Latin American History

'l Slr,rrrrrorr, M,rlitl.rlirrr, W. ltttt I'ttt Mrn:;, llt llttlntr llrlr rtrrrl lltr' ,'\tttr'tirrttt

()tcrtpnliorr, l9l5 19.J5. Ncw Vrrk: St. M.rrtirr's l'r't,cs, l(r(rlr Snmll Av: A Cnribbantr lourtwl uJ'Criticisrtr 13, no. 3/.t0 (.1(10()), l.'li 171i. Spt'ti,rl

forum on Aristide, focused on The Prophat sttd l)ouwr by Alr'r l)upr.ry antl Damnting the Flood by Peter Hallward [articles by L. 'Ii'ouillot. N. Nesbitt, V. Kaussen, A. Dupuy and P. Hallwardl.

Smith, Jennie Marcelle. When the Hands are Manq: Community Organization otrrl Social Change in Rural Haiti. lthaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.

Smith, Matthew f. "An Island Among Islands: Haiti's Strange Relationship witlr the Caribbean Communi\." Social and Economic Studies 54, no. 3 (2005): 776-1.95.

Smith, Matthew J. "Race, Color and the Marxist Left in Pre-Duvalier Haiti." In Extending the Diaspora: New Histories of Black People, edited by Dawne Y. Curry, Eric D. Duke, and Marshanda A. Smith, 245-269. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009a.

Smith, Matthew J. Red and Black in Haiti: Radicalism, Conflict, ancl Political Changc, 1934-1957 . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009b.

Suggs, Henry Louis. "The Response of the African American Irress to thc Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934." lournal of African-Anlerican History 87 (Wintcr 2002):70-82.

Tardieu-Dehoux, Charles. L'1ducation en Hailti de h pdriode coloniale d nos jours, 1980. Port-au-Prince: H. Deschamps, 1990.

Trouillot, Evelyne. La nrdntoire aux abois: Roman. Paris: Ho0beke, 2010. Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. Haiti, Stnte Against Nation: The Origins nnd Legacy oJ

Duallicrism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989. Turits, Richard Lee. "A World Destroyed, A Nation Imposed: The 1,937 Haitian

Massacre in the Dominican Ilepublic." Hispanic Anrcrican Historical Reoiew 82, no. 3 (2002): 589-635.

Turnier, Alain. Quand lo nation tlennnde des contptes. Port-au-Prince: Impr. Le Natal, 1989.

Verna, Chantalle. "Haiti's Second Independence and the Promise of Pan-American Cooperation, 7934-56." Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 2005.

Wilentz, Amy. The Rainy Season: Then and Nozu. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010 [reedition of The Rainy Season: Haiti since Duaalier, with post-earthquakt' prefacel.

Wtrcker, Michele. Why the Cocks Fight: Dominicans, Haitians, and the Strttggle Jitr Hispaniola. New York: Hill and \Nang,7999.

Yarrington, Landon. "From Sight to Site to Website: Travel-writing, Tourism anc.l the American Experience in Haiti, 1900-2008." M. A. thesis, College of Willianr and Mary, Anthropolog y, 2070.

Zacair,Phllippe,ed. Haiti and the HnitianDiasporain the Wider Caribbean.Gainesvilk': University Press of Florida, 2010.

Zanotti, Laura. "Cacophonies of Aid, Failed State Building and NGOs in Haiti: Setting the Stage for Disaster, Envisioning the Future." Tltird World Quarterly 31, no. 5 (2010): 755-771.

Z6phir, Flor e. T he H ai t i an Arn eri c an s. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004.

10

UNDER THE CUN

l

(Excerpt from Haiti and The United States: The Psychological Moment)

Brenda Gayle Plummer

In 1915 the United States began a military occupation of Haiti that lasted two decades. Citing widespread violence, anarchy, and imminent danger to foreigners'lives and property, the federal government ordered Marines Ianded at Port-au-Prince. The Haitian protectorate was unprecedented in its duration, the racism that characterized U.S. behavior in the black republic, and the brutality associated with pacification efforts. Political reorganization rapidly proceeded during the late summer of 1975, despite the uncertainty of President Woodrow Wilson and the State Department as to how to proceed. Many policies that lasted throughout the occupation took shape during these early months. These included the exclusion of European interference in Haitian internal affairs as well as the prohibition of any extrahemispheric exercise of naval power there.

The occupation brought to fruition a process begun years before. Long before the humiliating encounters between Marine officers and Haitian presidents, aliens dictated terms to Haitian leaders. Foreign battleships trained guns on Haitian shore installations before many Yankee veterans of the caco wars were born. The depression induced by the military regime's financial policies had its precedent in prior manipulations by expatriate financiers. Finally, the devaluation of Haitian culture by Protestant, posi- tivist, and dogmatic North Americans recalled an age of imperialism that was rapidly becoming obsolete in other parts of the world.

After peace had been restored to Port-au-Prince following Sam's assas- sination, the U.S. Navy and State Department, through their field reprc- sentative/ Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, cast about for a suitablc Haitian president to accept the terms they planned to dictate. Few volun- teers could be found. Their choice finally settled on a willing carrdidatc, Sudre Dartiguenave, president of the Haitian senate. The legislaturc clr-rly held elections, this time under the duress, as Hans Schmidt points oLrt, of the U.S. Marines rather than the caco armies of the past. DartigLrcnttvt"s election was soon followed by the promulgation of a Haitian-Anrcritarr

240 241

ltr'.tty, l).lsst'rl willrott[ (()r)rl(.nt lry llrt, t].1i, lir,rr,rlr. rn l,,l,nt,u\, l()l(), which "lcgalizctl" lhc occtrp.rti()n. lts 1'rrovision:, rrr, lrr,l,., I lrrr,rrrr i.rlovcl sight by U.S. officials, thc cstirblislrn.rcrrt ol'a rr.rlivr,torr,,l,rlrtrl,rry witlr Marine officers, federal supervisiorl of public wolks, .rrrtl tlrt' st'ttlt'rnr.rrt ol all foreign claims. Clearly the new government wotrkl boast scant lor'.rl suPport.l

