course MGT 279
Lanefowler
UnmannedSystemsICD.pdf
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INITIAL CAPABILITIES DOCUMENT 2
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for 4
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Unmanned Systems (Air, Ground, and Maritime) 6
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Validation Authority: JROC 8
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Approval Authority: JROC 10
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Milestone Decision Authority: DAE 12
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Designation: JROC Interest 14
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Prepared for a Materiel Development Decision 16
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Draft Version 2.2 18
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14 May 2010 20 21
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Releasability: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their contractors only 41
to protect information and technical data that advance current technology or describe new 42
technology in an area of significant or potentially significant military application or that relate to 43
a specific military deficiency or a potential enemy. Other requests for this document shall be 44
referred to the Maneuver, Aviation, and Soldier Division, ARCIC, TRADOC, Fort Monroe, VA 45
23651. 46
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Table of Contents 47
48 1. Concept of Operations Summary 2 49
2. Joint Capability Area 4 50
3. Required Capability 4 51
Table 3.1 Associated JCAs 6 52
4. Capability Gaps and Overlaps or Redundancies 7 53
Table 4.1 Capability Gap Table 8 54
5. Threat and Operational Environment 9 55
6. Ideas for Non-Materiel Approaches 10 56
7. Final Recommendation 11 57
Appendix A - Integrated Architecture Products A-1 58
Appendix B – References B-1 59
Appendix C - Acronym List C-1 60
Appendix D – Cost-Benefit Analysis D-1 61
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Revision History 63
Draft
Version
Date Purpose
1.0 20 Nov 09 Initial Draft for Developmental Staffing
1.1 23 Nov 09 Draft Released for Staffing
1.2 1 Dec 09 World Wide Staffing Comments
1.3 4 Dec 09 World Wide Staffing Comment Resolution
1.4 8 Dec 09 TRADOC Council of Colonels
1.6 11 Dec 09 TRADOC CoC Comment Resolution
1.7 17 Dec 09 GOSC Comment Resolution
1.8 09 Feb 10 ARCIC Comment Resolution
1.9 08 Mar 10 Cost-Benefit Analysis added
2.0 19 Mar 10 ARCIC Comment Resolution
2.1 26 Mar 10 ARCIC Comment Resolution
2.2 14 May 10 AROC 1-Star Comment Resolution
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Points of Contact 65
Name Agency/ Organization Phone Number
& DSN
Email Address
LTC Hatfield ARCIC/ TRADOC (757) 788-4947 DSN 680-4947
Willie Ward ARCIC/TRADOC (757)-788-3512 DSN 680-3512
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66
1. Concept of Operations Summary. Unmanned Systems can provide persistent relief from 67
dull, repetitive tasks or physically challenging,tasks, while providing providing standoff from 68
dirty or dangerous missions. Unmanned Systems have proven their value and saved Soldiers 69
lives in multiple combat theaters. Recognizing this, the U.S. Congress directed in the 2007 70
National Defense Authorization Act that: 71
“The Secretary of Defense shall develop a policy, to be applicable throughout the 72
department of defense, on research, development, test and evaluation, procurement, and 73
operation of unmanned systems. 74
- An identification of mission and mission requirements, including mission 75
requirements for the military departments and joint mission requirements, for 76
which unmanned systems may replace manned systems. 77
- A preference for unmanned systems in acquisition programs for new systems, 78
including a requirement under any such program for the development of a 79
manned system for a certification that an unmanned system is incapable of 80
meeting program requirements…” 81
82
a. This ICD supports that directive by identifying required capabilities across the Warfighting 83
Functions. For the scope of this document, an Unmanned System consists of a powered physical 84
system, with no human operator aboard the principal platform, which acts to accomplish 85
assigned tasks. It may be mobile or stationary, and it can be smart, learning, and self-adaptive. 86
It can include all associated supporting components such as Operator Control Units (OCU). 87
Examples include unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), unmanned ground systems (UGS), 88
unmanned maritime systems (UMS), and unattended munitions and sensors. The Unmanned 89
System, operated remotely or with some degree of autonomy, can carry human passengers, and 90
remain categorized as an unmanned system. Currently deployed Unmanned Systems are 91
remotely operated or semi-autonomous, thus requiring a human to be an integral component for 92
mission success. 93
94
b. Capability Contributions: The complexity and uncertainty of the current and future 95
Operational Environment (OE) (2009-2034) requires the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to 96
extend the reach of his situational understanding to continuously adapt to a changing 97
environment across the full spectrum of conflict, while facing hybrid threats. This extended 98
battlespace awareness requires the collection of information into the integrated battle command 99
systems network to enable informed decision-making. Unmanned Systems can support future 100
forces and expanded battlespace concepts by serving as economy of force assets and enhancing 101
force protection by providing standoff operational capabilities for many warfighter functions. 102
Interoperable with Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multi-national (JIIM) forces, 103
Unmanned Systems must be expeditionary with lethal and non-lethal capabilities that are 104
versatile, agile, sustainable, survivable, and capable to transition across the spectrum of 105
operations. Unmanned Systems with improved persistence, endurance, and autonomy will 106
provide efficiencies in Force Structure through manned and unmanned teaming. 107
108
c. Unmanned Systems conduct persistent surveillance for situational awareness. They can 109
provide force application, including targeting, lethal fires, and non-lethal effects, while 110
protecting the force through standoff from threat capabilities. Unmanned Systems also enable 111
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sustainment and force support operations through the automation of critical missions, including: 112
assured mobility, transportation, distribution, maintenance, explosive ordinance disposal, 113
communications, and health services. Integrated teams of air, ground, and maritime (surface and 114
subsurface) manned and unmanned systems will enable all warfighter function capabilities to 115
defeat the enemy, under any conditions in the current and future OE. 116
117
d. Operational Outcomes. The JFC will employ Unmanned Systems to conduct joint 118
interdependent operations across the spectrum of conflict. Unmanned Systems will be able to 119
conduct focused operations for high-risk missions or selected missions that best satisfy the 120
requirement without the limitations and vulnerabilities of manned systems. Autonomous 121
behavior and the elimination of life support systems will decrease size and weight of an 122
unmanned system. Unmanned Systems allow JFCs to make more informed decisions and plans, 123
to use their forces more effectively and efficiently to produce desired outcomes. JFC desire the 124
capability to provide a level of persistency that is not normally attainable by manned systems. 125
126
e. Effects. Unmanned Systems will provide the JFC the ability to persistently monitor their 127
OE, conduct lethal and non-lethal Engagement, and enable continuous command and control 128
(C2), while while protecting and sustaining the force at standoff distances from the threat. 129
130
f. How it complements the joint warfighting force. Unmanned Systems provide joint forces 131
greater flexibility when other manned assets are task saturated. Unmanned Systems complement 132
and are fully interoperable with national, strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities found at 133
