Week 8 - Signature Assignment: Design a System to Manage Administrative Policies

Unpacking the Collaborative Toolbox: Why and When

Do Public Managers Choose Collaborative Governance

Strategies?

Tyler A. Scott and Craig W. Thomas

The public policy and public management literatures together support a vibrant discussion of

collaborative governance. Much of this scholarship takes a broad perspective focusing on questions

such as what collaborative governance is; why collaborative governance emerges; or why individuals

and organizations choose to participate in voluntary, nonbinding collaborative efforts. This paper

focuses specifically on the role of public managers as leaders, encouragers, and followers of

collaborative governance. We examine the decision calculus factoring into the choice of collaborative

governance as a toolbox for achieving desired policy goals. That is, we ask why public managers

choose to devote public resources to collaborative governance. What motivates public managers to

pick up the phone, write a check, or otherwise change their current behavior? We develop 20

propositions that contextualize this choice in terms of two overarching questions: (i) How do

institutional structure and organizational strategy intersect to influence the ways in which public

managers design and implement collaborative governance?; and (ii) Why do public managers choose

particular roles within collaborative institutions? In doing so, we demonstrate how the public policy

and public management literatures can be coupled to better understand a theoretical issue that each

research body struggles to encapsulate in isolation.

KEY WORDS: collaborative governance, policy tools, public management

Introduction

Collaborative governance is common in numerous policy areas, including eco-

nomic development, municipal budgeting, public health, human services, environ-

mental protection and restoration, and transportation and land use (Donahue &

Zeckhauser, 2011; Feldman & Khademian, 2007; Lasker & Weiss, 2003; Page, 2010;

Sabatier, 2005). In keeping with this proliferation, collaborative governance is also a

popular topic in both the public policy and public management literatures. Indeed,

we use the term “collaborative governance” precisely because it encompasses the

terms “collaborative policymaking” (deLeon & Varda, 2009; Weible & Sabatier, 2009)

and “collaborative management” (Agranoff, 2012; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003;

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Bingham & O’Leary, 2008; O’Leary & Bingham, 2009). Other work has served to bet-

ter define the concept of collaborative governance itself (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2008;

Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015), formally distinguish collaborative governance from sim-

ple interaction and transactional relationships (e.g., Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011;

Margerum, 2011), and identify structural and institutional factors that motivate the

emergence of collaborative governance (e.g., Lubell, Schneider, Scholz, & Mete, 2002;

Tang & Mazmanian, 2010). In this paper, we examine an important theoretical ques-

tion that is more limited in scope and perspective: when and why do public manag-

ers choose to support collaborative governance arrangements instead of using their

limited resources to implement policy tools unilaterally?

We argue that, viewed from the perspective of public managers, collaborative gov-

ernance (an umbrella term for the myriad structures and processes used to shape collec-

tive action amongst independent organizations; see Emerson et al., 2015) represents a

set of tools for solving public problems. Such tools include informal sharing arrange-

ments, service sharing contracts, public–private partnerships, joint powers agreements,

regional intergovernmental authorities, city–county consolidations, deliberative

forums, participatory planning, and stakeholder advisory groups (Donahue & Zeck-

hauser, 2011). In other words, collaborative governance—while not a specific policy

tool in the traditional vein of tax credits or tradable permits (see Salamon, 2002)—is

itself a toolbox that policymakers and managers wield for public problem solving.

Second, we examine how both the public policy and public management literatures

conceive of collaborative governance as a strategic device in this fashion. We argue

that while both literatures acknowledge the strategic functions of collaborative gov-

ernance, each tends to focus more generally on the emergence of collaborative gov-

ernance amidst structural factors rather than on the strategic choice of collaborative

tools by public managers. This focus tends to emphasize participation incentives for

public, nonprofit, and private stakeholders alike that motivate collective action.

Accordingly, theory concerning when and why public managers choose to use col-

laborative governance tools to solve policy problems remains underdeveloped.

In this article, we seek to build upon and complement the extant collaborative

governance literature by focusing specifically on explaining the choice by public man-

agers, on the margin, to sponsor and support the “collaborative toolbox” over other

means for solving public problems. Drawing upon theoretical and applied findings

concerning the costs and benefits of collaborative governance, we develop a series of

theoretical propositions concerning when and why public managers choose to devote

resources to support collaborative governance and the policy tools associated with it.

Collaborative Governance as a Policy Toolbox

Following Emerson and Nabatchi (2015), we define collaborative governance as:

The processes and structures of public policy decision making and manage-

ment that engage people across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of

government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry

out a public purpose. (p. 18)

192 Policy Studies Journal, 45:1

In particular, we stress the final words of this definition—”in order to carry out

a public purpose”—because these words frame collaborative governance as a means

by which public goals can be accomplished.1 This definition evokes the idea of policy

tools (Salamon, 2000), which are instruments for accomplishing public purposes.

However, collaborative governance does not refer to a single tool, but rather can

encapsulate many different tools—either in isolation or in concert—that serve to

shape and guide collective action. In fact, many—if not all—of the policy tools

detailed by Salamon (2002) can be implemented through collaborative structures and

processes instead of unilaterally by a single public agency. Collaborative tools are

methods for initiating and supporting inter-organizational collaboration. Managers

use participation incentives, formal agreements, resource sharing, deliberative

forums, and other means to shape and incentivize collaborative actions. Accordingly,

even if “collaborative tools” are conceptually distinct from “policy tools” (tradition-

ally defined as “an identifiable method through which collective action is structured

to address a public problem” [Salamon, 2002, p. 19]), such as government loans and

regulations, public managers nonetheless wield a multitude of structures and proc-

esses in order to support collaborative governance as a means to an end. As such,

we argue collaborative governance represents a “toolbox” used to solve public

problems.