Haitian nationalists greeted the occupation with revulsion. Peasilnt insurgents mobilized in 1915 to repel the invaders. They were led by a handful of militant leaders, some of them educated, like Charlemagnc P6ralte, who as commander of L6clgAne under the Sam government, hari refused to surrender control of his district to the Marines. Outgunned, however, peasant guerrillas signed an armistice in Septembcr. Havirrg ended armed resistance for the time being, occupation officials then went to work on the Haitian cor-rstitution. The traditional refusal to allow foreigrr ownership of land, embedded in the constitution of 1889, was then in effect. Foreign powers had long resented this clause, and development experts considered it a cause of the dearth of available investment capital. The Haitian legislature's refusal to approve a document drafted in the State Department in 7977 led to the twelve-year suspension of that body, effected dramatically by a U.S. Marine officer under President Dartiguenave's orders. A "popular" plebiscite in which le.ss than 5 percent of the electorate participated approved the U.S.-endorsed cor-rstitution.2

Many other U.S. policies proved unpopular, such as the revival of the coraie , forced labor, which required peasants to work on road gangs away from their homes under armed supervision with nominal pay and inad- equate food and lodging. Foreign guns also safeguarded a national bank that operated only for aliens' benefit. Handsome salaries for imported bureaucrats drained the Haitian treasury, while indigenous functionaries received less remuneration for the same work. Newly arrived U.S. personnel insisted on racial segregation and introduced it into hotels, restallrants, and clubs. Curfews, press censorship, and intensive surveil- lance made Haitian dissidence risky.3

These conditions and the failure to improve the local economy led to the resurgence of cacoism in 1979. Many of those who had deplored the guer- rillas three years previously and assisted in routing them now saw them as heroes. Independent bands attacked foreign installations in the coun- tryside, and especially targeted the properties of the Haitian-American Sugar Company and its clients. A thousand men massed in the frontier district of Hinche, under P6ralte's command, and in Lascahobas. Raids on Port-au-Prince involved assassinations of selected prominent citizens, looting, and the capture of hostages for ransom. U.S. ar-rthorities realized that collusion between the cacos and urban residents facilitated these activities.a

The occupation forces responded by launching counterinsurgency strikes. Marines razed settlements and shot those believed to be rebels and

l,,rntlils. [\4rltl,rry r'llr, r,rl,, ,r, l.rr,,rllt'rl,]r'tl llrl rlt',rllr:, ol ovr'r' llrrlt' llrrrrr s,ttttl P1'11,1 111,, lr llrr,.,r,r,rrllrr l:,. Soltlit'r's,tlso.tss,tttllt'tl ,rrrtl lt,tt',tsst'tl tulr,ttt rcsitlt'rrts. Alrrr,r. l(x)l\ ()n .r p.rrtit trlarly rat:ial t'lritractt'r. Marint's tightt'rrt'tl scctrlity irr l'or'[ ,ru l'r'irrr'e whilc irritiating a ncw rtrlal canr;'ri.rigrr.'llrc trrcrr wirr crf 7919 20 was vicior-rs and hard fouglrt. Near Croix-de-Bouquets, just rnirrutes by motor from Port-au-Prince, insurgents killed four Haitian civil cngineers, whom they considered collaborators. In the North, P6ralte's band seized a machine gun and ammunition drums from a downed U.S. recoruraissance plane and shot a crew member.s

Resistance centered in the departments of the North and the Artibonite, Lrut numerous Haitians and foreigners in other parts of the country supplied financial and moral support for the movement. [. . .] In October 7977, Charlemagne P6ralte, by now publicly associated with the spirit of revolt, led his brothers and sixty others in an attack on the U.S. commander of Hinche, his own hometown. P6ralte was sentenced to five years at hard labor after the group's eventual capture. He escaped from prison and retreated to the mountains wlrere he reunited with his comrades.n

The organization of a native constabulary to maintain a sadly lacking law and order had been one of the occupation's first projects in Haiti. The responsibility of confronting rebels would ultimately fall to the so-called Gendarmerie d'Haiti. U.S. military and civilian officials saw this unit primarily as a peacekeeping force, not an army. They recruited men who would have been cacos before 1915. The Marines planned to sell the old weapons that the guerrillas had surrendered to a stateside department store for retail as wall trophies, and they ordered new uniforms for the Gendarmerie.T

The Gendarmerie was not ready for a counterinsurgency campaign, however, and proved ineffective in the field. The U.S. military thus had to mn the program directly, which it did with ruthless success. Marine Corps General Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, a veteran of the Haiti campaign, pioneered the use of bombers and personally flew "dozens" of missions. The Marines used bush landing strips cut by prisoners of war for these early "search and destroy" missions. They could not accurately distin- guish guerrillas from noncombatant peasants, and many Haitians suffered. [. . .]

After the pacification campaign of 791.9-20, greater attention turned to "Haitianizing" the Gendarmerie and extending its powers, especially over public works, but it never overcame general opposition. It proved more successful in the intelligence realm. Until 1920 the organization relied on information from paid or intimidated informants. Thereafter, a small detective squad, consisting primarily of local leaders (chefs de qunrtier) supplied needed information. These men drew no salary but enjoyed favors. A criminal investigation and identification bureau, headecl by a French civilian, organized the chcfs'espionage activities. The regular constabulary fully incorporated the spy ring in 1927.8

242

J

243

ItlilrNl)n (;A\ l,lr l'l llMl\4lrl{

Crlr.rrpli'rirrts pcrsiStccl a['rtltrt (lclrcl,ilrtlr('rit't'otttlrtt'1, r':'1'r't i'rlly itt t'tlt''tl

areas, and the outfit's rcPrcssivc rcsPol-lscs to tlrost'wilrrt'ssirrli lr|trtalitics

or ofiering criticism of tfficers' behavior. As genclarnlcs _w('rc rccrttited

from the"same social groups as the former cacos' l)'S' Consul Damon

Woods suggested, g."& ,tta ignorance led them to expect support for breaches 5i g"oa

"conduct. Thefts from and assaults upon peasants

comprised th-e most frequent grievances' The Cendarmerie was also

accused of favoritism in iti operaiions and of using anti-Vodun campaigns to settle officers' personal grudges'e

