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Chapter 1 Introduction to Deviance

Founded in 1972, the Fremont Fair is one of Seattle’s most beloved neighborhood street festivals, featuring a weekend of eclectic activities that celebrate the quirky community of Fremont, the self-proclaimed “center of the universe.” Held annually in mid-June to coincide with the Summer Solstice, the event draws more than 100,000 people to shop, eat, drink, mingle, groove, and enjoy all manners of creative expression. Artistic highlights include craft and art booths, street performers, local bands, wacky decorated art cars, the free-spirited Solstice Parade produced by the Fremont Arts Council, and many other oddities that personify Fremont’s official motto “Delibertus Quirkus”—Freedom to be Peculiar.

—Fremont Fair (2010)

The Fremont Arts Council (FAC) is a community-based celebration arts organization. We value volunteerism; community participation; artistic expression; and the sharing of arts skills. The Fremont Solstice Parade is the defining event of the FAC. We celebrate the longest day of the year through profound street theater, public spectacle, and a kaleidoscope of joyous human expressions. We welcome the participation of everyone regardless of who they are, or what they think or believe. However, the FAC reserves the right to control the content presented in the Fremont Solstice Parade.

The rules of the Fremont Solstice Parade, which make this event distinct from other types of parades, are:

No written or printed words or logos No animals (except guide dogs and service animals) No motorized vehicles (except wheelchairs) No real weapons or fire

—Fremont Arts Council (2010)

It is true that a parade with no logos, animals, or motorized vehicles is different from most parades that we experience in the United States. But one more thing sets the Fremont Solstice Parade apart from other parades: the public displays of nudity. Every year at the parade, a contingent of nude, body-painted bicyclists (both men and women) ride through the streets of Fremont as part of the parade. Rain or shine (and let’s face it, in June in Seattle, there can be a lot of rain), a large group of naked adults cycle down the street as the crowds cheer and wave. The Fremont City Council estimates that more than 100,000 people visit the weekend fair, and pictures show that the streets are crowded with parade watchers, from the very young to elderly.

Contrast this event to the following story of a flasher in San Diego County. Between the summer of 2009 and the summer of 2010, there were numerous reports of an adult man flashing hikers and runners on Mission Trails near Lake Murphy in San Diego. An undercover operation was set in motion to catch this flasher, and on July 19, 2010, an adult man was apprehended while flashing an undercover officer who was posing as a jogger in the park. The man was held on $50,000 bail while waiting for arraignment (KFMB-News 8, 2010).

While both these events center on public displays of nudity, one is celebrated while the other is vilified. Why?

Photos 1.1 & 1.2 When is a public display of nudity considered deviant? When is it celebrated?

©JMW Scout/iStockphoto

Photodisc/ThinkStock

Introduction You might expect that a book about deviance would start with a definition of what deviance is. But like all things worth studying, a simple definition does not exist. For example, in the stories above, one public display of nudity was not only welcomed but celebrated by 6-year-olds and grandmothers alike, but another display led to arrest and possible jail time. Why? This chapter and this book explore how it can be that the Fremont Summer Solstice Parade can be celebrated in the same summer that a flasher is arrested and held on $50,000 bail until charged.

Conceptions of Deviance All deviance textbooks offer their “conceptions of deviance.” Rubington and Weinberg (2008) argue that there are generally two conceptions of deviance as either “objectively given” or “subjectively problematic.” Clinard and Meier (2010) also suggest two general conceptions of deviance, the reactionist or relativist conception and the normative conception. Thio (2009) argues that we can view deviance from a positivist perspective or a constructionist perspective.

While none of these authors are using the same language, they are defining similar conceptions of deviance. The first conception—that of an “objectively given,” normative, or positivist conception of deviance—assumes that there is a general set of norms of behavior, conduct, and conditions on which we can agree. Norms are rules of behavior that guide people’s actions. Sumner (1906) broke norms down into three categories: folkways, mores, and laws. Folkways are everyday norms that do not generate much uproar if they are violated. Think of them as behaviors that might be considered rude if engaged in, like standing too close to someone while speaking or picking one’s nose. Mores are “moral” norms that may generate more outrage if broken. In a capitalist society, homelessness and unemployment can elicit outrage if the person is considered unworthy of sympathy. Similarly, drinking too much or alcoholism may be seen as a lapse in moral judgment. Finally, the third type of norm is the law, which is considered the strongest norm because it is backed by official sanctions (or a formal response). In this conception, then, deviance becomes a violation of a rule understood by the majority of the group. This rule may be minor, in which case the

deviant is seen as “weird but harmless,” or the rule may be major, in which case the deviant is seen as “criminal.” The obvious problem with this conceptualization goes back to the earlier examples of reactions to public nudity, where we see that violation of a most “serious” norm (law) can receive quite different reactions. This leads to the second conception.

The second conception of deviance—the “subjectively problematic,” reactionist or relativist, social constructionist conception—assumes that the definition of deviance is constructed based on the interactions of those in society. According to this conception, behaviors or conditions are not inherently deviant; they become so when the definition of deviance is applied to them. The study of deviance is not about why certain individuals violate norms but, instead, about how those norms are constructed. Social constructionists believe that our understanding of the world is in constant negotiation between actors. Those who have a relativist conception of deviance define deviance as those behaviors that elicit a definition or label of deviance:

Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders. For this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an “offender.” The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label. (Becker, 1973, p. 9)

This is a fruitful conceptualization, but it is also problematic. What about very serious violations of norms that are never known or reacted to? Some strict reactionists or relativists would argue that these acts (beliefs or attitudes) are not deviant. Most of us would agree that killing someone and making it look like he or she simply skipped the country is deviant. However, there may be no reaction.

A third conception of deviance that has not been advanced in many textbooks (for an exception, see DeKeseredy, Ellis, & Alvi, 2005) is a critical definition of deviance (Jensen, 2007). Those working from a critical conception of deviance argue that the normative understanding of deviance is established by those in power to maintain and enhance their power. It suggests that explorations of deviance have focused on a white, male, middle- to upper-class understanding of society that implies that people of color, women, and the working poor are by definition deviant. Instead of focusing on individual types of deviance, this conception critiques the social system that exists and creates such norms in the first place. This, too, is a useful and powerful approach, but there are still some things that the vast majority of society agrees are so immoral, unethical, and deviant that they should be illegal and that the system can serve to protect our interests against these things.

Given that each of these conceptualizations is useful but problematic, we do not adhere to a single conception of deviance in this book because the theories of deviance do not adhere to a single conception. You will see that several of our theories assume a normative conception, whereas several assume a social constructionist or critical conception. As you explore each of these theories, think about what the conception of deviance and theoretical perspective mean for the questions we ask and answer about deviance (Table 1.1).

Be Careful Who You Are Calling Deviant: Body Ritual Among the Nacirema In 1956, Horace Miner published an article on the Nacirema, a poorly understood culture that he claimed engaged in body rituals and ceremonies that were unique, obsessive, and almost magical. He highlighted several of these beliefs and actions:

The fundamental belief of the Nacirema people is that the human body is ugly and prone to “debility and disease.” The people engage in rituals and ceremonies in a “ritual center” considered to be a shrine. Affluent members of society may have more than one shrine devoted to these rituals and ceremonies. Each shrine has, near its center point, a box or chest filled with magical potions. Many believe they cannot live without these magical potions and so collect to the point of hoarding them, afraid to let them go even when it is determined they may no longer hold their magic. The people have an “almost pathological horror and fascination with the mouth, the condition of which is believed to have a supernatural influence on all social relationships. Were it not for the rituals of the mouth, they believe that their teeth would fall out, their gums bleed, their jaws shrink, their friends desert them, and their lovers reject them” (p. 505).

Miner never lets on that this fascinating culture that believes magic will transform its members’ ugly, diseased bodies is actually American (Nacirema spelled backward) culture. But his point is made: Our understanding and interpretation of events and behaviors is often relative. If we step back from the everyday events in which we engage with little thought, our most accepted practices can be made to seem deviant.

