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Journal of Applied Security Research

ISSN: 1936-1610 (Print) 1936-1629 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wasr20

Using a Fusion Center Model to Manage and Improve Border Security

Carla Lewandowski, Jeff Rojek & Victor M. Manjarrez

To cite this article: Carla Lewandowski, Jeff Rojek & Victor M. Manjarrez (2017) Using a Fusion Center Model to Manage and Improve Border Security, Journal of Applied Security Research, 12:1, 160-178, DOI: 10.1080/19361610.2017.1228424

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2017.1228424

Published online: 12 Jan 2017.

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JOURNAL OF APPLIED SECURITY RESEARCH , VOL. , NO. , – http://dx.doi.org/./..

Using a Fusion Center Model to Manage and Improve Border Security

Carla Lewandowskia, Jeff Rojekb, and Victor M. Manjarrezb

aRowan University, Glassboro, New Jersey, USA; bUniversity of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, Texas, USA

KEYWORDS Fusion centers; information sharing; border security

ABSTRACT Recent civil wars have led to a mass migration movement of people attempting to escape their homeland. This has left many nations scrambling to devise not only how they are going toman- age the considerable influxof refugees, but also how to secure the borders so that criminals do not take advantage of this situation to enter states at a vulnerable time. The following article examines one of the most well-researched borders, the southwest border of the United States to argue that countries can use a U.S. fusion centermodel to improveborder security and thusgather informa- tion to analyze from a variety of sources in order to developmore targeted intelligence that better assesses the threats each coun- try faces at the border. We begin with a background and discus- sion of the challenges facing the southwest border in the United States, the origins and evolution of the fusion center and finally, the prospects and challenges of using themodel in amore global border security setting.

Introduction

Considerable attention over the past year has been given to the Syrian refugee cri- sis and its resulting impact on European nations. The human toll of the Syrian war, coupled with the violent actions of different terrorist organizations operating in the region, has spawned a mass migration to surrounding nations and Europe. These refugees coupled with migrants from other North African nations, number- ing over one million in 2015 (BBC, 2016; IOM, 2015), have spurred debates on how to address this migration crisis and maintain border security (Almukhtar, Keller, & Watkins, 2015; Bienvenu & Lyman, 2015; Dunai, 2015; Grammaticas, 2016; Hig- gins, 2015; Reynolds, 2015). These efforts were made more complicated by the Paris terrorist attacks, which raised questions about individuals exploiting the migration crisis to gain entry to commit threatening acts and the need for increased focus on border security (Kanter, 2015; Lyman & Smale, 2015). These challenges are presenting themselves alongside the conventional concerns such as drug and

CONTACT Carla Lewandowski [email protected] Rowan University,  Mullica Hill Road, Campbell Library th Floor Glassboro, New Jersey, USA, . ©  Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

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human trafficking and the post-9/11 need to secure the border against potential terrorists.

In the broad sense, the decision to increase border security to stem the flow of migration pressure and prevent criminal or terrorist-linked individuals from enter- ing European nations is a political question. However, once this decision is made, there are complicated practical realities tomaking this political will come to fruition. In this case, the responsibility falls on national police and border security forces of European countries, which creates a number of difficulties in unity of response and communication of risks as migrants transit different national boundaries on route to their destination. The 2004 creation of the European Agency for theManagement of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member state of the EU, known as Frontex, was intended for the purpose of addressing these multijurisdic- tion coordination issues (Leonard, 2009). The current European migrant crisis is pressing the capacity of Frontex to meets its mandate (Levey-Abegnoli, 2015; Math- iason, Parsons, & Jeory, 2015). Given the urgency of the crisis, an understanding of the complications in securing borders and effective solutions has yet to be realized in this context.

There aremany operational challenges to creating a secure border with themulti- national approach in Europe, or themultiagency level (federal, state, and local) con- text of the United States. Some of these challenges can be ameliorated by improving efforts at increasing the exchange of tactical and strategic intelligence across orga- nizations and unifying collective effort. The following article argues that countries can use a U.S. fusion center model to improve border security and thus gather infor- mation to analyze from a variety of sources in order to develop more targeted intel- ligence that better assesses the threats each country faces at the border. We explore the utility of this approach in the context of the southwest border of the United States, which represents one of the most well-researched, volatile, and largest land borders. The problems associated with mission coordination in a location that con- sists of multiple jurisdictions have been addressed by the United States for years and it is something with which the United States still finds itself struggling. Despite the ongoing strains, we believe that European and other international border security agencies, as well as academics seeking to research these issues, will be able to under- stand some of the elements that have proven to be especially challenging and the approach we propose to help improve relations at the border. We will begin with a discussion of the challenges facing border security agencies, the origins and evolu- tion of the fusion center and finally, the prospects and challenges of using the model in a border security setting.

