organizational communication final essay

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Habermas’s Discourse Ethics and Principle of Universalization as a Moral Framework for Organizational Communication Rebecca J. Meisenbach University of Missouri–Columbia

The author argues for the potential of discourse ethics as a framework for guiding and assessing ethical action in organizational communication. Habermas’s discourse ethics offers an intersubjective procedure for develop- ing and challenging ethical norms through reasoned public communication. After examining the development of discourse ethics and reviewing existing organizational applications of Habermas’s ideas, the author then forms the principle of universalization into five steps necessary for an organization to enact a discourse ethic. These steps are used to assess the ethical problems and to identify alternative courses of action relating to the American Red Cross’s Liberty Fund case.

Keywords: discourse ethics; principle of universalization; Habermas; organizational communication; American Red Cross

W.Charles Redding (1996), often referred to as “the father of organiza-tional communication,” titled a speech and paper, “Ethics and the Study of Organizational Communication: When Will We Wake Up?” Redding charged that organizational communication scholarship rarely addressed ethical issues, even though “organizational life is saturated with ethical (or moral) problems”

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Author’s Note: Earlier versions of this article were presented at National Communication Association’s annual convention in 2003 in Miami, Florida, and at the 8th annual Communication Ethics Conference at Duquesne University in 2004. The author would like to thank Charley Conrad and the anonymous reviewers whose comments helpfully guided the revision of this article. Please send correspondence regarding this article to Rebecca Meisenbach, University of Missouri–Columbia, 115 Switzler Hall, Columbia, MO 65211-2310; e-mail: [email protected].

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(p. 18). Although ethical problems are potentially created every time organiza- tions send and receive messages (Johannesen, 2002), relatively few attempts in the discipline exist that develop and consider moral theory in organizational behavior (e.g., Anderson & Englehardt, 2000; Conrad, 1993; Seeger, 1997). A review of organizational ethics studies reveals a tendency to focus on addressing pragmatic microethical issues such as being an ethical consultant (Lippitt, 1982; Redding, 1979), whistle-blower (Bok, 1982), or public relations practitioner (Thomsen, 1998). These studies address how particular individuals and roles may act ethically within organizations, but there are also broader issues of how collective organizational actors and organizations may act ethically—that is, the ethics of organizational actors and organizations as they interact with internal and external publics (Edgett, 2002; Seeger, 1997). Scholars who study and consider corporate social responsibility are addressing such macro-level ethical issues (e.g., Buchholz, 1990; Cheney, May, & Roper, in press; Townsley & Stohl, 2003). Yet May and Zorn (2003) have suggested that interest in corporate responsibility ebbs and flows along with media atten- tion to corporate scandals. Furthermore, these studies often start and end with prescriptions for ethical courses of action in a particular situation, rather than richly and broadly considering theoretical and philosophical bases of a moral theory for organizational behavior.

Perhaps it is the complexity of determining how a collective, yet indi- vidualistic entity behaves or should behave that has kept organizational scholars from making the desired progress in macro-level organizational ethics. Whatever the reason, organizational scholars have yet to answer fully Redding’s call to wake up to the importance of organizational ethics or to realize May and Zorn’s hope for sustained interest in corporate responsibility. I argue that to better justify and articulate specific ethical courses of action, scholars should begin with moral theory and a process for moral argumentation before moving into practical ethics.

German critical philosopher Jürgen Habermas’s (1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996) theory of communicative action led him to the development of a dis- course ethics that provides such a moral grounding. This moral theory does not prescribe what is ethical; rather it describes an intersubjective procedure for developing norms of behavior through reasoned public communication. He argued that through competent speakers, speech acts raise validity claims to truth, rightness, and sincerity, and that these claims can be challenged, rejected, and accepted in discourse by other listeners and speakers. Discourse ethics is a form of practical argument for discursively testing norms. With its communicative approach, discourse ethics has valuable potential for organizational ethics. I suggest that it offers both explanations

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of current organizational failures and guidelines for ethical interactions that are highly relevant today. Although scholars have explored Habermas’s ideal speech situation, legitimation, and communicative action (e.g., Burleson & Kline, 1979; Deetz, 1992; Francesconi, 1986; Jacobson & Storey, 2004), Habermas’ formal presentation of discourse ethics was only published in English in 1990, and few scholars have explored its implications for com- munication theory (e.g., Arens, 1997; Gunson & Collins, 1997; Haas & Deetz, 2000; Leeper, 1996). French and Allbright (1998), in their critical assessment of Habermas’s suggestion of links between high levels of moral reasoning and discursive communicative action, argued that his discourse ethics “requires an operators’ manual as well as a proactive implementation if it is to be of use to business” (p. 191).

In this article, therefore, I investigate the potential of Habermas’s dis- course ethics for the development of moral theory in organizational com- munication with a goal of articulating specific ways that it can be interpreted and implemented. I argue that Habermas’s discourse ethics and his principle of universalization (Principle U) offer a communication-centered moral framework within which ethical standards may be developed and challenged by individuals and organizations. First, I introduce Habermas’s conceptual- ization of the lifeworld, communicative action, and validity claims. Then I present Habermas’s discourse ethics and Principle U, considering challenges and difficulties of his ethic. Third, I briefly review how these ideas have been taken up by communication scholars thus far. Fourth, I articulate five steps necessary for an organization to enact discourse ethics. Finally, I consider how this procedure could apply to a specific organizational situation and the difficulties that may arise. Through this analysis, I offer one way in which discourse ethics may frame and guide ethical organizational behavior.