Take a moment to examine some everyday activity that you engage in from the perspective of an outsider. What might watching television, going to a sporting event, babysitting, or surfing look like to those who have never experienced it? Can you write a description of this everyday event from an outsider’s point of view?

S o u rc e :S o u rc e : Miner (1956).

How Do YOU Define Deviance? As Justice Potter Stewart of the Supreme Court once famously wrote about trying to define obscene materials, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it” (Jacobellis v. Ohio, 1964). Those who do not study deviance for a living probably find themselves in the same boat; it may be hard to write a definition, but how hard could it be to “know it when we see it”?

Choose a busy place to sit and observe human behavior for one hour. Write down all the behaviors that you observe during that hour. Do you consider any of these behaviors to be deviant? Which conception of deviance are you using when you define each as deviant? Might there be some instances (e.g., places or times) when that behavior you consider to be nondeviant right now might become deviant? Finally, bring your list of behaviors to class. In pairs, share your list of behaviors and your definitions of deviant behaviors with your partner. Do you agree on your categorization? Why or why not?

Deviance in Popular Culture Many types of deviance are portrayed and investigated in popular culture. Films and television shows, for example, illustrate a wide range of deviant behavior and social control. There are often several interpretations of what acts are deviant in each film. How do you know when an act or person is deviant? One way to develop your sociological imagination is to watch films and television shows from a critical perspective and to think about how different theories would explain the deviant behavior and the reactions portrayed. To get you started, we’ve listed a number of films and television shows that you might watch and explore for examples of cultural norms, different types of deviant behavior, and coping with stigma.

Films Trekkies—A documentary following the stories of individuals who are superfans of Star Trek. Known as Trekkies, these individuals have incorporated Star Trek into their everyday lives. Some wear the uniforms or speak and teach the various languages from the show, one has considered surgery to alter the shape of his ears, and some have legally changed their names and incorporated Star Trek into their businesses and workplaces. The movie documents their fandom and experiences navigating these consuming obsessions while in mainstream society. Crumb—A movie about the cartoonist Robert Crumb, who was a pioneer of the underground comix. This movie offers a dark portrait of an artist besieged with personal and family demons. The Usual Suspects—A story of five men who are brought in for questioning for a crime they did not commit. While being held on suspicion of that crime, they agree to work together on another crime. They soon realize they are being set up by someone they had wronged in the past. Fourteen Days in May—A BBC documentary of the fourteen days before Edward Earl Johnson’s execution date in a Mississippi gas chamber. The film follows Johnson’s allegations that his confession had been made under duress and that he was innocent and the reactions from other death row inmates, prison guards, and the warden.

Television Television, reality shows and the TLC channel, in particular, features a number of programs offering an inside view of people perceived as deviant or different in some way and showing how they deal with stigma from various sources.

Sister Wives—A look inside the world of a polygamist marriage. This reality show introduces viewers to a man, his four wives, and his 16 children. His motto: “Love should be multiplied, not divided.” My Strange Addiction—A reality show that highlights potentially deviant obsessions of individuals with addictions such as eating glass, plastic bags, household cleaners, or makeup; having dozens of surgeries in order to look like a living doll; and living as husband and wife with a synthetic doll. Seinfeld—A situation comedy that is simply masterful at focusing on small behaviors or characteristics that break norms and are perceived as deviant. Episodes on the close talker, the low talker, and the high talker, for example, all illustrate unwritten norms of interpersonal communication.

The Internet/Podcasts/Social Media The Internet may be one of the best places to go for our examples of deviance and social control. It is all right at our fingertips all the time.

Dr. Pimple Popper, aka Dr. Sandra Lee. There are many YouTube videos dedicated to the oddities of the body, but one of our favorites is Dr. Pimple Popper, a board certified dermatologist who tapes some of her “extractions” for the popaholics who like to tune in to watch blackheads and pimples get popped.

In each of the chapters that follow, we will offer suggestions of one or more features of pop culture for you to watch from the theoretical perspective outlined in the chapter. We think you’ll soon agree: Deviance is all around us.

The Sociological Imagination Those of us who are sociologists can probably remember the first time we were introduced to the concept of the sociological imagination. Mills argues that the only way to truly understand the experiences of the individual is to first understand the societal, institutional, and historical conditions that individual is living under. In other words, Mills believes that no man, woman, or child is an island. Below is an excerpt from C. Wright Mills’s (1959/2000) profound book, The Sociological Imagination.

Men do not usually define the troubles they endure in terms of historical change and institutional contradiction. The well-being they enjoy, they do not usually impute to the big ups and downs of the societies in which they live. Seldom aware of the intricate connection between the patterns of their own lives and the course of world history, ordinary men do not usually know what this connection means for the kinds of men they are becoming and for the kinds of history-making in which they might take part. They do not possess the quality of mind essential to grasp the interplay of man and society, of biography and history, of self and world. They cannot cope with their personal troubles in such ways as to control the structural transformations that usually lie behind them. . . .

The sociological imagination enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals. It enables him to take into account how individuals, in the welter of their daily experience, often become falsely conscious of their social positions. With that welter, the framework of modern society is sought, and within that framework the psychologies of a variety of men and women are formulated. By such means the personal uneasiness of individuals is focused upon explicit troubles and the indifference of publics is transformed into involvement with public issues.

The first fruit of this imagination—and the first lesson of the social science that embodies it—is the idea that the individual can understand his own experience and gauge his own fate only by locating himself within his period, that he can know his own chances in life only by becoming aware of those of all individuals in his circumstances. In many ways it is a terrible lesson; in many ways a magnificent one. . . .

In these terms, consider unemployment. When, in a city of 100,000, only one man is unemployed, that is his personal trouble, and for its relief we properly look to the character of the man, his skills, and his immediate opportunities. But when in a nation of 50 million employees, 15 million men are unemployed, that is an issue, and we may not hope to find its solution within the range of opportunities open to any one individual. The very structure of opportunities has collapsed. Both the correct statement of the problem and the range of possible solutions require us to consider the economic and political institutions of the society, and not merely the personal situation and character of a scatter of individuals. . . .

What we experience in various and specific milieux, I have noted, is often caused by structural changes. Accordingly, to understand the changes of many personal milieux we are required to look beyond them. And the number and variety of such structural changes increase as the institutions within which we live become more embracing and more intricately connected with one another. To be aware of the idea of social structure and to use it with sensibility is to be capable of tracing such linkages among a great variety of milieux. To be able to do that is to possess the sociological imagination. (The Sociological Imagination by C. Wright Mills [2000] pp. 3–11. By permission of Oxford University Press, USA.)

One of our favorite examples of the sociological imagination in action is the “salad bar” example. In the United States, one of the persistent philosophies is that of individualism and personal responsibility. Under this philosophy, individuals are assumed to be solely responsible for their successes and failures. This philosophy relies heavily on the notion that individuals are rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of their actions, can see the consequences of their behavior, and have perfect information. The salad bar example helps those who rely heavily on this conception of the individual to see the importance of social structure to individual behavior.

No one doubts that when you order a salad bar at a restaurant, you are responsible for building your own salad. Every person makes his or her own salad, and no two salads look exactly alike. Some make salads with lots of lettuce and vegetables, very little cheese, and fat-free dressing. Others create a salad that is piled high with cheese, croutons, and lots and lots of dressing. Those who are unhappy with their choices while making their salad have only themselves to blame, right? Not necessarily.

A salad is only as good as the salad bar it is created from. In other words, individuals making a salad can only make a salad from the ingredients supplied from the salad bar. If the restaurant is out of croutons that day or decided to put watermelon out instead of cantaloupe, the individual must build his or her salad within these constraints. Some individuals with a great sense of personal power may request additional items from the back of the restaurant, but most individuals will choose to build a salad based on the items available to them on the salad bar. In other words, the individual choice is constrained by the larger social forces of delivery schedules, food inventory, and worker decision making. The sociological imagination is especially important to understand because it is the building block for our understanding of deviance and sociological theory.

Photo 1.3 The salad bar can represent the restriction on choices that individuals have. We can only make our salad with the ingredients offered to us on the salad bar.

