Midterm
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Understanding Environmental Security and Its Causal Factors with Reference to
Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh
This paper explores the causal factors related to environment and security. An attempt has been made to identify the sources of environmental degradation in Bangladesh in general and Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in particular. Homer-Dixon study on environment and security has put forward three causal factors of environmental degradation (increasing population growth, unequal distribution of lands and environmental changes), and it was successfully experimented by Alam in the case of Bangladesh. But the theory of Homer-Dixon (supply-induced scarcity, demand-induced scarcity and structural-induced scarcity) has proved to be insufficient in analyzing the causal factors of environmental degradation in the case of CHT. The empirical scrutiny shows that the non-market variables (religion, regime and nationalism) are the major causal factors of environmental degradation and conflicts in CHT.
© 2014 IUP. All Rights Reserved.
Arun Kumar Nayak*
* Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Government Degree College, Santir Bazar, Tripura, India. E-mail: [email protected]
Introduction There have been debates on the environmental security—relatively a new term in the lexicon of both global environmental politics and international studies—especially since the end of the Cold War. Analysts differ on the causal relations between environmental degradation and serious conflicts, and indeed the whole notion of environmental security is contested. However, the dominant approach to this link between the environment and security has become a new strategic resource, and environmental degradation has become a non-military threat to national and international peace and security. The whole issue of environmental security is therefore counted as a vehicle for enabling us to identify and understand new kinds of threats and instabilities and for thinking about security in more than military terms.1
There is scholarly literature on the subject of environmental degradation and security issues explaining the generation of conflicts within and between the states. However, there were disagreements among themselves while explaining the causal relations. In this context, this study tries to understand the whole discourse of research on environmental security and aims at identifying the causal relations
1 Lorraine Elliott (1998), “What is Environmental Security?: A Conceptual Overview”, in Alan Dupont (Ed.), The Environment and Security: What are the Linkages?, pp. 7-22, Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra.
41Understanding Environmental Security and Its Causal Factors with Reference to Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh
between environmental degradation and violent conflicts of Bangladesh in general and Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in particular.2
Environmental Degradation and National Security There have been debates on environmental degradation and national security both nationally and internationally, especially since the 1980s. It was largely due to acute environmental pressure triggered by increasing population, greater consumption of resources, pressure on agricultural lands, heavy industrialization, large-scale deforestation, pollution, mining and climate change, etc.3
The traditional concept of national security has dominated the international system during the Cold War. It was viewed as a successful pursuit of interstate power competition. But environmental security represents a significant departure from this approach to national security. The term ‘security’ was defined excessively based on narrow understandings; however, it gradually began to change in the 1990s. Environmental degradation as national security was recognized by the officials of the US. It was the Bush administration which acknowledged environmental security as part of overall US security. Later, the Clinton administration integrated environmental security with its national security policy by following the concept of national security in its 1994 national security document. It mentioned that the decreasing renewable resources are posing a risk by destabilizing regional stability and in due course blocking economic growth around the world. Therefore, it emphasizes on partnerships between governments and non-governmental organizations to mitigate the emerging environmental challenges.4 The UNDP also urged that environmental security should be part of a comprehensive approach to security and explained that one should move away from a narrow military and defensive meaning of security and give highest importance to environmental security. It is a huge problem accelerated by human activity causing concerns for both the planetary ecosystem and the future generations. People, states, and economies cannot be secure unless the ecosystem is secure. The increasing rate of environmental degradation has become the source of economic disruption, social tension and political antagonism.5
2 Lester Brown (1977), Redefining National Security, Worldwatch Paper, No. 14, Washington DC; Johan Galtung (1982), Environment, Development and Military Activity: Towards Alternative Security Doctrines, Norwegian University Press, Oslo, Norway; Richard H Ullman (1983), “Redefining Security”, International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 129-153; Carsten F Ronnfeldt (1997), “Three Generations of Environment and Security Research”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 473-482; Wenche Hague and Tanja Ellingsen (1998), “Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 299-317; Manus I Midlarsky (1998), “Democracy and the Environment: An Empirical Assessment”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 341-361; and Charles-Philippe David and Jean Francois Gagne (2006-2007), “Natural Resources: A Source of Conflict?”, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Vol. LXII, No. 1, Winter, pp. 5-17.