Habermas’s Communicative Action and Validity Claims

Habermas (1984, 1987) developed his discourse ethics out of his theory of communicative action, which focuses on how people act within the life- world (see Deetz, 1992; Leeper, 1996, for a fuller discussion). Habermas (1990) promoted an ideal realm of cultural rationality that is developed through communicative action, calling “interactions communicative when the participants coordinate their plans of action consensually, with the agree- ment reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims” (p. 58). Thus, communicative action or

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mutual understanding is a process of the intersubjective consideration of appeals to validity claims. Habermas posited that when agreement is reached linguistically by relying on the processes of cultural rationality, the speakers have made three kinds of successful validity claims associated with different value spheres.1

Cultural rationality consists of three value spheres (cognitive, moral, and aesthetic), each with its own type of validity claim, suggesting “alternative ways of presenting the propositional content” (Heath, 2001, p. 116, empha- sis in the original). When a speaker makes a statement or utterance, he or she is simultaneously making appeals to each kind of validity: the truth of the statement (cognitive), the rightness of the statement (moral), and the truth- fulness or sincerity of the statement (aesthetic; Habermas, 1990).2 The appealing suggestion of the copresence of the validity claims is that the truth or falsity of a statement does not stand separate from its rightness and sin- cerity. If I say, “I give money to the United Way,” I am arguing (cognitively) that it is true that I donate money to the United Way. On a moral level, I am also claiming that donating to the United Way is right or just in this situation and that it is ethical for me to present such an argument. Finally, I am claim- ing on the aesthetic level to be truthful or sincere (rather than sarcastic or contradictory to my other statements and actions) in my utterance. All three claims are present in my utterance, ready to be defended. Habermas (1990) noted, “In the case of claims to truth or rightness, the speaker can redeem his [claims] discursively, that is, by adducing reasons; in the case of claims to truthfulness [sincerity] he does so through consistent behavior” (p. 59). According to his discourse ethics, validity of claims is publicly and discur- sively debated by all those who would be affected by the outcome of the claims. Thus, I turn now to Habermas’s discourse ethics to understand how these ideas may frame organizational ethics.

Discourse Ethics

Habermas’s work on discourse ethics is extremely relevant to management communication scholars, because it suggests that structures and procedures of communication are central to identifying and grounding moral principles. His discourse ethics focuses on developing a procedural moral theory, leav- ing specific ethical judgments up to the participants in communication; it involves movement between universal and local levels. Habermas (1990) argued that, “The principle of discourse ethics prohibits singling out with philosophical authority any specific normative contents (as for example,

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certain principles of distributive justice) as the definitive content of moral theory” (p. 122). It does not say “it is right to protect yourself.” Rather, the principle of universalization (Principle U) sets up the intersubjective moral argumentation procedure necessary to justify such statements, stating that a valid norm must meet the following condition:

All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s inter- ests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative pos- sibilities for regulation). (p. 65)

In discourse ethics, Habermas communicatively grounded and revised Kant’s categorical imperative, which he viewed as incorrectly monologic, abstract, and strategic. Habermas argued that all studies of moral argumen- tation logic arrive at some form of the categorical imperative. However, whereas Kant argued that valid norms are those that one individual could decide should be universal law after solitarily considering the consequences for everyone, Habermas (1990) argued that valid moral norms must be pub- licly and discursively defendable. He did not believe that one person should decide what others would will or what the consequences of an action will be for others. Instead, Habermas supported Principle U, “compelling the uni- versal exchange of roles” (p. 65). All parties must engage in this exchange, not just organizational management. As Habermas (1996) stated, “If we con- strue the universalist claim of the moral principle intersubjectively, then we must relocate ideal role taking, which, according to Kant, each individual undertakes privately, to a public practice implemented by all persons in common” (pp. 109-110).

Benhabib’s (1992) development of discourse ethics challenges this key distinction between Kant and Habermas, arguing that moral conversation can occur either through actual dialogue or imagined conversation with others. But at the point of imagined conversation, the moral discussion reverts to a Kantian, monological, and hypothetical process, limiting the valuable toggling between universal morality and cultural-specific ethics available in discourse ethics. Principle U assumes “that the justification of norms and commands requires that a real discourse be carried out and thus cannot occur in a strictly monological form, i.e., in the form of a hypothetical process of argumentation occurring in the individual mind” (Habermas, 1990, p. 68). Therefore, Habermas has revised the solitarily adjudicated categorical imperative such that a potential maxim is submitted to all others who will be affected by its potential outcome to discursively test its universality. By

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anchoring moral autonomy in social dialectic, Habermas insisted that the justification of norms requires actual discourse and community.

A key point in accepting Habermas’s (1990) articulation of discourse ethics is the justification of the universality of Principle U: “every argumentation, regardless of the context in which it occurs, rests on pragmatic presuppositions from whose propositional content the principle of universalism (U) can be derived” (p. 82). He argued that Principle U is implied by presuppositions of argument in general, such that anyone who engages in argument is necessar- ily assuming Principle U. In other words, even an argument against Principle U would have to engage in the procedure described by Principle U, thereby engaging in a performative contradiction and negating the challenge.

Another challenge to discourse ethics stems from questions about the interactions among universalizable moral principles and culturally grounded ethical principles. Habermas’s (1990, 1993) early development of discourse ethics was characterized as privileging the universal (Haas & Deetz, 2000). Indeed, Habermas (1993) suggested that universalizable moral discussion should occur prior to specific ethical applications.3 Scholars have argued that this sequencing means that Habermas problematically advocated that the initial consideration of valid norms should be based on a generalized (uni- versal) other, leaving the viewpoint of the concrete (contextually sensitive) other unattended until it is used in a specific context (Benhabib, 1992; Haas & Deetz, 2000).

