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Understandingshame_ExamininghowjusticeandemotionsoperateinthecontextofrestorativejusticeREADINGONLY3.pdf

A R T I C L E

Understanding shame: Examining how justice and emotions operate in the context of restorative justice

Heather L. Scheuerman

Department of Justice Studies, James Madison

University

Correspondence

Heather L. Scheuerman, Department of Justice

Studies, James Madison University, 90

Bluestone Drive, Harrisonburg, VA

22807002E, USA.

Email: [email protected]

Abstract An essential element of the restorative justice process is engagement

in emotional healing, which is made possible via the ways in which

offenders manage shame. Effective shame management depends in

part on the operation of justice principles. While research has exam-

ined justice and the importance of emotions in facilitating the restor-

ative justice process, further investigation is necessary to understand

how various types of justice affect emotions and facilitate the resto-

ration of offenders. This article provides an overview of major find-

ings regarding the relationship between justice, attributions, and

emotions and how these findings relate to restorative justice. Impli-

cations for research in restorative justice are also discussed.

1 | INTRODUCTION

In comparison to deterrence‐based strategies which attempt to lessen crime by increasing the costs associated with

punishment, restorative justice attempts to repair the harm a crime has caused by focusing on healing relationships

between offenders, victims, and the community (Kurki, 1999). Restorative justice involves a bilateral process wherein

offenders and others affected by a wrongdoing come together to engage in a dialogue characterized by shared

decision making and mutual respect. Through this meeting, offenders are encouraged to accept responsibility for their

wrongdoing and apologize, while victims are encouraged to treat offenders in ways that illustrate their ability to be

redeemed (Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008). These aspects of the restorative justice process illustrate

its underlying psychological mechanisms of procedural justice and reintegrative shaming, which are thought to enable

it to be more effective than retributive approaches in reducing recidivism (Tyler, Sherman, Strang, Barnes, &

Woods, 2007; Wenzel et al., 2008).

Although procedural justice and reintegrative shaming theories have been used to understand the effectiveness of

restorative justice (Barnes, Hyatt, Angel, Strang, & Sherman, 2015; Maxwell & Morris, 2010; Tyler et al., 2007), various

questions remain regarding how justice, shame, and related emotions affect the restorative justice process (for a detailed

review, see Ahmed, Harris, Braithwaite, & Braithwaite, 2001). For instance, while different types of justice may operate

in restorative justice, criminological and restorative justice literatures tend to neglect this distinction. Moreover, the

notion of shame is conceptually ambiguous (Maxwell & Morris, 2010) and has not been effectively linked to justice

processes to elaborate upon ways in which shame‐related emotions are experienced (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a).

Received: 14 August 2017 Revised: 5 December 2017 Accepted: 6 December 2017

DOI: 10.1111/soc4.12561

Sociology Compass. 2018;12:e12561. https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12561

© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/soc4 1 of 13

This review examines research on justice, shaming, emotions, and attributions in order to expand upon the under-

lying psychological mechanisms of restorative justice. Below, I first provide an overview of characteristics of restor-

ative justice to elaborate upon the types of justice that operate within it. I then discuss shame, shaming, and shame

management so as to identify various emotions that should be common to this type of treatment approach. In doing

so, I discuss linkages between justice and emotions in order to identify implications for recidivism. I end by elaborating

upon avenues for future research.

2 | JUSTICE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

Restorative justice is an alternative to standard retributive responses to crime that characterize most Western sys-

tems of criminal justice (Garvey, 2011; Wenzel et al., 2008). Retributive justice considers punishment as deserved

for violating the law and state authority with the goal of deterring future rule‐breaking behavior (Kurki, 1999; Wenzel

et al., 2008). It is presumed that the humiliation and suffering associated with this unilateral imposition of punishment

will restore moral order and justice (Wenzel et al., 2008). In contrast to retributive justice, punishment is not central to

restorative justice (Kurki, 1999; for a more detailed discussion of retributive and restorative justice, refer to Wenzel

et al., 2008). Rather, restorative justice views crime as a transgression against the community and harms social rela-

tionships and thus seeks to heal the relationships that were violated by an offense (Kurki, 1999; Wenzel et al.,

2008; Zehr & Mika, 1998). In so doing, restorative justice attempts to foster “emotional resources and social connect-

edness between offenders, victims, and their communities” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 25), which reduces the likelihood of

recidivism (Harris, Walgrave, & Braithwaite, 2004). Although a range of restorative practices exist, the restorative jus-

tice conference “has been tested most extensively” (Strang, Sherman, Mayo‐Wilson, Woods, & Ariel, 2013, p. 2; see

also Sherman & Strang, 2012). Here, I use restorative justice conferencing to illustrate general characteristics of

restorative justice to link shaming and justice processes.