While some authors have previously considered collaborative governance from

this problem-oriented perspective, it has generally been done in a vague or underde-

veloped way. For example, Ansell and Gash (2008) explicitly define collaborative

governance as serving public purposes, but do not present a theory of why policy-

makers choose collaborative governance. Likewise, Koontz et al. (2004) provide a

framework on the various roles government can play in supporting collaborative

governance institutions, but do not present a theory of why and when public manag-

ers choose to play one or more of these roles. Kamensky and Burlin (2004) specifi-

cally analyze collaborative governance as a toolbox for leveraging networks and

partnerships, but do so as pragmatic advice to practitioners rather than within a the-

oretical framework. Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006) explicitly advance a broad

theory concerning the emergence of collaboration amongst multiple actors, stating

that “Public policy makers are most likely to try cross-sector collaboration when they

believe the separate efforts of different sectors to address a public problem have

failed or are likely to fail, and the actual or potential failures cannot be fixed by the

sectors acting alone” (p. 46). However, the propositions advanced by Bryson et al.

(2006) address when collaborative governance is likely to succeed rather than the

rationale for government investment in collaborative structures and processes. Other

scholars examine how managers select particular tools from the collaborative gover-

nance toolbox. For instance, Hill and Lynn (2003), McGuire (2003, 2006), and Impe-

rial (2005) focus on customizing collaborative efforts for particular network

management contexts and problem characteristics. Our paper takes up these types of

questions but from a narrow lens, focusing specifically on what motivates public

managers to initiate, support, or participate in particular forms and practices of col-

laboration (i.e., to select particular tools from the collaborative governance toolbox)

in order to further their goals.2

Scott/Thomas: Unpacking the Collaborative Toolbox 193

Collaborative Governance as Strategy

It is easy to view collaborative governance as a structural response to fragmented

policy systems (Feiock, 2013; Thomas, 2003) and complex, “wicked” problems

(Weber & Khademian, 2008). One example is the argument that collaborative gover-

nance is motivated by institutional collective action dilemmas (Feiock, 2013). This

perspective is drawn from institutional rational choice, and identifies resource attrib-

utes such as the characteristics of the problem itself (Tang & Mazmanian, 2010); insti-

tutional attributes such as existing rules, regulations, and incentives (Feiock, 2013);

and extant community attributes such as belief heterogeneity (Sabatier, Leach,

Lubell, & Pelkey, 2005) as collectively motivating collaborative group formation.

These structural conditions are most certainly key drivers of collaborative gover-

nance. Structure is not deterministic however, and thus it is informative to examine

when and why public managers choose collaborative tools to cope with—or

address—structural constraints. We complement the aforementioned structural per-

spective by approaching collaborative governance as a strategic tool—or more accu-

rately, as a collection of strategic tools—for achieving policy goals. In other words,

we argue that there are specific strategic aims that motivate a public manager to

devote funding, staff time, or other resources to a collaborative institution or process

(and likewise, reasons why a different manager within a similar structural environ-

ment might not). This strategic conception for collaborative governance rests on an

assumption of individual and organizational bounded rationality. That is, we assume

that individuals and organizations pursue collaborative governance in accordance

with their interests and purposes. Both the public management and public policy lit-

eratures employ this assumption.

The public management literature recognizes collaborative governance as a

“process of establishing, steering, facilitating, operating, and monitoring . . . organiza-

tional arrangements” (Tang & Mazmanian, 2010, p. ii). For instance, several scholars

have focused on collaborative governance as representing a set of tools for network

management3 by providing structure and processes that shape collective action

amongst independent organizations (McGuire, 2002; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Rethe-

meyer & Hatmaker, 2008). Much of the strategy discussed from a public management

lens emphasizes procedural dynamics and mechanisms that contribute to or detract

from interorganizational collaboration (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015) and process-

influencing issues such as the role and quality of leadership in collaborative governance

(Page, 2010), performance measurement (Amirkhanyan, 2009), and stakeholder inclu-

sion (Johnston, Hicks, Nan, & Auer, 2011).

Likewise, the public policy literature similarly addresses the strategic use of col-

laborative governance by organizations and individuals. The common pool resource

(CPR) governance research tradition of Ostrom (1990, 2000) emphasizes how actors

weigh the transaction costs of collaboration (e.g., searching for partners or monitor-

ing and enforcing agreements) against the perceived benefits of collective action.

Other works in this vein explore the strategic role of individuals and organizations

within collaborative governance by developing behavioral models of decision mak-

ing in collective action settings (Lubell & Scholz, 2001; Ostrom, 1998). The policy

194 Policy Studies Journal, 45:1

literature also emphasizes the strategic role of policy entrepreneurs and leadership

in initiating and directing collaborative efforts (Lubell, 2004).

This conception of collaborative governance—at the individual or organizational

level—is incomplete, however, because there are also societal-level norms at work.

Collaborative governance is perceived as a contrast to adversarial policymaking

(Ansell & Gash, 2008). Further, collaborative governance can increase legitimacy

(defined by Wolf [2002] as deriving from public consent to be governed and whether

government behavior and decisions authentically express public goals) by giving

standing to all relevant and significant interests in public decision making (Ansell &

Gash, 2008; Carlson, 2007; Emerson, Orr, Keyes, & Mcknight, 2009; Innes & Booher,

1999; Newig, Adzersen, Challies, Fritsch, & Jager, 2013).

In what follows, we examine how linkages between structural and strategic ele-

ments interact to influence the costs and benefits that public managers face when

weighing the choice to devote funding and other resources to tools within the collab-

orative governance toolbox. We stress that this is a more focused, specific perspective

than taken by other ongoing research agendas that consider the participation incen-

tives of collaborative governance more generally (e.g., the Institutional Collective

Action framework [see Feiock, 2013] and the Institutional Analysis and Development

Framework [see Blomquist & deLeon, 2011]), since our question specifically concerns

the rationale behind using public resources for collaborative governance instead of

devoting those same resources to other (unilateral) policy and management efforts.

This is an important theoretical gap and a significant empirical question in light of

the considerable time and resources that governments invest in collaborative gover-

nance (Margerum, 2011; Sabatier et al., 2005). In short, collaborative governance is

time consuming, costly, and has highly uncertain outcomes (Margerum, 2011), and

so the reasons why public managers employ collaborative tools merit consideration.

