be counted as a Cuban victory.

OPERATION MONGOOSE

President Kenrrecly did not waver from the goal of destroying the Cuban Revolu- tion and ensuring that Castro's victory at the Bay of Pigs 'was short lived. On 5 May 1961, he presided over a meetirrg of the NSC and ruled tl-rat U.S. policy would continne "to air.n at tl.re downfall of Castro." 'Ihe United States would not invade Cuba now, but neither would it fbreclose the possibility of a future mili- tary invasior.r. The president designated his brother to be his point mirn on Cuba. Robert Ker.rnedy roughly inforrnecl U.S. military and intelligence olficials that "the Cuban problem" was the top priority of the government and that "no time, money, efforts, or mnnpower is to be spared." The attorney general ofter.r berated senior CIA olficers about their lack of success in Cuba. Richard Bissell recounted being "chewed out" by the Kennedy brothers at the White House "fbr sitting on his ass and doir-rg nothing about Cuba." Richard Heln.rs, Bissell's successor at the CIA, was told in early 1962by Robert Kennedy, speaking for his brother, that "the

6nal chapter on Cuba has not been written."rt' President Kenr.redy judged Castro's Cuba a dire threat to vital U.S. national

interests. But his adrninistration's assessrnent of the Cuban threat did not sustain those fears. In preparation for the NSC rneeting of 5 May, Paul Nitze of the De- fense Departr.nent coordinated a lengthy evaluation of "Cuba's threat to the na- tional interests."'lhe report depicted Cuba as rnore of a psychological tl-ran a real tl-rreat to the traditional U.S. dominatior-r of the Western Hemisphere.'ihe Cuban I{evolution inspired radicals ar.rcl n.rilitants throughout tl.re region. Cuba assisted these potential revolutionaries througl.r propaganda and perhaps the supply of ['unds. But tl.re adn.rinistration had "r.ro l-rard evidence of an actual supply of arms <lr armed nren going from Cuba to other countries to assist ir.rdigerlous revolu- tionary moveurents." In any case, poverty and economic discontent, not Castro, generated social fennent throughout Latin An.rerica. The report also cor.rsidered it "a remote possibility" that the Soviet Union would transform Cuba into a mili- tirry base for ir strirtegic attack or.r the United States. Castro's real crirne was that "hc had providecl a working example of a communist state in the Americas, sllc- ccssfirlly defying the United States.":'

Whilc lwaiting a new campaign fbr underminir.rg Castro, President Kennedy blushcd irsidc ir (luban peace oll-er. On 17 August 1961, Che Guevara spoke late irrlo thc night with prcsiclcntial aitlc l{ichirrd Goodwin. llotl.r rnen were attending rrrr irttcl Antclican conli'rcncc irt LJrtrguay. Cucvitra hacl prc'viouslysent Goodwin ,r lrrrrtl, lrox lillctl rvillr llrc lint'sl ()trlrrrrr cisars. (itrcvara strsgcstcd that lry dis- (u\sinli issttt's lilit'llrt'll.S. ('\l)r()l)n,ll('(l ptolrt'ttit's, ltrttlt', rttttl (lrrlrrr's lolc irt l,tlittr\tttt'tr.,r,llrt'l\\,()(()unlttt'.,,ottltlr(',r(ll,l nt(,tllt\t'it'(n(/l ;rrv,ryollivirrtq

J

74 l'lll: KILLING ZONE

together. Goodwin inforrned his president of the conversatior.r. Nothing de- veloped from the Goodlvin-Guevara exchange. President Kennedy's only tan- gible gesture was to smoke one of Guevara's cigars.r'

In Novernber 1961, the president launched a new war against Castro, "Oper-

ation Mongoose," under the direction of General Edward G. Lansdale. l.ansdale was a flamboyant Air Force olhcer who clair.r.red expertise in counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfhre based or.r his experience in the Philippines and Vietr.ram in the 1950s. Armed with a $50 nrilliou buclget, Lansdale asser.nbled a tean-r of more thar.r tbur l-rr-rndred CIA employees and thoustrr.rds of Cuban exiles who operated frorn hetrdquarters near the University of Miami campus. 'lhe r.nission of the exiles was to make their way fron.r Florida to Cuba in speedboats, ir.rfiltrate the island, collect intelligence, organize resistance fighters, ar.rd carry or-rt sabotage on tire islirnd. A Cuban official later cited "5,700 acts of terrorisrn, sabotage, and murder" in 1962 alone. Lar.rsdale's plan wirs predicated or.r sparking a rnassive popular rebellion in Cuba that would prompt dernands for a rescue mission. The U.S. urilitary would then have the international legitimacy to invacle the island and clispose of Castro. Like the Bay of Pigs planners, Lar-rsdale denied Castro's political strength. In November 1961, a chastened CIA had conceded that "the great bulk of the population still irccepts the regirne and a substantial number still support it with enthusiasm." l.ansdale constar.rtly pressured CIA iu.ralysts to modity tlreir conclusions, as if changing thir.rgs on paper ir.r Washir.rgton would alter politicai ioyalties in Cuba.r"