Comstock/Thinkstock

The sociological imagination helps us understand the impact of social forces on both engaging in and reacting to deviance. One of the easiest reactions to or assumptions about someone who engages in deviance is that they are “sick” or “mentally ill.” This assumption is what we refer to as pathologizing an individual. It puts all the responsibility for their actions onto them without asking what impact the social forces and social structures around them might have. The sociological imagination reminds us that individuals exist in a larger social system, and they impact that larger social system just as it impacts them. One of the ways to systematically understand these impacts is to understand sociological theory.

The Importance of Theory The three of us (the authors of this book) spent many hours discussing the importance of theory as we wrote this book. Why did we choose to write a textbook about deviance with theory as the central theme? Many of you may also be asking this question and worrying that a book about theory may suck the life right out of a discussion about deviance. Really, who wants to be thinking about theory when we could be talking about “nuts, sluts, and preverts” (Liazos, 1972)? But this is precisely why we must make theory central to any discussion of deviance— because theory helps us systematically think about deviance. If it weren’t for theory, classes about deviance would be akin to watching MTV’s Jersey Shore or Bravo’s The Real Housewives of New Jersey (Why is New Jersey so popular for these shows?)—it may be entertaining, but we have no clearer understanding of the “real” people of New Jersey when we are done watching.

Theory is what turns anecdotes about human behavior into a systematic understanding of societal behavior. It does this by playing an intricate part in research and the scientific method.

The scientific method is a systematic procedure that helps safeguard against researcher bias and the power of anecdotes by following several simple steps (Figure 1.1). First, a researcher starts with a research question. If the researcher is engaging in deductive research, this question comes from a theoretical perspective. This theory and research question help the researcher create hypotheses (testable statements) about a phenomenon being studied. Once the researcher has created hypotheses, he or she collects data to test these hypotheses. We discuss data and data collection methods for deviance research in detail in Chapter 3. The researcher then analyzes these data, interprets the findings, and concludes whether or not his or her hypotheses have been supported. These findings then inform whether the theory the researcher used helps with our understanding of the world or should be revised to take into consideration information that does not support its current model. If a researcher is engaging in inductive research, he or she also starts with a research question, but in the beginning, the researcher’s theory may be what we call “grounded theory.” Using qualitative methods, such as participant observation or in-depth interviews, the researcher would collect data and analyze these data, looking for common themes throughout. These findings would be used to create a theory “from the ground up.” In other words, while a deductive researcher would start with a theory that guides every step of the research, an inductive researcher might start with a broad theoretical perspective and a research question and, through the systematic collection of data and rigorous analyses, would hone that broad theoretical perspective into a more specific theory. This theory would then be tested again as the researcher continued on with his or her work, or others, finding this new theory to be useful and interesting, might opt to use it to inform both their deductive and inductive work.

Figure 1.1 The Scientific Method Allows Us to Systematically Examine Social Phenomena Such as Deviance

If we go back to our example of reality shows about people from New Jersey, we may see the difference between an anecdote and a more theoretically grounded understanding of human behavior. After watching both Jersey Shore and The Real Housewives of New Jersey, we may conclude that people from New Jersey are loud, self-absorbed, and overly tan (all three of which might be considered deviant behaviors or characteristics). However, we have not systematically studied the people of New Jersey to arrive at our conclusion. Using inductive reasoning, based on our initial observation, we may start with a research question that states that because the people of New Jersey are loud, self- absorbed, and overly tan, we are interested in knowing about the emotional connections they have with friends and family. (We may suspect that self-absorbed people are more likely to have relationships with conflict.) However, as we continue along the scientific method, we systematically gather data from more than just the reality stars of these two shows. We interview teachers, police officers, retired lawyers, and college students. What we soon learn as we analyze these interviews is that the general public in New Jersey is really not all that tan, loud, or self-absorbed, and they speak openly and warmly about strong connections to family and friends. This research leads us to reexamine our initial theory about the characteristics of people from New Jersey and offer a new theory based on systematic analysis. This new theory then informs subsequent research on the people of New Jersey. If we did not have theory and the scientific method, our understanding of deviance would be based on wild observations and anecdotes, which may be significantly misleading and unrepresentative of the social reality.

In addition to being systematic and testable (through the scientific method), theory offers solutions to the problems we study. One of the hardest knocks against the study of deviance and crime has been the historically carnival sideshow nature (Liazos, 1972) of much of the study of deviance. By focusing on individuals and a certain caste of deviants (those without power) and using less-than-systematic methods, deviance researchers were just pointing at “nuts, sluts, and preverts” and not advancing their broader understanding of the interplay of power, social structure, and behavior. Theory can focus our attention on this interplay and offer solutions beyond the individual and the deficit model, which is a model that focuses on the individual (or group) in question and blames the deviance on something broken, lacking, or deficient in him or

her. Bendle (1999) also argued that the study of deviance was in a state of crisis because researchers were no longer studying relevant problems or offering useful solutions. One of Bendle’s solutions is to push for new theories of deviant behavior.

Theoretical solutions to the issue of deviance are especially important because many of our current responses to deviant behavior are erroneously based on an individualistic notion of human nature that does not take into account humans as social beings or the importance of social structure, social institutions, power, and broad societal changes for deviance and deviants.

The Poverty of the Sociology of Deviance: Nuts, Sluts, and Preverts Liazos argues that the study of deviance used to be the study of “nuts, sluts, and preverts,” a sensationalistic ritual in finger-pointing and moralizing. The focus was on individuals and their “aberrant” behavior. This meant that the most harmful behaviors in society—the ones that affected us most thoroughly—were ignored and, in ignoring them, normalized. Liazos referred to these forms of deviance as covert institutional violence.

According to Liazos, the poverty of the study of deviance was threefold: First, even when trying to point out how normal the “deviance” or “deviant” is, by pointing out the person or behavior, we are acknowledging the difference. If that difference really were invisible, how and why would we be studying it? This meant by even studying deviance, a moral choice had already been made—some differences were studied; some were not. Second, by extension, deviance research rarely studied elite deviance and structural deviance, instead focusing on “dramatic” forms of deviance, such as prostitution, juvenile delinquency, and homosexuality. Liazos argues that it is important to, instead, study covert institutional violence, which leads to such things as poverty and exploitation. Instead of studying tax cheats, we should study unjust tax laws; instead of studying prostitution, we should study racism and sexism as deviance. Finally, Liazos argues that even those who profess to study the relationship between power and deviance do not really acknowledge the importance of power. These researchers still give those in positions of power a pass to engage in harmful behavior by not defining much elite deviance as deviance at all.

The implication of this is that those who study deviance have allowed the definition of deviance to be settled for them. And this definition benefits not only individuals in power but also a system that has routinely engaged in harmful acts. While Liazos wrote this important critique of the sociology of deviance in 1972, much of his analysis holds up to this day. In this book, we examine theories expressly capable of addressing this critique.

As you explore each of the theories offered to you in this book, remember Liazos’s critique. Which theories are more likely to focus on “nuts, sluts, and preverts”? Which are more likely to focus on elite deviance and new conceptions of deviance?

Compiled from Alexander Liazos, 1972, in Social Problems, 20(1), 103–120.

Explaining Deviance in the Streets and Deviance in the Suites We have included a section in each chapter that discusses a “street” deviance and juxtaposes it against an “elite” or “suite” deviance. We have chosen to do this because, in many instances, street deviance is the focus of examinations. (Again, we gravitate to conversations of “nuts, sluts, and preverts” if we aren’t systematic.) We wanted to make sure for each street deviance we explored that we offered an exploration of an elite deviance, too. Depending on the chapter, we have chosen to do this in one of two ways. Some chapters focus on a single deviance that, while engaged in by a variety of individuals, is interpreted differently depending on the characteristics of who is engaging in it. For example, in Chapter 6, we focus on social learning theory and drug use and examine how class neighborhood characteristics impact drug use. In Chapter 8, we focus on labeling theory and how the class characteristics of individuals impact the likelihood that they will be labeled a person with a drinking problem. Both of these approaches show that a single behavior is impacted by class—by affecting either the likelihood of engaging in the behavior or the likelihood that the behavior will be perceived as deviant. Finally, in some of our chapters, we choose to examine two separate forms of deviance, highlighting how a street deviance (one that often receives more attention, is perceived as more detrimental, or is perceived as likely to be engaged in by the poor) compares with an elite or suite deviance (often an action or behavior that many cannot agree is deviant or that is engaged in by those who have substantial amounts of power). For example, in Chapter 10, we use critical theories to discuss how changing technologies have affected pornography (our example of street deviance) and illegal government surveillance (our example of suite deviance). In chapters such as this, we want to highlight how a single theory may address behaviors that are often on very different ends of the power and class spectrum. In all of the chapters, we first offer a substantive discussion of the deviance before we analyze it from the perspective of the chapter.