Collaborative Tools for Different Problem Contexts

There is a large body of theory and evidence about the benefits of collaborative

governance. For instance, collaborative governance can disseminate and create

knowledge to change beliefs (Leach, Weible, Vince, Siddiki, & Calanni, 2013),

increase familiarity (Scholz, Berardo, & Kile, 2008) and build trust (Klijn, Edelenbos,

& Steijn, 2010) among network actors, foster dialogue and discussion (Berardo,

Heikkila, & Gerlak, 2014), and increase legitimacy (Dietz & Stern, 2008). These inter-

mediate outcomes are the causal mechanisms by which collaborative tools such as

public participation can improve policy outcomes (Newig et al., 2013). Returning to

the distinction made above between collaborative tools and policy tools, a collabora-

tive tool such as stakeholder deliberation might be a means by which to increase the

efficacy of a policy tool such as a tradable permit system.

This section examines the different ways in which collaborative governance can

be a strategic response to structural conditions. Collaborative governance can

improve policy outcomes—and thereby benefit the public decision maker—by

improving policy outputs (either outputs of the decision maker’s agency or outputs

produced by the collaborative institution), increasing the perceived legitimacy of

Scott/Thomas: Unpacking the Collaborative Toolbox 195

actions, bridging different levels of institutional hierarchies, increasing the scope or

comprehensiveness of actions, realizing economies of scale, and diversifying what

issues are governed. These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive (and in many cases

likely go hand-in-hand), but examining different strategic purposes for collaborative

governance so as to improve policy outcomes in light of specific structural contexts.

Collaborative Governance to Improve the Quality of Policy Outputs

Collaborative governance can involve more perspectives and a greater array of

relevant knowledge, improving the quality of decision making by incorporating a

broader, more diverse perspective (Beierle & Cayford, 2002; Sirianni, 2009). By doing

so, collaborative governance produces more durable and effective plans and policies

(Innes & Booher, 1999; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987). To the extent that “contextual

conditions” (“the societal and political environment, the prehistory of a decision

making process, elements of the issue at stake, characteristics of the relevant stake-

holder field, and the level of pre-existing conflict” [Newig et al., 2013, p. 5]) are not

well understood by policymakers, input from other relevant actors becomes more

important. For instance, Newman, Barnes, Sullivan, and Knops (2004) describe col-

laborative governance as a means for improving welfare services by helping agencies

make policies and practices more responsive to recipients through the use of partici-

patory institutions such as user panels and area-based committees. When public

managers lack particular competencies or knowledge about a target population, col-

laborative tools intended to provide greater representation to program recipients or

gain greater input from subject-area experts can improve the design and implemen-

tation of public programs. One example is the creation of collaborative forums that

involve researchers, agency technicians, and other technical experts in order to pro-

vide expertise for decision making.

Proposition 1: When public managers administer a policy or program to a special-

ized subpopulation (as opposed to a broader constituency), they are more likely to

use collaborative governance tools to jointly implement programs, plans, or projects

with this target population.

Proposition 2: When public managers design a policy or program that extends

beyond their core competencies, they are more likely to use collaborative governance

tools to jointly implement programs, plans, or projects with subject-area experts.

Collaborative Governance to Increase Legitimacy

The literature also emphasizes the importance of giving standing to all relevant

and significant interests in public decision making (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Carlson,

2007; Emerson et al., 2009; Innes & Booher, 1999). This point is stressed as both a nor-

mative organizational principle (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015) and because giving

standing to relevant actors is also viewed as a way to improve policy implementation

196 Policy Studies Journal, 45:1

by helping to make sure that these actors are “on board” with the policy that is ulti-

mately adopted (Sabatier et al., 2005). Collaborative governance actions have greater

legitimacy among some members of the public because collaborative governance

appears to represent a broader consensus (Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson & Nabatchi,

2015) and thereby mitigates mistrust of government (Margerum, 2011). Dietz and Stern

(2008), writing specifically about public participation (what we would consider to be a

collaborative tool within the collaborative governance toolbox), note that it is a method

“for obtaining the consent of the governed in more specific ways than are possible with

elections” (p. 50). Increasing the perceived legitimacy of policy actions can further

both societal goals as a normative principle (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015) and indi-

vidual or organizational goals by improving policy implementation through get-

ting actors “on board” with policy measures (Sabatier et al., 2005). Two primary

ways to increase the legitimacy of government actions are to involve those who

will be affected by said actions in decision making and to collaborate with well-

reputed individuals or organizations in implementation. For instance, a policy

measure that carries the imprimatur of key stakeholders might be perceived as

more legitimate.

Proposition 3: When public managers perceive that the legitimacy of their organiza-

tion is low, they are more likely to use collaborative governance tools to jointly

implement programs, plans, or projects with parties directly affected by said actions.

Proposition 4: When public managers perceive that the legitimacy of their organi-

zation is low, they are more likely to use collaborative governance tools jointly

implement programs, plans, or projects with well-reputed network actors.

Collaborative Governance to Span Geographic Boundaries

The role of collaborative governance in fostering coordination or cooperation4

across geographic boundaries is a common theme in the literature, perhaps most

prominently related to the role collaborative governance tools can play in alleviating

scale mismatch between ecosystem processes and jurisdictional/land ownership pat-

terns (e.g., Gerlak, Lubell, & Heikkila, 2012; Karkkainen, 2002). More generally, frag-

mentation of policy responsibilities can mean that the individual governments are

unable to implement policy tools that match the scale of the policy problem and

pose “institutional collective action dilemmas” (Feiock, 2009, 2013; Feiock & Scholz,

2009) wherein the decisions of one government impose externalities on other govern-

ments. In this context, collaborative tools such as interlocal task forces or formal part-

nerships provide a means by which to integrate decision making across multiple

jurisdictions. When a government is too small to effectively address a problem, col-

laboration with surrounding jurisdictions can serve to expand policy and manage-

ment efforts to the relevant scale.

Scott/Thomas: Unpacking the Collaborative Toolbox 197

Proposition 5: When public managers are unable to take unilateral actions that

match the geographic scale of a policy problem, they are more likely to use collabo-

rative governance tools to jointly implement programs, plans, or projects with

neighboring jurisdictions.

