November 6, 2002 Revision
Wal * Mart Stores, Inc. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Translated in full with permission of Harvard Business, The President and Fellows of Harvard College. The original case, entitled “Wal*Mart Stores, Inc.” (9-794-024), Copyright © 1994, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College, was prepared by Research Associate Sharon Foley under the supervision of Professors Stephen P.
by Harvard Business School licensed, translated by the United States Full-time translation of the members of the association. The accuracy of this translation is the responsibility of the translator. The copyright of this translation (2010) is owned by President and Fellows of Harvard College. The original article is entitled "Wal*Mart Stores, Inc." (9-794-024), copyright 1994, owned by President and Fellows of Harvard College. This case was written by research assistant Sharon Foley under the direction of Professors Stephen P. Bradley and Pankaj Ghemawat. The purpose is to serve as a basis for class discussion, rather than to show whether the treatment of a management problem is effective.
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Wal-Mart Stores Ltd.
1993 In the Forbes magazine's list of American richest people, the sons of Sam Walton, the founder of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart"), took the 5th. By the ninth place, each person's worth was $4.5 billion. Sam Walton passed away in April 1992. It is he who made Wal-Mart achieve such brilliant achievements. In the past 20 years, the company's average equity yield has reached 33%, and the compound annual sales growth rate has reached 35%. At the end of 1993, Wal-Mart's market capitalization was $57.5 billion, with sales of nearly $300 per square foot, compared to an industry average of $210. It is widely believed that Wal-Mart has led the revolution in many aspects of the retail industry, and its investment in information technology is well known.
In February 1988, Sam Walton handed over the burden of Wal-Mart's CEO to David Glass, leaving himself only as chairman. Since then, the company has been taken over by David Glass and Don Soderquist. They served as CEO and COO, along the footsteps of Sam Walton. The two did not live up to expectations and achieved excellent results: Wal-Mart's sales increased from $16 billion in 1987 to $67 billion in 1993, and profits quadrupled from $628 million to $2.3 billion. At the beginning of 1994, the company had 1,953 discount stores (including 68 shopping malls), 419 warehouse member stores (Sam's Club), 81 Bud's stores and four mega supermarkets. Wal-Mart plans to open 110 stores in 1994, including five shopping malls and 20 Sam's Club stores, and plans to expand or relocate nearly 70 older discount stores and five Sam's Club stores, 65 of which The discount store will be expanded into a shopping plaza. In 1994, the company's sales are expected to reach $ 84 billion, and capital expenditures will total $ 3.2 billion. Schedule 1 summarizes the financial situation of Wal-Mart from 1983 to 1993. Schedule 2 is a store map of Wal-Mart.
How to maintain Wal-Mart's impressive performance is the main problem facing David Glass and Don Soderquist. The major newspapers have published commentaries arguing: “Growing kings encounter obstacles”, “Is Wal-Mart still able to maintain an alarming growth rate?” and “The Wal-Mart King’s throne is unstable.” In April 1993, after discussions with analysts Wal-Mart confirmed that the comparable sales growth rate in 1993 will fall back to 7%-8%, which is the first time since 1985 that it has fallen below 10%. The news came out that the New York Stock Exchange quickly queued up in front of the door, and people were busy selling Wal-Mart stock, causing the exchange to temporarily stop trading. From the beginning of March 1993 until the end of April, Wal-Mart's share price fell from 22% to 26%, and the company's market value evaporated by nearly $17 billion. Despite this, David Grass and Don Soderquist have not been in a mess, they believe that the development of shopping plazas and international expansion is the main means of achieving growth, and devoted all energy to this project.
Discounted retail industry
In the mid-1950s, after the supermarket, discount stores emerged as a new form of retail in the United States. Supermarkets mainly sell foods at an unprecedented low profit, while discount stores extend this sales method to daily necessities, with gross margins 10%-15% lower than traditional department stores. As a result, discount stores are meager, and in order to make up for this shortcoming, they try to cut costs: the equipment in the store is extremely simple, the promotion activities are very limited, and auxiliary services such as delivery and purchase are rare.
The emergence of discount stores coincides with the time. Since World War II, consumer news has become more informed. Supermarkets have taught them how to self-shop, and the distribution of daily necessities has matured. The television is full of manufacturing.
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makers to post an ad. The price standards set by the government also enhance consumers' self-confidence. Therefore, in addition to buying well-known brands, technically complex or “psychologically significant” products, many of them are willing to try cheaper prices. Self-service retail store.
In this case, the discount retail model came into being. Many businesses are rushing to the industry, opening discount stores locally, regionally or nationally. Sales in the discounted retail industry increased from $2 billion in 1960 to $19 billion in 1970, with a compound annual growth rate of 25%. In the 1970s, the industry continued to grow at an annual rate of 9%, and the number of stores increased by 5% per year; in the 1980s, the industry grew at a rate of 7%, but the number of stores grew by only 1%; in the 1990s, The industry growth rate was 11.2%, and the number of stores grew by nearly 2%. The trend of this new number of new stores is mainly due to the fact that discount retailers are gradually adopting a more cautious approach to expansion, and they are increasingly focusing on the decoration and repair of existing stores. In 1993, sales in the industry reached $124 billion. Analysts expect sales to continue to grow at an annual rate of around 5% over the next five years.
In 1962, Wal-Mart opened its doors, and none of the top 10 discount stores in the same period survived in 1993. Many large discount chains such as King's, Korvette's, Mammoth Mart, WT Grant, Two Guys, Volcker Chain (Woolco) and the Zaire chain (Zayre) have been declining for years, or acquired by other survivors. After a period of baptism, the industry became more centralized: In 1986, the top 5 discount stores accounted for 62% of total industry sales, and in 1993 this percentage rose to 71%, with more than 50 stores. The discounted chain company has a total sales volume of 82%. Schedule 3 lists the largest discount stores in 1993.
Wal-Mart discount store
development history value contribution has always been part of Wal-Mart's culture. This valuefrom Sam Walton's sproutedfirst Ben Franklin Franchise Store (opened in 1945). In the 1950s, the number of Ben Franklin franchises owned by Sam Walton has increased to 15. In 1962, he proposed to Ben Franklin to open a store in a small town, but was rejected, so he and his brother Bud opened the first "Wal*Mart Discount City" 95% of the funds are from Sam Walton.In thefollowing years, he continued to run his own Ben Franklin franchise store while opening a Wal-Mart discount store, and gradually withdrew from the operation of the franchise store before 1976. On October 31, 1969, when Wal-Mart was officially incorporated, Sam Walton had 18 Wal-Mart stores and 15 Ben Franklin franchisees.
By 1970, Wal-Mart had steadily increased its chain of stores to 30 in the suburbs of Arkansas, Missouri and Oklahoma. However, as the company continued to expand in the southern United States and the rural areas of the Midwest, its cost of goods sold (almost three-quarters of the sales revenue of the discount) became a thorny issue. As Sam Walton said: “We are in the backcountry, distributors do not take the initiative to supply us, and competitors operating in larger towns often enjoy this service. Therefore, our only choice It's about building your own warehouse so you can buy and storeat a more attractive price
one of the other two big discount stores: Kmart and Target also opened in 1962.
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products.”2due to Each warehouse cost $5 million or more, so Sam Walton went public in 1972 and raised a total of $3.3 million.