all echelons, providing for synergistic effects within a complex, net-centric environment. 134
135
g. Enabling capabilities required to achieve the desired operational outcomes. Unmanned 136
Systems are dependent upon the integrated battle command applications and supporting 137
communications architecture. For remotely operated systems, a loss of communications to the 138
OCU can be fatal to the system. For all Unmanned Systems, including autonomous systems, the 139
loss of connectivity prevents the shared situational awareness from the sensor to the commander 140
and risks mission failure. 141
142
2. Joint Capability Area. 143
144
a. Unmanned Systems primarily support the Joint Capability Areas (JCAs): Joint Battlespace 145
Awareness, Force Application, and Protection. Unmanned Systems also support Command and 146
Control, Force Support, Net-Centric, Building Partnerships, and Focused Logistics. 147
148
b. Range of Military Operations (ROMO). Unmanned Systems capabilities are applicable for 149
the full spectrum operations in all operational themes. 150
151
c. Timeframe under consideration for initial operation capability (IOC). Unmanned Systems 152
capabilities are critical to current (2009) operations and are projected to be needed beyond 2034 153
in alignment with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Unmanned Systems Integrated 154
Roadmap. IOC for specific capabilities will vary and be identified in follow-on Capability 155
Development Documents (CDD) and Capability Production Documents (CPD) 156
157
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d. Relevant Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) that apply. This ICD is applicable to the full 158
range of Defense Planning Scenarios, with particular applicability to IR-2, IR-3, and IR-4. 159
160
3. Required Capability. 161
162
a. Unmanned Systems provide commanders with capabilities necessary to provide dynamic 163
situational awareness (SA), employ lethal to non-lethal scalable effects to defeat any enemy, 164
protect, and sustain the force, and assure freedom of maneuver. The required capabilities in this 165
paragraph are organized by Warfighting Function and prioritized according to the OSD FY2009-166
2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 1 . 167
168
(1) Intelligence: The JFC requires a layered network of unmanned, manned, and space 169
sensor capabilities enabling persistent, all weather, all terrain, multi-discipline situational 170
awareness of the OE. Unmanned Systems provide unique sensor employment capabilities 171
enhancing the Commander’s SA and understanding. 172
173
(2) Fires: Unmanned Systems will assist in the conduct of Fires by facilitating planning, 174
development, and execution of Lethal and Non-lethal precision and area engagements, including 175
but not limited to: Joint Precision Targeting, Electronic Attack, and Information Operations. 176
Unmanned Systems will support precision direct and indirect fires and cooperative engagement 177
through automated dissemination and enhanced data distribution under the severest conditions in 178
full spectrum operations. These systems also assist in target identification through the 179
differentiation between friend and foe, combat identification, and/or positive identification. 180
181
(3) Protection: Unmanned Systems, teamed with manned systems, will enable 360 degree 182
spherical protection of fixed, semi-mobile, and mobile forces from current and future threats by 183
preventing, detecting, acting, and recovering. Unmanned Systems force health protection 184
includes battlefield extraction and transport. Unmanned systems will improve the security of 185
Sustainment Lines of Communication (LOCs) that protect personnel, information, infrastructure, 186
and materiel assets from destruction or degradation, thus enhancing operational reach and 187
endurance. 188
189
(4) Battle Command/C2: Unmanned Systems enhance commanders' situational 190
awareness by providing near-real-time relevant information within a collaborative C2 191
environment based on federated data standards and schema, an open architecture, and common 192
control standards. Commanders should also have the flexibility to selectively extend network 193
transport connectivity to units or battle space via Unmanned Systems. This network extension 194
capability enables information and knowledge connectivity to the tactical edge while operating in 195
degraded or interrupted network environments. 196
197
(5) Movement and Maneuver: Unmanned Systems will assist in conducting tasks 198
required for assured mobility and freedom of maneuver for the Warfighter. Unmanned Systems 199
1 The prioritized capability needs of the Warfighter in the OSD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap are
Reconnaissance and Surveillance, target identification and designation, countermine and explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD), and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance.
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will enhance the commander’s reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, with range and 200
endurance to support worldwide contingency operations. Unmanned Systems will be capable of 201
collaboration and coordination, autonomous operations, manned / unmanned teaming, and 202
reducing Soldier loads. Unmanned Systems will provide lethal and non-lethal force application 203
for effective maneuver and engagement in order to produce maximum relative combat power at 204
the decisive place and time. 205
206
(6) Sustainment: Unmanned Systems must conduct or support sustainment tasks, 207
functions, and missions of: supply, distribution, and services, from home station to forward 208
deployed locations, including the sea base. In order to counter enemy anti-access strategies and 209
provide for greatly increased and distributed force flow and sustainment, the adoption of new 210
and improved systems, platforms, and autonomous navigation capabilities is required to enable a 211
more rapid, precise, and responsive sustainment capability. 212
213
b. Capabilities essential to JFC. The ground force Commander requires the ability to 214
execute all Army Warfighting Functions (WFF) in support of the JFC’s military objectives. 215
216
c. Timeframe in which the capabilities are required. Unmanned Systems capabilities are 217
critical to current (2009) operations and are projected to be needed beyond 2034 in alignment 218
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Unmanned Systems Roadmap. The specific 219
requirements will be identified in follow-on CDDs, CPDs. and approved Combatant 220
Commanders’ Operational Needs Statements (ONS). 221
222
d. All Unmanned Systems will comply with applicable Department of Defense (DOD), Joint, 223
National, and International Policies and Regulations. Unmanned systems development or 224
modifications will comply with health and safety standards and reporting requirements of DOD 225
6055.1, 5000.2 and AR 40-10. 226
227
228
e. Associated Joint Capability Areas (JCA). 229
230
Table 3.1 Associated JCAs 231 Tier 1 Tier 2
Force Application - Engagement
- Maneuver
Command & Control - Organize
- Understand
- Planning
Battlespace Awareness - Intelligence, Surveillance, &
Reconnaissance
- Environment
Net-Centric - Information Transport
- Enterprise Services
- Net Management
Protection - Prevent
- Mitigate
Logistics - Deployment & Distribution
- Maintain
- Logistics Services
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Tier 1 Tier 2
- Engineering
Building Partnerships - Communicate
- Shape
Force Support - Force Preparation
- Installation Support
- Health Readiness
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4. Capability Gaps and Overlaps or Redundancies. Many current Unmanned Systems were 233
designed and fielded for specific niche applications in support of Operational Needs Statements 234
(ONS). They lack the standardization and interoperability needed for the sustained Unmanned 235
Systems program management and resource allocation. Current systems do not provide for 236
modular, configurable payloads for mission specific package tailoring with sufficient to 237
automatically disseminated tracking information. All of the required attributes that a program of 238
