

The Sociology of Emotions

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Dramaturgical and Cultural Theorizing on Emotions

The dramaturgical metaphor comes from William Shakespeare, who pro-claimed, "All the world is a stage, and all men and women merely players" who have their entrances and exits and play many parts during the course of their lifetime. In viewing social interaction as theater, attention is drawn to the script, stage, audience, staging props, and actors who play dramatic roles. Let us begin with the script. All dramaturgical theorists adopt the view that interaction is guided by a script written by culture. All actors are aware of the norms, values, beliefs, and other symbolic elements that direct how they are to talk, act, and otherwise play their roles.

Interaction is also performed on a stage in front of an audience. People act as if they are on a stage, and so each person in an interaction views others in a situation as constituting the audience to whom a presentation of self is given. In seeing people as actors performing on a stage, one's attention is drawn to the props – from clothing to physical objects – that individuals use to play their roles and to interpret the cultural script guiding their performance. Culture is not a straightjacket; although it is constraining, all actors are given some dramatic license in their playing of a role. Indeed, dramaturgical approaches emphasize impression management by actors as they present their selves to their audiences. Not only do actors play roles, giving interpretation of the script, but they also engage in strategic behavior as they manage their presentations of self. Actors not only "put on" a performance, but they often "put on" their audience, offering cynical and disingenuous performances to achieve specific goals that are unknown and unrecognized by the audience.

We should not get too carried away with the dramaturgical metaphor, but there is something distinctive about a set of approaches that emphasize the importance of culture as providing a script, the presentation of the self on a stage in front of others who constitute an audience, and the use of props and other staging devices to achieve not only dramatic goals, but also

strategic ends. Because Erving Goffman was the founder of this approach, we begin with his analysis.

ERVING GOFFMAN'S DRAMATURGICAL APPROACH

Erving Goffman considered himself to be a disciple of Émile Durkheim, especially Durkheim's late work on religion. In his *The Elementary Forms of The Religious Life*, Durkheim (1912/1965) drew on accounts of periodic gatherings of Aborigines in Central Australia (see the next chapter for a more detailed summary). What Durkheim noted was that as Aborigines gathered, their excitement increased, and, indeed, a kind of collective effervescence emerged, with the Aborigines perceiving that there was an external power, force, or "mana" above and beyond them. They represented this power with totems and articulated beliefs about the sacred qualities of these totems and a supernatural realm beyond the everyday world while engaging in rituals that heightened their emotions and perceptions about the power of mana.

Durkheim argued that the Aborigines were merely worshipping themselves and their patterns of organization; indeed, the sacred was nothing more than the worship of society. In making the connection among face-to-face gatherings, heightened emotional arousal, rituals, and sacred symbols of the group, Durkheim offered an image of how emotions are generated during the course of all face-to-face interaction, not just at occasional ceremonial gatherings. Goffman was not interested in religion, but he was the first to see important clues as to how individuals interact in Durkheim's analysis of religious activity among Australian Aborigines.

Goffman (1959, 1961, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1983) transformed Durkheim's analysis of periodic gatherings among Aborigines into a concept of the *encounter*, composed of the following elements: (1) a single visual and cognitive focus of attention; (2) a mutual and preferential openness to verbal communication; (3) an eye-to-eye ecological huddle, maximizing mutual perception and monitoring; (4) an emergent "we" feeling of solidarity and flow of feeling; (5) a ritual and ceremonial punctuation of openings, closings, entrances, and exits; and (6) a set of ritualized procedures for both pointing out deviance and for correction of deviant acts (Goffman, 1961). The fundamental unit of interaction is what Goffman termed the *focused encounter*, and it is not too difficult to see Durkheim's ideas in this portrayal of encounters. Indeed, for Goffman the analysis performed by Durkheim documented what occurs each and every time people engage in face-to-face encounters. What Durkheim saw as the origin of religion became, in Goffman's hands, the basic structure of all face-to-face interaction.

For Goffman (1983), focused encounters are lodged within larger structural and cultural units. Each encounter is embedded in a *gathering*, which

assembles individuals in space; gatherings are, in turn, embedded within a more inclusive *social occasion* composed of fixed equipment, distinctive cultural ethos, program and agenda, rules of proper and improper conduct, and preestablished sequences of activities. Goffman never pursued the dynamics of this embeddedness of encounters in any detail, but his conceptual distinctions all emphasize the significance of cultural scripts as they orient individuals within the encounter and as they guide strategic action. Figure 2.1 summarizes Goffman's general model of interaction.