Collaborative Governance for Achieving Economies of Scale

While problem scale—in particular mismatch between problem scale and juris-

diction—can motivate managers to seek collaboration with other organizations,

economies of scale with regards to the policy tools and service delivery can also

incentivize collaborative arrangements. Sharing in the production of public services

with other public, private, or nonprofit actors can achieve economies of scale by

reducing per-unit production costs (Bel & Warner, 2008), and by taking advantage of

the unique resources that different organizations have so as to obviate the need for

duplicative investment (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011).

Depending on the nature of the service provided—in particular, the transaction

risks involved in collaborating with another organization to provide said service

(Feiock, 2009)—collaboration to achieve economies of scale is expected to take several

different forms (Shrestha & Feiock, 2011). Sharing agreements can efficiently achieve

scale economies in low transaction risk situations such as waste management that

have few upfront costs and low investment in specific assets (Shrestha & Feiock,

2011). For higher risk collaborations that require large upfront infrastructure invest-

ments, such as water and sewer, the creation of a formal interorganizational author-

ity is more likely (Feiock, 2009). In any case, public managers can potentially reduce

the per-unit cost of providing a given service by realizing economies of scale through

collaborative partnerships with public, private, and nonprofit organizations at vari-

ous institutional levels.

Proposition 6: When public managers perceive a diseconomy of scale in independ-

ent production or service delivery, they are more likely to use collaborative gover-

nance tools to jointly implement programs, plans, or projects with other producers

(or would-be producers).

Collaborative Governance to Bridge Hierarchies

A public agency might have a mandate to act only in certain ways or provide

funding only for certain goods or services, which can hinder problem solving to the

extent that public managers are not authorized to act in ways necessary to address a

problem. Thus, collaboration with other organizations higher or lower in an institu-

tional hierarchy can be a way to leverage external authority and resources (e.g.,

Schneider, Scholz, Lubell, Mindruta, & Edwardsen, 2003).

Sometimes, coordination—defined by Margerum (2011) as “a process whereby

participants work jointly towards a common end” (p. 8)—can be a way of getting

around constraints that exist at one level of an institutional hierarchy. For example,

198 Policy Studies Journal, 45:1

HUD-VASH is a federal program administered by the U.S. Department of Housing

and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) that

provides services to homeless veterans (SRA/Abt Associates, 2014). As part of pro-

gram requirements, local service providers are required to maintain Homeless Man-

agement Information Systems (HMIS) that collect and maintain data on the needs

and characteristics of the homeless population. However, VA employees are not

allowed to enter data into HMIS systems. To work around this limitation, the VA

encourages collaborative relationships where the local public housing authority

enters these data into HMIS for the VA instead (see SRA/Abt Associates, 2014, p. 1).

Other times, hierarchical cooperation (where participants work independently

towards a common goal, Margerum, 2001, p. 8) can increase the comprehensiveness of

policy efforts. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sponsors stakeholder

management groups involving local agencies and private actors and provides adminis-

trative and technical resources to support policy and program implementation by these

independent actors. This cooperative effort seeks to more comprehensively address

land-use, habitat, and nonpoint source pollution problems in estuaries by fostering

action at both the federal and local level (Schneider et al., 2003). Because the EPA does

not have say in local zoning, estuary management problems such as nonpoint source

pollution are difficult to address through unilateral EPA actions. By supporting collabo-

rative arrangements with local entities the EPA can seek to further its policy goals

through cooperation with local organizations, and in turn local entities that work with

the agency gain access to greater resources in order to carry out policies and programs.

Proposition 7: When public managers at a federal or state level design a policy or

program that requires localized actions, they are more likely to use collaborative

governance tools to jointly implement programs, plans, or projects with local or

regional governments.

Proposition 8: When public managers at a local or regional level require additional

capacity or resources to pursue a desired course of action, they are more likely to

use collaborative governance tools to jointly implement programs, plans, or projects

with state or federal agencies.

Collaborative Governance for Issue Diversification

By involving external stakeholders or agencies, public managers can redefine

policy problems and thereby alter or expand the existing scope of action. For

instance, environmental public health problems such as chemical exposure or emer-

gency preparedness cross the sectoral boundaries and areas of expertise of public

health and environmental agencies (Daley, 2009). Thus, collaboration is often pre-

scribed as a means for comprehensively solving such problems approaching them

collectively rather than as purely an environmental or a public health issue alone

(Daley, 2009; Lasker & Weiss, 2003). In other words, collaborative governance can be

a way to redefine policy issues so as to better address complex problems.

Scott/Thomas: Unpacking the Collaborative Toolbox 199

Issue definition refers broadly to the framing of a problem that provides a ration-

ale for action and the scale at which the problem is defined and addressed (Koontz

et al., 2004). One of the unique aspects of collaborative governance however is that

issue definition remains variable after collaborative governance is initiated, as a

shared conception of problem size, scope, and scale are defined collectively (Koontz

et al., 2004; Leach & Pelkey, 2001) through an iterative process (Emerson & Nabatchi,

2015). In instances where a public agency is authorized to act only in certain ways or

provide funding only for certain goods or services, issue diversification can be a way

to redefine the issue so as to enable more or different actions. When a public decision

maker believes that the outcome of interest is a product of multiple interdependent

factors, but only has statutory authority to act in certain ways, involving other organ-

izations can be a way to facilitate different types of interventions.

Proposition 9: When public managers’ unilateral actions are constrained from

employing desired policy tools, they are more likely to use collaborative governance

tools to jointly implement programs, plans, or projects with actors who are author-

ized to act in different ways than the manager’s agency.

Proposition 10: When public managers are constrained to act within one policy sec-

tor but face a problem that spans multiple policy sectors, they are more likely to use

collaborative governance tools to jointly implement programs, plans, or projects

with organizations active in other sectors.

What Functions Do Public Managers Serve in Collaborative Governance?

In the previous section, we posed ten propositions that link structural conditions

with strategic choices made by public managers to use—or not use—collaborative

governance tools. As the prior section highlights, the term collaborative governance

refers to a wide array of tools used to foster collaboration with different types of

actors for different purposes. Responding to this diversity of forms, scholars have

developed typologies to conceptually organize the collaborative toolbox based upon

attributes such as geographic scale, institutional scale, inclusiveness, and stakeholder

incentives (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Cheng & Daniels, 2005; Emerson et al., 2015;

Margerum, 2011). In keeping with our specific focus on the choice by public manag-

ers to support collaborative governance, we turn our attention to the functional roles

that government actors play in collaborative institutions.

