WK 4 Assignment: Rehabilitation Program- Replies
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A R T I C L E
Understanding shame: Examining how justice and emotions operate in the context of restorative justice
Heather L. Scheuerman
Department of Justice Studies, James Madison
University
Correspondence
Heather L. Scheuerman, Department of Justice
Studies, James Madison University, 90
Bluestone Drive, Harrisonburg, VA
22807002E, USA.
Email: [email protected]
Abstract An essential element of the restorative justice process is engagement
in emotional healing, which is made possible via the ways in which
offenders manage shame. Effective shame management depends in
part on the operation of justice principles. While research has exam-
ined justice and the importance of emotions in facilitating the restor-
ative justice process, further investigation is necessary to understand
how various types of justice affect emotions and facilitate the resto-
ration of offenders. This article provides an overview of major find-
ings regarding the relationship between justice, attributions, and
emotions and how these findings relate to restorative justice. Impli-
cations for research in restorative justice are also discussed.
1 | INTRODUCTION
In comparison to deterrence‐based strategies which attempt to lessen crime by increasing the costs associated with
punishment, restorative justice attempts to repair the harm a crime has caused by focusing on healing relationships
between offenders, victims, and the community (Kurki, 1999). Restorative justice involves a bilateral process wherein
offenders and others affected by a wrongdoing come together to engage in a dialogue characterized by shared
decision making and mutual respect. Through this meeting, offenders are encouraged to accept responsibility for their
wrongdoing and apologize, while victims are encouraged to treat offenders in ways that illustrate their ability to be
redeemed (Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008). These aspects of the restorative justice process illustrate
its underlying psychological mechanisms of procedural justice and reintegrative shaming, which are thought to enable
it to be more effective than retributive approaches in reducing recidivism (Tyler, Sherman, Strang, Barnes, &
Woods, 2007; Wenzel et al., 2008).
Although procedural justice and reintegrative shaming theories have been used to understand the effectiveness of
restorative justice (Barnes, Hyatt, Angel, Strang, & Sherman, 2015; Maxwell & Morris, 2010; Tyler et al., 2007), various
questions remain regarding how justice, shame, and related emotions affect the restorative justice process (for a detailed
review, see Ahmed, Harris, Braithwaite, & Braithwaite, 2001). For instance, while different types of justice may operate
in restorative justice, criminological and restorative justice literatures tend to neglect this distinction. Moreover, the
notion of shame is conceptually ambiguous (Maxwell & Morris, 2010) and has not been effectively linked to justice
processes to elaborate upon ways in which shame‐related emotions are experienced (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a).
Received: 14 August 2017 Revised: 5 December 2017 Accepted: 6 December 2017
DOI: 10.1111/soc4.12561
Sociology Compass. 2018;12:e12561. https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12561
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/soc4 1 of 13
This review examines research on justice, shaming, emotions, and attributions in order to expand upon the under-
lying psychological mechanisms of restorative justice. Below, I first provide an overview of characteristics of restor-
ative justice to elaborate upon the types of justice that operate within it. I then discuss shame, shaming, and shame
management so as to identify various emotions that should be common to this type of treatment approach. In doing
so, I discuss linkages between justice and emotions in order to identify implications for recidivism. I end by elaborating
upon avenues for future research.
2 | JUSTICE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Restorative justice is an alternative to standard retributive responses to crime that characterize most Western sys-
tems of criminal justice (Garvey, 2011; Wenzel et al., 2008). Retributive justice considers punishment as deserved
for violating the law and state authority with the goal of deterring future rule‐breaking behavior (Kurki, 1999; Wenzel
et al., 2008). It is presumed that the humiliation and suffering associated with this unilateral imposition of punishment
will restore moral order and justice (Wenzel et al., 2008). In contrast to retributive justice, punishment is not central to
restorative justice (Kurki, 1999; for a more detailed discussion of retributive and restorative justice, refer to Wenzel
et al., 2008). Rather, restorative justice views crime as a transgression against the community and harms social rela-
tionships and thus seeks to heal the relationships that were violated by an offense (Kurki, 1999; Wenzel et al.,
2008; Zehr & Mika, 1998). In so doing, restorative justice attempts to foster “emotional resources and social connect-
edness between offenders, victims, and their communities” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 25), which reduces the likelihood of
recidivism (Harris, Walgrave, & Braithwaite, 2004). Although a range of restorative practices exist, the restorative jus-
tice conference “has been tested most extensively” (Strang, Sherman, Mayo‐Wilson, Woods, & Ariel, 2013, p. 2; see
also Sherman & Strang, 2012). Here, I use restorative justice conferencing to illustrate general characteristics of
restorative justice to link shaming and justice processes.