'11-re Ker-rnedy administration applied other pressures to Cubtr. It ir.r.rposed a near total trade embargo on Cuba. It dernanded that Latin Americirns drive Cuba out of the inter-American cor.nrnunity, tl're Orgar-rization of American States (OAS). 'll-re Defense Department drew up extensive plans to attack Cuba with air strikes, parachute drops, and an amphibious assault. In the spring of 1962, U.S. Marines trained for an amphibior.rs assault by invading Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. 'Ihe military exercise carried the coder.rame "ORTSAC," or "Castro" spelled backward. Attorney General Kennedy proposed staging a violent ilrcident at the U.S. military base at Guantinamo Bay, thus providing a rationale fbr an arttack on Cuba. Under pressure fron.r the adn.rir.ristration, the foint Chiet.s developed "Op-

eration Northwoods" as a complernent to Operation Mongoose. Among the schemes rnilitary planners sr.rggested was sirrking a boatload of Cuban refirgees sailing firr Florida or shooting Cubau refugees in the United States. Castro would be then blaured for the violence.r('

'Ihe CIAs assassination efforts agair.rst Castro, which began under President Eisenhrlr,ver, continued throughout the Kennedy presider.rcy. 'lhe proposed schemes included killing Castro with poisoned pi11s, pens, darts, or cigars, shoot- ing him with a telescopic rifle, or taking rrdvantage of Castro's lovc firr thc sca by cither giving hinr a diving suit with a deaclly contirnrirrirrrt ol rirging irrr t'rotic looking seashell with expl<lsivcs ncilr (lastro's litvorilc sttollit'lin1,, irrt'1.'llrc (llA itlso hopcrl thc Maliir wotrltl citrry ottt it gitttlilrttrtl slylt"'tttlrottl" ol ( lrrslro. Ilis Ioliittt I lotviu rl lottt's ltlts ;tr'1ittt'rl l ltlrl rtss.rssi rr,rl ion rr',r', l lrr"'11'rrt lrIi 11" ,,1 t lrt' ll,ry

CHAPl'uR 4 . WaragainstCuba 75

of Pigs invasior.t scenario. CIA plar.rners expected that a leaderless Cuba would be in chaos when Brigade 2506 hit the Cuban beaches.rr

what precise knowledge President Kennedy had of tl.rese conspiracies cannot be determined. Shortly after taking office, NCS advisor McGeorge Bundy re- ceived a briefing on the clA's assassination capabilities. In May 1962, Attorney General Kennedy received a thorough briefing about the clAs contacts with gambling syndicate figures )ohn Roselli and Sarn Giancana. No document has yet appeared proving thirt either Bundy or Robert Kennedy told the president about the assassination plots. Accordir.rg to aides, Presider.rt Kennedy asked for military intervention plans fbr the day when castro might be removed from the cuban scene. He also broached the subject of assassinatior.r with his good friend, Senator George Smathers (D-l'L), and with a journalist. Both men later said that the president expressed distaste for the idea. Biographers like Arthur Schlesinger have also claimed that a Rornan catholic like Kennedy could not countenance assassination. On the other hand, Richard Helms, who commanded the CIAs clandestine service, answered a journalist's question about whether president Kennedy wanted Castro dead. Helms replied that "there is nothing on paper, of course." Helms added that "there is certainly no questior.r in n-ry mind that he did."r: No docurnent exists that shows that the president ordered the end of assas- sination efforts against Castro.

Scholars and journalists have speculated about what led the Kennedy ad- ministration to engage in this bizarre, extreme behavior. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara would later lament that the adrninistration was "hysterical" about castro. Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, who interviewed former CIA operatives, has charged that the Kennedy brothers hacl a personal vendetta against castro, taking a blood oath to make castro and his Communist friends pay for the staining of the farnily's honor at the Bay of Pigs.rr Although personal irnir.nus r.nay have ir.rformed the admir.ristration's policies, no document or taped conversation has appeared in which the Kennedy brothers vowed revenge against Castro. Concerns about national security, the global balance ofpower, and do- rurestic politics intbrmed their discussions about Cuba.

