PSY6101week-2

Bending the Arc of North American Psychologists’ Moral Universe Toward Communicative Ethics and Social Justice

Richard T. G. Walsh Wilfrid Laurier University

Social contextual and social justice perspectives on North American psychologists’ conceptions of ethical ideals and prescribed practices show that interpersonal, organi- zational-institutional, and sociopolitical systems are dimly represented on our moral landscape. In this critical review I first examine conceptions of ethical decision-making from cognitive and interpersonal angles, noting the operation of nonrational phenomena and conversational processes and promoting a communicative conception of ethical decision-making. Next, I consider how the discourse on the concepts and practice of ethics addresses both the social conditions of our employment and the challenges of maintaining professional-personal boundaries on ethical conduct. Lastly, I assess the ways in which psychologists discuss ethical issues that arise from our espoused commitments to enhancing human welfare, responsibility to society, and social justice. I argue that certain historical trends in psychology’s culture reduce our moral vision of practicing the principle of justice to social reforms that sustain the status quo. I conclude by questioning how we can shift the transit of our ethical discourse and practice toward communicative ethics and social justice.

Keywords: ethical decision-making, Habermas, communicative ethics, organizational-institutional influences, social justice

It seems likely that most North American (i.e., Canadian and U.S.) colleagues believe that we psychologists behave ethically in our re- search, educational, professional, and commu- nity endeavors despite the embarrassment to our discipline of some psychologists’ ethical mal- feasance, such as participation in torture (see Teo, 2015a). But taking ethical responsibilities for granted could lead to their marginalization and invoking them chiefly when a possible so- ciopolitical transgression, professional ethical dilemma, or institutional review of a dubious research project occurs. Instead of central to our identity as scientific and professional psycholo- gists, ethics can seem peripheral to our worka- day worlds (Prilleltensky, Rossiter, & Walsh- Bowers, 1996), reducible to a recitation of

standards that demand adherence. A different view is that all aspects of our vocation are pro- foundly moral, ethical, and social. That is, princi- ples and practices of ethics, which are historical constructions, are enacted in the context of in- terpersonal, organizational-institutional, and so- cietal systems and particular cultural traditions. Accordingly, our principles and standards for ethical conduct, as well as our conduct itself, should reflect critical consciousness of the so- cial-contextual phenomena saturating ethics.

In this spirit, and from my perspective as a Canadian contributor to the literature in critical psychology (Teo, 2015b) and as a local political activist, I pose two principal questions for dis- cussion: (a) How adequately do our codes of ethics account for the nature of the relationship between us and those whom we serve? (b) How might the current interest in social justice ex- pressed by some psychologists inform a moral imperative that could be the basis for the ethical principle of responsibility to society specifically and for a reconceived ethical framework for psychologists generally? The latter question is relevant to psychologists’ relationship with so- cial justice (e.g., Vasquez, 2011; Walsh & Go-

I presented an earlier version of this article at the meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association, Vancouver, BC, Canada (June, 2014). I am grateful to Ravi Gokani for his helpful comments.

Correspondence concerning this article should be ad- dressed to Richard T. G. Walsh, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada N2L 3C5. E-mail: [email protected]

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Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology © 2015 American Psychological Association 2015, Vol. 35, No. 2, 90 –102 1068-8471/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/teo0000011

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kani, 2014). In discussing these questions I as- sess the social contextual qualities of the conceptions and practices described in the dis- course on the American Psychological Associ- ation’s Code of Ethics (American Psychological Association, 2010) (hereinafter, the APA Code) and the Canadian Psychological Association’s Code of Ethics (Canadian Psychological Asso- ciation, 2000) (hereinafter, the CPA Code).

A Social Contextual Review of Ethics Codes

The discourse on the codes suggests that so- cial contextual aspects of ethical thought and practice can be significant. These aspects in- clude cognitive and interpersonal perspectives on ethical decision-making, the social condi- tions of psychologists’ employment, and issues of responsibility to society and social justice, which roughly correspond to interpersonal, or- ganizational-institutional, and societal levels of social analysis, respectively.

Critical Perspectives on Ethical Decision-Making

The literature stipulates that psychologists should know how and when to competently apply a model of decision-making to an ethical dilemma confronting them. Although models of ethical decision-making emanate from distinct philosophical roots—principled (deontologi- cal), utilitarian (consequentialist), and relational (Cottone, 2011)—the APA and CPA Codes converge in their respective prescriptions for a problem-solving approach to ethical decision- making that entails a psychologist discerning the most ethically appropriate course of action in a given situation. Thus, ethical decision- making proceeds from “what a person of good character (aware of the virtues, values and fun- damental principles of the discipline), with sen- sitivity to the probable impact on the specific other involved persons, would choose to do” (Pettifor, 1996, p. 5). A possible link to affirm- ing social justice rests in “a sociocultural frame- work for ethical decision making” (Kakkad, 2005, p. 297), but this perspective is not wide- spread in the literature.