Restorative justice conferencing usually entails the meeting of an offender, who has admitted his or her wrongdo-

ing, with his or her supporters, the victim and his or her supporters, a facilitator, and police officer. The police officer may

interject facts about the offense and indicate potential punishments if the offender does not desist from offending, or

function as a trained, neutral facilitator (Daly & Hayes, 2001; Sherman, Braithwaite, Strang, & Barnes, 2001; Strang et al.,

2006). The conference provides a forum in which offenders and those affected by their transgressions can discuss the

offense, reasons why it occurred, and how it affected them (Daly & Hayes, 2001; Strang et al., 2006). Through this pro-

cess, an “undominated dialogue” (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 12) occurs wherein all parties are given voice in determining the

extent to which individuals were hurt, the responsibility of the offender, and how justice can be restored (Wenzel et al.,

2008). Unbiased decisions regarding the restitution of the offender can thus be made in a respectful manner

(Scheuerman & Keith, 2015b; Wenzel et al., 2008). Ultimately, restorative practices attempt to heal damaged relation-

ships by encouraging the offender to take accountability for his or her actions and demonstrate remorse, and reconnect

the offender with others via the expression of respect and a willingness to forgive (Wenzel et al., 2008).1

The process by which offenders are reconnected with the community can be explained by reintegrative shaming

theory (RST; Braithwaite, 1989). According to RST, offenders are first made to feel the requisite emotions of shame

and guilt via the expressed disapproval of their wrongful action. Offenders are then decertified as deviant after partic-

ipants in the restorative process demonstrate actions of forgiveness. This “reintegrative shaming” allows the offender to

enter back into a community of conventional others (Braithwaite, 1989) and fosters the creation and reinforcement of

moral obligations (Barnes et al., 2015). In contrast, stigmatizing or disintegrative shaming shames the offender as a per-

son, preventing the reestablishment of relationships and fostering the adoption of a deviant identity (Braithwaite, 1989).

Importantly, reintegrative shaming is fostered by the experience of just treatment within the restorative justice

process (Scheuerman & Matthews, 2014). The social psychological literature identifies four different types of justice:

distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational (Colquitt, Greenberg, & Zapata‐Phelan, 2005). Distributive

justice entails the fairness of outcomes (e.g., punishments), while procedural justice encompasses the fairness of

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decision‐making procedures that may be used to determine those outcomes (Hegtvedt, 2006). Interactional justice, or

how fair one is treated when outcomes are received and procedures are implemented, is composed of interpersonal

and informational justice. Interpersonal justice deals with respect and propriety, with treatment being respectful and

devoid of prejudicial questions or statements. Informational justice references whether individuals receive justifica-

tion for certain procedures and outcomes and whether authorities are open and honest when enacting those proce-

dures (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt et al., 2005).

Of these forms of justice, procedural justice—conceptualized as a combination of procedural and interactional jus-

tice—has mainly been highlighted as an essential mechanism in the restorative justice process and closely linked with

reintegrative shaming (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2012; Barnes et al., 2015; Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a; Scheuerman &

Matthews, 2014; Tyler et al., 2007). Procedures are considered just when they are able to be corrected (correctability);

involve taking into account the input of those affected by the procedure (representativeness or voice); are based on

accurate information (accuracy), unbiased (bias suppression), consistent across persons and time (consistency), and

reflective of ethical and moral principles of those involved with the decision‐making process (ethicality; Leventhal,

1980). Restorative justice programs emphasize certain of these rules to assist in fostering perceptions of procedural jus-

tice among offenders and victims (Barnes et al., 2015; Wenzel et al., 2008). Specifically, restorative justice participants

are given equal input in the decision‐making process, or voice (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2012; Wenzel et al., 2008) thereby

enabling decisions to be (1) made in an unbiased manner; (2) based on accurate information; and (3) correctable (Ahmed

et al., 2001; Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a, 2015b). Restorative justice can also renew shared values that were damaged

when a wrong occurred, thus allowing the morals of the parties involved to be upheld (Wenzel et al., 2008).