MISSILE CRISIS

l)resident Kennedy's national security f'ears came true on l6 October 1962, when he learr.red that the Soviets were developing sites in Cuba for medium- and intcrmediate-range ballistic missiles equipped to carry nuclear weapons. U.S. intclligence analysts hacl not anticipated this development. Soviet Chairman Nil<ita l(hrushchev and I"iclel Castro bear significnnt responsibility for the crisis. I)r'csiclcnt Kcnnccly hacl publicly wirrned that "the gravest issues would arise" if llrc Sovicts scrrl "grourrtl to grouncl rnissiles" to Cuba. Soviet and Cr.rban officials t('l)('ilt('(ll)/ itssttt't'tl tlte Ilrrilt'tl Slirlcs tlrirt tlrc Sovict Uni<ln wotrld not base oll-en- siv('\v('ill)()tl s1'slt'ttts irr (lttlru. litrl llrt'1..r'rrrrt'tly lrtlrrrirristrirliorr irlso catrsct[ [hc (()tllt()tll,llittrt.'lltt',rrlrrtirtislt,tlton ltirtl tornrrrillt'tl.rtls rrl rvrrr ;rliirirrsl (l;rslro's

176 THE KILLING ZONE, Cuba. The president did not think about the consequences of his anti-Cr-rban pol- icies. In fact, at the beginnir-rg of the crisis, Kennedy confessed that he did r-rot understand the motives behind missiles in Cuba, blurting out that "it's a god- damn mystery to me." From the Soviet and Cuban perspective, all evidence- assassination plots, the rejection of Che Guevirra's peace offering, Operation Mongoose, the trade embargo, military training exercises in the Caribbean- pointed to the conclusion that the United States wanted to invade Cuba and murder its leader. Secretary of Def'ense McNamara has conceded that "with hindsight, if I had been a Cuban leader, I think I migl-rt have expected a U.S. invasion."r'l

The course and conduct of the Cuban Missile Crisis are farniliar.ri After ex- tensive discussions in Moscow in mid-1962 with Cuban leaders, the Soviets re- ceived permission from the Cubans in early September 1962 kt install nuclear weapons in Cuba. The Soviets planned to send thirty-six medium-range rnissiles, twenty-four intermediate-range missiles, forty-eight light IL-28 bombers, and tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets could hit cities in the United States with the missiles and bombers. The approximately one hundred tactical nuclear weapons could be used to repel an invasion of the island. After the discovery, President Kennedy met secretly with advisors fbr trhnost a week. The president immedi- ately vowed that "we're going to take out those missiles." Initial discussions fo- cused on a military response, perhaps an air strike on the missile sites. The president decided, however, to postpone the militirry solution advocated strenu- ously by the |oint Chiefs of Staffand to impose a naval blockade, or "qnarantine,"

around Cuba. On 22 October, in a televised address, President Kennedy inforrned the nation ofthe crisis, announced the quarantine, and demanded that the Sovi- ets remove the missiles. Over the next week, tensior.rs mounted between the two superpowers. But on 28 October, the president and Soviet Chairrnan Khrushchev struck a deal. The Soviets would remove the missiles, and, in turn, the United States would pledge not to invade Cuba. The United States also confidentially promised to dismantle )upiter missile sites in Turkey. By 20 November, Kennedy announced the end of the crisis, with the Soyiets having withdrawn the missiles and bornbers from Cuba. U.S.-Soviet relatior.rs thereafter irlproved, with nuclear arms control treaties in the 1960s and an era ofd6tente in the 1970s.

Cuban-Soviet relatior.rs soured in the aftermath of the missile crisis. Chair- man Khrushchev had been nnnerved by a letter he received fiom Castro during the crisis. Warning that ar.r attack on the island was imminent, Castro urged Khrushchev not to "allow the circumstances in which the imperialists could launch the first nuclear strike." Troubled by Castro's rash talk about nuclear war, Khrushchev unilaterally decided to withclraw the trrctical nuclear weapons from Cuba. The United States had not discovered these nuclear weapons. Castro lur- ther angered Khrushchev when he refused to allow arn intcrnational inspcction team on the islands. The turious Cr.rbans allegcd that tlrc Sovicts hirrl sacliliccd Cubar.rsecurityandsocialistsolidaritylirrtlrclcrnovirlol llrt''lirrliislrrrrissilt'srrrrtl a bettcr relationship lvith thc L)nitcrl Slulcs. Srrbsct;rrt'rrl tlt'vr'loPnr('nls ills() st't'rrrt'rl tttcottlirttt llrt'(ltthitrr hcliel lltirl lltt"'tto ittl',tsiott Ilt'rl1it'" tr',r" trtt',tttittlqlt'sr."'

