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SIX

THE OTHER “OTHER HISPANICS”: SOUTH

AMERICAN–ORIGIN LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES

M A R I LY N E S P I T I A

D U R I N G M Y elementary school years, my teachers annually took a head count of all the “Spanish” children in my class. Although the purpose of this exer- cise was unclear to me at the time, I knew to raise my hand to be included for the tally even though my parents were from Colombia and I was born in the United States. Intuitively, I knew that the count consisted of all the Spanish- speaking children regardless of their birthplace. Later, in middle school, I no- ticed on my standardized test forms that I was no longer classified as Spanish, but, mysteriously, I had somehow become “Hispanic.” This new category ap- parently still included all the Spanish-speaking children regardless of their birthplace, but now, in addition, actual language capabilities in Spanish seemed not to be required. In high school, when I began to use the label His- panic as a self-referent, my college-educated brother quickly informed me that the politically correct term was now “Latino,” even though it appeared to represent the same people previously referred to under the old umbrella term, Hispanic. It wasn’t until my undergraduate years, when I began to meet other Colombian-origin Latinos that my specific background came to the forefront for others and myself. Since then, it has remained in the forefront, even in California and Texas, where I have at different times been presumed to be Puerto Rican (because of my New York City origins) or Chicana. With Colombian pop-star crossover sensation Shakira currently recognizable in the U.S. mainstream, I finally see a glimmer of acknowledgement in others when I tell them that I am Colombian American.

Although this brief recounting of my own experiences as a second- generation South American Latina is not in any way meant to imply that it

The Columbia History of Latinos in the United States Since 1960, edited by David Gutiérrez, Columbia University Press, 2004. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uiowa/detail.action?docID=909086. Created from uiowa on 2018-05-14 21:03:28.

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somehow represents that of a “typical South American,” it nonetheless helps to illustrate some key and timely questions about the increasingly compli- cated dynamics involved in the construction of latinidad among U.S. Lati- nos—that is, a sense of themselves as part of a larger historical and cultural Latino community in the United States (Dávila 2001; Laó-Montes and Dávi- la 2001). It also begins to reveal some of the ways South American Latinos are gradually coming to play a more important role in that process. With Latinos now officially acknowledged as the largest collective minority group (however problematic that appellation may turn out to be as a political or cultural reality in the future), developing some understanding of the signif- icant roles South Americans now play as a component of the pan-Latino population is an important endeavor in fully comprehending this heteroge- neous group.

With these issues in mind, the primary goals of this chapter are, therefore: to provide to a brief overview of South American migration patterns and their contribution to the recent explosive growth of the Latino population of the United States; to identify the key factors and characteristics that may be shaping the construction of latinidad as a pan-ethnic identity in the U.S. context; and to speculate briefly on the long-term impact South Americans might exert on the future social, cultural, and political evolution of the U.S. Latino population in both national and hemispheric affairs. To this end, I will review the existing data on the demographic and socioeconomic profile of South American Latinos, the context in both sending regions and in the United States of their immigration, and their settlement patterns as they re- late to these issues. This chapter is organized into three sections. The first section briefly describes the basic demographic profile of South American Latinos. Following this description, I will then highlight the key factors sur- rounding the immigration of South Americans to the United States and sit- uate their patterns within the context of Latin American immigration as well as international migration in general. The last section will then address the settlement experiences of South Americans, with an emphasis on the ques- tion of how transnational orientations and practices are maintained and how members of the second generation, in particular, may see themselves as part of an emerging pan-Latino ethnic group. By exploring South American immigration and settlement patterns, demographic structure, and the po- tential for change in South Americans’ political and cultural orientations over time, I hope to demonstrate not only how their own diversity may shape the meaning of what—and who—is Latino but also to offer some re- flections on how increasing migration from South America is contributing to the ongoing “Latinization” of the United States.

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WHO ARE THE “OTHER HISPANICS” FROM SOUTH AMERICA?

The demographic and socioeconomic profiles of South American Latinos pro- vide some important clues about their social and economic integration as His- panics into the existing U.S. racial and ethnic landscape. Compared to the Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans, who together continue to make up more than three quarters of the total U.S. Latino population, the combined South American Latino population is relatively small, only 5.2 percent of the Hispanic origin population in 2000 (Cresce and Ramirez 2003).1 In addition, this population of almost two million individuals probably tends to get over- looked because it is inherently diverse across a broad range of variables, in- cluding nationality, genetic admixture, language, social class and education, and many other factors. In spite of this striking heterogeneity, South American Latinos share two key characteristics that greatly impact their present status in the United States: the large proportion of their number that is foreign-born and their higher socioeconomic standing in relation to other Latino groups.

South American Latinos originate from a total of nine distinct countries: Ar- gentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Table 1 presents the population size of all the U.S. Latino groups in 1990 and 2000, with detailed information listed for the nine countries. The in- dividual representation of South American Latinos from these countries varies widely, with Colombian-origin Latinos ranking the highest, with recent popu- lation estimates of 653,029, and Paraguayan Latinos ranking the lowest with an estimated resident population of 12,807. In addition to being the largest South American Latino group in the United States, Colombian-origin Latinos are also the sixth-largest Latino group overall (after Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Dominicans, and Salvadorans). This sizeable presence in the United States has undoubtedly impacted those communities with the highest concen- tration of Colombian Latinos and it will be important to examine their areas of settlement to understand the full implications of their growing numbers.