Challenges of managing the border

The evolving border securitymission along the Southwest border of the United States

These challenges of developing a coordinated and effective border security effort, however, are not unique to the present European context. In particular, parallels can

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be found in the longstanding efforts to create a secure border between the United States and Mexico. The three decade effort of the United States to increase secu- rity on its southwest border with Mexico can be separated into what Payan (2006) calls the three border wars, or what can more accurately be viewed as three evolv- ing phases to secure the border. The first phase emerged from the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and centered on the issue of illegal immigration. Security on the southwest border up to this point in time was loosely enforced (Alden, 2012), but increasingmigration flows prompted political inertia to address unauthorized entries into the United States and those residing in the coun- try under this status. The 1986 act was intended to be a comprehensive measure for increasing security at the border and providing a path to citizenship for those resid- ing in the country as an unauthorized immigrant.While individuals took advantage of the citizenship process, the more notable shift that resulted from the legislations was a stronger emphasis on border security to prevent illegal entries into the United States (Jones-Correa & de Graauw, 2013), most notably on the southwest border. A key highlight of this shift was the immediate 50% increase in Border Patrol staffing that resulted from the act (Rosenblum, 2012). However, despite this increased secu- rity focus, the issue of illegal immigrationwas still largely viewed as a public nuisance issue as opposed to a security threat (Manjarrez, 2015).

The second wave of border control on the southwest border formed in the 1990s centered on combating transnational organized crime, specifically drug traf- ficking from Mexico. Efforts focusing on drug interdiction at the borders of the United States extend back to the 1970s with the drug control policies of the Nixon presidency. Moreover, Mexico has long been a producer of marijuana and heroin, along with a transshipment point for cocaine (Chabat, 2002), but a major change occurred in the illicit drug production and distribution system in the 1990s that led to Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) becoming the primary fig- ures in supplying the U.S. market. Specifically, increased enforcement activity broke the power of Colombian cartels and intensified enforcement activity which shut down the Caribbean smuggling route (Beittel, 2012). This resulted in Mexico becoming the primary transit point for cocaine into the United States, and subse- quently increased the power of Mexican DTOs and levels of associated violence in Mexico.

This shift resulted in the smuggling of illegal drugs across the southwest bor- der being defined as a serious threat to the United States, which pushed the Border Patrol to the forefront of drug enforcement efforts as exhibited in the agency’s des- ignation as the primary agency for interdiction between ports of entry by the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (U.S. GAO, 1994). Supporting this height- ened concern for securing the border was a considerable increase in Border Patrol agents, from just under 4,000 in 1990 to over 9,000 agents by 2000 (Rosenblum, 2012). In addition, the Border Patrol strategy shifted from a focus on apprehending individuals and contraband once it crossed the border to preventing the crossing in the first place. This effort involved placing Border Patrol agents in visible positions on the border and early efforts at erecting secure fencing as a deterrent to border crossings (Bean et al., 1994; U.S. GAO, 1994; Ordonez, 2008; Rosenblum, 2012). It is

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important to note that these increased efforts to interdict illicit drugs did not sup- plant the prior interest in deterring illegal immigration. Rather, they combined into a more complex mission for the Border Patrol.

The third phase followed the 9/11 attacks, which ushered in the most aggressive and comprehensive efforts to create a secure border. Althoughnone of the 9/11 high- jackers entered the United States illegally across land borders, the significant public and political demand that the government prevent future terrorists from entering the country redefined the issue of border control to a national security impera- tive not unlike the debates currently unfolding in Europe (Haddal, 2010; Manjar- rez, 2015). The demand to control the border was made in absolute terms that was unprecedented relative to past expectations, such as the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (Public Law 109–367) defining operational control of the border as the “prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States.” In support of this goal, the Border Patrol experienced dramatic increases from approximately 9,000 patrol agents in 2000 to just under 21,000 by 2014, with the overwhelming majority (approximately 18,000) deployed on the vast and sparsely populated 2,000 mile long border with Mexico (Seghetti, 2014). In addition, there were large investments in fortified bor- der fencing along nearly one third of the southwest border, ground-based sensing technology, and aerial surveillance (Haddal & Gertler, 2010; Seghatti, 2014). As in the case of the second phase, this new antiterrorist mission was incorporated into the existing illegal immigration and criminal activity preventionmission rather than supplanting them. In fact, they are viewed as intertwined under the logic that the locations, pathways, and techniques for individuals and contraband to enter the United States illegally, whether for economic, criminal, or terrorist motives, over- lap. As a result, strengthening border security to prevent illegal border crossings was meant to fulfill all three missions.