Restorative justice conferencing usually entails the meeting of an offender, who has admitted his or her wrongdo-
ing, with his or her supporters, the victim and his or her supporters, a facilitator, and police officer. The police officer may
interject facts about the offense and indicate potential punishments if the offender does not desist from offending, or
function as a trained, neutral facilitator (Daly & Hayes, 2001; Sherman, Braithwaite, Strang, & Barnes, 2001; Strang et al.,
2006). The conference provides a forum in which offenders and those affected by their transgressions can discuss the
offense, reasons why it occurred, and how it affected them (Daly & Hayes, 2001; Strang et al., 2006). Through this pro-
cess, an “undominated dialogue” (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 12) occurs wherein all parties are given voice in determining the
extent to which individuals were hurt, the responsibility of the offender, and how justice can be restored (Wenzel et al.,
2008). Unbiased decisions regarding the restitution of the offender can thus be made in a respectful manner
(Scheuerman & Keith, 2015b; Wenzel et al., 2008). Ultimately, restorative practices attempt to heal damaged relation-
ships by encouraging the offender to take accountability for his or her actions and demonstrate remorse, and reconnect
the offender with others via the expression of respect and a willingness to forgive (Wenzel et al., 2008).1
The process by which offenders are reconnected with the community can be explained by reintegrative shaming
theory (RST; Braithwaite, 1989). According to RST, offenders are first made to feel the requisite emotions of shame
and guilt via the expressed disapproval of their wrongful action. Offenders are then decertified as deviant after partic-
ipants in the restorative process demonstrate actions of forgiveness. This “reintegrative shaming” allows the offender to
enter back into a community of conventional others (Braithwaite, 1989) and fosters the creation and reinforcement of
moral obligations (Barnes et al., 2015). In contrast, stigmatizing or disintegrative shaming shames the offender as a per-
son, preventing the reestablishment of relationships and fostering the adoption of a deviant identity (Braithwaite, 1989).
Importantly, reintegrative shaming is fostered by the experience of just treatment within the restorative justice
process (Scheuerman & Matthews, 2014). The social psychological literature identifies four different types of justice:
distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational (Colquitt, Greenberg, & Zapata‐Phelan, 2005). Distributive
justice entails the fairness of outcomes (e.g., punishments), while procedural justice encompasses the fairness of
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decision‐making procedures that may be used to determine those outcomes (Hegtvedt, 2006). Interactional justice, or
how fair one is treated when outcomes are received and procedures are implemented, is composed of interpersonal
and informational justice. Interpersonal justice deals with respect and propriety, with treatment being respectful and
devoid of prejudicial questions or statements. Informational justice references whether individuals receive justifica-
tion for certain procedures and outcomes and whether authorities are open and honest when enacting those proce-
dures (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt et al., 2005).
Of these forms of justice, procedural justice—conceptualized as a combination of procedural and interactional jus-
tice—has mainly been highlighted as an essential mechanism in the restorative justice process and closely linked with
reintegrative shaming (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2012; Barnes et al., 2015; Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a; Scheuerman &
Matthews, 2014; Tyler et al., 2007). Procedures are considered just when they are able to be corrected (correctability);
involve taking into account the input of those affected by the procedure (representativeness or voice); are based on
accurate information (accuracy), unbiased (bias suppression), consistent across persons and time (consistency), and
reflective of ethical and moral principles of those involved with the decision‐making process (ethicality; Leventhal,
1980). Restorative justice programs emphasize certain of these rules to assist in fostering perceptions of procedural jus-
tice among offenders and victims (Barnes et al., 2015; Wenzel et al., 2008). Specifically, restorative justice participants
are given equal input in the decision‐making process, or voice (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2012; Wenzel et al., 2008) thereby
enabling decisions to be (1) made in an unbiased manner; (2) based on accurate information; and (3) correctable (Ahmed
et al., 2001; Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a, 2015b). Restorative justice can also renew shared values that were damaged
when a wrong occurred, thus allowing the morals of the parties involved to be upheld (Wenzel et al., 2008).