3 Graeme Hugo (1996), “Environmental Concerns and International Migrations”, International Migration Review, Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 113.
4 Gareth Porter (1995), “Environmental Security as National Security Issue”, Current History, Vol. 94, No. 952, May, pp. 221-222.
5 Elliott (1998), op. cit., pp. 19-21.
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The incorporation of environmental degradation into the security area of state raises a question: Does each and every environmental degradation have an impact on environmental security? The answer is no. All categories of environmental degradation do not come under the scope of environmental security. The understanding of environmental security addresses two distinct issues: the environmental factors behind potentially violent conflicts, and the impact of global environmental degradation on the wellbeing of societies and economies. Environmental degradation is considered as a security issue when it causes violent conflicts and it appears to be consistent with the traditional definition of national security. The first issue of environmental security primarily refers to any threat to the wellbeing of societies, either from an external force or by the public policies. The second refers to the serious degradation of natural resources (freshwater, soils, forests, fishery resources and biological diversity) and vital life support systems (the ozone layer, climate system, oceans and atmosphere) accelerated by global economic activities.6
The understanding of environmental degradation and its linkage with conflicts therefore needs to make a clear distinction between renewable and nonrenewable resources. Renewable resources include freshwater, air, soils, forests, atmosphere and biological diversity which are integrated into the ecosystem, and ensure their replacement and preservation. Minerals and fossil fuels are known as nonrenewable resources and their exhaustion would cause depletion not degradation. The renewable resources are not easily substituted and in some cases, they are not substitutable, at all. The conflicts caused due to the depletion of nonrenewable resources are not categorized under the framework of environmental security. Only those conflicts that arise due to degradation of renewable resources are considered as environmental security.7
The environmental insecurity caused by environmental degradation has multiple implications. Most important among them is the cross-border migration of the people, and most of the victims in these cases are the ethnic communities. As a result, conflicts between migrants and the host communities are obvious. Such cases are more noticeable in developing countries compared to the developed countries.8 Migration has both positive and negative impacts. Positive contribution could be the positive changes in the economy of the host countries. On the other hand, negative consequences include arms trafficking, drug smuggling, and trafficking of women and children, over which many host governments have little control. These security concerns are magnified when a host country fails to provide sufficient assistance to the large-scale migrants. Thus, host states perceive protracted refugee situations as
6 Porter (1995), op. cit., pp. 218-221. 7 Narotam Gaan (2001), “Rethinking Security: The Environment Approach”, International Studies,
Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 308-309. 8 Myron Weiner (1992-93), “Security, Stability and Migration”, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3,
pp. 91-126.
43Understanding Environmental Security and Its Causal Factors with Reference to Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh
posing direct and indirect threat to their national security and regime survival. However, not all refugees are seen as a threat. In this sense, the importance of ethnic and religious affinity cannot be overstated. If the host community perceives the incoming refugee as ‘one of us’, then positive and generous conception of distributive justice applies. Conversely, if refugees are seen as members of an ‘out group’, they are likely to receive hostile reception. In these cases, it becomes a threat to the balanced multiethnic societies and destabilizes the political balance of power.9
Research on Environment and Security It is in the 1970s and the early 1980s that the theories of relative deprivation and of resource mobilization featured prominently in research on conflict causation. There are certain factors which triggered the research community to look into the area to be researched. First, the introduction of the concept ‘sustainable development’ by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 1980 along with the Brundtland Commission Report of 1987 raised awareness on environmental degradation across the world. Secondly, the end of the Cold War during the 1990s ensured the search for a new security paradigm, and thus many writings and debates were opened up to link environmental degradation and conflicts which cause national security threats.10
Ronnfeldt has brilliantly conceptualized the discourse of research on environment and security and classified them into three generations.11 The first generation of researchers were very much critical of the traditional notion of security, and they actively debated to broaden the concept of state security in general and incorporate the environmental concerns into the security concerns in particular.12 Among them, Ullman13 excellently criticized and claimed that the American-defined national security is excessively military in nature. He argues that more concentration on perceived military threats leads to militarization of international relations and increases global insecurity. National insecurity does not come always from beyond the borders of one’s own country, but it often arises within it. The actions and events (natural disasters, epidemics, catastrophic floods, drought, famine, climate change, etc.) also threaten drastically and degrade the quality of life of the populace of the state. The increasing population growth and its demand for both renewable (forests, fish stocks, freshwater, air, soils, atmosphere and biological, etc.) and nonrenewable resources (Minerals and fossil fuels) also poses a great threat to all states, irrespective of their size.14
9 Gil Loescher and James Milner (2005), Protracted Refugee Situations: Domestic and International Security Implications, ADELPHI Paper, 375, pp. 32-34, July, USA and Canada.