Every encounter is embedded within an occasion that is part of a larger gathering. These structural parameters contain cultural scripts, composed of a cultural "ethos," "program," "agenda," and "rules" of proper and improper conduct. These cultural scripts orient actors as they make strategic decisions about how they should behave in the encounter and about how they should "present" themselves to others (Goffman, 1959). Such presentations occur along a number of important dimensions. One dimension is the form of talk, or how individuals are to use words, phrases, inflections, pace, and other aspects of talking (Goffman, 1981). A second dimension is the use of rituals, or stereotyped sequences of talk and other cues that open, close, structure, repair, and otherwise keep the interaction on track in accordance with the cultural script.

A third dimension is framing, in which boundaries as to what is being included or excluded from the interaction are established (Goffman, 1974). Fourth is the use of props, or stage equipment such as chairs, tables, and their organization in space. A fifth dimension is categorization of the situation as "work-practical," "social," or "ceremonial." There is also role making, or the process of signaling the rights and obligations that persons can claim as well as the style of self-presentations that they can use in an encounter. Finally, there is expressiveness, or presentation of emotions to others during the course of interaction.

What makes Goffman's approach to interaction dramaturgical is that individuals are seen to be actors who know their lines from a cultural script as they "act" on a stage composed of physical props and other equipment in front of an audience of others. However, individuals are not just actors, they are also strategists who manipulate the expression of gestures to present themselves in a certain way. Goffman's terminology varied across time, but the general thrust of his argument is that people try to present a self to others, signaling to their audience who they are, how they should be treated, and what they are doing. This strategic manipulation abides by the script, or at least appears to do so, as individuals talk; engage in ritualized sequences of behavior and talk; use staging props; establish frames; categorize situations in terms of the relative amounts of work-practical, social, and ceremonial content; establish roles; and offer expressive cues about emotions.




FIGURE 2.1. Goffman's model.

Goffman never developed a robust theory of emotions from this conceptual edifice, but he did address emotional dynamics. His most famous analysis of emotions is on the dynamics of *embarrassment*, or what we might see as a mild form of shame. When an individual cannot successfully present a self, and when he or she fails to abide by the script by talking inappropriately, incorrectly using rituals, failing to stay within the frame, inappropriately categorizing a situation, misusing stage props, or expressing inappropriate emotions, the negative emotions aroused in the audience will lead to negative sanctioning of the person, who will, in turn, experience embarrassment. Often, the audience will not even need to sanction a person if he or she recognizes the breach and feels embarrassed. Under these conditions, a sequence of repair rituals ensues, revolving around sanctions, apologies, and re-presentation of a more appropriate self. These kinds of disruptions are never trivial, because the social fabric and moral order depend upon the smooth flow of interaction in encounters; as a consequence, individuals sense that even in the most casual interaction, a moral order is at stake. People in encounters are thus highly attuned to the cultural script and the mutual presentations of self in accordance with the script.

Whereas Goffman's analysis is often interpreted as a form of symbolic interaction, it is Durkheimian at its core. People use rituals to sustain the smooth flow of interaction and thereby abide by and reinforce the sanctity of the cultural script. When they have failed in their self-presentations, negative emotions are aroused in both the self and others, leading to the expression of ritualized repairs of the breach in the interaction. Individuals are strategically motivated to manipulate gestures so that their presentations of "face" and "lines" are seen by others to conform to the cultural script, and in so doing, they reinforce the implicit morality of the cultural script.

STEVEN GORDON ON EMOTIONAL CULTURE

The Theory

Although Steven Gordon's work is not dramaturgical, he is one of the very early theorists who recognized the importance of culture in explaining emotional dynamics. Early on, Gordon (1981) made an analytical distinction between *biological emotions* (a psychological concept) and *social sentiments* (a sociological concept). A biological emotion is a configuration of bodily sensations and gestures in response to stimuli, whereas a social sentiment involves "combinations of bodily sensations, gestures, and cultural meanings that we learn in enduring social relationships" (Gordon, 1981, p. 563). Gordon argues that biological emotions such as anger and fear become, shortly after childhood, transformed into cultural meanings that are organized around a relationship to a social object, often another person or

group.¹ For example, sentiments of love and affection can develop toward persons such as parents, friends, and sexual partners; sentiments like grief, regret, and nostalgia can be directed at someone who has died; and sentiments such as envy and jealousy can emerge toward persons who possess objects that one desires. All of these sentiments are defined by culture. As individuals are socialized, they learn the meanings of these sentiments.