CHAp'f trtt 4 . War against Cuba 77

RENEWED WAR

The denouernent of tl.re missile crisis did not lead to a d6tente between the United States rrnd cuba. lhe Kennedy adrninistration continued to pursue an aggressive, belligerent policy toward cuba. In his 27 october letter to chairman Khrushchev, I(ennedy offered a nouinvasion pleclge for the removal of r.r.rissiles from Cuba. But itft.er 27 October, the adrninistration conditioned its noninvasion pleclge with the provisos that cuba must cease being a sollrce of Communist aggression, that the United Stirtes reservecl the right to halt subversion frort Cuba, and that the United States intended for the cuban people to gain their fiec-dom or.re day. Because it judged that castro's cuba lvould never confclrm to U.S. standards, the admir.ris- tration considered itsell tiee to attack cuba, foreswearing only an unprovoked military invasion of the island.

Betweeu December 7962 and November 1963, the adrninistratiort renewed its war against Castro <ln all fronts. 'Ihe Agriculture and State Departrnents investi- gated whether the United States could hurt the cuban economy by manipulating the price of sugar on world markets. The state Department pressured U.S. allies to curtail trade with cuba. The adn'rinistration also began the process of ejecting Cuba fron'r the International Monetary Fr.rnd. The president coupled econonric warfare with new rnilitary preparations. In April 1963, he urged his national se- curity tearn to prepare for an ir.rvasion of Cuba, asking, 'Are we keeping our cuban cor.rtingency plans up to date?" Kennedy wanted to send troops to cuba quickly in case of a general uprising.rT

The irdministrirtion's fury against castro mounted when the cubar.r spent the entire n-ronth of May 1963 in the Soviet Union. K}rrr-rshchev soothecl Castro's lir.rrt feelings over thc rnissile crisis with a package of economic ancl rnilitary irid lbr cuba. In April, Kennedy l-rad approved the sabotage of cargoes on cuban ships and the crippling of ships. He also authorized inciting cubans to harass, attack, and strbotage Soviet military personnei in Cuba, "providecl every precau- tion is takcn to prcvcnt attribution." After castro's trip, the presider.rt demanded and received an integrated program of propirganda, economic denial, and sabo- tage against Cuba. O, 19 June, Kennedy, dubbed "Higher Authority" in CIA Pirrlance, approved a sabotage program against cuba, expressing "a particr.rlar interest" in externirl sabotage operations. 'Ihe cIA was subsequently ar-rthorized to ciirry out tl-rirteen n.rajor sabotage operations in cuba, including attacks on ar.r clcctric power plar.rt, irn oil refinery, and a sugar mill. orr 12 Noven.rber, Higher r\uthority conductecl a major review of his anti Castro progranl ancl received an rrPbeat asscsslnent Irom tl.re CIA. The president was also informed that lhe CIA rvoultl launch new attircks, inclucling the underrvater dernolitior-r of docks and slrips. 'lhc rncnrorrrntlurns of record state that "Higher Authority" rather than l)t'csitlcltl Kcrrrtctly itttentlctl thesc nrectings.'Ihis wils to give the presicier.rt, .r1i,rirr rrr ( )lA lrrrrrirr;rrit', llrt'oPliotr ol'"Plrtirsil.llc denial." U.S. ofiicials wantecl lhe Itt'sitlt'ttl ol llrt'( lrtilr'tl Sl,rlt':, lo lrt'rrlrlt'to tlt'rry,llrirt lrc hirtl irtrllrolizctl terlolisrrr .t tttl s,tlrol,r1,,t'.''l

78 THE KILLING ZONE

Khrushchev protested these attacks on Cuba, averring that the United States had reneged on the agreement that ended the missile crisis. President Kennedy deflected the complaints, charging that the Cubans were fomenting revolution throughout the Western Hemisphere. Lacking evidence to sustain those claims, the United States perhaps fabricated evidence, as it previously had in 1954, when, with "Operation Washtub," the CIA planted arms in Nicaragua and blamed Guatemala. In early November 1963, Venezuela announced that it had discovered a cache of Cuban arms on a Venezuelan beach, allegedly left for leftist radicals determined to disrupt upcoming elections. This detection of the purported Cuban intervention raised many questions. Former CIA agents have subsequently written that they believed that their colleagues planted the arms in Venezuela, In May 1963, the CIA sent an anti-Cuba plan to the NSC that included the idea of placing caches of arms from Communist countries in selected regions of Latin America, "ostensibly proving the arms were smuggled from Cuba."3e

Assassination plots against Castro also continued after the missile crisis. On 22 November 1963, the day of the president's death in Dallas, CIA agents rendez- voused in Paris with a Cuban official, Rolando Cubela Secades, code-named AM/ LASH. The agents passed to Cubela a ballpoint pen rigged with a poisonous hypo- dermic needle intended to produce Castro's instant death. In the previous month, the CIA had assured Cubela that it operated with the approval of Attorney Gen- eral Kennedy. Former CIA operatives have also alleged that the president signaled encouragement to AM/LASH. On l8 November in Miami, in what turned out to be his last speech on inter-American affairs, Kennedy referred to Castro as a "bar- rier" to be removed.ao

Some scholars have suggested that Kennedy showed interest, during his last months in office, in improving relations with Castro. Intermediaries were autho- rized to speak with Cuban oflicials. The Kennedy administration however, at- tached stringent conditions to these preliminary discussions, insisting that Cuba would have to break ties with the Soviet Union, expel Soviet troops from the island, and end subversion in Latin America. The United States also wanted Castro to renounce his faith in communism. In short, President Kennedy was prepared only to accept Castro's surrender.ar His administration never renounced its policy of either overthrowing Castro or plotting his death.