10 Hague and Ellingsen (1998), op. cit., pp. 229-230. 11 Ronnfeldt (1997), op. cit., pp. 473-482. 12 Lester (1977), op. cit.; Galtung (1982), op. cit.; and Ullman (1983), op. cit. 13 Ullman (1983), op. cit. 14 Ullman (1983), op. cit., pp. 129-153.
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Although the first generation of research conceptually linked the causal relations with environmental degradation and conflicts, criticisms were made in the early 1990s on the ground that it only linked conceptually without any empirical evidence. Therefore, the second generation of research took many case studies for empirical verification in the 1990s. Among them, the work of Homer-Dixon15 has brilliantly testified the aforesaid causal relations by taking a number of empirical case studies. He finds that many parts of the developing countries are already facing environmental scarcities, causing violent conflicts, which are possibly the early signs of rise of violence in the coming decades and that would be sub-national, persistent and diffuse. He ascertained three main causes of environmental scarcities: (i) environmental changes, (ii) population growth, and (iii) unequal distribution of resources. First refers to human-induced decline both in terms of quantity and quality of renewable resources that degrade at a faster rate than are renewed by the natural processes. Second, the per capita availability of resources is being reduced day by day owing to increase in the population growth. Third, unequal resource distribution due to disproportionate concentration of resources in the society is empowering a few people to access bigger slice of resources.16
However, this generation is also not free from criticisms. In spite of a number of empirical studies undertaken, the approach or the model received severe criticisms from the third generation in the mid-1990s. Hague and Ellingsen17 argue that the Dixon model has some parallels in economic theories of the market, which can be composed into three dimensions: (i) supply-induced scarcity, (ii) demand-induced scarcity, and (iii) structural scarcity. It has given absolute importance to economic variables and ignored other variables (political and economic factors, type of regime, form of government, economic development, etc.) while linking the causal relations between environmental degradation and conflicts.18
Complementing the above criticism, David and Gagne19 claim that there is a negative relationship between non-democratic regime and environmental protection. Political violence is common in semi-democratic and non-democratic regimes. Enjoyment of limited civil liberties and neglected mediating mechanisms create a window of opportunities for various opposition forces to mobilize and organize against the regime. The lack of diversity in political representation in government institutions produces numerous opposition groups and wins domestic and foreign political support to accelerate their agitations and it sometimes disrupts the delivery of public services and the state faces difficulties to govern, which in turn heightens
15 Thomas F Homer-Dixon (1994), “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 5-40.
16 Homer-Dixon (1994), op. cit. 17 Hague and Ellingsen (1998), op. cit. 18 Ibid., pp. 229-234; Nils Petter Gleditsch (1998), “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the
Literature”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 381-396. 19 Charles-Philippe and Jean Francois (2006-2007), op. cit., pp. 12-16.