Restorative justice participants are also encouraged to be treated and treat others with respect (Ahmed et al., 2001;

Wenzel et al., 2008) and are provided with justification for decisions that are made and outcomes that result

(Wenzel et al., 2008). Accordingly, not only do participants in the restorative justice process perceive that procedures

and their treatment were fair, but they also report that the outcome was fair and satisfactory (Barnes et al., 2015;

Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a; Tyler et al., 2007). Fair outcomes and treatment, via the receipt of respect and informa-

tional justice (Bies, 2005), reflect distributive and interactional justice, respectively. Informational justice may also facil-

itate fairness perceptions as it assists the offender in making amends through “direct, open, honest, positive, and

constructive” (Goodstein, Butterfield, & Neale, 2016, p. 30) communication, thereby fostering empathy between

offenders and victims and their respectful treatment of each other (Harris et al., 2004).

3 | INJUSTICE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

Although designed to encourage the experience of justice, offenders who participate in restorative justice confer-

ences may experience unfair procedures and treatment via stigmatization (Barnes et al., 2015; Harris, 2006; Harris

et al., 2004). For instance, stigmatizing shaming may not enable offenders to participate effectively in the decision‐

making process thereby fostering procedural and distributive injustice (Bradt, Vettenburg, & Roose, 2007; Kenney

& Clairmont, 2009). Even though this injustice could then undermine reintegration by reducing pride in one's group

and lowering feelings of self‐worth (Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996; Tzafrir & Hareli, 2009), it may also motivate the

individual to repair relationships (Goodstein et al., 2016).

The experience of justice provides individuals with information regarding their value to a group and encourages

members to align their identities with that of the group (Barry & Tyler, 2010). Yet individuals who already identify with

the group may be motivated to engage in group‐serving behavior in response to just and unjust treatment. Just treat-

ment would lead individuals to want to reward the group for its fairness in the short and long term, while injustice

would encourage individuals to repair their perceived deficiencies in the short term. The latter would occur if exiting

the group is not easily accomplished physically or by individuals changing their sense of self (Barry & Tyler, 2010).

In the confines of the restorative justice conference, offenders have some connection to the parties that are pres-

ent (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015b). Although identification with these others may vary based on the identity of the

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offender, group‐serving behavior (e.g., making amends, taking accountability, offering an apology, lawful behavior)

should be most likely for those offenders who strongly identify with the group, which reintegrative shaming should

facilitate (Barry & Tyler, 2010; Braithwaite, 1989). This behavior may result from disrespected offenders attempting

to establish their self‐worth apart from the group (Sleebos, Ellemers, & de Gilder, 2006), or to correct for shortcomings

of the group (Barry & Tyler, 2010). As such, even if elements of stigmatization are present, as long as the conference

seeks to decertify the deviance of the offender, procedural and interactional injustice from others at the conference

may actually facilitate the healing process (Barry & Tyler, 2010; Sleebos et al., 2006).

The experience of (in)justice within restorative justice practices is further complicated by the relationship

between (in)justice, emotions, and shame management. Specifically, different types of justice are associated with

varying emotions and ways in which individuals manage their shame (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2012; Scheuerman &

Keith, 2015a), which has important implications for recidivism (Ahmed, 2006). Below, I detail literature on shame in

order to link this emotion to justice processes.

4 | EMOTIONS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

Despite research that highlights the significance of shaming and shame within restorative justice, questions still remain

regarding how shame relates to shaming and other shame‐related emotions, and what affects the experience of this

emotion (Harris, 2001). Distinguishing between the act of shaming and the emotion of shame, respectively, reflects

“others consciously taking steps to shame [and] the internalization of shame” (Maxwell & Morris, 2010, p. 136).

Cultural differences in defining and recognizing emotions also complicate understanding of the types of emotions

that may operate within restorative justice (Maxwell & Morris, 2010). For instance, Western societies distinguish

between shame, embarrassment, and guilt. However, in non‐Western cultures, shame and embarrassment may be

combined into a single emotion and guilt may not even be recognized (Haidt, 2003). Below, I discuss these theoretical

distinctions between shame, embarrassment, and guilt and highlight empirical contradictions in terms of how these

emotions operate within restorative justice.