In this regard, we follow Koontz et al. (2004) who identify three general roles

that public actors play in collaborative governance. They may act as (i) leaders, who

convene and direct collaborative governance initiatives; (ii) encouragers, who pro-

vide human, financial, or technical resources in order to precipitate or support col-

laborative governance; and/or (iii) followers, who join collaborative governance

efforts convened or encouraged by others.

One of the challenges in assessing the behavior of followers in accordance to the

original Koontz et al. (2004) trichotomy is distinguishing between whether followers

200 Policy Studies Journal, 45:1

are contributing but taking a backseat or whether they are simply observing or free-

riding on the efforts of others. Thus, we redefine this category such that contributors

who take a backseat are encouragers (i.e., category two) and followers are either: (i)

free-riders who stand to benefit from participation in collaborative governance but

do not meaningfully contribute to bearing costs; or (ii) “opposers” who participate in

collaborative governance to prevent losses being imposed. It must be noted, how-

ever, that free-riding or opposing followers of collaborative governance still bear par-

ticipation costs—they do not, however, bear administrative costs or other costs of

supporting the collaborative institution itself. Further, leader, encourager, and fol-

lower roles are not mutually exclusive, particularly when collaborative arrangements

are viewed longitudinally, and thus organizational roles can shift over time. None-

theless, this distinction provides an organizing framework to examine why public

managers might choose to participate in collaborative governance in different ways.5

We identify intersecting structural and strategic factors that motivate government

actors to fill a particular role.

Government Actors as Leaders

Public managers take a leadership role in collaborative governance when they

act as conveners and initiate the collaborative institution. While collaboration entails

benefits and costs for all participants, the decision calculus for forming and leading a

collaborative institution differs from simple participation. Specifically, Koontz et al.

(2004) identify resources used for facilitation and operations as areas where the

leader of collaborative governance incurs (but as we distinguish below does not nec-

essarily bear) significant costs. These costs include funding, human capital, and tech-

nical support (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Koontz et al., 2004; Steelman & Carmin,

2002; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). For instance, leadership is a prominent human

capital cost that has been shown to be key for successful collaborative efforts (e.g.,

Crosby & Bryson, 2005; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Page, 2010; Thomas, 2003). The

convener must manage and facilitate collaborative governance directly, or else must

oversee and manage contractual arrangements in order provide these services (e.g., a

professional facilitator). While it is the convener who takes a leadership role and

thus incurs costs and oversees day-to-day administrative operations, funds stem-

ming from another organization outside of the organization within which the collab-

orative leader works can offset these costs. In other words, the presence of an

encourager can reduce the costs of being a convener.6 For instance, grant funding

from the federal government or a nonprofit organization that can be used hire new

personnel to help lead and manage collaborative governance might incentivize a

local public manager (e.g., a county agency director or city manager) to establish or

convene a collaborative structure or process.

Proposition 11: Public managers are more likely to convene collaborative governance

to the extent that external resources can be used to offset convener-incurred costs.

Scott/Thomas: Unpacking the Collaborative Toolbox 201

Existing infrastructure and institutional arrangements can also influence the costs

of convening. Collaborative governance typically exhibits low automaticity (the extent

to which it uses existing administrative structures [Salamon, 2002]) since it typically

requires the creation of a new institutional body outside the public agency, and/or the

development of new decision-making procedures within the agency. However, in

cases where collaborative governance can take advantage of existing network struc-

tures (Bryson et al., 2006) or administrative apparatuses, it becomes less costly to initi-

ate and lead such an institution. For instance, if a given policy or management process

already requires public hearings or a comment process, collaborative governance

might leverage the existing public involvement process and not require the wholesale

development and implementation of a brand-new institutional structure or process.

Proposition 12: Public managers are more likely to convene collaborative gover-

nance as the potential automaticity of collaborative governance increases.

Collaborative decision making may also reduce costs (including time spent) in

litigation (Bingham, 2010; Booher, 2004; Thomas, 2003). In other words, the convener

might choose to spend more time and effort in dialogue and deliberation with other

stakeholders at the outset in order to avoid costly and time-consuming legal wran-

gling and negotiations later on.

Proposition 13: Public managers are more likely to convene collaborative gover-

nance when the perceived costs of controversy and litigation are higher than

convener-incurred costs.

While there are many potential benefits that might be achieved by leading a col-

laborative institution, giving outside actors greater access to decision making can

also pose costs to a public agency. By definition, collaborative governance is consen-

sus oriented (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Margerum, 2011).

Accordingly, inviting other actors from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to

participate in policymaking and management actions increases the time and effort

that must be spent on communication and deliberation (Margerum, 2011). Moreover,

in some cases bringing additional actors into the fold can increase conflict and

detract from productivity (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Schlager & Blomquist, 2008).

From the perspective of the public-sector convener, this raises an interesting issue: it

is easiest to deliberate with actors with whom the convener already has some degree

of familiarity. In other words, while the popular conception of collaborative gover-

nance is that it provides a forum for engagement and dialogue amongst previously

unconnected parties, for the convener the potential costs of leading a CGR are less-

ened by collaborating with actors with whom the convener is already aligned.

Empirical evidence speaks to this phenomenon, as many local and regional collabo-

rative governance institutions have heavily overlapping memberships instead of

bridging disparate actors (Lubell, Henry, & McCoy, 2010; Scott, 2016; Scott &

Thomas, 2015). In practice, what one might expect to see then is that public actors

202 Policy Studies Journal, 45:1

who “know” more network members (i.e., the more central the public actor is within

the network) are more likely to convene a CGR.

Proposition 14: Public managers are more likely to convene collaborative gover-

nance when they occupy a more central network position.

To summarize this section, we propose that government is more likely to be a

convener—and thus design, implement, and manage collaborative governance—to

the extent that: (11) external funding is available; (12) existing infrastructure or insti-

tutions can be used; (13) the perceived threat of controversy or litigation is higher;

and (14) the convener is a central network actor.