The Wal-Mart development plan developed by Sam Walton has two key elements. First, the store will be opened in remote villages and small towns with populations ranging from 5,000 to 25,000. In response, his explanation is: “Our key strategy is to open stores of the right size in rural towns that everyone else has turned a blind eye to.”3Sam Walton believes that discount operations can flourish in small towns. “If the price of the goods we offer is the same as the price of the goods in the downtown shops that can be reached by driving for four hours, or even more favorable,” he said, “people will definitely buy nearby.”4The second element of Wal-Mart’s development plan is Expansion mode. As David Glass explained: “We always expand outwards with the help of internal motivations, and never leap forward blindly, and then go back and fill the gaps.”5
In the mid-1980s, Wal-Mart was about three. One of the stores in which the store is located has no other competitors involved. However, as the company's geographic coverage expands, its competition with other major retailers is increasingly fierce. By 1993, 55% of Wal-Mart stores were directly facing the competition of Kmart, and 23% of the stores faced the competition of Target, but 82% of the Kmart stores and 85% of the Target stores were not allowed. Not directly facing Wal-Mart's competition. 6Wal-Mart infiltrates into the West Coast of the United States and the northeastern states. By the beginning of 1994, its operations had covered 47 states and plans to open stores in Vermont, Hawaii and Alaska. Schedule 4 compares the performance of Wal-Mart and its competitors.
Sam Walton's legacy
After a long struggle with cancer, Sam Walton unfortunately died in April 1992 at the age of 74. But his service philosophy has been around for a long time, widely spread in Wal-Mart's huge system, rooted in every store. He cherishes the value of every penny and is keen to sell products at a lower price than any other competitor. It is this philosophy that drives all aspects of the company's business. For example, in the case of outbound purchases, his experience is that travel expenses should not exceed 1% of the purchase amount, which means that you have to share the hotel room with others when you are staying, and walk instead of taking a taxi when you go out.
Sam Walton instilled in his staff (what he called an associate) an idea that Wal-Mart advocates a maverick way of doing things, not letting work and life stay the same, but be fun and interesting. On one occasion, Sam Walton bet with David Glass, who predicted that the company’s pre-tax profit in 1983 would exceed 8%, which is the case. Sam Walton is willing to gamble and lose, actually jumping on the Wall Street, he said: "Most people may think that our company has a weird and crazy chairman, this is purely a propaganda gimmick. They are I didn't realize that this kind of thing happened every moment in Wal-Mart.”7
2Forbes, August 16, 1982, p. 43. 3 Sam Walton and John Huey, Sam Walton, Made in America, (New York: Bantam Books Publishing Company, 1992). 4Business Week, November 5, 1979, p. 145. 5 Ibid., p. 146. 6 George Strachan (George C. Strachan), "discount industry status quo" (The State of the Discount StoreGoldman Sachs Group (Goldman Sachs), April 6, 1994. 7 Sam Walton, "Made in America" (Sam Walton, Made in America).
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Sam Walton Also stay in your own store as much as possible to review the competition. It is reported that he has counted the number of vehicles parked in the parking lot of Kmart and Tagit, and also measured the shelf space at Ames, and recorded the price of the goods. He knows his competitors and will follow the other's great ideas. He met Sol Price, who created the Price Club, and copied his ideas to his Sam's Club.
In Sam Walton's view, the most important factor in Wal-Mart's success is its way of treating employees. He believes that if you want employees in each store to care about customers, then you must ensure that you are concerned about the employees of these stores. However, from the moment when Wal-Mart really succeeded, the company developed a subculture inside, which always plagued Sam Walton. “We have created a lot of millionaires in the company,” he said. “When they advertise themselves, it really makes me angry. Some people will make some excessive swaying actions from time to time. I always I didn't hesitate to blame and criticize at the regular meeting on Saturday morning. I never thought that Wal-Mart's culture is to live in a big, spacious house, open a car, and we have to serve customers."8
Sam Walton Describe his management style as “the management of running around”, while other Wal-Mart personnel describe it as “the management that makes you exhausted” and the “management of monitoring”. In terms of personnel management, Sam Walton stated: “You must let them take responsibility and trust them, but they will be reviewed afterwards.” The partnership between Wal-Mart and employees means they need to share data: Sam Walton operates the business as an open book and always implements an open policy. Wal-Mart aims to achieve excellence through employee empowerment, maintaining technical advantage and building loyalty to employees, customers and suppliers.
merchandising Wal-Mart'sgoods are tailored for each market, in many cases, even according toofdoor, the needsthe particular configuration of the shop which is what the aid of information systems "feature tracking" (traiting) function can be achieve. Feature tracking is a process that selects sources of supply and arranges for merchandise sales based on thousands of store and market characteristics. That is to say, the local store manager uses the inventory and sales data to select the shelf product according to the customer's preference, and determines the shelf space according to the demand situation of the certain product in the store. Wal-Mart's promotion strategy "everyday low price" provides branded goods to customers at a lower price than department stores and specialty stores. Wal-Mart rarely makes promotions. Other major competitors typically distribute 50-100 advertising flyers each year to attract customers, while Wal-Mart only issues 13 major flyers each year. In 1993, Wal-Mart's advertising costs were 1.5% of discount store sales, compared to 2.1% for its direct competitors.9In addition, Wal-Mart also developed a "satisfaction guaranteed" policy, meaning that customers can unconditionally return the purchased goods to a store any Wal-Mart.
Wal-Mart is highly competitive in terms of price, giving store managers greater authority to set commodity prices rather than adopting a centralized pricing model like Caldor and Venture. Store managers typically price products based on local market conditions, maximizing sales and inventory turnover while minimizing costs. A study conducted in the mid-1980s found that when Wal-Mart and Kmart were adjacent to each other, Wal-Mart's commodity prices were about 1% lower than the latter, while Wal-Mart, Kmart, and Target were the three major
8 Ibid. 9 Management Ventures, Inc.
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giants were 4-6 miles apart, Wal-Mart's commodity prices were on average 10.4% and 7.6% lower than the latter two. If the store is located in a remote location and does not have to face direct competition from large discount stores, Wal-Mart's merchandise price is 6% higher than the store located next to Kmart.
As the competition in the retail industry changed, Wal-Mart decided to use its original promotional slogan “Always Low Price – Forever” (When Wal-Mart established a chain store to offer a better price than a small town vendor, it was promoted with this slogan. Changed to "All goods are always low-priced - forever" (see Schedule 5 for pricing studies of Wal-Mart, Kmart, and Bradlees in New Jersey suburban stores). By the early 1990s, in most markets, the price difference between Wal-Mart and its largest competitors was usually between 2% and 4%: in seven pricing surveys conducted between 1992 and 1993. The price of Wal-Mart goods is 2.2% lower than that of Kmart, and Wal-Mart is priced less than 3% of Kmart in the products sold by the two companies. In six surveys conducted in comparison with Target, Wal-Mart's average selling price was lower than that of Target's 3.7%. Wal-Mart's pricing was 4.1% lower in the products sold by the two companies' stores. In addition, Wal-Mart is 3.9% and 4.7% lower than the regional retail company Venture, which has the lowest operating cost. Compared to other regional competitors, Wal-Mart's price advantage is even more pronounced: the average selling price is 21.4% lower than Caldor and 28.8% lower than Bradlees.10
Wal-Mart is known for its national brand strategy, and its sales are mainly derived from branded products that promote advertising across the country. However, private label clothing also accounts for about 25% of Wal-Mart apparel sales. Wal-Mart has also gradually introduced several other proprietary products to its discount stores, such as the beauty care brand Equate, the dog food brand Ol'Roy and the food brand Sam's American Choice. In 1992, a year after Sam's American Choice was launched, the brand's range of products increased to more than 40, including cola, cornflakes, chocolate chip cookies and salad dressing. The brand is considered Wal-Mart's premium product line, which is 26% cheaper than other comparable brand products, with a price advantage between 9% and 60%;11This product line is also available at Sam's Club (using larger member packages) ) and sold in the shopping plaza.
