Writing Assignment: write Persuasive Message with Visual

Unit 8

Writing Persuasive Messages II: The Structure of Arguments

Objectives: Through this Unit’s discussion and readings you should be familiar with the following topics:

• What we mean by ‘rhetorical argument’ • The classical model of rhetorical argument • Problems with the classical model • The Toulmin model of rhetorical argument • The distinction between the formal validity of an argument and its persuasiveness

in a more general sense • The importance of assumptions shared by the sender and receiver of a

(persuasive) message Read: Locker/Findlay, Chapter 9 and “TeknoSport” and “Rocky Mountain Fitness” (pdfs on Lectures page); Assignment Case: “Just Clean Your Hands” in Course Book

Discussion Topic: Your aim in TeknoSport would be to construct an argument (make a case) in which you use reasons and data to support a Claim. Your Claim is that the STP should be retained, in at least more or less its present form. Your Warrant for this Claim will involve some assumptions (‘common ground’) which you need to define, and which you can reasonably expect Karvinen to share with you. What might these Warrants look like?

Overview of Unit 8 In this unit we will explore the logical core, or structure, of the arguments which lie at the centre of persuasive messages. As we noted in Unit 7, our assumption here is that all else being equal, unless you have a specific (rhetorical) purpose which requires that you give priority to persuasion by other means (appeals to emotion or credibility), your writing of persuasive messages will ordinarily be conditioned first and foremost by your need to construct a rationally persuasive case. Accordingly, we will spend some time here looking at two basic models of rhetorical argument – that is, practical argument ‘in the world’ intended to persuade others to agree with us that we ought/ought not do something. We will look first at the ‘classical’ model of rhetorical argument, derived as we’ve seen principally from Aristotle, and then explore a more recent model developed by the philosopher Stephen Toulmin – a model which he developed to more accurately reflect, in theoretical terms, what it is we actually do when we construct rhetorical arguments of various kinds on various subjects. We’ll conclude this discussion by working up an analysis of another case: ‘Rocky Mountain Fitness’. Rhetorical Argument: The Classical Model

Recall that in Units 1, 3, and 7 we glanced back at terminology and concepts derived from classical rhetoric (Aristotelian theory) in order to talk about the ways in which we go about persuading others to come round to our point of view, solution to a problem, and so on. In fact, of course, Locker/Findlay do this as well at page 195. More specifically, I’ve suggested that one very good way of checking a draft of any persuasive message is, of course, to check for coherence by attempting to reduce your entire argument to an enthymeme; that is, to see if you can reduce your argument to a single, complex sentence in the form “You should (not) believe/we should (not) do X because 1, 2, 3 etc. (reasons).”

In classical rhetoric, and contrary to our common contemporary meaning when we use the term ‘rhetorical’ or ‘mere rhetoric’ to characterize some piece of discourse (spoken or written), ‘logic’ in this general, practical sense was at the heart of the study and practice of rhetoric, and was indeed given primacy. ‘Enthymeme’ is Artistotle’s term for the rhetorical form of a syllogism – in other words, what we might call the ‘logical core’ of any practical argument. Whether or not we are successful with a persuasive argument depends on the coherence of this logical core, and as well on other factors such as our own credibility, our audience’s emotional/psychological responses, and so on. The problem of finding arguments with which to make a case was treated under the heading of invention (inventione in Latin; heurisis in Greek: the skill of discovering and then formulating arguments on any subject, opinions on the resolution of any problem, or reasons for or against any proposed course of action). Classical rhetoric approaches the problem of invention, in this sense, through the use of topoi, or topics: literally, ‘things to talk about.’ The Greek word topos means ‘place’ – it is a geographical term – and is used in this context descriptively: topics are ‘places’ in the mind where one can go to ‘find’ arguments on any subject whatsoever. Put another way, they are ‘techniques’ as it were which correspond to basic tendencies we all have to think about things in certain ways. From the topics we get such common terms, in the modern teaching of writing strategies, as definition, part and whole, compare/contrast, cause and effect, and so on. In Locker/Findlay at pages 250 – 251 you’ll find a contemporary description of several of the classical topics, adapted to our particular writing context. These kinds of topics are helpful both to thinking about (finding) arguments to create and support a thesis, and to creating patterns of organization to impose on a message.