45Understanding Environmental Security and Its Causal Factors with Reference to Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh
the risk of civil war and insurgency. In response to it, state militarizes the region to suppress the movement and it becomes the only tool of political communication.20
On the other hand, Midlarsky21 claims that there is a positive relationship between democratic regime and the protection of environment, which respects individual rights in contrast to authoritarian states. The environmentalists freely market their ideas and implement them in environmental legislation. Democratic governments are more responsive and accountable to public opinion and are more cooperative with the international environmental agencies to mitigate the environmental degradation. However, many times, democratic governments even face difficulties in protecting their environment. Sometimes, Multinational Corporations (MNCs) control the nuts and bolts of daily democratic governance, which is very different from the ideal. Secondly, the absence of inclusive economic growth and the existence of income inequality in the society causes barriers to environment protection.22
The discussion on these three generations of research and their methods and approaches has indeed given broader insights and has inculcated a big picture in the minds of the researchers to explore other dynamics of linkage between environmental degradation and conflicts. Following the methods and approaches of third generation, here, an initiative has been made to explain various causes of environmental degradation in Bangladesh in general and Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in particular.23
Natural Resources of Bangladesh The study of Alam24 on Bangladesh has shown that the country is facing acute scarcity of natural resources due to (i) environmental changes, (ii) extreme population pressure, and (iii) unequal distribution of resources. It is the most important and constantly changing factor in the ecological equation affecting the demand on the natural resources of Bangladesh. The absence of hope for survival in other parts of their own country leaves them with no other option but to migrate to India in
20 David Charles-Philippe and Gange Jean Francois (2006-2007), “Natural Resources: A Source of Conflict?”, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Vol. LXII, No. 1, Winter, pp. 12-16.
21 Midlarsky (1998), op. cit. 22 Midlarsky (1998), op. cit., pp. 341-347. 23 Yuri V Gankovsky (1974), “The Social Structure of Society in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh”, Asian
Survey, Vol. 14, No. 3, March, pp. 220-230; Willem Van Schendel (1992), “The Invention of ‘Jummas’: State Formation and Ethnicity in Southeastern Bangladesh”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 95- 97; Ajay Darshan Behera (1996), “Insurgency in the Bangladesh Hills: Search for Autonomy”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. XIX, No. 9, pp. 985-986; Rahman Safiduqur Khan (2003), “Indigenous Peoples in Bangladesh: Land Rights and Land Use in the Context of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)”, Master Thesis, pp. 9-15, Faculty of Law, Lund University, Sweden, May 16, available at http://www.jur.lu.se/Internet/ english/essay/Masterth.nsf/0/9E1E3437C900AFB0C1256D5D0040DDFF/$File/xsmall.pdf? OpenElement. Retrieved on 12/05/2007.
24 Sarfaraz Alam (2003), “Environmental Induced Migration from Bangladesh to India”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 3, July-September, pp. 422-438.
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large numbers and it has become a major source of tension between the two countries.25
He argues that Bangladesh being an agricultural country, land is the most important natural resource for livelihood. However, the extreme population growth in the country has reduced the man-land ratio to a great extent, which is unfavorable for sustainable food production. According to the 2001 Census, the population of Bangladesh has reached 129.2 million from 42.16 million in 1951. And the density of population too has increased from 285 to 975 persons per sq. km, which reduced the man-land per capita ratio at 0.15 acre, and it became a factor responsible for acute scarcity of land resources in the country. Besides population growth, unequal distribution of land too is an important factor for land scarcity in the country. According to the National Agricultural Census undertaken in 1996, 24.14% of farmers (who are rich) own 56.89% and operate on 58.81% of the land. On the other hand, landless and small farmers (each owning up to 1.49 acres of land) constitute 64% of total households of the country, but own only 26.24% and operate on 23.3% of the land. Land scarcity is further accentuated by severe environmental changes ravaged by large-scale natural disasters such as riverbank erosion, cyclones accompanied by storm surges, floods and droughts in the country. Bangladesh lies within the combined delta of three major rivers: the Ganges, the Brahmaputra-Jamuna and the Meghna. The low deltaic terrain, extreme rainfall in the nearby hills, and high flows from these large catchments mean that over 20% of Bangladesh is inundated in a ‘normal’ flood year. It exceeds 36% during severe floods, which is nearly 60% of the net cultivable areas.26
Chittagong Hill Tracts It seems true from the above study that Bangladesh is facing acute environmental crunch triggered by population growth, unequal distribution of land and environmental changes. However, the study has some limitations; it is purely based on the statistical data and economic theories of demand-supply relationship. It is well known that statistical data always does not show the reality and this study shows that in the case of CHT, non-market economic variables (religion, regime and nationalism) play a greater role in changing the environment.