Ideas in Action For the purposes of this book, we are expanding the discussion of public policy to include public and private programs, which is why we have titled this section in each chapter “Ideas in Action.” While a single, concrete definition of public policy is elusive, there is general agreement that public policy is the sometimes unwritten actions taken by the city, state, or federal government. These actions may be as formal as a law or regulation or be more informal in nature, such as an institutional custom. While public policy is often associated with government guidelines or actions, we also find it important to highlight the work of public and private programs, nonprofits, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). For this reason, our “Ideas in Action” section may highlight a private program or entity or a public (state or federal) guideline, rule, or law that affects our understanding or control of deviance.

Some argue that tension exists between public policies and private programs created to address deviance, crime, and public well-being. These tensions are twofold. The first argument involves what some argue is a movement of public well-being out of the public realm (the government) to a private and more likely profit-motivated industry (private programs). This shift is often referred to as neoliberalism.

The term neoliberalism refers to a political, economic, and social ideology that argues that low government intervention, a privatization of

services that in the past have predominately been the domain of government, an adherence to a free-market philosophy, and an emphasis on deregulation (Frericks, Maier, & de Graaf, 2009) is “the source and arbiter of human freedoms” (Mudge, 2008, p. 704). What may be one of the most important aspects of neoliberalism from the standpoint of those focused on social justice, then, is this link between the free markets and morality. While free markets have proven time and again to place the utmost emphasis on the profit motive (because this is what the free market is: an adherence to the notion of supply and demand)—this connection between free markets and “freedom” seems to intrinsically suggest that free markets, and, therefore, neoliberalism, have individual well-being as their focus.

However, individual well-being in the form of a guarantee that individuals will have access to the basic human needs of shelter, food, clothing, good health care, and safety from harm is not always produced by two of the most central components of neoliberalism— privatization and deregulation. In some ways, privatization and deregulation are opposite sides of the same coin. Privatization means the “opening up of the market” and the loosening of the rules (regulations) that are often the purview of the government. But privatization, at its core, is also the introduction of the profit motive into services that, at their core, are about protecting the human condition. A reliance on a neoliberal philosophy and free market economy means that we begin to evaluate everything through the lens of profit and cost-benefit analyses. We abdicate the responsibility of the state to private companies and then feign surprise when those companies defer to the profit motive. . . . In addition to the increased preference for free markets and profits, privatization both reduces state responsibility for the care of its citizens and masks the lack of preparation of the government to care for its citizens that quickly develops (Mitchell, 2001). (Bates & Swan, 2010, p. 442)

As you read and evaluate the policies and programs we have chosen, keep this argument in mind. Does it play out with the programs we discuss?

The second argument is that public programs may more likely focus on suppression (the social control of deviance), whereas private programs may more likely focus on rehabilitation and prevention. In general, suppression policies are those that focus on the punishment and social control of behavior deemed deviant. Rehabilitation programs focus on groups or individuals who are deemed likely deviant and involve attempts to change this assumed deviant behavior. Prevention programs may be focused on groups or individuals who are assumed to be more “at risk” for deviant behavior, or they may be focused on decreasing the likelihood of deviance in all groups equally. Many argue that there has been a buildup of suppression policies in the state and federal governments at the expense of rehabilitation and prevention programs. Meranze (2009) argues,

From the recently repealed Rockefeller drug laws through the expansion of the prison systems in Texas and Florida, onto the increasingly punitive response to poverty in the Clinton years, and the continuing disparity in sentencing laws, states and the federal government have chosen the Iron State over the Golden State. And whatever arguments there may be about the relative effectiveness of imprisonment in affecting crime rates (a topic of great controversy amongst scholars and analysts), one thing seems certain: a policy that exacerbates the brutalization of society is not one that will make us safer. Investing in prisons means investing in institutions that produce neither goods nor new opportunities (aside from the limited jobs available for prison employees and the one-time opportunities in construction); money spent on imprisonment is money taken from rebuilding our worn out infrastructure, our schools, our communities, and our economic future. Insofar as corrections remains at the heart of our social policy—rather than as a supplemental or marginal support as it was throughout most of United States history—it is the Iron State stealing from the future of the Golden State. (n.p.)

Finally, according to Barlow and Decker (2010), “Policy ought to be guided by science rather than by ideology” (p. xi). As we have already briefly discussed, a central part of the scientific method is theory. Therefore, a book whose primary focus is a theoretical examination of deviance and social control should have as one of its central themes an examination of public policy from the viewpoint of each of these theories.

The reaction to deviance has often been spurred by interests well beyond science. Barlow and Decker (2010) point out,

The pen remains firmly in the hands of politicians and legislators, whose allegiance is less to the products of science—for example, how to deal with the AIDS pandemic, warnings about global warming, and the ineffectiveness of the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI (otherwise known as “Star Wars”)—than to the whims of voters and the personal agendas of their counselors and financial supporters. (pp. xi–xii)

This means the reactions to deviance have often focused on the stigmatization and criminalization of a variety of behaviors and, in many instances, on the harsh punishment of those behaviors.

We offer a wide variety of public policies, or “ideas in action,” that were designed to address deviant behaviors. It will be your job to evaluate these programs and policies for their intents and subsequent success.

Now YOU . . . Use Your Sociological Imagination In his 1972 article, “The Poverty of the Sociology of Deviance: Nuts, Sluts, and Preverts,” Alexander Liazos argues that the sociology of deviance focuses too much

attention on individual idiosyncrasies and not enough attention on structural dynamics and the deviance of the powerful. One of the areas that we might examine for examples of individual, organizational, and global deviance is the consumption of energy and the impact on climate change. While in certain segments of the population there is still an argument, there is a growing acceptance of the detrimental impact of industrialization on climate change. The following are several examples of individual and national behavior in response to this growing concern:

In 1997, 192 out of 195 countries signed the Kyoto Protocol, pledging to lower greenhouse gas emissions. The agreement required that developed countries commit to lowering their emissions while developing countries were asked to try to lower emissions. The United States was one of the three countries that did not sign. In the summer of 2015, Shell Oil pulled its drilling rig into Puget Sound on the way up to the remote waters of the Chukchi Sea, off the coast of Alaska. Environmental activists known as kayaktivists protested the deep-sea drilling and the use of the Port of Seattle as a way station for drilling materials by surrounding the drilling rig with kayaks, thus blocking the movement of the rig, and later by blocking a Shell icebreaker headed to Alaskan waters by dangling from the St. John’s Bridge over the Willamette River while more kayaktivists surrounding the large vessel below (Brait, 2015). On December 12, 2015, in Paris, 195 countries adopted the Paris Agreement. In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, this pact required that all countries address greenhouse emissions in some way. Some of the elements, like target reductions in carbon emissions, are voluntary, whereas other elements, such as verifying emissions, are legally binding (Davenport, 2015).

Figure 1.2 is taken from a webpage from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (part of the Department of Energy) explaining the U.S. energy consumption by sector for 2012. Following this chart on the webpage is a section taken from the Environmental Protection Agency (also a federal agency) explaining the effects of fossil fuels on climate change.

Figure 1.2 Primary Energy Consumption by Source and Sector, 2012 (Quadrillion Btu)

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2012, 2.0 Primary Energy Consumption by Source and Sector, 2012.