In order to replace the foreign goods sold in the store with American products, Wal-Mart launched the “Buy Chinese Goods” campaign. In 1985, the company also sent a letter to invite American manufacturers to participate in the sport. The company left or transferred orders that were originally ordered or produced overseas to domestic producers. By 1989, such orders totaled $1.7 billion. The company has thus created or retained more than 41,000 jobs for US workers.
shopping malls Wal-Martabout 70% of the stores are leased, and the remaining stores are owned property. In 1993, Wal-Martdiscount store rental costs account for 3% of sales, while this proportion of its direct competitors an average of 3.3%.12An ordinary Wal-Mart store covers an area of 80,000 square feet. The newly built store covers an area of about 100,000 square feet. It takes nearly 120 days to open for business. The construction cost is about $20 per square foot. Since the 1980s, Wal-Mart began to consider the possibility of future expansion of discount stores when selecting a site. In the early 1990s, 45% of Wal-Mart's stores were less than 3 years old, and only 15% of stores were more than 8 years old, while Kmart's data were 10% and 85% respectively. Wal-Mart's sales per square foot is $300, while Target is $209 and Kmart is $147. Every Wal-Mart store will be 10%
10 Strachan, "Discount Industry". 11 Emily DeNitto, “In Dry Grocery, Wal*Mart Sees Selective Success”, Supermarket News, 1992 5 Month 4th. 12 Management Ventures, Inc., including rental fees, rent and depreciation.
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space reserved for inventory Used, and the industry average is 25%. Wal-Mart's operating expenses in 1993 accounted for 18.1% of discount store sales, while the industry average was 24.6%. The average economic benefits of the discount retail industry are shown in Table 6.
Most Wal-Mart stores are open from Monday to Saturday, from 9 am to 9 pm, and from 12:30 to 5:30 on Sunday. Some stores, including most shopping malls, are open 24 hours. When the customer enters the Wal-Mart store, a "welcome member" will come forward and deliver the shopping cart to the customer. The sales method is mainly self-service purchase, pay-as-you-go. Customers can use Visa, MasterCard, Discover cards to checkout or enjoy the Lay-away Plan at each store.
Wal-Mart's products are dazzling, each store is generally divided into 36 merchandise departments, including clothing, footwear, household items, auto parts, gardening equipment, sporting goods, toys, photographic equipment, beauty care products, medicines and jewelry, etc. .
Table 1 Wal-Mart's sales in 1993, by commodity category (% of total sales),
industry merchandise category, Wal-Mart average, a
soft commodity (clothing, linen, textiles) 27 35 rigid goods (hardware, household items, cars) Parts, small appliances) 26 24 Stationery and candy 11 9 Sporting goods and toys 9 9 Beauty products 8 7 Gifts, shadows and electronics 8 9 Drugs 7 2 Footwear 2 2 Jewelry 2 2 Miscellaneous (pet food) 0 2
Source: Wal-Mart 10K,Discount Merchandiser, June 1994. a Due to rounding, the sum of percentages does not equal 100.
Since 1983, Wal-Mart has used the Uniform Product Code (UPC) electronic scanner at some points of sale. By 1988, electronic scanning had spread to almost all Wal-Mart stores, two years earlier than Kmart. Wal-Mart clerk can scan the price of the item using a hand-held barcode scanner. These scanners use RF technology to exchange data with the store's computer inventory system, ensuring accurate quotations for goods and increasing efficiency. As a result, many stores simply affix price tags to the shelves without having to tag each item. Wal-Mart has also established a tracking and certification system that tracks returns and certifies product ownership. Once someone steals a merchandise from one store and returns it to another, the system recognizes it, reducing the lack of merchandise (the euphemistic expression of theft or the act of obedience).
To support electronic scanning and to enhance communication between stores, distribution centers, and headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas, Wal-Mart installed a satellite communications system in 1983. The system supports daily sales data collection and analysis, allowing managers to instantly understand which types of goods are circulating at a slower rate, thus avoiding overstocking and over-sales. Later, the system was also used for image transmission, credit card password authentication, and inventory control. Daily information such as sales of each store and its merchandise department, labor hours of each store, and inventory losses can be compared with the overall operating conditions of any time, any region or country.
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more. From 1987 to 1993, Wal-Mart invested more than $700 million in satellite communications networks, computers and related equipment.
merchandise distribution Wal-Martusing the two-step distribution network star, the first transport of goods by truck to the distribution center, classify,and then shipped to stores around often put forward the goods delivered within 48 hours after delivery request in stores. The product replenishment process begins at the point of sale and the information is transmitted via satellite to the Wal-Mart headquarters or the supply distribution center. About 80% of the products purchased at Wal-Mart stores are delivered through Wal-Mart's 27 distribution centers, while in Kmart, the ratio is only 50%. The rest of the goods are shipped directly by the supplier, who stores the goods for the Wal-Mart store and bills the goods at the same time as the goods are shipped out. Wal-Mart introduced a logistics technology called “connected transfer”, which means that the products are directly loaded from the vehicles that are put into the warehouse to the vehicles that are shipped out of the warehouse, so that the goods are continuously Shipped to the warehouse, repackaged and delivered to each store. In the process, the goods do not even have to stay as inventory. By the beginning of 1994, about 10% of Wal-Mart's goods were delivered through four “distribution transshipments” through four distribution points. According to analysts, the logistics cost of Wal-Mart's purchases in 1993 (part of the cost of goods sold) accounted for 3.7% of discount store sales, compared with 4.8% for its direct competitors.13
Wal-Mart stores every week on average pick five car (or cars full of discontent car), due to the effective coordination between the various stores can, therefore cargo truck trip can often supply several stores. The returns are shipped back to the distribution center for concentration. Since many of the suppliers' warehouses or factories are within Wal-Mart's distribution area, the trucks can also come back with a few new items on the way back. Wal-Mart's freight fleet has more than 2,000 trucks and employs about 2,500 drivers. These trucks typically carry up to 60% of the full load when they return. In terms of delivery time and frequency, Wal-Mart has developed four options, each store can choose one, more than half of the stores choose to distribute in the evening. If the store is within a certain distance of a distribution center, you can also enjoy accelerated delivery and deliver the goods in place within 24 hours.
Wal-Mart's distribution center typically covers 1 million square feet and employs 700 people to operate 24 hours a day. The operation of the distribution center is highly automated to meet the cargo distribution needs of nearly 150 stores within a 200-mile radius. When picking goods out of the order, the computerized “Pick to Light” can guide employees to the right inventory area to pick the goods. In 1993, Wal-Mart built a million-square-foot distribution center in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Utah to expand its distribution network to serve a growing number of stores.
Supplier relationshipcustomers
Wal-Mart talks about the business and goes straight to the theme, exempting. When the supplier visits Wal-Mart's headquarters in Bentonville, the company does not entertain them at the Procurement Office, but instead brings them into a direct negotiation in the 40 reception rooms. The furnishings here are extremely simple, with only one table and four chairs. At the beginning of 1992, Wal-Mart removed the power of manufacturers' representatives to participate in negotiations between the company and its suppliers. It is estimated that this would save the company 3% -4% of the cost (the manufacturer's representative tried to get the Federal Trade Commission to intervene. But unsuccessful). In 1993, Wal-Mart implemented a new policy. The purchase of telephone calls was paid by the other party (supplier), and the purchase of goods was also concentrated at the company headquarters, and the company wasany of the
13 Management Ventures, Inc.
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Suppliers purchase no more than their purchases 2.4% of the total. In addition, the supplier itself must meet a number of conditions, such as no more than 60 hours of work per week, a safe working environment, and no child labor, otherwise Wal-Mart will not purchase goods from them.
In the early stages of Wal-Mart's development, a strong supplier like Procter & Gamble could arbitrarily decide how many items to sell to Wal-Mart at what price. However, over time, Wal-Mart has grown and its relationship with a number of suppliers has evolved into a partnership, and the key to collaboration is sharing electronic data. P&G was one of the first manufacturers to establish an online connection with Wal-Mart. It also sent a team of 70 people to Bentonville to supply Wal-Mart. By 1993, Wal-Mart had become the largest customer of P&G, with an annual transaction volume of around US$3 billion, accounting for about 10% of P&G's total revenue.