The occupation regime"haisucceeded in creating a sin-gle military organization that conirolled the entire country and yet subordinated

itself

to"civilian control. For the moment, the Gendarmerie remained apart from

national politics, but U.S. reforms did not alter the traditionally predatory

relationsi'rip between the Haitian armed forces and the largely peasant

community. The North American presence checked large-scale abuses of

p;;". a,.rring the 1920s. In spite of the violence that punctuated this 'Jecade, U.S. officials.on."r."d themselves less with Gendarmerie abuses

in Haiti than with political fallout abroad. They wished to keep Haiti out

of the news. TheprotectoratestruckacriticalblowagainstHaitianresistancewhen

Marines finally located and killed P6ralte in october 191,9. A captain,

r"fprt"afy in Utuct face, stole into his camp and, assassinated him' P6ralte's chief lieutenant, Benoit Batraville, continued the struggle

until

1gay 1g20,when he too was slain. when cacoleaders died or surrendered,

the event was heavily publicized in an effort to discourage further revolt'

The Marines pnotogiaphed p6ralte,s body on a litter of boards as if he had

been crucified, u.,d1ne., buried him in concrete, allegedly to deter subse-

quent use of the corpse for superstitious purposes' The,famous photo-

;raPn oip6ralte o., tf* "cross" confirmed his pure martyrdom, and by the

latetwentiethcenturyHaitiansregardedthispatriotasamajorfigurein their historY.lo

Military Lxperts judged the "bandit t"pPtgt:io".'.w1k. complete by

mid_]une 192b. Rumoi about the war nia a.iftea back to the United state;, where they incited mounting criticism from Repullican

sources

anxious to discredit the Democrats and from civil rights and peace ud,o.ut",.onlyafterthemostflagrantoffenseshadoccurred,andthe presidential election of 1,920 had passed, did the U'S' Senate begin

its

investigation into the occupation. Subcommittee hearings chaired by

Repubfican Senator Medill frcCormick of Illinois also probed conditions

in the Dominican Republic, similarly occupied from 1916 to 1924.11 The

senate hearings p.orided the incentive for in improved administration of

theprotectorateandanendtotheworstabuses.Thesenatorscalledfor continuedoccupation,butwithcontrolvestedinahighcommissioner, Thisfunctionarywouldpossessdiplomaticpowers/answer'totheStatc Department, urtd ,rp".'oise an elaborate bureaucratic network'

?t llNI)lili I lllr (;lrN 'l'lrc ttrrrrrnir,r,rrln f,r,r\,('(l ll.riti as a sharlow govt't'tttrtt'ttI tlt.rt lt'lt tlrt'

clit'nt sl.alt' willr lilll(' t,xclusivc jurisdicticln. 'l'hc indiviciutrl sclcctccl as high conrnrissiont'r wns John B. Russell of Georgia, a Marine officcr and former judgc advocate of the Navy. Russell had also served as brigade commander during the early years of the occupation. Russell's appoint- ment demonstrated policymakers'belief that Haiti needed the discipline that a southem militarist could provide.

Bureaucratization was not only an end in itseli but a demonstration of the need to gain time to make permanent changes. Haiti required modern- ization if the occupation was to be justified and continuing peace ensured. Development questions could not be separated from strategic concerns. Military authorities, for example, attributed their counterinsurgency successes to the roads built under their auspices. Road-building policy clearly reflected the regime's priorities. Paved routes spanned areas without markets in a country that used animal, not motorized, transport. They gave rise to a new system of coast-bound trucking, but their continued upkeep required additional expenditure. The eventual deterio- ration of many of the roads indicated in part that Haiti could not afford them.12 Other plans included clinic construction and agricultural and medical services. In most cases, these projects were undertaken without sufficient thought as to how Haitians could sustain them after the protec- torate expired. They relied excessively on technical expertise from North Americans who gained their tropical experience in dependencies rather than sovereign states and who brought a determined moralism to their tasks. The missionary tone with which U.S. officials subsequently clothed the occupation surfaced less than a fortnight after the sailors and marines landed in 1915. William fennings Bryan had assured Solon M6nos, the Haitian minister in Washington, that Haiti had nothing to fear from U.S. intervention. On the contrary, "The intelligent Haitians should feel gratified that it was the United States rather than some other power whose motives might not be as unselfish as ours."r3

True to Bryan's words, official occupation rhetoric had a veneer of the same Progressivism that characterized domestic reform during the same era. The underlying philosophy in both instances pinpointed efficiency and competence as the elements necessary to ensure good government. During this period, many U.S. municipalities opted for city managers rather than mayors, believing that trained administrators would rise above the tawdry seductions of politics. [. . .] The realization of justice and social stability, Progressives felt, would stem from prudent management. Similar solutions to political problems, they believed, could aid foreign countries.la

t...1 This reasoning explains the technocratic character of the administration

that the United States imposed on Haiti once it solved the problem of establishing military control. The regime could coexist with racist thinking,

244 245

lililNl),\ (,r\\ tl t,l ttvt N,t lt(

.ls tllc U.S. casc hacl alreircly rlcnronstratccl.'llrc oltl t'ivilizirrg r)tission of tl-rc ninctccntl'r century, clad ir-r Progressive trappings, rcrnainccl intact. Paternalism was its most benign expression, and its most malevolent manifestation was the overt racism associated frequently with members of the military establishment.

Colonel Littleton W. T. Wallec who arrived shortly after the occupation began, exemplified thc latter tendency. Though more flamboyant than others, Waller resembled them in his assumption that he "knew the nigger and how to handle him." He believed that cultural differences among blacks made little difference and, in any case, blacks had to yield to white domination. The Haitians "are niggers in spite of the thin varnish of education and refinement," he claimed. "Down in their hearts they are just the same happy, idle, irresponsible people we know of."15

The State Department expressed a more sophisticated variant of this prejudice. Certain officials, convinced that only vocational training suited blacks, consulted Thomas Jesse Jones, a noted purveyor of that philosophy, on Haitian prospects. jones worked with the Phelps-Stokes Fund, a foun- dation that systematically undermined those independent educational institutions that refused to endorse its narrow definition of education for blacks.r6 The choice of Jones suggests that State Department officials tended to see Haiti primarily as a repository of cheap labor.