Gordon argues that because a sociological approach to emotions recognizes that emotions emerge out of enduring social relationships, there is a tendency to focus on the more lasting emotions such as love and friendship compared to the shorter term emotions like anger and fear emphasized by psychologists. Emotions thus arise not only from the immediacy of the situation, but also from the history of interaction as it evolved in the past and from perceived prospects for interaction in the future. A sociological approach sees both psychological forces (one's inner experiences and feelings) and social forces (culture) as coalescing to produce particular emotions in a situation, but as cultural advice about those emotions changes (including suppressing or intensifying those emotions), the frequency and expression of particular emotions may change over time.

Gordon (1990) sees emotions as composed of (1) bodily sensations, (2) expressive gestures, (3) social situations or relationships, and (4) emotion culture of a society. In Gordon's view, the first element, bodily sensations, only takes on significance when expressed in behaviors guided by cultural scripts. Thus, the facial expressions, verbal expressions, and bodily gestures revealing emotions are not so much the result of innate biological drives as the outcome of cultural forces as they constrain how people respond to others and situations. The power of culture is particularly evident, Gordon argues, in the vocabularies denoting emotions, the beliefs that people hold about emotions, and the rules about how people should feel as well as when and how emotions should be expressed. For every emotion, members of a society learn the vocabulary (words for emotions), beliefs about emotions (e.g., happiness should be freely expressed, whereas anger should be tempered), and norms about emotions (we should feel sad at a funeral and happy at a party). Gordon (1989a, 1989b, 1990) labels this complex of emotion vocabularies, beliefs, and norms the emotion culture of a society.

The culture of emotions for a society is revealed not only in language, but also in rituals, art forms, and other cultural elements. Culture provides accounts of the origins and nature of different emotions, including their likely causes and outcomes, and it identifies how emotions are to be expressed and managed. Gordon (1990) maintains that the emotion culture

¹ Although sentiments may identify a relationship to a nonsocial object such as a deity or a pet, Gordon argues that these nonsocial objects are usually personified as having human qualities.

The second type of norm is *display rules*, which specify when and how the overt expression of emotions in a situation is to occur, such as crying at a funeral and laughing at a party (Hochschild, 1979, 1983).² For Hochschild, when individuals follow these display rules, they are engaging in *surface acting*. Surface acting involves changing one's outward appearance and behavior so that they are consistent with normative expectations. For example, people often "put on a happy face" to sustain an encounter where display rules require they should feel happy.

The two sets of norms – feeling and display rules – reflect the broader emotion culture and the emotion ideology guiding activity in a particular situation. Moreover, the structures of the larger organizational context, particularly the division of labor and distribution of power, also determine the feeling and display rules for individuals. For example, norms may indicate that all workers are supposed to display a serious focus and demeanor in their job, but these rules may apply somewhat differently to the manager, the foreman, and the assembly line worker in a specific organization. Those with power are typically given more latitude of feeling and display rules than are those with less power.

The thrust of Hochschild's analysis concerns how individuals cope with cultural rules and ideologies, especially when cultural scripts force them to engage in behaviors that arouse negative emotions. For instance, how do airline stewards sustain the pleasant demeanor dictated by feeling and display rules in the face of rude behavior by passengers?³ For many situations, people must engage in what Hochschild (1979, 1983) terms *emotion work* or *emotion management* to maintain a presentation of self that conforms to emotion ideologies, feeling rules, and display rules.⁴ The techniques of

² Hochschild's *display rules* echo Goffman's *expression rules*. Expression rules are conventions guiding the display (or masking) of feelings that actors must adhere to in situations. These rules oblige actors to "give off" some feelings and not others depending upon the situation. In abiding by the expression rules and suppressing and controlling alternative expressions, actors can create a favorable impression to others. Essentially, when individuals are "on stage," they must express the emotions appropriate to the part they are playing.

³ Hochschild (1979) maintains that whereas Goffman is interested in how people try to appear to feel, where their capacity to act on feeling is based on the occasion, he obscures how people try to feel, that is, how they try to manage their emotions internally. She maintains that what is missing in his analysis is the self with a developed inner life. Hochschild sees Goffman's actor as passive rather than active: an entity who acquiesces to social conventions rather than an agent who *struggles with feeling rules and who may manage his or her emotions* in response to this struggle. Hochschild maintains, that whereas Goffman acknowledges that actors may suppress or control their emotions, he does not discuss the inner processes or techniques that accomplish this. In short, the inner voice of the actor is relatively absent from Goffman's analysis. Hochschild attempts to rectify this.