Restorative justice participants are also encouraged to be treated and treat others with respect (Ahmed et al., 2001;
Wenzel et al., 2008) and are provided with justification for decisions that are made and outcomes that result
(Wenzel et al., 2008). Accordingly, not only do participants in the restorative justice process perceive that procedures
and their treatment were fair, but they also report that the outcome was fair and satisfactory (Barnes et al., 2015;
Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a; Tyler et al., 2007). Fair outcomes and treatment, via the receipt of respect and informa-
tional justice (Bies, 2005), reflect distributive and interactional justice, respectively. Informational justice may also facil-
itate fairness perceptions as it assists the offender in making amends through “direct, open, honest, positive, and
constructive” (Goodstein, Butterfield, & Neale, 2016, p. 30) communication, thereby fostering empathy between
offenders and victims and their respectful treatment of each other (Harris et al., 2004).
3 | INJUSTICE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Although designed to encourage the experience of justice, offenders who participate in restorative justice confer-
ences may experience unfair procedures and treatment via stigmatization (Barnes et al., 2015; Harris, 2006; Harris
et al., 2004). For instance, stigmatizing shaming may not enable offenders to participate effectively in the decision‐
making process thereby fostering procedural and distributive injustice (Bradt, Vettenburg, & Roose, 2007; Kenney
& Clairmont, 2009). Even though this injustice could then undermine reintegration by reducing pride in one's group
and lowering feelings of self‐worth (Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996; Tzafrir & Hareli, 2009), it may also motivate the
individual to repair relationships (Goodstein et al., 2016).
The experience of justice provides individuals with information regarding their value to a group and encourages
members to align their identities with that of the group (Barry & Tyler, 2010). Yet individuals who already identify with
the group may be motivated to engage in group‐serving behavior in response to just and unjust treatment. Just treat-
ment would lead individuals to want to reward the group for its fairness in the short and long term, while injustice
would encourage individuals to repair their perceived deficiencies in the short term. The latter would occur if exiting
the group is not easily accomplished physically or by individuals changing their sense of self (Barry & Tyler, 2010).
In the confines of the restorative justice conference, offenders have some connection to the parties that are pres-
ent (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015b). Although identification with these others may vary based on the identity of the
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offender, group‐serving behavior (e.g., making amends, taking accountability, offering an apology, lawful behavior)
should be most likely for those offenders who strongly identify with the group, which reintegrative shaming should
facilitate (Barry & Tyler, 2010; Braithwaite, 1989). This behavior may result from disrespected offenders attempting
to establish their self‐worth apart from the group (Sleebos, Ellemers, & de Gilder, 2006), or to correct for shortcomings
of the group (Barry & Tyler, 2010). As such, even if elements of stigmatization are present, as long as the conference
seeks to decertify the deviance of the offender, procedural and interactional injustice from others at the conference
may actually facilitate the healing process (Barry & Tyler, 2010; Sleebos et al., 2006).
The experience of (in)justice within restorative justice practices is further complicated by the relationship
between (in)justice, emotions, and shame management. Specifically, different types of justice are associated with
varying emotions and ways in which individuals manage their shame (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2012; Scheuerman &
Keith, 2015a), which has important implications for recidivism (Ahmed, 2006). Below, I detail literature on shame in
order to link this emotion to justice processes.
4 | EMOTIONS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Despite research that highlights the significance of shaming and shame within restorative justice, questions still remain
regarding how shame relates to shaming and other shame‐related emotions, and what affects the experience of this
emotion (Harris, 2001). Distinguishing between the act of shaming and the emotion of shame, respectively, reflects
“others consciously taking steps to shame [and] the internalization of shame” (Maxwell & Morris, 2010, p. 136).
Cultural differences in defining and recognizing emotions also complicate understanding of the types of emotions
that may operate within restorative justice (Maxwell & Morris, 2010). For instance, Western societies distinguish
between shame, embarrassment, and guilt. However, in non‐Western cultures, shame and embarrassment may be
combined into a single emotion and guilt may not even be recognized (Haidt, 2003). Below, I discuss these theoretical
distinctions between shame, embarrassment, and guilt and highlight empirical contradictions in terms of how these
emotions operate within restorative justice.
Shame, like guilt and embarrassment, is a self‐conscious and moral emotion as it fosters rule‐abiding behavior and
reinforces the social order (Haidt, 2003). Shame pertains to norm violations and the fact that others are aware of those
violations, while embarrassment is experienced as a less intense emotion that occurs when Westerners violate social
conventions. For a Westerner, shame is a damaging emotion that signifies that something is “wrong or defective with
one's core self, generally due to a failure to measure up to standards of morality, aesthetics, or competence” (Haidt,
2003, p. 860). Specifically, shame results from social rejection or disapproval, personal failure, or wrongdoing (Harris,
2001). Moreover, shame emerges from hierarchical interactions, while guilt extends from communal relationships “in
which one believes one has caused harm, loss, or distress to a relationship partner” (Haidt, 2003, p. 861). Shame deals
with the self, while guilt deals with the evaluation of an action as bad. Importantly, guilt, not shame, is associated with
empathy and serves as a motivating emotion that fosters the righting of wrongs (Haidt, 2003; Tangney, 1991) via “repar-
ative action (e.g., confession, apology, effort to undo the harm)” (Tangney, Stuewig, & Hafez, 2011, p. 710). Shame, in
contrast, may promote hostility and lead to feelings of “humiliation, rage and desire for revenge rather than feelings
of guilt and remorse” (Vagg, 1998, p. 250; Tangney, 1991).