Immediately south of Colombia, the bordering nations of Ecuador and Peru provide the points of origin for the second- and third-largest South American groups in the United States, with population sizes of 380,428 and 339,027, respectively. In a distant fourth, over 120,000 Latinos each identify Argentina and Venezuela as their nations of origin. Such population origins also strongly affect what might loosely be termed the “racial” composition of the general flow of South American transmigrants. Although variation exists in all South American national-origin groups, in recent years the influx has deviated from past patterns, when the majority of South American migrants were middle-class mestizos, to a situation that is much more diverse today. As

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TA B L E 1 U.S. Latino Population by National Origin, 1990 and 2000

ORIGIN 1990 2000

NUMBER % NUMBER %

TOTAL 21,900,089 100.0 35,238,481 100.0

Mexico 13,393,208 61.2 22,338,311 63.4

Puerto Rico 2,651,815 12.1 3,539,988 10.0

Cuba 1,053,197 4.8 1,312,127 3.7

Dominican Republic 520,151 2.4 999,561 2.8

CENTRAL AMERICA 1,323,830 6.0 2,435,731 6.9

Costa Rica 57,223 0.3 93,583 0.3

Guatemala 268,779 1.2 574,785 1.6

Honduras 131,066 0.6 333,636 0.9

Nicaragua 202,658 0.9 272,655 0.8

Panama 92,013 0.4 126,500 0.4

El Salvador 565,081 2.6 1,010,740 2.9

Other Central America 7,010 0.0 23,832 0.1

SOUTH AMERICA 1,035,602 4.7 1,847,811 5.2

Argentina 100,921 0.5 132,864 0.4

Bolivia 38,073 0.2 65,220 0.2

Chile 68,799 0.3 98,057 0.3

Colombia 378,726 1.7 653,029 1.9

Ecuador 191,198 0.9 380,428 1.1

Paraguay 6,662 0.0 12,806 0.0

Peru 175,035 0.8 339,027 1.0

Uruguay 21,996 0.1 27,401 0.1

Venezuela 47,997 0.2 122,268 0.3

Other South America 6,195 0.0 16,711 0.0

Spain 519,136 2.4 190,656 0.5

Hispanic 390,945 1.8 1,067,782 3.0

Latino 1,577 0.0 93,783 0.3

Spanish 444,896 2.0 523,323 1.5 Other Hispanic 565,732 2.6 889,408 2.5

Source: Cresce and Ramirez 2003, tables 1 and 6.

will be discussed further below, while middle-class mestizos continue to make up a significant portion of migrants from South America, in recent years a much broader mix has been evident, which now includes significant numbers of different groups of mestizos, increasing numbers of indigenous peoples, and a significant number of individuals of Afro-Latino heritage. Given the com-

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position of recent migration flows—particularly those of the last years of the twentieth century—it is reasonable to expect that South Americans will con- tinue to contribute to the ongoing diversification of the resident pan-Latino population of the United States (Rodriguez 2000; Brea 2003).

The most recent demographic data on South American Latinos as well as other Latinos are presented in table 2. Perhaps the most striking feature of the South American population is the large proportion of foreign-born individu- als. Of course, this feature reflects just how recently South Americans have begun to migrate in significant numbers. Unlike the Mexican- and Puerto Rican–origin populations, which obviously have large U.S.-born components, the majority (73.6 percent) of South American Latinos in the United States are foreign-born (Logan 2002). According to his recent study, Logan estimates that out of the three largest South American groups, Ecuadorians have the largest proportion of foreign-born, followed by Peruvians and Colombians. In addition, it is important to note that a significant proportion of the recent mi- gratory flow from South America to the United States has occurred outside of authorized channels and thus has also contributed to the expanding presence of undocumented immigrants in the United States (Kyle 2000; U.S. Immigra- tion and Naturalization Service 2003).

The large foreign-born proportion of the resident South American popula- tion clearly helps to shape the experiences of the Latino newcomers, influenc- ing geographical settlement patterns, processes of socioeconomic integration, and propensities to interact with both Latino and non-Latino U.S. natives. The fact that a large proportion of the resident South American population is undocumented also strongly influences these different behaviors. Estimates generated by the former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (which has since been reorganized as part of the Department of Homeland Security) indicate that the proportion of undocumented immigrants ranges, at the low end, from 8 percent of Uruguayan immigrants to at least 36 percent of all Ecuadorians in the country in 2000 (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 2003). Table 3 presents these estimates of unauthorized migrants for Latin America countries. As other contributors to this volume have noted, the lack of proper documentation for a substantial portion of the foreign-born population obviously constrains economic opportunities, influences possibil- ities for residential mobility, and strongly affects the possibility of maintain- ing transnational ties with communities of origin, especially given the height- ened enforcement of U.S. borders since September 11.