Border clutter, situational awareness, and improving border security

The evolution of the previous phases led to a shift in the orientation of a southwest border that has gone from a negligible interest to a zero tolerance for illegal entries. Despite these efforts, neither the illegal entries of individuals nor the flow of ille- gal drugs across the southwest border have been eliminated, though there has been measurable impact. For example, the number of apprehensions of individuals mak- ing unauthorized entry across the southwest border went from 1.6 million in 2000 to just over 337,000 in 2015 (U.S. CBP, n.d.a)1. This reduction of individuals mak- ing unauthorized entry through the preventative dimensions ofmanpower, barriers, and technology reduces what Manjarrez (2015) calls border clutter, resulting in an increased capacity to counter what are considered to be the more serious threats related to DTOs and terrorist activity. The underlying assumption of this logic is criminal and terrorist organizationswill exploit the ability to hide their activity in the movement of large numbers of what are considered less serious economic migrant unauthorized entries. Thus, in reducing the overall flow of economic based illegal

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migrant entries, who are presumed to be the most deterred by preventative border control actions, border agents are more likely to identify the more serious threats.

However, this reduced clutter does not exist in a stable state. Nonroutine chal- lenges continually create complex conditions and disruptions to border control, such as acute periods of mass migration. For example, the southwest border wit- nessed an unprecedented rise in the number of minors (individuals 17 years old and younger) crossing this land border alone, increasing from18,411 in 2010 to 68,541 in 2015 (U.S. CBP, n.d.b). Given the legal requirements and policies associated with the apprehension of minors, such mass migrations absorb considerable resources and, thereby, reduce the capacity of the Border Patrol to prevent crossings associatedwith more serious threats (NCBSI, 2014). The shift toward or to improve the prevention of unauthorized entries in urban areas through the construction of secure fencing has also increased the complexity of the border control by creating a demand for humanitarian assistance. Urban fencing efforts were implemented with the intent of pushing the pathways for unauthorized entry to themore difficult desert andmoun- tainous areas along the border, with the assumption that these conditions would deter individuals from attempting to cross. However, there is a sizable population willing to risk these conditions, which include extremely high desert temperatures in the summer and cold temperatures in the winter. The number of migrant deaths from attempted border crossings increased from 254 in 1998 to 472 in 2005 (U.S. GAO, 2006), with environmental exposure deaths (dehydration and hypothermia) becoming the lead cause over this time period.2 The increased response to provide emergency services to those at risk in remote locations further absorbs Border Patrol resources, directing them away from more serious threats.3

Clutter can also be produced bymore assertive actors along the border.Organized crime-related homicides in Mexican states along the border greatly increased from 1,152 in 2006 to 7,178 in 2011 (U.S. GAO, 2013a).4 Ciudad Juarez, which is across the border from the El Paso, Texas metropolitan area, had under 300 homicides in 2007 but exploded to more than 3,000 in 2011, with roughly two thirds resulting from gang-related violence (Economist, 2012; Valencia, 2015). This activity has increased concerns of DTO violence directly spilling over into the United States via violent disputes extending into areas where Mexican DTOs are active in the United States, or indirectly through DTO-connected individuals fleeing into the United States and continuing their criminal activity (U.S. GAO, 2013a). This has heightened concern for violent threats posed to border agents and citizens that live along the border. It also brings state and local law enforcement agencies that have jurisdiction along the border into the border control nexus as their communities are most likely to be impacted by such spillover.

Another assertive actor that is not directly criminal but no less challenging for Border Patrol agents are border control activists in the United States deployed along the border. These activists are citizenmilitias who believe that the government is not doing enough to secure the southwest border. These individuals are often armed and operate on the position that they must fill the void left by the federal government by being present on the border to prevent unauthorized crossings. While their actions

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are typically not criminal, their presence frequently draws border agents away from other border security activities because they set off electronic sensors monitored by Border Patrol or create other calls for response, and in a few cases have led to armed confrontations with border agents (Baddour, 2015; Hicks, 2014; Vina, Nunez-Neto &Weir, 2006).