⁴ This emotion management is not simply emotional control or suppression in the Goffmanian sense. Although it can include this, it also includes changing the type of emotion one is feeling.

more power in the marriage, expressions of anger are curbed, and love is expressed by meeting the needs of the powerful. In this way, the emotions are expressed, reflecting the oppression of the time. However, although these data support the idea that the emotion culture of a society changes, they do not indicate the degree to which the culture determines *which* emotions individuals experience or *how* these emotions are expressed. It would be important to demonstrate that changes in culture were reflected in people's emotional experiences and expressions.

ARLIE HOCHSCHILD'S CULTURAL ANALYSIS

The Theory

Arlie Hochschild (1975, 1979, 1983) adopts elements of Erving Goffman's analysis while adding a critical edge that is more reminiscent of Karl Marx's views on alienation. For Hochschild, individuals often engage in strategic performances that are not gratifying. Cultural scripts often impose requirements on persons that are stressful, if not alienating. In her famous study of airline stewards, who must maintain a pleasant and friendly demeanor even when passengers are rude and unpleasant, Hochschild (1983) exposed the stress on these workers and outlined some of the ways in which they managed to present the appropriate face and line.

Hochschild (1979) postulates that societies reveal an *emotion culture* consisting of a complex of ideas about what people are supposed to feel in various types of situations. This culture is composed of *emotion ideologies* about appropriate attitudes, feelings, and emotional responses in basic spheres of activity. In the biography of individuals, there are emotional markers or events in their lives that highlight and symbolize a more general emotion ideology, as would be the case, for instance, when a child first learns from sanctions by the teacher that he or she must maintain expressive control in the classroom. Through socialization, individuals successively acquire emotion ideologies for the various contexts of activity within a society, and the sum of these ideologies constitutes the most general postulates of the emotion culture.

In any specific context of activity, there are two basic types of norms (Hochschild, 1979, 1990). One type is *feeling rules*, which specify the emotions that individuals should feel and experience in a situation, as when one is supposed to feel sadness at a funeral or happiness at a cocktail party. Feeling rules govern the *intensity* of the emotion (from strong to weak), the *direction* of the emotion (positive or negative), and the *duration* of the emotion (from fleeting to lasting). For example, when a loved one is lost, feeling rules indicate that people should grieve deeply for a period of time.

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


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In any specific context of activity, there are two basic types of norms (Hochschild, 1979, 1990). One type is *feeling rules*, which specify the emotions that individuals should feel and experience in a situation, as when one is supposed to feel sadness at a funeral or happiness at a cocktail party. Feeling rules govern the *intensity* of the emotion (from strong to weak), the *direction* of the emotion (positive or negative), and the *duration* of the emotion (from fleeting to lasting). For example, when a loved one is lost, feeling rules indicate that people should grieve deeply for a period of time.

The second type of norm is *display rules*, which specify when and how the overt expression of emotions in a situation is to occur, such as crying at a funeral and laughing at a party (Hochschild, 1979, 1983).² For Hochschild, when individuals follow these display rules, they are engaging in *surface acting*. Surface acting involves changing one's outward appearance and behavior so that they are consistent with normative expectations. For example, people often "put on a happy face" to sustain an encounter where display rules require they should feel happy.

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² Hochschild's *display rules* echo Goffman's *expression rules*. Expression rules are conventions guiding the display (or masking) of feelings that actors must adhere to in situations. These rules oblige actors to "give off" some feelings and not others depending upon the situation. In abiding by the expression rules and suppressing and controlling alternative expressions, actors can create a favorable impression to others. Essentially, when individuals are "on stage," they must express the emotions appropriate to the part they are playing.

³ Hochschild (1979) maintains that whereas Goffman is interested in how people try to appear to feel, where their capacity to act on feeling is based on the occasion, he obscures how people try to feel, that is, how they try to manage their emotions internally. She maintains that what is missing in his analysis is the self with a developed inner life. Hochschild sees Goffman's actor as passive rather than active: an entity who acquiesces to social conventions rather than an agent who *struggles with feeling rules* and *who may manage his or her emotions* in response to this struggle. Hochschild maintains that whereas Goffman acknowledges that actors may suppress or control their emotions, he does not discuss the inner processes or techniques that accomplish this. In short, the inner voice of the actor is relatively absent from Goffman's analysis. Hochschild attempts to rectify this.