Despite this large undocumented component, the general socioeconomic profile of South American Latinos tends to be significantly higher than that of other Latino subpopulations (see table 2). In contrast to the other Latinos, South American immigrants have the highest average years of education (12.6)

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and mean earnings ($13,911) and consequently are much more favorably situ- ated in the American socioeconomic structure than are other populations. This is reflected in the low percentage of South American Latinos living below the federal poverty line (13.6 percent) and the low proportion (4.6) of unem- ployed South American Latinos in the late 1990s. Indeed, in aggregate, the so- cioeconomic profile of South American Latinos surpasses even that of Cubans, who are typically perceived and commonly portrayed as the most economically stable and successful group among Latinos. Examined individ- ually, Colombians, Ecuadorians, and Peruvians also fare better than Cubans in regard to their years of education and the proportion of their populations that are poor and unemployed. However, the mean earnings among these

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TA B L E 2 Social and Economic Characteristics of Hispanics, by National Origin (Pooled Estimates from the Current Population Survey, March 1998 and March 2000)

% % % BELOW

FOREIGN RECENT YEARS OF MEAN POVERTY %

ORIGIN BORN ARRIVALS EDUCATION EARNINGS LINE UNEMPLOYED

TOTAL 38.5 44.8 10.7 $9,432 25.2 6.8

Mexico 36.5 49.3 10.2 $8,525 23.3 7.0

Puerto Rico 1.3 26.7 11.4 $9,893 30.4 8.3

Cuba 68.0 26.7 11.9 $13,567 18.3 5.8

Dominican

Republic 62.7 45.3 10.8 $7,883 36.0 8.6

CENTRAL

AMERICA 71.3 48.2 10.3 $9,865 22.3 6.4

Guatemala 74.8 56.1 9.8 $9,204 27.1 7.9

Honduras 69.0 50.2 10.4 $10,244 27.2 10.8

Nicaragua 72.5 42.7 12.0 $10,506 17.4 4.0

El Salvador 69.6 45.9 9.7 $9,631 20.8 5.1

SOUTH

AMERICA 73.6 44.4 12.6 $13,911 13.6 4.3

Colombia 71.7 38.4 12.4 $11,579 16.4 4.8

Ecuador 76.0 48.9 11.8 $11,848 19.0 5.8

Peru 73.0 51.5 12.7 $11,996 11.7 3.0

Note: Central and South American groups are listed if they had 200 or more people in the pooled CPS sample.

Source: Logan 2001, table 1.

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three groups does fall below the mean earnings of Cubans and, more impor- tantly, below the mean earnings of South American Latinos as a group. This difference indicates that the higher average earnings found among South American Latinos may be due to the skewing effects of immigrants from more developed countries in this region, especially Argentina and Chile. For exam- ple, data from the 1990 U.S. census demonstrate that approximately one-third of Argentine and Chilean Latinos were employed in professional and mana- gerial occupations (where they presumably command significantly higher wages), compared to only 14 percent of Ecuadorians and 17 percent of Colom- bians (Cordova and Pinderhughes 1999). In other words, although South American Latinos have a comparatively favorable socioeconomic profile, one must keep in mind that a large variation exists between immigrant groups from the different South American countries of origin, with immigrants from the Southern Cone faring much better than those from elsewhere.

SOUTH AMERICAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

With almost 74 percent of the South American Latino population being foreign-born, particular attention must be paid to the processes that led to their immigration and consequently shaped their settlement patterns. At first glance, the story of South American immigration to the United States appears to be similar in many ways to that of the rest of Latin America. That is, as is true of most other Latin American immigrants, most South Americans have immigrated to the United States to pursue better economic opportunities, to flee precarious and often violent political environments in their communities of origin, and to join family members already in the United States. However, prior to the most recent influx of migrants, migration from South America had been characterized by a disproportionate movement of urban, educated, and upper-middle-class individuals (Cordova and Pinderhughes 1999; Portes and Rumbaut 1996) This particular phenomenon still dominates a significant proportion of the current immigration flow from South America, although it recently has become more heterogeneous, drawing greater numbers from rural, less-educated, and working-class individuals through the establishment of immigrant networks (Kyle 2000; Guarnizo and Diaz 1999; Julca 2001).

Table 4 presents estimates of the South American foreign-born population in the United States from 1960 through the present. A quick examination of the resident population across the forty years reveals that, at least until fairly recently, overall immigration from South America has been slow and steady, with its greatest growth occurring in the last two decades. This pattern is dis- tinctly different from the more sustained growth and the more recent enor-

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mous increases (both in actual size and growth rates) found in the Mexican, Cuban, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan immigrant communities over the past ten years. As a result, where these other national communities were able to form a critical mass almost overnight (or, in the case of Mexicans, renew and greatly augment established communities), South Americans have not been able to do so in the same manner until recently, when their population sizes have become significant. In other words, although some Argentines, Colom- bians, and Chileans may have slowly formed small communities in certain cities over the years, their smaller numbers did not allow for the same kind of ethnic infrastructural development (for example, businesses, community or- ganizations, or civil- and/or human-rights organizations) that occurred with most of the other larger national communities. Thus, many of the earlier

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TA B L E 4 Latin American Foreign-Born Populations in the United States, 1960–2000