While each of these dynamics continually challenges the capacity to control the border and prevent unauthorized entries, they pale in comparison to the clutter cre- ated by legitimate trade and travel across the southwest border. Mexico is the third largest trading partner for the United States, which is largely accomplished through themovement of goods across the land ports of entry on the southwest border, along with individuals traveling between these locations for legitimate business and per- sonal reasons. The U.S. Department of Transportation data shows approximately 5 million commercial trucks, 10 thousand trains, 70 million passenger vehicles, and 41 pedestrians on foot entered the United States from Mexico across land ports of entry in 2014.5 This level of activity creates an immense amount of clutter or noise through which to sift to identify unauthorized entries of individuals and contra- band. Moreover, there is a considerable amount of pressure from political officials and the business community to facilitate the rapid movement of goods and peo- ple through these ports of entry (Ireland, 2009; Jones & Seghetti, 2015; U.S. GAO, 2013b;), which compresses the time capacity of personnel at ports of entry to screen for the prevention of unauthorized entries.

The issue of trade and travel through ports of entry also highlights the challenge posed by multiple agencies having roles in border security along the southwest bor- der. Discussions of border security in the United States typically focus on the Border Patrol, which is responsible for the prevention of unauthorized entries between ports of entry. However, the maintenance of security over the previous mass flow through ports of entry is managed by the Office of Field Operations, which has more than 24,000 officers thatwork at themore than 300 ports of entry in theUnited States (U.S. CBP, 2015). While both of these agencies have been housed under the Customs and Border Protection agency since the 9/11 restructuring of homeland security func- tions, these two entities largely operate independently in their day-to-day functions. In addition, there are federal agencies that have overlapping jurisdictional bound- aries or operations along the southwest border that have actual or potential contact with unauthorized entries, such as the Drug Enforcement Agency, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Forest Service, and the Bureau of Land Management (Had- dal, 2010; U.S. GAO, 2013b). The operational space of the Border Patrol also has jurisdictional overlaps with four state law enforcement agencies and numerous local law enforcement agencies on or near the border that have convergent concerns and enforcement responsibilities (U.S. GAO, 2013a). Lastly, there have been repeated deployments of the National Guard on the southwest border since 2005 to support border security efforts (Richiter & Garza, 2015; U.S.GAO, 2012).

The complexity of missions, sources of clutter, and overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities and interests reflects a more complicated picture of accomplishing a secure southwest border than assumed at first glance, not unlike the issues currently

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challenging the collective borders of Europe. Manjarrez (2015) notes that one of the key elements of maintaining a secure border is the accomplishment of effective sit- uational awareness of activity on the border. He notes that the infusion of personnel and surveillance technologies over the past two decades has greatly increased the Border Patrol’s capacity for situational awareness. This has resulted in an increase in arrests at the border and the prevention of others attempting to enter illegally, thereby reducing the clutter the criminal element relies on which increases their operational risk. In light of fiscal restraint and competing positions on the prospect of additional growth of the Border Patrol and investment supporting technologies, the future increase in situational awareness may have to be realized through alterna- tive mechanisms. One avenue for such improvement is to increase the nexus among the Border Patrol and the different federal, state, and local agencies operating along the border. Government sponsored reports have noted that information sharing and collaboration efforts have improved in relation to border security since 9/11, but also assert that there is a need for more improvement to develop a more integrated approach to border security (Haddal, 2010; U.S. GAO, 2013b). The remainder of this article focuses on the fusion center concept as a means for interconnecting the informational sources of federal, state, and local agencies arrayed along the bor- der to improve situational awareness, and as a mechanism for coordination of the resource of these agencies to prevent unauthorized entries in order to increase the risk of apprehension for criminal actors.

The fusion center model—origins and current research

Origins and evolution of the fusion center

While the principle for a collaborative center predates their inception, fusion centers gained traction after the events of September 11, 2001 (Carter & Carter, 2009). The premise of a fusion center is that information collected from a variety of resources will lead to a greater analytical intelligence product (Carter & Carter, 2009; Clark, 2007). With this as its basis for existence, a fusion center is the physical space that houses the collaboration of two or more agencies who gather and analyze, or “fuse” the information, at a subfederal level in order to share the results with state and local communities (Carter & Carter, 2009). The agencies within the fusion center include federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies in addition to non- law enforcement agencies such as emergency management agencies, transportation agencies, and public health officials and are designed to cover a specific geographic area (Taylor & Russell, 2012).