record would assess and manage, i.e., force protection, survivability, payload, transportability, 239
C2, and Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (RAM). Current Unmanned Systems do not 240
meet the interoperability requirements for unified standards enabling aerial – ground teaming or 241
controller commonality. Add-on C2, intelligence, and sensor payloads exceed the size, weight, 242
and power (SWaP) constraints for current platform and dismounted employment. ONS from 243
Combatant Commanders have identified gaps in Battle Command, Network, Fires, Sustain, 244
Protect, and Battlespace Awareness capabilities that can be mitigated through the employment of 245
Unmanned Systems. 246
247
a. Missions, tasks, and functions that cannot be performed or are unacceptably limited. 248
249
(1) Intelligence: The current force lacks the ability to conduct persistent multi-discipline 250
intelligence collection, near-real-time reallocation, and dynamic re-tasking of assets. The leap-251
ahead technology to full autonomous capability with smart learning and self-adaptiveself 252
adaptive applications will allow for intelligence fusion reduce cognitive workloads. This gap is 253
an issue of both sufficiency (insufficient number of intelligence collection assets) and a lack of 254
capability (limited sensing and endurance of assets). 255
256
(2) Fires: The force lacks the sufficient capability to deliver lethal and non-lethal fires, 257
field-scalable munitions, and advanced technologies (electromagnetic (EM), high power 258
microwave (HPM) and high pulse lasers (HPL)), where manned systems are limited, restricted, 259
denied entry, or unavailable. 260
261
(3) Protection: The force lacks the sufficient capability to provide adequate standoff 262
distance to protect the force from threats in the OE. Force health protection capability gaps 263
include the inability to safely diagnose, recover, and transport casualties with enroute care from 264
areas where manned systems are denied entry or unavailable. 265
266
(4) Command and Control: The force lacks sufficient capability to enable a robust network 267
to fully support information and knowledge connectivity with required capacity throughout the 268
extended OE. Unmanned Systems will also provide network extension capabilities to enable a 269
robust network to fully support information and knowledge connectivity. This lack of capability 270
impacts collaboration and dissemination of relevant information for the Common Operational 271
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Picture (COP), creating entire communications enterprise overload. The capability to access, 272
update and collaborate on consistent geospatial and environmental data across the OE does not 273
exist. Classification policies between nations, the absence of technological competency, 274
consistency, and standards between disparate applications, further complicated by language and 275
cultural differences, are examples of the challenges facing Commanders in the execution of 276
Unified Action. Due to limited availability and capacity of the Space segment, long rang and 277
beyond-line-of-site connectivity gaps for ground forces exist. 278
279
(5) Movement and Maneuver: The force lacks the sufficient capability to reduce the 280
dismounted Soldier load, reduce cognitive workloads, provide extended weapons effects against 281
the enemy, provide standoff from the threat, and provide assured mobility throughout the OE. 282
Current Unmanned Systems do not support manned / unmanned teaming and lack sufficient 283
power for continuous operations, operational ranges, endurance, and speed. Current Unmanned 284
Systems lack the levels of autonomy to coordinate and collaborate between systems to enable 285
multiple unmanned system force application. Current Unmanned Systems require one or more 286
dedicated operators per Unmanned System. Current Unmanned Systems lack the required 287
platforms, payloads, and sensors to accomplish the JFC’s current and projected future missions 288
described in ONS. 289
290
(6) Sustainment: The Force lacks sufficient autonomous ground, air, and maritime 291
logistics and distribution capability to provide responsive, assured supply and services to highly 292
dispersed units across the extended OE. The Force lacks the capability to provide health services 293
or mortuary affairs services where manned systems are denied entry or unavailable. 294
295
b. Attributes of the desired capabilities. Unmanned Systems and autonomously augmented 296
manned systems must be capable of interoperability, coordination, and collaboration with other 297
manned and Unmanned Systems in the OE. As defined within the DOD sponsored National 298
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 1011-I-2.0 (October 2008): 299
300
(1) Interoperability is the ability of software, hardware, or components to operate together 301
successfully with minimal effort by the end user. Interoperability can be further attributed with 302
functional, behavioral, lifecycle, and architectural scopes and it can be delineated in terms of 303
control, levels, types, or degrees. It is facilitated by common or standard interfaces. 304
305
(2) Coordination is the ability for Unmanned Systems to share common data such as 306
mission or task plans, maneuver coordinates, or local Common Operating Picture (COP). 307
308
(3) Collaboration is the process by which multiple manned and/or Unmanned Systems 309
perform a common mission or task synergistically, while sharing data (see coordination). 310
311
Attributes of specific Unmanned Systems, within their mission sets and environments, will 312
be outlined in more detail in their specific requirements documents (CDD and CPD). 313
314
c. Recommended prioritization of the gaps. The capability gaps, overlaps, and redundancies 315
organized by Warfighting Functions in paragraph 4 are listed by Tier 1 and Tier 2 JCAs and 316
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prioritized according to the OSD FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 2 within 317
Table 4.1. 318
Table 4.1 Capability Gap Table 319
320 Priority Tier 1 & Tier 2
JCAs
Description Metrics Minimum Values
1
BattlespaceAwareness
- Intelligence,
Surveillance, &
Reconnaissance
The Force lacks the capability to
conduct unattended persistent
multi-discipline intelligence
collection throughout the OE for
Sustained Situational Awareness
Time on station
(sufficiency)
Percent of Time
(operational availability)
24 hours per day
90%
2 Force Application
-Engagement
The Force lacks sufficient
resources to adequately, and for
extended time periods and/or
repetitive conditions, conduct
unmanned or unattended Lethal
and Non-Lethal fires operations
The Force lacks the capability to
conduct unattended precision
target acquisition and targeting
Number and Type of
Engagements
Target Location Error
Appropriate values
will be established
in the systems
specific CDD/CPD
< 10 Meters
3 Protect
-Prevent
-Mitigate
The Force lacks the ability to
provide maximum standoff
from threats
Distance Greater than threat
lethal radius
4 Command and Control
-Understand
The Force lacks the capability to
display relevant and tailored
Situational Awareness
The Force lacks the ability to
reallocate/retask unmanned
assets in near real time
Time
Time
< 5 Seconds
(Network Latency)
< 5 Seconds
(Network Latency)
5 Net-Centric
-Information Transport
-Enterprise services
-Net Management
-Information Assurance
-System-to-System
The Force lacks a network
providing non-interrupted
communications for dispersed
units (Networked Enabled)
The Force lacks unified
interoperability standards to
facilitate Open Architectures and
common controls
The Force lacks the capability to
provide integrated sensor data in
near real time to the exchange
% Critical Information
Exchange Requirements
Complete
% proprietary Interface
Controls
Time
100%
<10%
< 5 Seconds
(Network Latency)
2 The prioritized capability needs of the Warfighter in the OSD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap are
Reconnaissance and Surveillance, target identification and designation, countermine and explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD), and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance.
