Leadership case study

Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values

Author(s): Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker

Source: American Sociological Review , Feb., 2000, Vol. 65, No. 1, Looking Forward, Looking Back: Continuity and Change at the Turn of the Millenium (Feb., 2000), pp. 19- 51

Published by: American Sociological Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2657288

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MODERNIZATION, CULTURAL CHANGE,

AND THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES*

Ronald Inglehart Wayne E. Baker University of Michigan University of Michigan

Modernization theorists from Karl Marx to Daniel Bell have argued that

economic development brings pervasive cultural changes. But others, from

Max Weber to Samuel Huntington, have claimed that cultural values are an

enduring and autonomous influence on society. We test the thesis that eco-

nomic development is linked with systematic changes in basic values. Using

data from the three waves of the World Values Surveys, which include 65

societies and 75 percent of the world's population, we find evidence of both

massive cultural change and the persistence of distinctive cultural tradi-

tions. Economic development is associated with shifts away from absolute

norms and values toward values that are increasingly rational, tolerant,

trusting, and participatory. Cultural change, however, is path dependent.

The broad cultural heritage of a society-Protestant, Roman Catholic, Or-

thodox, Confucian, or Communist-leaves an imprint on values that endures

despite modernization. Moreover, the differences between the values held by

members of different religions within given societies are much smaller than

are cross-national differences. Once established, such cross-cultural differ-

ences become part of a national culture transmitted by educational institu-

tions and mass media. We conclude with some proposed revisions of mod-

ernization theory.

he last decades of the twentieth century

were not kind to modernization theory, once widely considered a powerful tool for peering into the future of industrial society. Modernization theory's most influential pro- ponent, Karl Marx, claimed that economi- cally developed societies show the future to less developed societies (Marx 1973). His prophecies have had enormous impact, but as the twenty-first century begins, few people anticipate a proletarian revolution or trust a state-run economy. Furthermore, although theorists from Marx to Nietzsche to Lerner to Bell predicted the decline of religion in the wake of modernization, religion and spiritual beliefs have not faded. Instead, social and political debate about religious and emotion-

ally charged issues such as abortion and eu-

thanasia have grown increasingly salient

(DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Hunter

1991; Williams 1997), and a resurgence of

fundamentalist Islam has established a major cleavage in international politics.

Well into the twentieth century, modern- ization was widely viewed as a uniquely

Western process that non-Western societies could follow only in so far as they aban- doned their traditional cultures and assimi- lated technologically and morally "superior"

Western ways. But during the second half of the century, non-Western societies unexpect-

edly surpassed their Western role models in key aspects of modernization. East Asia, for

example, attained the world's highest rate of economic growth. Using official exchange rates, Japan had the highest per capita in-

come of any major nation in the world, led the world in automobile manufacturing and

consumer electronics, and had the world's highest life expectancy. Today, few observ- ers would attribute moral superiority to the

* Direct all correspondence to Ronald Inglehart, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48106-1248 ([email protected]). The authors express their thanks to Gary Hamilton and Randy Stokes and

to the anonymous ASR reviewers, for helpful comments.

American Sociological Review, 2000, Vol. 65 (February: 19-5 1) 19

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20 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

West, and Western economies are no longer

assumed to be the model for the world.

Nevertheless, a core concept of modern- ization theory seems valid today: Industrial-

ization produces pervasive social and cul-

tural consequences, from rising educational

levels to changing gender roles. Industrial-

ization is seen as the central element of a

modernization process that affects most other

elements of society. Marx's failures as a

prophet are well documented, but he cor-

rectly foresaw that industrialization would

transform the world. When he was writing

Das Kapital (1867), only a handful of soci-

eties were industrialized; today, there are

dozens of advanced industrial societies, and

almost every society on Earth is at some stage of the industrialization process.

Our thesis is that economic development

has systematic and, to some extent, predict-

able cultural and political consequences. These consequences are not iron laws of his- tory; they are probabilistic trends. Neverthe- less, the probability is high that certain changes will occur, once a society has em-

barked on industrialization. We explore this thesis using data from the World Values Sur-

veys. These surveys include 65 societies and more than 75 percent of the world's popula-

tion. They provide time-series data from the

earliest wave in 1981 to the most recent

wave completed in 1998, offering new and rich insights into the relationships between economic development and social and politi- cal change.

MODERNIZATION OR THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES?

In recent years, research and theory on so- cioeconomic development have given rise to two contending schools of thought. One school emphasizes the convergence of values as a result of "modernization"-the over- whelming economic and political forces that drive cultural change. This school predicts the decline of traditional values and their re- placement with "modern" values. The other

school of thought emphasizes the persistence of traditional values despite economic and political changes. This school assumes that values are relatively independent of eco- nomic conditions (DiMaggio 1994). Conse-

quently, it predicts that convergence around some set of "modern" values is unlikely and that traditional values will continue to exert

an independent influence on the cultural

changes caused by economic development. In the postwar United States, a version of

modernization theory emerged that viewed

underdevelopment as a direct consequence of

a country's internal characteristics: tradi-

tional economies, traditional psychological

and cultural traits, and traditional institutions

(Lerner 1958; Weiner 1966). From this per- spective, traditional values were not only mutable but could-and should-be replaced

by modern values, enabling these societies to follow the (virtually inevitable) path of capi- talist development. The causal agents in this developmental process were seen as the rich,

developed nations that stimulate the modern-

ization of "backward" nations through eco- nomic, cultural, and military assistance.

These arguments were criticized as blam- ing the victim, because modernization theo-

rists assumed that underdeveloped societies needed to adopt "modern" values and insti- tutions to become developed societies (Bradshaw and Wallace 1996). Moderniza- tion theory was not only criticized, it was

pronounced dead (Wallerstein 1976). The postwar version of modernization theory tended to neglect external factors, such as colonialism, imperialism, and newer forms of economic and political domination. The emerging neo-Marxist and world-systems theorists emphasized the extent to which rich countries exploited poor countries, locking them in positions of powerlessness and struc- tural dependence (Chase-Dunn 1989; Chirot 1977, 1994; Frank 1966; Wallerstein 1974). Underdevelopment, as Frank put it, is devel- oped. This new school of thought conveyed the message to poor countries that poverty has nothing to do with internal problems-it is the fault of global capitalism.

World-systems theory itself has not been immune from criticism. For example, Evans (1995) argues that the global division of la- bor offers opportunities as well as con- straints, enabling developing nations to transform themselves and change their posi- tions in the global economy. The involve- ment of multinational corporations in under- developed nations does not appear to be as harmful as world-systems theorists claim. In

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 21

fact, foreign investment has been found to

stimulate growth (DeSoya and Oneal 1999;

Firebaugh 1992) and improve national wel-

fare, benefiting the masses, not just the elites

(Firebaugh and Beck 1994). Hein (1992) and

Dollar (1992) demonstrate that those with

high levels of trade and investment from

capitalist countries showed higher subse- quent rates of economic growth than did other countries (also see Firebaugh 1999).

The central claim of modernization theory

is that economic development is linked with

coherent and, to some extent, predictable changes in culture and social and political life. Evidence from around the world indi-

cates that economic development tends to propel societies in a roughly predictable di- rection: Industrialization leads to occupa-

tional specialization, rising educational lev- els, rising income levels, and eventually brings unforeseen changes-changes in gen- der roles, attitudes toward authority and sexual norms; declining fertility rates;

broader political participation; and less eas-

ily led publics. Determined elites in control

of the state and the military can resist these changes, but in the long run, it becomes in- creasingly costly to do so and the probability of change rises.1

But cultural change does not take the

simple linear path envisioned by Marx, who assumed that the working class would con- tinue to grow until a proletarian revolution brought an end to history. In 1956, the United States became the world's first soci-

ety to have a majority of its labor force em-

ployed in the service sector. During the next

few decades, practically all OECD (Organi-

zation for Economic Cooperation and Devel- opment) countries followed suit, becoming "post-industrial" societies, in Bell's (1973)

terms. These changes in the nature of work

had major political and cultural conse-

quences (Bell 1973, 1976; Dahrendorf 1959).

In marked contrast to the growing material- ism linked with the industrial revolution, the

unprecedented existential security of ad- vanced industrial society gave rise to an

intergenerational shift toward postmaterialist and postmodern values (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997). While industrialization was linked with an emphasis on economic growth

at almost any price, the publics of affluent

societies placed increasing emphasis on

quality-of-life, environmental protection, and self-expression. Bell emphasized changes in the nature of work, while Inglehart emphasized the consequences of

economic security; but they and others agreed that cultural change in postindustrial society was moving in a new direction. Ac-

cordingly, we suggest that economic devel- opment gives rise to not just one, but two main dimensions of cross-cultural differen- tiation: a first dimension linked with early industrialization and the rise of the working class; a second dimension that reflects the changes linked with the affluent conditions of advanced industrial society and with the rise of the service and knowledge sectors.

The shift from preindustrial to industrial society wrought profound changes in people's daily experiences and prevailing worldviews (Bell 1973; Inglehart 1997; Spier 1996). Preindustrial life, Bell (1976) argues, was a "game against nature" in which "one's sense of the world is conditioned by the vi- cissitudes of the elements-the seasons, the storms, the fertility of the soil, the amount of water, the depth of the mine seams, the droughts and the floods" (p. 147). Industrial- ization brought less dependence on nature, which had been seen as inscrutable, capri- cious, uncontrollable forces or anthropomor- phic spirits. Life now became a "game against fabricated nature" (Bell 1973:147), a technical, mechanical, rationalized, bureau- cratic world directed toward the external

problem of creating and dominating the en- vironment. As human control of the environ-

1 Paradoxically, modernization can actually strengthen traditional values. Elites in underde- veloped nations who attempt to mobilize a popu- lation for social change often use traditional cul- tural appeals, as in Japan's Meiji Restoration. More recently, radical reformist groups in Alge- ria used Islam to gain peasant support, but as an unintended result strengthened fundamentalist re- ligious values (Stokes and Marshall 1981). Thus, cultural identity can be used to promote the inter- ests of a group (Bernstein 1997) and in the pro- cess may strengthen cultural diversity. Generally,

"[a]s global integration intensifies, the currents of multiculturalism swirl faster. Under these condi- tions, which include the juxtaposition of ethni- cally distinct labor forces and communities, the politics of identity tends to substitute for the civic (universalist) politics of nation-building" (McMichael 1996:42).

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22 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

ment increased, the role ascribed to religion and God dwindled. Materialistic ideologies arose with secular interpretations of history, and secular utopias were to be attained by human engineering operating through ratio- nally organized bureaucratic organizations.

The emergence of postindustrial society

seems to be stimulating further evolution of prevailing worldviews, but it is moving in a different direction. Life in postindustrial so- cieties centers on services, and hence life be- comes a "game between persons" in which people "live more and more outside nature, and less and less with machinery and things; they live with, and encounter only, one an- other" (Bell 1973:148-49). Less effort is fo- cused on producing material objects, and more effort is focused on communicating and processing information. Most people spend their productive hours dealing with other people and symbols. Increasingly, one's for- mal education and job experience help develop the potential for autonomous decision-making (Bell 1973, 1976). Thus, the rise of postindustrial society leads to a growing emphasis on self-expression (Inglehart 1997). The hierarchical organiza- tions of the industrial age required (and al- lowed) little autonomous judgment, whereas service and knowledge workers deal with people and concepts, operating in a world in which innovation and the freedom to exer- cise individual judgment are essential. Self- expression becomes central. Furthermore, the historically unprecedented wealth of ad- vanced industrial societies, coupled with the rise of the welfare state, mean that an in- creasing share of the population grows up taking survival for granted. Their value pri- orities shift from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being and quality-of-life (Inglehart 1977, 1997). Thus, cultural change is not linear; with the coming of postindustrial society, it moves in a new direction.