Returning to the enthymeme, the logical core of any persuasive message, let’s

take a closer look at how this works. To reiterate, the enthymeme is a proposition in the form of a complex sentence: an assertion (a claim) in the main clause, followed by one or more reasons supporting the claim contained in one or more subordinate clauses. Let’s create an example, and look at some of the complexities. Suppose we want to make an argument in favour of a flat-rate income tax. It might look something like this:

“The current progressive-rate income tax regime should be replaced by a flat-rate

Because a flat-rate income tax regime would treat all taxpayers equally.”

As you read this over, you should begin to notice something: there seems to be a whole lot of assumptions built into this assertion! That’s true, and that’s the point! Enthymemes are persuasive, and effective, if your audience agrees, or can be persuaded to agree, with the assumptions packed into them. Consider just our simple example:

§ What does it mean to ‘treat all taxpayers equally’? To answer this question, we have in turn to consider (and argue for!) definitions of what constitutes ‘equal treatment’ in general and specifically within an income tax regime

§ Even if we can expect agreement on what ‘equal treatment’ means, is that (one might ask) the primary, or even an important, consideration (among many) in structuring an income tax regime?

§ In other words, even if we agree on definitions, is ‘equal treatment’ in this context desirable, or even possible, given other supportable objectives of income tax regimes?

§ Can, in fact, an income tax regime ever treat individual taxpayers equally? and so forth.

We can see immediately that to support such an initial claim persuasively, and it is a coherent thesis, all these kinds of assumptions (there are many more) would in turn have to be argued for within our message. Nevertheless, the enthymeme is a useful device for us as writers of persuasive messages because it does allow us to test whether or not we have a coherent (i.e. arguable) thesis at the heart of our message. Now, the enthymeme as suggested above is in fact the rhetorical equivalent of a syllogism in Aristotelian formal logic; it is a syllogism (which is a three-term argument) with either the major (first) premise or term or the minor (second) premise or term omitted. Expanding any enthymeme into its full syllogistic form does allow us to check our thesis for formal validity. We can take our example above and so expand it:

§ (If) An income tax regime should treat all taxpayers equally § (and If) Only a flat-rate income tax regime treats all taxpayers equally § (then it follows that) The current progressive-rate income tax regime

should be replaced by a flat-rate. Notice how I’ve had to state that first (major) premise or step in the argument – a step that is left unstated in my enthymematic representation of it.

What we have here is an argument (it is our argument) that is formally valid. What that means is this: if I can convince you to accept my first two statements, then you will have to agree (conclude), logically, with my third statement. Notice, though, how much argumentation (as we noticed above) I would have to make to do this; the reason of course is that all of the (many) assumptions packed into the claim/conclusion and in both