Although the APA Code does not specify a model of ethical decision-making, extant mod- els (e.g., Kitchener & Kitchener, 2011) gener-

ally complement the problem-solving model prescribed by the CPA Code. In addition, both Codes note the value of collegial and supervi- sory consultation for decision-making, and Fisher’s (2013) model prescribes dialogue with those impacted by the decision. In some con- trast, a social-constructivist model stresses the interpersonal nature of ethical decision-making itself (Cottone, 2011), while an ethic of care (Truscott & Crook, 2013) and a approach known as communicative ethics (Rossiter, Walsh-Bowers, & Prilleltensky, 2002) hold that sound ethical decision-making results from trustworthy communication with peers, as I ex- plain subsequently. Yet the codes appear to assume that ethical decision-making is the re- sponsibility of a persistently rational individual engaging in logical problem-solving, a doubtful assumption that flows from the individualistic moral philosophies undergirding the codes (Walsh, 2015).

Nonrational cognitive processes. The lit- erature on nonrational cognitive processes sug- gests that the recommended procedure for eth- ical decision-making might be flawed psychologically. For example, the APA Code suggests that psychologists’ primary ethical ob- ligation is to maintain our competence. How- ever, “research in health care, education, and multicultural and social psychology raise[s] se- rious doubts about psychologists’ capacity for consistently accurate self-assessments of com- petence” (Johnson, Barnett, Elman, Forrest, & Kaslow, 2012, p. 557). If “maintaining compe- tence beyond initial credentialing continues to mean that psychologists rely on self-assessment and voluntary consultation with colleagues if problems arise” (Johnson et al., 2012, p. 559), this disposition is prone to self-serving bias. In fact, confirmation biases, among other nonra- tional phenomena, also impair reasoning. Fol- lowing Kahneman’s (2003) notion of bounded rationality and distinction between automatic intuition and deliberate reason, effective deci- sion-making incorporates intuitive-emotional processes more than solely rational ones. Con- sequently, ethical reasoning does not necessar- ily lead to ethical conduct, because unrecog- nized “nonrational processes can compromise accurate self-reflection” (Rogerson, Gottlieb, Handelsman, Knapp, & Younggren, 2011, p. 619). Accordingly, we might make wiser ethical decisions if we integrated “emotional sensitiv-

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ity, personal values, contextual forces, and in- tuitive responses with normative rational anal- ysis nonrational with rational factors” (Rogerson et al., p. 622), while attempting to prevent cognitive distortions.

One interpretation of this cognitive analysis is that if we ethical actors monitor the opera- tions of nonrational cognitive phenomena, then our capacity as reasoning individuals is af- firmed. But another interpretation is that recog- nition of nonrational processes is insufficient for ethical decision-making. Moreover, sources of social influence also are activated in the process of ethical decision-making. They in- clude the qualities of the ethical situation itself; the roles of significant others (e.g., supervisors, peers, the recipients of our activities); the cul- ture and social climate of organizations or in- stitutions with which a psychologist is affili- ated; and societal influences stemming from sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and technologi- cal structures and ideologies (Malloy & Hadji- stravopoulos, 1998). Ethical decision-making, therefore, entails much more than a presumed rational judgment emanating from an advanced level of moral consciousness. In sum, given the potential for cognitive distortions and covert social influences, the notion of an autonomous, reasoning, and virtuous psychologist who re- calls and applies the correct ethical principle or standard in a kind of cognitive decision-tree does not represent ethical decision-making re- alistically. Rather, sound ethical decision- making arguably depends upon a dialogical pro- cess of understanding the applicability of ethical principles and corresponding standards to the situation, for which consultation with trustworthy colleagues is indispensable.

Interpersonal processes. Communication difficulties in our work as psychologists often can have ramifications for ethical decision- making. But attending to the discursive pro- cesses as well as the content of ethics conceiv- ably could enrich understanding our moral responsibilities in our professional relation- ships. For example, a dialogical process of ne- gotiating conversational differences ideally oc- curs in counseling or psychotherapy, shaped in part by differentials of social power between the parties, the psychologist’s expertise and ethical responsiveness, and the client’s knowledge, in- tentions, and preferences (Strong & Sutherland, 2007). When psychologists strive to balance

their perspective with clients’ perspectives, pro- cessual sensitivity to a given conversation’s quality embodies the ethical principle of re- spect.

Although the ethics discourse tends to mar- ginalize conversational processes in decision- making, studies on clinicians’ experiences with ethics indicate that ethical decision-making is more socially contextualized than first meets the eye (Rossiter et al., 2002). It seems wiser, there- fore, to regard ethical decision-making as a di- alogical process of coconstruction with influen- tial others, including the recipients of a psychologist’s activities, rather than the product of a solitary ethical actor. According to Cot- tone’s (2011) social constructivist approach, in- stead of an individual’s wholly internal deci- sion, ethical decision-making can entail up to three interpersonal steps: consensualizing, ne- gotiating, and arbitrating. In this approach, re- solving an ethical dilemma becomes an interac- tive process of reflection and consensus, attained through open discussion with trustwor- thy colleagues and supervisors concerning the balance between ethical principles and specific standards appropriate to a particular situation. Yet, such dialogues only can provide contest- able ethical knowledge, not certainties, about ethical courses of action. [See Shotter (2005) for another constructivist approach to dialogue and ethics.]