September 11th was the catalyst for the creation of the 78 fusion centers for sev- eral reasons. First, after a thorough investigation, the 9–11 Commission reported on a need “to integrate strategic intelligence from all sources into joint operational planning” because of problems with information sharing (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). While criticisms abounded about the missed opportunities and the inability to “connect the dots” (Zegart, 2007), it

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was clear that law enforcement agencies at all levels were not communicating or sharing information with one another. Much of this was due to the long-standing tradition of secrecy within law enforcement and the organizational incentives which encouraged overclassification (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). Collocating the various law enforcement entities into one phys- ical locationwas thought to enhance communication by allowing the representatives to build meaningful relationships that allow for open dialogue to occur. For exam- ple, if a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) needs information about the type of visa that someone is on, he would be able to seek out the rep- resentative from Homeland Security Investigations by asking him in person rather than having to call a number, verify himself, and wait for the information. More- over, a fusion center has the opportunity to begin each day with a meeting of all personnel to review any critical events or information that has surfaced in the last 24 hours (Lewandowski, 2012). Personnel from the other agencies can listen and ask each other for more information if they think the information may be pertinent to something they are investigating. It is one of the perceptible changes meant to help “connect the dots” that was once absent from the interaction of agencies.

One of the later incentives for the development of the fusion centers was the abil- ity to provide analytic capabilities to smaller police agencies who may not have the personnel or funding to do so themselves. Prior to 9/11, many small police agencies did not have a dedicated intelligence function which could perform analysis of raw information (Carter&Carter, 2009; Riley, Treverton,Wilson,&Davis, 2005). Fusion centers now operate differently from intelligence centers developed prior to 9/11; they serve as a clearinghouse for information which they then analyze and dissemi- nate to state and local agencies (Chermak, Carter, Carter, McGarrell, &Drew, 2013). Police agencies not only receive daily bulletins regarding developing threats they may face, but a police agency can also send information to their state-designated fusion center to be analyzed by trained analysts in order to better understand crime patterns and criminal networks.

Though fusion centers began as a response to terrorism,many fusion centers have since tailored their centers to target the needs of their jurisdiction. Many fusion centers have now expanded their mission to include “all-crimes” or “all-hazards”; thus there is no “one size fits all” fusion center (Masse, O’Neill, & Rollins, 2008). Though somemay see this as problematic, or evidence of “mission creep” (Monahan & Palmer, 2009; Taylor & Russell, 2012), scholars have pointed out that this allows each fusion center to fill the voids most needed by the state and local law enforce- ment agencies (Johnson & Dorn, 2008). The needs of a state such as Texas or Ari- zona, which have the duty to police an international border, are different from those ofColorado, a land-locked state, orNewYork orWashington,DCwhich housemany critical infrastructures that are seen as potential targets of terrorist groups. More- over, each fusion center has a different funding structure and lead agency which oversees the daily operations which affects the resources they have available to them.

Despite the differences among the various fusion centers, all fusion centers have the same goal: to increase information sharing in order to better understand the

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threat facing the area of responsibility. This targeted intelligence is then dissemi- nated to local agencies which can help gather information based on the stated infor- mation needs of the fusion center. This feedback loop is an important part of the fusion process. While fusion centers have the potential to be of great benefit to local police agencies, the relationship is meant to be mutually beneficial for all parties involved. State and federal agencies do not have the manpower or placement to monitor daily activities on the ground. Local agencies, on the other hand, are the “boots on the ground” who have daily contact with the public and can act as the eyes and the ears of state and federal agencies. Studies have shown that terrorists have contact with state and local authorities through other criminal activities prior to terrorist activity because of their need to finance their operations (Hamm, 2005). It would, therefore, behoove state and federal agents to use local police officers to track and locate, or at a minimum, provide information about past contacts with potential terrorists; it is a significant tool that police can use in their counterterror- ism efforts (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009). Using information from local police thus enhances the fusion center’s ability to detect terrorist activity and better assess the criminal landscape.

Current research on fusion centers

The research on fusion centers has been sparse to date because of privacy con- cerns on the part of the fusion center (see Chermak et al., 2013; Cooney, Rojek & Kaminski, 2011; Graphia-Joyal, 2010). However, the research that has been com- pleted on fusion centers shows promising signs of increased information sharing if the fusion centers are able to market their abilities more to those they would like to serve. Utilizing survey and interview data with 51 state troopers about the informa- tion received from the state fusion center, Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) found that a majority of the troopers (75%) called the fusion center for intelligence information at least once within the last 6 months and nearly one third (30.7%) had called the fusion center at least once a month. Cooney and colleagues (2011) surveyed police executives, a population with different needs, and also found that most (75%) rated the state fusion center to be moderately useful or very useful. Finally, Lewandowski and Carter (2014) surveyed the recipients of the daily intelligence bulletin that was disseminated from a state fusion center and found that the intelligence product is read daily and perceived to be moderately useful by the recipients.