These theoretical distinctions, however, have not been consistently shown empirically (Harris, 2001). The psycho-
logical literature supports that shame and guilt are distinct and adds nuance to how these emotions can better be
understood (for a detailed review regarding these distinctions and origins of these emotions, see Kim, Thibodeau, &
Jorgensen, 2011 and Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007). Specifically, due to the fact that shame involves a painful eval-
uation of the whole self through the individual's own view (internal focus) and concern regarding how an individual
thinks others view him or her (external focus), this emotion can consist of “internal shame” and “external shame,”
respectively (Gilbert, 1998; Kim et al., 2011). External shame deals with one's reputation, while internal shame con-
cerns an individual's self (Gilbert & Woodyatt, 2017). Despite these differences, internal and external shame should
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most likely co‐occur and foster each other when shame is experienced (Kim et al., 2011). Guilt, moreover, can be
either adaptive (i.e., legitimate guilt) or maladaptive depending on how individuals attribute responsibility for a harmful
action. For instance, guilt becomes maladaptive when individuals overly attribute responsibility of an event to them-
selves for which they have no control or when they experience guilt that is not tied to a specific event. In contrast,
guilt is adaptive when it deals with a situationally relevant transgression for which individuals had control (Kim
et al., 2011).
Regardless of these differences, shame and guilt share certain commonalities. Both emotions emerge from
“equally strong judgments that one has violated a moral standard, feels responsible for their actions, and experiences
anger and disgust at themselves as a result” (Lickel, Kushlev, Savalei, Matta, & Schmader, 2014, p. 1050). In addition,
although guilt is a primary motivator of reparative action after a transgression has occurred, shame, and to a lesser
extent guilt, is associated with a desire to change the self (Lickel et al., 2014). These similarities and potential
differences in measurement may lead to the conceptual blurring of these emotions (Kim et al., 2011, p. 88), especially
when researching restorative justice practices.
For instance, through research on restorative justice conferencing, Harris (2001, 2003) proposes that shame and
its related emotions reflect three constructs: shame‐guilt, unresolved shame, and embarrassment‐exposure. Shame‐
guilt consists of individuals feeling ashamed of themselves and their actions and is positively associated with empathy
towards victims and negatively correlated with hostility (Harris, 2001, 2003). Although this research suggests that
shame and guilt may reflect different aspects of a larger construct (Harris, 2001), the distinction between these emo-
tions may not have been detected in the context of restorative justice. Namely, shame and guilt reflect “public” and
“private” emotions, respectively. Individuals who are exposed and who feel more exposed to disapproving others
experience shame, while guilt emerges from rumination over a troubled conscience. Importantly, those events that
elicit these emotions are extremely similar and, especially in regard to restorative justice practices, tend to be public
(Tangney et al., 2011). Unresolved shame, in contrast, deals with individuals being concerned with having been
unfairly judged, the loss of respect or a future opportunity, and not being able to identify whether what they did
was right or wrong. Last, embarrassment‐exposure assesses the extent to which individuals feel to be the center of
attention, exposed, awkward and aware, humiliated, and uneasy being with people perceived to be more important
than themselves (Harris, 2001, p. 117).
Based on these literatures, it can be inferred that offenders will experience some manifestation of shame, includ-
ing its internal and external forms, and guilt within the restorative justice conference. Because research on restorative
conferencing differs from the psychological literature by recognizing shame‐guilt and not guilt as an adaptive emotion
that should facilitate reparative action (Harris, 2001; Tangney et al., 2011), I frame my discussion according to the for-
mer research.2 Within restorative justice, offenders are made aware of their specific wrongdoing and the harm that
was caused in the attempt to correct for it (Strang et al., 2006). The respectful communication of disapproval of a
wrongful action via reintegrative shaming should undermine unresolved shame and promote the experience of
shame‐guilt, especially when offenders are shamed by respected others (Harris, 2001). When offenders experience
respect and empathy from others, they are more likely to feel empathy for those that were harmed, which activates
feelings of remorse, guilt, and shame (Harris et al., 2004). Restorative justice conferences not only emphasize that the
offense harmed relationships but also emphasize that communal or moral values were violated, fostering shame, guilt,
and remorse (Gonzalez & Tyler, 2007). Shaming that stigmatizes, however, should hinder the experience of shame‐
guilt and foster unresolved shame and embarrassment‐exposure (Harris, 2001, 2006).