Some authors, drawing from critical social philosophy, understand this dialogical approach as communicative ethics (Rossiter et al., 2002). In the interests of transforming societies and drawing from his concept of “the lifeworld” (an idealized social context of moral values, demo- cratic principles, ethics, and consensus), Haber- mas (1981/1983) promotes the emancipatory character of clear and undistorted communica- tion, which he terms an ideal speech situation. Such communication requires that all parties in the relationship should experience four condi- tions: symmetrical power, sincerity, disclosure of truth, and an inclination to express what is morally right. Crucially, Habermas proposes fundamental changes to society’s socioeco- nomic conditions to lay the foundations for ideal speech to occur. But some scholars are wary that if undistorted communication is prac- ticed as an abstract dialogue, it could ignore power relations embedded in social categories

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(e.g., ethnocultural status, gender, class; Mee- han, 1995).

From my perspective, then, ethical decision- making is better understood as a social process that partly is shaped by experience and consul- tation with other psychologists and profession- als as well as the recipients of our activities, rather than the activity of an autonomous rea- soning psychologist. Accordingly, discerning appropriate ethical conduct might best occur, if professionals experience a safe space such as small-group discussions with trustworthy peers, in which to discuss their ethical concerns with- out fear of judgment and surveillance by their supervisors (Rossiter et al., 2002). However, such an opportunity would require that supervi- sors and administrators foster an organizational climate conducive to the secure discussion of complex ethical situations without supervisory prejudicial judgment. Although ethics codes per se “cannot create safe spaces for the discussion of ethics within organizations” (Pettifor, 1998, p. 236), the crucial concern remains how we are to respond to “organizational or systemic pres- sures [that] may influence [our] capacity to im- plement ethical decisions” (Pettifor, 1998, p. 234).

The Social Conditions of Psychologists’ Vocation

The social conditions of our vocation as psy- chologists also can impinge upon our ethical conceptions and practices. Two such contextual issues are: organizational and institutional influ- ences in places of work, and the challenge of maintaining professional-personal boundaries.

Organizational and institutional influences. Although there has been much discussion on ethical issues involving police and military psy- chology in recent years (e.g., Kennedy, 2011; Teo, 2015a), the contextual realities that we face when the work required within an organi- zation or institution impacts ethical decision- making and conduct has received rather less attention. The APA Code covers organizational demands in Standard 1.03, while the CPA Code addresses organizational influences in several of its standards. Yet, beyond police and military contexts, the social conditions of scientific and professional psychologists’ employment might adversely affect our ethical judgment and the quality of ethical relations that we maintain with

the recipients of our scientific or professional activities. The reality is that evidently in many organizations, agencies, or institutions, particu- larly since the incursion of neoliberal austerity programs, psychologists and other professional staff have little time in which to reflect upon and discuss ethical issues in safe, constructive dia- logue that facilitates understanding the applica- tion of ethical principles and standards in par- ticular circumstances (Rossiter et al., 2002). Instead, in a climate of “do more with less,” staff must serve more clients for shorter periods of time. In such contexts discussing ambiguous ethical matters, which often induce anxiety, has become a luxury.

Relatedly, the nature of supervisory relation- ships can affect ethical deliberations negatively (Rossiter et al., 2002). We psychologists might be anxious about supervisors judging us as pro- fessionally inadequate, if we acknowledge eth- ical uncertainty or misgivings about ethical con- duct in a given situation, as if we should already know the answers to ethical questions. Thus, a virtual taboo against admitting that often we do not know how to behave ethically can operate. Supervisors’ surveillance to induce supervisees’ compliance also might militate against safe, constructive dialogue (Rossiter et al., 2002). In short, the potential to actualize our moral re- sponsibilities is embedded in power relations with supervisors. But the ethical discourse largely suggests that we engage in ethical prob- lem-solving as if it were an abstract process transcending the workaday realities of social entanglements in organizations and institutions, such as supervisor-staff relations. But some contend that accounting for the effect of work contexts on ethical decision-making is essential for ethical conduct ( Vergés, 2010).

The inadequacy of the ethical discourse con- cerning how to deal with diverse working con- ditions is evident in the situation of psycholo- gists who engage in humanitarian work in cultural settings different from their own (Aubé, 2011). Typically, they experience stressful local cultural realities, such as political and military pressure on their nongovernmental organiza- tion. The ethical challenges include the domi- nant-subordinate relationship between service providers and recipients, exacerbated by post- colonial issues; cultural differences in ethical standards, for instance, in the protection of con- fidentiality and consent; and extremely limited

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ethical resources. Ethical ambiguities appar- ently abound in such humanitarian work, just as they might within the permeable boundaries between our professional and personal lives.