Government Actors as Encouragers

Just as a public decision maker can choose to convene collaborative governance,

she can also choose to encourage other actors to form and engage in collaborative gov-

ernance processes or institutions. One motivation for a public manager to encourage

collaborative governance is to facilitate relationships amongst other network actors

(i.e., to act as a network broker) (Scott & Thomas, 2015). By encouraging the formation

of a collaborative institution, an encourager can broker network relationships by pro-

viding knowledge and information that in turn fosters learning and belief change

amongst participating stakeholders (Leach et al., 2013). These resources in effect subsi-

dize the networking costs that other organizations face. For instance, a public manager

can provide a forum for deliberation and dialogue to reduce search costs for network

partners (Scholz et al., 2008) and improve communication between different levels of

government (Schneider et al., 2003). This also speaks to the potential emergent qual-

ities of collaborative governance, whereby collaboration has been shown to alter goals,

motivations, and beliefs (Bingham & O’Leary, 2008; Innes & Booher, 2010; Leach &

Sabatier, 2005; Lubell, 2005). Mutual understanding and shared commitment (not nec-

essarily agreement) are key collaborative dynamics (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015),

because they reduce bargaining costs and enforcement costs amongst participants. To

the extent that the various network actors that a public decision maker works with

lack mutual understanding and shared commitment, encouraging collaboration

amongst these actors might offer benefits to the encourager.

When an individual or organization occupies a broker position in a policy net-

work by linking other organizations or network cliques, this position can be lever-

aged to foster direct ties between other actors (Henry, Lubell, & McCoy, 2011).7 The

network literature generally finds that triadic ties (e.g., where actors A, B, and C are

connected via a triangular ties structure such as A!B, A!C, and B!C) reinforce collaborative behavior and facilitate resource mobilization to a much greater extent

than bilateral tie structures (e.g., A!B and A!C without a third connection between B and C) (Krackhardt & Handcock, 2007). Thus, when a government actor has a rela-

tionship with a local government and with a local nonprofit, but these two organiza-

tions do not have a tie with one another, this represents “unrealized social capital”

Scott/Thomas: Unpacking the Collaborative Toolbox 203

(Henry et al., 2011). We might expect then that from the encourager’s perspective,

the potential gains of supporting a collaborative institution are highest to the extent

that the encourager occupies a significant brokerage role connecting actors who are

not well connected themselves (i.e., unrealized social capital is greater).

Proposition 15: Public managers are more likely to encourage collaborative gover-

nance to the extent that they are positioned as a network broker.

One pragmatic rationale for encouraging collaborative governance is that it can

greatly reduce the number of points of contact an actor needs to address or maintain.

For instance, consider a state social service agency that contracts or otherwise coordi-

nates with numerous service providers and local organizations. Instead of managing

and maintaining each relationship in isolation, encouraging these disparate actors to

form a collective regional body could reduce the number of points of contact and

thereby reduce overall networking costs. However, if the encourager now needs to

coordinate with both the collaborative institution and its constituents, this increases

rather than decreases points of contact.

Thus, to the extent that encouraging collaborative governance then allows the

encourager to economize, for instance by giving one grant to or forming one contract

with the collaborative governance institution instead of to each individual organiza-

tion, it can reduce the network burden that the encourager currently faces (by needing

to coordinate ties with multiple organizations). Presumably, this is most beneficial

when a government actor currently engages with multiple organizations that are

largely duplicative. For instance, if there are multiple independent social service pro-

viders in a county, it might benefit the county to have these providers develop a collab-

orative institution with which the county can then contract or otherwise connect with.

At first glance, this supposition might also seem to apply to a government actor

taking a leadership role in collaborative governance. However, convening a collabo-

rative institution does not necessarily serve to economize on points of contact; the

convener presumably still needs to manage multiple relationships and maintain

some form of contact with every group member. Leading might change the venue in

which contact occurs, but not serve to reduce points of contact.

Proposition 16: Public managers are more likely to encourage collaborative gover-

nance when the collaborative institution reduces points of contact for the encourager.

For a public actor, encouraging collaborative governance involves the transfer of

resources to external actors. These resources need not be financial or technical—

managers can lend social capital and reputational benefits to collaborative gover-

nance as well. No matter the nature of the resource, in essence the public decision

maker encouraging collaborative governance allows participants to shape planning

and policymaking (presumably to be more in keeping with participant interests) in

exchange for participation. This represents an inherent tension between increased

“external decision costs” (Feiock, 2013) resulting from the extent to which collective

action deviates from the encourager’s preferred course of action.

204 Policy Studies Journal, 45:1

We might expect then that to the extent that a would-be encourager can be cer-

tain about how and to what purpose the resources she gives to a collaborative gover-

nance effort will be used imposes fewer potential external decision-costs on the

encourager. This makes investment in involving external organizations in collabora-

tive governance more favorable, as otherwise the degree to which actions taken by

others might deviate from the encourager’s aims defeats the purpose of the invest-

ment. Accordingly, public managers are more likely to be an encourager of collabo-

rative governance when the encourager can expect relatively low variance (e.g., fixed

outcomes, guaranteed deliverables, etc.) or has the ability to impose restrictions on

resource use. This proposition specifically addresses the motivation to encourage,

rather than convene, because the encourager is bequeathing resources for others to

lead collaborative governance while the convener is taking an active leadership role,

and thus presumably has a greater ability to mitigate external decision costs even

without up-front certainty.

Proposition 17: Public managers are more likely to encourage collaborative gover-

nance to the extent that they can be certain how—or to what purpose—their

resources will be used.

To summarize, we propose that a public manager is more likely to encourage

collaborative governance to the extent that: (15) she occupies a brokerage position

within a network; (16) doing so serves to reduce points of contact; and (17) she can

be certain about the nature of the processes and/or outputs that she is supporting.

As described above, we identify all three motivations as relating most directly to

encouragement and not leadership. For Proposition 15, this is because an encourager

can broker connections between mutual friends without needing to take a leadership

role in a collaborative institution. In the case of Proposition 16, this is because the

convener still maintains contact with all participants and thus leading a collaborative

governance effort does not necessarily reduce points of contact. Finally, for Proposi-

tion 17 this is because the encourager is allowing others to take the lead in decision

making within the collaborative institution or process.