Technical advisers turned their attention to Haiti's chronic poverty, wl'rich Wilsonians believed made it vulnerable to revolution. Officials relied on the wisdom of select foreign bankers to analyze problems pecu- liar to the local economy. One of these, Domenick Scarpa, a National Bank of the Republic of Haiti (BNRH) vice-president, wrote a JuIy 7976 report on the Haitian economy. Scarpa disingenuously suggested that real reha- bilitation lay beyond the capacity of both the bank and occupation offi- cialdom. His report is significant because of its breadth, his knowledge and authority, and the influential policy recommendations he made.

Scarpa pointed to the dual currency usage in Haiti. Foreign traders and members of the bourgeoisie were paid in dollars; gourdes were reserved for financial transactions with "the home trade." Gourdes slowly moved to the countryside during the harvest and retumed to the cities during the "dead season," when peasants had no cash. This seasonal flow accounted for much of the fluctuation in the rate of exchange once the occupation regime curbed merchant-banker speculation.u Haiti's currency was a fiat money based on government decree rather than on a gold or silver standard. Exceeding the limits of its supply elasticity would prove disastrous. Haiti did not have industry or even a varied agricultural economy. Its one-crop dependency created urgent, short-term demands for cash. Interest rates could not be used to regulate the money supply because high risk-high rate conditions made lending impractical, as did the unstable rate of exchangc.rs

These conditions had long encouraged the development of speculativc enterprises, Scarpa suggested, and discouraged the growtlr of busirrt'sscs

trNlrl t( I lll, (,trN

llrat rvorrlrl r,rrlr,rrr, t'llrt'prrlrlic wcll.tre. A goltl gottt'rlt'ot'tltt'r'xt'lustvt'ttst' of U.S.(ulr'('n(ytoultl notl'rclpnrirttcrs,frlrgolclwoulclsinrprlyciriftLrack to thc rrretnlpolit.rn centers as a result of Htriti's financiarl obligatiorrs irrrd irnport dcpendcncy. Dollars would follow suit and raise the cost of real wages and production. Scarpa regarded this as an undesirable effect, for the conviction that Haiti's best hope resided in low wages had already become a truism by that time. Wages would naturally rise, according to conventional wisdom, once the Americans began to develop the country.le

The banker expressed enthusiasm about the anticipated progress. "All is still to be made in Haiti.... With cheap labor we may well hope to recollp the many, many years that have been wasted." Scarpa regarded the low standard of living and depressed income structure as Haiti's only asset in the struggle for development. "Put labor on the level of what it costs in Cuba or Porto Rico-and what will be the chances remaining for Haity [sic]?" Scarpa endorsed the maintenance of the gourde/dollar exchange rate at 5:1, a more liberal tariff convention, the abolition of export taxes, tax holidays for pioneering corporations, and port improvements.2{l His ideas helped create an enduring legacy. Fiscal austerity, permanently depressed living conditions, favored status for foreign investors, and low wages remained the cornerstones of financial policy to the present time.

On the face of it, occupation policies sought to maximize the possibility of foreign investment. In reality, a combination of opposition from U.S. critics, partiality and suspicion on the part of treaty officials, and internal resistance stymied industrial development plans. Many U.S. firms refused to invest in Haiti without strong guarantees. As a result, corporate interest in the black republic flickered. The Sinclair Oil Company could not agree with President Louis Borno on the government share of any oil it found. Borno sanctioned an exploratory concession, but Sinclair rejected his terms and left the country. The United States Geological Survey's research found Haitian mineral reserves commercially meager, and Texaco and Standard Oil of New jersey, which had "prowled around," gave "it up as abad job" by 1929.21

Rubber concerns also inspected Haiti in the 7920s. [. ..) " Liberia's success as a rubber colony and the onslaught of the Great Depression prevented the full-scale development of Haitian rubber cultivation during the epoch.

Despite these problems, U.S. officials did not lack a policy toward corporate enterprise. They simply played favorites. The activities of firms already in the field were just as questionable as new ventures that the State Department routinely rejected; the justification that the former were upheld because they predated the intervention and represented prior commitments does not explain why radical modification in their contracts could not have been made. On the contrary, the State Department backed these concessions, going so far as to block the development of other crlrporatt' irritiativcs in so doing.2l

l 246 2,17

BRENDA GAYLE PLUMMER

The record with regard to agriculture was similarly disappointing' Few

of 1n" expatriate teJh.icians*understood peasants' economic behavior,

*ni.n thly often dismissed as simply ignorant' Coffee' logwood' and sisal, all important exPorts, grew t"ti*ild--Cultivators carelessly prepared

these commodities for marlet because it did not pay them to handle them

better. Speculators stood between the producers and the buyers, taking

their percentage as well as the export tax out of the transaction' The

resulting price"did not warrant the expenditure of greater labor costs in

processing the Products'24 Few experts comprehended these economies' Most continued

to Pursue

schemes io instruci Haitians in techniques and behaviors that were not

necessarily appropriate to their circumstances' Occasionally' perceptive

scientists hoa" constructive suggestions but found their advice some- iirr.", igr',or"d. One botanist, for eiample, argued strongly for a. program

ofafforestation.Thehighcommissionerviewedhisstudyastoopessi- mistic and had it suppre"ssed. The man lost the job to a candidate

who had

more "tact."25 With a few exceptions, corporate plantations made little headway,

but

indigenous labor lost none of its appeat to, entrepreneurs elsewhere. Cheap

Haitln laborhad long attracted sugirproducers inCuba and the Dominican

Republic. Those *oi("., who wanted more than the meager wages and onl cupful of rice and bean hash per day provided by local companies

had

io "_ig.ut".

Labor joined coffee and other commodities as a significant

export"during the occupation years, and. labor management provided a

,olr." of incJme for the Haitian bourgeoisie.26 The major recruiter in Aux a;t; made enough money from what was popularly called the "slave trade,, to invest in freight facilities, ice plants, and movie theaters.