Different societies follow different trajec- tories even when they are subjected to the same forces of economic development, in part because situation-specific factors, such as cultural heritage, also shape how a par- ticular society develops. Weber ([1904] 1958) argued that traditional religious values have an enduring influence on the institu-

tions of a society. Following this tradition,

Huntington (1993, 1996) argues that the

world is divided into eight major civiliza- tions or "cultural zones" based on cultural differences that have persisted for centuries. These zones were shaped by religious tradi-

tions that are still powerful today, despite the forces of modernization. The zones are West- ern Christianity, the Orthodox world, the Is- lamic world, and the Confucian, Japanese,

Hindu, African, and Latin American zones. Scholars from various disciplines have ob-

served that distinctive cultural traits endure over long periods of time and continue to shape a society's political and economic per- formance. For example, Putnam (1993) shows that the regions of Italy in which democratic institutions function most suc- cessfully today are those in which civil soci- ety was relatively well developed in the nine- teenth century and even earlier. Fukuyama (1995) argues that a cultural heritage of "low-trust" puts a society at a competitive

disadvantage in global markets because it is less able to develop large and complex so- cial institutions. Hamilton (1994) argues that, although capitalism has become an al- most universal way of life, civilizational fac- tors continue to structure the organization of economies and societies: "What we witness with the development of a global economy is not increasing uniformity, in the form of a universalization of Western culture, but rather the continuation of civilizational di- versity through the active reinvention and reincorporation of non-Western civilizational

patterns" (p. 184). Thus, there are striking cross-cultural variations in the organization of capitalist production and associated mana- gerial ideologies (DiMaggio 1994; Guillen 1994).

The impression that we are moving toward a uniform "McWorld" is partly an illusion. As Watson (1998) demonstrates, the seem- ingly identical McDonald's restaurants that have spread throughout the world actually have different social meanings and fulfill dif- ferent social functions in different cultural

zones. Although the physical settings are similar, eating in a McDonald's restaurant in Japan is a different social experience from eating in one in the United States or Europe or China. The globalization of communica- tions is unmistakable, but precisely because

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 23

its manifestations are so obvious, its effects

may be overestimated. While it is obvious

that young people around the world are wear- ing jeans and listening to U.S. pop music, the

persistence of underlying value differences is less apparent.

THE EVIDENCE

Data

Our main data source is the World Values

Surveys, the largest investigation ever con- ducted of attitudes, values, and beliefs around the world. This study carried out three waves of representative national sur-

veys: in 1981-1982, 1990-1991, and 1995- 1998. It covers 65 countries on all six inhab-

ited continents, and contains more than 75 percent of the world's population. These so- cieties have per capita annual gross national products ranging from $300 to more than $30,000, and their political systems range from long-established stable democracies to authoritarian states.

We use the most recent data for the 65 countries. Data for the following 50 societ- ies are from the 1995-1998 wave: United States, Australia, New Zealand, China, Ja- pan, Taiwan, South Korea, Turkey, Bangla- desh, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Arme- nia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Great Britain, East Germany, West Germany, Switzerland, Nor- way, Sweden, Finland, Spain, Russia,

Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Slo- venia, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Ni- geria, South Africa, Ghana, Argentina, Bra- zil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, Ven- ezuela. Most of the 1995-1998 surveys were carried out in 1996, but Argentina, Australia, China, Croatia, Ghana, Nigeria, Japan, Puerto Rico, Russia, Slovenia, Taiwan and the United States were surveyed in 1995; Ar- menia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, West and East Germany, Macedonia, Pakistan and Po- land were surveyed in 1997; Bosnia, Great Britain and New Zealand were surveyed in 1998. Data for 15 societies are from the 1990

European Values Survey: Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia,

and Romania. The number of respondents in-

terviewed in these surveys averages about 1,400 per country. These data are available

from the Inter-university Consortium for Po-

litical and Social Research (ICPSR) survey

data archive at the University of Michigan.2

Measures

Our thesis implies that economic develop-

ment is linked with a broad syndrome of dis-

tinctive value orientations. Does such a syn- drome exist? Inglehart (1997) analyzed ag- gregated nation-level data from the 43 soci-

eties included in the 1990-1991 World Val- ues Survey and found large and coherent

cross-cultural differences. The two most im- portant dimensions that emerged tapped scores of variables and demonstrated that the worldviews of the peoples of rich societies differ systematically from those of low-in- come societies across a wide range of politi- cal, social, and religious norms and beliefs. These two dimensions reflect cross-national polarization between traditional versus secu- lar-rational orientations toward authority; and survival versus self-expression values.

Each society can be located on a global map of cross-cultural variation based on these two dimensions (Inglehart 1997:81-98).

We use the term "traditional" in a specific sense here. In the course of human history, thousands of societies have existed, most of which are now extinct. These societies had a vast range of characteristics. Infanticide was common in hunting and gathering societies, but became rare in agrarian societies; homo- sexuality was accepted in some preindustrial societies; and women are believed to have dominated political and social life in some preindustrial societies. Although the full range of "traditions" is diverse, a mainstream version of preindustrial society having a number of common characteristics can be identified. All of the preindustrial societies for which we have data show relatively low levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, and homosexuality; tend to emphasize male dominance in economic and political life, deference to parental authority, and the im-

2 For further information about these surveys, see the World Values Survey web site (http:// wvs .isr.umich.edu).

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24 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Table 1. Items Characterizing Two Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Variation: Nation-Level Analysis

Factor Loadings

Dimension and Item Nation Level Individual Level

Traditional vs. Secular-Rational Valuesa

TRADITIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING:

God is very important in respondent's life. .91 .70

It is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious .89 .61 faith than independence and determinations

Abortion is never justifiable. .82 .61

Respondent has strong sense of national pride. .82 .60

Respondent favors more respect for authority. .72 .51

(SECULAR-RATIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE OPPOSITE)

Survival vs. Self-Expression Values c

SURVIVAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING:

Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over .86 .59 self-expression and quality-of-life.d

Respondent describes self as not very happy. - .81 - .58

Respondent has not signed and would not sign a petition. .80 - .59

Homosexuality is never justifiable. .78 - .54

You have to be very careful about trusting people. .56 - .44

(SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES EMPHASIZE THE OPPOSITE)

Source: Nation-level and individual-level data from 65 societies surveyed in the 1990-1991 and 1995- 1998 World Values Surveys.

Note: The original polarities vary. The above statements show how each item relates to the given dimen- sion, based on a factor analysis with varimax rotation. Number of cases for nation-level analysis is 65; total N for individual-level is 165,594 (smallest N for any of the above items is 146,789).

a Explains 44 percent of cross-national variation, and 26 percent of individual-level variation.

b Autonomy index.

c Explains 26 percent of the cross-national variation, and 13 percent of the individual-level variation.

d Measured by the four-item materialist/postmaterialist values index.

portance of family life, and are relatively au-

thoritarian; most of them place strong em- phasis on religion. Advanced industrial soci-

eties tend to have the opposite characteris- tics. It would be a gross oversimplification

to assume that all known preindustrial soci- eties had similar characteristics, but one can

meaningfully contrast the cultural character-

istics of industrial societies with those of this

mainstream version of preindustrial society.

There are various ways to measure the

character of societal cultures. We build on prior findings by constructing comparable

measures of cross-cultural variation that can

be used with all three waves of the World

Values Surveys at both the individual level and the national level. Starting with the vari-

ables identified in analysis of the 1990-1991

surveys, we selected variables that not only

tapped these two dimensions, but appeared

in the same format in all three waves of the World Values Surveys. Inglehart (1997) used

factor scores based on 22 variables, but we

reduced this number to 10 items to minimize problems of missing data (if one variable were missing, we would lose an entire nation from the analysis).

Table 1 lists the 10 items that tap the tradi- tional versus secular-rational dimension and the survival versus self-expression dimen- sion, using a factor analysis of the World Values Survey data aggregated to the na-

tional level.3 The items in each dimension

3 To avoid dropping an entire society from our analysis when one of these variables is not avail-

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 25

are highly intercorrelated. The two dimen-

sions explain 70 percent of the total cross- national variation among these 10 variables. This holds true despite the fact that we de- liberately selected items covering a wide

range of topics. For the traditional/secular-

rational dimension, for example, we could

have selected five items referring to religion

and obtained an even more tightly correlated cluster, but our goal was to measure broad dimensions of cross-cultural variation.

The factor scores generated by the 10

items used in this analysis are highly corre-

lated with the factor scores based on the 22 items used by Inglehart (1997:334-35, 388). The traditional/secular-rational dimension based on the five items used here is almost

perfectly correlated (r = .95) with the factor scores from the comparable dimension based on 11 variables; and the survival/self-expres- sion dimension based on five variables is al- most perfectly correlated (r = .96) with the survival/self-expression dimension based on 11 variables.

Table 1 also shows the results from a fac- tor analysis of the same variables using the individual-level data. Instead of 123 cases, we now have 165,594 cases. As expected, the factor loadings are considerably lower than those at the national level, where much of the random measurement error normally found in survey data cancels out. Nevertheless, these items produce two clearly defined di- mensions with a basic structure similar to that found at the national level.

Each factor taps a broad dimension of

cross-cultural variation involving dozens of

additional variables. Table 2 shows 24 addi-

tional variables in the World Values Survey

that are closely correlated with the tradi-

tional/secular-rational values dimension (the

median correlation is .61). This dimension

reflects the contrast between societies in

which religion is very important and those in

which it is not, but deference to the authority of God, Fatherland and Family are all closely linked.4 The importance of the family is a

major theme: In traditional societies a main

goal in life is to make one's parents proud- one must always love and respect one's par-

ents, regardless of how they behave. Con- versely parents must do their best for their

children even if their own well-being suffers. People in traditional societies idealize large

families, and they actually have them (high scores on this dimension are strongly corre- lated with high fertility rates). Yet although

the people of traditional societies have high levels of national pride, favor more respect for authority, take protectionist attitudes to- ward foreign trade, and feel that environmen-

tal problems can be solved without interna- tional agreements, they accept national au- thority passively: They seldom or never dis- cuss politics. In preindustrial societies the family is crucial to survival. Accordingly, societies at the traditional pole of this dimen- sion reject divorce and take a pro-life stance on abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. They emphasize social conformity rather than in- dividualistic striving, believe in absolute standards of good and evil, support deference to authority, and have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the oppo- site preferences on all of these topics.

The survival/self-expression dimension taps a syndrome of trust, tolerance, subjec- tive well-being, political activism, and self- expression that emerges in postindustrial so- cieties with high levels of security. At the

able, the nation-level aggregate dataset (but not the individual-level dataset) sometimes uses re-

sults from another survey in the same country. For example, the materialist/posmaterialist bat-

tery was not included in the 1981 surveys in the United States and Australia, but this battery was included in the 1980 national election surveys in

both countries, and the results are used in these cases. When this option was not available, we ranked all societies on the variable most closely

correlated with the missing variable and assigned the mean score of the two adjacent countries in this ranking. For example, the 1997 Bangladesh survey omitted a variable rating the acceptability of homosexuality (V197); but it did include a variable on homosexuals as a group one would not like to have as neighbors (V60). Nigeria and

Georgia were the two closest-ranking societies on V60, so Bangladesh was assigned the mean of Nigeria's and Georgia's scores on V197.

4These 65 societies show a tremendous amount of variation. In Pakistan, 90 percent of the popu- lation say that God is extremely important in their lives, selecting "10" on a 10-point scale; in both Brazil and Nigeria, 87 percent select this extreme

position on the scale; in East Germany and Ja- pan, on the other hand, only 6 percent and 5 per- cent, respectively, take this position.

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26 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Table 2. Correlation of Additional Items with the Traditional/Secular-Rational Values Dimension

Item Correlation

TRADITIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING:

Religion is very important in respondent's life. .89

Respondent believes in Heaven. .88

One of respondent's main goals in life has been to make his/her parents proud. .81

Respondent believes in Hell. .76

Respondent attends church regularly. .75

Respondent has a great deal of confidence in the country's churches. .72

Respondent gets comfort and strength from religion. .72

Respondent describes self as "a religious person." .71

Euthanasia is never justifiable. .66

Work is very important in respondent's life. .65

There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here. .63

Suicide is never justifiable. .61

Parents' duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being. .60

Respondent seldom or never discusses politics. .57

Respondent places self on right side of a left-right scale. .57

Divorce is never justifiable. .57

There are absolutely clear guidelines about good and evil. .56

Expressing one's own preferences clearly is more important .56 than understanding others' preferences.