⁴ This emotion management is not simply emotional control or suppression in the Goffmanian sense. Although it can include this, it also includes changing the type of emotion one is feeling.

emotion work for feeling and displaying appropriate demeanor include the following:

1. *Body work*, whereby people attempt to alter their physiological reactions to a situation. For instance, when trying to remain calm, one individual might try deep-breathing exercises to generate a sense of calm, and another person might scream and yell assertively to mobilize the body for aggressive behavior (as is done by athletes before entering a game). In this way, the body is used to *inspire* (or *dampen*) feeling (Hochschild, 1983).
2. *Surface acting*, whereby individuals manipulate their external expressive gestures in the hope that such acting will enable them to feel and experience the emotion that these gestures are supposed to signal. For example, people often "put on a happy face" to sustain an encounter where display rules require they should feel happy, but this act is also performed with the expectation that the person might eventually feel happy and, indeed, get in a positive mood.⁵
3. *Deep acting*, whereby people try to arouse within themselves particular feelings that will allow them to experience the emotions that display rules require them to express overtly. Actors often use this technique to alter their internal states in the direction of an emotional display required by the script.
4. *Cognitive work*, whereby a person invokes the thoughts and ideas associated with a particular emotion in an effort to generate feelings along these lines. For instance, if a situation calls for sadness (say, a funeral), a person may think about what it is like to be sad, and, indeed, the person may call up past experiences when he or she was sad to produce a genuine sense of sadness that will make his or her overt expression of sadness seem authentic.

Hochschild (1983) calls emotion work or emotion management that is done for a wage *emotional labor*. She associates this type of labor with jobs that require workers to have face-to-face or voice-to-voice contact with the public, to produce a positive or negative emotional state in others, and to endure supervision and control over their emotional activities. Hochschild studied the emotion work of individuals in two polar-opposite jobs: airline flight attendants and bill collectors. Whereas flight attendants are carefully recruited and given extensive training, bill collectors need very little training, and there is high turnover. Whereas the work of the flight attendant

⁵ What Hochschild adds to the traditional Goffmanian sense of emotional expression is that the display of the "appropriate" emotion is not only in the service of abiding by the social occasion, it is also in the service of changing one's feeling state. In acting, actors hope to feel and experience the emotion that their gestures are supposed to signal. A performance is "given off" with the expectation that the person might eventually *feel* what they are cueing.

is to enhance the customer's status – to make the customer feel good – the work of the bill collector is to deflate the customer's status and to humiliate. Finally, whereas the setting for flight attendants is close and personal as they interact with their customers, relations between actors in the collection business is depersonalized and guarded from the start.

Hochschild points out that the purpose of a company such as Delta Airlines is to make a profit at the emotional expense of its workers. Flight attendants have to maintain a positive demeanor despite passengers' rude behavior in the hopes that the passengers will continue using Delta as their airline carrier. Attendants are selected based on their ability to be empathic, positive, and a team player. They are then trained in how to "give off" and maintain a positive appearance (e.g., showing feelings of happiness through smiling, forced niceness, and "pleasant talk") through formal mechanisms such as company manuals that explicitly convey the expectations of the organization and through informal mechanisms such as coworkers delicately informing one another on how to behave.

The opposite of this kind of emotional labor is that of the bill collector, who must use his or her negative emotions as a way to get the customer to comply. Rather than showing empathy and sympathy for the customer (as in the case of the flight attendant), bill collectors are more likely to distance themselves from their clients, assume that their clients are dishonorable, and not identify with their excuses for nonpayment. Rather than elevating the status of their customers and reducing their own as flight attendants do, bill collectors seek to reduce the status of their customers and elevate their own status. A negative demeanor rather than a positive demeanor is displayed, and inner feelings that are at odds with this negative demeanor must be suppressed.

What makes workers "reliable," Hochschild points out, is their *emotional stamina*. Emotional stamina involves sustaining a particular controlled feeling for a long time, demonstrating to others the "staying power" of the affect expressed. More generally, workers have to find ways to reduce the strain that emerges when what they feel does not correspond with the emotions they must feign. To reduce the strain, they attempt to close the distance between feeling and feigning emotions either by (1) changing what they feel or (2) changing what they are feigning. When the appropriate display of particular emotions is part of a person's job, the individual will seek to change his or her internal feelings through the techniques listed earlier, whereas when displays are less central to a particular job, persons are much more likely to reveal their inner feelings.