These relationships between shaming and shame‐related emotions can be illustrated by shame management the-
ory, which connects the likelihood of future deviance with how offenders manage their shame and its related feelings
(Ahmed, 2006; Murphy & Harris, 2007). Specifically, the most adaptive way to manage shame, which involves more
shame acknowledgment and less shame displacement (Ahmed, 2006), is fostered by reintegrative shaming and hin-
dered by disintegrative shaming (Murphy & Harris, 2007). Shame acknowledgement occurs when individuals identify
the wrongfulness of their actions and express remorse, while those who displace their shame express anger and blame
towards others for the particular harm that occurred. Others may also internalize their shame, which relates to
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withdrawal and attack of self, or avoid their shame by pretending as if nothing is amiss. Adaptively managing one's
shame through shame acknowledgment lowers the likelihood of deviant behavior, while shame displacement
enhances it (Ahmed, 2006).
Consequently, shame may be a positive or negative emotion in facilitating the restorative process. When this
emotion is indicative of whether an offender feels he or she is a bad person or a negative evaluation of the whole self,
this emotion is not restorative (Harris, 2001). The difficulty in distinguishing between shame and guilt in restorative
conferencing also indicates that importance should be placed not on whether shame or guilt is experienced, but on
whether shame is resolved. Ineffectively managing one's shame or experiencing stigmatizing shaming should foster
the experience of unresolved shame and increase the likelihood of recidivism, even if shame‐guilt is also experienced.
Whether shame is properly managed, however, depends on how individuals understand and explain their experience
of (in)justice, as unresolved shame involves injustice (Harris, 2001). Below, I link research on (in)justice, attributions,
and emotions in order to further understanding of adaptive shame management within restorative justice.
5 | (IN)JUSTICE, ATTRIBUTIONS AND EMOTIONS
5.1 | Experiencing injustice
Guilt and shame are not only experienced when an offender commits an injustice towards another (Skarlicki, O'Reilly,
& Kulik, 2015), but also when injustice is perpetrated against that individual (Barclay, 2005). Guilt may occur when an
individual is overrewarded (distributive injustice) at the expense of another (Clay‐Warner, Robinson, Smith‐Lovin,
Rogers, & James, 2016), or when one receives a favorable outcome due to a procedure that is biased in favor of
the individual (Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). Moreover, shame should occur in response to procedural and
interactional injustice (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2006, 2012; Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a). Yet whether this shame is
effectively managed depends on specific aspects of justice. Having voice in the process of determining one's punish-
ment (procedural justice) produces the strongest effect on adaptively managing shame over that of having control
over outcomes, being treated consistently, and experiencing interactional justice (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a). As
such, in addition to other forms of procedural and interactional injustice, lacking voice within restorative justice prac-
tices should be a significant predictor of unresolved shame (Harris, 2001).
5.2 | Understanding (in)justice
The presence or absence of justice also indicates attributional or causal information underlying decisions, outcomes,
or treatment (Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Tzafrir & Hareli, 2009) that affects one's self‐worth (Tyler et al., 1996).
Essentially, the restorative justice conference is a context in which offenders make sense of a personal moral failing
and the resultant outcomes associated with the transgression they perpetrated. Offenders not only have to explain
the reasons for their actions but also understand their outcomes and treatment within the restorative justice process
(Petrucci, 2002; Strang et al., 2006). Understanding how justice and attributions operate in restorative justice can pro-
vide another view of the mechanisms that make this alternative form of punishment effective (see also Petrucci, 2002)
as causal attributions affect the types of emotions individuals experience (Weiner, 1985).
Attributions have four prominent dimensions: locus, controllability, stability, and globality (Van Vliet, 2009;
Weiner, 2000). In regard to locus, individuals may attribute events or outcomes internally to themselves or externally
to outside factors. Depending on the nature of the event or outcome, internal attributions can result in pride or
shame. In terms of controllability, individuals assess the degree to which they are responsible for a certain event or
outcome. One's “misfortune outcome is more likely to result in guilt if it was brought about by one's own actions.