After Wal-Mart installed the Electronic Data Interchange System (EDI), it is estimated that approximately 3,600 suppliers can receive orders from Wal-Mart online for online transactions. These transactions account for 90% of Wal-Mart's total trading volume. Since then, the scope of applications of electronic data interchange systems has expanded, covering areas such as sales forecasting, planning, replenishment and shipping. Wal-Mart issues electronic invoices to more than 65% of its suppliers and electronic transfers with many suppliers. By the late 1980s, major suppliers such as Wrangler and General Electric (GE) had begun to use vendor-managed inventory systems to replenish Wal-Mart stores and warehouses. Wal-Mart sends sales data to Wrangler every day, which uses the data to generate jeans orders of different quantities, sizes and colors, and to develop a distribution plan from which warehouse to which store. Similarly, Wal-Mart sends a daily warehouse inventory status report to GE Lighting, which uses this data to plan inventory levels, generate purchase orders, and deliver the right goods at the right time. As a result, Wal-Mart and its suppliers have benefited from both, reducing inventory costs and increasing sales. Since 1990, Wal-Mart's “Retail Link” system has allowed more than 2,000 suppliers to access the network and view sales data at the point of sale to use this data to analyze sales trends and the inventory of their products in each store. In 1993, Wal-Mart's information system expenses accounted for 1.5% of its discount store sales, while its direct competitors accounted for 1.3%.14
Each year, each commodity department in Wal-Mart stores also develops a strategic business planning electronic data report, sharing its data with suppliers, including sales, profitability and inventory targets of the commodity department, as well as macroeconomic trends and market trend analysis. And Wal-Mart's overall business focus. These reports also clarify Wal-Mart's expectations of suppliers and encourage the latter to contribute to improving Wal-Mart and its own performance. A commodity department report is up to 60 pages long.
However, in the process of dealing with suppliers, Wal-Mart is not everything, and its cooperation with Gitano is a negative example. Gitano's sales in 1991 were $780 million, of which 26% came from Wal-Mart. Although the company's on-time delivery rate and zero defect delivery rate have reached 80%, Wal-Mart has repeatedly urged its improvement. However, the company failed to meet Wal-Mart's requirements despite great efforts. Instead, it lost $90 million in 1992 due to structural adjustments and inventory impairments, causing its share price to fall from $18 to $3 in one year.15
14 Management Ventures, Inc. 15Business Week, December 21, 1992.
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Human Resources Management
Wal-Mart Recognized as one of the 100 best-selling companies in the United States, with 528,000 full-time employees and temporary workers, it is the largest employer after the federal government and General Motors. The company operates a non-union system and 30% of its employees work part-time. Wal-Mart's culture emphasizes the important role of employees. Compared with other retail chains, Wal-Mart gives employees more responsibility and recognition to stimulate their enthusiasm. At Wal-Mart, people share information and ideas: store clerk at each store knows about store sales, profits, inventory turnover, and price cuts. As David Glass said: "Wal-Mart has no superstars. We are a company of ordinary people who have achieved outstanding achievements." 16Suppliers also praised Wal-Mart employees for their dedication to the company. “沃尔玛是由极度忠诚的员工所管理的一家精益型企业。” 一家领先制造商的高级经理如此评价道,“无论在何处,哪里有沃尔玛的员工, 哪里就一派热火朝天的景象。他们生而为沃尔玛的辉煌而拼搏。这听起来像是胡言乱语,但事实确实这么不可思议。我们的生产人员、分销人员和营销人员在拜访过沃尔玛后都简直无法相信这一奇迹。”17