LYNDON JOHNSON AND CUBA

President Lyndon B. fohnson maintained the U.S. policy of hostility toward Castro's government. The )ohnson administration refused to negotiate with Castro's Cuba, and it intensified the economic pressure on the island. In mid-1964, it per- suaded two-thirds of the members of the OAS to support a resolution calling on member states to sever all political and economic tics witlr (luba. L)cfcnclcrs of the resoltrtion included anti-Communist, clictatolial lcgirucs lil<c Ilrazil arrcl Nicarirgua.'1-his resolutir)ll wils in rctoliirtion lirr ()uhir's rrllcl3'tl irrtclvcrttion irt Vcrrcz.rrclir. l)cnrocrirtic statcs, likc (llrilc rrrrtl tlrrrlirriry, lvlritlr lrirtl oppo51'11 111.'

CHAPTER 4 . WaragainstCuba 79

resolution eventually complied with the oAS mandate. only Mexico resisted U.S. pressure and maintained its ties with Castro's Cuba.

The fohnson administration also cajoled European allies to join the eco- nomic embargo of Cuba. In |ohnson's characteristic salty language, he wanted "to pinch their [Cubanl nuts.'", After the OAS meeting, Secretary of State Dean Rusk met with the ambassadors of allies such as Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and West Germany to press the U.S. case against Cuba. Belgium, for example, succumbed to u.S. pressure and canceled a sale of locomotives to cuba. The ad- ministration especially wanted its closest ally, the United Kingdom, to sever rela- tions with cuba. President |ohnson made a personal appeal to prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home in a meeting at the white House in 1964.The U.S. position was that "economic sanctions against cuba was the only weapon short of an act of war that could make the support of castro's cuba rnore costly to the Soviet Union." The United states further believed that an embargo of trade could create "conditions of economic stringency that might ultimately bring about the elim- ination of the Communist regime." However, the British rejected the U.S. argu- ments and continued to trade with Cuba. The United Kingdom depended on trade for its economic vitality.4l

The Johnson administration, like the Eisenhower and Kennedy adminis- trations, refused to accept the legitimacy of the cuban Revolution. The admin- istration also had a confrontation with cuba in 1964. A dispute over a cuban fishing boat led Fidel castro to cut the water supply to the military base at Guantinamo Bay. President fohnson responded by transforming the base into a sealed enclave with little cuban contact. The united states created its own water supply, constructing a desalinization plant. But President fohnson made one significant change in his predecessor's policy. He gradually shut down the campaign of assassination, sabotage, and terrorism directed at Castro's Cuba. Johnson, who had not been actively involved as vice president in the covert war against castro, received his first comprehensive briefing on cIA activities on 19 December 1963. cIA officials reviewed the various sabotage and terrorism irttacks that President Kennedy had personally approved in June and November 1963. At the briefing, President fohnson asked the pointed question "whether there is any significant insurgency within Cuba." Desmond Fitzgerald, the CIA official who directed the covert campaign, admitted that "there is no national movement on which we can build." Thereafter, at the briefing, president fohnson ruled that the CIAs next attack on a major target-the Matanzas power plant- would be canceled.a{

Over the next eighteen months, President |ohnson shut down the covert war agairrst Fidel Castro. The United States stopped sponsoring raids on cuban tar- gcts, it terrninated the funding of cuban exile groups that planned to attack cuba, iurd it sevcrctl its contacts with potential assassins. By fune 1965, the United States rro longcr wagctl covcrl, violcnt war against Cu['rir. Jol.rnson overruled powerful lrttrcitttcnte ics lil<c tlrc (llA antl thc foint (llricl.s ol'Stall'ol'thc U.S. nrilitirry that witttlctl lo tottlittttt'lo rtllutl< (ltrhl. llis tlccisiorr wits sul)l)()t'lctl hy inllucnliirl

VI

80 'fHE KII,LING ZONE,

administration figures such as Secretary Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara,

and the new assistant secretary of state for Latin America, Thomas Mann.