Many of the previous studies noted, however, that fusion centers still need to do a better job of marketing themselves to their potential end-users. In follow-up inter- views, state troopers stated that they did not contact the fusion center because they were unaware of the capabilities of the fusion center (Ratcliffe & Walden, 2010). Joyal-Graphia (2010) also noted improved information sharing among agencies after conducting site visits and interviews with personnel from four different fusion centers but warned that acquiring support and legitimacy from various agencies, including the agency running the fusion center, was difficult without more market- ing. Finally, Cooney and colleagues (2011) found that the personnel most likely to

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use the fusion center were thosewho had received training and those that prioritized intelligence-led policing.

The evidence of the benefits of fusion centers have not silenced their critics, how- ever. Some commentators believe that the lack of evidence of information sharing in addition to the various missions of each agency is evidence of their ineffectiveness (Masse et al., 2008; Taylor & Russell, 2012; U.S. Senate., 2012). More specifically, the autonomy of a traditional policing agency in addition to the interagency ego may hinder quality information sharing (Taylor & Russell, 2012). Monahan and Palmer (2009) instead worry that the fusion centers are violating citizens’ civil liberties by functioning beyond their original purposes of operating as a counterterrorism entity and instead racially profiling and collecting information on street crime that is not related to terrorism. However, as mentioned earlier, this change inmission is seen as an adaptation and ameans of augmenting the utility of fusion centers for all the state and local agencies whose primary concern is street crime (Chermak et al., 2013).

In the same vein, a fusion center may be able to bring together national and local agencies for a border security function. The ability to utilize the omnipresence of local agencies for the national benefit of additional security at the border would be invaluable to the agencies tasked with this undertaking as even small land borders can be quite onerous to oversee. National security would increase if local agencies could share their information more efficiently with border protection agencies who may not be able to see all that is occurring on the ground or even further inside the country which may provide information on patterns of migration or international crime.

Prospects and challenges of integrating the fusion center concept into border security

Prospects—Adding clarity to a complex situation

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 not only spurred legislation that expanded authorities, created a new agency, and demanded the collaboration of information and intelligence, it institutionalized the link between terrorism and bor- der security of the United States (AFCEA, 2007; Manjarrez, 2015). The U.S. Depart- ment of Homeland Security (DHS) was created out of this legislative activity to con- front future acts of terrorism as well as other functions to include border security. The department describes the keystone to the strategy to secure the nation’s bor- ders as the ability to reduce risks and vulnerabilities to the United States (USDHS, 2014). The idea of reducing risks by adding clarity to the United States’ border secu- rity efforts is not a new idea but one that has been repeated and reinforced the last 15 years. It is clear that the business of border security has evolved into a business of prevention through the utilization of collaborative and intelligence efforts by a wide range of federal, state, local, and tribal entities that bring the “whole of government” to border security efforts (Peteritas, 2013; USDHS, 2014). Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States has discussed how the sharing of information has and will

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become critical to the success of securing the homeland and its borders (AFCEA, 2007; Peteritas, 2013). Fusion centers have the potential to improve the clarity of a chaotic and cluttered border by improving domain and situational awareness.

The concept of fusion centers as part of border security in the United States is a relatively new notion, but the idea of centralized intelligence systems has had its place domestically as well as internationally for decades. The allure of fusion centers in a border security environment where the “fusion” of intelligence involves joint or collaborative efforts between jurisdictions is strongly desired by the U.S. homeland security enterprise (Eack, 2008). In the United States, this means federal, local law enforcement, and tribal entities working in a structure that resembles intelligence cross-cueing in an effort to conduct joint border management. As a GAO report (2014) noted, the complexity of attempting to bring clarity and situational aware- ness along the 24 U.S. border counties that share a border with Mexico could be improved if the sheer number of law enforcement entities within these areas were seen as part of a border security cueing system. Increasing the clarity in areas of high illegal activity and in particular border regions has the potential to significantly improve situational awareness by mitigating the “white noise” (Burch, 2008; Eack, 2008). The aim of border centric fusion centers is to improve data collection and analysis capabilities in order to increase the capacity to consistently assess risk and improve situational awareness (Rollins, 2008).

A renewed effort that utilizes fusion centers in a border security environment should address old dichotomies of stovepipes of intelligence, interoperability, and unified command in order to reduce risk and improve border security (Bersin, 2012). In addition to providing increased domain and situational awareness, bor- der security fusion centers have the potential to significantly increase intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. This intelligence becomes key in making data into useable information that is central to the evaluation of risk (Bersin, 2012). It is the evaluation of risk that improves the decision-making process in directing resource deployment along the border. This becomes important when the aim is to reduce risk by developing strategies that refine and focus targeting efforts to miti- gate threats to the homeland (U.S. GAO, 2014). This further develops an effective intelligence cross-cueing system across federal, state, local, and tribal organizations by seeing through the “clutter” of an active border region to improve border security efforts (Rollins, 2008).