Professional-personal boundary maintenance. Psychologists’ professional and personal lives often intersect, which can present ethical prob- lems. By practicing moral discernment, as Pipes, Holstein, and Aguirre (2005) claimed, we can recognize when such boundaries are more or less fused or are distinct. One criterion for moral discernment is the perceived risk to both the recipients of our activities and to the disci- pline, while a mitigating factor is the social context of a given ethical situation. Pipes et al. held, as the CPA Code does, that ethical con- duct should reflect adherence to the underlying principles as well as to standards. The authors recommended that the APA Code emulate the CPA Code’s direction that we indicate whether we are speaking publicly as a professional or a private citizen. Pipes et al. (2005) also sug- gested that we apply the APA Code’s aspira- tional principles to our personal lives, given the permeable nature of personal-professional boundaries. But, from a critical perspective, the process of moral discernment concerning these boundaries likely is as influenced by nonrational cognitive processes, interpersonal relations, and organizational-institutional in- fluences as ethical decision-making in general seems to be.

Allowing a role for personal conscience, the CPA Code accepts the potential for reciprocal influence between the personal and the pro- fessional. In contrast, the APA Code exempts personal activities on our own time from its purview. Yet the virtue ethics and feminist- relational ethical perspectives (Walsh, 2015) as- sume that our personal characteristics do influ- ence our conduct (as in “the personal is the political”) and that matters of social justice re- quire our personal commitment. But, some psy- chologists insist, public perceptions of our con- duct during personal time might adversely affect professional relationships with clientele. For instance, involvement in contentious polit- ical issues might lead to abusing the power of our social position inadvertently and harming our professional role and others’ reputations. Thus, “Taking a public position on a controver- sial issue might call into [our] ability to be objective and nonjudgmental” unless our asso-

ciation has taken a stance on the issue (Haeny, 2014, p. 269). This rationale implies, as I ex- plain below, regression to the mean, so to speak, of social reform.

Overall, the codes and the literature contain little discussion of ethical ambiguities inherent in professional-personal boundaries. Instead, the discourse seems preoccupied with prevent- ing blemishes to the image of an autonomous psychologist practicing scientific problem- solving that we strive to manage in society. This inclination, however, might contribute to the difficulties we have had in practicing ethical responsibility to society beyond social reform.

Ethical Relationship With Society

Since World War Two (Capshew, 1999; Her- man, 1995), the discipline has committed itself to advance both psychological knowledge and human welfare. From the societal level of anal- ysis, I assess in this section how the ethical discourse addresses the ethical principle of re- sponsibility to society and the similar concepts of social responsibility and social justice. Actu- alizing a moral imperative, grounded in socio- political consciousness (Prilleltensky & Walsh- Bowers, 1993), might inspire a reconceived ethic of responsibility to society.

The codes’ orientations. Not surprisingly, the codes share a common inclination in their respective depictions of psychologists’ ethical obligations to promote the well-being of indi- viduals and society and to prevent infringement of human rights. For instance, the APA Ethics Code “indicate[s] that psychologists are com- mitted to creating, communicating, and apply- ing psychological knowledge in order to benefit individuals and society and facilitate the reso- lution of global challenges” (Swim et al., 2011, p. 246). However, APA introduced this princi- ple, then known as “Social Responsibility,” in the previous 1992 Code, but the adjective “so- cial” since has disappeared. In the 2002 edition, the principle of “Justice,” connoting fairness and equity, encompasses psychologists’ respon- sibilities to society.

In the CPA Code social justice “refers to fairness and equity in the allocation of, impact of, and access to psychological services” (Truscott & Crook, 2013, p. 170), as exempli- fied by the Values Statement for Principle I: Respect for the Dignity of Persons. Yet the

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concept of social justice transcends concern simply with “the particular ethical obligations owed to individuals arising out of professional relationships . . . to include obligations owed to individuals collectively . . . [and] society in general” (Truscott & Crook, 2013, p. 176). An- other definition of social justice is “work[ing] for the common good by transforming the social organizations and processes that contribute to power inequalities, oppression, and marginal- ization” (Vasquez, 2011, p. 76). Social justice can be linked with civic virtue, which is synon- ymous with “general welfare” and “public in- terest” and implies responsibility to one’s pro- fessional society as well as civil society. In my view, however, social justice is better understood concretely as a continuum of interventions that range in their effects from reform (i.e., adjust- ments to a social system) to transformation (i.e., fundamental changes in the substance of a sys- tem or even its demise), even revolution, non- violent or not (Walsh & Gokani, 2014). The concept of social responsibility refers to at- tempts to effect social justice by improving societal systems to benefit everyone equitably.

The codes differ from each other in how they address our potential involvement as psycholo- gists with issues of justice and how we may ethically engage with society to contribute to societal improvement. Although APA does not incorporate social justice explicitly in its Ethics Code, the concept is identified as a core value in the vision statement of APA’s strategic plan and the association has become more outspoken in its political advocacy (Vasquez, 2011).