Shame, like guilt and embarrassment, is a self‐conscious and moral emotion as it fosters rule‐abiding behavior and

reinforces the social order (Haidt, 2003). Shame pertains to norm violations and the fact that others are aware of those

violations, while embarrassment is experienced as a less intense emotion that occurs when Westerners violate social

conventions. For a Westerner, shame is a damaging emotion that signifies that something is “wrong or defective with

one's core self, generally due to a failure to measure up to standards of morality, aesthetics, or competence” (Haidt,

2003, p. 860). Specifically, shame results from social rejection or disapproval, personal failure, or wrongdoing (Harris,

2001). Moreover, shame emerges from hierarchical interactions, while guilt extends from communal relationships “in

which one believes one has caused harm, loss, or distress to a relationship partner” (Haidt, 2003, p. 861). Shame deals

with the self, while guilt deals with the evaluation of an action as bad. Importantly, guilt, not shame, is associated with

empathy and serves as a motivating emotion that fosters the righting of wrongs (Haidt, 2003; Tangney, 1991) via “repar-

ative action (e.g., confession, apology, effort to undo the harm)” (Tangney, Stuewig, & Hafez, 2011, p. 710). Shame, in

contrast, may promote hostility and lead to feelings of “humiliation, rage and desire for revenge rather than feelings

of guilt and remorse” (Vagg, 1998, p. 250; Tangney, 1991).

These theoretical distinctions, however, have not been consistently shown empirically (Harris, 2001). The psycho-

logical literature supports that shame and guilt are distinct and adds nuance to how these emotions can better be

understood (for a detailed review regarding these distinctions and origins of these emotions, see Kim, Thibodeau, &

Jorgensen, 2011 and Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007). Specifically, due to the fact that shame involves a painful eval-

uation of the whole self through the individual's own view (internal focus) and concern regarding how an individual

thinks others view him or her (external focus), this emotion can consist of “internal shame” and “external shame,”

respectively (Gilbert, 1998; Kim et al., 2011). External shame deals with one's reputation, while internal shame con-

cerns an individual's self (Gilbert & Woodyatt, 2017). Despite these differences, internal and external shame should

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most likely co‐occur and foster each other when shame is experienced (Kim et al., 2011). Guilt, moreover, can be

either adaptive (i.e., legitimate guilt) or maladaptive depending on how individuals attribute responsibility for a harmful

action. For instance, guilt becomes maladaptive when individuals overly attribute responsibility of an event to them-

selves for which they have no control or when they experience guilt that is not tied to a specific event. In contrast,

guilt is adaptive when it deals with a situationally relevant transgression for which individuals had control (Kim

et al., 2011).

Regardless of these differences, shame and guilt share certain commonalities. Both emotions emerge from

“equally strong judgments that one has violated a moral standard, feels responsible for their actions, and experiences

anger and disgust at themselves as a result” (Lickel, Kushlev, Savalei, Matta, & Schmader, 2014, p. 1050). In addition,

although guilt is a primary motivator of reparative action after a transgression has occurred, shame, and to a lesser

extent guilt, is associated with a desire to change the self (Lickel et al., 2014). These similarities and potential

differences in measurement may lead to the conceptual blurring of these emotions (Kim et al., 2011, p. 88), especially

when researching restorative justice practices.

For instance, through research on restorative justice conferencing, Harris (2001, 2003) proposes that shame and

its related emotions reflect three constructs: shame‐guilt, unresolved shame, and embarrassment‐exposure. Shame‐

guilt consists of individuals feeling ashamed of themselves and their actions and is positively associated with empathy

towards victims and negatively correlated with hostility (Harris, 2001, 2003). Although this research suggests that

shame and guilt may reflect different aspects of a larger construct (Harris, 2001), the distinction between these emo-

tions may not have been detected in the context of restorative justice. Namely, shame and guilt reflect “public” and

“private” emotions, respectively. Individuals who are exposed and who feel more exposed to disapproving others

experience shame, while guilt emerges from rumination over a troubled conscience. Importantly, those events that

elicit these emotions are extremely similar and, especially in regard to restorative justice practices, tend to be public

(Tangney et al., 2011). Unresolved shame, in contrast, deals with individuals being concerned with having been

unfairly judged, the loss of respect or a future opportunity, and not being able to identify whether what they did

was right or wrong. Last, embarrassment‐exposure assesses the extent to which individuals feel to be the center of

attention, exposed, awkward and aware, humiliated, and uneasy being with people perceived to be more important

than themselves (Harris, 2001, p. 117).

Based on these literatures, it can be inferred that offenders will experience some manifestation of shame, includ-

ing its internal and external forms, and guilt within the restorative justice conference. Because research on restorative

conferencing differs from the psychological literature by recognizing shame‐guilt and not guilt as an adaptive emotion

that should facilitate reparative action (Harris, 2001; Tangney et al., 2011), I frame my discussion according to the for-

mer research.2 Within restorative justice, offenders are made aware of their specific wrongdoing and the harm that

was caused in the attempt to correct for it (Strang et al., 2006). The respectful communication of disapproval of a

wrongful action via reintegrative shaming should undermine unresolved shame and promote the experience of

shame‐guilt, especially when offenders are shamed by respected others (Harris, 2001). When offenders experience

respect and empathy from others, they are more likely to feel empathy for those that were harmed, which activates

feelings of remorse, guilt, and shame (Harris et al., 2004). Restorative justice conferences not only emphasize that the

offense harmed relationships but also emphasize that communal or moral values were violated, fostering shame, guilt,

and remorse (Gonzalez & Tyler, 2007). Shaming that stigmatizes, however, should hinder the experience of shame‐

guilt and foster unresolved shame and embarrassment‐exposure (Harris, 2001, 2006).