It is true that population has been increasing in CHT and the rate of degradation of renewable resources both in quantity and quality is faster than it is renewed by the natural processes (demand-induced scarcity). But the trend of decreasing indigenous people (tribals) and increasing Bengali population in the CHT is justifying other factors of population growth. In 1872, the tribals constituted 98%, whereas the Bengalis constituted 2%. In 1901, the tribals constituted 93%, while the Bengalis increased to 7%. In 1951, the Bengali population in CHT rose to 9%, 41% in 1981
25 Alam (2003), op. cit. 26 Ibid.
47Understanding Environmental Security and Its Causal Factors with Reference to Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh
and 49% in 1991. It is a fact that economic migrants from the plains of Bangladesh have been coming to CHT for many years. However, tribals in CHT, who constituted 91% in 1951, were suddenly reduced to 59% in 1981. Such drastic demographic changes within three decades were no doubt influenced by other factors. The study shows that the major reasons are the introduction of drastic political and administrative reforms in Bangladesh, combined with ethno-cultural factors, besides other factors like religion, regime and nationalism.27
Bangladesh is known for its least ethnic diversity in South Asia, where Bengalis constitute 98% of the total population and the rest 2% comprises 12 distinct ethnic groups. The former are largely concentraed in the plains and the latter generally live in the hilly tracts known as Chittagong Hill Tracts. This area constitutes about 10% of the total territory of the country, covered with dense forests and plenty of natural resources, which is subdivided into three districts (Khagracherri, Bandarban and Rangamati) for its administrative convenience. The people of this region belong to the Sino-Tibetan descent group and closely resemble the people of northeast India, Myanmar and Thailand and are distinct from the people of the plains of Bangladesh. The people of CHT practice Buddhism and, on the other hand, the rest of the population of the country (Bengalis) follow Islam. However, they have their rich cultural heritage irrespective of their diversified language and religion.28
Agriculture is the prime source of livelihood for the hill people and hence land is the prime resource for them. Their traditional agricultural economy represented a reasonably harmonious adjustment to environmental and social conditions and it consists of five predominant subsistence activities: rice cultivation, animal husbandry, fruit cultivation, horticulture, timber and bamboo extraction for household consumption. The economic activities of the CHT can be divided into three classes: (1) big land-owners, (2) peasant (flatland) producers, and (3) landless cultivators, who practice slash-and-burn or shifting cultivation locally known as jhum cultivation. However, land suitable for rice cultivation is 100,000 acre which is only 3% of the total land of the CHT. Thus practicing jhum cultivation is inevitable for the hill people.29
27 Behera (1996), op. cit., p. 998; Raja Devashish Roy (1997), “The Population Programme of 1980s and the Land Rights of the Indigenous People of Chittagong Hill Tracts”, in Subir Bhaumik, Meghana Guhathakurta and Sabyasachi Basu Ray Choudhury (Eds.), Living on the Edge: Essays on Chittagong Hill Tracts, pp. 167-208, South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Kathamandu; and Arun Kumar Nayak (2005), “Environmental Induced Conflicts in Bangladesh”, South Asia Politics, Vol. 4, No. 8, December, p. 40.
28 Philip Gain (1998), Bangladesh Land Forests and Forest People, Society for Environment and Human Development (SEHD), Dhaka; Philip Gain (2000), “Life Nature at Risk”, in Philip Gain (Ed.), The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Life and Nature at Risk, Society for Environment and Human Development (SEHD), Dhaka; Philip Gain (2001), “Land Use Policies in Chittagong Hill Tracts”, Earth Touch, June, pp. 20-28; Philip Gain (2002), The Last Forests of Bangladesh, Society for Environment and Human Development (SEHD), Dhaka; Gankovsky (1974), op. cit.; Schendel (1992), op. cit.; Behera (1996), op. cit.; and Khan (2003), op. cit.