Note: Sum of components may not equal 100% due to independent rounding.

Using your sociological imagination, how might you discuss the figures and examples as indicators of deviance? How might the relationship between the U.S. government, lobbyists, and oil companies affect the conversation around climate change? Pretend you are an oil executive. Which might be more deviant in your view: the breakdown of U.S. energy consumption, the research on climate change, or the Paris Agreement? Why? Now pretend that you are an oceanographer studying changes in the Gulf of Mexico, a zoologist studying polar bear migration, or an activist hanging off a bridge. What might you define as deviant? Why? Would these groups define the same information as deviant? Do you consider either the breakdown of the U.S. consumption of energy or the discussion of climate change to be deviant? Why or why not?

For over the past 200 years, the burning of fossil fuels, such as coal and oil, and deforestation have caused the concentrations of heat-trapping “greenhouse gases” to

increase significantly in our atmosphere. These gases prevent heat from escaping to space, somewhat like the glass panels of a greenhouse.

Greenhouse gases are necessary to life as we know it, because they keep the planet’s surface warmer than it otherwise would be. But, as the concentrations of these gases continue to increase in the atmosphere, the earth’s temperature is climbing above past levels. According to NOAA and NASA data, the earth’s average surface temperature has increased by about 1.2°F to 1.4°F in the last 100 years. The eight warmest years on record (since 1850) have all occurred since 1998, with the warmest year being 2005. Most of the warming in recent decades is very likely the result of human activities. Other aspects of the climate are also changing, such as rainfall patterns, snow and ice cover, and sea level.

If greenhouse gases continue to increase, climate models predict that the average temperature at the earth’s surface could increase from 3.2°F to 7.2°F above 1990 levels by the end of this century. Scientists are certain that human activities are changing the composition of the atmosphere, and that increasing the concentration of greenhouse gases will change the planet’s climate. But they are not sure by how much it will change, at what rate it will change, or what the exact effects will be. (Environmental Protection Agency, 2011)

Conclusion: Organization of the Book We start your introduction to deviance by examining the diversity of deviance, how our definitions of deviance change over time, and how we research deviance. Then, we focus on theories of deviance, starting with the traditional, positivist theories of deviance and moving to social constructionist and critical theories of deviance. We also try to present the theories in a fairly chronological manner. While all these theories are still in use in the study of deviance, some have been around longer than others. Positivist theories have been around longer than social constructionist theories, and within positivist theories, anomie has been around longer than social disorganization. We think this offers you a general road map of how thinking and theories have developed about deviance. In each of these chapters, we present the classical versions of each theory and then the contemporary version, and along the way, we explore several types of deviance that may be explained by each given theory. Then, in our final chapters, we examine our individual and societal responses to deviance and end with an exploration of global deviance, reactions, and social control.

This book has been written with a heavy emphasis on theory. In seven chapters, we explore nine theories. Anomie and strain theory, among the first of the truly sociological explanations of the causes of deviant behavior, seek to understand deviance by focusing on social structures and patterns that emerge as individuals and groups react to conditions they have little control over. Social disorganization theory was developed to explain patterns of deviance and crime across social locations, such as neighborhoods, schools, cities, states, and even countries. In Chapter 6, we focus on differential association and social learning theory. These theories focus on the importance of learning in the development of deviance. Social control theory is our last traditional or normative theory. Control theorists assert that human beings are basically antisocial and assume that deviance is part of the natural order in society; individuals are motivated to deviate. Our first social constructionist theory is labeling theory. Labeling theorists examine the social meaning of deviant labels, how those labels are understood, and how they affect the individuals to whom they are applied. Our next theories are Marxist and conflict theory. These theories focus on the effect of power on the creation and maintenance of laws (and policies) that benefit one group over another. For a book on deviance, then, we might say that Marxist and conflict theorists are interested in why and how some groups are defined as deviant and how their behavior, now defined as deviant, gets translated into illegal behavior through the application of the law. Finally, our last theory chapter focuses on critical theories. Critical theories question the status quo, examining societal responses to deviance often from the perspective of those with less societal power. While there are quite a few critical theories, we have decided to share critical race theory, feminist theory, and peacemaking theory.

We think you will agree, as you read the book, that these theories are an important organizational tool for understanding (1) why deviance occurs, (2) why some behavior may or may not be defined as deviant, and (3) why some individuals are more likely to be defined as deviant. It is important to note that you probably won’t have the same level of enthusiasm for every theory offered here. Some of you will really “get” anomie theory, whereas others might be drawn to labeling or feminist theory. Heck, we feel the same way. But what is important to remember is that all of these theories have been supported by research, and all help answer certain questions about deviance.

Along the way, we present examples of specific acts that may be considered deviant in both the research and pop culture. You will be introduced, at the beginning of each chapter, to a vignette that discusses a social phenomenon or behavior. As you learn more about theory, you can decide for yourself how and why these acts and actors may be defined as deviant. One of our goals for you is to help you start to think sociologically and theoretically about our social world and the acts we do and do not call deviant.

Exercises and Discussion Questions 1. Choose a behavior, action, or group that you consider to be deviant. Explain why you consider your example to be deviant, and then explain which conception of

deviant you are using when you make your determination. 2. Choose any half-hour sitcom. While watching the show, examine its treatment of “deviant” behavior. Is there a character that others treat as different or deviant?

Why do others treat him or her this way? Is there a character that you would describe as deviant? Is he or she treated this way by others in the show? What conception of deviance are you using to determine the deviant behavior on the show?

3. Why is theory important to our understanding of deviance?

Key Terms Critical conception Folkways

Laws Mores Normative conception Norms Pathologizing Positivist perspective Prevention programs Rehabilitation programs Relativist conception Scientific method Social constructionist conception Sociological imagination Suppression Theory

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Reading 2 In this article, Wahrman points to three concepts common to the student of deviance: “status,” “norms,” and “sanctions.” These are common sociological concepts, but they are at best fuzzy and in need of deep contemplation if we are to advance our understanding of some basic issues in the study of deviance. The concept of status, for example, is multidimensional and may refer to “esteem,” “admiration,” or “prestige.” In the study of deviance, we tend to think that these concepts are associated with power and the ability to “get away with stuff.” Wahrman reminds us that both the conceptualization and the context may affect how status affects behavior and reaction to behavior. Similarly, one of the most common definitions of deviance is “the violation of group norms.” Wahrman discourages us from oversimplifying the term and uses experimental studies to show just how complicated the concept can be. Finally, the term sanctions, which is so common in the study of deviance, is no more clear. Wahrman makes a strong case that experimental studies of sanctions have been far too narrow for the student of deviance to make much use of them. Two important things can be taken from this article. First, it seems to us that Wahrman makes clear the overlapping and interacting nature of these key concepts and how, taken together, we find ourselves in quite murky waters. Second, he argues against the overly simplistic notion that status is simply a measure of power that protects certain persons who violate norms; to illustrate his claim, he points to contexts where high-status persons may be particularly subject to sanctions and low-status persons may be less sanctioned than those holding power.

Status, Deviance, and Sanctions: A Critical Review Ralph Wahrman

Groups Have Norms Group members abide by the norms because they believe the norms are proper or because they fear that sanctions will be applied by other group members who do believe in the norms. High- status members apparently have less to fear. We frequently find that nonconforming high-status members of a group are not sanctioned (Wahrman, 1970a). On those rare occasions when they do receive sanctions, those who possess high status may be more severely sanctioned than lesser members (Wahrman, 1970b).

There are two schools of thought about the reasons high status so often enables people to avoid sanctions. One approach suggests that nonconformity is perceived as deviant regardless of who

performs it. Because high status and high power often go together, less powerful members of the group fear retaliation and therefore do not act on their perceptions (Blau, 1964a; McGrath, 1964; Homans, 1961).

The other approach suggests that behavior is perceived differently depending on who the actor is and that nonconformity by high-status group members is not seen as deviance but as innovation, tolerable idiosyncrasy, occasion for changing the norm or broadening its limits, and so on. In other words, what strikes an outside observer as “deviance” appears to the group as an event which does not call for sanctions (Hollander, 1961).