These relationships between shaming and shame‐related emotions can be illustrated by shame management the-

ory, which connects the likelihood of future deviance with how offenders manage their shame and its related feelings

(Ahmed, 2006; Murphy & Harris, 2007). Specifically, the most adaptive way to manage shame, which involves more

shame acknowledgment and less shame displacement (Ahmed, 2006), is fostered by reintegrative shaming and hin-

dered by disintegrative shaming (Murphy & Harris, 2007). Shame acknowledgement occurs when individuals identify

the wrongfulness of their actions and express remorse, while those who displace their shame express anger and blame

towards others for the particular harm that occurred. Others may also internalize their shame, which relates to

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withdrawal and attack of self, or avoid their shame by pretending as if nothing is amiss. Adaptively managing one's

shame through shame acknowledgment lowers the likelihood of deviant behavior, while shame displacement

enhances it (Ahmed, 2006).

Consequently, shame may be a positive or negative emotion in facilitating the restorative process. When this

emotion is indicative of whether an offender feels he or she is a bad person or a negative evaluation of the whole self,

this emotion is not restorative (Harris, 2001). The difficulty in distinguishing between shame and guilt in restorative

conferencing also indicates that importance should be placed not on whether shame or guilt is experienced, but on

whether shame is resolved. Ineffectively managing one's shame or experiencing stigmatizing shaming should foster

the experience of unresolved shame and increase the likelihood of recidivism, even if shame‐guilt is also experienced.

Whether shame is properly managed, however, depends on how individuals understand and explain their experience

of (in)justice, as unresolved shame involves injustice (Harris, 2001). Below, I link research on (in)justice, attributions,

and emotions in order to further understanding of adaptive shame management within restorative justice.

5 | (IN)JUSTICE, ATTRIBUTIONS AND EMOTIONS

5.1 | Experiencing injustice

Guilt and shame are not only experienced when an offender commits an injustice towards another (Skarlicki, O'Reilly,

& Kulik, 2015), but also when injustice is perpetrated against that individual (Barclay, 2005). Guilt may occur when an

individual is overrewarded (distributive injustice) at the expense of another (Clay‐Warner, Robinson, Smith‐Lovin,

Rogers, & James, 2016), or when one receives a favorable outcome due to a procedure that is biased in favor of

the individual (Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). Moreover, shame should occur in response to procedural and

interactional injustice (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2006, 2012; Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a). Yet whether this shame is

effectively managed depends on specific aspects of justice. Having voice in the process of determining one's punish-

ment (procedural justice) produces the strongest effect on adaptively managing shame over that of having control

over outcomes, being treated consistently, and experiencing interactional justice (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a). As

such, in addition to other forms of procedural and interactional injustice, lacking voice within restorative justice prac-

tices should be a significant predictor of unresolved shame (Harris, 2001).

5.2 | Understanding (in)justice

The presence or absence of justice also indicates attributional or causal information underlying decisions, outcomes,

or treatment (Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Tzafrir & Hareli, 2009) that affects one's self‐worth (Tyler et al., 1996).

Essentially, the restorative justice conference is a context in which offenders make sense of a personal moral failing

and the resultant outcomes associated with the transgression they perpetrated. Offenders not only have to explain

the reasons for their actions but also understand their outcomes and treatment within the restorative justice process

(Petrucci, 2002; Strang et al., 2006). Understanding how justice and attributions operate in restorative justice can pro-

vide another view of the mechanisms that make this alternative form of punishment effective (see also Petrucci, 2002)

as causal attributions affect the types of emotions individuals experience (Weiner, 1985).

Attributions have four prominent dimensions: locus, controllability, stability, and globality (Van Vliet, 2009;

Weiner, 2000). In regard to locus, individuals may attribute events or outcomes internally to themselves or externally

to outside factors. Depending on the nature of the event or outcome, internal attributions can result in pride or

shame. In terms of controllability, individuals assess the degree to which they are responsible for a certain event or

outcome. One's “misfortune outcome is more likely to result in guilt if it was brought about by one's own actions.