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Priority Tier 1 & Tier 2
JCAs
Description Metrics Minimum Values
6 Force Application
-Maneuver
The Force lacks the autonomy to
assist in the reduction of
operator task saturation
The Force lacks the ability to
reduce the soldiers load
The Force lacks the ability to
deliver force application
missions from distance
Autonomy Level
Weight
Effective Range
Human Machine
Interface levels will
be established in the
systems specific
CDD/CPD
As appropriate for
mission and
environment
Appropriate values
will be established
in the systems
specific CDD/CPD
7 Logistics
-Deployment and
Distribution
-Supply
-Maintain
-Logistics Services
-Installation Support
The Force lacks unmanned
systems to perform logistics
support and services
Reliability, Availability,
Maintainability (RAM ),
and Throughput
Appropriate values
will be established
in the systems
specific CDD/CPD
8 Force Support
-Health Readiness
-Human Capital
Management
The Force lacks the capability to
provide standoff Health
Services and Force Health
Protection where manned
systems are denied entry or
unavailable
Survival rate of
casualties and first
responders
Appropriate values
will be established
in the systems
specific CDD/CPD
321
5. Threat and Operational Environment 322 323
a. Threat to be Countered or Targeted. Unmanned Systems’ targets will be located 324
throughout an OE that could include routes, areas of interest, point targets, personnel, weapons 325
systems, the entire range of military and civilian vehicles, structures, minefields and obstacles, 326
CBRN, IEDs, and other explosives. These targets may be located within battlefield and 327
electromagnetic (EM) clutter, and may incorporate or operate employing various 328
countermeasures to detection, identification, engagement and targeting. 329
330
b. Projected Threat Environment. 331
332
(1) Over the next two decades, U.S. forces will operate in a geo-strategic 333 environment of considerable uncertainty, an era of persistent conflict. This era will be 334
characterized by protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors using 335
violence to achieve their political and ideological desired end states. Future adversaries will rely 336
less on conventional force on force battles to thwart U.S. actions and more on employing tactics 337
that allow him to frustrate U.S. intentions without direct confrontations. 338
339
(2) U.S. ground forces will operate in all terrain sets and weather conditions in 340
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increasingly complex environments which severely restrict engagement of the opponent at a time 341
and place of our choice due to combinations of natural or manmade topography, dense 342
vegetation, or civil populace. Adversaries will be networked and fighting on familiar terrain, 343
among sympathetic civilians within a known cultural environment. Their forces and capabilities 344
will be optimized for their terrain and circumstances, often enabled, or assisted by irregular 345
forces, criminals, and terrorists. These “hybrid” threats will conduct complex, irregular warfare, 346
characterized by dispersed operations. They will conduct standoff, hit-and-run attacks, 347
ambushes, and other elusive tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), incorporating capabilities 348
ranging from the asymmetric to advanced. They recognize that small numbers of sophisticated 349
“niche” systems can have a dramatic effect on the OE and perceptions. Extended routes of 350
supply and lines of communication offer opportunities for attack of less protected logistics 351
elements. Adaptive adversaries recognize U.S. dependence on logistics and will focus on 352
disruption of the logistics tail. 353
354
(3) Adversaries reduce exposure to standoff fires and detection by utilizing complex battle 355
positions (CBPs) and cultural standoff. CBPs are locations designed to protect the occupants 356
from detection and attack while denying their seizure and occupation. They are not necessarily 357
tied to an avenue of approach. CBPs protect forces while providing sanctuary from which to 358
launch attacks. Camouflage, cover, concealment, and deception (C 3 D) measures are critical to 359
the success of a CBP. These C 3 D efforts and actions include, but are not limited to, underground 360
facilities, complex/urban terrain, fortification, false and decoy positions, and information warfare 361
support. Cultural standoff TTPs employed by threat actors include: integrating religious, 362
medical, and other sensitive facilities into complex battle positions, employing human terrain for 363
C 3 D purposes, and exploiting a population using information warfare. 364
365
(4) Increasingly, they will possess advanced reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 366
acquisition capabilities integrated within local networks. Enemies will attempt to achieve 367
information dominance, manipulate information for their own ends, and deny information to 368
friendly forces possibly through electronic warfare and computer network attack. Opponents 369
will incorporate lessons learned from ongoing operations against U.S. forces and export these 370
lessons. They have observed U.S. employment of unmanned systems in current operations, and 371
will possess knowledge regarding TTP and vulnerable areas for Unmanned Systems and will 372
adapt operations over time to reflect their experience and other available information. Chemical 373
and biological agents will become more diverse and sophisticated. Both state and non-state 374
actors will be actively pursuing and will likely gain access to nuclear weapons, sophisticated 375
and/or bio-engineered biological agents, and non-traditional chemical agents. The air and EM 376
environments will be congested with competing demands for airspace, spectrum, and bandwidth 377
among U.S., Allied, civilian and enemy elements. 378
379
c. Threats to Unmanned Systems. Threats to Unmanned Systems will be dependent upon 380
platform and mission, but may include sea, ground, artillery, air, air defense, or any other type of 381
conventional or unconventional attack. The primary threats to Unmanned Systems are physical 382
damage and/or destruction by enemy combatants using bullets (including armor piercing); anti-383
armor munitions (hand held HEAT) and anti-material sniper rifles; surface and subsurface 384
munitions and mines; indirect fire (rockets, mortars and artillery) with improved conventional 385
munitions (ICM) and precision guided munitions (PGM); enhanced blast munitions (EBM) 386
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including thermobarics, flame and fire, mines, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); surface-387
to-air missiles (SAM); and air defense artillery. Other threats include, fixed and rotary wing 388
aircraft, UAS, UGS, UMS, CBRN, and information operations. Electronic attack will potentially 389
threaten associated communications, data link, and position navigation systems; computer 390
network operations could threaten associated networks. Enemies will possess a wide variety of 391
target acquisition means from the intercept of unencrypted cell phone traffic, through image 392
intensification (active and passive infrared), and thermal imaging systems. Employment of 393
various camouflage, concealment, cover, denial, and deception means including obscurants, nets, 394
and coatings will complicate intelligence collection missions. Finally, adversaries may employ 395
various physical barriers and other techniques to counter employment of smaller and perhaps 396
other Unmanned Systems. Directed energy weapons, including laser and radiofrequency 397
weapons, and other developing technologies will pose increased threats over time. 398
399
d. Threat References. More detailed threat information is contained in the Defense 400