The CPA Code’s Values Statement for Prin- ciple IV: Responsibility to Society (CPA, 2000) seems at first to be concerned with ensuring that we psychologists treat extant social structures with respect and comport ourselves in an “even- tempered” manner. Then the code states that if social systems obstruct the actualization of the code’s four principles, “psychologists involved have a responsibility to speak out in a manner consistent with the principles of this Code, and advocate for appropriate change to occur as quickly as possible” (CPA, 2000). This Values Statement stresses that we are expected to chal- lenge extant social systems and societal prac- tices but in a respectful and collaborative man- ner. However, as progressive as this statement might seem to traditional psychologists, any code of psychological ethics founded in indi-

vidual-centered moral philosophies (Walsh, 2015) has difficulty embracing the transforma- tional potential of social justice, because the duty to practice social justice emanates from “relational [and communitarian] ethics, which motivate us to act out of concern for others and consideration of social contexts” (Truscott & Crook, 2013, p. 170). Our ethical codes and discourse would be enriched, some argue, if the codes incorporated relational and communitar- ian perspectives, which assume human interde- pendence (Johnson et al., 2012).

Both codes’ foundational principles do sug- gest that we have an ethical obligation to con- tribute to bettering society and protecting hu- man rights, such as advocating for progressive social change. In fact, the CPA Code’s Principle IV: Responsibility to Society contains standards that encourage us, as in Standard IV. Six for example, to “Participate in the process of criti- cal self-evaluation of the discipline’s place in society, and in the development and implemen- tation of structures and procedures that help the discipline to contribute to beneficial societal functioning and changes” (CPA, 2000). More- over, three of the APA Code’s principles— fidelity and responsibility, integrity, and jus- tice— contain within them expectations for psychologists’ making public statements about matters of social policy. The code’s Standards 2.01, 2.06, and 3.04 urge psychologists to be cautious and clear in drawing inferences about social applications from psychological findings. However, sufficient empirical evidence fre- quently is lacking on a particular social issue, yet societal exigencies seem to demand an au- thoritative response from us. The consensus is that when taking a public stance on matters where empirical support is insufficient, we should distinguish between our personal opin- ions and values and our professional, scientific claims (Martel, 2009). Nevertheless, typical concerns are that direct participation in the work of social justice and political activism could politicize the discipline, confuse our formal roles, and harm the discipline’s scientific cred- ibility (Kakkad, 2005).

Impediments to justice. One could argue that psychologists “who are truly respectful and caring of others cannot be blind to social injus- tice” (Pettifor, 1996, p. 8). But throughout our discipline’s history, when we have responded to social injustices, our interventions have been

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reformist, politically speaking (Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014), which I assert, represents a visual and behavioral impairment in social mo- rality. Furthermore, ethical discourse in the dis- cipline continues to counsel us to maintain po- litically moderate professional identities (Haeny, 2014; Kakkad, 2005). If this is our historical and current reality and self-image, what could move us to respond to calls to social justice, which often are immoderate, even rad- ical, in their implications?

When Martin Luther King, Jr. (1968) ad- dressed psychologists in a 1967 summer of Af- rican American rebellions against systemic rac- ism, he urged us not to contribute to the psychological adjustment of citizens, because, he said, individuals and society should never be adjusted to oppressive conditions. Rather, he challenged us to foster “creative maladjust- ment,” that is, to transform society into relation- ships of justice. Answering King’s denunciation of promoting adaptation and adjustment and his annunciation of overturning the societal status quo demands that we confront the impediments in our discipline to enacting social justice be- yond the inadequacies of our ethics codes. But we have not practiced his exhortation, largely because we have little history of contributing to social change that strengthens ecological- environmental, economic, and social justice (Walsh & Gokani, 2014). Instead, we have ig- nored our discipline’s inherent sociopolitical limitations yet have contributed to various types of social reform, if not directly, then indirectly (Walsh et al., 2014). Aspirations for enacting social justice notwithstanding (e.g., Vasquez, 2011, 2012), psychology has been and remains an administrative tool for society’s power bro- kers, that is, our activities have and continue to enhance the efficacy of society’s economic, ed- ucational, and governmental institutions (Dan- ziger, 1979).

The interrelated disciplinary, institutional, sociopolitical, and personal aspects of our tra- ditional educational, investigative, and profes- sional endeavors have mitigated our attempts to address social injustice in society systematically and systemically. Consequently, any attempts to effect social justice require, first and foremost, that we strive to resolve the contradictions in our own practices. Given that many authors have identified psychology as an individualistic science (e.g., Sarason, 1981), a status that hin-

ders the enactment of social responsibility and social justice, I focus on other impediments: psychology as a natural science, its reformist orientation, our personal distance from oppres- sion, and our social contract with society.