Instead, Benhabib (1992) argued that moral discussion should simultane- ously consider generalized and concrete others. Habermas (1996) seemed to acknowledge this simultaneity in his later development of discourse ethics, as he discussed how laws seeking legitimation must “harmonize with the moral principles of universal justice and solidarity” as well as “with the ethical prin- ciples of a consciously ‘projected’ life conduct” (p. 99). In fact, the title of his book, Between Facts and Norms, highlights the necessary tensions between context and universal claims of reason and points to how “a claim to validity raised here and now, and perhaps justified according to local standards, ulti- mately points beyond a particular community” (Rehg, 1996, p. xiv). Indeed Habermas (1996) wrote of the “process of norm application as weaving together a description of the circumstances and a concretization of general norms” (p. 218).4 Habermas (2003) also advocated a morality “where indi- viduation and generalization interpenetrate” (p. 56). Thus, discourse ethics allows exploration of movement between the local and universal. But although Habermas was very interested in articulating and justifying the pro- cedure of discourse ethics, he left using and implementing it in actual situa- tions to others (French & Allbright, 1998). Therefore, it is appropriate for

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communication scholars to consider and critique the actions of organizations on both ethical and moral levels through discourse ethics.

Communication Scholars and Habermas’s Discourse Ethics

Taking up this invitation, several communication scholars have consid- ered the implications of Habermas’s work, including his Principle U, for communicative ethics. Before Habermas even published his books on dis- course ethics, Burleson and Kline (1979) posited that Habermas’s “axiology should prove to be particularly attractive to speech communication scholars since its locus of values is intrinsic to the nature of communication itself” (p. 427). In particular, communication scholars have turned to discourse ethics as a source of ethical frameworks for public relations (Leeper, 1996) and media (Arens, 1997).5

Organizational scholar Stan Deetz (e.g., 1992; Haas & Deetz, 2000) has taken the most thorough look at the moral implications of Habermas’s work for the study of organizational communication. Specifically, Deetz (1992) described Habermas’s “ideal speech situation as a moral process,” but one that can and should encourage conflict (p. 8). Haas and Deetz (2000) dis- cussed Habermas’s theory of communicative action and discourse ethics in light of Benhabib’s (1992) challenges and revisions. Arguing that manage- ment needs to ensure ethical procedures for identifying stakeholders and for representing these stakeholders, they suggested that the validity claims can help delineate ethical interactions between corporate managers and stake- holders. However, their treatment of Habermas focused more on his earlier articulated ideal speech situation and four validity claims than on Principle U. Also, as discussed above, Habermas (1996) has further developed dis- course ethics in Between Facts and Norms, answering some of the earlier challenges to the perspective. The current article builds on this work to develop discourse ethics for communication study by offering a specific concrete plan for enacting Principle U in organizational settings.

Enacting Discourse Ethics in Organizations

Therefore, I will now describe how Habermas’s Principle U and justifi- cation of validity claims can be enacted from a communicative perspective. Based on his articulation of Principle U, I suggest five steps for enacting discourse ethics (see Table 1). These steps are designed to realize the moral principle in communicative action and can be followed by both individual and organizational rhetors.

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First, the rhetor identifies and/or generates an utterance that contains claims to normative validity. Organizations consist of seemingly endless chains of utterances; communication is their lifeblood. And every utterance that offers a choice entails ethical elements (Johannesen, 2002). But does every utterance signify the start of discourse ethics? The potential exists, but utterances that are best suited for a discourse ethics procedure are those that have both local and universal import. For example, decisions about a company’s waste disposal policy affect the local community and broader expectations of treatment of communities. Mahoney (2002) argued that “only those interests and actions that bear on others’ standing as equal members of the moral community require a rational justification within a moral discourse” (p. 303). From these perspectives, not every decision is subject to the rules of discourse ethics.

In generating an utterance in Step 1, organizations are defining their terms (e.g., What do we mean by “proper disposal” or “high quality educa- tion”?). Strategic ambiguity and polysemy may come into play here as rhetors seek to imbue different meanings in their utterances for different audiences or stakeholders (Ceccarelli, 1998; Eisenberg, 1984). An interest- ing finding was that such strategy entails simultaneously constructing the claim and considering the stakeholders (Step 2).

Second, the rhetor determines who is potentially affected by the enactment of a particular claim. This step relates directly to research on stakeholders (e.g., Carroll, 1989; Deetz, 1995; Freeman, 1984) and involves managing ten- sions between being practical yet inclusive. Ideally this determination of

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Table 1 Steps of Enacting Discourse Ethics

Steps Description Issues

Step 1 Generate an utterance or potential norm Defining terms, meaning; use of strategic ambiguity

Step 2 Determine who is potentially affected by Rhetor control and bias; determining the enactment of the utterance expanding circles of those affected

Step 3 Articulate the utterance to all parties Dialogic articulation of utterance; identified in Step 2 practicality

Step 4 All parties discursively debate the Equal and full participation; consequences and their acceptability practicality

Step 5 Make a judgment about the validity and Handling disagreement; acceptability of the proposed privileging consensus utterance or norm

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stakeholders would rely on widespread input. Haas and Deetz (2000) have suggested that determination of the stakeholders in a decision is best accomplished by having management acknowledge its biases and simul- taneously take the stance of a generalized and concrete other, seeking dif- ferences and commonalities with a managerial perspective. Yet Haas and Deetz noted that practicality necessitates grouping individuals into “con- crete other” stakeholder groups rather than truly considering everyone indi- vidually. In this way, the rhetor determines who must be involved in the remaining steps. For example, if a corporation was announcing a plan to eliminate its retirement plan, stakeholders might include a board of direc- tors, employees, former employees, and government regulators. This is one individual’s list, but a second perspective may well generate important additional stakeholders. At minimum, organizations should have distinct internal individuals work together to identify stakeholders, but issues remain of whether an organization is capable internally of fully identifying stakeholders.