Consuls

regarded Cuba as a sin-ecure and regularly cheated the Haitian government

or-t of remittances due on each worker disembarked there. ln 1979-20, of

the $29,181 Port-au-Prince should have received, consuls sent it 91,98430.27

Both Haitian and U.s. officials expressed concern over the exodus' They

did not plan to give away what tirey considered Haiti's most valuable

asset, its cheap IJor, and iemittances were then too small to significantly affecithe

".o.o,,'y. in" nign commissioner, himself a native of the Black

Belt in the United States, aiproved of agricultural companies. He believed

that the peasants needed io b".o-" habituated to wage labor and steady work, a striking contrast to their small-plot gardening e1n1le.15e'

Russell

wantedtheUnitedFruitCompanytosetupplantationsinHaitibutcould not persuade the firm to locate tirere. United Fruit contented itself

witlr

recruiting Haitian workers for its operations elsewhere in the region.2s

In the lourse of the 1920s, venture capitalists initiated schemes to grow

cotton, pineapples, and other products' Most did not succeed' In sotrrc

instance's ,p".rlutu" companies never intcndccl to pli.rrrt. lll othcr cascs' they fell prey to poor.r,o,-rugement. Urrccrttrir.rtit's rt'l,ttt'tl to lalrtl atrcl

wa[e, ttsc^han'tp"."a conrnlcrciirl agrictrlttrn'' l' ' 'l

UNDER THE GUN

Historic legislation against alien real estate ownership had limited foreign plantation development, and peasant tenure continued to charac- terize national agriculture. [. . .]

The absence of sufficiently large individual estates further blocked the emergence of full-scale corporate agriculture on a contractual basis. [. . .] In 1928 officials launched a cadastral survey to help establish clear titles. This involved the aerial photography of land in the Artibonite and other parts of the country. They stored thenegatives in a warehouse belonging to the Public Works Administration. Considerable fear existed in Haiti that the survey would lead to widespread evictions and the conversion of the peasantry into a landless proletariat. It is also probable that title regis- tration would revive old feuds. That uneasiness temporarily abated when someone broke into the warehouse and set fire to the films.2"

After the demise of the cadastral survey, Washirrgton settled on prescrip- tive rights as the next best option. No one wanted to repeat the Dominican experience, where the expansion of sugar and lumber operations had dispossessed large numbers of rural people. Despite this apparent resolvc, several plantation companies managed to acquire state lands for leasing during the 1920s. The Haytian-American Development Corporation held fourteen thousand acres in 7929, on which it planted sisal. The Haitian Agricultural Corporation had twenty-two hundred. HASCO, in addition to six hundred and thirty acres leased from the state, owned twenty-four thousand as a pre-1915 concessionaire.30

In 1930 the National Union, a Haitian organization that concerned itself with land questions, assailed the Haytian-American Development Corporation's sisal project. It accused the company of destroying houses and food supplies in various localities where sisal competed with provision crops and livestock for acreage. Petty government officials staffed company stores that kept peasants in debt peonage. Laborers' money went abroad in payment for imported food while locally owned shops lost custom. The Haytian-American Development Corporation had diverted a stream for its exclusive use in the Fort Libert6 commune and had even taken its workers to the polls under military supervision so that each one could vote more than once for laws favorable to foreign interests.3r

I...1 The occupation also sought to stifle foreign businesses that lay outside

the U.S. orbit. Officials regarded Germany as their greatest challenger, but also acted quickly when they perceived Britain and France evincing growing independence. After World War I, for example, the British briefly attempted to regain their lost momentum in the Caribbean. The Royal Bank of Canada, headed by an energetic manager believed hostile to thc occuptrtion, was one of their agencies in Haiti.32 Sccrc-tary of Statc Cl-rarlcs Evnns lirrghcs cndorsccl ir cornpctitivc policy ainrt'r'l irt ctrrtailing tlrt' ('antrdiirrr barrl<'s,rnrhilions. lit'irrs llrat il worrltl I'rut'lt,rsr'lin'rtr'lt lrt'ltl

lllilrNl),\ (ir\\ I l' l'l l,l\l l\ll li

sharcs of thc Nationirl l3ank of thc llcpuLrlic ol-l l.rili (llNl(l l) k,tl llrt'Stal.t' Department to increasc' its vocal support of tl'rc Nation.rl ('ily ll,rrrk.'l

Washington also fended off French complaints aborrt arlritrary irncl bureaucratic mismanagement of the Haitian customs service. h-r drafts addressed to the French ambassador and German charg6 in the U.S. capital, the State Department pointedly declared that no other natior"rs would be invited to participate in reform of Haitian tariff regulations. The note for the French ambassador was not as curt as that addressed to Charg6 von Haimhauser, but the message remained unambiguous. It also made clear that tariff policy in Haiti derived from Washington, and not from the high commissioner's office.3{

Wartime restrictions on foreign businessmen mirrored the aggressive- ness with which the United States supplanted European control in the Caribbean. The Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 and the Edge Act of 1919 allowed corporations to form overseas trusts and cartcls to facilitate trade.35 Expatriates who endorsed the occupation usually prospered, for vocal support of the United States helped their businesses. The protec- torate gradually loosened the foreign community's steadfast identification with European metropoles by using the carrot-and-stick method. The carrot represented law and order and the stable, if chronically depressed, economy that firm control ensured; the stick symbolized the threat of financial ruin and political reprisal against those who criticized or charted an independent course. If aliens accepted the discipline imposed on them, that is, the current reality of life in Haiti, they need not suffer unduly.3'; The new order transcended the old struggle between Haitians and foreigners for control of tl-re export-import sector. The North American presence meant that both Haitiins andforeigners had to accommodate themselves to the designs of new masters.

t...1 Enropeans in Haiti formed part of Wilson's cotnprador class. Some,

without strong allegiances to a fatherland, could be incorporated into New York or Chicago-centered business communities. Syrio-Lebanese already oriented themselves toward the United States. The task was now to assimilate the Europeans, many of whom would lose nothing in the process. The only losers (aside from Haitians) would be the continental metropoles.

The use of the European commercial community as manufacturers' representatives substantially assisted the growth of U.S. influence and the increased consumption of North American commodities. [. . .l Brand names became important. Haitians, British subjects, Syrians, and Danes sold Studebakers, Scott Tissuc, and Gold Medal Flour. [. . .]