Government Actors as Followers

While the choice to follow a collaborative governance effort initiated or sup-

ported by others might seem less in keeping with our basic question as to why pub-

lic managers choose to invest in collaborative governance, participation and

engagement nonetheless entail costs even to those who simply sit in as observers of

collaborative governance efforts. Thus, it is also worthwhile to consider why public

managers might choose to be participate in or observe collaborative governance insti-

tutions led and supported by others.

First, we might expect that public managers are most likely to follow a collabora-

tive governance effort when it is closely related to their interests or agendas. That is,

if a collaborative group’s goals or actions affect the public manager, this increases

Scott/Thomas: Unpacking the Collaborative Toolbox 205

the potential costs to said manager of not being in the room. A desire to protect her

organization’s turf and make sure that others are not stepping on the organization’s

toes can motivate a public manager to attend meetings (Thomas, 2003). In essence,

we argue that a public manager who does not want to support collaborative gover-

nance by providing resources for operations might still participate in order to avoid

losses.

Proposition 18: Public managers are more likely to follow collaborative governance

efforts to the extent that they are worried about turf losses rather than joint gains.

Goal compatibility with those directing the institution or process can also moti-

vate a public manager to follow a collaborative governance effort. Namely, free

riding is incentivized when collaborative governance is directed by those with

whom a public manager has similar goals and interests since collaborative benefits

can be achieved without voluntarily contributing to their provision (Hill & Lynn,

2003). If there are other organizations that are in essence willing to invest in further-

ing an organization’s goals, then there is little incentive for this organization itself to

devote its own funds and resources (i.e., act as a leader or encourager) instead of

free-riding. In essence, in the absence of other motivating factors, compatibility with

an encourager or leader incentivizes free riding and possibly credit-claiming for

whatever the collaborative effort produces.

Proposition 19: Public managers are more likely to free ride on collaborative gover-

nance efforts to the extent that their goals are compatible with those of the encour-

ager and/or leader.

A third rationale for a public manager to follow a collaborative governance effort

rather than contribute to it is simply as a way to improve communication and dia-

logue with other network actors independent of the purpose of the collaborative gov-

ernance institution itself (note that this is distinguished from the discussions above,

which focus on attempts to improve communication and dialogue between other net-

work actors). For a follower, collaborative governance can serve more general net-

working purposes, such as building familiarity and understanding with other

network organizations. In other words, the incentives for free riding on collaborative

governance might be driven less by the actual purpose or actions of the collaborative

governance institution and more by the opportunity collaborative governance

presents to network with other organizations.

One prominent example of how investment in networking can benefit a public

decision maker can be drawn from relational contract theory. Relational contracts are

contractual relationships that are incomplete, in that not all aspects of the relation-

ship are codified (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Kirkpatrick, 1999). Relational con-

tracts are thus based not only on legal obligations but also on credibility and norms

of cooperation that motivate extralegal cooperative behavior amongst the contracting

parties (Bertelli & Smith, 2010). Repeated interactions and increased credibility

206 Policy Studies Journal, 45:1

amongst network actors can thus reduce the transaction costs of contracting (Bertelli

& Smith, 2010). Thus, there are potential future benefits from membership and par-

ticipation for government entities that “follow” collaborative governance. We might

expect that these benefits are greatest for government organizations that are not

already participants in other collaborative venues—who presumably have other net-

work opportunities—and for organizations that are not already densely embedded

in a network, since the marginal benefits of increased networking are presumably

greatest for these actors. Moreover, capacity limitations make it more difficult for

managers who already participate in other collaborative venues to allocate time and

resources to following an additional collaborative institution (Lubell et al., 2010; Scott

& Thomas, 2015).

Proposition 20: Public managers are more likely to follow collaborative governance

to the extent that they do not already participate in other collaborative venues and/

or are not densely embedded within an organizational network.

To summarize, public managers are more likely to follow collaborative gover-

nance efforts when: (18) the issue area of the collaborative governance process or

institution overlaps with their own agenda; (19) the goals of the encourager(s) are

similar to their own; and (20) they do already participate in other collaborative gov-

ernance efforts and/or do not already have strong ties to other network actors.

Linking Roles and Collaborative Tool Selection

Above, we have outlined: (i) a series of propositions concerning the strategic

purposes that collaborative governance can serve; and (ii) a series of propositions

that distinguish the particular roles that public managers can play in collaborative

governance. In weighing the various incentives associated with collaborative gover-

nance, it is clear that these purposes and roles are interactive.

For instance, we propose above that collaborative governance is a way for public

managers to increase the perceived legitimacy of their actions by involving other

well respected parties (Proposition 4). However, successful collaborative governance

efforts require a well-respected and well-positioned (see Propositions 14 and 15) con-

vener (Bryson et al., 2006; Crosby & Bryson, 2005). Thus, public managers who per-

ceive that the legitimacy of their organization is low are not well equipped to

convene collaborative governance due to the very nature of the problem. We argue

that the role of convener is open only to individuals or organizations that are already

well respected and perceived to be legitimate actors, and thus the use of collabora-

tive governance to overcome a lack of perceived legitimacy is limited to encouragers

(in order to support actions by better-positioned actors) and followers (who might

not care about the purpose of the collaborative governance institution itself, but

nonetheless can pursue increased perceptual legitimacy through engagement with

other network actors).

Scott/Thomas: Unpacking the Collaborative Toolbox 207

Likewise, while leaders, encouragers, and followers all must expend resources

(either actual funds, benefits in-kind, or transaction costs) for collaborative gover-

nance, only the encourager provides resources that other organizations or individu-

als then employ. Proposition 8 holds that local or regional public managers can use

collaborative governance to garner resources from state or federal actors; by implica-

tion, these local or regional managers have limited resources themselves, and are

thereby unlikely to be able to give resources of their own to others in order to

encourage collaboration.

Figure 1 characterizes each of the 20 propositions outlined above in terms of

both the roles government actors play within and the purposes for which collabora-

tive governance is used.