A natural science. Historically, North American psychology has been fixed in a natu- ral-science orbit that concentrates on predicting, controlling, and theorizing individuals’ behav- ior and mental processes, to the virtual exclu- sion of a human-science conception that con- centrates on understanding and interpreting contextualized experience of individuals and their cultures (Walsh et al., 2014). Our lengthy training in the natural-science orientation in- clines us to segregate subjective from objective judgment, as if the facts that we construct exist independently of our interpretations of observa- tions. In the CPA Code’s Principle III: Integrity of Relationships, for instance, this objectivism is apparent in four standards pertaining to ob- jectivity, generally unqualified.

The convention in natural-science psychol- ogy also has been that in our formal relationship with society we are duty bound as objective scientists to uphold the Humean distinction be- tween facts and values (e.g., Kendler, 2008); that is, “empirical data are and should be value- free” (Martel, 2009, p. 104). In my view, the relationship between putative scientific facts and social values is key to understanding what the ethical considerations might be when we address social issues. The traditional position is that if we engage in social action as individuals, our stances of social-advocacy risk being per- ceived as expressions of bias, which weakens our individual credibility and stains the disci- pline’s reputation (Haeny, 2014; Kendler, 2008; Truscott & Crook, 2013). An alternative view is that ethical values and practices, as well as scientific ones, are enacted in a cultural- historical context of social roles and relation- ships that are embedded in societal ideologies, structures, and institutions. From this perspec- tive, then, our moral task is to recognize and address how social realities influence our val- ues, concepts, and practices. Yet, our scientific and professional training has socialized us to relate to the persons we study and serve from a reputedly value-free standpoint of neutral ob- jectivity, even as we might avoid reflecting on our biases, such as our longstanding neglect of social class (Walsh & Gokani, 2014). As a

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consequence, in our formal relationships we convey personal interests, prejudices, and so- ciopolitical biases that are sustained by our priv- ileged socioeconomic status as members of the establishment. In light of this history, actualiz- ing overarching ethical values of respecting hu- man dignity and protecting human rights might be compromised at least to some extent, when we enter the public domain of social issues laden with such baggage.

A reformist bent. Particularly in the U.S. A., psychology originated within a nineteenth- century social order characterized by free- market capitalism and global imperialism. When massive urbanization occurred, business, industry, and government leaders, aided by sci- entists and the new class of professionals, in- cluding psychologists, aimed to administer the masses effectively by rationalizing society (Danziger, 1979). Social engineering to ensure that citizens adapted to their station in life be- came psychology’s applied mission, which is reflected in the notion of social adjustment (Na- poli, 1981). Historically, then, we psychologists have been much more likely to engage in social reform and thereby to sustain the societal status quo (Herman, 1995) than in any interventions that could merit the term transformative. More- over, self-servingly we have regarded the prog- ress and advancement of our science and pro- fession as a barometer of democracy and the health of society at large (Capshew, 1999). Within the discipline’s tradition of social re- form the consensus is that we have a responsi- bility to contribute (conventional) psychologi- cal research on the particular social issues under scrutiny and to educate the public about the likely outcomes of one course of action versus another action.

Yet, there are few precedents for psycholo- gists who take political stances, because few of us study political action, even fewer engage directly in it, and we rarely consider anarchistic and revolutionary political options (Walsh & Gokani, 2014). Moreover, the discipline shows little interest in fostering an ethical obligation of social responsibility to contribute to changing social systems so that all in a given society benefit. Instead, overtly or not, for generations we have pledged allegiance to the flag of evolv- ing capitalism, as APA presidential addresses show (Sarason, 1981). We have absorbed capi- talist discourse so well and thereby distanced

ourselves from its destructive nature that some of us speak of social support as “social capital” and community interventions as “social entre- preneurship” apparently without irony; our cri- terion of value evidently reflects the ideology of neoliberal capitalism (see Sugarman, 2015).

Overall, then, since the postwar era psychol- ogists have made no essential distinction among service to the state, employment by the govern- ment, and social responsibility for the science and profession (Herman, 1995). Rather, indi- rectly or directly in our psychologized societies, we have occupied the privileged position of plausibly explaining individuals to themselves. Thus, as citizens, “Our feelings, beliefs, desires, hopes and fears are suffused with the descrip- tions, injunctions, and evaluations of those [for example, psychologists] who claim to know more about what is good for us than we do ourselves” (Rose, 1996, p. 224).

Personal distance from oppressive social conditions. The codes have insufficiently ad- dressed the larger social context in which ethi- cal issues and dilemmas occur, such as the oppressive societal conditions of poverty, rac- ism, sexism, and heterosexism that permeate all layers of social relations. Such distancing is manifest, for instance, in the APA Code in which universal moral duties are understood ideally and abstracted from societal conditions. Thus, autonomy refers to psychologists foster- ing the right to self-determination of those whom we study, teach, treat, counsel, or con- sult; beneficence and nonmaleficence mean nur- turing well-being and doing no harm to those with whom we engage; fidelity refers to being trustworthy in all our scientific and professional relations; and justice refers to acting with fair- ness and equity.

