fsmt311 week 8 final project

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4425795:Week_8_Final_Project.docx by Brandon Olsen

From Week 8 Final Project (402978)

Processed on 29-Dec-2019 12:40 AM EST ID: 1238620942 Word Count: 1239

Turnitin Originality Report

sources:

9% match (Internet from 11-Nov-2019) https://www.sfpe.org/page/2006_Q3_4

3% match (Internet from 27-Oct-2018) http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.694.3722&rep=rep1&type=pdf

2% match (student papers from 20-Aug-2019) Submitted to American Public University System on 2019-08-20

2% match (student papers from 01-Jan-2014) Submitted to Columbia Southern University on 2014-01-01

2% match (student papers from 07-Nov-2017) Submitted to Embry Riddle Aeronautical University on 2017-11-07

2% match (student papers from 04-Aug-2013) Submitted to Columbia Southern University on 2013-08-04

2% match (student papers from 15-Oct-2013) Submitted to Columbia Southern University on 2013-10-15

2% match (student papers from 01-Sep-2019) Submitted to Kaplan University on 2019-09-01

1% match (student papers from 28-Oct-2019) Submitted to American Public University System on 2019-10-28

1% match (Internet from 26-Jun-2019) http://brookmeyer.dxjav1.xyz/zoellnitz-men.html

1% match (student papers from 26-Aug-2019)

1/2/2020 Turnitin Originality Report

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Submitted to University of Birmingham on 2019-08-26

1% match (student papers from 10-Apr-2014) Submitted to University of Central Lancashire on 2014-04-10

1% match (Internet from 14-Dec-2016) https://failures.wikispaces.com/The+Station+nightclub? responseToken=0aad07f0e9a8f1f608921557c70ca085

1% match (student papers from 06-Jan-2019) Submitted to Kaplan University on 2019-01-06

1% match (student papers from 23-Feb-2017) Submitted to CSU, San Diego State University on 2017-02-23

1% match (student papers from 08-Dec-2012) Submitted to Kaplan University on 2012-12-08

1% match (student papers from 22-Aug-2019) Submitted to American Public University System on 2019-08-22

1% match (student papers from 25-Sep-2012) Submitted to Columbia Southern University on 2012-09-25

1% match (student papers from 30-Jun-2018) Submitted to American Public University System on 2018-06-30

1% match (student papers from 11-Dec-2019) Submitted to Victoria University on 2019-12-11

1% match (student papers from 29-Oct-2017) Submitted to American Public University System on 2017-10-29

1% match (student papers from 31-Dec-2017) Submitted to American Public University System on 2017-12-31

1% match (student papers from 20-Feb-2013) Submitted to Columbia Southern University on 2013-02-20

1% match (student papers from 30-Oct-2014) Submitted to University of Canterbury on 2014-10-30

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< 1% match (student papers from 29-Apr-2018) Submitted to American Public University System on 2018-04-29

< 1% match (student papers from 23-Oct-2012) Submitted to Columbia Southern University on 2012-10-23

paper text:

22Fire Dynamics: The Station Nightclub Fire Calamity Brandon Olsen American Public University

29DEC19

19Fire Dynamics: The Station Nightclub Fire Calamity Fire outbreak is one of the

deadliest jeopardies on earth. When they occur, they destroy a lot of properties and take away many lives. Thus, fire safety and prevention dynamics are crucial aspects of life from both individual and communal levels; this was arguably the main lesson from

25the Station Nightclub Fire Outbreak. Overview of the Fire

13The Station Nightclub was a popular and dominant club in West Warwick, Rhode Island.

The fire

21broke out in the night of February 20, 2003, a

Thursday

26during a live performance of the Great White

band.

15462 people were in attendance surpassing the club’s capacity of 404.

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Around 100 people died while at least 230 got injured (Duval, 2016). The figures saw the fire enter the world’s books of history regarding fire calamities. The fire broke out when onstage pyrotechnics kindled soundproofing froth in the backstage. One minute hardly ended and the whole stage was engulfed.

23The fire then spread quickly throughout the club. The bulk of the

audience dashed towards the main entrance; however, they could not rescue themselves quickly because of big crowd according to Duval (2016). The back entrance could have helped in exiting but the club’s bouncers prevented those who tried to use it maintaining that it was exclusively for the band. Around 90% of the deaths occurred at the main entrances where the fatalities were overawed by smoke inhalation. According to specialists, this calamity was avertible. Dynamics of the Fire Immediately the fire hit headlines, it became a subject for various forms of inquiry.

10The Fire Research Division at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

specifically launched a probe into the causes of the fire in a bid to develop prevention and control solutions for the future (Barylick, 2015). In its report, NIST established that the flammable soundproofing acoustic form was the cause of the fire while the hazardous mixture of the building materials were among the core factors, which facilitated the fire making it severe. The club was wood-framed, for a case in point, while its ceiling was also made from combustible wood materials. Other factors included lack of automatic sprinklers and inadequate exits according to Barylick (2015). The fire

20reached flashover within a minute, causing all inflammable materials to catch fire and burn.