29 Gain (2000), op. cit., pp. 13-15.
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During the British rule, the region of CHT was administered under the CHT Regulation Act of 1900, which declared the region as an excluded area.30 Under this regulation, CHT was given regional autonomy and the tribals were enjoying a variety of rights over the land.31 The Government of India Act 1935 too mentioned it as a ‘totally excluded area’ and outsiders were prohibited from entering the region and interfere with them.32 However, they lost their ‘autonomy’ and their status of ‘excluded’ area soon after the independence of Pakistan (earlier Bangladesh was part of Pakistan, known as East Pakistan). The region was administered directly by the Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Government of Pakistan. Although the constitution of 1956 and 1962 of Government of Pakistan maintained CHT as excluded area, later the constitutional amendment in 1963 abrogated the CHT Regulation of 1900 to exploit the natural resources of the region and started to acquire land in the name of public purpose by introducing the CHT (Land Acquisition) Regulation, 1958 (Government of East Pakistan, 1958).
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan introduced a number of developmental projects in the CHT which caused large-scale environmental degradation and loss of livelihood to the tribals. The first large-scale development project was the Pakistan’s National Pride ‘Karnaphuli Paper Mills’, which started its production in 1953, which was given 99 years to extract raw materials (bamboo and softwood) from the forest areas. The Karnaphuli Rayon Mill and Kaptai Hydroelectric Project were constructed in 1963 and 1966, respectively.33 The Kaptai Dam submerged 54,000 acres of cultivable land, and about 100,000 people lost their homes. Massive environmental degradation caused by such projects brought far-reaching effects on sustainable economy, life style, and severe livelihood crisis among the tribals. It is estimated that approximately 40,000 tribals were forced to cross the border and become refugees in the northeastern states of India due to the construction of Kaptai Dam alone.34 Apart from land acquisitions, encouragement of commercial plantations (rubber and teak) in CHT by the government further aggravated the situation. Rubber plantations began in CHT in 1959 on an experimental basis and within a decade the government took over
30 Roy (1998), op. cit., pp. 56-79. 31 Schendel (1992), op. cit., pp. 110-115; and Swapna Bhattacharya (2001), “The Refugee Generating
Chittagong Hill Tracts: Past, Present and Future”, in Sanjoy K Roy (Ed.), Refugee and Human Rights: Social and Political Dynamics of Refugee Problem in Eastern and Northeastern India, p. 325, Rawat Publications, Jaipur and New Delhi.
32 Behera (1996), op. cit., p. 987. 33 Nafis Ahmad (1950), “Industrial Development in East Bengal (East Pakistan)”, Economic Geography,
Vol. 26, No. 3, July, pp. 183-195; and Gain (2000), op. cit., pp. 30-36. 34 David E Sopher (1963), “Population Dislocation in Chittagong Hills”, Geographical Review, Vol. 53,
No. 3, July, pp. 339-362; Shaukat Hassan (1991), “Environmental Issues and Security in South Asia”, pp. 24-25, Adelphi Papers 262, Autumn; and Norwegian Refugee Council (2006), “Bangladesh: Minorities Increasingly at Risk of Displacement”, Internal Monitoring Displacement Centre, Norway, March 28, pp. 27-28, available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/ DEE60477D0B99F 33C125713F002EFFD8/$file/Bangladesh+-March+2006.pdf. Retrieved on March 20, 2007.
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40,000 acres of land to promote commercial plantations and it caused the source of conflicts over land on which ethnic communities held customary rights.35
Such policies of Government of Pakistan threatened the source of livelihood, ethnic identity and culture of the tribals of CHT. Against this backdrop, they began to resist such policies and, in 1966, an underground political party was formed known as CHT Welfare Association with the aim and intention to protect their rights. However, it was dissolved in 1972 with the formation of Parbottya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS), headed by Manobendra Narayon Larma, to lead the movement.36
Conversely, the Government of Pakistan saw it as guerilla activity spilling over the border from hostile neighbor states of India and Myanmar and suppressed their struggle.37 However, with the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, tribals hoped to get back their cultural autonomy and rights and placed a four-point charter of demands before the Prime Minister, Mujibur Rehman. However, he was in no mood to listen to their demands and clearly expressed, “We are all Bengalis, we cannot have two systems of governments,”38 and advised them “to do away with their ethnic identities” and “emphasized on Bengali nationalism and culture.”39 Hence, the movement led to a cultural and religious conflict between tribals (Buddhists) and Bengalis (Muslims).