Third, once the stakeholders are determined, the rhetor articulates the claim to those individuals and/or organizations believed to be affected. The method of this articulation can take many forms in today’s media-saturated society, as long as the stakeholders actually hear and interpret the utterance. Of course some communication channels invite dialogic interaction more than others (Haas & Deetz, 2000; Thompson, 1995). Organizations fre- quently articulate utterances, if they share them with stakeholders at all, in monologic ways, such as television advertisements. But discourse ethics requires that articulation of the utterance be offered dialogically in a man- ner, such as in a face-to-face interaction, conference call, or internet chat that invites the discussion outlined in the remaining steps.

Fourth, together, these participants discursively anticipate the conse- quences of the utterance. Although this is a step that Benhabib (1992) sug- gested could be imagined, Habermasian discourse ethics requires actual participation and discussion. The real participation of those potentially affected is essential to identifying and seeing the various benefits and prob- lems of a particular utterance. Logistically, finding the time and space for dis- cussion could be extremely difficult. Furthermore, participants must ensure the equal recognition of all voices during this process (Haas & Deetz, 2000).

Finally, the participants make a judgment about whether the claim and its consequences are acceptable to all affected and are, therefore, ethical. Here is where at least three kinds of judgments are being made. The truth of the content, the rightness, and the sincerity with which the utterance of the statement is offered are all decided. Yet how disagreement over validity

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is resolved is not immediately clear. Habermas seems to suggest that what discourse ethics does is bring all of the necessary information to the dis- cussion and that with this shared information everyone in the group will come to the same conclusion and consensus. In this scenario the ethic priv- ileges a logically derived form of justice. On the other hand, if the discus- sion can end in the identification of unreconciled differences, discourse ethics is still useful. The original rhetor and dissenting stakeholders are likely to have at least a better understanding of each others’ positions. The organization can decide to proceed with its plan—that is, stand by its utter- ance while being aware of the challenges to its utterance so that the stake- holders can make informed decisions about their future interactions with that organization.

These steps represent and realize Habermas’s Principle U, making it prac- tical and useful for communication scholars and organizational actors. Given all the potential difficulties noted here, organizations may neglect a dis- course ethics procedure. However, if Principle U is indeed universal, then the procedure is occurring, and organizations are left only with deciding whether they are consciously and intentionally participating. I will explore how these steps can be enacted and the potential difficulties that may be encountered in doing so or not doing so by applying them to the American Red Cross’s (ARC) handling of its Liberty Fund after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.

The ARC and the Liberty Fund

The ARC is a well-established organization in the United States with an operating budget in 2001 of $3 billion. Established in 1881, the ARC is devoted to providing relief to disaster victims and serves as the country’s primary supplier of blood and blood products. Traditionally, the ARC accepts donations to local chapters, to its disaster relief fund, and to its international relief fund. When a disaster occurs, money is taken from the appropriate fund to provide assistance and relief.

Shortly after the September 11th attacks, the ARC, led by president and CEO Dr. Bernadine Healy, took the unusual step of establishing a separate fund, called the Liberty Fund. According to a link that appeared on the ARC Web page on October 8, all funds donated to the ARC since the attacks were placed in the Liberty Fund, which would “support the immediate and emerg- ing efforts of the ARC to alleviate human suffering brought on by the attacks of September 11” (American Red Cross, 2001b).6 Donations poured in. On

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October 12, the ARC issued a press release that drew negative attention with its predictions of how the ARC would use donated funds:

. . . toll-free nationwide hotlines now being operated by the Red Cross to pro- vide immediate help to callers, information systems, database management, contribution processing, public information and communication, expanded audit services, accounting services and around-the-clock activation of the Red Cross Disaster Operations Center. (American Red Cross, 2001d)

Two weeks later, Healy announced her retirement from the ARC amid speculation about the board’s displeasure with her establishment of the Liberty Fund (Williams, 2001). On the same day, the ARC published another story on its Web site, repeating the distribution plans and adding a line that received a lot of attention in the press: “The Red Cross also will pull resources from the Liberty Relief Fund to prepare and mitigate in the event of more attacks” (Kriner, 2001). Negative news coverage and public outcry surrounded Healy’s departure and the announced plans for the funds. By the end of October, the fund had collected $547 million in public dona- tions (Greenberg, 2001). Harold Decker, the interim ARC CEO, announced that the organization would no longer solicit donations for the Liberty Fund, and the ARC posted a new link on its Web site titled “Myth and facts: How your money is being spent” (American Red Cross, 2001a). Healy and other ARC spokespersons argued to the press that the ARC had never promised that all of the donations would go to victims’ families and stood by the ARC’s distribution plan (Levine, 2001).