Disentangling the circumstances under which each approach is correct and the circumstances under which certain levels and types of status do or do not make it possible to violate certain types of norms is the sort of problem for which field and laboratory experiments are eminently suitable. Therefore, this review concentrates on experimental studies of status and deviance. The literature is not a large one, but the issues and their implications are not only significant for understanding abstract questions about the dynamics of social control in informal groups but are also of relevance for students of delinquency (Black & Reiss, 1970) and adult crime (Wolfgang et al., 1962), for students of social change (e.g., Putney & Putney, 1962; Fathi, 1968), students of intergroup relations (Sherif, 1962; Julian et al., 1969), and for students of leadership (Hollander, 1964).

Although the literature is not generally thought of as a large one, it is much smaller than we usually admit. I exclude from this review studies which have asked about the willingness of high- status people to violate norms. These are generally inaccurately cited in social psychology texts as supplying evidence for the ability of high-status people to get away with deviance. Willing and able are not the same things.

I exclude here also studies of credibility (Berlo et al., 1969; Griffin, 1967; Simons et al., 1970) for several reasons. First, they tend not to study normative issues but rather issues on which subjects tend to have quite weak personal opinions (Hovland, 1959). Second, the speakers tend not to be members of groups of which subjects are members. Space limitations suggest that I focus here on situations in which subjects and deviants, if only temporarily, are members of the same group, and the deviant has some reason to be aware of the existence of the group and its norms.

Although this review examines limitations of existing research, my basic intention is to suggest research possibilities for the future. Let us first examine the basic concepts “status,” “norms,” and “sanctions” as utilized in studies which attempt to combine all three.

Status Groups do not value all members equally. Abstractly, we can say that some members have higher value to the group because they possess rewarding (or potentially rewarding) qualities and abilities, and their fellow members reward them in turn by according them “status” or social approval (Secord & Backman, 1964; Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).

The particular qualities for which one is accorded varying levels of status vary with the nature and purpose of the group, and depending on the circumstances, a group may have more than one

status hierarchy. Researchers studying the effects of status on deviance have not been clear about whether their studies were addressed to studying “status,” “prestige,” “esteem,” or “admiration” (cf. Ellis, 1962; Ellis & Keedy, 1960), which should be thought of as different kinds of rankings with potentially different consequences for the possessor. Although these terms tend to be used mainly by sociologists who wish to refer to responses to one’s possession of formal roles separately from personal reactions to the role incumbent, students of informal groups have utilized similar distinctions and supplied an additional vocabulary related to roles and dimensions of behavior in informal groups. “Status” may have reference to a task or social-emotional activity hierarchy (Slater, 1955) or to attractiveness as a workmate or roommate (Jennings, 1943), to private or public popularity (Taylor, 1954), to integration (Blau, 1960), or to whatever shows up on some global observational measure like Sherif and Sherif’s (1969) “effective initiative” or a global question such as “who are your most valued members?” or “who would you select to represent this group at a conference?” All of these are presumably valid measures of some of the kinds of things referred to as “status,” but there is no evidence that behavior permitted to or forbidden people who score high on one measure applies to someone who scores high on another. Although most of these conceptions of status are represented in studies cited below, I am not aware of a single study which attempted to compare reactions to the deviance of people who scored high on different measures of status. Perhaps this is only another way of saying that our research on status and deviance is not systematic and tends not to represent attempts to formulate and test theories about status. Rather, the theoretical discussion sections of most of the studies cited below appear to be plausible justifications of hunches about the circumstances under which a high-status deviant will elicit a certain kind of reaction rather than strict derivations from any kind of theory.

Whether we choose to study status one dimension at a time or to use a global measure, we will ultimately have to start studying complex variables (group characteristics) such as status congruence, consensus on status, and the distances between ranks as suggested by Videbeck (1964). We must go beyond oversimplified problem formulations which ask only if high status (nature unspecified) always (or ever) protects one from sanctions.

The typical approach to status manipulation is to utilize extreme dimensions of competence or socioeconomic status or academic rank—that is, highly competent versus incompetent, professor versus department store clerk, graduate student versus freshman, and so on. Although these extreme differences may be necessary for a strong manipulation, they neglect an important consideration. People at both extremes may be treated quite differently from the way anyone in the middle ranks is treated.

Responses may follow a curvilinear pattern. Furthermore, even close to the extremes, people may be responded to differently: Leading members may not receive the same response as the leader who has not only high status but a role which may have to be taken into account in understanding reactions to his deviance (see Hollander, 1964). The leader, for example, is expected to innovate even if it means disregarding certain norms. A high-status nonleader’s innovation may be responded to with “who asked you?”

The issue of roles and status enters into consideration in another way. We have tended to utilize a somewhat simple model of status in our research and assumed that what one high-status person will be permitted or forbidden to do will be also permitted or forbidden to every other person of equally high status. This may not be so. For example, a task leader and a social-emotional leader may be equally valued, but each may find himself with freedom or restraints on deviation in quite

different realms of behavior (Wahrman, 1970b). This may appear obvious and trivial, but it bears on an important point in interpreting research findings: Groups may be misperceiving or inventing excuses or good motives by which they excuse a high-status person for violating a norm which is applicable to all members or it may be that it was never intended or expected that a certain norm be applicable to that particular actor (see Sampson, 1963).

Norms If the nature of “status” is something on which there is low consensus, “norms” are no less confusing (see Gibbs, 1965, 1968).

Norms may be thought of as a range of permitted behaviors (Jackson, 1965; Sherif & Sherif, 1969) or as a single permissible behavior. They may be seen as matters of high consensus, or amount of consensus may be thought of as a contingent attribute of norms rather than part of their definition (Gibbs, 1965, 1968). Research on status and deviance has tended to utilize the single-behavior model, and laboratory studies have attempted to find behaviors on which virtually all subjects could be expected to agree. As was suggested for status earlier, research should consider amounts of consensus on norms and other qualities of norms as variables. One can see in descriptions of status manipulations some understanding that there may be different types of status: The conceptions are more or less standard distinctions and dichotomies—e.g., liking versus working, respect versus affection. In the study of norms, there are no commonly accepted classifications or typologies. Procedures for scaling norms in terms of relevance or importance, such as that of Mudd (1968), or for tapping dimensions, such as those suggested by Jackson (1965), have not been introduced into the study of status and deviance in the laboratory or outside. This makes it difficult to specify the types of norms to which the study is an attempt to generalize.

Again, this may be considered a reflection of the unsystematic nature of research on status and deviance. Although, as noted, we have never had a high degree of consensus on which phenomena to reserve the concept “norm” for, one difference between the way social psychologists and sociologists tend to use the word involves the issue of “sharedness.” Homans (1961), Newcomb et al. (1965), and others have argued that what makes a norm different from any old garden-variety belief about appropriate behavior held by a given individual is that they would reserve the term for a belief which a certain number of members of a group share, are aware they share, and believe they have a right to demand that other people abide by. Homans (1961) further suggests that a norm effectively exists when the people who believe in it can effectively apply sanctions more or less freely; i.e., others who are not particularly committed to the norm will permit those who do care to enforce it.

Studies in which a deviant performs in the presence of more than one subject are unusual (Sampson & Brandon, 1964; Alvarez, 1968; Sabath, 1964; Harari & McDavid, 1969). This is unfortunate, not only because knowledge that other people share a belief about proper behavior gives norms their character, but also because the response to a deviant may not be a simple function of individual reactions but may be the result of a collective interpretation of what the act represents, and some people’s opinions may carry more weight than the opinions of others. Studying individual responses has its advantages, but the question of who stands up to tell the deviant to stop doing whatever he is doing, or of what happens if the lower-status members disapprove while the high-status members back the alleged deviant, and other questions about

social control as a dynamic process are ignored if we limit ourselves to considering individual responses to an esteem questionnaire as the sole dependent variable. The aforementioned studies, which have utilized group situations, have presumably produced overt responses in other subjects; i.e., the other subjects must have glared, questioned the deviant, or asked him to stop whatever it was that he was programmed to do, but with the exception of Sampson and Brandon’s Interaction Process Analysis (Bales, 1950), this dialogue remains unreported and unacknowledged.