Shame, on the other hand, is more likely to be the reaction to the same outcome if the situation was the result of
something out of one's control, e.g. a lack of ability” (Tzafrir & Hareli, 2009, p. 354). Stability refers to whether the
cause is stable (e.g., ability) or unstable over time (e.g., luck). Respectively, hopefulness and helplessness are expected
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to occur when individuals attribute a favorable and unfavorable outcome to stable causes (Tzafrir & Hareli, 2009).
Last, globality entails the degree to which a cause involves many or limited aspects of life (Weiner, 2000). Individuals
who make global assessments for a harm tend to experience maladaptive forms of shame as they engage in self‐
blame. In contrast, localizing a negative event to a specific behavior rather than global self‐characteristics may moti-
vate behavioral self‐blame and guilt, which can enhance perceptions of personal agency and control over future
actions (Van Vliet, 2009).
Restorative justice conferences should enable offenders to make attributions for their wrongdoings as they are
brought face‐to‐face with those they harmed. These interpersonal interactions should prompt them to ask themselves
why they committed an offense (Petrucci, 2002; Strang et al., 2006). If offenders attribute a negative outcome or a
perceived injustice to themselves and feel responsible for it, they should experience either guilt or shame (Tzafrir &
Hareli, 2009; Weiner, 1985).
The emotions of shame and guilt could foster healing by encouraging offenders to apologize for their actions
(Goodstein et al., 2016; Petrucci, 2002). For instance, making amends is especially likely when offenders make internal
attributions for the harm they perpetrated and perceive that they treated the victim in a procedurally or interactionally
unfair manner (Goodstein et al., 2016). The making of an apology can then further the reintegration of the offender by
fostering a positive offender–victim interaction and allowing the offender to see the action as not part of his or her
self (Petrucci, 2002).
The operation of justice and reintegrative shaming would also lead these emotions to have positive outcomes
within restorative justice. The experience of justice can lead offenders to make internal attributions for their
behaviors. Individuals tend to blame themselves more for a distributive injustice than external causes when they
perceive the process or their interpersonal treatment to be fair (Barclay et al., 2005). Further, reintegrative shaming
should enable offenders to attribute their wrongdoing to internal, unstable, controllable, and specific causes
(e.g., my action was bad v. I am a bad person), fostering guilt and reducing feelings of hopelessness (Harris, 2001;
Petrucci, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006; Van Vliet, 2009; Weiner, 1985). The experience of justice and reintegrative
shaming indicates to offenders that they are valued by the groups to which they belong, which, in addition to adaptive
shame management, promotes group‐oriented behaviors and self‐esteem (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a; Tyler et al.,
1996).
6 | IMPLICATIONS FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
In summary, restorative justice practices encourage the operation of psychological mechanisms that motivate the
offender to take responsibility, make amends, and engage in law‐abiding behavior (Tyler et al., 2007). This alternative
form of punishment fosters the operation of justice, especially that of procedural and interactional justice, reintegra-
tive shaming, and adaptive shame‐related emotions (Harris, 2001; Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a; Tangney et al., 2011).
These emotions partially mediate the relationship between shaming and offending behavior (Murphy & Harris, 2007),
indicating that shaming through reintegration encourages offenders to correct for the harm they caused in order to
maintain relationships and a positive self‐view (Murphy & Harris, 2007; Tyler et al., 2007).
Yet, as evidenced by this review, further research is needed to clarify how restorative justice practices are
experienced and the conditions under which offenders will experience adaptive emotions. First, research on
restorative justice should incorporate findings from research in psychology in order to further clarify how shame
and guilt may operate within restorative practices. Despite their similarities (Harris, 2001; Lickel et al., 2014;
Tangney et al., 2011), the different motivations and origins of these emotions (see Gilbert & Woodyatt, 2017;
Kim et al., 2011) implicate the importance of attempting to reconcile the criminological and psychological litera-
tures. For instance, perhaps reintegrative shaming is better at promoting legitimate guilt and external shame, which
would not be as damaging to an individual's identity thereby reducing the likelihood of maladaptive forms of shame
management (Gilbert, 1998).
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Second, researchers should identify how various justice rules may affect the restorative justice process (Barnes
et al., 2015; Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a). How do offenders understand their ability to voice their concerns in com-
parison to their respectful treatment? Does having voice negate the experience of other forms of injustice and stig-
matization? How do different justice rules relate to shame management and shame‐related emotions? In light of the
finding that representativeness appears to exert the strongest effect on adaptively managing shame in comparison
to other procedural and interactional justice principles (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a), more research is needed.