However, publics and donors felt that they had been misled about how their funds were going to be used. Negative media stories continued, and the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Commerce and Energy held a subcommittee oversight hearing on November 6 that focused heavily on and criticized the intentions and actions of the ARC. Just more than a week after the hearing, Decker led a press conference announcing the ARC’s deci- sion to alter its planned uses of the Liberty Fund, pledging that “The people affected by this terrible tragedy have been our first priority, and beginning today, they will be the only priority of the Liberty Fund” (American Red Cross, 2001c). The ARC paid for full-page advertisements in major news- papers across the United States to further publicize the changes and ask the public to trust them again. In June, 2002, the ARC announced a new “Donor DIRECT” plan designed to ensure better understanding of donor and orga- nization intent. This same June, the ARC hired the CEO of Girl Scouts of America, Marsha Johnson Evans, as its new CEO. I will now look at how

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the Liberty Fund situation aligns or could have aligned with Habermas’s discourse ethics and his principle U as a way of explaining, understanding, and critiquing what happened.7

How to Use the Liberty Fund: The Steps of Discourse Ethics

The first step in discourse ethics is generating and deciding on an utter- ance that makes claims about its validity. In looking back over the ARC situ- ation, the Liberty Fund was created at Healy’s request, and according to her testimony at the November 6th hearing, it was designed to help with account- ability: “[the Liberty Fund money] has to be kept separate. It is easier to audit. It is easier to have public disclosure” (House of Representatives, 107th Congress, 2001). The main utterance for this analysis was posted on the ARC Web site on October 8, 2001, introducing the fund: “The Liberty Fund will support the immediate and emerging efforts of the ARC to alleviate human suffering brought on by the attacks of September 11.” Remembering that defining terms and meanings is a key part of Step 1, the communication critic can note the potentially divergent interpretations of “emerging efforts” and how the ARC might “alleviate human suffering.” However, the same docu- ment goes on to state the following:

The work of the American Red Cross in the aftermath and as a consequence of September 11 will not just be about supporting ‘disaster relief services for victims of this and other disasters.’ Rather, the Liberty Fund will support an integrated response that involves virtually all of our lines of service, and all of our existing and new responsibilities under our Charter and the attending statutory obligations.

Perhaps surprisingly to those familiar with the case as covered in the media, in this last statement, the ARC directly confronted and denied implications that the funds would only go directly to victims and their families. However, patrons clicking on the “donate now” link on the site the same day would read an option titled “send a check to benefit disaster victims directly.” Thus, potential problems loomed in the first step about definitions and conflicting interpretations of the utterance(s) from the ARC.

According to Habermas, this statement generates three different kinds of validity claims. In this case, the press release asserted (a) that it was true that the ARC would use the Liberty Fund donations in this way; (b) that it was right for the ARC to use the fund in this way and to assert that it should be used this way; and (c) that the ARC was being truthful and sincere about

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the content of the statement. According to discourse ethics, listeners can discursively determine how well the utterance fulfills each of these claims. Thus, I offer the October 8 statement as an utterance containing validity claims, fulfilling the first step in the process.

Once an organization has identified an utterance, it can move to Step 2 of fulfilling Principle U by determining who all is affected by the enactment of the utterance. In this case, those who would potentially be affected by its enactment include ARC employees, victims’ families, donors, and on a larger scale, potential donors and individuals who could be affected by future ter- rorist acts. One can quickly see the difficulty of determining where to cut off ever-broadening circles of involvement. Furthermore, Habermas’s procedure seems problematically to allow that the rhetor is going to determine who is affected by an utterance. Otherwise, the process falls into an infinite regress with ever-expanding groups being called in to discuss and determine who should be involved in discussion and determination of the initial utterance. For it to work, it is necessary that exclusionary judgment occurs at some point. It is here that discourse ethics can use Haas and Deetz’s (2000) sug- gestion of organizations openly acknowledging their interests and biases, rather than pretending or assuming that they can maintain a neutral stance. In the case of the Liberty Fund, Healy apparently consulted with very few indi- viduals and groups even within the organization about the fund’s creation.8

Greater input from people inside the ARC could have helped the organization better identify and understand its stakeholders. In this retrospective analysis of the case, it is unclear who all the ARC perceived as being affected by its statement until the third step is considered.

Once those potentially affected are identified, in the third step, the rhetor presents the utterance to the affected individuals and/or organizations. The ARC encountered major problems at this stage in the process. As Healy testified:

We repeatedly communicated to the public our range of service, through our chapter network, through PSAs [public service announcements], through contacts with donors, Web sites, in numerous TV appearances, press releases, in several—in full-page ads in several major newspapers listing the range of services, how much money we have raised and what it was being spent for. (House of Representatives, 107th Congress, 2001)

Such a range of communication sounds impressive and quite possibly suffi- cient. Yet even Healy conceded, “Perhaps not everyone heard it.” Looking beyond Healy’s assertions of what the ARC did, a search conducted using the

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Internet archive (waybackmachine.org) shows that although an explanation of the Liberty Fund appeared on the ARC Web page on October 8, 2001, there is no record of a formal ARC press release announcing the fund. Furthermore, most of the methods that she listed can be classified as mono- logic forms of communication. Even though it departed significantly from previous ARC policies and procedures, the creation of the Liberty Fund did not generate any significant print news coverage at the time, suggesting that key stakeholders may not have heard the message or that the media assumed there was no conflict of understanding. A search of national newspapers reveals only one brief mention of the Fund’s existence on October 10th. The first ARC press release to mention the Liberty Fund was released on October 12th, detailing estimated costs of services associated with the disaster. The fund was only mentioned in the last line of the release, linking long-term relief efforts to the fund. Healy’s resignation and Kriner’s (2001) October 26th story on the ARC Web site, which offered greater detail on how funds would be designated, signals the moment when the media began reporting on the Liberty Fund (e.g., Ibarguen, 2001; Levine, 2001) and publics began to voice their concerns. In contrast, the simultaneously created September 11th Fund and its managers explicitly focused on public relations and communi- cation of needs, goals, and plans for fund distribution from the outset. In fact, this second non-ARC fund also faced challenges about how it was using funds but responded more quickly, dialogically, and openly than the ARC did (discussed below, see also, Seessel, 2002).