Conclusion

This article has sought to leverage and build upon the collective understanding

that can be drawn by combining the public policy and public management litera-

tures to assess issues that span both literature bodies. We seek to synthesize promi-

nent collaborative governance scholarship (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson &

Nabatchi, 2015) with a perspective of policy tool selection rooted in institutional

rational choice (e.g., Feiock, 2013; Salamon, 2002; Weimer & Vining, 2010). We have

used this theoretical nexus to advance theory and develop a series of testable propo-

sitions regarding when and why public managers choose to devote resources to

Public managers lead collaborative governance efforts in order to… [x].

… leverage external resources (P11). … leverage existing processes (P12). … co-opt potential litigants (P13). … incorporate peripheral actors (P14).

Public managers follow collaborative governance efforts in order to… [z].

… protect against turf losses (P18). … free ride on external actions (P19). … increase their social capital (P20).

Public managers encourage collaborative governance efforts in order to… [y].

… connect mutual network partners (P15). … reduce network points of contact (P16). … foster external actions that match internal goals (P17).

… leverage high level actions (P8).

borative governance

… gain reputational bene�its (P4).

… gain input from clients (P1). … garner external expertise (P2). … involve affected parties (P3). .... achieve economy of scale (P6).

… enable low level actions (P7). … enable alternative actions (P9).

… involve other jurisdictions (P5).

… work across policy sectors (P10).

Figure 1. When Public Managers Lead, Encourage, or Follow Collaborative Governance.

208 Policy Studies Journal, 45:1

collaborative governance tools. Much of the current literature focuses on the emer-

gence of collaborative governance more broadly, emphasizing how participation

incentives for public, nonprofit, and private stakeholders alike motivate collective

action. This focus on emergence belies the reality that collaborative governance is

time consuming, costly, and uncertain (Koontz et al., 2004; Margerum, 2011), and

that the use of collaborative tools requires someone to foot the bill for administrative

and operating costs and to bear the costs associated with deliberative decision mak-

ing. Accordingly, theory concerning when and why public managers choose to use

collaborative governance tools to solve policy problems remains underdeveloped.

The propositions we advance in this paper seek to explain the decision calculus of

public managers who purposefully choose to devote time and resources to support col-

laborative governance endeavors. We argue that public managers use collaborative

governance—a toolbox of collaborative processes and structures—to achieve policy

goals, and thus the decision to devote resources to said collaborative tools can be under-

stood through the linkage of structural constraints and strategic interests. Each proposi-

tion can—and we hope will—be empirically tested. Testing these propositions will not

only contribute towards refining the theory developed herein, but will also help practi-

tioners consider the use of collaborative governance in a more systematic fashion.

Tyler A. Scott is an assistant professor in the School of Public and International

Affairs at the University of Georgia.

Craig W. Thomas is professor and associate dean at the Daniel J. Evans School of

Public Policy and Governance at the University of Washington, Seattle.

Notes

The authors would like to thank the organizers and participants of the Policy Studies Journal Nexus Workshop, held in Tucson, Arizona from October 16-18, 2014, for their initial feedback and guidance; Craig Smith and Andy Whitford provided particularly in-depth comments. We also thank Kate Crosman, Kirk Emerson, Tom Koontz, Steve Page, and David Suarez for providing comments and suggestions that greatly improved the article, and two anonymous reviewers for their extensive and constructive reviews.

1. It is also helpful to distinguish our use of the term “collaboration” in this paper from amongst what Margerum (2011) terms the “seven Cs”: communication, consultation, conflict resolution, consensus building, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. In this paper and in much of the extant litera- ture, collaboration is a catch-all term that incorporates elements of the other six processes. In other words, collaborative governance can involve any—and all—of these processes, since “Communication, consultation, and conflict resolution are an ongoing part of [collaboration]. . . con- sensus building is a core concept. . . [in] developing collaborative arrangements, and implementation. . . may be carried out through cooperative or coordinated approaches” (Margerum, 2011, p. 9). Thus, collaboration is a useful way to summarize the diversity and breadth of ways in which these processes combine and interact.

2. It is important to acknowledge that while our paper takes the perspective of a public manager who decides whether or not to engage in collaborative governance, in few—if any—cases does one individ- ual have the capacity to make this decision in isolation. A manager might need approval from a direc- tor or other high-level official, or the support and buy-in of those “on the ground” who are actually tasked with collaborating. Thus, we use the singular term “public manager” because it clearly empha- sizes our focus on the strategic choice to engage in collaborative governance, but recognize that in almost any empirical application the choice to initiate, support, or participate in collaborative gover- nance arises from some collective internal decision-making process (e.g., deliberation between a

Scott/Thomas: Unpacking the Collaborative Toolbox 209

manager, employees, and director regarding a particular course of action). The extent to which individ- ual and organizational goals with regard to collaborative governance are congruent remains an inter-

esting topic for future study.

3. In this literature, networks are defined as “public policy making and administrative structures involv- ing multiple. . . agencies and organizations. . . with multiple linkages” (McGuire, 2002, p. 600). This is contrasted with the definition of collaborative governance cited previously that refers to specific proc-

esses or structures that are intended to carry out a public purpose (see Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 8). Networks can be goal oriented (Provan & Kenis, 2008), but while a network is a necessary condition for collaboration (since more than one organization must be involved) it is not sufficient (since organiza-

tions within a network need not collaborate with one another).

4. Coordination is defined as a process whereby participants work jointly towards a common end, whereas cooperation is defined as a process whereby participants work independently towards a com-

mon goal (Margerum, 2011, p. 8).

5. It is important to note that private and nonprofit actors can also be leaders, encouragers, or followers of collaborative governance. Again, we focus in this paper on the narrower question of why a public deci-

sion maker would elect to fill each of these three roles.

6. The managerial aspect of convening collaborative governance is an important distinction between leadership and encouragement roles. Both a leader and an encourager can provide funding for a group

coordinator. However, the leader is responsible for hiring and managing the coordinator while the encourager is not.

7. Network brokerage can be related to network centrality, but it more specifically refers to actors who

span particular structural gaps, for instance between organizations in different policy sectors, geo- graphic areas, or ideological groups (Gould & Fernandez, 1989). Thus, whereas network centrality reflects overall popularity, network brokerage refers to network positions that specifically bridge het-

erogeneous actors (Jasny & Lubell, 2015).

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