My country's environmental problems can be solved without any international agreements .56 to handle them.

If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems. .53

One must always love and respect one's parents regardless of their behavior. .49

Family is very important in respondent's life. .45

Respondent is relatively favorable to having the army rule the country. .43

Respondent favors having a relatively large number of children. .41

(SECULAR-RATIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE OPPOSITE)

Source: Nation-level data from 65 societies surveyed in the 1990-1991 and 1995-1998 World Values Surveys.

Note: The original polarities vary. The above statements show how each item relates to the traditional/ secular-rational values dimension, as measured by the items described in Table 1.

opposite extreme, people in societies shaped by insecurity and low levels of well-being,

tend to emphasize economic and physical se-

curity above all other goals, and feel threat-

ened by foreigners, by ethnic diversity and

by cultural change. This leads to an intoler-

ance of gays and other outgroups, an insis-

tence on traditional gender roles, and an au- thoritarian political outlook.

A central component of this dimension in- volves the polarization between materialist

and postmaterialist values. Extensive evi-

dence indicates that these values tap an intergenerational shift from an emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increased emphasis on self-expression, sub-

jective well-being, and quality-of-life con- cerns (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997). This cultural shift is found throughout advanced industrial society; it emerges among birth cohorts that have grown up under conditions in which survival is taken for granted. These

values are linked with a growing emphasis on environmental protection, the women's

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 27

Table 3. Correlation of Additional Items with the Survival/Self-Expression Values Dimension

Item Correlation

SURVIVAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING:

Men make better political leaders than women. .86

Respondent is dissatisfied with financial situation of his/her household. .83

A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled. .83

Respondent rejects foreigners, homosexuals, and people with AIDS as neighbors. a .81

Respondent favors more emphasis on the development of technology. .78

Respondent has not recycled things to protect the environment. .76

Respondent has not attended meeting or signed petition to protect the environment. .75

When seeking a job, a good income and safe job are more important than .74

a feeling of accomplishment and working with people you like.b

Respondent is relatively favorable to state ownership of business and industry. .74

A child needs a home with both a father and mother to grow up happily. .73

Respondent does not describe own health as very good. .73

One must always love and respect one's parents regardless of their behavior. .71

When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women. .69

Prostitution is never justifiable. .69

Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. .68

Respondent does not have much free choice or control over his/her life. .67

A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl. .67

Respondent does not favor less emphasis on money and material possessions. .66

Respondent rejects people with criminal records as neighbors. .66

Respondent rejects heavy drinkers as neighbors. .64

Hard work is one of the most important things to teach a child. .65

Imagination is not one of the most important things to teach a child. .62

Tolerance and respect for others are not the most important things to teach a child. .62

Scientific discoveries will help, rather than harm, humanity. .60

Leisure is not very important in life. .60

Friends are not very important in life. .56

Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections .58

would be a good form of government.

Respondent has not taken part and would not take part in a boycott. .56

Government ownership of business and industry should be increased. .55

Democracy is not necessarily the best form of government. .45

Respondent opposes sending economic aid to poorer countries. .42

(SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES EMPHASIZE THE OPPOSITE)

Source: Nation-level data from 65 societies surveyed in the 1990-1991 and 1995-1998 World Values Surveys.

Note: The original polarities vary; the above statements show how each item relates to the survival/self- expression dimension, as measured by the items described in Table 1.

a Outgroup index.

b Job motivation index.

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28 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

movement, and rising demands for partici- pation in decision-making in economic and political life. During the past 25 years, these values have become increasingly wide- spread in almost all advanced industrial so- cieties for which extensive time-series evi- dence is available.

Table 3 conveys the wide range of values that are linked with the survival versus self- expression dimension. Societies that empha- size survival values show relatively low lev- els of subjective well-being, report relatively poor health, are low on interpersonal trust, relatively intolerant of outgroups, are low on

support for gender equality, emphasize ma- terialist values, have relatively high levels of faith in science and technology, are relatively low on environmental activism, and rela- tively favorable to authoritarian government. Societies high on self-expression values tend to have the opposite preferences on these topics.

When survival is uncertain, cultural diver- sity seems threatening. When there isn't "enough to go around," foreigners are seen as dangerous outsiders who may take away one's sustenance. People cling to traditional gender roles and sexual norms, and empha- size absolute rules and familiar norms in an attempt to maximize predictability in an un- certain world. Conversely, when survival be- gins to be taken for granted, ethnic and cul- tural diversity become increasingly accept- able-indeed, beyond a certain point, diver- sity is not only tolerated, it may be positively valued because it is interesting and stimulat- ing. In advanced industrial societies, people seek out foreign restaurants to taste new cui- sine; they pay large sums of money and travel long distances to experience exotic cultures. Changing gender roles and sexual norms no longer seem threatening.

The past few decades have witnessed one

of the most dramatic cultural changes that has occurred since the dawn of recorded history-the emergence of new gender roles enabling women to enter the same occupa- tions as men. Polarization over new gender roles is strikingly evident in the survival/ self-expression dimension: One of its high- est-loading issues involves whether men make better political leaders than women. In the world as a whole, a majority still accepts the idea that men make better political lead-

ers than women, but this view is rejected by

growing majorities in advanced industrial

societies and is overwhelmingly rejected by the younger generation within these societ- ies. Equal rights for women, gays and lesbi-

ans, foreigners, and other outgroups tend to be rejected in societies where survival seems uncertain and increasingly accepted

in societies that emphasize self-expression

values.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Global Cultural Map, 1995-1998

Figure 1 shows the location of 65 societies on the two dimensions generated by the na- tion-level factor analysis in Table 1. The ver- tical axis on our global cultural map corre- sponds to the polarization between tradi- tional authority and secular-rational author- ity associated with the process of industrial-

ization. The horizontal axis depicts the po- larization between survival values and self- expression values related to the rise of postindustrial society.5 The boundaries around groups of countries in Figure 1 are drawn using Huntington's (1993, 1996) cul- tural zones as a guide.6

Cross-cultural variation is highly con- strained. As the traditional/secular-rational dimension's loadings indicate (Tables 1 and 2), if the people of a given society place a strong emphasis on religion, that society's relative position on many other variables can

5 This cultural map is consistent with an earlier one by Inglehart (1997:334-37) based on the 1990-1991 World Values Surveys. Although our Figure 1 is based on a factor analysis that uses less than half as many variables as Inglehart used (1997), and adds 22 societies that were not in- cluded in the earlier map, the overall pattern is

strikingly similar to the cultural maps in Inglehart (1997, chaps. 3 and 11). These similarities dem- onstrate the robustness of the two key dimensions of cross-cultural variation. The same broad cul-

tural zones appear in essentially the same loca- tions, even though some zones now contain many more societies.

6 An alternative strategy would be to use one of the many available clustering techniques to identify groups of nations and draw boundaries. We prefer to use the theoretical classifications proposed by Huntington and then test for their ex- planatory power.

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 29

1.8 -m -O 40P I ~~~~~~~~~~East

1.8 l ; / St Germany

-4 Japa Weat Sweden Germany0

1 /3 Estonia Latvia Denmark0 Norway 0 0 ~~~~~Czech0

- .8 Rusna 0 * Co? ^ Europe .? ? | * *Ukraine Blai * 1 Switzerland

Yugoslavia Tia

E Belarus Slovakia SloveniaNehrad . 3 L Armenia i f{Belgiu Nte o odoaMaedn Catholic BelIum Ieln

L Mo-dova Macedonia Europe France I .? Southomania I Olt. New Zealand

-1.2_ ItBangladeshGeoraln B Iritain Canada 2 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r_ ~~~~~~~~~~~~Australia

Azerbaijan omiica \

_01PlGNPiP RepublinEnglish- speaking

Souh N/Argentina

-2.2 I / A frica Ghile Mexico Ireland U.S.A. -2.0 -1.50-1.0 -.5 0 . 1

Sur , 110 Bangladesh Latin Ireland

Philippine Republic Pakistan *Piipn

* South OBrazil America -1.7 Africa

Colombia

Nigeria 0 0 Vnezuela P~uerto

-2.2 1 1 1 Africa Ghna 0 Ric'o -2.0 -1.5 - 1.0 -.5 0 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0

Survival/Self-Expression Dimension

Figure 1. Locations of 65 Societies on Two Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Variation: World Values Surveys, 1990-1991 and 1995-1998

Note: The scales on each axis indicate the country's factor scores on the given dimension. The positions of Colombia and Pakistan are estimated from incomplete data.

be predicted-from attitudes toward abor- tion, level of national pride (highly religious

nations rank high on national pride), the de-

sirability of more respect for authority (reli-

gious nations place much more emphasis on

respect for authority), to attitudes toward

childrearing. The survival/self-expression di- mension reflects another wide-ranging but

tightly correlated cluster of variables involv- ing materialist values (such as maintaining

order and fighting inflation) versus post- materialist values (such as freedom and self-

expression), subjective well-being, interper-

sonal trust, political activism, and tolerance of outgroups (measured by acceptance or re- jection of homosexuality, a highly sensitive indicator of tolerance toward outgroups in

general).

Economic development seems to have a

powerful impact on cultural values: The

value systems of rich countries differ sys-

tematically from those of poor countries.

Figure 1 reflects a gradient from low-income

countries in the lower left quadrant, to rich societies in the upper right quadrant. Figure

2 redraws Figure 1, showing the economic

zones into which these 65 societies fall. All 19 societies with an annual per capita gross

national product over $15,000 rank relatively high on both dimensions and fall into a zone

at the upper right-hand corner. This eco-

nomic zone cuts across the boundaries of the

Protestant, ex-Communist, Confucian,

Catholic, and English-speaking cultural zones. All societies with per capita GNPs be-

low $2,000 fall into a cluster at the lower left

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30 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

1.8

1.3-

.8 - $5,000 0 ~~~~~~~~to

$2,000 $15,000Moeta

E to NP per capita $15,000 a 3- $5,000 \ \

GNP per capita G

40 0 -.2

-2.7 - 1. 10 -5 0 . . . .

0 ~ ~ ~ ~~~Sria/efEpeso Dimension

0 ~ ~ ~ $,0

Source: GNP per capitaisbsdothWolBaksPrhsnPoePaiyetmessof19,n

1 -.7 -1.21 GPprcpt

-2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -.5 0 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0

Survival/Self-Expression Dimension

Figure 2. Economic Zones for 65 Societies Superimposed on Two Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Varia- tion

Note: All but one of the 65 societies shown in Figure 1 fit into the economic zones indicated here; only the Dominican Republic is mislocated.

Source: GNP per capita is based on the World Bank's Purchasing Power Parity estimates as of 1995, in U.S. dollars (World Bank 1997:214-15).

of Figure 2, in an economic zone that cuts across the African, South Asian, ex-Commu- nist, and Orthodox cultural zones. The re-

maining societies fall into two intermediate cultural-economic zones. Economic develop- ment seems to move societies in a common

direction, regardless of their cultural heri- tage. Nevertheless, distinctive cultural zones persist two centuries after the industrial revo- lution began.

GNP per capita is only one indicator of a

society's level of economic development. As Marx argued, the rise of the industrial work- ing class was a key event in modern history.

Furthermore, the changing nature of the la- bor force defines three distinct stages of eco- nomic development: agrarian society, indus-

trial society, and postindustrial society (Bell

1973, 1976). Thus, another set of boundaries

could be superimposed on the societies in

Figure 1: Societies with a high percentage of

the labor force in agriculture would fall near

the bottom of the map, societies with a high

percentage of industrial workers would fall near the top, and societies with a high per-

centage in the service sector would be lo-

cated near the right-hand side of the map.