Plans to remake the black republic came undone on the reefs of the Great Depression. By the late 1920s most statesmen recognized that thc Western Hemisphere's economic problems were structural. As a raw materials exporting region affected by the global sltrrrrl'r irr t'orlrrodity

llNl)l,li I ilt. (,t,N

1-rt'ir't's.tntl lirrrrr;,1',111 lirrirrrci:rl failurr', l,atirr Arrrr,rit'.r t.orrltl nol lrt,.rllcn,tl tl'rrotrgh rrtilit.rly intcrvct.ttior-r ancl tl.rc app'rointrtrcnt ol. Nrlrth Arrrt.r.it.,rrr proxy ofl'ici.rls. Neither could those expedierrts prcvcrrt tlrt' witlt,sPn,.rtl defaults on government loans characteristic of thc periocl. As llobt,rt N. seidel put it, "The depression proved to internationilirt Ir.ngr"ssivcs th.rl their schemes for progress and development stood ancl fe.li, trltinral.cly, according to the actions of economic laws which, unlike civil or corp()r.at(. law, could not be easily amended."37 Reformers could not fit Haitians into a framework made in the united states and wasted phenomenal surrrs ol' money in their attempts to do so. By the end of the decade, policyrnake rs were uncertain that developing countries could absorb any ,,intelligcnt guidance," and washington knew it lacked the capability to endow its lcss fortunate neighbors.3s

The drive to normalize Haitian-American relations during the Hoovcr administration represented a repudiation of fifteen years of

-military rule.

In 1930 the State Department raised the rank of its chief officer in Fiaiti to ambassador and sent the Latin Americanist scholar Dana G. Munro to fill that post. Munro did not blatantly exercise the dictatorial authority char- acteristic of General John Russell's High Commission, but his powers exceeded those of an ambassador. Late in 1937, for example, he ordered a moratorium on the payment of Haitian official salaries, including that of President st6nio Vincent, because he disapproved of certain appointments Vincent had made.3"

An incident in 1929 at the agricultural training college at Damien precipitated an essential change in the direction and operation of the protectorate. Until 7929 the Haitian government had supplied scholar- ships totaling $10,000 to Damien students. Many recipienii, members of the bourgeoisie, would not perform actual farm tasks, such as feeding Iivestock. These young men instead subcontracted such jobs to rurtri youths while they confined themselves to academic studies. in an attempt to halt this practice, the government began withholding 20 percent of tlitr bursaries in order to support poorer studer-rts who had no qualms alrottl dirtying their hands. The elite students objected strenuously and wcnt otl strike. They won the cooperation of law and medical students, who stntck in sympathy with them and organized student demonstrations all ovtrl, the country.4o

Attempts to further enlarge the strike failed until4 December, whcrt lh$ firing of an employee precipitated a walkout in the port-au-prince cuNlonlr house. other persons left their places of work and crowds gatherctl lrt llu city. After a declaration of martial law the Cendarmerie restorecl orrlt,t', ( I I 6 December, however, peasant sugar producers in the Aux Cayr,r nnri, already aggrieved by taxes, protested the con'rpe.tition lcvieti rrl{,tll[l them by HASCo's nine-thousand-gallon-per-diem-ctrpacity stiil. t tn$( t t produced 40 percent of all the alcohol consumecl irr FIaiti. Snrall tllrlllhp, unatrlt' to rltrl'rlicatc thc corporation's econornics, lowcrt'tl tlrt, Pr,ir,r,n llfly

250 25t

lllil Nl)r\ (,i\\ I l' I'l lll\ll\ll l(

p.lir{ t() gr()wcrs. I'oor ccl[lcc l]l'iccs irls() c()ntri[)ut('(l lo tttt,tl tliss.rtisl.tt- tion. Coffee would become even more expcr-lsivc to ;-rttrrl tttt' il'occt"t1-ratiot.t officials enforced the new standardization proposals cttrrcutly Lrndet' consideration.4l

Fifteen hundred peasants went to Aux Cayes on 6 December to present their complaints to the authorities. They encountered a small detachment of twenty U.S. Marines who, unnerved by the size of the crowd confronting them, opened fire. They killed twenty-five persons and wounded seventy- five others. Despite the obvious economic root of popular discontent, U.S. officials persisted in attributing the agitation to the subversive activities of nationalists.a2

Officials tried to suppress details of the Aux Cayes incident, but news reached the United States and banner headlines appeared. Opinion had changed dramatically since the caco war in1979. The public had tired of U.S. policy in Haiti, and many now conceded that fifteen years of control had yielded too little significant change to warrant extension. Aux Cayes prompted President Hoover to appoint a commission of inquiry and a second commission assigned to review Haitian education. Black American educators, led by Robert R. Moton, president of Tuskegee Institute, staffed the education commission. They were expected to approve the system of "industrial education" in the Booker T. Washington mode that had led to the Damien conflict. They did not. During the 1920s, serious rebellions erupted on black American college campuses as students and faculty alike challenged the utilitarian Tuskegee philosophy and its concomitant focus on political acquiescence and abstention from protest. Washington's death in 1915 began a process that conservatives could not control. By 1979 Tuskegee Institute itself offered an education far more liberal than any had dreamed of earlier in the century. The Moton rePort on Haitian education contested the separation of agricultural and industrial training from the remaining curriculum and censured the Haitian government for failing to provide general public education. lts findings may also have been influ- enced by the racial discrimination that the group suffered at the hands of the U.S. Navy, which, intent on enforcing Jim Crow regulations, left it temporarily stranded.a3

The commission of inquiry was a five-member, all-white grouP headed by former New Jersey Governor Cameron Forbes.aa It did not call for the withdrawal of the Marines and showed little enthusiasm for the nation- alist movement, whose ubiquitous, planned demonstrations, Forbes believed, lacked spontaneity, sincerity, and mass support. Most thoughtful Haitians wanted the United States to stay because they had no confidence in their own ability to govern. Forbes advocated a continued, if less visible, Marine presence.ns