President Johnson probably had several reasons for reversing the Eisenhower-Kennedy policy of attacking cuba. The new president disliked At-

torney General Kennedy, the persot] most identified with the anti-Castro cam-

paign. He wanted to improve relations with the Soviet Union and did not want

another Soviet-American confrontation over Cuba. )ohnson wanted to be per-

ceived as a steacly, reliable man of Peace during the 1964 presidential campaign. In

any case, |ohnson already had his share offoreign policy challenges, especially in

vietnam. His clecision to invade the Dominican Republic in late March 1965 to

forestall an alleged Communist takeover only compounded his international

problems. President fohnson also seems to have been repelled by the nature of

iome U.S. actions, such as assassination plots, against castro's cuba. Shortly after

taking office, he told CIA Director John McCone that he no longer wanted his CIA

chief to have the image of a "cloak and dagger role." After he left office, |ohnson

revealed in an interview that "we were running a damned Murder Incorporated in

the Caribbean."15

Perhaps the key reason for |ohnson's decision to halt the war against castro

was that he concluded tl-rat the CIAs war against Castro would not work. Attacks

on Cuba's economic infrastructure and maritime raids on coastal targets were

designed to spark a mass uprising in Cuba against Castro. However grudgingly,

Johnson and his advisors conceded that F'idel Castro enjoyed widespread popular

support. President Johnson wanted to "get rid of" Castro. But as Assistant Secre-

tary Mann explained about Castro, "as long as that army is loyal to him, he is

going to be there until he dies." Mann turther observed in a memorandum to

iecretary of State Rusk that Cuban political figures in exile in Miami, Florida'

had little sllpport within Cuba.a6 After mid-1965 and for the rest of the lohnson presidency, the United States

pursued "containment" policies against Fidel Castro. In essence, it adapted the policies it practiced against the Soviet Union. The administration authorized the

CIA to disseminate propaganda, covertly collect intelligence and counterintelli-

gence, and wage economic warfare against Cuba. The United States would make

life hard for Cubans, hoping either that the Communist system would collapse in

Cuba or that Castro would die.

CHE GUEVARA IN BOLIVIA

Castro would not die in the twentieth century. But his companero, Ernesto "Che"

Guevara, would be executed in the village of La Higuera, in southcirstert.t Bolivia, by a Bolivian soldier on 9 October 1967.The presider-rt of Bolivia'

(lcn-

eral Ren6 Barrieltos Otr.rfla 0,964-1969), issued tl.re orcler to cxcctltc thc pris

oner. Che Ggevitra's captrlre 1ncl exccntiort itt a rctttotc prtrl ol'Ilolivia exposctl

t5c cortrplicatccl rcalitics ol'pronrotitrll t'cvoltttiott irr Lrtlirr Atttt't itrl. ( lttt'vrttrt's

tlcrrrisc irrrtl lhr,tlclt.irl ol lris liu('r'r'illil itntty itt llrlivi,r lttt llrct tlt'lttrtltslr';rlt'tl llr:tl

CIIAPTER 4 . WaragainstCuba 81

the United States held exaggerated fears about Cuba's revolutionary role in the hemisphere.

Guevara's decision in 1966 to organize a guerrilla movement in Bolivia re- flected his political philosophy, Cuba's geopolitical challenges, and his yearning for glory. Guevara rejected Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev's call for "peaceful coexistence" with the United States and the Western capitalist nations. He also abhorred Latin American Communist parties who participated in peace- ful, political activities and spurned armed revolution. Guevara preached "the tri- continental strategy" of promoting revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and defeating imperialism. The Vietnamese Communists had shown the way by defending national liberation and socialism and sinking the United States into the quagmire of endless war. Guevara's contribution to revolutionary thinking was his " foco lheory." A small band of guerrillas could spark a mass revolution- ary movement. The guerrillas could count on the forces of imperialism, including the United States, responding to thefoco threat in a heavy-handed way, alienating the local population and turning them into guerrilla supporters. The insurgency would spread throughout the country. With the United States rnilitarily tied down in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, socialist countries like Cuba would be free. The United States would no longer be able to focus on attacking Cuba and mr.rrdering its leaders. Guevara's patron, Fidel Castro, subscribed to Guevara's worldview, but always had to be conscious of the Soviet Union's disapproval of armed rebellion in Latin America. Cuba depended on the Soviet Union lor eco- nomic and military aid. Guevara's strategy also fit his sense of heroic destiny. He once told reporters: "I am convinced that I have a mission to fulfill in this world, and on the altar of this mission I have to sacrifice my home, I have to sacrifice all tl.re pleasures of daily life, I have to sacrifice my personal security, and I might even have to sacrifice my life."a7