The poor public presentation of the Liberty Fund utterance may be explained by suggestions that Healy established the fund to make sure that local chapters could not misuse the funds. In fact, local chapters, which are allowed to dip into the National Disaster Relief Fund, were unable to use any funds from the Liberty Fund (Attkisson, 2002). Thus, as a separate fund only accessible through national headquarters, the Liberty Fund would have very clear accountability. If the fund was designed to control potential internal misuse, the ARC’s lack of publicity about the fund’s existence may make sense from the organization’s perspective. Publicizing the fund might have highlighted issues of internal mistrust and conflict in the ARC.

Thus, it seems that the ARC failed to fulfill this crucial third step of a dis- course ethic. In the best-case scenario, it can be judged as having tried to share the utterance and failing.9 Alternatively, the organization may not have identified publics and donors as being affected. Another possibility is that the ARC overestimated how familiar the various stakeholders already were with the intent of the ARC and its various funds (Gotbaum, 2003). A final possible explanation is that the ARC knew its message was not reaching publics in a significant way and intentionally maintained this stance to hide

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issues of internal mistrust. Regardless of the reasons, the failure to dialogi- cally communicate the utterance to publics caused problems for the ARC.

In terms of Step 4, there was little, if any, discussion when the utterance was first articulated. Thus, the ARC and stakeholders did not successfully carry out Step 4 as I have laid it out here. All those affected by the outcome of the utterance did not discursively anticipate the consequences of the utterance—at least not successfully. It is of course plausible that Healy and ARC executives anticipated the consequences among themselves, but this does not fit Habermas’s discourse ethics. Instead, such a private discussion represents a Kantian internal consideration of how others will be affected. In addition, it exemplifies Deetz’s (1992) charge that private organizations are becoming the locus of public decisions. Media and other stakeholders negotiated their way into discussion over the utterance gradually. The out- cry highlights the problems with making decisions for others and making assumptions about what they know and how they will react. Additionally, by violating the procedure, the discussion happened in segments: first the ARC, then the media, and finally donors, victims, and government.

The best example of a true face-to-face moral deliberation in this example occurred on November 6, 2001, at a congressional oversight hearing in Washington, D.C. Individuals present included Healy, congressional represen- tatives, two widows whose husbands died in the attacks, the New York State Attorney General, and the president of the United Way. The meeting offered formal time-regulated segments for each person to talk and then involved peri- ods of questioning. The discussion highlighted the divergent opinions about the content and meaning of the utterance in question. Part of the problem for the ARC was that, at this point, much of the focus was not on determining whether it was right for the ARC to use the funds as it planned but on whether they had actually clearly expressed the intended use of the funds.

Chairman Tauzin: Dr. Healy, if the Red Cross had announced that it wanted Americans to donate for this and other terrorist events and future events—

Ms. Healy: That is what we have announced repeatedly. Chairman Tauzin: If the Red Cross announced that. . . What is at issue here is

that a special fund was established for these families— Ms. Healy: No. It was established for— Chairman Tauzin: It was especially funded for this event, for September 11, and it

is being closed now because we are told enough money has been raised in it, but we are also being told parenthetically, by the way, we are going to give two thirds of it away to other important Red Cross needs. (House of Representatives, 107th Congress, 2001)

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If the organization had willfully engaged in the process of discourse ethics earlier, the focus and outcome of such a hearing might have better served the organization and other stakeholders.10 Again as a contrast, when the September 11th Fund faced controversy about its intended fund dispersement, the organization conducted an online poll as early as October 1 and conducted a telephone survey a month later to determine public opinion toward and understanding of the fund’s goals and plans (Seessel, 2002). The surveys revealed that 80% of respondents supported the fund’s goals of taking a broad understanding of who should be helped, and the fund communicated these findings as justification for its plans, avoiding the ARC’s public difficulties.

The final step of enacting Principle U involves judging the validity of the utterance’s claims. The ARC or even Healy by herself may have solitarily judged the utterance to be acceptable. Of course, the organization painfully learned that many stakeholders did not agree that the utterance was valid and acceptable. The truth element of the validity claim became particularly mud- died. The ARC thought it was true that it was dispersing funds as outlined in the utterance, but the public contested the meaning of the utterance and found the ARC’s claim to propositional truth to be invalid, arguing that it was not true that the ARC was using the funds as described in the utterance. In addition, it seems that the utterance was judged as morally wrong (at least by congressional representatives and media coverage), violating the second value sphere and claim to moral validity. These groups did not believe it was right or just for the ARC to use the funds for anything other than helping the victims and their families directly.11 Furthermore, the sincerity of the ARC was questionable, considering its initially confusing and reticent stance on presenting the utterance. Earlier incidents of mistrust of the ARC and non- profit organizations may also have contributed to doubt about the ARC’s sincerity in its intentions through this utterance (Seessel, 2002).