Shame, on the other hand, is more likely to be the reaction to the same outcome if the situation was the result of

something out of one's control, e.g. a lack of ability” (Tzafrir & Hareli, 2009, p. 354). Stability refers to whether the

cause is stable (e.g., ability) or unstable over time (e.g., luck). Respectively, hopefulness and helplessness are expected

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to occur when individuals attribute a favorable and unfavorable outcome to stable causes (Tzafrir & Hareli, 2009).

Last, globality entails the degree to which a cause involves many or limited aspects of life (Weiner, 2000). Individuals

who make global assessments for a harm tend to experience maladaptive forms of shame as they engage in self‐

blame. In contrast, localizing a negative event to a specific behavior rather than global self‐characteristics may moti-

vate behavioral self‐blame and guilt, which can enhance perceptions of personal agency and control over future

actions (Van Vliet, 2009).

Restorative justice conferences should enable offenders to make attributions for their wrongdoings as they are

brought face‐to‐face with those they harmed. These interpersonal interactions should prompt them to ask themselves

why they committed an offense (Petrucci, 2002; Strang et al., 2006). If offenders attribute a negative outcome or a

perceived injustice to themselves and feel responsible for it, they should experience either guilt or shame (Tzafrir &

Hareli, 2009; Weiner, 1985).

The emotions of shame and guilt could foster healing by encouraging offenders to apologize for their actions

(Goodstein et al., 2016; Petrucci, 2002). For instance, making amends is especially likely when offenders make internal

attributions for the harm they perpetrated and perceive that they treated the victim in a procedurally or interactionally

unfair manner (Goodstein et al., 2016). The making of an apology can then further the reintegration of the offender by

fostering a positive offender–victim interaction and allowing the offender to see the action as not part of his or her

self (Petrucci, 2002).

The operation of justice and reintegrative shaming would also lead these emotions to have positive outcomes

within restorative justice. The experience of justice can lead offenders to make internal attributions for their

behaviors. Individuals tend to blame themselves more for a distributive injustice than external causes when they

perceive the process or their interpersonal treatment to be fair (Barclay et al., 2005). Further, reintegrative shaming

should enable offenders to attribute their wrongdoing to internal, unstable, controllable, and specific causes

(e.g., my action was bad v. I am a bad person), fostering guilt and reducing feelings of hopelessness (Harris, 2001;

Petrucci, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006; Van Vliet, 2009; Weiner, 1985). The experience of justice and reintegrative

shaming indicates to offenders that they are valued by the groups to which they belong, which, in addition to adaptive

shame management, promotes group‐oriented behaviors and self‐esteem (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a; Tyler et al.,

1996).

6 | IMPLICATIONS FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

In summary, restorative justice practices encourage the operation of psychological mechanisms that motivate the

offender to take responsibility, make amends, and engage in law‐abiding behavior (Tyler et al., 2007). This alternative

form of punishment fosters the operation of justice, especially that of procedural and interactional justice, reintegra-

tive shaming, and adaptive shame‐related emotions (Harris, 2001; Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a; Tangney et al., 2011).

These emotions partially mediate the relationship between shaming and offending behavior (Murphy & Harris, 2007),

indicating that shaming through reintegration encourages offenders to correct for the harm they caused in order to

maintain relationships and a positive self‐view (Murphy & Harris, 2007; Tyler et al., 2007).

Yet, as evidenced by this review, further research is needed to clarify how restorative justice practices are

experienced and the conditions under which offenders will experience adaptive emotions. First, research on

restorative justice should incorporate findings from research in psychology in order to further clarify how shame

and guilt may operate within restorative practices. Despite their similarities (Harris, 2001; Lickel et al., 2014;

Tangney et al., 2011), the different motivations and origins of these emotions (see Gilbert & Woodyatt, 2017;

Kim et al., 2011) implicate the importance of attempting to reconcile the criminological and psychological litera-

tures. For instance, perhaps reintegrative shaming is better at promoting legitimate guilt and external shame, which

would not be as damaging to an individual's identity thereby reducing the likelihood of maladaptive forms of shame

management (Gilbert, 1998).

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Second, researchers should identify how various justice rules may affect the restorative justice process (Barnes

et al., 2015; Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a). How do offenders understand their ability to voice their concerns in com-

parison to their respectful treatment? Does having voice negate the experience of other forms of injustice and stig-

matization? How do different justice rules relate to shame management and shame‐related emotions? In light of the

finding that representativeness appears to exert the strongest effect on adaptively managing shame in comparison

to other procedural and interactional justice principles (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015a), more research is needed.