the major and minor premises, expressed in either enthymematic or (full) syllogistic form, are going to have to be supported. This brief analysis shows us a couple of things. First, as noted, checking your arguments’ formal validity and coherence in these ways is very useful. What you are doing is ensuring that from the point of view of purely deductive logic your argument is valid – that is, coherent. Second, however, it does point up the limitations of using a deductive model derived from the study of formal (i.e. mathematical) logic to understand how arguments on practical subjects actually persuade an audience. As we’ve seen, we know our argument above is valid, but if we think about it formal validity has, at the end of the day, very little to do in fact with whether or not we are going to be persuasive, even though it is a necessary condition. Persuasiveness has more to do with the quality of the arguments we use, and the evidence from fact and authoritative, credible opinion we use to support the kinds of claims made in the assumptions on which we are relying. This is the problem that modern rhetorical theory has addressed: can we come up with a theoretical model of actual, practical argument – of the ways in which we actually persuade one another on real-world problems, issues, and so forth – which is more accurate and useful? Rhetorical Argument: The Toulmin Model In the later twentieth-century several such models were developed; perhaps the most interesting and helpful is that developed by Stephen Toulmin. What Toulmin (and others) noticed was that although given certain assumptions an argument of the form we’ve been discussing can be formally valid (that is, we can supply the missing premise and create a valid syllogism), the fact is that its persuasiveness seems in fact to inhere not so much in formal, deductively logical validity as in whether, and to what extent we can gain our readers’ assent to the various assumptions which underlie the steps in such an argument. In other words, there are many ‘hidden’ assumptions or steps in the argument, each of which has to itself be further argued. Toulmin’s main point is that real-world argumentation is always a matter more of probability/the best possible result/compromise, rather than deductive logical certainty, and therefore the Aristotelian model doesn’t work very well other than as a ‘check’ on formal validity (which is, he agrees, important), because the readers’ assent (or not) to these kinds of assumptions is crucial. Toulmin’s question then was: can we come up with a ‘model’ which better reflects ‘real world’ (as opposed to ‘mathematical’) argument about real-world problems? Toulmin then developed just such a model. He first insists that unlike, say, mathematical reasoning, which is deductive, and ‘closed-system,’ rhetorical reasoning, which aims to secure an audience’s assent to solutions to problems ‘in the world,’ is ‘open-system’ (indeed his inspiration for this was legal argument), and therefore also what he calls ‘field-dependent’ – that is, the ‘rules of engagement’ depend in part on the subject-matter of the debate, the context or ‘rhetorical situation’ within which the debate is occurring, as well as on formal, logical rules. Hence, Toulmin developed a model to

reflect this process: the ways in which we usually, unlike mathematicians!, try to persuade one another. Crucially, for Toulmin (think about it!) we most of us always start with a conclusion (about something or other), and we then go about finding ways to support that conclusion so as to persuade our audience to agree with us.

So, on Toulmin’s analysis, we START with the conclusion, or main claim, in an argument. We are, all of us, always immersed in process, in the world – happenings, life- events – out of which ‘problems’ to be solved arise. Psychologically, we tend to formulate initial responses/solutions (CLAIMS) to problems first, then hope to prove them: “I just don’t like progressive-rate income tax … it’s just not fair. I think everyone should pay the same percentage rate.” Further, these kinds of responses are always conditioned by the nature of the problems, which fall into certain broadly categorizable subject areas (hence, the notion that real-world argument is ‘field-dependent).

If we switch our example over to our TeknoSport case example, now, we begin

immediately to see how this works. ‘You’ are immersed in a rhetorical context conditioned by, among many other factors, your organization, its culture, its past practices, organizational relationships, and so on. ‘You’ (i.e. representing one block of opinion) believe that eliminating the STP would be a mistake, and you are now trying to construct an argument to support that view and persuade Karvinen to adopt it (as his own!). You didn’t ‘come to that opinion’ by looking at all the evidence and logically deducing that this is the position you must hold; rather, you ‘hold’ that view based on your experience and knowledge, and now seek to turn that experience and knowledge into the basis for an argument to support that view that will lead (logically) someone who doesn’t hold your view (Karvinen) to come round to your way of thinking. For Toulmin, this is how we typically ‘reason’ in a practical sense.

So, the model looks something like this:

MAIN ARGUMENT:

Reasons/data, with evidence >>>SO/THEREFORE>>>(QUALIFIERS)>>>CLAIM from fact, opinion, authority, must/should experience perhaps possibly WARRANT(S)

Coming between the reasons/data and the ‘therefore’ step, and usually

UNSTATED, is what Toulmin calls the ‘Warrant’ for the claim: its justification, which can often be reduced to a clause beginning with ‘because ... – i.e. the ‘backing’ for the leap from reasons/data to Claim: a logical, persuasive LINK BETWEEN Claim and Reasons. Put another way, Warrants are the ‘authority to proceed’ in an argument, a ‘case’; in effect, the (often unargued) assumptions, on the readers’ assent to which we depend in order to ‘make our case’.

This notion of ‘assent’ is crucial to Toulmin’s model: if our audience accepts the

assumptions on which we are relying, then we can proceed with evidence to develop our Claim, but if warrants are disputed (our assumptions questioned), then of course those warrants themselves become ‘Claims’ which need argument before the main argument can proceed. A Warrant, then, just is a ‘general principle’ that justifies the move from Reasons/Data to Claim, and often most effectively consists of values/principles/beliefs ‘shared’ with our audience. In effect, this is what Locker/Findlay mean by ‘common ground’ and its importance.