The traditional/secular-rational dimension

is associated with the transition from agrar-

ian society to industrial society. Accordingly,

this dimension shows a strong positive cor- relation with the percentage in the industrial

sector (r = .65) and a negative correlation

with the percentage in the agricultural sector

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 31

(r = -.49) but it is weakly linked with the

percentage in the service sector (r = .18).

Thus, the shift from an agrarian mode of pro-

duction to industrial production seems to bring with it a shift from traditional values

toward increasing rationalization and secu- larization. Nevertheless, a society's cultural

heritage also plays a role. Thus, all four of

the Confucian-influenced societies have rela- tively secular values, regardless of the pro- portion of their labor forces in the industrial sector. The former Communist societies also rank relatively high on this secularization di- mension, despite varying degrees of indus-

trialization. Conversely, the historically Ro- man Catholic societies display relatively tra-

ditional values when compared with Confu- cian or ex-Communist societies with the same proportion of industrial workers.

The survival/self-expression dimension is

linked with the rise of a service economy: It shows a .73 correlation with the relative size of the service sector, but is unrelated to the relative size of the industrial sector (r = .03). While the traditional/secular-rational values

dimension and the survival/self-expression values dimension reflect industrialization

and the rise of postindustrial society, respec- tively, this is only part of the story. Virtually all of the historically Protestant societies rank higher on the survival/self-expression dimension than do all of the historically Ro- man Catholic societies, regardless of the ex-

tent to which their labor forces are engaged in the service sector. Conversely, virtually all of the former Communist societies rank low

on the survival/self-expression dimension. Changes in GNP and occupational structure have important influences on prevailing worldviews, but traditional cultural influ- ences persist.

Religious traditions appear to have had an

enduring impact on the contemporary value systems of 65 societies, as Weber, Hunting- ton, and others have argued. But a society's culture reflects its entire historical heritage. A central historical event of the twentieth

century was the rise and fall of a Communist empire that once ruled one-third of the world's population. Communism left a clear imprint on the value systems of those who

lived under it. East Germany remains cultur- ally close to West Germany despite four de- cades of Communist rule, but its value sys-

tem has been drawn toward the Communist

zone. And although China is a member of the

Confucian zone, it also falls within a broad

Communist-influenced zone. Similarly

Azerbaijan, though part of the Islamic clus-

ter, also falls within the Communist super-

zone that dominated it for decades. The influence of colonial ties is apparent

in the existence of a Latin American cultural

zone. Former colonial ties also help account

for the existence of an English-speaking

zone. All seven of the English-speaking so-

cieties included in this study show relatively

similar cultural characteristics. Geographi-

cally, they are halfway around the world from each other, but culturally Australia and

New Zealand are next-door neighbors of

Great Britain and Canada. The impact of colonization seems especially strong when reinforced by massive immigration from the

colonial society-thus, Spain, Italy, Uru-

guay, and Argentina are all near each other on the border between Catholic Europe and

Latin America: The populations of Uruguay

and Argentina are largely descended from immigrants from Spain and Italy. Similarly, Rice and Feldman (1997) find strong corre-

lations between the civic values of various

ethnic groups in the United States, and the values prevailing in their countries of ori-

gin-two or three generations after their

families migrated to the United States Figure 1 indicates that the United States is

not a prototype of cultural modernization for other societies to follow, as some mod- ernization writers of the postwar era naively assumed. In fact, the United States is a devi- ant case, having a much more traditional value system than any other advanced in- dustrial society. On the traditional/secular- rational dimension, the United States ranks far below other rich societies, with levels of religiosity and national pride comparable to those found in developing societies. The phenomenon of American exceptionalism has been discussed by Lipset (1990, 1996), Baker (1999), and others; our results sup- port their argument. The United States does rank among the most advanced societies along the survival/self-expression dimen- sion, but even here, it does not lead the world, as the Swedes and the Dutch seem closer to the cutting edge of cultural change than do the Americans.

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32 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

How Real Are the Cultural Zones?

While the placement of each society in Fig- ure 1 is objective, determined by a factor analysis of survey data from each country,

the boundaries drawn around these societies are subjective, using Huntington's (1993,

1996) division of the world into several cul-

tural zones. How "real" are these zones? The

boundaries could have been drawn in vari- ous ways because these societies have been influenced by a variety of factors. Thus, some of the boundaries overlap others. For example, the ex-Communist zone overlaps the Protestant, Catholic, Confucian, Ortho- dox, and Islamic cultural zones. Similarly, Britain is located at the intersection of the English-speaking zone and Protestant Eu- rope. Empirically, it is close to all five of the English-speaking societies, and we included

Britain in that zone, but with only slight modification we could have put it in Protes-

tant Europe, for it is also culturally close to those societies.

Reality is complex: Britain is both Protes-

tant and English-speaking, and its empirical position reflects both aspects of reality. Simi- larly, we have drawn a boundary around the Latin American societies that Huntington

postulated to be a distinct cultural zone. All 10 of these societies show similar values in

global perspective, but with only minor

changes we could have defined an Hispanic cultural zone that included Spain and Portu- gal, which empirically also resemble the Latin American societies. Or we could have drawn a boundary that included Latin America, Catholic Europe, the Philippines, and Ireland in a broad Roman Catholic cul- tural zone. All these zones are conceptually and empirically justifiable.

Figure 1 is based on similarity of basic val- ues-but the map also reflects the relative distances between these societies on many other dimensions, such as religion, colonial influences, the influence of Communist rule, social structure, and economic level. The in- fluence of many different historical factors can be summed up remarkably well by the two cultural dimensions on which this map is based, but because these various factors do not always coincide neatly, there are some obvious anomalies. For example, East Ger- many and Japan fall next to each other: Both

societies are highly secular, relatively wealthy and have high proportions of indus-

trial workers. But Japan was shaped by a

Confucian heritage while East Germany was

shaped by Protestantism (though interest-

ingly, when the Japanese first drew up a

Western-style constitution, they chose a Ger-

man model). Despite such anomalies, societ-

ies with a common cultural heritage gener-

ally do fall into common clusters. At the

same time, their positions also reflect their

level of economic development, occupa-

tional structure, religion, and other major

historical influences. Thus, their positions in

this two-dimensional space reflect a multidi- mensional reality-and this remarkable so-

cioeconomic-cultural coherence reflects the fact that a society's culture is shaped by its

entire economic and historical heritage. Modernization theory implies that as soci-

eties develop economically, their cultures

tend to shift in a predictable direction, and our data fit the implications of this predic- tion. Economic differences are linked with large and pervasive cultural differences (see

Figure 2). Nevertheless, we find clear evi- dence of the influence of long-established cultural zones. Using data from the latest available survey for each society, we created dummy variables to reflect whether a given society is predominantly English-speaking, ex-Communist, and so on for each of the clusters outlined in Figure 1. Empirical analysis of these variables shows that the cultural locations of given societies are far from random (see Table 4). Eight of the nine zones outlined on Figure 1 show statistically significant relationships with at least one of the two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation (the sole exception is the Catholic Europe cluster: It is fairly coherent but has a neutral position on both dimensions). For ex- ample, the dummy variable for Protestant Europe shows a .46 correlation with the tra- ditional/secular-rational dimension and a .41 correlation with the survival/self-expression dimension (both correlations are significant at the p < .001 level). Similarly, the ex-Com- munist dummy variable correlates .43 with the traditional/secular-rational dimension and -.74 with the survival/self-expression di- mension.

Do these cultural clusters simply reflect economic differences? For example, do the

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 33

Table 4. Standardized Coefficients from the Regression of Traditional/Secular-Rational Values and

Survival/Self-Expression Values on Economic Development and Cultural Heritage Zone

Independent Variable Traditional/Secular-Rational Survival/Self-Expression

Ex-Communist zone (= 1) .424** (3.10) -.393*** (-4.80)

Real GDP per capita, 1980 .496*** (3.57) .575*** (4.13)

Percentage employed in industrial sector, 1980 .216 (1.43)

Percentage employed in service sector, 1980 .098 (.67)

Adjusted R2 .50 .73

Protestant Europe zone (= 1) .370** (3.04) .232* (2.24)

Real GDP per capita, 1980 .025 (.19) .362* (2.12)

Percentage employed in industrial sector, 1980 .553 (4.83)

Percentage employed in service sector, 1980 .331* (2.06)

Adjusted R2 .50 .63

English-speaking zone (= 1) -.300"* (-2.65) .146 (1.48)

Real GDP per capita, 1980 .394** (3.02) 434** (2.56)

Percentage employed in industrial sector, 1980 .468*** (3.98)

Percentage employed in service sector, 1980 .319* (1.93)

Adjusted R2 .47 .61

Latin-American zone (= 1) -.342** (-3.29) .108 (.98)

Real GDP per capita, 1980 .195 (1.72) .602** (2.97)

Percentage employed in industrial sector, 1980 .448*** (3.94)

Percentage employed in service sector, 1980 .224 (1.13)

Adjusted R2 .51 .60

African zone (= 1) -.189 (-1.65) .021 (.22)

Real GDP per capita, 1980 .211 (1.72) .502"* (2.81)

Percentage employed in industrial sector, 1980 .468*** (3.79)

Percentage employed in service sector, 1980 .320 (1.85)

Adjusted R2 .43 .59

South Asian zone (= 1) .070 (.51) .212* (2.08)

Real GDP per capita, 1980 .258* (2.04) .469** (2.90)

Percentage employed in industrial sector, 1980 .542*** (3.87)

Percentage employed in service sector, 1980 .455** (2.63)

Adjusted R2 .40 .62

Orthodox zone (= 1) .152 (1.26) -.457*** (-6.94)

Real GDP per capita, 1980 .304* (2.31) .567*** (4.77)

Percentage employed in industrial sector, 1980 .432*" (3.13)

Percentage employed in service sector, 1980 .154 (1.28)

Adjusted R2 .42 .80

Confucian zone (= 1) .397*** (4.15) -.020 (-.21)

Real GDP per capita, 1980 .304** (2.83) .491** (2.90)

Percentage employed in industrial sector, 1980 .505** (4.76)

Percentage employed in service sector, 1980 .323* (1.95)

Adjusted R2 .56 .59

Number of countries 49 49

Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. Reduced Ns reflect missing data on one or more independent variables.

*p<.05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 (two-tailed tests)

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34 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

societies of Protestant Europe have similar values simply because they are rich? The an- swer is no. As Table 4 demonstrates, a society's Catholic or Protestant or Confucian or Communist heritage makes an independent contribution to its position on the global cul- tural map. The influence of economic devel- opment is pervasive. GDP per capita shows a significant impact in five of the eight mul- tiple regressions predicting traditional/secu- lar-rational values, and in all of the regres- sions predicting survival/self-expression val- ues. The percentage of the labor force in the industrial sector seems to influence tradi- tional/secular-rational values even more con- sistently than does GDP per capita, showing a significant impact in seven of the eight re- gressions. The percentage of the labor force in the service sector has a significant impact in six of the eight regressions predicting sur- vival/self-expression. (Note, the relationship between these values and the relative size of the service sector resembles a J-curve, with the impact of the service sector growing stronger as its value increases; consequently, we use the square of the percentage in the service sector in these regressions.)

The impact of a society's historical-cul- tural heritage persists when we control for GDP per capita and the structure of the la- bor force. Thus, the ex-Communist dummy variable shows a strong and statistically sig- nificant impact on traditional/secular-ratio- nal values, controlling for economic devel- opment. The secularizing effect of Commu- nism is even greater than that of the relative size of the industrial sector and almost as great as that for GDP per capita. The ex- Communist dummy variable also has a strong significant (p < .001) negative impact on survival/self-expression values. Simi- larly, the Protestant Europe dummy variable has strong and significant impacts on both

of the major cultural dimensions. English- speaking culture has a strong and significant impact on the traditional/secular-rational di- mension: Controlling for level of develop- ment, it is linked with a relatively tradi- tional outlook. But although the English- speaking societies are clustered near the right-hand pole of the survival/self-expres- sion dimension, this tendency disappears when we control for the fact that they are relatively wealthy and have a high percent-

age of the work force in the service sector. All but one of the dummy variables for cul- tural zones in Table 4 show a statistically significant impact on at least one of the two dimensions. The sole exception is the Afri- can group, which forms a tight cluster but contains only three cases. This generates a dummy variable for which 62 cases were coded "0" and only 3 were coded "1." With such an extreme skew, this variable is un- likely to explain much variance.