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA’s) are typically seen as the pre- cursor to the modern fusion center concept in the United States (Finklea, 2013). Unfortunately, the HIDTA concept is based on confronting drug trafficking which is only one symptom of a complex and chaotic international border that is cluttered. Although limited to the 368 miles of the Arizona–Mexico border, the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) offers a fresh example of a fusion center concept in a border security context. The ACTT was established in 2009 and is a 66 agency effort that attempts to integrate intelligence and operations among home- land security partners that include other federal, state, local, and tribal organiza- tions (U.S. GAO, 2014). According to the U.S. GAO (2014), the primary purpose of

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the ACTT is to leverage the capabilities and resources of partners against individu- als and criminal organization involved in cross-border activity. This means that the aim is to address all threats to the border region that are transnational in nature. An additional premise behind the ACTT is the commitment of joint border man- agement responsibilities of law enforcement entities participating in this campaign. The Arizona ACTT is led by a 13-member unified command that provides strategic direction and is at its most effective when acting on coordinated prioritized tactical targets. Although the ACTT is widely acclaimed as successful due to the reduction of border clutter, it is still a coalition of willing partners among other issues (U.S. GAO, 2014).

Challenges

Finklea (2013) points out that the 21st century presents new challenges to law enforcement entities combatting transnational criminal organizations in an era of increased terrorism threats. Although the ACTT is an example of a multiagency effort that synthesizes intelligence and operational efforts focused in border secu- rity, the expansion of this effort has faced some of the typical challenges of previous fusion center efforts. The U.S. GAO (2014) reported that the ACTT was soon fol- lowed by the Joint Field Command (JFC) in Arizona and the South Texas Campaign but these efforts are specific to the DHS entities and are much smaller in scale. The challenges in establishing border security centric fusion centers in the United States has four underlying themes: common ground for policy and procedures, barriers to intelligence information sharing, nonalignedmissions, and concerns with organiza- tional autonomy (Eack, 2008; Peteritas, 2013; Rollins, 2008; U.S. GAO, 2014). Our recent history in attempting to establish fusion centers that are border centric are confronted by these four challenges.

Rollins (2008) points out that significant barriers still abound when it comes to establishing policy, procedures, and protocols that allow for common terminology and communication systems. The lack of interoperability of systems continues to be an issue for federal, state, local, and tribal entities where there is a lack of coor- dination concerning information management systems. For example, the ACCT members cannot easily share information electronically because of the varying informationmanagement systems that in some cases are proprietary (Rollins, 2008). Furthermore, U.S.members of theACTT, as amatter of policy, are required to report a foreign contact to their agency chain of command as a result of any interactions with Mexico’s CISEN (Center for Investigation and National Security). The report- ing of foreign contacts is done as part of most U.S. agency’s security clearance proto- cols but is not practical when the contact is almost daily. CISEN is a foreign partner within the ACTT that provides tactical and strategic information on criminal orga- nizations operating in northernMexico but impacting the United States (U.S. GAO, 2014; Rollins, 2008). Although these examples may seem insignificant, they demon- strate the lack of coordination and policy adjustment needed in dealing with issues that are not only cross regional but binational as well.

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Fusion centers across the United States have long had barriers related to intelli- gence sharing as a result of security clearances required between federal agencies and federal agencies with state and local entities. One example of the issues and bar- riers faced by state and local entities is that there is a lack of coordination between the DHS and the FBI (Eack, 2008). State and local law enforcement agencies in these fusion centers are required to have security clearances in order to receive classified material. Yet, many of these entities report that the FBI will not accept the DHS clearances and DHS does not have access to databases that indicate who from state and local entities possess an FBI security clearance (Burch, 2008; Eack, 2008). The lack of coordination between the FBI and DHS does not simply extend to security clearances but manifests itself in the overuse of Secret or even For Official Use Only classifications of information (Peteritas, 2013; Rollins, 2008). The overclassification of material results in frustration which hinders the participation of state and local law enforcement agencies participating in fusion centers because it limits their abil- ity to receive, analyze, and disseminate actionable intelligence.