The Mujibur Rehman government identified the movement for regional autonomy as a “national security problem”, called it a secessionist movement and deployed police forces in CHT to suppress the autonomy movement. The same strategy was even followed by Zia-ur-Rehman and Mohammad Ershad as well.40 The large-scale military persecution in the region further forced tribals to migrate to the northeastern states of India. About 40,000 tribals migrated to Mizoram in 1983 and 50,000 to Tripura in 1986.41
35 Gain (2001), op. cit., pp. 23-26; Nayak (2005), op. cit., pp. 39-40; Nayak Arun Kumar (2006), “Chakmas: Living on the Edge in Bangladesh”, Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, July-September, pp. 61-62; and Gain (2002), op. cit., pp. 41-48.
36 Montu Kazi (1980), “Tribal Insurgency in Chittagong Hill Tracts”, Economic and Political Weekly, September 6, p. 1510.
37 M Q Zaman (1982), “Crisis in Chittagong Hill Tracts: Ethnicity and Integration”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 78.
38 S R Chakravarty (1995), Bangladesh under Mujib, Jia and Ersad: Dilemmas of a New Nation, pp. 7-15, Har-Anand Publication, New Delhi; Sanjoy Hazarika (1995), Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India’s Northeast, p. 278, Penguin Books, New Delhi; Amena Mohsin (1997), “Military Hegemony and the Chittagong Hill Tracts”, in Subir Bhaumik, Meghana Guhathakurta and Sabyasachi Basu Ray Choudhury (Eds), Living on the Edge: Essays on Chittagong Hill Tracts, pp. 18-19, South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Kathmandu; and Rajesh S Kharat (2003), “From Internal Displacement to Refugees: The Traumas of Chakmas in Bangladesh”, p. 6, research paper presented at Researching International Displacement: State of the Art International Conference on IDPs, February 7-8, Trondheim, Norway, available at http://www.idp.ntnu.no/Register/UpLoadFiles/Rajesh_Kharat_idp-ef.pdf. Retrieved on May 06, 2007.
39 Zaman (1982), op. cit., p. 78. 40 Mohsin (1997), op. cit., pp. 18-20. 41 Peter J Bertocci (1985), “Bangladesh in 1984: A Year of Protracted Turmoil”, Asian Survey, Vol. XXV, No.
2, pp. 163; and Kharat (2003), op. cit., pp. 9-10.
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Apart from the deployment of police forces, the government encouraged Bengalis in plains to settle permanently in the CHT. This was a strategy devised by the government to suppress the ethnic people and make the country a greater Bengal society. The first population transfer program was started in 1973 by the Mujibur Rehman government and later it was followed by Ziaur-Rahman and Mohammad Ershad too.42 Under this program, approximately, 4,41,000 Bengali people were transferred from the plain lands to CHT, which violated their individual as well as the collective land rights and accelerated the livelihood crisis further. Having no options, again, they were forced to migrate to the northeastern states of India on a larger scale.43
It is being argued that the overpopulation in the plains (827 persons per sq. km) justified the Bengali settlement in the CHT (96 persons per sq. km). The government claims that Bengalis are settled in the empty Khas land of CHT owned by the government, therefore there has been no encroachment of private property. But the much-publicized notion of ‘emptiness’ of land or the Khas land in the CHT is essentially the hill people’s traditional jhum land and forestland. For the hill people, this is a common property belonging to the community and kinship groups and even members of spiritual world.44 A study on CHT relating to land-man ratio shows that even before the construction of Kaptai Dam, the available cultivated lands were insufficient for the CHT population. It is clearly noticeable that the government only managed to compensate for one-third of the lands submerged by Kaptai Dam due to acute scarcity of land in CHT.45
It was well known that migration of Bengalis to the CHT has been continuing from the pre-colonial period and even after the independence of Pakistan. The hill people never opposed the natural migration of Bengalis since they had not come as land grabbers or posed any threat to their survival. But they started to oppose when the pattern of migration changed from ‘natural’ to ‘political’ soon after the independence of Bangladesh, which altered the demographic balance of CHT, and it posed a challenge to the hill people in maintaining their livelihood.46 However, after 25 years, the conflict came to an end when human rights violation of Government of Bangladesh on tribals was exposed and criticized by various international human rights organizations. An historic Accord was signed on December 2, 1997 between the PCJSS and the Awami League government headed by Sheikh Hasina, which was
42 Zaman (1982), op. cit., p. 78; and Kharat (2003), op. cit., pp. 8-9. 43 Kharat (2003), op. cit., pp. 9-10; Raja Devashish Roy (1997), “The Population Programme of 1980s and
the Land Rights of the Indigenous People of Chittagong Hill Tracts”, in Subir Bhaumik, Meghana Guhathakurta and Sabyasachi Basu Ray Choudhury (Eds.), Living on the Edge: Essays on Chittagong Hill Tracts, pp. 167-191, South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Kathmandu.