The commission of inquiry criticized Woodrow Wilson's original staffing of the treaty regime and noted its shortage of experienced coloni- alists. Forbes disliked the antidemocratic manner irr wl-rich clicnt

t|Nl)l li lilt (,lrN

['rt't'sirlr'ttl:, lr,r,l l,t't'rt itttpost'cl on tlrc'cottntry anrl "kt'pt irr by tlrt.bayont'ts tlt ott t' ow n lnrops. " I lc rrovertheless syrnpathizccl with tlrc crr rrort l ltt itian presiclcnt, l,ouis Borno, and felt that he had a "right to feel sore" at the High Commission's undermining of his position. The Forbes Commission endorsed some important changes in the regime's structure. It called for the abolition of the High Commission, the resumption of presidential and legislative elections, and the restoration of normal diplomatic relations.a6

The Hoover administration accepted these recommendations and began a phased disengagement and normalization. Hoover and Stimson planned a general revision of U.S. policy toward Latin America to end the expen- sive interventions thought particularly burdensome in a time of economic depression. The new approach substituted indigenous armed forces for U.S. troops. North American officers trained these national guards, perceived as police rather than an army, just as they did in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua.aT The Good Neighbor policy stressed coopera- tion rather than coercion, and in Haiti, it cleared St6nio Vincent's path to the presidency in 1930. Vincent had a reputation as a militant and outspoken critic of the treaty regime. Reinstatement of representative government resulted in the selection of a legislature some Americans considered radical and nationalist.

The Hoover administration reached an agreement to gradually termi- nate the occupation before Franklin D. Roosevelt became president of the United States in 1933. A new treaty abrogated all functions of the protec- torate except those relating to financial administration, alienation of land, the avoidance of entangling alliances, and law and order. These excep- tions were, of course, among the most essential aspects of government. By 31 December 1934, the constabulary, renamed in 1928 the Garde d'Haiti, would be completely Haitianized ancl the Marines withdrawn. Provisions were made for continuing fiscal oversight by Americans.as The United States had neither changed nor reformed Haitian politics but inadvert- ently strengthened and assured the survival of many of its worst features.

NOTES

1 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti,1915-1934 (New Brunswick, N.J.,1977),72-7s.

2 rbid.,97. 3 Admiral H. S. Knapp to the Secretary of the Navy, 2 Oct. 1920, State Department

Decimal File (DF), 838.00/1704; Schmidt, United States Occuytation,101-7; Burke E.Davis, Marine! The Life of Lt. Gen. Lewis B. (Clrcsty) Puller, USMC (Rei.) (Boston, 1962),41,45; Ceorges Sylvain to James Weldon Johnson,26 Nov. 1920, James Weldon Johnson Papers, Sterling Library, Yale University; J. Price-Mars to Walter White,28 Mar. 1934, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress.

4 Gen. Catlin to the Maj. Gen. Commandant, 16 Mar. 1919, DF, 838.00/1572; Charles Moravia to the Secretary of State, 5 Apr. 1919, DF, 838.00/1578; C. Ben<rit to thc lJaitian Foreign Office, 9 Oct. 1919, in Russell to the American Ministt'r',20 ()t'1. l()lc), DF,838.00/1611; Russcll to the Secretary of the Navy,

252 253

Itrf,rn. l()ll0,l)lrlill.t00/lrrll;litrsst,llloAtlrrr, I l,rrorvrlr.rr, lt)N,l,rr, l(,:)0,1)1, ti:]tt.00/ I(,2(,.

5l;rcclcrickM.Wise ar-rtlMcigsO. lrrost,,4 Mtr.t.ittr'li,ll:;ll ltt )rrrr(Nt,rr,\,pr.l<, l9lt)), 314,375; Yvan M. D6sinor, fragitrit:s ttnftricnincs (r,or-t-atr-r;r.irr,,,,'r,iuzt, I32 -33.6 s!?y Castor, La ocupaci6n nortiamericorta cre Httiti y sur ri,,rrrl,,r),,rins ( t9.t 5-rg34)(Mexico City, 797 t)1, 720-23.

7 Davis, Marine!,27;,\lex S. Williams to y3j.' Butler, 14 /une 1916, Smedley ^

p3rlilglon Butler papers, USMC Historical Mrr"rrr-,, Wurii"gt"", n.C.8 Alex S. williams to Mgj Butrer, 14 l,ne 1916; Butrer ro c";.'i;j;;.,",23 Junc I2!7.,Py!,."r^Plpers; His_to_ry of the Folice Department_of port-au-iiince. 15 May7934,Haiti Collection, USMC Historical Museum, Washington, D.-.9 Constantin vieux ro Littleton w. T. waller, i 0 June 1916, K;;F;he, colle.tio.,, .S.:hg.-by.q Research Cenrer, New yoik public I_ibrary; i;;;." Woods,"Political Report tol.f{l anlf Aug. 192s,,, 1 Sept. r92ii,'oi,.-ssa.oot9eS;

-^ fvinth-1ogR. Scott to the State Deparlment, 4Dec.tbZq,ii,'Aii.OO"iZOOO.10 Rrssetl, Daily DiaryReport, 1 Apr. 7g2o,bF szs.oo/tli[.'se"tiJger cailard, Hinche Mise en Croix (porrau_priirce, n.d.).

11 Schmidt, Llnited States Occupation, 121_n:. 12 R^u-ssell,Daily Diary-Report,20]une rgz,,DF,83g.00/1647;Russe, to snowden,10Mar'1920,DF,838.00/1o6;tbstimonyofRicharde.pori"rtini"r"t",

rnquiry.13 Bryan to Wilson, 7 Aug.1975, Lansiny iooerr. 14 Robert Neal seidel, "p"rogressive pai Americanism: Deveropment and unitedStates Policy_J.yrl{ South America, j.906_1931" eh5.'-airr., Corn"ttUniversity, 7979), 11-79. 15 Waller to Lejeune, 11 |une 1916;13 Oct. 1915, John A. Lejeune papers, Library

of Congress. 76 Boaz Long srnemor3n11um,23 Nov. 1915, DF,g3g.42/ 4;Jordan Stabler,s memo_randum, 11 oct. 1918; Carter G. Wooctson, rhi Negro iln (it;; i;i;;(w^shington,