Guevara's experience in Bolivia made obvious the errors in his thinking. He presumed a universal code of revolution. Whereas Guevara, an Argentine, was an international revolutionary, not all who wanted change and social justice were. Cuba was not the world or even Latin America. Impoverished, oppressed Latin Americans dreamed of a better life, but they also had loyalties to their nation, their region or state, their ethnic and racial heritage, and their Roman Catholic religion. The campesinos of southeastern Bolivia proved not to be the sea ir-r which guerrillas could swim. Neither Guevara nor his men could speak the local indigenous language, Guarani. Bolivian country folk did not join the gucrrilla lrovement, declined to supply the guerrillas, asked Guevara to leave the rcgiou, and reported Guevara's movements to the Bolivian army. Guevara and his mcr.r hld to resort to stealing food and supplies frorn villages to survive. Iirlivian (}nrnrunists, aclhering to the dictates of Moscow, also refused to enlist in ( irtcvitr';t's t'uovcrt.tcrtt. l]olivian (lonrruunist leacler Marrio Monje warned: "When Ilrc Pt'1rPl1'lr'lrrr IlrirI tlris 6rrcrlilla l)rovcnrcnt is lctl by a filrcigncr, thcy will tr,rrn lltt'it lrrttli.s;ttttl tt'litst'l() sltl)l)ot l il." Morrjc ittltlt'rl: "Yorr lvilltlic vct 1, hcroicirlly, lrttl ),ott lt,tvt'tn l)r()\l)('(ls ol vitloty." (itrt't,,tt,r's v,tttily ltrttl rt'tlilt'ssrtt'ss:rlsol

VI

82 TI-IE I(ILI,ING ZONE

contributed to the Bolivian disaster. I-Ie insisted on sole control ofthe guerrilla

movement, cleclaring in Bolivia that "here I arn adviser to no one." Guevara failed to heed the advice he once received from Gamal Abdel Nasser, the nation-

alist leader of Egypt. The Egyptian wondered why Guevara talked of accepting

"the challenge of death." Nasser noted: "You are a young man. If necessary we

shoulcl die for the revolution, but it would be much better if we could live for the

revolution."a8

Guevara slippecl into Bolivia in November 1966. He would be joined by six-

teen Cubans, Bolivians, and a few other Latin Atnericans, eventually creating a

force of fbrty-seven combatants. These numbers easily superseded the numbers

of men who retreated into the Cuban mountains in 1956. But the Castro brothers

and Guevara had glorified their guerrilla movement, forgetting that they had a

vital network of urban support in Cuba in the late 1950s. Only a handful of urban

Bolivians supported the guerrillas, and their organization was penetrated by the

CIA and Bolivian police. The Bolivian army, numbering about a thousand men,

chasecl the guerrillas for seven months in 1967, eventually trapping them in a canyon. Bolivian solcliers found Guevara in a pathetic state. Cucvara, who turned

rhirty-nine in 1967,realized that he no longer had the physical agility that he had

in Cuba in the 1950s. A life-long asthmatic, the former doctor could not lind the

medicine in rural Bolivia that he needed. He appeared emaciated and dirty. His

hair was long, straggly, and matted, his clothes were torn, and he had rough lea-

ther sheaths, not boots, on his feet. Before being captured on 7 Octobet 1967,

Guevara had been wounded in the calf. After executiug Guevara, the Bolivian

military flew the body to the town of Vallegrande, where the corpse was photo-

graphed. Guevara achieved mythic status in death. To sotne, Guevara in death

iesembled Jesus Christ. The reality, however, was that Guevara failed as a revolu-

tionary everywhere, except fbr Cuba. The United States played a role in the defeat ofGuevara. In response to the

cuban revolution, the Kennedy administration had transformed military aid

policies for Latin America from hemispheric defense to counterinsurgency-

developing tactics to defeat guerrilla movements. The Kennedy administration

increasecl military aid to Latin America to $77 million a year, a 50 percent in-

creaseovertheaverageoftheEisenhoweryears.Infiscal lg62,thepeakyear,the

United States trained 9,000 l.atin American officers and enlisted personnel.

overall, cluring the 1960s, an average of 3,500 Latin American ofljcers and men

annually attended miiitary schools such as the U.S. Army Caribbean School in

the Canal Zone, renamed the "school of the Americas." Select Latin Americans

trained at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolit.ra, tl-re home

of the fhmed "Green Berets." Latin Americans studied topics taugl-rt in Spanish

on the essentials of counterinsurgency-clandestine operations, cotnrtlttttisttl

and democracy, defoliation, the use of informants, intcrrtlgatiou ol' pt isottcrs

a1d slspects, hancllir-rg mass rallies ancl rncctir.tgs, irttclligcrtcc photogr.irplly, arltl

polyuraphs.r"