ORIGIN 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Mexico 575,902 759,711 2,199,221 4,298,014 9,177,487

Cuba 79,150 439,048 607,814 736,971 872,716

Dominican Republic 11,883 61,228 169,147 347,858 687,677

CENTRAL AMERICA

Costa Rica 5,425 16,691 29,639 43,530 71,870

Guatemala 5,381 17,356 63,073 225,739 480,665

Honduras 6,503 19,118 39,154 108,923 282,852

Nicaragua 9,474 16,125 44,166 168,659 220,335

Panama 13,076 20,046 60,740 85,737 105,177

El Salvador 6,310 15,717 94,447 465,433 817,336

SOUTH AMERICA

Argentina 16,579 44,803 68,887 92,563 125,218

Bolivia 2,168 6,872 14,468 31,303 53,278

Chile 6,259 15,393 35,127 55,681 80,804

Colombia 12,582 63,538 143,508 286,124 509,872

Ecuador 7,670 36,663 86,128 143,314 298,626

Paraguay 595 na 2,858 6,057 na

Peru 7,102 21,663 55,496 144,199 278,186

Uruguay 1,170 5,092 13,278 20,766 na

Venezuela 6,851 11,348 33,281 42,119 107,031

Latin American Total 774,080 1,570,412 3,760,432 7,302,990 14,169,130

Source (1960–1990): Gibson and Lennon 1999, table 3.

Source (2000): U.S. Census Bureau 2000.

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South American immigrants may have depended on broader Spanish- language institutions and resources rather than country-of-origin-specific ones, creating greater opportunities for interaction between Latino immigrant groups and possibly a future basis for the development of a pan-Latin Amer- ican identity.

South Americans’ generally higher levels of education almost certainly af- fected their patterns of adaptation and community development. Having, in most cases, entered the country with higher levels of education and other forms of “social capital” than was true of virtually all other groups with the possible exception of Cubans, the earliest South American immigrants prob- ably found it easier to blend into higher strata of the American socioeconom- ic structure. Indeed, during the so-called brain drain era of migration that oc- curred in the economically fluid period following the end of World War II, an inordinate number of highly educated and professional individuals, specifi- cally doctors, engineers, scientists, and other skilled South American workers, entered the United States (Reimers 1992). This flow was most prevalent among Colombians and Argentines, as is evident from the size of their U.S. populations by the end of 1960 (as shown in table 3). Primarily, the most skilled and talented individuals (including those who possessed basic English skills) with contacts in the United States initiated the move in order to maxi- mize the economic rewards associated with their already favorable occupa- tional status (Portes 1976). In other words, these professionals were respond- ing to the limited employment opportunities within their domestic markets by pursuing the higher wages and career opportunities found in the United States (Marshall 1988). This brain-drain flow from South America was part of a larger immigration phenomenon that also attracted similarly qualified indi- viduals from Asia and elsewhere in the world (Reimers 1992).

The passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 exerted mixed effects on both the potential and actual northward flow of South American immigrants. On the one hand, the codification of new occu- pational preferences in the law kept the door open to potential brain-drain South American migrants. As David G. Gutiérrez notes in the introduction to this volume, although the Immigration Act of 1965 is primarily known for the abolition of the national-origins quota system and the strengthening of the family reunification preference, for the first decade following its passage the law actually worked to select immigrants with high-level skills because Con- gress did not apply the same “first-come, first-served” family preference sys- tem to the Western Hemisphere until 1976 (Pastor 1984). Consequently, al- though immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (i.e., spouses and children) were exempt from the quota, immigration from the Western Hemisphere during this era was largely dominated by a different set of priorities, which required

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labor certification and other immigration restrictions based on “social capi- tal” issues such as levels of literacy, ability to pay various taxes, and whether a potential immigrant was likely to become a public charge. The 1965 act also marked the first time that Congress established numerical restrictions on visas for the Western Hemisphere (including Latin America). Thus, these otherwise “liberal” changes in U.S. immigration law had the paradoxical effects of main- taining an influx of South American technical elites, increasing the waiting pe- riod for other migrants attempting to enter through officially authorized means, and contributing to the rapid increase in the number of undocument- ed migrants entering the United States from Latin America. Indeed, undocu- mented migration from Mexico in particular, but also from Latin America generally, began to rise significantly within a decade of the passage of the 1965 act (Reimers 1992).

The exodus of mostly educated, upper- and middle-class immigrants from South America during this time was (and still is) certainly enhanced by the unstable economic structure of many South American countries. Like other regions of Latin America, beginning in the early 1970s South America also ex- perienced significant shifts in its economy and policies that left many rural in- habitants without jobs and urban middle- and working-class individuals with decreasing job opportunities and wages (Skidmore 2001; Brea 2003; Pellegri- no 2000; Bonilla et al. 1998). With most of South America’s gradual transition from economies based largely on agriculture and extractive industries to sys- tems based on import-substitution policies and, finally, to the current neolib- eral trade and free-market economic regimes, the opportunities for individu- als to maintain positions that earn sufficient wages or offer the prospect of social mobility have eroded dramatically. Indeed, the recent collapse of free- trade negotiations at Cancún, Mexico, the political disruptions caused by sim- ilar, grassroots protests in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and elsewhere, and the strong current attempt by Brazil and Argentina to block U.S. efforts to expand coverage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to South America all provide further evidence of both the increasing social restiveness on the southern continent and the depth of the social and economic restruc- turing that has taken place there in recent years.2