Also worthy of note is that the hearing did not end in consensus. Stake- holders were able to present their perspectives and hear alternative positions. Disagreement and dissent abounded at times during the hearing and led to out- comes such as the ARC’s decision to change its policy about the dispersal of the Liberty Fund money. The ARC had made its own internal decision prior to this discussion about the validity of its course of action, but at a high cost. By omitting or failing at the middle steps of discourse ethics, particularly by short- circuiting actual participation by stakeholders, the organization violated the procedure. The outcome highlights the importance of the procedural and inclusive nature of discourse ethics. Thus, Habermas’s discourse ethics as out- lined by a breakdown of his Principle U offers a useful heuristic for examin- ing and explaining the troubled reception of the Liberty Fund.

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Discussion

This exploration of discourse ethics and its application to the ARC’s Liberty Fund reveals several possibilities and complications inherent in applying moral frameworks to organizational utterances. I have argued that Habermas’s Principle U can be broken down into steps that offer both a practical procedure for organizations and their rhetors to follow in pursuit of ethical rhetorical action and an analytic framework for understanding and critiquing the ethical actions and failures of organizations. An interest- ing finding was that despite the ARC’s “violations” of the procedure in this example, Habermas’s Principle U did eventually occur on at least one level. Publics entered discussion of the validity of the ARC’s claim through the media. Major stakeholders then judged the utterance’s validity. The ARC revised its original utterance into something whose validity was justified and accepted by these stakeholders. The money of the Liberty Fund went exclusively to assist the victims’ families, and a new CEO took charge of the ARC.12

Another interpretation of this case can question whether Habermas’ ideal level of communicative action and discourse ethics actually occurred even when publics appeared to enter the discussion. Media representatives quickly labeled the ARC as having acted inappropriately. Fuller and earlier discussion of the original claim among all stakeholders might have led publics to agree with the organization’s original decision. Using the money to prepare for future attacks makes sense on many levels. However, publics might have been more open to this decision and use of their donations if they had been included in the discussion initially. Instead, the situation fostered a belief that the ARC tried to “pull a fast one” with donors. ARC protests that it had acted in ways consistent with the original utterance were met with skepticism, if not disregarded entirely.

Thus, a focus on discourse ethics provides both an explanation for the difficulties the ARC encountered in this incident and a procedure by which the organization may have avoided this particular crisis. Future research can consider the usefulness of these steps in other situations, including even internal communication among the ARC board, CEO, and local chapters.13

Future research can also further explore some of the difficulties of dis- course ethics that became evident in this analysis. First, it remains difficult to determine who is articulating an utterance for an organization. Is it the public relations practitioner, the organization as an entity or actor, and/or the CEO? Multiple utterances can contribute to conflicting interpretations and definitions as they did for the ARC. Future research can also address

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new possibilities that organizations can use, including virtual meetings, for the dialogic discussion required by discourse ethics.

In addition, the ARC case points out difficulties in deciding who is affected by an utterance. Habermas’s setup suggests that the rhetor is ini- tially in control of making this determination, but how can that rhetor over- come his or her biases? Just as Habermas argues that one person should not decide how everyone else will feel, one person may not be capable of deter- mining who all might be affected by an utterance. Some may suggest that this step of determining who is potentially affected must also be opened to public determination. Yet discourse ethics can run into a problem of infinite regression if it demands public discussion of who is affected by an utter- ance. In other words, does discourse ethics require public discussion of who participates in another public discussion? As a partial answer, I offer Mahoney’s (2002) argument that only actions that bear on others’ equal standing demand the procedures of discourse ethics. But participants are still left to judge when equal standing is at stake. At some point, an exclu- sionary judgment must be made about who should participate in any par- ticular discussion for the desired discussion to occur. On a practical level, if discussion reveals that someone who will be affected has been left out, then that party can be invited to join. Haas and Deetz’s (2000) suggestion of acknowledging organizational biases should also be further investigated in cases where scholars have greater access to the process of identifying stakeholders.

Discourse ethics must also answer concerns that the procedure might allow a group to judge an utterance as ethical, when outsiders view it as wrong. Habermas’s discourse ethics argues against the possibility of such an outcome because of its assumption of rational argument that privileges the equality of all participants. Mahoney describes it as guarding against this situation because “a moral consensus is valid only if all affected had the opportunity to participate and if the outcome of the discourse does not erode any participant’s standing as an equal member of the community” (p. 303). In other words, the movement between universal moral and local ethical levels of discourse ethics should prevent such a situation. The bal- ancing of attention to the contextual and universal is a strength of discourse ethics. This same strength is also how discourse ethics addresses concerns about unequal power relations. Within the discursive realm of communica- tive action, all human perspectives have equal value. A decision reached where stakeholder voices have been overpowered is not morally valid. Yet translating this equality into organizational reality is fraught with difficulty and requires further consideration.

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Other challenges to the enactment of discourse ethics remain. Benhabib (1992) criticized the ethic’s focus on and assumption of the desirability of achieving consensus. Consensus is distinct from achieving mutual under- standing, and although discourse ethics may more usefully and practically pursue mutual understanding, it does seem to privilege consensus with its focus on a judgment as outcome. Yet Habermas believes that the process of moral deliberation is continuous and any conclusion is only temporary. Furthermore, I have discussed how knowledge and understanding can be gained through the procedure even when consensus is not reached.