The other key term in Toulmin’s model is ‘rebuttal’; any argument (attempt to

persuade) we make is always subject to opposition, i.e. rebuttal argument. Rebuttal is usually directed toward either our Warrants (and the backing for them) or our Reasons/Evidence in support of our claim. Our audience may attempt to demonstrate why our warrants don’t apply in a particular case, and/or may try to demonstrate that the reasons and data we’ve produced to support our claim are misrepresented, wrong, or otherwise flawed.

Let’s take a look at how all this works through a short legal example. Smith deprives another person of his/her life, and is arrested by the police. The ‘problem’ that arises is what, if anything, to do with/to Smith; and this problem, and the claims for action/solution to it are immediately ‘field-dependent’ – the problem falls within the ‘law’ in our society; we do not allow the victim’s family, e.g., to take direct vengeance on Smith.

In law, we might CLAIM (believe, feel, think) that Smith is guilty of murder.

Our REASONS/DATA for this claim will be the facts/circumstances surrounding the case that we can ‘prove’, especially e.g. the ‘facts’ that Smith did an act that caused the death of the victim, and that Smith did this act with the intention of wrongly depriving the victim of his/her life. Our WARRANT for this (legal) argument will in turn consist of the elements of the legal definition of murder; this/these are the assumptions, shared by police, prosecutor, defence lawyer, judge, and jury alike which allow the claim to be made. Schematically, the argument would look something like this:

Claim: Smith is guilty of murder. Warrant: (‘We all agree that’) Murder is the intentional taking of a human life without lawful excuse. Reasons/Data: i) the evidence shows that Smith pulled the trigger of the gun that killed Bloggs ii) Bloggs died from that gunshot iii) Smith pulled the trigger with the intention of killing Bloggs iv) Smith did not have any lawful excuse or justification for doing so

In turn, each side will attempt to argue, according to perspective, that the REASONS/DATA do or don’t fit those assumptions, and/or that the operational understanding of the assumptions themselves (the ‘law’) is wrong or right/applicable.

Finally, the Toulmin model is helpful because unlike the Aristotelian model it easily provides for ‘qualifiers’ – another feature of ‘real world’ argument. So, in our murder example, the judge/jury might end up accepting the prosecutor’s argument that “Smith is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of ‘murder’, given a) the facts/evidence and b) the Warrant (legal definition of murder). Logical certainty is NOT required, in legal or any other real-world/problem-solving argument; indeed – and crucially – it is not possible. We are looking always for the ‘best thing to do in the circumstances’, or (in our hypothetical murder case) to be satisfied that, given what has been proved, it is extremely likely that Smith did what he was accused of.

You might want to think a little more about how this model of practical

(rhetorical) argument could in fact be helpful in the writing of persuasive messages in our context. If so, here’s another sample work-up based on the “Rocky Mountain Fitness” case. “Rocky Mountain Fitness”: Analysis and Discussion

The following discussion constitutes, in effect, a short ‘workshop’ in which we’ll attempt to do a pre-drafting analysis of the ‘Rocky Mountain Fitness’ case along much the same lines as you will do in relation to the “Just Clean Your Hands” scenario (Assignment #3). We’ll take a look at the case material, and apply some of the concepts developed more fully in Units 7 and 8.

Briefly, imagine that ‘you’ are the Administrative Assistant to Joseph Mirola, who is the Claims Manager for Rocky Mountain Mutual (RMM). One of his ‘pet’ projects within the company is its ‘Fitness Centre’. Recently, however, this has come under threat, specifically from one Zachary Evans, a long-time employee of the company recently promoted to VP-Operations.

Evans takes a very different view of the Fitness Centre. Essentially, he believes it should be eliminated, primarily because he considers it (and its use) to be ‘marginal at best to making money’, which is or should be the main objective of all RMM employees. Further, he believes that the costs associated with the maintenance of the Fitness Centre (direct operating costs of approximately $100,000/year together with a capital investment of $1,000,000.00) do not contribute directly or indirectly to RMM’s profitability, and that the space devoted to its physical premises could be better utilized if given over to RMM’s IT (information technology) facilities.