Such strains are perhaps seen most poignantly in the changing circum- stances of two comparatively prosperous South American nations, Argentina and Venezuela, which have historically received more immigrants from their South American neighbors than they have sent their own abroad (Brea 2003; Pellegrino 2000; Marshall 1988). Prior to 1999, Argentina was typically hailed as the leading example of the success of neoliberal free-market economic poli- cies (Wucker 2002). However, as has been true most notably in Mexico, to- ward the end of the twentieth century several signs, including an increasing

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unemployment rate, rapidly increasing interest rates, and the nation’s steadi- ly diminishing ability to pay its rising debt to both the private sector and the International Monetary Fund, pointed to the steady erosion and current fragility of its economy (Wucker 2002). As a result, immigration from Ar- gentina to the United States—particularly of members of its educated and urban elite—has increased significantly in recent years (Brea 2003; Jachimow- icz 2003). In Venezuela, on the other hand, the left-wing presidency of Hugo Chávez has created civil unrest and economic recessions (Cameron and Major 2001). In the Andean region, Venezuela has long been the most economically stable nation because of its reserves of petroleum. In the last three to five years, however, the volatility of the oil market and the wide-ranging social dis- locations caused by the ongoing restructuring of the regional economy have forced many people into unemployment (or chronic underemployment)— and have stimulated a significant emigration of many educated and middle- class Venezuelans (Brea 2003).

Rising levels of civil unrest, and the state-sponsored violence that often ac- companied them, have combined to stimulate rising rates of emigration from several South American nations. For example, the rise of the Pinochet regime in Chile during the early 1970s and the subsequent military coup and violent excesses of the ruling junta in Argentina obviously contributed to the forced emigration and exile of thousands of Chilean and Argentine citizens (Skidmore 2001; Marshall 1988; Cordova and Pinderhughes 1999). Similarly, from its be- ginning Colombian immigration to the U.S. was greatly stimulated by a polit- ical period of the late 1950s known by Colombians as “La Violencia” (Reimers 1992; Cordova and Pinderhughes 1999). More recently, educated middle-class Colombians continue to flee the country in order to avoid the internal fighting by left-wing guerillas and the military, the incessant violence spawned by nar- cotics trafficking, and the increasing incidence of kidnapping perpetrated by guerillas attempting to extort ransom from individuals, corporations, and gov- ernment agencies (Marin 2002; Chace 2000). Although Chile and Argentina have recently begun the painful process of healing and have taken the first fit- ful steps toward a kind of “democratization,” deep tensions in these societies, combined with the precariousness of their economic positions, leave the ulti- mate outcome of these processes in some doubt and thus also raise questions about the potential for more South American emigration in the future.

However much changing economic and political circumstances have stim- ulated an exodus of South Americans to the United States, the delayed effects of changes in U.S. immigration law and policy should not be underestimat- ed. After an initial period of anxiousness and uncertainty created in Latin America by passage of the 1965 INA Amendments, the subsequent imple- mentation of a stronger family reunification system in 1976 for the Western

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Hemisphere finally allowed permanent legal residents from Latin America to petition for other family members such as their spouses and unmarried chil- dren to join them in the United States. U.S. citizens of South American ori- gin could also apply for reunification with their adult children (regardless of marital status) and their siblings. Over time, these changes in policy natural- ly resulted in the expansion of a more diverse immigration pool from Latin America and allowed for the subsequent increases in legal immigration from the South American continent.

Although illegal migration from Latin America has increased slowly but steadily since the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. government has long considered this phenomenon primarily a Mexican trend and thus focused most of its en- forcement resources on the U.S.–Mexico border. However, as has been true of migrants from elsewhere in the world, the increase in the number of business, tourist, and student visas from Latin America and Asia also suggests the in- creasing pattern of another form of unauthorized migration, where individu- als simply remain in the United States after their visiting periods expire (Reimers 1992). The Immigration and Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which allowed temporary agricultural workers and undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S. since 1982 to “regularize their status” (to use the bureau- cratic language of the INS) also presented an opportunity for a significant number of unauthorized Latin American immigrants to apply for legal resi- dency in the United States and subsequently petition for their family members residing abroad. Although the vast majority of applications for permanent res- ident status under IRCA’s provisions went to Mexicans and Central Ameri- cans, approximately 3.2 percent of the 2.7 million successful applicants were of South American origin (U.S. Department of Labor 1986). As previously noted in table 3, the increasing population of unauthorized migrants from South America in the United States adds to the complexity of that issue for the gov- ernments of both the United States and the countries of origin.

SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND THE EMERGENCE OF LATINIDAD IN THE SOUTH AMERICAN POPULATION

Although it is too early to venture any definitive conclusions about how the distinctive patterns of initial emigration from South America, the shifting contexts of their reception in the United States, and their subsequent patterns of adjustment and settlement will ultimately affect these immigrants’ social, cultural, and political orientations as members of American society, several trends suggest some tentative answers to these complex questions. Specifical- ly, in terms of latinidad, it is critical to examine how transnational behaviors

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by South American Latinos serve as a resource for maintaining country-of- origin affiliations and how local Latino groups may potentially shape the process of creating a pan-ethnic community.

Among South American Latinos, some intriguing preliminary research has been conducted on different kinds of transnational practices among Colom- bians, Peruvians, and Ecuadorians—not coincidentally the largest three South American groups (Jones-Correa 1998; Kyle 2000; Guarnizo and Díaz 1999). Among all three groups, some of the strongest forms of transnationalism are the existing networks of chain migration that span the United States and the sending countries. One of the most interesting aspects of the emergence of South American immigration networks is how they have developed across long distances to assist in the process of illegal migration, whether by land, sea, air, or a combination of all three. One study, in particular, has documented how networks have been used to allow Ecuadorians from rural areas to im- migrate to the United States (Kyle 2000). These networks have allowed for a greater diversification than previous immigration trends because migrants do not have to provide all of the financial resources for the trip. Rather, they can promise to pay off their debt once in the United States. As other contributors to this volume have noted, the establishment of these transnational networks among South American migrants over the past twenty years has been one of the most distinctive features of the population flows between the two conti- nents. These networks, like those binding other immigrant groups, allow for information, labor, and capital to be easily exchanged between two or more nations. For example, part of this established immigrant network also in- cludes a courier service that allows immigrants in the United States to regu- larly send money and packages to their homeland and receive news and pack- ages from family members still residing abroad. Such practices allow for the maintenance of strong country-of-origin affiliations, especially among mem- bers of the immigrant, or “first-generation,” cohort.

Among Colombians, these transnational practices have manifested them- selves in local organizations in the United States. It is well documented that Colombians often form civic organizations that closely mirror the class system they were part of prior to immigration (Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Jones- Correa 1998). These organizations often sponsor cultural celebrations such as Colombia’s Independence Day in July, musical showcases of folkloric dance and music groups, soccer and other organized sports leagues, and activities to mobilize the Colombian community against the continuing violence and other hardships in Colombia (Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Chaparro 2002). Since dual citizenship is extended to Colombian immigrants naturalized in the United States, these organizations are also used to organize campaigns for political candidates in Colombia and to encourage Colombian immigrants to

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vote at their consulates in the United States (Jones-Correa 2001). These transnational organizations obviously serve as sites where country-of-origin identities and ties are strengthened even among those who have settled per- manently in the United States.

How these networks will ultimately affect the emergence of sociocultural and political orientations among South American Latinos in the United States largely remains, however, an open question. Increased security measures along U.S. borders will undoubtedly influence the extent to which South Americans can maintain meaningful transnational ties over time. But despite the obstacles created by these trends, it is clear that at least over the short term thousands of South Americans will continue to maintain such ties through previously established social networks, businesses, and organizations. Of course, the recent moves by Colombia and several South American states to extend dual nationality to their expatriates abroad will probably also con- tribute to the maintenance of such ties and networks, regardless of U.S. bor- der policy.

The presence of Spanish-language media is also important to both transna- tional and local U.S. practices of South American immigrants, as it is another critical source of information and consumption. Colombian immigrants of all class backgrounds seem to share, at least initially, tastes in Spanish-language media, which, in turn, seem also to reinforce at least some country-of-origin identifications and ties. For example, the importation of Colombian telenove- las (soap operas), radio shows, and television news to the to U.S. Latino con- sumer markets has certainly strengthened the sense of a Colombian commu- nity and has exposed other Latino groups to the distinct issues and cultures presented by Colombians (Davis 2002). The resiliency of such behaviors and tastes over time—as well as the persistence of Spanish-language dominance among this overwhelmingly foreign-born population—remains to be seen, however. While it might be reasonable to expect that if immigration trends re- main constant in the future, then language preference and other cultural be- haviors will continue to be reproduced in the U.S. context, though if migra- tion flows are constrained by increasing U.S. security measures, the future is more uncertain.

Class divisions and other differences in social capital among South Ameri- can migrants will also probably play an important role in the ways new im- migrants and their children become socialized in the United States. Of course, until recently, the general socioeconomic profile of South American residents of the United States has been more in line with Cubans than with any other Latino group. Thus, just as the Cuban experience had until recently largely been seen as lying outside the “typical” Latino experience in American socie- ty, South Americans were largely seen as exceptions to more general social and

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cultural trends. However, current immigration trends indicate that although a significant proportion of the flow of South American migrants continue to originate in the upper socioeconomic strata of Latin American society, the troubled economies and political situations in many countries are just as ob- viously increasing the pressure on working-class individuals to consider emi- grating, either through legal means or through unauthorized channels (Kyle 2000; Guarnizo and Diaz 1999; Julca 2001). If this pattern continues, it may well contribute to a significant social bifurcation in the United States between better-educated, middle-class, and legal South American immigrants, on one end, and less-educated, working-class, and unauthorized migrants on the other. This trend has already been suggested in research on the growing Colombian and Peruvian populations (Guarnizo and Diaz 1999; Julca 2001).