CHAPTER 4 . War against Cuba 83

The body of Ernesto "Che" Guevara is surrounded by Bolivian soldiers in this photograph taken in Vallegrande, Bolivia, in October 1967. By the time the Bolivians captured him, Guevara was in poor physical shape, looking emaciated and bedraggled. Although the Bolivians displayed Guevara like a hunting trophy, the international impact of the photograph was not as they perhaps intended. The photograph added to Guevara's mythic status. To some, Guevara looked as they imagined Jesus Christ might have looked in death after his crucifixion. (O Bettmann/CORBIS)

At the request of President Barrientos, the fohnson administration dis- patched a highly decorated cornbat veteran and trainer, Major Ralph "Pappy" Shelton of the Green Berets, to Bolivia in April 1967.He trained a Bolivian ranger battalion that joined the hunt for Guevara and captured him. U.S. advisors did not join the Bolivians in the field. A CIA operative, Felix Rodriguez, helped or- sanize an intelligence network in the rural areas and briefly interrogated the cap- ltrrc'cl Gnevara. 'Ihe United States did not request the execution of Guevara. f olrr.rson aclministration oliciarls thought the Bolivians had acted unwisely in kill- ing the rcr.rowucd Argcntine revolutionary. Walt W. Rostow, President fohnson's rrirtionirl sccurity atlvisor. callccl the executior.t "stupid," perhaps believing that the lirliviarrs lrirtl t rt'irtctl a nlilrtyr lirr thc (l<lnrntutrist canse.!0

'llrt'tlr';tllr ol ( ittt't,ittit syrrrbolizccl lvlrat hirrl bccn aPParcut lirr sorttc ycirrs llrt'toll,tlrst'ol tt'r,olrtliottrtt1, 111111'.'1ttt'ttts llrlorrl',ltotrt l,rrtilr Att'tt't'ir'it. As ir Slirle

84 THE KILLING ZONE

Department official happily summarized in 1967, "The confident predictions of sweeping Communist victories which have often emanated from Havana have not been borne out." In March 1968, the U.S. intelligence community reiterated the State Department's optimism, noting in a "National Intelligence Estimate" on "The Potential for Revolution for Latin America" that "in no case do insurgencies pose a serious short-run threat to take over a government." In truth, the Cubans had talked more about revolution in Latin America than of actually fomenting it. Their only sustained efforts had been in Venezuela and Bolivia. Both efforts had failed miserably. Throughout the 1960s, Latin American Communists obeyed Moscow and abjured armed conflict. Moscow informed Latin American nations that it did not support resolutions, such as at the Tricontinental Conference, call- ing for revolution in Latin America. Except for gaining a difficult ally in Cuba, the Soviet Union did not appreciably increase its influence in the region in the 1960s. During the Cold War, only three nations-Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay-continuously maintained ties with the Soviet Union, and only Mexico always kept its embassy open in Havana. The Soviet Union allocated only about 6 percent of its foreign aid to the non-Communist world to Latin America. Excluding Cuba, its trade with Latin America was minuscule. The balance of trade always favored the Latin Americans. For example, the hungry Soviets needed to purchase Argentine wheat because of perennial shortcomings in the Soviet agricultural sector.st

By mid-1968, Fidel Castro accepted the major objectives of Soviet foreign policy, which included peaceful coexistence with the West. Castro waited for news of victory from Bolivia. But the Cuban leader lacked the logistical resources to aid Guevara and his guerrilla band. Guevara's defeat and Brezhnev and Kosygin's fury over Guevara's mission forced Castro back into the Soviet camp. Castro shocked idealistic supporters and admirers of the Cuban Revolution around the world when, in August 1968, he publicly defended the appalling Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Soviet tanks had entered Prague to crush the liberal reforms ofthe "Prague Spring" pursued by Alexander Dubdek. Castro now appeared to be little more than a Communist stooge because he conceded that the Soviet Union had illegally violated Czechoslovakia's sovereignty. Castro could only offer that the socialist camp had the right to prevent a socialist country from breaking away. Both Soviet and U.S. officials habitually characterized Castro as emotional, immature, and irresponsible. In fact, Castro was shrewd, calculating, and realistic. He stayed in power for five decades because he had a pragmatic side to his governing philosophy. The Cuban Revolution's survival depended on Soviet economic and military assistance because the United States had succeeded in isolating the island. Fidel Castro could not follow the path of ideological purity; he could not "be like Che."s2

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CHAPTER 4 . WaragainstCuba 85

fallen short of its goals. But the United States had contained the Cuban Revolu- tion. By the end ofthe 1960s, cuba no longer posed a revolutionary threat to the region. U.S. political and economic pressure had also hobbled the island. The containment of Cuba involved more than just attacking castro and his revolu- tion. The united states tried to undercut the appeal of the cuban Revolution by building a better Iife for Latin Americans through the Alliance for progress eco- nomic development program. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations also attacked and undermined Latin American leaders deemed soft on castro and communism.