Third, future research is needed to assess how attributions affect the restorative justice process. For instance, the
locus dimension of attributions may be especially relevant when dealing with events that entail negative, surprising, or
unexpected outcomes (Harvey, Madison, Martinko, Crook, & Crook, 2014; Weiner, 1985). Indeed, internal attribu-
tions for a wrongdoing are necessary so that offenders can experience self‐directed emotions of shame and guilt
(Tzafrir & Hareli, 2009; Weiner, 1985). Attributing negative behavior or outcomes internally may be more likely when
procedural and interactional justice are present (Barclay et al., 2005) and if individuals have an internal locus of con-
trol. Locus of control is a personality trait that “concerns people's generalized expectancies that they can or cannot
control reinforcements in their lives” (Spector & O'Connell, 1994, p. 2). An internal locus of control reflects a tendency
of individuals to perceive outcomes as based on their choices and actions (Mirowsky & Ross, 2003), while those with
an external locus of control attribute their outcomes to fate, luck, or chance (Rotter, 1966).
Nevertheless, after an offender has identified that the wrong was indeed based on his or her actions, the healing
process should then shift to identifying either external causes for his or her behavior, separating actions from motiva-
tions, or emphasizing the instability of the harmful action (Van Vliet, 2009). Doing so will assist in the recovery from
maladaptive forms of shame (Maruna & Ramsden, 2004). For instance, when explaining the harm that occurred,
offenders should be encouraged to identify the reasons or conditions that facilitated their offense (Van Vliet,
2009). In addition, the conference should assist in identifying positive aspects of the offender so that they can reduce
the amount of global self‐judgment in which they engage (e.g., “What I did was bad, but my needs were not bad.
Therefore, I am not bad”; Van Vliet, 2009, p. 146). Last, offenders should be encouraged to see that their wrongdoing
was not a stable aspect of themselves and that they have the opportunity to change (Van Vliet, 2009).
Overall, these practices should encourage the formulation of redemption scripts or narratives that assist
offenders in “making good” by separating their core selves from the harm they perpetrated and taking responsibility
for correcting past wrongs (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001; Maruna, 2001; Maruna & Ramsden, 2004). For instance,
an offender may state something like, “I only got into crime and drugs because of my disadvantaged childhood, but
now I am working hard to go straight” (Maruna, 2001, p. 148). Offenders thereby can externalize their past mistakes
and internalize their responsibility for overcoming their harmful acts (Maruna, 2001). Therefore, restorative justice
practices should foster requisite internal and external attributions to maximize the healing process.
Fourth, researchers should investigate how injustice within the restorative justice conference may actually pro-
mote prosocial behavior (Barry & Tyler, 2010; Sleebos et al., 2006). Restorative practices may involve an element
of stigmatization even if offenders perceive them to be more reintegrative than other forms of punishment (Barnes
et al., 2015; Scheuerman & Keith, 2015b). For example, offenders who took part in the Canberra Reintegrative Sham-
ing Experiments (RISE) were observed to be subject to more stigmatizing names and labels, harassment, and shouting
than offenders who were randomly assigned to court (Barnes et al., 2015, p. 119). Whether or not injustice promotes
group‐oriented behavior depends in part on group identification (Barry & Tyler, 2010). As such, the ties that offenders
have to others should be emphasized to enhance identification with their communities of concern (Braithwaite, 1989;
McCold, 2004; Prichard, 2002). This may be done by ensuring that conference participants are respected and
depended upon by the offender (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015b). Care, however, must be done in highlighting this iden-
tification as stigmatization may only be beneficial if it does not lead offenders to become overly concerned with how
others view them. Rather, if this negative treatment leads offenders to re‐evaluate themselves or their personal moral-
ity, they may attempt to better themselves and repair their relationships with others (Kwon, 2016).
Importantly, even if the experience of injustice harms an offender's social image, as long as restorative practices
allow the offender to make amends, prosocial behavior can still result (Kwon, 2016; Leach & Cidam, 2015). Although
8 of 13 SCHEUERMAN
some harms are more easily amendable than others, prosocial behavior can occur in light of a less reparable offense if
offenders view their social image as flexible and not fixed (Kwon, 2016; Leach & Cidam, 2015). For instance, one pow-
erful motivator of participating in restorative practice is for offenders to alter for the better how they are viewed by
victims and their supporters (Umbreit, Vos, Coates, & Armour, 2006). As such, the experience of injustice may foster
prosocial behavior via a variety of mechanisms.