Equally critical to the process and potential direction of the social integra- tion of South American Latinos in the United States are the specific contexts of reception they face, which, of course, deeply influence the ways they ulti- mately fit into the communities in which they settle. For example, in the Southwest the Latino experience has long been strongly shaped, if not actual- ly defined by the presence of a well-established—and growing—Mexican- origin population, whereas in the Northeast, Puerto Ricans and, more recent- ly, Dominicans have strongly influenced the character both of local Latino communities and the local variants of latinidad that have emerged in those communities. Thus, population densities and ratios and the geographic loca- tion of South American settlement can be expected to play key roles in the ways they will relate to other Latino groups and to the modes of cultural iden- tity and expression that emerge as a result.3

The settlement and residential patterns among South American Latinos are of significant interest because, unlike the other three Latino groups, they are not geographically concentrated in one particular region or state of the coun- try. Table 5 lists the sixteen states with the largest populations of South Amer- ican Latinos. As the table indicates, their largest numerical presence is felt in the states of New York, Florida, California, New Jersey, and Texas. This resi- dential pattern demonstrates that South Americans are currently represented in regions where Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans traditionally domi- nate. As a consequence, it is not likely that South Americans will play a key role in the ways local notions and practices of latinidad are conceived of and practiced. Indeed, it may well prove the case that in areas where South Amer- icans settle next to existing Latino populations, they will adjust to prevailing Latino patterns of acculturation and social interaction. For example, in Los Angeles, entrepreneurial Colombian immigrants tend to cater their business- es to Mexicans and Central Americans rather than other South Americans (Guarnizo, Sánchez, and Roach 1999).

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However, another important relationship to examine is where South Amer- ican Latinos constitute the largest share of a local U.S.-Latino population be- cause in such places it is much more likely that the construction of latinidad will be substantively different than in a locale like the state of Arizona, for ex- ample, where Mexican-origin Latinos obviously dominate the group. Al- though more research is needed to confirm this, one can already see the emer- gence of new, hybrid forms of latinidad—expressed in language, cuisine, dress, music, dance, art, literature, and in increasing rates of inter-Latino part- nering and intermarriage—in the cities of the Northeast and in other urban areas where no single Latino national subpopulation predominates. Indeed, in cities like Washington, D.C., Miami, Houston, and parts of the San Francisco Bay Area, separate nationality-group clusters continue to form loose-knit communities, but they are otherwise drawn together in new, syncretic, Spanish-language-based cultural contexts. Not surprisingly, in such contexts South American Latinos are probably much more likely to be incorporated into a process of adaptation and acculturation that is pan-ethnic in nature, al- though it must be kept in mind that the maintenance of strong ties with their countries of origin will probably continue to exist simultaneously. In the end, however, the complexity and uncertainty of such dynamic processes must be kept in mind before we attempt to make any hard and fast predictions about the future orientations and behaviors of South American Latinos in the Unit- ed States. As the political scientist Michael Jones-Correa has noted in his re- cent study of Latino politics in New York City:

Ethnic choices are made not only on the basis of the immediate context, but also on the basis of previous contexts which may appear at first glance to be no longer relevant. This is particularly the case with immigrants. Latin Amer- ican immigrants’ ethnic identities are shaped not just by the choices they make in the United States, but also by the weight of identity choices made in the past. Previous constructions of identity have a kind of inertia to them; they become the raw materials for ethnic choices and ethnic politics in the United States. . . . These continuities, however, do not play out in any straightforward fashion: identities submerged in the home countries can resurface, and previ- ous identities can take on a different significance in a new context.

(Jones-Correa 1998: 122)

THE SECOND GENERATION

It may well be, however, that the best predictor of the future of South Amer- ican Latinos in the United States lies with their U.S.-born children. The avail-

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able statistics show that for South American Latinos, approximately 26 per- cent are born in the United States (Logan 2002). With the bulk of South American immigration occurring after 1980, children born in the United States to this cohort are most likely to be under the age of eighteen and still living at home with their immigrant parents. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect their socioeconomic integration will be strongly shaped both by their parents’ own experience and by the powerful influences of American con- sumer culture as they grow up as Latinos in the United States. However, sev- eral questions arise concerning the potential social trajectories of the so-called second-generation Latinos of South American heritage. On the most funda- mental level, a question is raised about whether or not the higher socioeco- nomic status of many South American immigrants will allow their children to take advantage of their relative “head start” by leveraging their access to high- er levels of social capital to achieve higher levels of education and social mo- bility in U.S. society. Again, given the relatively short time a sizable South American population has been in the United States, it may be too soon to pre- dict answers to this question.4

However, the existing literature on other immigrant groups such as Mexi- cans and black migrants from the Caribbean suggests, contrary to popular myth about the workings of the American “melting pot,” that those main- taining stronger ties to their immigrant backgrounds are more likely to expe- rience upward social mobility, whereas those identifying with established eth- nic groups (i.e., U.S.-born Chicanos in the case of ethnic Mexicans and African Americans in the case of Caribbean settlers) are more likely to adopt adversarial views of the United States, develop antisocial or oppositional be- haviors, and, ultimately, experience downward assimilation (Portes and Rum- baut 2001; Zhou 2001; Waters 1996; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 1995). Indeed, unlike the case of South Americans, who are scattered in communi- ties across the United States, part of the success of the Cuban community has been attributed to its cohesion, even across generations. Thus, if South Amer- ican Latinos follow the trajectory of other second-generation groups, their so- cioeconomic outcomes will be highly dependent on how they come to identi- fy and affiliate themselves within their own community and other groups (including both U.S. “minorities” and non-Latino whites).