When we combine the clusters shown in Figure 1 into broader cultural zones with large sample sizes, we generate variables having even greater explanatory power. Fig- ure 3 indicates that the Catholic societies of Eastern Europe constitute a distinct sub- cluster of the Catholic world-midway be- tween the West European Catholic societies and the Orthodox societies (Figure 1 merges these Eastern and Western clusters into one

Catholic Europe zone). The Latin American cluster is adjacent to the two Catholic groups, so we can combine all three of these groups to form a broad Roman Catholic "su- per-zone." Two other historically Catholic societies, the Philippines and Ireland, are also nearby and thus can be merged into the Catholic zone. Similarly, Protestant Europe and most of the English-speaking zone can be merged into a broad historically Protes- tant zone. Each of these two new zones cov- ers a vast geographic, historical, and eco- nomic range, but each reflects the impact of a common religious-historical influence, and each is relatively coherent in global per- spective.

To illustrate the coherence of these clus- ters, we examine one of the key variables in the literature on cross-cultural differences- interpersonal trust (one component of the survival/self-expression dimension). Cole- man (1990), Almond and Verba (1963), Put- nam (1993), and Fukuyama (1995) argue that interpersonal trust is essential for build- ing the social structures on which democ- racy depends and for creating the complex social organizations on which large-scale economic enterprises are based. Figure 4 demonstrates that most historically Protes- tant societies rank higher on interpersonal trust than do most historically Catholic soci- eties. This holds true even after controlling for levels of economic development: Inter-

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 35

1.8 ~~~~~~~-to -o -m -GM- 1.8 dop- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~East -0 ricallY emn -- Histol nist Japan

mu''i Weat Sweden 1 .8 0 z . 0 5 t o r i c a; sY > Germany 0

1.3 0 Norway u. 1 .3 / Estonia Latvia Denmark, *

0 0 -

O .8 Russia Lithuania < SKoea GOo Russia 0 China' * 4% ._ | *OUkraine Bugaria Switzerland

Bulgariad 0 Yugoslavi laviwa and *

E) uBlSovaki Slovenia Benarus 3 Croatia - Netherlands

Armenia HungaryBegu .3 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~N Begu 4%

UMoldova Macedoni / Q b Iceland Romania ,. France Icln

0 Romania 4%~0 0 * 0 I 0 1 ,4~~~~~~~%9 Austria - Bosniae G , * * New Zealand

% -.Georgia Bosni Italy | Britain Canada -.2 0 Italy ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Australia

3 Azerbaijan Poland I Portugal U O _ _ Urugua Spain

o I Argentina* - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~India

-1.2 CSouth while Mexico N. Ireland U South

1.2 Asia Bangladesh ur ey o Ireland

Sominican 7 Republic

Pakistan S hilippines * Suth 0 Brazil

-1.7 Africa 0*Bru Colombia

Nigeria 0 * Venezuela Puerto A frica Ghan 0 Rc

-2.2 I / I I 1 1 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -.5 0 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0

Survival/Self-Expression Dimension

Figure 3. Historically Protestant, Historically Catholic, and Historically Communist Cultural Zones in Relation to Two Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Variation

personal trust is significantly correlated with a society's level of GDP per capita (r = .60), but even rich Catholic societies rank lower than equally prosperous historically Protestant societies. A heritage of Commu- nist rule also has an impact on interpersonal trust, with virtually all ex-Communist soci- eties ranking relatively low (in italic type in Figure 4); thus, the historically Protestant societies that had experienced Communist rule (e.g., East Germany and Latvia) show relatively low levels of interpersonal trust. Of the 19 societies in which more than 35 percent of the public believe that most people can be trusted, 14 are historically Protestant, three are Confucian-influenced, one (India) is predominantly Hindu, and only one (Ireland) is historically Catholic. Of the 10 societies ranking lowest on trust in Figure 4, 8 are historically Catholic and none is historically Protestant.

Within given societies, Catholics rank about as high on interpersonal trust as do Protestants. The shared historical experi- ence of given nations, not individual per-

sonality, is crucial. As Putnam (1993) ar-

gues, horizontal, locally controlled organi- zations are conducive to interpersonal trust, whereas rule by large, hierarchical, central- ized bureaucracies seems to corrode inter- personal trust. Historically, the Roman

Catholic Church was the prototype of a hier- archical, centrally controlled institution; Protestant churches were relatively decen- tralized and more open to local control. The contrast between local control and domina- tion by a remote hierarchy has important long-term consequences for interpersonal trust. Clearly, these cross-cultural differ- ences do not reflect the contemporary influ- ence of the respective churches. The Catho- lic church has changed a great deal in recent

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36 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

70

60~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ / itoricall 60 _ /D~~~~~~ ~~~~~enmark\

o 50Swde @ I | < NetherlandS~~~~Protestant | X _ C~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~eheraFilandsfCnd

a)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~aa Confucian reland N.

Ukraine ~ Tiwa

F \ Taiwan ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Iceland 0 West Switzerland > 40 _ IndSa BlaiGermany

Belus LaAustralia U.

a) Armeni \ usao.Rp

Moldoa Georgia * Qatinay Portugal Fac XB20ngla-~Y * hEnia * /

a) Nigeria /e Sermia AfrcaeArgentina , X 0Pakistan 0 Poland * Slovenia Historically At

l samenic Ss Venezuela Catholic 1 0 G \aColombia /

Turkey Ex-Communist PPhilippineseru Puerto societies in italics

anUruguay* Brazil Rlc o

20

0 $5,000 $9,000 $13,000 $17,000 $21,000 $25,000

GNP per Capita

Figure 4. Locations of 65 Societies on Dimensions of Interpersonal Trust and Economic Development,

by Cultural/Religious Tradition

Note: GNP per capita is measured by World Bank purchasing power parity estimates in 1995 U.S. dol- lars. Trust is correlated with GNP per capita at r = .60 (p < .001).

decades, and in many countries, especially Protestant ones, church attendance has dwindled to the point where only a small minority of the population attends church regularly. While the majority of individuals

have little or no contact with the church to-

day, the impact of living in a society that was historically shaped by once-powerful Catholic or Protestant institutions persists today, shaping everyone-Protestant, Catholic, or other-to fit into a given na- tional culture.

The individual-level data provide addi- tional insights concerning the transmission of religious traditions today. There are two main possibilities: (1) that contemporary re- ligious institutions instill distinctively Prot- estant, Catholic, or Islamic values in their re- spective followers within each society; or (2) that given religious traditions have histori-

cally shaped the national culture of given so-

cieties, but that today their impact is trans-

mitted mainly through nationwide institu-

tions, to the population of that society as a

whole-even to those who have little or no

contact with religious institutions. As Figure

5 indicates, the empirical evidence clearly

supports the latter interpretation. Although historically Catholic or Protestant or Islamic

societies show distinctive values, the differ-

ences between Catholics and Protestants or Muslims within given societies are relatively small. In Germany, for example, the basic

values of German Catholics resemble those

of German Protestants more than they re-

semble Catholics in other countries. This is true in the United States, Switzerland, The Netherlands, and other religiously mixed so- cieties: Catholics tend to be slightly more traditional than their Protestant compatriots,

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 37

1.8

Protestant 0

1.3 - West Germany * Catholic

0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Protestant o5 .8- Protestant Switzerland

E \ ieaNetherlands E Catholic Catholic

.3-

Historically -.2 - Protestant

U ~~~~~Historically _ 0 lHindu' Catholic

I -1.7 -Christian

Nigeria \t/ Muslim I

-2.2 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -.5 0 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0

Survival/Self-Expression Dimension

Figure 5. Differences between the Religious Groups within Religiously Mixed Societies on Two Di- mensions of Cross-Cultural Variation

but they do not fall into the historically Catholic cultural zone. Rather surprisingly, this also holds true of the differences be- tween Hindus and Muslims in India, and be- tween Christians and Muslims in Nigeria: The basic values of Nigerian Muslims are closer to those of their Christian compatriots than they are to those of Indian Muslims. On questions that directly evoked Islamic or Christian identity, this would probably not hold true; but on these two dimensions of basic values as measured in the World Val- ues Surveys, the cross-national differences dwarf within-nation differences.

Protestant or Catholic societies display distinctive values today mainly because of the historical impact their respective churches had on their societies, rather than through their contemporary influence. For this reason, we classify Germany, Switzer- land, and The Netherlands as historically Protestant societies-historically, Protestant-

ism shaped them, even though today (as a re- sult of immigration, relatively low Protestant birth rates, and higher Protestant rates of secularization) they may have more practic- ing Catholics than practicing Protestants.

These findings suggest that, once estab- lished, the cross-cultural differences linked with religion have become part of a national culture that is transmitted by the educational institutions and mass media of given societ- ies to the people of that nation. Despite glo- balization, the nation remains a key unit of shared experience, and its educational and cultural institutions shape the values of al- most everyone in that society.

The persistence of distinctive value sys- tems suggests that culture is path-dependent. Protestant religious institutions gave rise to the Protestant Ethic, relatively high interper- sonal trust, and a relatively high degree of social pluralism-all of which may have contributed to earlier economic development

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38 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

in Protestant countries than in the rest of the world. Subsequently, the fact that Protestant societies were (and still are) relatively pros- perous has probably shaped them in distinc- tive ways. Although they have experienced rapid social and cultural change, historically

Protestant and Catholic (and Confucian, Is- lamic, Orthodox, and other) societies remain distinct to a remarkable degree. Identifying, the specific mechanisms through which these path-dependent developments have occurred

would require detailed historical analyses that we will not attempt here, but survey evi- dence from societies around the world sup- ports this conclusion.

More detailed regression analyses that control for the structure of the work force and simultaneously test the impact of vari- ous cultural zones, provide additional sup- port for the conclusion that a society's value system is systematically influenced by eco- nomic development-but that a Protestant or Catholic or Confucian or ex-Communist heritage also exerts a persistent and perva- sive influence on contemporary values and beliefs. Tables 5a and 5b show the results of OLS regression analyses of cross-national differences in traditional/secular-rational values and survival/self-expression values as measured in 65 societies (using the latest available survey for each country: The re- duced N reflects missing data on the inde- pendent variables). For both dimensions, real GDP per capita (using data from the Penn World tables) and the structure of the work force play major roles. However, the percentage enrolled in the primary, second- ary and tertiary educational levels has sur- prisingly little impact on either dimension. Some modernization theorists emphasize the cultural impact of rising educational levels (Inkeles and Smith 1974; Lerner 1958) but our results suggest that expansion of the educational system is not the crucial factor. The percentage employed in the industrial sector has a major impact on traditional/ secular-rational values, while the percentage employed in the service sector has a major impact on survival/self-expression values.

The people of poor societies and societies with high percentages working in the agrar- ian sector tend to hold traditional values, while the people of richer societies and so- cieties with a high percentage of the labor

force in the industrial sector tend to hold secular-rational values. But a given society's historical heritage also has an im- portant influence on the contemporary val- ues and behavior of its people, even control- ling for economic level and occupational structure.7 Tables 5a and 5b indicate that various other cultural variables also show significant relationships with traditional/ secular-rational values, but they overlap with, and tend to be dominated by, the three cultural indicators included here. For centu- ries, Confucian societies have been charac- terized by a relatively secular worldview, and they remain so today. Communist re- gimes made major efforts to eradicate tradi- tional religious values, and they seem to have had some success. But historically Ro- man Catholic societies proved relatively re- sistant to secularization, even after control- ling for the effects of economic develop- ment and Communist rule.