This resulted into an

5intense black smoke, which engulfed the club within approximately 5½ minutes. A video footage of the calamity displays its ignition, rapid growth, and the billowing smoke, which hardly allowed escape, as well as the blocked egress, which further mired evacuation. Practically, this fire was

as a result of an architectural error in the designing and construction of the club (Barylick, 2015). Fire safety was not considered in all architectural stages. The acoustic foam only ignited the fire, but it is the inflammable

17materials that were used in the construction of the building

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that sustained the fire and led to its rampant and quick spread. If incombustible materials such as concrete were used in the ceiling and frames of the building, for instance, specialists reveal that the fire would not have been that fatal and would not have spread so fast and stayed for that long. The club’s temperature situation also sustained and expedited the fire. According to FDS simulations and fire experts, the club’s temperature facilitated the ignition of the burnable surfaces and structures in the club (Barylick, 2015). Inquiry reports showed that the

4heat release rate (HRR) of 1500kW/m2 and a maximum burning rate of 0.008kg/m2s in the

club created a conducive environment

4for the initial burning locations and burnable surfaces respectively.

Revisiting The Fire’s Lessons: The New Codes Entering the world’s books of history of calamities, The Station Nightclub Fire Outbreak no doubt taught the world a lot of lessons particularly regarding its prevention and control. From these lessons, new and tougher building and safety codes were established. The 2003 model codes required the installation of all premises with sprinkler systems as one of the precautionary measures for fighting any fire calamity (Firehouse, 2018). There was also

8the tentative interim amendment (TIA), which was approved in July 2003. It required that sprinklers are fitted in the existing nightclub facilities venues with capacities of more than 100

people. Additionally, Firehouse (2018) reported that the board delineated that restrictions are executed on festival orchestra in both

2new and existing facilities if the capacity is more than 250 persons, unless

the facility meets the life safety credibility. The Conducted Fire Dynamics Simulator Model Overview and Purpose

2The focus of this simulation was to probe the conditions, which may have been present in the club in the fire’s early stages

(Madrzykowski, Bryner & Kerber, 2006). Thus, the main

3purpose of the simulation was to determine the cause of the fire.

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Pictures from the WPRI video were used in the development of the model input in the establishment of the location of the different inner surfaces in the club. They were also utilized

1as a general resource for verifying the physical organization of the club. The simulation was performed for 300 seconds to scrutinise the time period from ignition to the estimated moment of application of water by the fire

brigade team (Madrzykowski, Bryner & Kerber, 2006). The computation encompassed

1simulated fire and smoke spread, potential temperatures, oxygen concentrations, and visibility, which may have been present in the actual occurrence. All these parameters were then compared to published tenability

standards.

1The full simulation results were then compared with the WPRI video recording of the incident

to test their credibility.

1In addition, analysis of the simulation considered published tenability criteria and the location of the victims within the nightclub. Results and

Recommendations The simulation results revealed that

24conditions that existed in the initial stages of the fire

facilitated its ignition and spread. The first one is

1the significant differences in temperature between the 1.5 m (5 ft) elevation and 0.6 m (2 ft), which occurred in the main barroom and the main entrance

(Madrzykowski, Bryner & Kerber, 2006). The oxygen volume fraction also facilitated the evolution of the fire. However, the simulation indicated that the

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12open doors and windows allowed in sufficient fresh air, which maintained a level of tenability

in areas around the windows and the main entryway. Moreover, the simulation showed that sprinklers would have prevented flashovers in the incidence. From these findings, the following recommendations, among many others were reached according to Madrzykowski, Bryner and Kerber (2006); • • systems. Limitation of nightclub’s capacity to 100 Mandatory

16installation of NFPA 13-compliant automatic fire sprinkler • Clear identification of

flammable

7materials such as non-fire-retarded polyurethane foam. They should

also

7be specifically forbidden for interior finish material in all nightclubs • Strict regulation of

the use of pyrotechnics in nightclubs • Endorsement of the use of

2up-to-date fire safety codes across the board; hence, eliminating the umbrella clause.

References

11Firehouse, (2018). The station fire lead to tougher building, safety codes.

The Providence Journal, R.I. Retrieved on 27th December

32019 from https://www.firehouse.com/prevention- investigation/news/12398466/the-station-fire- lead-to-tougher-building- safety-codes-firefighter-news

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18Duval, R., F., (2016). NFPA Case Study: Nightclub Fires. Retrieved

on 27th December

142019 from https://www.sfpe.org/page/2006_Q3_4

6Madrzykowski, D., Bryner, N., & Kerber, S., I., (2006). The NIST Station Nightclub Fire Investigation: Physical simulation of the fire. SFPE. Retrieved

on 27th December 2019

9from https://www.sfpe.org/page/2006_Q3_4 Barylick, J. (2015). Killer show: The Station nightclub fire,

America’s deadliest rock concert. Print book: English: First paperpack edition.