Third, future research is needed to assess how attributions affect the restorative justice process. For instance, the

locus dimension of attributions may be especially relevant when dealing with events that entail negative, surprising, or

unexpected outcomes (Harvey, Madison, Martinko, Crook, & Crook, 2014; Weiner, 1985). Indeed, internal attribu-

tions for a wrongdoing are necessary so that offenders can experience self‐directed emotions of shame and guilt

(Tzafrir & Hareli, 2009; Weiner, 1985). Attributing negative behavior or outcomes internally may be more likely when

procedural and interactional justice are present (Barclay et al., 2005) and if individuals have an internal locus of con-

trol. Locus of control is a personality trait that “concerns people's generalized expectancies that they can or cannot

control reinforcements in their lives” (Spector & O'Connell, 1994, p. 2). An internal locus of control reflects a tendency

of individuals to perceive outcomes as based on their choices and actions (Mirowsky & Ross, 2003), while those with

an external locus of control attribute their outcomes to fate, luck, or chance (Rotter, 1966).

Nevertheless, after an offender has identified that the wrong was indeed based on his or her actions, the healing

process should then shift to identifying either external causes for his or her behavior, separating actions from motiva-

tions, or emphasizing the instability of the harmful action (Van Vliet, 2009). Doing so will assist in the recovery from

maladaptive forms of shame (Maruna & Ramsden, 2004). For instance, when explaining the harm that occurred,

offenders should be encouraged to identify the reasons or conditions that facilitated their offense (Van Vliet,

2009). In addition, the conference should assist in identifying positive aspects of the offender so that they can reduce

the amount of global self‐judgment in which they engage (e.g., “What I did was bad, but my needs were not bad.

Therefore, I am not bad”; Van Vliet, 2009, p. 146). Last, offenders should be encouraged to see that their wrongdoing

was not a stable aspect of themselves and that they have the opportunity to change (Van Vliet, 2009).

Overall, these practices should encourage the formulation of redemption scripts or narratives that assist

offenders in “making good” by separating their core selves from the harm they perpetrated and taking responsibility

for correcting past wrongs (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001; Maruna, 2001; Maruna & Ramsden, 2004). For instance,

an offender may state something like, “I only got into crime and drugs because of my disadvantaged childhood, but

now I am working hard to go straight” (Maruna, 2001, p. 148). Offenders thereby can externalize their past mistakes

and internalize their responsibility for overcoming their harmful acts (Maruna, 2001). Therefore, restorative justice

practices should foster requisite internal and external attributions to maximize the healing process.

Fourth, researchers should investigate how injustice within the restorative justice conference may actually pro-

mote prosocial behavior (Barry & Tyler, 2010; Sleebos et al., 2006). Restorative practices may involve an element

of stigmatization even if offenders perceive them to be more reintegrative than other forms of punishment (Barnes

et al., 2015; Scheuerman & Keith, 2015b). For example, offenders who took part in the Canberra Reintegrative Sham-

ing Experiments (RISE) were observed to be subject to more stigmatizing names and labels, harassment, and shouting

than offenders who were randomly assigned to court (Barnes et al., 2015, p. 119). Whether or not injustice promotes

group‐oriented behavior depends in part on group identification (Barry & Tyler, 2010). As such, the ties that offenders

have to others should be emphasized to enhance identification with their communities of concern (Braithwaite, 1989;

McCold, 2004; Prichard, 2002). This may be done by ensuring that conference participants are respected and

depended upon by the offender (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015b). Care, however, must be done in highlighting this iden-

tification as stigmatization may only be beneficial if it does not lead offenders to become overly concerned with how

others view them. Rather, if this negative treatment leads offenders to re‐evaluate themselves or their personal moral-

ity, they may attempt to better themselves and repair their relationships with others (Kwon, 2016).

Importantly, even if the experience of injustice harms an offender's social image, as long as restorative practices

allow the offender to make amends, prosocial behavior can still result (Kwon, 2016; Leach & Cidam, 2015). Although

8 of 13 SCHEUERMAN

some harms are more easily amendable than others, prosocial behavior can occur in light of a less reparable offense if

offenders view their social image as flexible and not fixed (Kwon, 2016; Leach & Cidam, 2015). For instance, one pow-

erful motivator of participating in restorative practice is for offenders to alter for the better how they are viewed by

victims and their supporters (Umbreit, Vos, Coates, & Armour, 2006). As such, the experience of injustice may foster

prosocial behavior via a variety of mechanisms.