Modernization theory holds that the pro- cess of economic development and the rise of the industrial sector are conducive to a

secular-rational worldview. As Model 6 in Table 5a demonstrates, when we control for a society's cultural heritage, the impacts of GDP per capita and industrialization are sig- nificant. Indeed, Model 6 explains most of the cross-national variation in traditional/ secular-rational values with just five vari- ables. Models 3, 4, and 5 demonstrate that each of the three cultural variables makes a substantial contribution to the percent of variance explained, with the Confucian vari- able making the largest contribution. Includ- ing all three cultural indicators in the re- gression increases the percent of variance explained from 42 percent to 70 percent: A society's heritage makes a big difference.

7 By controlling for economic development, we may be underestimating the impact of a society's historical heritage because Protestantism, Confu- cianism or Communism may have helped shape the society's contemporary level of economic de- velopment. For example, Weber ([1904] 1958) at- tributes a crucial role to Protestantism in launch- ing economic growth in Europe, and it is a his- torical fact that-in its early phase, though clearly not today-industrialization was overwhelmingly concentrated in predominantly Protestant societ- ies and among the Protestant population of mixed societies.

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 39

Table 5a.Unstandardized Coefficients from the Regression of Traditional/Secular-Rational Values on

Independent Variables Measuring Modernization and Cultural Heritage

Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Real GDP per capita, 1980 .066* .086* .131** .042 .080** .122*** (in $1,000s U.S.) (.031) (.043) (.036) (.029) (.027) (.030)

Percentage employed in industrial .052 * .051*** .023 .061*** .052*** .030* sector, 1980 (.012) (.014) (.015) (.011) (.011) (.012)

Percentage enrolled in -.01

education (.01)

Ex-Communist (= 1) 1.05** .952*** (.351) (.282)

Historically Catholic (= 1) -.767** -.409* (.216) (.188)

Historically Confucian (= 1) 1.57*** 1.39***

(.370) (.329)

Adjusted R2 .42 .37 .50 .53 .57 .70

Number of countries 49 46 49 49 49 49

Table 5b.Unstandardized Coefficients from the Regression of Survival/Self-Expression Values on In-

dependent Variables Measuring Modernization and Cultural Heritage

Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Real GDP per capita, 1980 .090* .095* .056 .120* .098*" .144*4* (in $1,000s U.S.) (.043) (.046) (.043) (.037) (.037) (.017)

(Percentage employed in service .042"8 .011o .035 .019 .018 sector, 1980)2 (.015) (.000) (.015) (.014) (.013)

Percentage employed in service -.054

sector, 1980 (.039)

Percentage enrolled in -.005 education (.012)

Ex-Communist (= 1) -.920*** -.883 ?** -.411* (.204) (.197) (.188)

Historically Protestant (= 1) .672* .509* .415**

(.279) (.237) (.175)

Historically Orthodox (= 1) -1.182*** (.240)

Adjusted R2 .63 .63 .66 .74 .76 .84

Number of countries 49 46 49 49 49 49

Source: Latest available survey from 1990-1991 or 1995-1998 World Values Surveys.

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

*p <.05 ** < .01 *** < .001 (two-tailed tests)

The economic modernization indicators

(GDP per capita and the relative size of the

service sector) in Model 1 explain 63 percent of the cross-national variation in survival/ self-expression values (Table 5b). The per- centage of the population enrolled in primary, secondary, and tertiary education and the

untransformed percentage employed in the

service sector do not have significant ex-

planatory power. Nevertheless, three cultural

variables do show significant effects: A Prot-

estant cultural heritage is associated with the

syndrome of high levels of trust, tolerance,

well-being, and postmaterialism that consti-

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40 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

_. China 90 1 .8 China90 East Germany 97

Japan 95 West Germany 97 Sweden 96

1 .3 Estonia Estonia 90 Norway 96 Bulgaria 90 96 S. Korea 96 9 90 81

JapanSwdn8 Russia 90 ~~~~~~~~81

9 Blrs9 Latvenia 90 S. Korea 81

o .8 el arus 90 *Bulg. 90 a .2? . 97 S. Korea 96 Norway 81 Switzerland 96

Lithuania F arn 81 Net ands 81 Ne lands 90 Russia 96 ChIna 95in tan81

{e 96 .Ja966 West Germany 81 DAti

EK5 -.7 Xndia 9Belarus 96 Slovenia 90 oand 96

.3 Hungary 909 u 90 Franc rn 90 Iceland 90

Polaungaryn81 Switzerland 90 Hungary ria Arge Britain 98 *Canada 90

81 ~~~~tly 90 Iceland 81 -.2 Poland AustraliaN95

Spain 81~ ~ ~~~~Bitin8 -2.0 -1 ss -1.0 -. 0 .In5 Britain2.

Survival/Seln Aimension ustralia 81

-.7 1~~~~~~~Ini 96 Aotric Argentina 95 Canada 81 o Indiao - * 81

Bai90Mxico 96 si U.S.A 81

Trkey 9 Chile 96 NIrln90 U.S.A 95

-1.2 Sot~ Turkey Ireland8 Africa 96 Ireland 90

eties~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Poland 90

- .7 Brazil 97 Initial survey

Nigeria time points in theWorld Last survey Nigeria 95

-2.2 I

-2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -.5 0 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0

Survival/Self-Expression Dimension

Figure 6. Change Over Time in Location on Two Dimensions of Cross Cultural Variation for 38 Soci- eties

Note: The 38 countries included are those for which time-series data are available from the earliest to the

latest time points in the World Values Surveys.

tutes self-expression values; an Orthodox re- ligious heritage and a Communist historical

heritage both show a negative impact on these

values, even after controlling for differences in economic level and social structure. Each

cultural factor adds to the percentage of vari- ance explained (Models 3, 4, and 5 in Table 5b), with the ex-Communist variable making the greatest contribution by itself, but with the Orthodox variable making a substantial supplementary contribution. Including all three cultural indicators in the regression equation increases the percentage of variance explained in survival/self-expression values from 63 percent to 84 percent (Model 6). Thus, a combination of economic and cultural indicators explains considerably more vari- ance than do the economic indicators alone.

CHANGES IN VALUES OVER TIME

We have shown that cross-national cultural variation is closely associated with a society's level of economic development and its cultural heritage. Are these merely cross- sectional patterns? Only time-series data can answer this question conclusively. The World Values Surveys provide time-series data cov- ering the relatively brief span from 1981 to 1998.

Figure 6 shows, for each of the 38 societ- ies for which we have data from at least two time points, how values have changed dur- ing the years covered by our surveys. For ex- ample, the arrow for West Germany, near the upper right-hand corner of Figure 6, shows the changes in values among the West Ger-

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 41

man public from 1981 to 1997. Data from

East Germany are available only from the

1990 and 1997 surveys, and a somewhat

shorter arrow shows the trajectory of change

in values for what was once East Germany and is now part of the Federal Republic of Germany. Both regions of Germany experi- enced substantial changes in values and both moved upward and to the right, toward in- creasingly secular-rational values and an in- creasing emphasis on self-expression values. Many countries in Figure 6 show similar shifts in values from 1981 to 1997.

Some societies (e.g., Russia and Belarus) show retrograde movements, moving down- ward and to the left. With the collapse of the economic, social, and political systems of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991, the peoples of all the Soviet successor states placed increas- ing emphasis on survival values, and some placed increasing emphasis on traditional values as well.

The pattern underlying these shifts was not random. Our thesis holds that economic de- velopment promotes secular and self-expres- sion values, while economic collapse will push in the opposite direction. Thus, most of the societies that show a retrograde move- ment are ex-Communist societies, reacting to the collapse of their economic, social, and political systems. During the time period for which we have data, the publics of all 20 ad- vanced industrial societies (Australia, Bel- gium, Canada, Finland, France, East Ger- many, West Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Northern Ireland, South Korea, Italy,

Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States) increas- ingly emphasized self-expression values.

Most of these societies (60 percent of them) also moved toward secular/rational values, but the pattern was mixed. Two contrasting trends are found in advanced industrial soci-

eties: Established religious institutions are losing the allegiance of their followers, but there is a growing interest in spiritual con- cerns at the individual level.

The ex-Communist societies fall into two groups: those that experienced economic and social collapse, and those that made a suc- cessful transition to market economies. All of the Soviet successor states fall into the former group. Among the societies for which we have time-series data, Russia, Belarus,

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all experi-

enced economic decline during the 1990s,

showing an average negative growth rate of 5.8 percent from 1990 to 1997. Another

group of ex-Communist countries-China,

Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia-showed

positive growth rates, averaging 4.0 percent

during this period. All five societies that ex- perienced economic collapse shifted toward an increasing emphasis on survival values,

while three of the four publics that experi-

enced economic growth shifted in the oppo-

site direction. Similarly, among the former

group, only two shifted toward increasingly

secular-rational values, while among the lat-

ter group, three out of four did so.

The trend toward modern values is not ir-

reversible. While this seems to be the pre-

vailing trend among industrialized societies,

the combination of economic, political, and

social collapse that afflicted the former So- viet Union during the 1980s and 1990s

clearly reversed this trend, bringing growing misery, distrust, rejection of outgroups, xe- nophobia, and authoritarian nationalism.8

The eight developing and low-income so- cieties for which we have time-series data show two contrasting patterns: There is little evidence of secularization-only two of the eight societies shifted toward the secular-ra- tional pole (Chile and Mexico); Argentina, Brazil, India, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tur- key do not shift. Yet most of these societies do show some movement from survival val- ues toward self-expression values-only Ni- geria and South Africa do not.

Secular-rational values became more wide- spread in most advanced industrial societies

8 The contrasting paths that different types of societies have taken in recent years indicates that these cultural changes do not result primarily from the emergence of a global communications

network. Most ex-Communist societies have been exposed to Western motion pictures, television, the Internet, and a global pop culture of jeans, Coca-Cola, and rock music. Nevertheless, their underlying basic values have been shifting in the opposite direction from other industrial societies. While the rise of a global communications net- work is important, an even more crucial influence on cultural change is whether people experience secure socioeconomic environments in their daily lives. Security has been notably absent from the former U.S.S.R. during the last decade.

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42 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

and most ex-Communist societies-except

the Soviet successor states-but in only two

of the developing and low income societies. Self-expression values became more wide-

spread in all advanced industrial societies

and in most other societies, but in none of

the Soviet successor states. These findings

suggest that rising security tends to produce

a shift toward secular values and tolerance,,

trust, subjective well-being, and a post- materialist outlook, while social and eco-

nomic collapse propel a society in the oppo-

site direction. Most societies have experi- enced economic growth during the last two centuries, but since about 1980 the Soviet

successor states have not. However, the col- lapse of Communism was a onetime histori-

cal event and in the long run these societies will probably reestablish economic growth, as several ex-Communist countries already have done. If they do, we predict that they will move toward modern and postindustrial

values in the new millennium.

VALUE DIFFERENCES ACROSS BIRTH COHORTS

The basic values of these publics showed complex but systematic shifts during the years from 1981-1982 to 1995-1998. How- ever, from the perspective of modernization, this 17-year span is all too brief. An analysis of the value differences between generations may provide insight into value changes over a much longer period.

A large body of evidence indicates that the basic values of individuals are largely fixed by the time they reach adulthood (Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt 1981; Inglehart 1977, 1997; Rokeach 1968, 1973). As Schuman and Scott (1989) argue, generations have "collective memories," imprinted in adolescence and early adulthood, that persist throughout the life cycle. Thus, we expect to find substantial differences between the val- ues of the young and the old in societies that have experienced a rising sense of security (Inglehart 1997:45-47). Theoretically, rising levels of existential security are the key fac- tor underlying intergenerational value change. During the twentieth century, the formative experiences of the younger genera- tions in industrial societies have differed from those of older ones-survival has be-

come increasingly secure and a growing seg- ment of the younger generation has come to take survival for granted. A country's GDP per capita provides a rough indicator of the degree to which survival is secure, but war, disease, crime, and other factors also are sig-

nificant. The best indicator of existential se- curity during one's formative years, is the

country's life expectancy from 1900-1910

(during the childhood of our oldest respon- dents) to the present. Although we do not have such time-series data for most of these

countries, we do know that life expectancies were relatively low at the start of this cen- tury and have risen dramatically in all soci- eties that have experienced economic growth, improved diet and improved medi- cal care, and related factors. Even in the United States (already the richest society on Earth), life expectancy in 1900 was only 48

years, and today it is 76 years. Societies with high life expectancies today tend to be soci- eties that have experienced relatively large increases in existential security since 1900.