With one exception (Hollander, 1961), no study has attempted to use the same stimulus person to study more than one norm. Hollander asked each of his subjects to imagine a hypothetical person of high or low status and then to imagine that this person had performed eight behaviors and to indicate how much they disapproved of each of these eight acts. Hollander apparently formulated no hypotheses, but he reports that several of these behaviors elicited statistically significant differences in disapproval. Although, as Doob and Gross (1968) note, the sanctions one says he would hypothetically give and what he actually does may be quite different; the hypothetical situation may be the only feasible way to compare reactions in a group to violations of different norms by the same person.

The area is still in its infancy, which perhaps explains why many researchers tend to ask their confederates to violate several norms simultaneously. Hollander (1960), for example, asked his confederate to violate several procedural norms. Sabath (1964) had his confederate violate several procedural and courtesy norms, and so did Alvarez. As one reads the descriptions of the manipulations, it is clear that these researchers have achieved great spontaneity and realism at the cost of replicability (see Wahrman & Pugh, 1971), as well as understanding of the norms to which subjects were responding.

Only one study in this literature has attempted to work without a confederate. Videbeck (1964) set up three-man discussion groups and instructed the members privately about the best way to perform in a discussion group, always instructing one differently from the other two. He found a positive relationship between amount of nonconformity and status assigned by others at the end of the discussion. The basis for assigning status is not described. Videbeck’s study appears to me to confuse the processes involved in gaining status with those involved in maintaining status (Hollander, 1960). This is the only study in this literature that has considered consensus on norms and consensus on status as variables.

Thibaut and Riecken (1955) had two confederates, one of high status and one of low status, simultaneously first refuse to share certain materials with the subject and then simultaneously agree to share these materials. Thibaut and Riecken then asked subjects for their interpretations of the sudden generosity of each confederate. They did not ask about subject interpretations of the confederates’ selfishness. This is the only study that exposed subjects to high- and low-status people simultaneously violating the same norm.

Sanctions “Sanctions” are no less fuzzy a concept than “norms” and “status.” Gibbs (1966) points out that we cannot seem to agree on such basic issues as whether a sanction must be a response to deviance that is intended to punish the deviant or whether it must be intended to prevent future occurrences of the behavior, whether it must be perceived by the deviant or it must merely be the

sort of internal response that would distress the deviant if he were aware of it.

At least, among the researchers cited here, there seems to be consensus that some measure of loss of esteem is a minimal if not completely adequate measure of sanctioning.

Nonetheless, there is some question of what responses should be considered sanctions. For example, Sampson and Brandon (1964) had a liberal confederate take a somewhat reactionary position on the appropriate treatment for a Negro delinquent. Although, on sociometric measures, the confederate appeared not to suffer a loss of esteem, during the discussion significantly more questions and hostile comments were directed to her than to a bigot who scored low on the esteem measures. Should Sampson and Brandon have considered the questions and hostility to be sanctions, as does Israel (1956)?

Hollander (1960) found that a confederate who was highly competent but who violated procedural norms early in the course of a meeting temporarily lost influence over the group’s decisions. A confederate who waited until later in the session to violate these norms did not suffer such influence loss. Shall we assume that this patient deviant did not suffer a loss of esteem (Hollander did not ask esteem questions), or shall we go along with Hollander and argue that the only relevant sanction is the one he chose to utilize—actual loss of influence? Doob and Gross (1968) had confederates in either new, expensive cars or old, inexpensive cars remain at traffic lights after the signals had changed. People blocked by the old car honked their horns sooner and more frequently. Is it possible that the new car owner was cursed more vehemently in the privacy of the honkers’ cars (male students in a classroom situation claimed they would have honked faster at the newer car than the field data indicated they probably would have)? Or does it not matter? Harari and McDavid (1969) suborned high- and low-status classroom and club members, had the children in class steal money from the teacher’s desk, and had the club members break the club leader’s tape recorder. When interrogated in the presence of another child (witness), peers turned in high-status children. When interrogated alone, peers did not turn them in. Low- status children were turned in whether the “fink” was interrogated alone or in the presence of another. Shall we say that if the child was not turned in he was not therefore sanctioned—e.g., peers did not lose respect for him? Or shall we say that if others did not blow the whistle on him he was unsanctioned? This is the only study of status and deviance I am aware of which utilized an actual group member as a confederate rather than using a trained confederate.

Evan and Zelditch (1961) found, in the simulated organization they set up, subjects privately disobeyed an incompetent supervisor and ignored his instructions. Shall we say that because there was no overt defiance, the supervisor is unsanctioned?

The answers to these questions depend on how one chooses to utilize the term sanction. In the case of sanctions, perhaps more than in the case of norms and status, the question represents more than semantic quibbling. Although the majority of studies cited here have been limited to studying individual responses on various paper-and-pencil esteem measures, in the world outside the laboratory, overt responses are important cues for letting other group members know whether the norm is still in effect for the deviant or for other members of the group.

One can possibly make equally valid arguments for the relative importance of covert or overt responses, but if the reader decides to limit his consideration only to studies of overt sanctions, he remains with a quite tiny experimental literature using quite nonequivalent sanctions. On what scale does one equate, let us say, “finking” to the teacher with horn-honking, or refusal to follow

a deviant across the street against the light (Lefkowitz et al., 1955), particularly in terms of other possible overt responses within those experimental situations. Mudd (1968) is the only one I am aware of who attempts to scale overt behaviors and sanctions, but this technique has not been used in the context of status, deviance, and sanctions.

As noted earlier, some theorists have interpreted an absence of overt sanctions to mean that the group must have been intimidated by high-status people into withholding sanctions that would otherwise have been applied. The vast majority of the studies cited here appear to lend little support to this interpretation. Most of them find that the high-status person’s behavior is interpreted quite generously. Certainly there are occasions when high-status people are perceived as deviant and do intimidate the group into withholding sanctions. This body of literature is not helpful in understanding such situations, not only because subjects did not appear to disapprove of the high-status confederate, but because, even if they had disapproved, the situations were not structured in such a way as to enable them to actually react overtly to the deviant.

The few studies that do provide evidence of greater disapproval of the high-status deviant also restrict the sorts of responses subjects could make.

Iverson’s (1964) subjects disapproved of a high-status person who was self-punitive but who praised his audience. Subjects were aware that they were rating a tape-recorded person and could only react by means of a rating scale.

Alvarez’s (1968) subjects apparently withdrew esteem (4-point scales multiplied by 100 and presented without statistical tests are not strong evidence) from a high-status deviant, but nothing is reported about subject reactions in any of the four 1-hour meetings at which the deviant insulted subjects and violated rules of procedure.

Hollander’s (1961) subjects would hypothetically have disapproved of certain behavior if the actor was of high status, but he does not explore what they would hypothetically have done about it.

Harari and McDavid’s students presumably disapproved of the confederate’s theft or vandalism. Since the researchers were not observing the act, but only the later willingness to identify the culprit, there is not much they can say about subject responses.

Thibaut and Riecken (1955) found that some of their subjects, not the majority, disapproved more of a high-status confederate who refused to share certain materials, but the subjects were in no position to do much about it. Wahrman’s (1970b) subjects were more severe in their criticism of a high-status deviant, but again were not in a position to do anything about it.

Evan and Zelditch (1961) ran subjects individually, and although subjects were apparently willing to sanction by disobedience the confederate’s violation of the normative expectation that supervisors ought to be competent, subjects were alone, and perhaps the absence of social support made it less likely than otherwise that they would openly rebel.

Apparently, we have not selected sufficiently strong manipulations to produce laboratory answers to such problems as the circumstances under which high-status deviance will both be disapproved and acted upon. Keeping subjects isolated from one another makes it easier to study individual responses uncontaminated by interaction with others, but it may, where subjects

disapprove of the high-status deviant, underestimate the severity of responses which subjects in interaction would have produced.