Group identification can also influence how victims and offenders interact, which highlights a possible fifth

strand of research: understanding better the role that others play in influencing the psychological mechanisms of

restorative justice (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015b). This review focused mainly on the experience and actions of

offenders and not that of victims. Yet, investigating what victims and other participants perceive and experience

can assist in clarifying characteristics of restorative justice that facilitate healing and reduce recidivism (Strang

et al., 2006). For instance, those who share a common social identity with the offender will be better able to

communicate within the conference, which could prevent them from engaging in punishment and intimidation of

the offender (Wenzel et al., 2008). Additionally, victims who learn the life stories of their victimizers are better

poised to empathize with them (Strang et al., 2006), thereby increasing the likelihood that the offender will apol-

ogize and experience adaptive shame‐related emotions (Harris et al., 2004). An apology not only enables the

offender to take accountability for his or her actions but also allows the victim to recover emotionally from the

offense (Strang et al., 2006).

Nevertheless, group identification could produce mixed outcomes within the conference. For instance, in

response to the offender's act, participants in restorative practices could experience vicarious shame, due to their

identification with the offender, or guilt, due to their interpersonal interdependence, or degree to which they interact

and share goals and norms of behavior (Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005). Shame could lead these

others to distance themselves from the offender, which would harm the reparative process, while guilt could foster

healing by making these individuals more cooperative in attempting to repair the harm caused by the offense (Lickel

et al., 2005). This could help to explain why offenders who highly depend upon others present at the conference expe-

rience beneficial outcomes as they are more likely to perceive justice, which would foster the experience of reintegra-

tive shaming (Scheuerman & Keith, 2015b). Future research is needed that assesses the type of emotions other actors

within restorative justice programs experience in order to assess how they might affect their behavior and overall per-

ception and operation of the restorative process.

Last, only a few studies attempt to test the directionality of the relationship between justice, shaming, and shame‐

related emotions (e.g., Murphy & Harris, 2007; Scheuerman & Matthews, 2014). As the relationship between shaming

and shame may be recursive (Harris, 2001, p. 203), more research is needed to test whether emotions are precursors,

mediators, or outcomes of justice and shaming processes (see De Cremer, 2007; Scheuerman, 2014). Indeed, the

experience of negative emotions may precede the recognition of injustice (Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2007). As such,

how offenders manage shame may function as an indicator of their experience of shaming and justice within restor-

ative justice practices. If shame‐related emotions can serve as antecedents of shaming and justice, research should

identify the conditions under which shame management may mediate or precede the relationship between shaming

and offending behavior (see Murphy & Harris, 2007).

7 | CONCLUSION

The existing and emerging literature on justice, restorative justice, shaming, and shame highlights that the effective-

ness of restorative justice depends in part on its underlying psychological mechanisms. The experience of various

types of justice and even that of injustice may foster positive outcomes in the context of restorative justice practices.

Additionally, shame and related emotions can encourage emotional healing if the actions of offenders and not their

persons are condemned. These emotions implicate the importance of attributions within restorative justice processes.

The ways in which individuals account for negative outcomes may assist in restoring offenders, victims, and

SCHEUERMAN 9 of 13

communities if offenders internally attribute their wrongdoing to themselves and identify external factors that

affected their actions. Specifying how these processes link together is the domain of future research.

ENDNOTES 1 It should be noted, however, that genuine forgiveness is not typically achieved and should not be expected. Rather, restor- ative practices should aim to create an environment in which forgiveness is welcomed (for a more detailed discussion, refer to Braithwaite, 2016).

2 This contradiction in classifying shame and its relation to guilt may possibly be resolved conceptually by identifying how reintegrative shaming may be viewed of as “reintegrative guilting” or “the induction of guilt without shame” (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001, p. 8). Nevertheless, empirical findings that focus on restorative justice conferencing promulgate the position that shame‐guilt occurs in the context of offending (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001).

ORCID

Heather L. Scheuerman http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2376-3209

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Heather L. Scheuerman is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Justice Studies at James Madison

University. Her research centers on how social psychological concepts and processes structure behavior, including

crime. A major strand of this research examines how justice and related concepts operate within restorative

justice conferences to affect perceptions and behaviors of offenders. Recent work in this substantive area has

appeared in Restorative Justice: An International Journal, Criminal Justice Policy Review, and Justice Quarterly.

How to cite this article: Scheuerman HL. Understanding shame: Examining how justice and emotions

operate in the context of restorative justice. Sociology Compass. 2018;12:e12561. https://doi.org/10.1111/

soc4.12561

SCHEUERMAN 13 of 13

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