Furthermore, the fact that, as a group, psy- chologists operate from positions of substantial socioeconomic privilege can inhibit our re- sponding effectively to the diverse social loca- tions of the individuals, groups, organizations, and communities with whom we work (Walsh & Gokani, 2014). Although many of us can be subjected to oppressive experiences due to our locations in intersecting social categories, our socioeconomic status as scientist-professionals distances us from understanding and relating with the recipients of our psychological activi- ties in a way that appreciates how societal con- ditions of oppression might affect them directly

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and indirectly. The potential disparities between our social locations and those of the recipients of our activities can impede our capacities for ethical decision-making (Lerman & Porter, 1990).

Social contract with society. The codes’ disposition of responsibility to society assumes, explicitly or not, an “overriding ethic of a social contract” between psychologists and society (Sinclair, 1998, p. 168). The current CPA Code, for example, expanded “its [initial] scope be- yond a narrow individualistic world view” through the notion of a social contract that “ob- ligates psychologists to place the public interest above self-interest” (Pettifor, 1998, p. 232, em- phasis added). According to this principle, we make a commitment to contribute to human welfare in return for receiving professional sta- tus and autonomy in society.

However, the likelihood that this quid pro quo obligates us to sustain extant social institu- tions, even if attempting to improve them to benefit all, is evident in the following depiction of the social contract: “In order to honor and sustain this interdependence a professional code of ethics ought not contain anything that is discordant with the values of society at large” (Truscott & Crook, 2013, p. 3). Moreover, what is meant by the public interest and what activ- ities might be included within the domain of privileging societal and individual welfare above our own interests have remained unde- fined. In addition, the politically limited scope of this social contract is evident in CPA Stan- dard IV.10 in which we are encouraged to “[c]ontribute to the general welfare of society (e.g., improving accessibility of services, re- gardless of ability to pay).” This example rep- resents charity not justice. Furthermore, if “psy- chology uses ethical codes to support the political professionalization strategies of the discipline” and these “strategies help to market the discipline and to ensure public support for science and practice” (Pettifor, 1996, p. 2), as Dunbar’s (1998) historical analysis of the CPA Code attested, then any suggestion that altruism is psychologists’ primary motivation for engag- ing in a social contract is misleading. Realisti- cally, we value our own interests at least as much as contributing to societal welfare, as our history has shown (Walsh et al., 2014).

Furthermore, maintaining personal-profes- sional boundaries that do not tarnish public per-

ception of psychologists’ credentialed status is the disciplinary norm (Haeny, 2014), which the codes underscore. Despite the CPA Code’s di- rection, for instance, that we are to privilege the welfare of society and individuals above our own, pragmatically, the social contract enables the discipline to flourish in society. Conse- quently, an inherent disinclination on our part to “bite the hand that feeds us” appears to limit the quality and degree of our contributions to hu- man welfare and well-being and to ensure that, as far as mainstream psychologists are con- cerned, extant social structures and institutions remain intact, even if reformed to benefit some citizens.

The Transit of Social Ethics in Psychology: Shifting Psychologists’ Ethical Discourse

In light of tensions within APA over its com- mitment to the public interest and its stances on public policies and the history of unjust psycho- logical practices, Vasquez (2012) asserted that “To prevent abusive application of psychologi- cal principles and knowledge, psychologists must remain vigilant about how we, and the discipline of psychology, are encapsulated in the social contexts and cultural positions in which we live” (p. 338). In responding to Vasquez’s call for vigilance yet mindful of the limitations of the discourse on ethics, I ask: Of what does social morality for psychologists consist, given that we conform to society’s laws, social structures, and mores, as well as those of our discipline, even while some have challenged the establishment in society and the discipline by striving to overcome dysfunc- tional and oppressive laws, social structures, and mores? Is there moral space in psychology, as King (1968) urged, in conscience and soli- darity with other citizens, for denouncing an ecologically, economically, politically, and cul- turally imperiled and unjust society and promot- ing economic, sociopolitical, and cultural trans- formation, even to the point of rebellion and revolution?

Discussion of such questions among psychol- ogists is sparse, not simply perhaps because we do not wish to jeopardize our social contract with the societal establishment, but also because we are both shaped by and committed to the Enlightenment ideal of the reasoning moral sub- ject who makes competent ethical decisions and

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to a reformist psychological, if not also socio- political, worldview. Besides, few of us psy- chologists are either philosophers or political activists. Altogether, then, our notions of re- sponsibility to society are rather limited. In ef- fect, we lack a moral compass for addressing the interrelated existential challenges that con- tinue to confront humankind: (a) escalating cli- mate change and ecological destruction on land and sea render life on Earth extremely precari- ous; (b) unsustainable neoliberal economic and financial practices (e.g., regimes of austerity) ensure obscene largesse for the tiny minority, continued comfort for the scientific-profes- sional class, and relative or absolute poverty for the masses; and (c) militarized governments wage perpetual war in the name of fighting terrorism, while the omnipresent danger of a nuclear holocaust looms on the horizon with the Doomsday Clock now registering three minutes to midnight, meaning imminent global catastro- phe. I conclude, therefore, that our regnant dis- position of moderation concerning our respon- sibility to society shows a lack of courage, hence is unacceptable morally. Moreover, our responses to global, national, and local precarity will remain superficial until we develop an un- derstanding of the concrete ecological-environ- mental, economic, political, and cultural condi- tions of mundane life (Walsh & Gokani, 2014), which would require reconstructing psychology (Walsh et al., 2014).