Explanations of Extreme Responses to High-Status Deviants Many studies of criminal justice, anecdotes, field studies, and experiments back up the proposition that high status frequently enables the possessor to receive minimal or no sanctions for acts that would be harshly dealt with if the perpetrator were of middle or low rank.

Much less evidence exists for the proposition that penalties for certain acts of deviance may be more severe for those of high status than for those of lesser rank—e.g., indulgence of upper-rank behavior has limits.

Little attempt has been made to explain both kinds of response in the same theory (compare Hollander & Willis, 1967; Wahrman, 1967, 1970a, 1970b). Rather, many explanations have been offered for the mild response, and the more severe response has been barely acknowledged.

Mild Response Let us first consider explanations of why high status often gives license to misbehave. As noted earlier, there are two schools of thought on this issue. Sociologists have tended to consider the prospect that power and status often go together. They suggest that the group may well perceive the act as equally deviant regardless of whether the actor has high or low status, but because group members of lesser rank may be intimidated by those of high rank, they do not act on their perceptions.

Psychologists have tended to ignore the prospect of power-blocking sanctions and have provided a good deal of evidence that the behavior is perceived differently when an actor has high status. The actor’s power is irrelevant if others see nothing wrong in his behavior. The experiments cited above have tended to provide support for this approach, although, as noted earlier, those instances where there was greater disapproval of the high-status deviant have not offered subjects much opportunity to express this to the deviant.

If one accepts for the moment the proposition that most of the time high-status nonconformity is not perceived as inappropriate and leaves for future research the question of what happens if and when it is, one still has the problem of explaining why this should be so. What do the subjects perceive? Why does what strikes the outside observer as deviance not strike the members this way?

The studies have offered a variety of explanations of what subjects might have perceived and why this should have been so. With very few exceptions (e.g., Iverson, 1964; Pepitone, 1958), the researchers assumed that certain thoughts were occurring to their subjects but neglected to ask for confirmation. Iverson (1964) reports that some of his subjects saw, in extrapunitive behavior by an expert on retardation, missionary zeal and concern for his fellow man, whereas they saw in identical behavior exhibited by a speaker described as a high school student, “impudence.”

Pepitone (1958) reports that his subjects found justifications for the rudeness of a renowned expert toward an ignorant student. Hollander (1960) reports that when his competent confederate delayed his procedural nonconformity several groups changed the norms and followed his example. Thibaut and Riecken (1955) had low- and high-status deviants first simultaneously refuse and then simultaneously agree to share certain materials. They report no subject explanations for the original selfish acts. Asking subjects any kind of question about how they justified the deviance is clearly the exception rather than the rule.

There are a number of theories which can be offered to explain why an act is not perceived as deviant. The various consistency theories can be and have been offered as explanations for why it is uncomfortable to perceive “good” people as guilty of “bad” acts, though the various theories do not appear to be sufficiently developed to explain why one deviant act results in a complete change in the norm for all, another results in an excuse being made for the actor but the norm being retained, still another ends up with the norm’s range being broadened for the deviant but no one else, while still another deviant act is denied to have occurred to begin with.

Berkowitz and Goranson (1964), Kelman and Eagly (1965), and Manis (1961) provide evidence that the act may be “assimilated” to fit the norm. Exchange theory can be invoked (Wahrman, 1970a) to explain why groups would prefer not to admit deviance is possible in people who have been granted status in exchange for conformity; i.e., this is to admit that they have foolishly given status to an unworthy person. Sherif and Hovland’s (1961) conception of “latitudes of acceptance” may be invoked to suggest that the range of permissible behaviors can be widened to incorporate behavior previously not within the latitude of acceptance. One can argue for a primacy effect, earlier good behavior being weighted more heavily in judgments than more recent deviant behavior (Hendrick & Constantini, 1970; Petronko & Perin, 1970).

Asch’s (1946) theory can be invoked to explain why the act has a different meaning if performed by different actors. It strikes me that what I am doing here is changing vocabularies rather than explaining anything. Nor has anyone attempted to test the utility of one of these perceptual explanations against another. Certainly there is a difference between attributing benevolent motives to the nonconformer and retaining the norm and changing the norm for the actor or for the whole group, but we do not know how these differences occur. It may help to ask subjects to explain their responses instead of inferring what they must have believed or perceived.

Hollander (1958) and Homans (1961) have both suggested “bank account” models of status from which group members draw for deviance. Homans implies that although a given act costs everyone the same number of units, those of high status have more to spare and therefore may retain their standing as the highest-ranked members even if they violate some norms.

Hollander suggests that the price of deviance is lower for those of high status; they lose fewer units per act of deviance than would lesser members and therefore suffer only mild drops in status for deviance. Hollander’s idea of sanctions is unclear. He suggests that one uses up “idiosyncrasy credits” by violating norms, but that, if one does not use up his credits, there will be no sanctions. In other portions of his theory, he suggests that one needs these credits to innovate. Unless I seriously misunderstand Hollander, losing these credits is in itself a sanction if it inhibits the actors’ freedom to innovate at a later date.

In any case, neither Homans nor Hollander nor anyone else can supply us with acceptable measures of what such units or credits might be. How these units get translated into various

interpretations of behavior is not yet known. The question of what happens when one has lost sufficient units so that the person who had been next ranking is suddenly one’s superior remains to be explored.

Severe Response The question of why and when—despite the aforementioned tendencies toward consistency, assimilation, benevolent motive attribution, and the like—groups not only decide the high-status people are deviant but are also worthy of more severe penalties than lesser deviants would have received remains unclear and unexplored. It is not clear whether the deviance is seen as more deviant and therefore worthy of more severe penalties or it is seen as equally deviant but, for some unclear reason, more severe penalties are applied.

Wahrman (1970b) found evidence that subjects found a psychology graduate who insisted on giving strict discipline to a delinquent (who clearly required warmth) a good deal more disturbing than they did a graduate biologist or undergraduate psychology major who espoused the same position.

Wiggins et al. (1965) found that a highly competent confederate whose violation of the experimenter’s procedural rules resulted in the experimenter’s penalizing the group severely was sanctioned more severely than a confederate of moderate competence who provoked the experimenter into equally harsh treatment of the group.

Walster et al. (1966); Rokeach and Rothman (1965); and Wyer (1970) also supply evidence of overreaction to those of high status.

This phenomenon may result from a calculation of what it takes to make a high-status deviant feel sanctioned—a one-dollar fine means less to a wealthy man than to a pauper—or may involve some less calculated process. Hollander and Willis (1967) suggest that high-status people are seen as more in control of their own behavior and therefore their deviance represents greater willfulness on their part. Perhaps, as Wahrman (1970a) suggests, extreme penalties should be thought of as a response to an exchange agreement which high-status people are seen as having betrayed. The excess esteem withdrawn is the psychological equivalent of interest; i.e., a penalty for betrayal is added to the normal penalty for deviance.

It may be that, as Sampson (1963) and Turner (1962) suggest, we cannot interact with people effectively unless we know how to anticipate their behavior, and it may be more important for people in important roles to live up to their expectations than those of less value to the group. The annoyance produced by deviance would, if this approach is correct, be less disturbing than the fact of unpredictability. The confusion surrounding interpretation of how to respond to the actor in the future would be more responsible for the severe penalties than the deviance itself.

Although one could invent other explanations in addition to these, we have not yet been in a position to test the explanations we already possess.

Conclusions We have reason to believe that high status tends to protect the possessors from sanctions. On

those occasions when it does not protect them, it tends to make them more vulnerable than lesser members of the group would be. It is, apparently, rare for the same sanctions to be applied to high-status people as are applied to those of moderate or low status.

Future research will have to systematically vary types of status and types of norms. The available literature has tended to rely on individual responses to rating scales and has ignored both the process by which groups reach consensus on how to interpret the behavior and consensus on what overt responses to make to deviance.

Research on status and deviance has drawn on the vocabularies of a number of theories but has not been strictly derived from theory. There is need for theories which will clearly predict not only whether sanctions will be stronger or milder for those of high status but also which of a variety of mild or strong outcomes will occur.

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