Intelligence Agency-validated classified Future Combat System Brigade Combat Team (FCS-401
BCT) System Threat Assessment Report dated 27 February 2009, Air Capstone Threat 402
Assessment, DoD-1577-4320-08, June 2008, and the Chemical/Biological, Radiological, and 403
Nuclear Warfare Capstone Threat Assessment, DIA-05-0909-027, October 2009. 404
405
6. Ideas for Non-Materiel Approaches (DOTmLPF analysis). Analysis to support this ICD 406
considered DOTLPF alternatives other than a new materiel solution. 407
408
a. Doctrine. Changes to current doctrine will not eliminate or adequately reduce the 409
capability gaps requiring persistent situational awareness and protection through standoff from 410
the threat. 411
412
b. Organizational. The described capability gaps cannot be eliminated or adequately reduced 413
by instituting organizational changes alone. Increasing the number of manned systems to the 414
force structure can mitigate some persistence gaps, but may increase risk with those additional 415
forces exposed to the enemy. Likewise, continued funding for contracted logistics support 416
(CLS) can mitigate sustainment gaps, though at excessive cost and risk to contractors. Fielding 417
technologically advanced Unmanned Systems in effective manned / unmanned teams is expected 418
to deliver efficiencies in force structure and costs over time. 419
420
c. Training. Changes to training can optimize effectiveness when employing current 421
Unmanned Systems and may improve capabilities, but they cannot eliminate the capability gaps. 422
Common control standards described in this document could reduce training load through 423
efficiencies and standards in commonality. 424
425
d. Leadership & Education. Educating Leaders on the employment and capabilities of current 426
Unmanned Systems can optimize mission effectiveness, but it cannot eliminate all of the 427
capability gaps. 428
429
e. Personnel. Identify, track, and manage critical skills related to Unmanned Systems 430
operators, leaders, and maintainers. Unmanned Systems maintainers (Mechatronics) require 431
multi-technical automotive, electronic, and programming skill sets added to an existing or new 432
UNCLASSIFIED
12
UNCLASSIFIED
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Changes to personnel within the force structure will not 433
eliminate the capability gaps. 434
435
f. Facilities. Facility changes will not address the capability gaps, although existing facilities 436
will benefit from Unmanned Systems applications reducing cognitive and physical workloads 437
with increased force protection. 438
439
7. Final Recommendations. The gaps identified in this ICD, which cannot be mitigated with a 440
non-materiel solution, could be satisfied through the development of interoperable Unmanned 441
Systems in the air, ground, and maritime domains. Current systems do not provide modular, 442
configurable payloads for mission specific package tailoring. These systems should be modular 443
within their capability range (example: small, medium, large) to establish commonality at the 444
platform and controller levels. Additionally, appliqué systems that roboticize manned tactical 445
vehicles and can provide a cost effective unmanned capability; therefore, every new or 446
upgraded manned vehicle should include connectivity for an autonomous appliqué system. 447
Mission specific payloads (ex: intelligence collection, EOD, weapons, sustainment, network 448
extension) are interchangeable within a platform class. Recommend a common standardized 449
remote remotely operate control system for Unmanned Systems currently in use. Likewise, the 450
operating software, integrating network, and communications architecture must be standardized 451
across all Unmanned Systems to enable collaboration and coordination in operations. This 452
synergistic, common operational picture and extended battlespace awareness enables the 453
integrated battle command systems network to support informed decision-making. Unmanned 454
Systems can support future forces within the expanded battlespace by serving as economy of 455
force assets with intelligence collection and area security and by enhancing force protection by 456
providing standoff operational capabilities. 457
458 a. As new Unmanned Systems are developed for the force, recommend a continuous 459
organizational assessment of the mix of manned and Unmanned Systems to ensure a 460
synchronized and increased capability is introduced. This continuous assessment, including 461
bandwidth availability and network integration considerations, allows for the evolutionary 462
introduction of additional unmanned capabilities in conjunction with evolutionary networks 463
required to horizontally/vertically integrate, collaborate, and coordinate effectiveness and 464
efficiencies between manned and Unmanned Systems. Recommended changes to doctrine, 465
training, or facilities will be updated within the system specific CDD or CPD. 466
467
b. The recommended approach is interoperable Unmanned Systems and their modular 468
payloads that will cover the following desired capabilities; Battlespace Awareness, Force 469
Application, Protection, Command and Control, Logistics, Force Support and Net-Centric. 470
Unmanned Systems will be responsive to near-real-time changes and mission requirements. This 471
approach takes advantage of experiences with units equipped with Unmanned Systems. It also 472
takes the next step to ensure that the systems fielded to the force are fully supportable. The 473
recommended materiel solutions involve the harvesting of Lessons Learned from current 474
programs and systems equipped to meet ONSs to ensure that future programs of record will 475
enable accomplishment of capabilities necessary to mitigate gaps. 476
477
UNCLASSIFIED
13
UNCLASSIFIED
c. Recommend the continued evaluation of Unmanned Systems currently fielded in support 478
of approved Joint Urgent Operational Need Statements (JUON) and ONSs for potential enduring 479
capabilities and transition to a Program of Record through the Capabilities Development for 480
Rapid Transition (CDRT) process. To meet other unfulfilled capability gaps, recommend the 481
continued evaluation of Unmanned Systems prototypes, advanced engineering concepts, and 482
Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) projects that have the potential to satisfy 483
approved JUONs or ONS. 484
485
d. Recommend the establishment of a TRADOC Capabilities Manager Unmanned Ground 486
Systems (TCM UGS) under the Maneuver Center of Excellence, the current TRADOC lead for 487
UGS, in order to align with Robotic Systems Joint Program Office (RSJPO) for program 488
management and integration of UGS across the Force. The U.S. Army Policy for the Acquisition 489
of Unmanned Ground Systems and Integration of Mission Capability Packages (24 Nov 09) 490
“charters the Program Manager (PM), RSJPO as the centralized PM with the responsibility for 491
the acquisition life-cycle of Unmanned Ground Systems.” This would provide UGS with the 492
structure currently provided UAS, whose proponency, management, and oversight are provided 493
by the Aviation Center of Excellence, the UAS Center of Excellence, and TCM UAS. 494
UNCLASSIFIED
A-1
UNCLASSIFIED
Appendix A. Integrated Architecture Products 495 496
High-level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1) 497
498
499
UNCLASSIFIED
B-1
UNCLASSIFIED
Appendix B. References 500 501
Air Maneuver Battle Lab, Family of Unmanned Systems Experiment (FUSE) Unmanned Aerial 502
Resupply (UAR) Final Report, 17 Oct 2008 503
504
Aerial Sensor and Relay CBA, TRAC, Jan 06 505
506
Aviation Operations FAA, Aviation COE, Feb 09 507
508
Aviation Operations FNA, Aviation COE, Jun 09 509
510
Advanced Remote Ground Unattended Sensor (ARGUS) Operational Requirements Documents 511
(ORD), JROCM 228-04, 20 Dec 2004 512
513
Aerial Layer Network Transport ICD, 29 May 2008, USASC 514
515
Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment Spiral C, Final Report, Mar 2007, ATEC/ MBL 516
517
Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment Spiral D, Final Report, Mar 2008, ATEC/ MBL 518
519
Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment Spiral E, Final Report, Mar 2009, ATEC/ MBL 520
521
Base for the future Modular Force 2015-2024, 23 Mar 2009 522
523
Baseline Capability Assessment (BCA), 11 Sep 2003 524
525
CASCOM, DL2/QA, R-CAAT Series 101th Sustainment Brigade Lessons Learned Slide 526
Presentation OEF 07-09, 6 May 2009 527
528
Capability Development Document (CDD) for Special Operations Forces Long Endurance 529
Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aircraft System (SOF-LEVUAS), 24 Nov 2008 530
531
Coded Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (COFDM) Radio on the 510 FasTac 532
Comparative Assessment, Final Report, Mar 2009, MBL 533
534
CASCOM, ATCL-BL, Theater Distribution Computer Assisted Map Exercise (CAMEX), 10 535
Nov 2007 536
537
CASCOM, ATCL-BL, Air-Ground Distribution Computer Assisted Map Exercise (CAMEX), 1 538
Feb 2008 539
540
COL Peterman, M.P., USAWC Strategy Research Project, Three-Dimensional (3D) Distribution, 541
11 Mar 2009 542
543
Capability Development Document (CDD) for Special Operations Forces Long Endurance 544
Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aircraft System (SOF-LEVUAS), 24 Nov 2008 545
UNCLASSIFIED
B-2
UNCLASSIFIED
546
CASCOM, DL2/QA, R-CAAT Series 593 rd
Sustainment Brigade Western Iraq Lessons Learned 547
Slide Presentation, Volume 6, Jul 2007 548
549
CASCOM, DL2/QA, R-CAAT Series 43 rd
Area Support Group Lessons Learned LPD 550
Presentation Transcript, Volume 12, Aug 2008 551
552
CASCOM, DL2/QA, R-CAAT Series 4th Sustainment Brigade Lessons Learned Slide 553
Presentation, 5 Nov 2008 554
555
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense (CBRND) Functional Area Analysis 556
(Final), Sep 2004 557
558
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) and Functional Solution Analysis (FSA), Aug 2005 559
560
Chemical and Biological Defense Technology Objective (DTO), Feb 2003 561
562
Chemical Contamination Avoidance (CCA) MAA, Oct 2001 563
564
Defense Systems magazine, Special Report, Unmanned Aircraft: Bigger, Smaller, Smarter and 565
Deadlier, Apr 2009 566
567
Department of Defense Protection Joint Functional Concept, Jun 2004 568
569
Department of Defense Joint Forcible Entry Joint Integrating Concept, Version .92A3, Sep 2004 570
571
Department of Defense Integrated Air and Missile Defense Joint Integrating Concept, Version 572
1.0, Dec 2004 573
574
Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program Annual Report to Congress 575
Mar 2005 576
577
Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program Annual Report to Congress 578
Mar 2005 579
580
Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Program 581
Annual Report to Congress, May 2004 582
583
Department of Defense Information Assurance (IA) Strategic Plan, V1.1, Jan 2004 584
585
Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Program 586
Annual Report to Congress, May 2004 587
588
Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Program 589
FY2003-2005 Performance Plan, May 2004 590
591
UNCLASSIFIED
B-3
UNCLASSIFIED
Department of Defense Information Assurance (IA) Strategic Plan, V1.1, Jan 2004 592
593
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=289207&lang=en-US accessed 10 Jul 2009 594
Extended Range/Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Operational 595
596
Functional Concept for Battlespace Awareness, 31 Dec 2003 597
598
Future Combat System (FCS) Operational Requirements Document (ORD), JROCM 024-05, 31 599
Jan 2005 600
601
Future Modular Force Logistics Resupply Mission for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, CASCOM 602
ATCL-CDC-CQ, FY 2009 Study Proposal 603
604
FM 7-15 "The Army Universal Task List", 27 Feb 2009 605
606
Gladiator Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle Operational Requirements Document (ORD), 607
USMC, 26 Apr 2004 608
609
Global Information Grid (GIG) Mission Area Initial Capabilities Document (MA ICD), JROCM 610
202-02, 22 Nov 2002 611
612
Global Information Grid (GIG) Mission Area Initial Capabilities Document (MA ICD), JROCM 613
202-02, 22 Nov 2002 614
615
HQDA, FM 1-100, U.S. Army Aviation Operations, 21 Feb 1997 Department of Defense, 616
Defense Acquisition University, Defense Acquisition Guide Book, Technology Maturity, and 617
Technology Readiness Assessments, 15 Jun 2009, Headquarters 618
619
Headquarters, United States Air Force, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047, 18 620
May 2009 621
622
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Material Maintenance Policy AR 750-1, 20 Sep 623
2007 624
625
HQDA, Integrated Logistics Support, AR 700-127, Rapid Action Revision (RAR) Issue Date: 29 626
Apr 2009 627
628
IED Reconnaissance using Man Transportable Robotic System (MTRS) Experiment Final 629
Report, MSBL, Apr 2006 630
631
Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) Nov 2003 632
633
Joint Publication (JP) 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 634
(NBC) Environments, 11 Jul 2000 635
UNCLASSIFIED
B-4
UNCLASSIFIED
636
JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 637
638
Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS), Operational Requirements Document (ORD) 639
Joint Staff, J8, JRO-CBRND, 21 Jul 2003 640
641
Joint Biological Standoff Detection System (JBSDS), Joint Staff, J8, JRO-CBRND, JROCM 642
110-04 643
644
Joint Chemical Agent Detector, Joint Staff, J8, JRO-CBRND, 21 Mar 2002 645
646
Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector Operational Requirements 647
Document (ORD), Increment 1, Joint Staff, J8, JRO-CBRND JROCM 129-05 648
649
Joint Service Light NBC Reconnaissance System, Joint Staff, J8, JRO-CBRND, Sep 2003 650
651
Joint Staff Memorandum, J-8A 00057-03, subj Validation of Urgent, and Compelling 652
653
Joint Enabling Concept (JEC) for CBRN Defense, 17 Sep 2003 654
655
Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) Nov 2003 656
657
Joint Senior Seminar Wargame (JSSWG) (Welch Panel Report), Air and Missile Defense 658
Support to Combatant Commandeers, AMD Operational and Organizational Plan for the Future 659
Forcehttp://thefutureofthings.com/news/7685/acoustic-maps-to-aid-the-blind.html 660
661
Joint Direct Support Airborne ISR ICD (Draft), 10 Dec 2009, ARCIC/USAICoE 662
663
Joint Senior Seminar Wargame (JSSWG) (Welch Panel Report), Air and Missile Defense 664
665
Karin, Janice, Acoustic Maps to Aid the Blind, 05 Aug 2009 666
667
Maintenance Strategy for Robotics, General Dynamics for Commander, Combined Arms 668
Support Command and Department of the Army, ODCSLOG, Dec 2009 669
670
(ORD) for Multi-Mission Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – Special Operations Forces (M2UAV-671
SOF), 22 Dec 2003 672
673
Small Unit Remote Scouting System (SURSS) Operational Requirements Document (ORD), 674
USMC, 2 Aug 2004 675
676
Support to Combatant Commandeers, AMD Operational and Organizational Plan for the Future 677
Force 678
679
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66, Force Operating Capabilities, 7 Mar 2008 680
681
UNCLASSIFIED
B-5
UNCLASSIFIED
TRADOC Pam 525-3-6, The Army’s Functional Concept for Move 2015-2024, 30 Apr 2007 682
683
TRADOC Pam 525-4-1, US Army Functional Concept for Sustain 2015-2024, 30 Apr 2007 684
685
TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army in Joint Operations, The Army’s Future Force Capstone 686
Concept for 2015-2024, 7 Apr 2005 687
Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System (TARS) Operational Requirements Documents 688
(ORD), undated, USAF 689
690
TRADOC Pam 525-7-10, US Army Contributions to Joint Land Operations from a Joint Sea 691
692
USSOCOM Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for Rucksack Portable Unmanned 693
Aerial Vehicle (RPUAV), Block I, 24 Aug 2004 694