If we work through the case carefully, in fact, we might come up with an understanding of Evans’ argument that looks something like this:

“The Fitness Centre should be eliminated because it does not contribute to corporate profits, directly or indirectly. Evidence:

§ The Fitness Centre was ostensibly built to attract new recruits, but § Our competitors don’t do this, and its regular users account for only 35%

of our workforce. So, § It clearly hasn’t been and isn’t a ‘recruiting’ factor § In fact, its ‘real use’ is by (and it really exists for) ‘fitness fans’ § Can’t justify the tie-up of capital space and continuing operating costs of

$100K a year for ‘those few’”

That, essentially, is Evans’ apparent position. Mirola, on the contrary, holds a very different view, for reasons given extensive coverage in the case report. Essentially, faced with Evans’ position, Mirola wants to argue the following:

“The Fitness Centre should be retained because it does contribute – both directly and indirectly – to RMM’s profitability, and potentially could do so even more if its use were effectively promoted.”

This, of course, is where ‘you’ come in! Mirola has asked you to look into all this, i.e. do some research both internal and external, and come up with an argument that will persuade Evans to change his mind. So, let’s work through this methodically, and try to come up with some of the main questions and considerations.

Your purpose for writing would be, rather obviously, to try to change Evans’ mind. We’ve already made a start (above) at understanding his position. This is crucial, for two reasons: first, it will allow us to present ourselves (i.e. Mirola) as ‘fair’ (ethos), and second, it will allow us to better understand both the strengths and weaknesses of Evans’ position and anticipate his objections to our (Mirola’s) position. Let’s take another look at our enthymematic representation of Evans’ position, with this question also in mind: can we make a distinction between Evans’ ostensible (stated) reasons and what may be one or more equally important unstated but actual reasons? Ostensibly, Evans argues as above: the FC should be eliminated because it does not contribute directly or indirectly to corporate profit. But if we look more closely at the kinds of evidence and supporting reasons Evans gives, as outlined above, we might notice something. The ‘bottom line’ rationale is certainly there, but in addition his language suggests an emotional objection: that one actual reason is that those who use the FC do so for ‘fun’, which Evans considers to be contrary not only to the profitability of RMM but also contrary to his image of what a ‘proper’ or ‘true’ business person/corporate employee should be. In other words, FC use ‘by the few’ is an indulgence, incompatible with ‘business.’ That emotional position could certainly be one of Evans’ motivations, and if so we have a problem: how to come up with an argument to retain the FC which both a) overcomes Evans’ ‘money’ objections to it and b) overcomes his psychological objections to it. Putting this another way, we would want to come up with a motivational

argument – something that will ‘move’ Evans toward accepting our position in addition to appeals to evidence/facts (logos). As we know from our text, people are usually unwilling to admit to holding ‘emotional reasons’ for a position, and (important) Mirola can’t attack those reasons anyway without opening himself up to the counter-charge that he just wants to keep the FC because he likes it! So, our challenge is this: can we come up with an argument in favour of retaining the FC that speaks to money, and frame it in such a way that Evans could ‘save face’ by adopting it as his own position because it is consistent with his image of himself as a ‘hard-nosed’, profit-driven, ‘no time for fun’ business person?

Given this problem – implicit in the rhetorical situation in which we find ourselves – what then are our possible lines of argument; how strong a case can we make? Recall our three basic ‘appeals’: to reason (logos), to (our own) credibility (ethos), and to emotion (pathos). The appeal to reason here will be central, and in fact the case report itself contains significant evidence that you could use to demonstrate that Evans’ position is not correct; that it happens that there is a correlation between FC use and ‘profit’.