Thus, we would expect to find strong cor- relations between a given society's life ex- pectancy and the size of the intergenerational value differences in that society, and we do. Intergenerational value differences are great- est in the societies with the highest life ex- pectancies. Across 61 societies, the correla- tion between 1995 life expectancy and the size of the intergenerational difference in tra- ditional/secular-rational values is .56, sig- nificant at the p < .001 level; and the corre- lation between life expectancy and the size

of the intergenerational difference in sur- vival/self-expression values is .41, also sig- nificant at the p < .001 level.

Figure 7 shows the level of traditional/ secular-rational values for seven birth co- horts born during the 70-year span from 1907 to 1976. A graph attempting to depict the age differences among 60-some societies would be unreadable. Thus, to convey the overall pattern in parsimonious fashion, we grouped societies into four categories based on their economic histories during the twen- tieth century: (1) The "advanced industrial democracies" have 1995 per capita GNPs over $10,000 (based on World Bank purchas- ing power parity estimates) and have experi- enced substantial economic growth during the twentieth century (which is the main rea-

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 43

.60

.40 -

0

.20

7z) NV.

5o -.60 DvlIng I 111I

-.80 .111 Low-inco me SOc e

0 -

-1.0 - l l l l 1907-1916 1917-1926 1927-1936 1937-1946 1947-1956 1957-1966 1967-1976

Birth Year

Figure 7. Traditional/Secular-Rational Values by Year of Birth for Four Types of Societies

Source: Data come from the most recent survey for each country in the World Values Surveys.

Note: High values on the traditional/secular-rational dimension indicate secularism. Data are weighted to give each society equal weight.

a Ex-Communist societies include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep.,

Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia (N = 15,804).

b Advanced industrial democracies include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, East Germany, West Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Italy, Japan, South

Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States (N = 21,947).

c Developing societies include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, South Africa, Puerto Rico, Turkey, Uru-

guay, Venezuela (N = 8,024).

dLowincome societies include Dominican Republic, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines (N = 5,280).

son why they are rich)-according to data from the Penn World tables (Heston and Summers 1991), their real mean per capita GNP in 1992 was 7.0 times higher than it

was in 1950; (2) the "ex-Communist societ- ies" experienced even faster economic growth since 1950-their mean real per capita GNP in 1992 was 13.1 times higher than in 1950, but they have experienced ma- jor economic reversals in recent years; (3) the "developing societies" include all non-

Communist countries with real per capita GNPs from $5,000 to $10,000 per year- their mean per capita GNP in 1992 was 4.7

times higher than in 1950; and (4) the "low-

income societies" include all countries with

real per capita GNP below $5,000-a group that experienced the least long-term growth,

with real per capita GNP in 1992 being only 2.0 times higher than it was in 1950.9

As Figure 7 indicates, the young are mark- edly less traditional than the old in the ad-

9 Ideally, we want to have economic data since the first decade of the twentieth century to coin- cide with the birth years of our oldest cohort. For

technical reasons, comparable data from before 1950 are not available.

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44 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

1.0

t To ~- - - 0

ar4001 L1owugnc societies -.5 __ -) .0 2 107-1916 119 11 19 11 9

C,)

X~ ~ ~~~~~

Birth Year

Figure 8. Survival/Self-Expression Values by Year of Birth for Four Types of Societies

Source: Data come from the most recent survey for each country in the World Values Surveys.

Note. High values on the survival/self-expression dimension indicate high self-expression. Data are weighted to give each society equal weight. See the note to Figure 7 for groupings of societies.

vanced industrial democracies and in the ex-

Communist societies. But this holds true only in societies that have experienced sub-

stantial economic growth since 1950. The steep slope indicates that younger groups have much more secular-rational worldviews

than do older groups in both capitalist and ex-Communist industrial societies. The slope

is less steep in developing societies, and in

low-income societies the young and the old

are about equally likely to hold traditional values.

While change in economic conditions seems to play a significant role in differences across birth cohorts, that is only part of the story. Thus, the older groups that were brought up in ex-Communist societies exhibit stronger secular-rational values than do those of comparable age in any other type of soci- ety. Their formative years were characterized by rapid economic growth during an era when Communism seemed to be surpassing capi-

talism. Moreover, they were subjected to powerful campaigns to eradicate religion and

traditional values, which probably had some impact. Accordingly, we find steep value dif-

ferences between the older and younger co- horts in ex-Communist societies. During the last two decades, however, these societies ex-

perienced economic stagnation and declining ideological fervor, and the intergenerational differences flatten out-virtually disappear- ing among the young. Conversely, the oldest cohorts in advanced industrial societies show

much more traditional values than do their peers in ex-Communist societies; but ad- vanced industrial societies show a steeper slope that continues longer, so that their youngest cohorts are even less traditional than are their peers in the ex-Communist so- cieties. The pattern in Figure 7 is consistent with the expectation of large intergener- ational value differences in societies that have experienced rising life expectancies and long-term economic growth, but not in soci- eties that are only beginning to do so.

Figure 8 shows the levels of survival/self- expression values among seven birth cohorts

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 45

in the four types of societies. Again, the

steepest intergenerational differences occur in advanced industrial societies and in ex-

Communist societies, relatively small intergenerational differences occur in devel-

oping societies, and little difference is found between the values of older and younger co- horts in the low-income societies. In contrast

with Figure 7, Figure 8 shows that ex-Com- munist societies rank much lower than other societies on the "syndrome" of trust, toler- ance, subjective well-being, political activ- ism, and self-expression that constitutes this

major dimension of cross-cultural variation.

In part, this may reflect the impact of current circumstances: During the last decade most

ex-Communist societies have been in tur- moil, with the peoples of the Soviet succes-

sor states experiencing the collapse of their economic, political, and social systems. Life has been insecure and unpredictable, and life expectancy has actually fallen. This results in a complex pattern: Although we find a

relatively steep intergenerational slope, sug- gesting a long-term trend during the last 60 years in which peoples' lives became in- creasingly secure, the immediate reality is that the peoples of the former Communist societies now emphasize survival values even more strongly than do the peoples of low-income societies. In other words, we find both cohort and period effects.

Because we have data only from the 1990 and 1995 surveys for over half of these soci- eties, we cannot perform the type of cohort analysis that might enable us to separate these long-term and short-term changes. The fact that the ex-Communist societies cur- rently rank so low suggests that economic and political collapse has had a substantial impact. Evidence from the 1981 World Val-

ues Survey (in which Hungary and Tambov oblast, a representative region of Russia, were the only Communist societies included) indicates that these societies had signifi- cantly higher levels of subjective well-being in 1981 than they do now. But even then, their levels were considerably lower than those in advanced industrial societies. Over- all levels of well-being eroded sharply with the collapse of Communist systems, most of which now show levels of subjective well- being far below those of the low-income countries. Because subjective well-being is a

core component of this values dimension, we suspect that the strong emphasis on survival

values shown by ex-Communist societies in Figure 7 is partly due to the collapse of Com-

munism in 1989-1991.

The absence of intergenerational change in low-income societies suggests a continuing

emphasis on survival values by the over- whelming majority of their people through- out the past several decades. 10 In the ex-Com- munist societies, by contrast, successive birth cohorts experienced rising levels of economic security until the collapse of Communism propelled them downward. The low levels of self-expression values found in ex-Commu- nist societies are not solely the result of cur- rent economic factors, however. Even in 1981, a decade before the collapse of the So- viet Union, these societies showed lower lev-

10 Societies with traditional values also have much higher fertility rates than those with secu- lar-rational values, which enables traditional val- ues to remain widespread despite the forces of modernization. Our traditional/secular-rational values index shows a strong negative correlation with the 1995 fertility rates of these societies (r = -.75), after controlling for economic develop- ment, education, and social structural variables. Today, most industrial societies have fertility rates below the replacement level. In Germany,

Russia, Japan, Spain, and Italy, the average woman of child-bearing age now produces from 1.2 to 1.6 children (2.1 is the replacement rate). In contrast, low-income societies continue to have much higher fertility rates (due, in part, to the high rates of reproduction encouraged by tra- ditional values). In Nigeria, for example, the av- erage woman currently produces 5.5 children, and she has them earlier in life, shortening the span between generations. The fertility differences be- tween industrial and developing societies are so large that we observe two seemingly incompat- ible trends: (1) Most societies are industrializing, and industrialization tends to bring increasingly secular worldviews; but (2) today, larger numbers of people than ever before hold traditional val- ues. In 1970, 73 percent of the world's popula- tion lived in developing countries and 27 percent lived in developed countries. By 1996, the devel- oped countries contained only 20 percent of the world's population; by 2020, they will contain an estimated 16 percent of the world's population (U.S. Census Bureau 1996). The peoples of most developed countries have shifted toward modern values, but their societies contain a diminishing share of the world's population.

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46 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

els of subjective well-being than societies

that had a fraction of their per capita GNP. As

our multiple regression analysis indicates, the low levels of self-expression values found in

ex-Communist societies persist, even after

controlling for economic variables. In part, they may reflect the consequences of living under repressive authoritarian regimes.

THE PERSISTENCE OF RELIGIOUS

AND SPIRITUAL BELIEFS

As a society shifts from an agrarian to an in-

dustrial economy and survival comes to be taken for granted, traditional religious beliefs tend to decline. Nevertheless, as the twenty- first century opens, cleavages along religious

lines remain strong. Why has religion been

so slow to disappear? There are several reasons. For example, al-

though rising existential security does seem to make religious faith less central, the con- verse is also true, and history has taken an ironic turn. Communist-style industrializa-

tion was especially favorable to seculariza- tion, but the collapse of Communism has given rise to pervasive insecurity and a re-

turn to religious beliefs. In 1990, when a tot- tering but still dominant Communist party ruled Russia, 56 percent of Russians de- scribed themselves as religious. By 1995,

when the Soviet political, economic, and so- cial systems had collapsed, 64 percent of Russians described themselves as religious-

a figure that is not only well above the previ- ous level for Russia, but above the average level for advanced industrial societies. Belarus and the three Baltic republics all have shown a similar religious revival. Sev- enty years of Communist rule did not eradi- cate religion in the U.S.S.R., and the collapse of Communism brought a resurgence of reli- gious orientations.

The data reveal two contrasting trends: the decline of attendance at religious services throughout advanced industrial society, on one hand, and on the other, the persistence of religious beliefs and the rise of spiritual- ity. Among the 20 advanced industrial soci- eties for which we have time-series data, 16 show declining rates of church attendance and only 2 show increases (Table 6). Al- though the United States has been exception- ally resistant to secularization (Hout and

Table 6. Percentage Attending Religious Ser-

vices at Least Once a Month, by Coun-

try and Year

1990- 1995- Net

Country 1981 1991 1998 Change

Advanced Industrial Democracies a

Australia 40 25 -15

Belgium 38 35 - 3

Canada 45 40 - 5

Finland 13 13 11 - 2

France 17 17 0

East Germany - 20 9 -11

West Germany 35 33 25 -10

Great Britain 23 25 + 2

Iceland 10 9 - 1

Ireland 88 88 0

Northern Ireland 67 69 + 2

South Korea 29 60 27 - 2

Italy 48 47 - 1

Japan 12 14 11 - 1

Netherlands 40 31 - 9

Norway 14 13 13 - 1

Spain 53 40 38 -15

Sweden 14 10 11 - 3

Switzerland 43 25 -18

United States 60 59 55 - 5

Ex-Communist Societies b

Belarus 6 14 + 8

Bulgaria 9 15 + 6

Hungary 16 34 +18

Latvia 9 16 + 7

Poland 85 74 - 11

Russia 6 8 + 2

Slovenia 35 33 - 2

Developing and Low-Income Societies c

Argentina 56 55 41 -15

Brazil 50 54 + 4

Chile 47 44 - 3

India 71 54 -17

Mexico 74 63 65 - 9

Nigeria 88 87 - 1

South Africa 61 70 + 9

Turkey 38 44 + 6

a Sixteen of 20 advanced industrial democracies

declined; mean change = -5.

b Of ex-Communist societies, 5 of 7 increased; mean change = + 4.

c Of developing and low-income societies, 5 of 8 declined; mean change = - 4.