沃尔玛实行分散式培训。管理人员的专题讨论会常常放在各个配送中心召开,而不是在公司总部,这样可以让门店经理更多地了解分销网络。一家门店在开张之前,要从其他门店调派10-12 名助理经理对新店的员工进行培训。不仅如此,沃尔玛还开设了许多课程帮助员工熟悉业务。在“山姆,我们也能行!” (Yes We Can Sam) 的提建议活动中,员工提出了简化和改进工作的提议,以及取消不必要工作的方法。 1993 年,该公司采纳了650 多条建议,节省资金估计达8,500 多万美元。 1986 年,沃尔玛开始致力于实施“店中店”方案,以便对负责管理某个商品部的员工给予支持、认可和奖励。在此项活动中,商品部经理人就成为“店中店”的门店经理,部门销售额屡屡超过百万美元。最后,我们还要提及的是“缺失率降低奖励计划”。如果某家门店能将商品缺失率控制在公司设定的目标下,该门店的员工就能得到一笔年度奖金。沃尔玛1993 年的商品缺失成本估计占折扣店销售额的近1.7%,而其直接竞争对手的这一比例平均为2%。18
门店经理和主管的报酬中,除基本工资外,还包含根据门店的利润创收情况获得的奖励。门店经理的年薪可达10 万美元以上。助理经理的年薪则在2 万到3 万美元之间,他们平均每两年要进行一次轮岗调整,以适应公司的发展要求。例如,该公司有一位经理是俄克拉荷马州人,最初管理加利福尼亚州的一家门店, 他在10 年内就调动了8 次。19门店的其他员工以小时计薪,再根据公司的生产率和利润率情况发给奖金。每周工作28 小时以上的兼职人员则可享受医疗福利。
受雇满一年的员工还可以分享公司利润。沃尔玛根据利润增长率,将占每位合格员工工资一定比例的资金分配到他/她的利润分享账户中,员工在离职时可以现金提取账户余额,或折换成沃尔玛公司股票。自1988 年以来,沃尔玛已经在员工利润分享计划中耗资7.27 亿美元,相当于其净收入的8%,其中的80% 都由一个员工组成的委员会出面投资于沃尔玛股票。通过利润共享计划,一些员工已
16 温迪•泽尔纳(Wendy Zellner),“OK, So He's Not Sam Walton”,《商业周刊》,1992 年3 月16 日。 17《超市新闻》(Supermarket News),1992 年5 月4 日。 18 Management Ventures, Inc. 19 比尔•萨波里托(Bill Saporito),“A Week Aboard The Wal*Mart Express”,《财富》,1992 年8 月 24 日。
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经赚得了可观的收益。从1981 年到1991 年间,总部一名普通员工的利润共享金额可从8,000 美元涨至228,000 美元。对以小时计薪的员工来说,如果他在1968 年刚进公司时领取的是每小时1.65 美元的最低薪资,到他1989 年退休时,薪资可涨到每小时8.25 美元,而且可以从利润共享计划中获益20 万美元。对1972 年加入公司的沃尔玛总部的货车司机来说,到1992 年可通过利润共享计划获取70.7 万美元。 20沃尔玛还推出了一项员工持股计划,鼓励员工认购公司普通股。在最高达1,800 美元的员工股票认购额中,沃尔玛出资补贴了其中的15%。大约有60% 的沃尔玛员工都参加了这项股票认购计划。
近期,沃尔玛股价下跌成为大卫·格拉斯和唐·索德奎斯特急需解决的问题。 “管理层承受着巨大压力。”唐·索德奎斯特解释道,“我们对员工负有很大责任。眼下,我们认为这正是逢低购入公司股票的良机。只要我们努力工作, 股价反弹是迟早的事,毋庸操心。” 21沃尔玛在全公司范围内进行了卫星播报, 向员工解释沃尔玛股价下跌的原因,并让他们相信股价将及时反映公司基本面。唐·索德奎斯特也指出,大多数人并无在次日抛售公司股票的意思。
管理层 沃尔玛的管理团队多为四五十岁左右的高级经理人。他们从高中或大学毕业 之后就一直为公司效力,只有少数例外,如公司总裁兼首席执行官大卫·格拉斯。他是为数不多的几位在其他公司开始迈入职场的管理人员之一。大学毕业后,他在密苏里州从事消费品市场方面的工作,1976 年加入沃尔玛,担任财务高级副总裁,后升任首席财务官。 1984 年,山姆·沃尔顿把时任首席财务官的大卫·格拉斯和担任总裁的杰克·休梅克(Jack Shewmaker) 二人的职位进行了对调。大卫·格拉斯是一位以注重运营著称的高级经理人,他为沃尔玛复杂的分销系统的建立做出了重要贡献。唐·索德奎斯特最初在位于芝加哥的本·富兰克林便利店公司(Ben Franklin Variety Stores) 担任总裁,于1980 年加入沃尔玛,自1987 年起担任公司首席运营官。
大卫·格拉斯的管理风格同山姆·沃尔顿如出一辙,都崇尚节俭。 “他是世界上最抠门的管理人。”沃尔玛的一位高级副总裁戏谑道。 22出差在外,大卫·格拉斯只舍得租用普通轿车,还跟其他高级经理合住房间。在公司总部,他也跟其他所有员工一样,买一角钱一杯的咖啡。这可并不表示他不富有:1992 年,他所持的150 万股沃尔玛股票已经升值到8,200 万美元。 1983 年,大卫·格拉斯突发心脏病,病愈后不得不尽量减少连续工作和熬夜加班的时间。
大卫·格拉斯每周都要花上两三天时间走访门店。由于不可能做到每年到每家门店都走访一次,他就利用公司的卫星系统向遍布全国的员工讲话。该公司的15 位区域副总裁都集中在本顿维尔的总部办公,每年也约有200 天的时间要外出视查各家门店。他们管理着11-15 名地区经理,而每名地区经理又掌管8-12 家门店。走访门店的行程从周一一大早开始,区域副总裁、采购人员以及50-60 名公司官员登上公司的15 架飞机启程。他们要尽量在周三或周四赶回本顿维尔,并
20 山姆• 沃尔顿,《富甲美国》(Made in America)。 21 杰伊•约翰逊(Jay L.Johnson),《我们都是合伙人》(We're All Associates),《折扣商》,1993 年8 月。
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“至少带回一个让人感觉不虚此行的构想。”沃尔玛不设立区域办事处,这样每年
节省的成本约为销售额的2%。
每周五上午,该公司都要举行商品销售例会。大卫·格拉斯声称,他总是在会议上“迫使[团队] 讨论各种商品在各家门店的销售情况。”23据他称:“我们聚集一堂,吵吵嚷嚷,争辩不休,但得遵循一条规则,就是在散会之前把问题解决掉。” 24他们还邀请贵宾列席会议,其中就包括通用电气的首席执行官杰克·韦尔奇(Jack Welch)),后者这样评价他们的会议:“会议上每个人都会积极推崇某个想法,所有人的想法也都能得到重视,职位高低在此并不重要。他们80 来个人济济一堂,抛开级别隔阂自如沟通。我已经参加过他们三次会议了。每次去阿肯色州参加这样的例会,你都可以搭乘他们的专机返回纽约。”25
次日清晨7 时,沃尔玛管理团队的全体成员以及总部员工协同亲朋好友齐集大礼堂参加周六聚会。这个聚会把休闲娱乐同正式的业务汇报结合到一起,目的是为了让大家共享信息,加强团结。唐·索德奎斯特常常身穿一条蓝色牛仔裤, 搭配一件亮色的法兰绒衬衫参加聚会。他要在会上回顾各个区域的经营成果报告、市场份额数据以及各分部每周和每季度的数据,而区域副总裁则就新开门店的经营业绩做出汇报。会场树立着一块巨型公告牌,公布了自1962 年以来顾客在沃尔玛购物所节省的金额:截至1993 年6 月已达120 亿美元左右。几乎所有的成绩都值得一提,有很多理由让沃尔玛员工欢呼雀跃:员工持股比例在不断上升, 三名员工庆祝为沃尔玛效力10 周年,或是本周促销商品在指定门店成功热销。这种聚会的受邀嘉宾包括前全美橄榄球联盟(NFL) 四分卫弗兰·塔肯顿(Fran Tarkenton)、乡村歌手加斯·布鲁克斯(Garth Brooks) 以及喜剧演员乔纳森·温特斯(Jonathan Winters)。周一上午,做出的各项决策将在各门店贯彻实施。工作流程重新开始,周而复始。
多元化 20 世纪80 年代早期,沃尔玛在最初的零售店基础上开始尝试其他经营模 式。它开设了最早的三家山姆会员店(Sam's warehouse clubs),并在爱荷华州开设了首家低价折扣药店(Dot Deep Discount Drugstore),后又以山姆·沃尔顿妻子的名字命名,在密苏里州开设了海伦工艺品店(Helen's Arts and Crafts store)。不过,1988 年,沃尔玛年出售了旗下的3 家海伦工艺品店,并在1990 年将14 家低价折扣药店出售。
1987 年,沃尔玛开设了首家购物广场,并借鉴法国特大超市的理念(萌生于20 世纪60 年代)建立了两家特大卖场(Hypermart USA,沃尔玛前后共开了4 个这样的特大卖场)。特大超市是集食品杂货和家庭日用品销售为一体的大卖场, 营业面积超过22 万平方英尺,商品种类在2 万至3 万种之间,毛利润达13%- 14%。在经营特大超市的过程中,沃尔玛吸取了不少经验教训,并最终放弃了这
22 泽勒(Zeller),《商业周刊》,1992 年3 月16 日。 23 同上。 24《财富》,1992 年8 月24 日。 25 比尔•萨波里托,《山姆•沃尔顿教会了美国人什么》 (What Sam Walton Taught America),《财富》, 1992 年5 月4 日。
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种经营形式,转而关注规模较小的购物广场。
1991 年,沃尔玛收购了西部商品公司(Western Merchandisers,一家音像和书籍的批发销售中心)和菲利普公司(Phillips Companies,该公司在阿肯色州经营20 家食品杂货店)。沃尔玛还建立了以山姆·沃尔顿兄长的名字命名的Bud's 量贩商场。当沃尔玛的某家折扣店因空间限制无法满足发展需要而搬迁后,原有店面就改建成Bud's 量贩商场,每年可以产生600 万到700 万美元的销售额。量贩商场内约20% 的商品都是沃尔玛的剩货,其余则是直接从供应商处运来的清仓商品、破损产品或是多余产品。