It is clear the issue of nonaligned missions among the organizations and efforts to ensure the maintenance of organizational autonomy in this coalition of the will- ing continues to be a barrier for effective fusion centers (Burch, 2008; Eack, 2008; Rollins, 2008; U.S. GAO, 2014). Although the ACTT in Arizona by most accounts is seen as successful, a GAO audit reports that state and local entities do not believe that their agencymission is fully considered by the federal organizations (U.S. GAO, 2014). Not only is this complaint by state and local entities problematic because of the belief their mission is not as valued, it points to the deeper issue that border management is not viewed as the primary focus of their participation. For example, the Department of Interior (DOI) is an activemember of the ACTT but its ownmis- sion of enforcing federal land management laws often conflicts with the U.S. Border Patrol’s border security mission. Over 35% of the international border with Mex- ico is managed by the DOI and to some level are considered “protected lands” (U.S. GAO, 2011). The GAO report points out that this often pits the DOImission of pro- tecting sensitive lands with the border securitymission of theU.S. Border Patrol that requires unimpeded access to these same lands. The U.S. GAO (2011) reports that the missions are so dynamically opposed that DOI officers have threatened Border Patrol Agents with fines and prosecution if they patrol on protected lands among the international border (U.S. GAO, 2011).

There are other barriers regarding the use of fusion centers in a border secu- rity context that are not only present in the United States but exist internationally as well. For example, in Mexico, the Federal Security Directorate (Direccion Fed- eral de Seguridad–DFS) was replaced by CISEN in 1989 because of the issues of trust and organizational autonomy that thwarted the growth and development of the Federal Security Directorate (Bailey, 2010). Border security is one segment of homeland security and asking state and local organizations to participate in multi- ple efforts appears as a duplication of efforts or even competing interests on limited budgets (Eack, 2008). It is clear that the underlying theme among the four barri- ers discussed is the idea of developing a climate of trust. Persson (2013) describes

JOURNAL OF APPLIED SECURITY RESEARCH 173

how the terrorist’s attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States forced other European countries to develop a coalition of the willing and re-evaluate how intel- ligence is shared and managed across borders. It is this same coalition of the willing that is needed to improve the effectiveness of fusion centers but often operates in an environment that is at risk to politicization (Persson, 2013).

Conclusion and policy implications

The issue of mass migration that is being faced by European nations and other nations around the world is not new and has long been studied in the United States along the southwest border. The European community is now experiencing many of the same issues that have plagued the southwest border of the United States when mass migration is so overwhelming that it creates chaos and clutter. While illegal immigration and border security are two different and divergent issues facing the United States and European countries, both issues undoubtedly have significant bearing and influence on each other. Understanding the complexity of the issue hinges on understanding the correlation between illegal immigration and border security. The basic premise is that opportunistic criminal elements will exploit bor- der regions that have overwhelming illegal immigration. This is due to the fact that the environment is chaotic and cluttered creating a favorable opportunity for the criminal element to flourish. The same chaos and clutter of an uncontrolled border, due to overwhelming illegal immigration, also becomes an area that is vulnerable to the exploitation by terrorist organizations. This issue becomes the real threat of an uncontrolled border.With this research as our context, we have argued that a fusion center frameworkmay be a possible resolution to the increased “border clutter” that is now becoming viewed as a border security issue.

There are two important policy implications given our review of the literature and research in this area. First, it is clear that any center, which will be overseeing bor- der security at an international border, must have a border centric approach. When bringing together many different entities that have had historically different objec- tives, it can be challenging to combine resources and information if all of the organi- zations are focusing on their particular agenda. A border security centric approach would facilitate the concept that border security is every participants’ business and strengthen the border security organizational culture of a fusion center. Secondly, as in the United States, the European community will soon be faced with the policy implication of reduced funding and resources to address the issues of mass migra- tion. In an era of restricted fiscal resources, border security entities will seek to iden- tify and improve efficiencies to confront the hidden threats among mass migration. Border security centric fusion centers offer the potential to increase these efficien- cies by aligning agency missions and the free-flow of cross-cueing information by mitigating the typical bureaucratic concerns. The aim of a border centric fusion cen- ter should be to provide additional situational awareness (clarity) to what is occur- ring so that the greater threats (criminal organizations and terrorists) cannot exploit the chaos and clutter. As has been seen in recent terrorist events in Brussels and

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Paris, security is of the utmost important to both politicians and citizens; these two recent events highlight the urgency of the need for the most effective security at the borders.

Notes

1. Apprehensions represent themost commonmethod of measuring border crossings. See U.S. GAO 2013c.

2. Since 2005, border crossing related fatalities have declined to 308 in 2014 and 240 in 2015 (U.S. CBP, n.d.c).

3. For example, the Border Patrol performed 2,183 rescues of individuals along the southwest border in 2015, typically individual in danger from environmental exposure or swift water rescue due to flash flooding.

4. Figures drawn from the 2011 and 2012 Trans-Border Institute reports on Drug Violence in Mexico.

5. Data drawn from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transporta- tion Statistics Border Crossing/Entry Data-http://transborder.bts.gov/programs/ international/transborder/TBDR_BC/TBDR_BCQ.html

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