Group identification can also influence how victims and offenders interact, which highlights a possible fifth
strand of research: understanding better the role that others play in influencing the psychological mechanisms of
restorative justice (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015b). This review focused mainly on the experience and actions of
offenders and not that of victims. Yet, investigating what victims and other participants perceive and experience
can assist in clarifying characteristics of restorative justice that facilitate healing and reduce recidivism (Strang
et al., 2006). For instance, those who share a common social identity with the offender will be better able to
communicate within the conference, which could prevent them from engaging in punishment and intimidation of
the offender (Wenzel et al., 2008). Additionally, victims who learn the life stories of their victimizers are better
poised to empathize with them (Strang et al., 2006), thereby increasing the likelihood that the offender will apol-
ogize and experience adaptive shame‐related emotions (Harris et al., 2004). An apology not only enables the
offender to take accountability for his or her actions but also allows the victim to recover emotionally from the
offense (Strang et al., 2006).
Nevertheless, group identification could produce mixed outcomes within the conference. For instance, in
response to the offender's act, participants in restorative practices could experience vicarious shame, due to their
identification with the offender, or guilt, due to their interpersonal interdependence, or degree to which they interact
and share goals and norms of behavior (Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005). Shame could lead these
others to distance themselves from the offender, which would harm the reparative process, while guilt could foster
healing by making these individuals more cooperative in attempting to repair the harm caused by the offense (Lickel
et al., 2005). This could help to explain why offenders who highly depend upon others present at the conference expe-
rience beneficial outcomes as they are more likely to perceive justice, which would foster the experience of reintegra-
tive shaming (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015b). Future research is needed that assesses the type of emotions other actors
within restorative justice programs experience in order to assess how they might affect their behavior and overall per-
ception and operation of the restorative process.
Last, only a few studies attempt to test the directionality of the relationship between justice, shaming, and shame‐
related emotions (e.g., Murphy & Harris, 2007; Scheuerman & Matthews, 2014). As the relationship between shaming
and shame may be recursive (Harris, 2001, p. 203), more research is needed to test whether emotions are precursors,
mediators, or outcomes of justice and shaming processes (see De Cremer, 2007; Scheuerman, 2014). Indeed, the
experience of negative emotions may precede the recognition of injustice (Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2007). As such,
how offenders manage shame may function as an indicator of their experience of shaming and justice within restor-
ative justice practices. If shame‐related emotions can serve as antecedents of shaming and justice, research should
identify the conditions under which shame management may mediate or precede the relationship between shaming
and offending behavior (see Murphy & Harris, 2007).
7 | CONCLUSION
The existing and emerging literature on justice, restorative justice, shaming, and shame highlights that the effective-
ness of restorative justice depends in part on its underlying psychological mechanisms. The experience of various
types of justice and even that of injustice may foster positive outcomes in the context of restorative justice practices.
Additionally, shame and related emotions can encourage emotional healing if the actions of offenders and not their
persons are condemned. These emotions implicate the importance of attributions within restorative justice processes.
The ways in which individuals account for negative outcomes may assist in restoring offenders, victims, and
SCHEUERMAN 9 of 13
communities if offenders internally attribute their wrongdoing to themselves and identify external factors that
affected their actions. Specifying how these processes link together is the domain of future research.
ENDNOTES 1 It should be noted, however, that genuine forgiveness is not typically achieved and should not be expected. Rather, restor- ative practices should aim to create an environment in which forgiveness is welcomed (for a more detailed discussion, refer to Braithwaite, 2016).
2 This contradiction in classifying shame and its relation to guilt may possibly be resolved conceptually by identifying how reintegrative shaming may be viewed of as “reintegrative guilting” or “the induction of guilt without shame” (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001, p. 8). Nevertheless, empirical findings that focus on restorative justice conferencing promulgate the position that shame‐guilt occurs in the context of offending (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001).
ORCID
Heather L. Scheuerman http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2376-3209
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Heather L. Scheuerman is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Justice Studies at James Madison
University. Her research centers on how social psychological concepts and processes structure behavior, including
crime. A major strand of this research examines how justice and related concepts operate within restorative
justice conferences to affect perceptions and behaviors of offenders. Recent work in this substantive area has
appeared in Restorative Justice: An International Journal, Criminal Justice Policy Review, and Justice Quarterly.
How to cite this article: Scheuerman HL. Understanding shame: Examining how justice and emotions
operate in the context of restorative justice. Sociology Compass. 2018;12:e12561. https://doi.org/10.1111/
soc4.12561
SCHEUERMAN 13 of 13
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