山姆会员店
仓储式会员店是20 世纪70 年代由普莱斯会员店率先开创的一种经营方式, 它利用大批量、低成本的销货方式,将管理成本降到最低,并充分利用自身的采购能力,让会员受益,同时实现9%-10% 的毛利率。店内的最小存货单位(SKU) 有限,因而存货周转率较高。公司购买库存也基本上通过应付账款(有时候甚至占到货款的80%-90%)递延支付,从而使得对经营资本的需求降到最低。会员费约占山姆会员店经营利润的三分之二。首家山姆会员店开办于20 世纪80 年代,其销售额在4 年内就超过了普莱斯会员店,成为美国最大的仓储式会员店。到1993 年,山姆会员店的规模几乎比普莱斯会员店翻了一番。
山姆会员店的经营理念是,在简朴装修的仓储式建筑中,出售数量有限的以货盘计的最小存货单位(约为3,500 件,而一家正规折扣店的最小存货单位要接近3 万件)。该店以批发价向会员(70% 是企业)销售品牌产品,用于企业自身运作或者转售给顾客。山姆会员店的管理团队比折扣店更为分散,店址常常选在沃尔玛门店旁。山姆会员店每年共创造8 千万-1.4 亿美元的销售额。山姆会员店也接受Discover 卡付款,但总体而言实行现付自运的支付方式。企业和个人会员每年都要支付25 美元的会员费。要想加入,会员需出具有效的营业税征收许可证和经营许可证。个人会员通常来自联邦政府、各大高校和中小学校、公用事业单位、医院、信用社以及沃尔玛的股东。山姆会员店每周营业7 天,它跟沃尔玛门店不同,大约70% 的商品都直接由供应商运送,其余则来自公司的配送中心。
山姆会员店的销售额在1993 年上升了19.5%(1992 年为31%),是美国所有仓储式连锁会员店中销售额最高的(见附表 7 销量最大的仓储式会员店)。据行业分析师估计,1993 年山姆会员店实现毛利率9.4%,其费用率约为8.4%,经营利润率为3%,略低于1992 年3.2%的水平。26同年,山姆会员店的销售额占行业总销售额的39%,较之于1992 年的36%有所上升。不过,该年度山姆会员店的可比销售额比上年下降了3%,这是多年来首次出现下降情况。 1993 年,仓储式会员销售行业的总值为375 亿美元,预计到1994 年将增长到405 亿美元,其中大部分增长都归因于这些会员店“填补”了现有市场,而非进入新的地区。在许多市场上,山姆会员店都选择增大开店密度,虽然如此导致了各会员店彼此侵蚀利润,但却防止了竞争对手有可趁之机。
26 斯特罗恩,“折扣行业”(“Discount Industry”)
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整个行业的产能过剩导致竞争日趋激烈,并购活动也将持续。 1991 年,沃尔玛收购批发俱乐部(Wholesale Club,该店在美国中西部运营有28 家门店),并开始对旗下的业务单位进行重组,使其融入山姆会员店的网络之中。 1993 年10 月,Price Co. 公司和好事多仓储公司(Costco Wholesale Corp.) 联姻,组成拥有206 家连锁店的普莱斯好事多有限公司(Price Costco Inc.)。 1993 年末,沃尔玛收购了凯玛特旗下113 家PACE 会员店中的99 家,从而使山姆会员店得以进入阿拉斯加、亚利桑那、罗德岛、犹它等各州以及华盛顿地区,并在加利福尼亚广阔的零售市场上进行了扩张。对于凯玛特而言,出售这些门店是其转型计划的重要一步,自此它开始剥离专卖店业务,而集中精力于其核心的折扣店经营。
购物广场 购物广场是综合了超市和折扣店要素的大卖场,平均面积在12 万到13 万平 方英尺之间。 (附表 8 呈现了购物广场的布局)。一般说来,超市的商品种类繁多,一应俱全,而购物广场则并非如此,为了保持低成本,它仅提供有限的几种包装规格和品牌。不仅如此,购物广场里常常还设有面包房、熟食店以及诸如摄影部、冲印部、干洗店、眼镜店以及美发沙龙等便利店。一家沃尔玛购物广场一般雇用员工约450 名,其中70% 为全职人员。在中央付款区设有约30 台收银机。商场全年24 小时营业。 1993 年初,沃尔玛经营的购物广场有30 家,销售额达10 亿美元,而到该年年末已扩展为68 家,销售额达35 亿美元。
购物广场的食品杂货销售区往往会与超市、独立经营的食品店、折扣零售店以及仓储式会员店的食品销售相互竞争。 1993 年,食品零售行业的总值达3,800 亿美元,经营者主要是当地和区域性公司,而非全国性连锁店(见附表 9,了解10 家主要超市连锁店的财务状况)。 20 年前,独立经营的食品杂货店的销售额占超市销售额的42%,而到1992 年仅占29%。该行业的经营利润率极低,一家典型的超市能争取到2% 的利润率已属幸运。 (见附表 10 超市与购物广场的获利能力对比)。面包房、海鲜店、花店以及熟食店等专卖店帮助商场增加了客流量, 利润率高达35%-40%。 1993 年,折扣零售店和仓储式会员店出售食品共计近200 亿美元,比1992 年的163 亿美元增长了不少,大约有15% 的超市除了销售食品外,也销售家庭日用品。这些综合性的超市,或称“超级百货商店”的营业面积在4.5 万至6.5 万平方英尺之间,其中大约25% 的空间都用以销售非食品类商品。在超市公司所开设的门店中,综合性超市较之传统超市的占比越来越高。自1985 年至1993 年,综合性超市中家庭日用品(包括美容保健品)的销售额几乎翻了一番,从64 亿美元增长到122 亿美元,门店数也增长了42%,从2,667 家增加到3,786 家。 1993 年,除超市外的各商家的食品销售额在食品销售总额中占5%,预计到1996 年该比例将翻倍。27
购物广场的经营模式推动了销售额的显著增长,从1992 年的118 亿美元上升到1993 年的146 亿美元。梅杰(Meijer) 和弗雷德·梅耶(Fred Meyer) 两家零售巨头分别在销售额和门店数量方面继续独占行业鳌头,不过分析家们预测它们仍将保持区域性经营方式(见附表 11 购物广场连锁店排名)。对于一家经营成功的折扣店/食杂店来说,食品销售额通常要占总销售额的40%,主要因为食品是吸引客
27《折扣商》月刊,1994 年4 月。
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源的重要商品。但购物广场的利润则通常来自利润率更高的家庭日用品。到1993 年末,凯玛特旗下有19 家综合性门店,取名为超级凯玛特商场(Super Kmart)。凯玛特计划在1994 年增开55 家超级凯玛特门店,未来数年内可望再增开数百家。该公司正在转变策略,将原来用于改建现有凯玛特门店的大量投资转而用以建造新的超级凯玛特门店,通常每家新的超级凯玛特商场都能替代原有市场上一家或几家传统型折扣店。凯玛特通过两家食品批发商(Fleming 和Super Valu)为其购物广场供货,且无意建立食品分销网络。最近,塔吉特也宣布将于1995 年开设购物广场。 沃尔玛先后尝试了几种不同规模的购物广场,面积分别为11.6 万、13.6 万和 16.7 万平方英尺,还有规模最大的一种,集6 万平方英尺的食品杂货购物区和13 万平方英尺的折价销售区为一体。食品杂货购物区提供大约1.7 万件食品(包括新推出的自有品牌“Great Value”,旗下约有500 种系列食品),折价销售区的非食品类商品则有6 万件。据业内分析师称,沃尔玛购物广场正“谋求每平方英尺50 美元甚至更高的利润,除了玩具反斗城公司(Toys 'R'Us) 以外,还没有任何一家领先零售店打破这一记录”。 28沃尔玛最初开设的购物广场都座落在阿肯色、密苏里以及俄克拉荷马等州的小城镇上,它们替代了沃尔玛最早设立的折扣店,吸引了方圆60 英里的顾客,并充分利用了沃尔玛友好亲善和天天低价的企业形象。 1990 年,沃尔玛买下了德克萨斯州的一家食品杂货零售供应商麦克莱恩公司 (McLane Company),为其购物广场和山姆会员店供货。 1993 年,麦克莱恩公司旗下有16 个配送中心,为分布于全国的便利店和食品杂货店供货。同年,该公司在阿肯色州和德克萨斯州的仓库投入使用,每个仓库都有76 万平方英尺,可以为80-90 家购物广场供货。该年度麦克莱恩公司的销售额增长了37%,达到了将近40 亿美元。行业分析师估计,1993 年该分销商可实现毛利率9%,其费用率为7.5%,经营利润可达1.5%。29
进入超市行业后,沃尔玛是否也能像在折扣零售业内一样占据相当大的市场份额尚无法得知。要知道,购物广场已今非昔比,它从小镇超市的手中攫取利润的能力已经削弱,利润率将在现有水平上下降1%-2%。许多连锁店已经开始经营大包装商品,以与仓储式会员店相抗衡。这些连锁店还拥有利润率更高的自有产品系列,与品牌产品相比,其包装更具吸引力,价格也更低。老牌的杂货连锁店也在捍卫自己的市场份额。例如,通用超级市场(Supermarkets General) 计划在美国东北部地区扩张公司旗下拥有147 家门店的Pathmark 连锁店的购物广场。总部位于辛辛那提、拥有1,270 多家门店的克罗格超市(Kroger) 在6、7 个地区都与沃尔玛展开了针锋相对的竞争,并且已拨出1.3 亿美元用于信息技术开发,以便降低其在配送和其他方面的成本。30
28 温迪•泽尔纳,“ When Wal*Mart Starts a Food Fight, It's a Doozy”,《商业周刊》,1993 年6 月 14 日。 29 斯特罗恩(Strachan),“折扣行业”。 30 泽尔纳,《商业周刊》,1993 年6 月4 日。
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国际性扩张