Nevertheless, one giant leap for our ethical discourse might be to revise the codes to enable the principles and standards to suit our existen- tial realities. The APA Code could ensure that the Principle of Justice is understood in terms of social justice and social responsibility, while the CPA Code could rank Principle IV: Responsi- bility to Society equivalent to Principle I: Re- spect for the Dignity of the Person in its hier- archy. Both codes could incorporate dialogical ethics within them, as the modus operandi for ethical psychologists. Second, we could devote our scientific and professional attention to ad- dressing humankind’s existential challenges. For instance, psychologists from different sub- disciplines could investigate and interpret the human perceptions, causes, and consequences of climate change as well as adaptive and mit- igating responses by individuals and communi- ties to climate change (Swim et al., 2011).

However, some cautionary notes are neces- sary on the prospects of psychologists becom- ing mindful advocates and practitioners of so- cial justice. One moral flaw in the codes is that they address the rights of the recipients of our scientific, educational, and professional activi- ties only indirectly in their focus on our per- spectives and privileges (Prilleltensky et al., 1996). As a result, the balance of social power implicit within the codes’ texts strongly favors protecting our interests. The CPA Code, for instance, does not specifically prescribe consul- tation with recipients concerning “ethical deci- sions that affect them” (Pettifor, 1998, p. 233). If equal emphasis were placed on the ethical rights of the recipients of our activities, which would strengthen the centrality of dialogical communication in the prescribed procedures of ethical decision-making, it could balance our social-cultural power and aid in preventing ma- leficence and fostering beneficence. However, such a development, although welcome and vi- tal, would affect the interpersonal level of social systems primarily, not the organizational- institutional and societal levels. Furthermore, a transition toward social-ethical conceptions and practices of ethics is unlikely to occur, if we remain committed in theory and practice to an exclusively natural-science individualistic con- ception of psychology. Rather, a transition to- ward social ethics requires, and could enrich, basic changes in our conceptions and practices of psychological science, applications and ser- vice to society, education of students, and our functions in organizational and institutional sys- tems (Walsh et al., 2014).

In addition, not only does our heritage consist of shoring up the status quo through social reform, but also the history of progressive movements in psychology shows that the disci- pline constrains impulses for progressive change just as the larger socioeconomic system coopts such impulses in its economic, political, and social institutions (Walsh & Gokani, 2014). Various calls for incorporating “social justice and activism into [psychology’s] larger iden- tity” (Kakkad, 2005, p. 307) neglect how soci- ety and psychologists struggle with regression toward the societal mean. Societal regression serves as a sociopolitical undertow that drags us back to the comforts of the abundant intellectual and material privileges that we members of the scientific-professional class enjoy, relative to

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most North Americans. But this very status con- strains our moral engagement as participants in solidarity and in dialogue with other citizens, rather than objectivistic spectators, in the strug- gle to collectively confront the existential issues of our time.

To conclude, I have argued for a critique both of the taken-for-granted assumption of the psy- chologist as an autonomous ethical actor who competently applies logical problem-solving to ethical situations and of the sociopolitical ide- ology implicit in ethical discourse, which con- flates social reform with social transformation in the name of social justice. I am arguing that as psychologists we lack moral preparation for progressive engagement in society. This defi- ciency seems attributable largely to a basic his- torical contradiction for which there is no easy resolution and many moral ambiguities. On the one hand, we barely consider the dubious con- viction that we can practice moral discernment as autonomous ethical actors, even while non- rational and communicative processes affect our ethical conduct and social-historical forces shape our vocation. This conviction obscures psychological and sociocultural limits to our capacity for exercising reason in ethical deci- sion-making. On the other hand, we seek to apply our science for the betterment of society, according to the tradition of social reform and adjustment to society.

An alternative to these standard practices is one of animating the fundamentally moral na- ture of our vocation by shifting our conceptions and practices of ethics from an individualistic orientation toward communicative and emanci- patory orientations (see also Teo, 2015b). In advancing this case I invoke the hope that we will bend the arc of our moral universe toward ecological-environmental, economic, political, cultural, and social justice (Walsh & Gokani, 2014). However, if our ethical conceptions and practices, including the APA and CPA Codes, are merely reformed, thus remain unchanged in substance, they will serve more as emblems of professional pride than as worthy instruments in the urgent struggle toward justice locally, na- tionally, and globally.

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Received February 13, 2015 Accepted March 3, 2015 �

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du al

us er

an d

is no

t to

be di

ss em

in at

ed br

oa dl

y.