695
Unmanned Systems Collaboration Experiment, Final Report, Sep 2008, MBL 696
697
United States Air Force, 2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integration Roadmap, 06 Apr 2009 698
699
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Operational Requirements Document 700
(ORD) for Multi-Mission Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – Special Operations Forces (M2UAV-701
SOF), 22 Dec 2003 702
703
USSOCOM Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for Rucksack Portable Unmanned 704
Aerial Vehicle (RPUAV), Block I, 24 Aug 2004 705
706
United States Joint Forces Command, the Joint Operating Environment 2008, 25 Nov 2008 707
708
UNCLASSIFIED
C-1
UNCLASSIFIED
Appendix C. Acronym List 709
Part I Acronyms: 710
711
ACT Acquisition Category
AMSAA Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity
Ao Operational Availability
AoA Analysis of Alternatives
AR Army Regulation
ARCIC Army Requirements Capabilities Integration Center
ARL Army Research Labs
ASI Additional Skill Identifier
AT Antitank
ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile
C2 Command and Control
C 3 D Camouflage, Cover, Concealment, And Deception
CBA Capability Based Assessments
CBP Complex Battle Positions
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-yield Explosives
CDD Capability Development Document
CDID Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate
CDRT Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition
CLS Contractor Logistics Support
CONOPS Concept of Operations Summary
CONUS Continental United States
COP Common Operating Picture
COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf
CPD Capability Production Document
CREW
Counter RCIED (Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device)
Electronic Warfare
DPS Defense Planning Scenarios
DoD Department of Defense
DOTMLPF
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education,
Personnel, and Facilities
EBM Enhanced Blast Munitions
EFF Essential Function Failure
EFP Explosively Formed Penetrator
EM Electromagnetic
EMR Electromagnetic Radiation
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
UNCLASSIFIED
C-2
UNCLASSIFIED
ETM Electronic Technical Manual
EW Electronic Warfare
FOC Full Operational Capability
GCS Ground Control Station
HEAT High Explosive Anti-Tank
HQDA Headquarters Department of the Army
IAW In Accordance With
ICD Initial Capabilities Document
ICM Improved Conventional Munitions
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IOC Initial Operational Capability
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
JCA Joint Capability Areas
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JCTD Joint Capability Technology Demonstration
JFC Joint Force Commander
JIIM Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multi-national
JUON Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement
LOC Line Of Communications
MANSCEN Maneuver Support Center
MCOE Maneuver Center of Excellence
MIL STD Military Standard
MIL-PER Military Personnel
MIL-SPEC Military Specification
MOS Military Occupational Specialty
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Net-Centric Operations and Warfare (NCOW)
OCU Operator Control Unit
OE Operational Environment
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
ONS Operational Needs Statement
PGM Precision Guided Munitions
PM Program Manager
POR Programs of Record
RAM Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability
RDD Requirements Determination Division
RDT&E Research, Development, Test & Evaluation
REG Regulation
UNCLASSIFIED
C-3
UNCLASSIFIED
RSJPO Robotic Systems Joint Program Office
RSTA Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition
DOTMLPF RIO Resource-informed, integration-focused, and outcome-based solutions which address doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel, and facilities gaps
SAM Surface-To-Air Missiles
STANAG Standardization Agreement
STAR System Threat Assessment Report
SWaP Size, Weight and Power
TCM TRADOC Capability Manager
TRADOC US Army Training & Doctrine Command
TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UAS Unmanned Aircraft Systems
UGS Unmanned Ground Systems
UMS Unmanned Maritime Systems
U.S. United States
USAES United States Army Engineer School
USAF United States Air Force
USAICoE US Army Intelligence Center of Excellence
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
WFF War Fighting Functions
712
Part II Terms and Definitions: 713
714 Acquisition Category (ACAT). Categories established to facilitate decentralized decision-715
making and execution, and compliance with statutorily imposed requirements. The categories 716
determine the level of review, decision authority, and applicable procedures. DOD 5000.2-R, 717
part 1, provides the specific definition for each acquisition category (ACAT I through IV). 718
719
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). The evaluation of the operational effectiveness, operational 720
suitability, and estimated costs of alternative systems to meet a mission capability. The analysis 721
assesses the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives being considered to satisfy capabilities, 722
including the sensitivity of each alternative to possible changes in key assumptions or variables. 723
724
Analysis of Materiel Approaches (AMA). The JCIDS analysis to determine the best materiel 725
approach or combination of approaches to provide the desired capability or capabilities. Though 726
the AMA is similar to an AoA, it occurs earlier in the analytical process. Subsequent to approval 727
of an ICD, which may lead to a potential ACAT I/S&RL Integrated Enterprise Domain 728
Architecture program, Director Program Analysis & Evaluation provides specific guidance to 729
refine this initial AMA into an AoA. 730
731
UNCLASSIFIED
C-4
UNCLASSIFIED
Architecture. The structure of components, their relationships, and the principles and guidelines, 732
governing their design and evolution over time. 733
734
Attribute. A testable or measurable characteristic that describes an aspect of a system or 735
capability. 736
737
Capability. The ability to execute a specified course of action. It is defined by an operational 738
user and expressed in broad operational terms in the format of an initial capabilities document or 739
a DOTMLPF change recommendation. In the case of material proposals, the definition will 740
progressively evolve to DOTMLPF performance attributes identified in the CDD and the CPD. 741
742
Capability Gap. Those synergistic resources (DOTMLPF) that is unavailable but potentially 743
attainable to the operational user for effective task execution. These resources may come from 744
the entire range of DOTMLPF solutions. 745
746
Capability Production Document (CPD). A document that addresses the production elements 747
specific to a single increment of an acquisition program. 748
749
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI). A replacement document for all types 750
of correspondence containing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) policy and guidance 751
that does not involve the employment of forces. An instruction is of indefinite duration and is 752
applicable to external agencies or both the Joint Staff and external agencies. It remains in effect 753
until superseded, rescinded, or otherwise canceled. CJCS Instructions, unlike joint publications, 754
will not contain joint doctrine and/or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. 755
756
Crew. The people who man a ship, aircraft, or vehicle. 757
758
Deploying. The act of relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational areas. 759
Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, 760
specifically including intra-continental United States, inter-theater, and intra-theater movement 761
legs, staging, and holding areas. 762
763
Doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements there of guide their 764
actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. 765
766 DOTMLPF RIO. Resource-informed, integration-focused, and outcome-based solutions which 767 address doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities 768 gaps. 769 770
Embedded instrumentation. Data collection and processing capabilities integrated into the 771
design of a system for one or more of the following uses: diagnostics, prognostics, testing, or 772
training. 773
774
Environmental quality. The condition of the following elements that make up the environment: 775
flora, fauna, air, water, land, and cultural resources. 776
777
UNCLASSIFIED
C-5
UNCLASSIFIED
Functional area. A broad scope of related joint war fighting skills and attributes that may span 778
the range of military operations. A major area of related activity. Specific skill groupings that 779
make up the functional areas are approved by the JROC. 780
781 Increment. A militarily useful and supportable operational capability that can be effectively 782
developed, produced or acquired, deployed, and sustained. Each increment of capability will 783
have its own set of threshold and objective values set by the user. 784
785
Information Exchange. Is an act of exchanging information between two distinct operational 786
nodes and the characteristics of the act, including the information element that needs to be 787
exchanged and the attributes associated with the information element (e.g., Scope), as well as 788
attributes associated with the exchange (e.g., Transaction Type). 789
790
Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). Documents the need for a materiel approach to a specific 791
capability gap derived from an initial analysis of materiel approaches executed by the operational 792
user and, as required, an independent analysis of materiel alternatives. It defines the capability 793
gap in terms of the functional area, the relevant range of military operations, desired effects, and 794
time. The ICD summarizes the results of the DOTMLPF analysis and describes why non-795
materiel changes alone have been judged inadequate in fully providing the capability. 796
797
Integrated architecture. An architecture consisting of multiple views or perspectives (operational 798
view, systems view and technical standards view) that facilitate integration, promote 799
interoperability, and permit identification and prioritization of capability shortfalls and 800
redundancies. 801
802
Intelligence. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, 803
analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or 804
potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also 805
applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such 806
activity.” JP 1-02 June 2007 (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 807
definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) And “intelligence 1. 808
(Joint) The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, 809
and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information 810
and knowledge about an enemy obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or 811
understanding.” (FM 2-0, May 2004) 812
813 Joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc. in elements of two or more Military 814
Departments or countries participate. 815
816
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). Policy and procedure that 817
support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 818
in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capabilities needs. Implement an 819
integrated, collaborative process to guide development of new capabilities through changes in 820
DOTMLPF. Change recommendations are developed, evaluated, and prioritized based on their 821
contribution to future joint concepts. 822
823
UNCLASSIFIED
C-6
UNCLASSIFIED
Joint Force. The term “Joint Force” in its broadest sense refers to the Armed Forces of the 824
United States. The term “joint force” (lower case) refers to an element of the Armed Forces that 825
is organized for a particular mission or task. Because this could refer to a joint task force or a 826
unified command, or some yet unnamed future joint organization, the more generic term “a joint 827
force” will be used, similar in manner to the term “joint force commander” in reference to the 828
commander of any joint force. 829
830
Mission. A collection of tasks and sub-tasks that defines some specific aspect of commander’s 831
intent. The aspect could be bounded geographically, by time, by desired outcome (end state), by 832
allocation to specific forces capabilities, by type of operations, or by a combination of the 833
aforementioned. (Used akin to commander’s intent, job, task, sub-task.) 834
835 National Security Systems (NSS). Telecommunications and information systems, operated by 836
the DOD – the functions, operation or use of which involves (1) intelligence activities, (2) 837
cryptologic activities related to national security, (3) the command and control of military forces, 838
(4) equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons systems, or (5) is critical to the 839
direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions. Subsection (5) in the preceding sentence 840
does not include procurement of automatic data processing equipment or services to be used for 841
routine administrative and business applications (including payroll, finance, logistics, and 842
personnel management applications). 843
844
Objective. An operationally significant increment above the threshold. An objective value may 845
be the same as the threshold when an operationally significant increment above the threshold is 846
not significant or useful. 847
848
Operational Requirements. A system capability or characteristic required to accomplish 849
approved mission needs. Operational (including supportability) requirements are typically 850
performance parameters, but they may also be derived from cost and schedule. For each 851
parameter, an objective and threshold value must also be established. 852
853
Operator. Somebody who operates machinery, an instrument, or other equipment. 854
855
Payload. The quantity of cargo or number of passengers that a plane, train, or other vehicle can 856
carry, often expressed as weight or volume, or the revenue-producing portion of its cargo or 857
passengers 858
859
System Characteristics. Design features such as weight, fuel capacity, and size. Characteristics 860
are usually traceable to capabilities (e.g., hardening characteristics are derived from a survival 861
capability) and are frequently dictated by operational constraints (e.g., carrier compatibility) 862
and/or the intended operational environment (e.g., CBRN). 863
864
Threshold. A minimum acceptable operational value below which the utility of the system 865
becomes questionable. 866
867
Throughput. In transportation, the average quantity of cargo and passengers that can pass 868
through a port on a daily basis from arrival at the port to loading onto a ship or plane, or from a 869
UNCLASSIFIED
C-7
UNCLASSIFIED
discharge from a ship or plane (clearance) from the port complex. Throughput is usually 870
expressed in measurement tons (short tons, passengers). Reception and storage limitation may 871
affect final throughput. In patient movement and care, the maximum number of patients (stable 872
or stabilized) by category, that can be received at the airport, staged, transported, and received at 873
the proper hospital in the same 24 hour period. 874
UNCLASSIFIED
D-1
UNCLASSIFIED
875
Appendix D. Cost-Benefit Analysis 876 877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
AS OF: 19 March 2010
Unmanned Systems (Air, Ground, Maritime)
Initial Capabilities Document Cost – Benefit Analysis
LTC Stuart Hatfield
Chief, Lethality Branch
Maneuver, Aviation, & Soldier Division
Army Capabilities Integration Center
887 888
889
890
891
892
893
(See attached slides) 894