沃尔玛坚决以全球化作为其未来的发展方向。大卫·格拉斯认为,沃尔玛不能无视蒸蒸日上的世界经济,他在最近一次的区域性会议上告诉各门店高级经理人,如果他们不能以国际化的思维来考虑问题,那么他们无疑投错了门。 31然而,沃尔玛的经营模式在美国以外的地区能否成功,公司管理层对此却并无把握。 1992 年,沃尔玛以墨西哥为首个国际市场开始了全球化进程。它与墨西哥当地最大的零售商斯弗拉(Cifra SA) 一起建立了一家合资公司,开始在当地尝试几种零售模式。据沃尔玛预计,到1994 年末,其将在墨西哥城、蒙特雷以及瓜达拉哈拉等发达城市经营63 家门店,其中包括22 家山姆会员店和11 家沃尔玛购物广场,并计划到1995 年底将门店数量增加到100 多家。普莱斯/好事多和凯玛特也通过与当地零售商合伙的方式在墨西哥谋求发展,到1994 年下半年,前者计划开设11 家仓储式会员店,并在1995 年继续增开,而凯玛特则计划开设5 家门店。
1994 年3 月,沃尔玛扩张到了加拿大,从沃尔沃思公司(Woolworth Corp, 该公司每平方英尺的销售额为72 美元)手中收购了122 家沃尔克连锁店(Woolco),并按自己的经营模式对其进行改造:改变商品组合、翻修门面,还对将近1.6 万名原沃尔克员工进行再培训。沃尔玛还在加拿大发起了“购买国货”运动,为本土公司提供了机会。只要这些加拿大公司能够达到沃尔玛的服务标准, 做到准时配送、价格合理,沃尔玛就会接受它们的供货。 1994 年第一季度,沃尔克与沃尔玛在美国新收购的佩斯会员店(Pace) 共创造了9 亿美元的销售额,不过暂无利润。
1995 年,沃尔玛计划进军南美市场,并首选该大陆最大的消费市场巴西和阿根廷开设了首批门店。在此,沃尔玛面对的竞争对手多为欧洲零售商,如家乐福(Carrefour) 和万客隆(Makro)。在亚洲地区,凯玛特计划于1994 年在新加坡开设两家门店。分析师认为沃尔玛正在密切关注香港的风险投资企业,试图以该地区为前站,向高度管制下的广阔的中国大陆市场扩张。在这片市场上,沃尔玛将同28 万多家国有企业竞争,这些企业掌控了中国40% 的零售销售额,1994 年的零售额估计将达1,880 亿美元。分析师认为,未来沃尔玛的国际销售额可望达到1,000 亿美元。32
展望未来 大卫·格拉斯和唐·索德奎斯特承认,现在的沃尔玛不再是昔日山姆·沃尔 顿留下的那家沃尔玛了。公司面临着前所未有的挑战,比如日趋庞大的规模,以及20 世纪90 年代初的经济萧条。大卫·格拉斯的前任是广受欢迎的公司创始人,从他手中继承这份事业无疑得承受一种额外的压力。 “你无法取代山姆·沃尔顿,”格拉斯说道,“但是,无论他是否在位,他已经让公司走上了顺利发展的轨道。” 33目前,大卫·格拉斯的首要任务就是跟沃尔玛的员工尽量保持沟通。
31《折扣店新闻》,1994 年6 月20 日。 32 同上,1994 年9 月5 日。 33 泽尔纳,《商业周刊》,1992 年3 月16 日。
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进入1994 年,沃尔玛还得面对公众提出的诸多质疑:在一些小城镇,反对沃尔玛的团体日益庞大,纷纷指责沃尔玛排挤本地商家。在佛蒙特州,沃尔玛打算在此开设首家门店的计划已被搁置了两年之久。 1993 年,三家独立的制药公司成功将沃尔玛告上法庭,起诉沃尔玛位于阿肯色州康威市的购物广场的药品定价低于药品成本。沃尔玛被责令停止以低于成本的价格出售药品,但沃尔玛称此项判决“不利于消费者”,并打算提出上诉。在阿肯色州的另一地区,也有一起类似案件亟待裁决。 (1986 年,沃尔玛在俄克拉荷马州的一场有关商品定价的官司中败诉,提出上诉后又以庭外解决收场,最后沃尔玛同意在该州提高商品价格。) 此外,塔吉特也在广告中攻击沃尔玛的价格比较,声称沃尔玛的商品报价时常有误,并指出“如果山姆·沃尔顿还在人世的话,就决不会发生这种情况。”沃尔玛反驳说,公司依然遵循山姆·沃尔顿的策略,塔吉特的指责完全是子虚乌有。
就沃尔玛所面临的新挑战,大卫·格拉斯做出了总结:“多年来,规模更大的同行们,包括西尔斯(Sears)、彭尼(Penney) 和凯玛特为我们提供了前车之鉴, 使我们避免了很多错误。而如今,我们没有可供学习的对象了。当我们公司规模尚小时,我们是反抗压迫的挑战勇士。而当你成长为行业老大时,你便成了标靶,不再是英雄了。”34
34 艾伦•纽伯恩(Ellen Neuborne),“增长大王遭遇障碍”(Growth King Running into Roadblocks),《今日 美国》,1993 年4 月27 日。
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This document is authorized for use only by Shan Gu ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional copies.
This document is authorized for use only by Shan Gu ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional copies.
附表 3 1993 年销售额排名前15 位的折扣店(百万美元)
销售额门店数门店平均规模连锁店名称1993 1992 变动比例
1/94 1/93 1/92 千平方英尺
沃尔玛 a AR 44,900 38,200 17.5 1,953 1,850 1,720 84 凯玛特 b MI 26,449 25,013 5.7 2,323 2,281 2,249 110 塔吉特MN 11,743 10,393 13.0 554 506 463 110 Caldor CT 2,414 2,12 8 13.5 150 136 128 99 爱美斯c CT 2,228 2,316 (3.8) 308 309 371 50 Bradlees MA 1,880 1,831 2.7 126 127 127 71 Venture MO 1,863 1,718 8.4 104 93 84 100 Hillsd MA 1,766 1,750 0.9 151 154 154 67 ShopKo WI 1,739 1,683 3.3 117 111 109 74 Family Dollar NC 1,297 1,159 12.0 2,105 1,920 1,759 7 Rose'se NC 1,246 1,404 (11.3) 172 217 217 43 Dollar General TN 1,133 921 23.0 1,800 1,617 1,522 6 Value Cityf OH 842 798 5.5 75 73 53 60 Jamswayg NJ 722 856 (15.6) 94 108 122 59 Pamida NE 659 625 5.4 173 178 178 27
资料来源:《折扣店新闻》,1994 年7 月4 日,Value Line。 a 该销售数据是沃尔玛折扣店和Bud's 店的销售额之和,不包括购物广场。 b 该销售数据仅为美国凯玛特超市的销售额,不包括超级凯玛特商场。 c 1989 年收购扎伊尔(Zayre),1990 年根据《美国破产法》第11 章申请破产保护,1992 年解除破产保护,
重新开业。 d 1993 年10 月解除破产保护,重新开业。 e 根据《美国破产法》第11 章处于破产保护期。 f 该公司财年截至1993 年7 月31 日。 g 根据《美国破产法》第11 章处于破产保护期。
附表 4 折扣店的整体业绩表现,按权益回报率排名(%)
5 年平均a 1993 年或最近12 个月连锁店名称回报率权益
b 销售
增长率c 每股收益
增长率
销售回报率
回报率资本
d 负债资本
比率e 沃尔玛32.2 28.2 25.0 3.5 17.3 40.3 Venture 28.7 6.8 15.4 2.5 16.7 31.1 Family Dollar 21.5 14.4 23.6 4.9 22.5 0.0 ShopKo 18.7 9.7 12.1 2.5 9.5 45.2 Dollar General 16.1 8.7 37.3 4.1 21.9 2.6 Dayton Hudsonf 15.8 10.5 12.1 1.8 8.1 56.9 凯玛特13.8 8.1 NM 1.9 8.5 39.5 资料来源:“美国行业年报”(Annual Report on American Industry),《福布斯》杂志,1994 年1 月3 日。
NM:无意义,即指该公司亏损一年以上。 a 5 年增长率是根据最近一个财年年末的经营结果计算而得的。 b 权益回报率=每股收益除以财年初的股东每股权益。此处的5 年平均是采用修正后的年数加总法计算而
得,越近期的经营数据的权重越大。 c 销售增长率和利润增长率计算采用的是最小二乘法,对剧烈的波动进行了修正,能够最近似地反映出平
均增长率。 d《福布斯》所定义的公司总资本包括长期债务、普通股和优先股,递延税项、投资退税以及合并子公司
的少数股东权益。 e 负债/资本总额比率是将包括资本租赁债务在内的长期债务除以总资本计算而得。 f 塔吉特门店的母公司。
19 This document is authorized for use only by Shan Gu ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional copies.