An examination of intermarriage rates may provide some initial hints about the possible future orientation and self-identification of South American Lati- nos. Much more research needs to be done in this vital area, but according to one recent study on intermarriage among various Latino subgroups based on New York City, using data in 1991, South American immigrants (who were counted in this study as one group) were shown to have the lowest rates of in- termarriage (Gilbertson, Fitzpatrick, and Yang 1996).5 However, intermarriage

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rates among second-generation South American Latinos in New York City sig- nificantly increased, to the extent that fully 70 percent reported their spouse’s background from a different Latino group or as non-Hispanic.

Based on this 1991 study of South American adults, it can be speculated that there are at least two possible trajectories of integration for this group. First, for those high-status South American settlers who can successfully cross lines of “race” and culture through intermarriage and incorporation into main- stream U.S. institutions, the process of integration may well mimic the expe- rience of previous generations of “white” European immigrants. Again, re- search on this question is thin, but given the substantial intermarriage rates of South American Latinos with non-Hispanics in New York City, there does seem to be some evidence to support this view (Gilbertson, Fitzpatrick, and Yang 1996). On the other hand, given the many cultural, linguistic, and his- torical commonalities that bind South American Latinos, many may choose to identify themselves as part an emerging pan-ethnic Latino group. Howev- er, there are risks associated with this strategy, especially for working-class members of the growing South American Latino population. As noted briefly above, if research findings for other “native” Latino populations can be ap- plied to more recently arrived South American Latinos, their life-chances and patterns of acculturation may be adversely influenced by the socioeconomic status of the Latino group dominant in a particular locale. For example, if the overall low economic status of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in New York City is considered, South American Latinos who choose to associate and affil- iate with such populations may be more likely to experience social pressures that lead to “segmented assimilation” and downward mobility.6

There is also recent evidence that second-generation South American Lati- nos identify with their parents’ country of origin. Again, in New York City, where there is a substantial community of Colombians, Ecuadorians, and Pe- ruvians, research shows that these U.S.-born Latinos maintain active ties with their parents’ countries of origin via regular trips to these South American na- tions, personal remittances to family members abroad, and participation in U.S.-based ethnic organizations (Kasinitz et al. 2002). Thus, it may be that in addition to a pan-ethnic identity, ties with their parent’s country of origin may also serve to buffer some risks of “downward” assimilation.

CONCLUSION

The diverse experiences of South American Latinos highlight the increasing complexity of the social terrain on which the construction of Latino identities in the United States will occur in the years to come. This brief review of the

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South American–origin population’s demographic characteristics, socioeco- nomic profiles, immigration history, and settlement patterns immediately re- veals the internal heterogeneity within the category of “South American Lati- nos.” Although the comparatively skewed class background of the extant South American Latino population virtually assures that middle-class indi- viduals will continue to enjoy advantages unavailable to most other U.S. Lati- nos (with the possible exception of ethnic Cubans), the unsettledness of the South American social, economic, and political environments—and the sim- ilarly unsettled nature of U.S. society in the first years of the twenty-first cen- tury—also raises significant questions about the future social trajectories of South American Latinos. As the other chapters of this volume indicate, as in- triguing as these issues are to observers of the ongoing “Latinization” of the United States, at this point the definitive answers to these questions will be- come clear only with the passage of time.

NOTES

1. I use the simulated totals calculated by Cresce and Ramírez rather than the official

U.S. Census totals because the simulated totals include individuals who self-

identified as Hispanic, self-identified into a specific group, and those who reported

a place of birth or ancestry of “Hispanic” origin.

2. For insightful journalistic discussion on these increasingly complex and politically

charged issues, see, for example, The Economist, 18 September 2003, on Cancún;

Larry Rohter, “Bolivian Peasants’ ‘Ideology of Fury’ Still Smolders,” New York

Times, 20 October 2003; and Tony Smith, “Argentina and Brazil Align to Fight U.S.

Trade Policy,” New York Times, 21 October 2003.

3. For discussion of this process in a larger context, see Frances R. Aparicio, chapter

9, this volume.

4. For general discussions of the issues associated with the so-called second genera-

tion, see Portes 1996; Rumbaut and Portes 2001; and Portes and Rumbaut 2001.

5. Although this rate can be interpreted as evidence that South American immigrants

maintain company within their own country-of-origin group, it can also be mis-

leading, given that it is not clear from the statistics if, for example, Colombians are

marrying Colombians or Colombians are marrying Peruvians. Nonetheless, it can

be safely assumed that there is some cohesion present at the regional level.

6. For discussion of a similar line of argument, see David. G. Gutiérrez, introduction

and chapter 1, this volume.

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