44 Mohsin Amena (2000), “State Hegemony”, in Philip Gain (Ed.), The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Life and Nature at Risk, pp. 66-70, Society for Environment and Human Development (SEHD), Dhaka.
45 Ibid. 46 Ibid.
51Understanding Environmental Security and Its Causal Factors with Reference to Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh
declared as a ‘landmark achievement’ by the government. However, the opposition, Bangladesh National Party (BNP), which follows the ideology of Islamic nationalism denounced it and called it a ‘black pact’ and alleged that it violated both the country’s sovereignty and its unitary constitution.47 Although an Accord had been signed, no sincere efforts were made to ensure its implementation and the same situation continued to prevail. The situation further aggravated when Khaleda Zia-led BNP in coalition with the Jamaat-e-Islami came back to power in the 2001 elections. The government claimed that the Accord signed by PCJSS made them second class citizens and a movement known as ‘Sama Odhikar Andolan’ (movement for equal rights), was started, reportedly backed by the government, and the population transfer program was again continued. It too promoted various developmental projects in the CHT and declared half of the land of CHT as ‘Reserve Forests’, which caused the eviction of 2,000 people from their land.48
Conclusion This study shows how bureaucratic mismanagement of environment and induced population growth in CHT led to environmental degradation and conflicts in the region, triggered by the forces of nationalism and enforced by the civil-military regime of Bangladesh. The Government of Pakistan in the initial years of independence brought certain administrative reforms in the CHT in order to ensure nationalism in the country, and it indirectly became the root cause of environmental degradation, livelihood crisis and conflicts in the region. The conflict was further aggravated by the Government of Bangladesh when it forcefully acquired the customary lands of tribals to suppress their autonomy movement and to make the country a greater Bengal society by introducing population transfer program in CHT with the help of military as well as religious persecutions. The civil-military regime of Bangladesh undemocratically violated the customary law of the tribals, and the conflicts in the region became a factor responsible for the environmental degradation in the region. The government disregarded the sustainable management of environment, practiced by tribals, which had been providing them livelihood for generations. Such factors led to acute shortage of resources for livelihood, and hence the indigenous people or tribals were forced to cross the border as stateless citizens into the neighboring Indian states.
Contextualizing the case of CHT with regard to research on environmental degradation and conflicts, it is very clear that noneconomic variables too play a greater role as causal factors besides economic variables. The study has shown that there is a negative relationship between non-democratic regime and environmental protections, which leads to curtailment of civil liberties of the people, which in turn leads to civil war and insurgency.
47 Bhattacharya (2001), op. cit., p. 333; M Rashiduzzaman (1998), “Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord: Institutional Features and Strategic Concerns”, Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 7, pp. 654-656.
48 Norwegian Refugee Council (2006), op. cit., pp. 31-46.
The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. VIII, No. 4, 201452
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Reference # 55J-2014-10-03-01
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