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附表 6 1993 年折扣行业经济效益(占销售额百分比)
沃尔玛 a 直接竞争者塔吉特
·梅耶加权平均值凯玛特 aa 弗雷德Caldor Bradlees Venture ShopKo 售额 (百万美元) 48,620 18,730b 28,039 11,743 2,979 2,414 1,881 1,863 1,737 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 销货成本75.1 72.8 72.4 75.3 68.7 71 .7 67.6 74.7 71.9 毛利润24.9 27.2 27.6 24.7 31.3 28.3 32.4 25.3 28.1 经营费用18.1 24.6 25.2 20.7 27.2 24.5 30.1 21.1 24.2 其他收益 c 0.7 1.3 1.4 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.7 经营收益7.5 3.9 3.8 4.8 4.6 4.1 3.0 4.3 4.6
资料来源:高盛集团(Goldman Sachs),案例作者估计。 a 仅包括折扣店和购物广场。 b 按照1993 年的销售额估计值加权。 c 包含经营许可费。
附表 7 按1993 年销售额排名的10 大仓储式会员店(百万美元)
销售额门店数门店平均
规模连锁店1993 1992 1991 1993 1992 1991 (千平方名称英尺)
山姆会员店阿肯色14,749 12,339 9,430 419 256 208 120 普莱斯会员店 a 加利福尼亚7,648 7,320 6,598 96 81 69 117 好事多华盛顿7,506 6,500 5,215 122 100 82 115 佩斯b 科罗拉多4,000 4,358 3,646 100 114 87 107 BJ's 仓储会员店马萨诸塞2,003 1,787 1,432 52 39 29 116 Smart & Final 加利福尼亚837 765 663 135 129 116 16 Mega Warehouse Foods 亚利桑那409 293 248 46 22 15 10 仓储会员店(Warehouse Club) 伊利诺斯215 233 250 10 10 10 100 Wholesale Depot 马萨诸塞150 200 100 11 8 4 64 Source Clubc 密歇根— 10 NA 7 3 0 100 行业总值37,517 33,805 27,582 898 762 620 —
资料来源:《折扣店新闻》,1994 年7 月4 日和1993 年7 月5 日,公司年报。 a 普莱斯会员店与好事多于1993 年10 月合并。财年截至93 年8 月29 日。 b 1993 年6 月,凯玛特将14 家佩斯会员店出售给沃尔玛的山姆会员店分部,1994 年1 月又出售了91 家,并关闭了其余的
佩斯会员店。 c 1993 年12 月,梅杰公司宣布计划关闭旗下的7 家Source Club 会员店,以便为其购物广场腾出资源。
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Lube Express 汽车服务商店 园艺用具
收银台 摄影部
美容保健化品美容保健品
眼镜部美 发服
客公沙部
入口龙入口
资料来源:Salomon Bros,1994 年1 月。
附表 9 按1993 年销售额排名的前10 大超市(百万美元)
销售额5 年平均 a 1993 连锁店变动权益回销售额销售回名称 1993 1992 比例报率增长率报率毛利率Kroger 俄亥俄22,384 22,145 1.1 NE 4.5 0.7 23.6 Safeway Stores 加州15,214 15,152 0.4 NE NM 0.6 27.2 American Stores 犹它14,400 14,500 (0.7) 14.2 5.3 1.3 26.4 Albertson's 印第安纳11,284 10,174 10.9 24.0 10.8 2.9 24.7 Winn-Dixje 佛罗里达10,832 10,337 4.8 23.2 3.8 2.2 22.6 A&P 新泽西10,384 10,499 (1.1) 4.7 2.7 Def 30.8 Food Lion 北卡罗来纳7,610 7,196 5.8 28.5 19.3 1.4 19.6 Publixb 佛罗里达6,800 6,600 3.0 NA NA NA NA Ahold USA 新泽西6,615 6,323 4.6 22.1 6.8 NA NA Vons 加州5,075 5,596 (9.3) 14.4 10.9 0.8 27.2
资料来源:《Stores》,1994 年7 月,《福布斯》杂志,1994 年1 月3 日,Value Line,公司年报。 NE:负值。 NM:无意义,即,该公司亏损一年以上。 NA:不祥。 Def:赤字。 a 1993 年或最近5 年的数据。 b 私营公司。
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肉附表 8 沃尔玛购物广场——店面布局图
咖啡吧公预约订购处
熟食肉类乳酪制品牛类
制品 类鲜花 家庭用品鞋类针织工艺品
食品杂货
冷食品
面包房
家具个人护理电器产品
家用器日用化工产品
宠物用品
家庭办公用品卡糖果
婴儿服装男童装
袜类和男士职业装
男装 装
体育用品
汽车用品护
电子产品
五金产品
汽车零配件
玩具
珠宝首饰
季节性产品
小时快速冲印部
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附表 10 购物广场的获利能力
投资额
普通超市(4 万平方英尺)
沃尔玛购物广场(15 万平方英尺)
定设备$1,400,000 $2,100,000 流动资本500,000 2,000,000 开业前费用200,000 600,000
总投资额$2,100,000 $4,700,000 预计经营数据销售额$20,000,000 $50,000,000 息税前收益7,000,000 3,100,0 00 息税前利润率3.5% 6.2% 息税前投资收益率33.3% 66.0%
资料来源:《超市新闻》,1992 年5 月4 日。
附表 11 按1993 年销售额排名的前10 大购物广场连锁店(百万美元)
销售额门店数门店连锁店名称1993 1992 1991 1/94 1/93 1/92 平均规模
(千平方英尺) 梅杰密苏里5,480 5,043 4,400 75 69 65 200 沃尔玛a 阿肯色3,500 1,500 600 68 34 10 173 弗雷德·梅耶俄勒岗2,932 2,809 2,702 97 94 94 137 Smitty'sb 678 650 580 28 26 24 105 Bigg's 俄亥俄500 449 350 7 7 6 200 超级凯玛特购物广场密歇根500 313 255 17 4 6 165 Big Bear Plus 俄亥俄290 280 190 12 12 9 120 Twin Valu 明尼苏达115 110 110 3 2 2 80 Laneco 宾法尼115 110 100 16 15 14 80
亚Holiday Mart 夏威夷100 100 100 3 3 3 100
资料来源:《折扣店新闻》,1994 年7 月4 日;公司年报。 a 包括四家特大超市(Hypermart USA)。 b 包括Smitty's and Xtra 超市连锁店。
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haixin hu
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