D.C.,1e22). 17 Domenick Scarpa,s report to J. Butler Wright, July 1916,24,DF, g3g.00 / 1404.18 Ibid.,4_5,6. 19 rbid.,7;LosisGation, Aspects de l'iconontie et desfinances d,Haiti(port-au-Irrince,

7944),7L. 20 Scarpa report,7,8. 21 Dunn to the secretary of-state, 1 sept. 1923, DE g3g.00/19 64;w.w.Cumberlandin the Herald Tribune, 22 Dec. tozo; vtittspaugh, r.++;,rnaut"a Jrpping in ^^

NAACP Papers, Library of Congress. 22 Russell to the Secretarf of State)1 Jan. 1929,DF, ggg.S2/Germans/2. 23 Blanchard to the secietary of state, 15 Mar 7g2r, DF, g3l.s76/r66; Russell,Daily Diary Report, 2!-I an. 7s21, DF, 838.00 / 17 48; HGh"r; iil'dec.etr.y of

,^h" T.g1:yy.t_t May 7921, DF, s3B.Si.6 / t67. Mayer to tii" S"ci"liry or Stut", UAug. 19t7, DF, 838.00/1476; Scott to Munro, '12 luty lSig, DF,, igt.Z7 /374;Grummon to the secretary of State, 9 oct.1929,witn"r-,'.tor*". M;y;;,, memo-randum, 28 oct. 1918, DF, g3g-61339/2. Dunn to the secretary of dtate, 1 sept. 7923, DF,838.00/1964; Herald Tribune ,22Dec.1929, ;;;;J irppi"g, NAACP Papers, Millspaugh, 144.

,n 5:,1":.^?:,91e1

Lon"gpreal ,,Haitian Coffee: Its Cuttivation and preparation for -- )nrpment," 9 Sepr. 1922,DF,839.61333/40.25 Munro to White, 9 Apr. 1.923,DF, g3g.67/26.: author,s interview with Dana G.Munro,27 Apr. 1979. 26 Ferdinand Maver, "United west rndies Company's prans Regard ing,Haiti,,, 12

July 1918, DF,838.52/12; Harry A. F;";.[, R;rnming throrrgh thcWcstlrdrcs (Ncw York, 1920), 153.

.t'/ lllttr' l11xl, lrl I lrttltil t,'tr'ltltrr rl'l /rrrlr (Nt'lv Yoll., l(l.l(l),.1()1r; St'rr,rtt', I ltrtt itt,'i,, lu'lrtt,' rt !.r'lr'r I t t,ntttullt't'rttr llrriti rtrttl *rtrlo l)ottritriqo (Waslrirtgtorr, 1922), l:11;1 l:17:i.

2fi lirrsst,ll lo llrt,st'ut'tary ol'Statc,2l Jan. 1929, DI, ti3u.52/Clclrllilrrs; iclenr ttr iclcrrr,')ll ( tct. l()27, DF, 838.504/5.

2c) Nca; Ytrk'l'itttt's,8Apr 1929,3:1,7;RusselltotheSecretaryof State, 18lan. 1928, DF,838.00/2437.

30 Munro to the Solicitor,3 June 7929,DF,838.52/91; Arthur F. Millspaugh, Halfl lJnder American Control (Boston, 1931), 152, 153; Munro interview; Perceval Thoby, D tp o ss e s si on s (Port-au-Prin ce, 7930), 11, 1 B, 1.9.

31 Thoby, D(possessions, 2l-23. 32 Charles Evans Hughes to the Secretary of the Tieasury, 11 May 1921,

838.5L6/1.67; Shepherd to Simon, 2 Feb. 1933 and enclosure, Great Britain Foreign Office (FO) 371/16579.

33 Hughes to the Secretary of the Tieasury, 11 May 1.921; Dana G. Munro, lnteraention and Dollar Diplomacy in tlrc Caribbea;rr (Princeton, 1964), 382. Special Report (NAACP) Notes, Haiti, Johnson Papers.

34 State Department to Haimhauser,2lluly 7924;State Department to the French Ambassador, DF, 838.51. French Legation file, Gendarmerie d'Haiti, United States Marine Corps Records, Record Group (RG), 727, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

35 Seidel, "Progressive Pan Americanisrn," 4748. 36 Included in the extensive files of the Gendarmerie is a dossier on aliens thought

especially dangerous. Gendarmerie Records, RG 127, National Archives. 37 Seidel, "Progressive Pan Americanism," 515. 38 Bryce Wood, The Making of the Cood Neighbor Pollcy (New York, 1961),123-35;

Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United Sfafes (New York, 197\),221.-23.

39 Bellegarde to Walter White, 28 June 1931; White to Ernest Gruening, 28 Oct. 1931, NAACP Papers.

40 Dana Munro, "liecent Events in Haiti," in Munro to Sen. Tasker Oddie, 9 Dec. 7929, DF, 9838.00 / 2639 A.

41 Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti and the United States, 1714-1938 (Durham, N.C., '1940),269,269 n.20.

42 Dana Munro, "Recent Events in Haiti"; Russell to the Secretary of State, 12 Dec. 7929, DF,838.971/ 10.

43 Raymond Wolters, The New Negro on Campus: Black College Rebellions of the 1920s (Princeton, 1975); Kenneth James King, Pan-Africanism and EdtLcation (Oxford, 1971); Brenda Gayle Plummer, "TheAfro-American Response to the Occupation of Haiti, 7975-1.934," Phylon 43 (fune 1982):12543.

44 AtnsterdantNews,ll Dcc. 7929,20;The Crisis 37 (August 1930):275; (April 1930): 127; Schmidt, Llnited States Occupation, 785; Plummer, "Afro-American Response," 141.

45 The Journal of Cameron Forbes, Llbrary of Congress. 46 fbid.; Forbes to William Allen White,4 June 1930; Forbes to Elie Vezina, 19 May

1930; Forbes to White, 15 Apr. 1930, journal. 47 Wood, Making of tlrc Good Neighbor Policy, 392 n. 32. 48 Munro, Interoentiott andDollnr Diplomau1,337-39; Smith to Little,26Sept.1932,

Louis McCarty Little Papers, USMC Historical Museum, Washington, D.C.

254 255