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 47

Greeley 1998), our data show modestly de-

clining church attendance even in this coun-

try-a trend also found in the General Social

Surveys from 1989 to 1998 (Smith 1999).

Among the ex-Communist societies, how- ever, the pattern is quite different: Five of the seven societies for which we have time-se-

ries data show rising church attendance.

Among developing societies we find a mixed

pattern, with roughly equal numbers of coun-

tries showing rising and declining rates of

attendance. I I A decline in the prevalence of traditional

religious values characterizes industrializa-

tion, but not necessarily the postindustrial

phase. The need for security is not the only attraction of religion. People have always sought answers to such questions as: Where do we come from? Where are we going? Why are we here? The need for answers may be especially acute in the face of disaster, but it does not die out in postindustrial society. Spiritual concerns will probably always be

part of the human outlook. The established churches today may be on the wrong wave- length for most people in postindustrial soci- eties, but new theologies, such as the "theol- ogy" of environmentalism, or New Age be- liefs, are emerging to fill an expanding niche

(Baker 1999). With the rise of postindustrial

society, allegiance to the established reli- gious institutions continues to decline, but spiritual concerns do not. Wuthnow (1998) argues, for example, that the decline of orga- nized religion in America is accompanied by the rise of spiritual concerns, a shift from what he calls a "spirituality of dwelling" (emphasizing sacred places) to a "spiritual- ity of seeking" (emphasizing a personal quest for new spiritual avenues). Wuthnow's thesis seems relevant beyond the American context. Postmaterialists are less attached to

traditional forms of religion than are materi- alists, but they are more likely to spend time thinking about the meaning and purpose of life. And in the three successive waves of the World Values Surveys, concern for the mean-

'1 The illiterate (and most traditional) segment of the population in developing societies tends to be underrepresented in these surveys. Because this segment of the population is a major part of

the public in low-income societies, we suspect that these data overstate the decline of religious participation in these societies.

Table 7. Percentage Rating the "Importance of

God in Their Lives" as "10" on a 10-

Point Scale, by Country and Year

1990- 1995- Net Country 1981 1991 1998 Change

Advanced Industrial Democracies a

Australia 25 21 -4

Belgium 9 13 +4

Canada 36 28 -8

Finland 14 12 -2

France 10 10 0

East Germany - 13 6 -7

West Germany 16 14 16 0

Great Britain 20 16 -4

Iceland 22 17 -5

Ireland 29 40 - +11

Northern Ireland 38 41 +3

Italy 31 29 -2

Japan 6 6 5 -1

Netherlands 11 11 - 0

Norway 19 15 12 -7

Spain 18 18 26 +8

Sweden 9 8 8 -1

Switzerland 26 17 -9

United States 50 48 50 0

Ex-Communist Societies b

Belarus 8 20 +12

Bulgaria 7 10 +3

Hungary 21 22 - +1

Latvia 9 17 +8

Russia 10 19 +9

Slovenia 14 15 +1

Developing and Low-Income Societies c

Argentina 32 49 57 +25

Brazil 83 87 +4

Chile 61 58 -3

India 44 56 +12

Mexico 60 44 50 -10

Nigeria 87 87 0

South Africa 50 74 71 +21

Turkey 71 81 +10

a Eleven of 19 advanced industrial democracies declined; mean change = -1.

b Of ex-Communist societies, 6 of 6 increased; mean change = +6.

c Of developing and low-income societies, 5 of 8 increased; mean change = +6.

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48 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

ing and purpose of life became stronger in

most advanced industrial societies.

The subjective importance of religious be-

liefs has changed little in most advanced in-

dustrial democracies. For example, the World Values Surveys asked, "How impor- tant is God in your life?" (This variable is a particularly effective indicator of overall re-

ligiosity and was a component of the tradi- tional/secular-rational values dimension). The percentage choosing "10," the highest score on the question's 10-point scale, de- clined only slightly in advanced industrial democracies (see Table 7). Although the pub- lics in the overwhelming majority of these

societies reported lower rates of church at-

tendance, only about half of these societies show declining emphasis on the importance of God, and the mean change is a decline of only 1 percentage point. Religious feeling holds up even more strongly in the rest of the world. In all six of the ex-Communist societ- ies for which we have time-series data, the importance attached to God increased. A similar pattern held in most of the develop- ing and low-income societies: The impor-

tance of God in one's life increased in five of the eight societies, and in one of the soci- eties in which it did not increase (Nigeria), it remained at an extremely high level.

The subjective importance of God declined

slightly in advanced industrial democracies, but increased in the world as a whole. But

even in advanced industrial societies, broader spiritual concerns have become more widespread. The World Values Surveys' re- spondents were asked, "How often, if at all, do you think about the meaning and purpose of life?" Four alternatives were offered: "of-

ten," "sometimes," "rarely," and "never." The percentage saying that they "often" think about the meaning and purpose of life increased in 26 of the 37 societies for which

we have time-series data, and the increase was most pronounced in the advanced indus- trial democracies, where 16 of our 20 societ- ies show increased interest in spiritual con- cerns (Table 8). The power of the established hierarchical churches may be declining, but the rise of postindustrial society does not necessarily diminish interest in religion. In- deed, the evidence suggests that it leads to growing interest in spiritual concerns, broadly defined.

Table 8. Percentage Saying They "Often" Think

About the Meaning and Purpose of

Life, by Country and Year

1990- 1995- Net

Country 1981 1991 1998 Change

Advanced Industrial Democracies a

Australia 34 44 +10

Belgium 22 29 +7

Canada 38 43 +5

Finland 32 38 40 +8

France 36 39 +3

East Germany - 40 47 +7

West Germany 29 30 41 +12

Great Britain 34 36 +2

Iceland 39 36 -3

Ireland 25 34 +9

Northern Ireland 29 33 +4

South Korea 29 39 +10

Italy 36 48 +12

Japan 21 21 26 +5

Netherlands 21 31 +10

Norway 26 31 32 +6

Spain 24 27 24 0

Sweden 20 24 28 +8

Switzerland 44 43 -1

United States 48 48 46 -2

Ex-Communist Societies b

Belarus 35 47 +12

Bulgaria 44 33 -11

China 30 26 -4

Estonia 35 39 +4

Hungary 44 45 +1

Latvia 36 43 +7

Lithuania 41 42 +1

Russia 41 45 +4

Slovenia 37 33 -4

Developing and Low-Income Societies C

Argentina 30 57 51 +21

Brazil 44 37 -7

Chile 54 50 -4

India 28 23 -5

Mexico 32 40 39 +7

Nigeria 60 50 -10

South Africa 38 57 46 +8

Turkey 38 50 +12

a Sixteen of 20 advanced industrial democracies increased; mean change = +6.

b Of ex-Communist societies, 6 of 9 increased; mean change: +1.

c Of developing and low-income societies, 4 of 8 increased; mean change = +3.

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES 49

CONCLUSION

Evidence from the World Values Surveys

demonstrates both massive cultural change and the persistence of distinctive traditional values. Economic development is associated with pervasive, and to some extent predict- able, cultural changes. Industrialization pro- motes a shift from traditional to secular-ra-

tional values, while the rise of postindustrial society brings a shift toward more trust, tol- erance, well-being, and postmaterialist val- ues. Economic collapse tends to propel soci- eties in the opposite direction. If economic development continues, we expect a contin- ued decline of institutionalized religion. The influence of traditional value systems is un-

likely to disappear, however, as belief sys- tems exhibit remarkable durability and resil- ience. Empirical evidence from 65 societies indicates that values can and do change, but

also that they continue to reflect a society's cultural heritage.

Modernization theorists are partly right. The rise of industrial society is linked with

coherent cultural shifts away from traditional value systems, and the rise of postindustrial society is linked with a shift away from ab- solute norms and values toward a syndrome of increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, postindustrial values. But values seem to be path dependent: A history of Protestant or Orthodox or Islamic or Confucian traditions gives rise to cultural zones with distinctive value systems that persist after controlling for the effects of economic development. Economic development tends to push societ- ies in a common direction, but rather than

converging, they seem to move on parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heri- tages. We doubt that the forces of modern- ization will produce a homogenized world culture in the foreseeable future.

We propose several modifications of mod- ernization theory. First, modernization does not follow a linear path. The rise of the ser- vice sector and the transition to a knowledge society are linked with a different set of cul- tural changes from those that characterized industrialization. Moreover, protracted eco- nomic collapse can reverse the effects of modernization, resulting in a return to tradi- tional values, as seems to be happening in the former Soviet Union.

Second, the secularization thesis is over- simplified. Our evidence suggests that it ap- plies mainly to the industrialization phase-

the shift from agrarian society to industrial society that was completed some time ago in most advanced industrial societies. This shift was linked with major declines in the role of the church, which led Marx and others to as- sume that, in the long run, religious beliefs would die out. The shift from agrarian to ur- ban industrial society reduces the importance of organized religion, but this is counterbal- anced by growing concerns for the meaning and purpose of life. Religious beliefs persist, and spiritual concerns, broadly defined, are becoming more widespread in advanced in- dustrial societies.

Third, cultural change seems to be path

dependent. Economic development tends to bring pervasive cultural changes, but the fact that a society was historically shaped by Protestantism or Confucianism or Islam leaves a cultural heritage with enduring ef- fects that influence subsequent development. Even though few people attend church in Protestant Europe today, historically Protes- tant societies remain distinctive across a wide range of values and attitudes. The same is true for historically Roman Catholic soci- eties, for historically Islamic or Orthodox societies, and for historically Confucian so- cieties.

Fourth, it is misleading to view cultural change as "Americanization." Industrializing societies in general are not becoming like the United States. In fact, the United States seems to be a deviant case, as many observ- ers of American life have argued (Lipset 1990, 1996)-its people hold much more tra- ditional values and beliefs than do those in any other equally prosperous society (Baker 1999). If any societies exemplify the cutting edge of cultural change, it would be the Nor- dic countries.

Finally, modernization is probabilistic, not deterministic. Economic development tends to transform a given society in a predictable direction, but the process and path are not inevitable. Many factors are involved, so any prediction must be contingent on the histori- cal and cultural context of the society in question.

Nevertheless, the central prediction of modernization theory finds broad support:

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50 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Economic development is associated with

major changes in prevailing values and be-

liefs: The worldviews of rich societies differ

markedly from those of poor societies. This

does not necessarily imply cultural conver- gence, but it does predict the general direc-

tion of cultural change and (in so far as the process is based on intergenerational popu-

lation replacement) even gives some idea of

the rate at which such change is likely to occur.

Ronald Inglehart is Professor of Political Sci- ence and Program Director at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. He helped found the Euro-Barometer surveys and is Chair of the executive committee of the World Values Surveys. His research deals with chang- ing belief systems and their impact on social and political change. His most recent books are Mod- ernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Eco- nomic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton University Press, 1997) and Human Values and Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook (with Miguel Basanez and Alejandro Moreno, University of Michigan Press, 1998). Author of more than 125 publications, he has been a visit-

ing professor or visiting scholar in France, Ger- many, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Nigeria and has served as a consultant to the U.S. State Department and the European Union.

Wayne E. Baker is Professor of Organizational Behavior and Director of the Center for Society

and Economy at the University of Michigan Busi- ness School, and Faculty Associate at the Insti- tute for Social Research. His research interests

include economic sociology, networks, organiza- tion theory, and culture.

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