Finally, full use of discourse ethics is a perhaps debilitatingly time- consuming process in the face of unending ethical ramifications of organi- zational decisions. This consumption of time directly conflicts with societal rationality’s focus on power and money (Habermas, 1984, 1987). Corporations are not in the business of giving everyone an equal voice and chance for dis- cussion; they are focused on increasing profit margins. Discourse ethics’ requirement of the actual participation by all affected also creates logistical difficulties for organizations. Thus, it is easy to see how the principle of universalization is typically overlooked in organizations.

Enacting discourse ethics certainly creates some difficulties, but as the ARC example suggests, the principle itself may be unavoidable. Even in the Liberty Fund case, where public participation was overlooked at first, Principle U ended up occurring at least partially. Organizations and their managers may wish to consider this argument when choosing a procedure regarding their own actions and utterances. If they believe that the affected public will eventually get to challenge the validity of an utterance, organi- zations may be more motivated to ensure that publics get to participate in the initial discussion of utterances before costly decisions are made. Indeed, Healy’s successor, Evans, almost immediately launched a strategic planning process for the ARC that solicited and received input from a wide variety of publics.14 By purposively including the stakeholders during the process, organizations may earn credibility as positive participants in cul- tural rationality and communicative action.

Conclusion

Overall, I have offered Habermas’s discourse ethics as a model for devel- oping communicatively based organizational ethics. Discourse ethics sug- gests that the only universal moral principle is that rhetors follow Principle U to make judgments about statements. I have broken this principle into five

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steps that organizations and their rhetors may follow to enact discourse ethics. Individual and specific ethical judgments are made by the participants in a discussion who follow this principle. Organizations may be inclined to circumvent the procedure in pursuit of the power and profit that are promoted by societal rationality. However, I have argued that if Habermas’s Principle U is valid, then cultural rationality is still being used to interpret the lifeworld, and participative communicative action will occur. Following discourse ethics can help organizations maintain and engage cultural rationality. On a practical level, discourse ethics and Principle U may have to be employed as an overarching framework, something that is in the consciousness of an orga- nization, something that can balance societal rationality’s nondiscursive stan- dard of profit. Organizations and individuals can benefit from understanding how cultural rationality, mutual understanding, and discourse ethics work.

I have explained how these principles can apply to organizations com- municatively, concretely articulating how organizations and organizational actors can enact discourse ethics in pursuit of ethical utterances and behav- iors. Ideals can be impossible to realize, and aiming for ethical organiza- tional behavior is aiming for what some may call an impossible ideal. Yet by developing Habermas’s notion of discourse ethics into something concrete and specific, organizational scholars and practitioners may have a useful guide for how to get closer to an ideal of ethical organizational communication.

Notes

1. In earlier work, Habermas (e.g., 1979) discussed four validity claims. The fourth claim is to intelligibility of the claim, suggesting that the listener must be able to hear and understand the utterance being articulated.

2. Heath (2001) advocates an interpretation of Habermas’s work that suggests that “it makes no sense to suppose that the agent could raise any more than a single validity claim with any given utterance” (p. 119). However, individuals frequently imbue more than one meaning or intent in the same utterance. Therefore, I maintain the stance that speakers simultaneously raise all three claims to validity in utterances.

3. Habermas (1993) suggested that when deciding which previously justified moral norm to apply in a given situation, Principle U functions as a principle of appropriateness, directing the procedure for discussion and deliberation. The implication is that the norm is valid prior to its application to an ethical dilemma.

4. I wish to acknowledge one of the anonymous reviewers for directing me toward this development of discourse ethics and its consequent invitation to communication scholars.

5. Both of these authors provide thorough descriptions of discourse ethics as developed by Habermas in Moral Consciousness (1990) and Justification and Application (1993). Also see Pearson’s (1989) reliance on Habermas’s ideal speech situation as a basis for two-way dialogi- cal public relations practice.

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6. The majority of the press releases referenced here are no longer available on redcross.org. However, using www.waybackmachine.org, I was able to locate original and subsequent revi- sions of the various press releases regarding the Liberty Fund.

7. This case is so rich that the space allotted here does not allow room for discussion of all of its nuances. For an overview of most of the issues, see the transcript of the November 6, 2001 oversight committee hearing, available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/Hearings/ 11062001hearing414/print.htm.

8. In fact, her decision to create the fund without consulting the board of directors, although technically allowed by the organization’s structure and rules, is what likely led to her ouster by the board (see the transcript of the November 6, 2001 hearing).

9. Although I noted above that the American Red Cross (ARC) failed to communicate the utterance to stakeholders, the evidence of ways in which the message did exist suggests that the stakeholders are not blameless here either.

10. The ARC’s original plan for the Liberty Fund included strengthening its crisis phone line structures. Inadequate phone support was something the organization was criticized for in its 2005 response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.

11. Note, too, how the moral judgment is tightly linked to the cognitive judgment of truth or falsity, reinforcing the earlier discussion of the simultaneity of the various validity claims and the need to consider them in concert.

12. The linkage of Evans’s subsequent premature departure in December, 2005, to issues of board management and communication suggests a concerning trend in ARC leadership that is ripe for further study.

13. Reports that both Evans and Healy resigned from the ARC because of disagreements with the board suggests a serious need for investigation of such internal processes.

14. Evans reported in an interview that approximately 6,000 individuals participated in the development of the ARC’s strategic plan (see Taylor, 2005).

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Rebecca J. Meisenbach (PhD, Purdue) is an assistant professor of communication at the University of Missouri–Columbia. Her research focuses on intersections among organizing, rhetoric, and ethics, with particular attention to issues of nonprofit and gendered organizing.

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