More tricky is the question of Mirola’s credibility. Credibility in our context derives from two main sources: ‘expert’ status, and/or ‘organizational power’. Arguably, relative to Evans, Mirola certainly does not have organizational power. On the other hand, while he doesn’t have any technical ‘expert’ status on the subject matter (correlation between exercise/fitness and productivity/profitability), that status could be constructed for him by representing him as being:

§ Factual (don’t have him claim what he can’t demonstrate with evidence) § Specific/detailed (explaining why, exactly, will retaining the FC be good

for RMM and not just ‘fun for the few’? What are the precise, concrete benefits that will flow through to the company?)

§ Reliable

Emotional appeal is tricky in this context, as noted above. To reiterate, the question would be how to frame Mirola’s argument so as to make Evans ‘want’ to retain the FC? One way to do this is, of course, to establish a common ground. Here, there doesn’t seem much to go on, but there is a possible way in: the ‘recruiting’ issue. Recall: the original motivation behind construction of the FC was to create a recruitment/retention device. There does, however, indeed appear to be only weak evidence, if any, to support the notion that the FC has been and is an effective recruiting tool for RMM. That in turn is, of course, one of Evans’ main ostensible points. So, we might wonder: is there a way we could ‘frame’ the argument so as to get Mirola and Evans onto ‘common ground’, and as part of that use the ‘recruiting issue’ as a ‘throwaway’, i.e. as a concession to Evans, to help get him to be more receptive to our position?

A crucial point here is mentioned in the case at page 28: we are told that while

Evans can be “ … hardheaded and stubborn … he is also fair and listens carefully to others’ opinions.” Consequently, even if as we suspect he has a kind of emotive reason

for not wanting to retain the FC, it would appear that he might be open to being persuaded otherwise, provided we can construct an effective case. In turn, this strongly suggests that we use the classic ‘indirect problem-solving’ pattern: we expect resistance, certainly, but we can also expect that logic will in fact be more important than emotion in overcoming resistance, even if (we suspect) there is a strong emotive component to Evans’ position.

Putting all this together, a possible enthymematic representation of our case might

be something like this: “The FC should be retained because although it is true that there is little evidence for its effectiveness as a recruiting tool, there is convincing evidence that a) it contributes both directly and indirectly to RM’s profitability now, and b) could do so even more extensively in the future if its use were developed and promoted throughout the company.” Now let’s expand this a little, and sketch out a brief ‘Toulmin analysis’ of this

argument. It might look something like this: Claim: The FC should be retained. Data (reasons, facts, authoritative opinion supporting the Claim; there are several – I list just a couple here):

§ FC contributes directly to productivity § FC contributes directly to reduction of absenteeism (sick time)

Now, these (and all) reasons will of course need to be supported by (demonstrated by) evidence; that evidence is present in the case report. Next, we need to consider our Warrants, the logical, persuasive connections between our Data and Claim. This is where ‘common ground’ (assumptions held in common) come into play; again, below are just a couple of the several obvious main warrants: Warrants:

§ We all want to maintain and increase RMM’s profit margins § We all agree that keeping operating costs, both direct and indirect, down

helps with this aim § Those costs can, and do, include costs incurred through absenteeism

You might now begin to see how this works! Remember, ‘rebuttal’ (i.e. by Evans, here) can be directed against both Data and Warrants; your language needs to frame both carefully, but essentially you should be able to construct a ‘case’ along these lines from the evidence contained in the case report (the various figures/statistics mentioned therein).

Let’s conclude this discussion with a more specific example. There’s little doubt that we could get Evans’ agreement on, let’s say, the ‘costs’ of absenteeism. Employees who miss work through illness ‘cost’ RMM. The question is (see case, page 27), is there

a reasonable correlation between FC use and reduced absenteeism (“users missed an average of six days a year, whereas non-users missed twelve days”)? As ‘you’ and Joe note, this fact in and of itself doesn’t prove anything (in a logically necessary sense). There might be a causal relation, there might not; FC users simply might, after all, be ‘healthier’ anyway, or more driven/highly motivated, and so on. Nevertheless, the statistics do suggest a correlation, which can be further supported by the subsequent evidence drawn from Joe’s Wellness Program. In other words, on this point alone you could construct a step in your argument to Evans which presents support in the form of factual evidence, and which further boosts Mirola’s credibility by showing him to be careful, self-critical, and willing to ‘test’ his own views further.