For Hochschild, the display of particular feelings (and thus the suppression of other feelings) to sell something or invoke a particular feeling in another leads to using feelings for a commercial rather than a private purpose. When displayed feelings repeatedly must depart from inner feelings, self-estrangement, alienation, and feelings of inauthenticity are likely

to emerge. Whereas Marx argued that alienation emerges when workers are unable to control the relationship among what they produce, how they produce it, and to whom they sell the products of their labor, Hochschild argues that alienation emerges in the contemporary world when individuals are unable to control the relationship between what they must do and how they feel.

Whereas organizations subject workers to the technical aspects of doing work in accordance with the dictates of machinery and the production line, thereby increasing workers' alienation, they further subjugate workers by controlling their hearts. In this way, organizations control the actor at a deeper level because a person's private, inner experiences are being manipulated. When work does not permit the expression of authentic feelings, people's feelings have no meaning for them, with the result that workers experience a false sense of who they are. To the extent that individuals spend much time in the workplace and even come to identify themselves through their jobs, the emotional inauthenticity that comes from labor that forces people to deny their emotions may carry over into other domains, such as the family or intimate relations.

As a general rule, Hochschild implicitly argues, emotion work will be most evident when people confront emotion ideologies, emotion rules, and display rules that go against their actual feelings, and especially when they are required by these rules to express and display emotions that they do not feel. Complex social systems with hierarchies of authority, or market systems forcing sellers of goods and providers of services to act in certain ways to customers who have more latitude in expression of emotions, are likely to generate situations where individuals must engage in emotion work. Because these types of systems are more typical of industrial and postindustrial societies, Hochschild sees modernity as dramatically increasing the amount of emotion work that people must perform. Such work is always costly because people must, to some degree, repress their "true emotions" as they try to present themselves in ways demanded by the cultural script.

Another extension of this line of reasoning is more in tune with Goffman's repeated fascination with how individuals "con" one another. If the feeling and display rules are known by all participants in an encounter, an individual is in a position to manipulate gestures to convince others that she also feels the same emotions and has the same goals when, in fact, she may have a devious purpose. A good con man, for instance, can appear to be helpful to people experiencing difficulty by displaying gestures indicating that he feels their pain and is doing his best to help them out of a difficult situation when, in reality, he is trying to cheat them. Of course, only good actors can get away with this, as anyone who has ever interacted with a "sincere and caring" used-car salesperson can attest. Most of the time in most situations, however, individuals make a good-faith effort

to feel and express the appropriate emotions because the rules of culture have a moral quality that invites negative feelings and sanctions for their violation, even in seemingly trivial interactions. Thus, people implicitly understand that to violate feeling and display rules is to disrupt the encounter and, potentially, the larger social occasion.

In later work, Hochschild (1989, 1990) examines the link between ideology (culture) and feeling rules. Hochschild (1979) argues that we can think of any ideology as an interpretive framework made up of framing rules and feeling rules. The *framing rules* designate what interpretations and meanings individuals should give to situations, whereas the *feeling rules* specify how people ought to feel in a situation given a particular interpretation demanded by framing rules. In studying the relationship between ideology and feeling rules, Hochschild turned to marital roles rather than occupational roles (such as flight attendant and bill collector) and focused on the gender ideologies of men and women as well as the emotion culture associated with these gender ideologies. Essentially, she examined how individuals put together their gender ideologies, feelings, and behavior.

For her book *The Second Shift*, Hochschild (1989) interviewed 50 married couples in which both partners worked at full-time jobs and also cared for young children. She showed how men and women enter into marriage with similar or conflicting gender ideologies, and she identified the feeling rules – that is, how they should feel about their work inside and outside the home – associated with these gender ideologies. She identified three main gender ideologies: (1) the traditional, in which both men and women think that the woman's place is in the home and the man's place is outside of the home; (2) egalitarian, in which both men and women believe that husbands and wives should share both the paid and unpaid work; and (3) transitional, in which both men and women support a mixture of the traditional and the egalitarian (e.g., either the man or the woman believes it is good for the wife to work outside of the home, but it is also her responsibility to do most of the work inside the home).

The feeling rules for each support the gender ideology. Traditional men and women feel that the wife should identify primarily with her role at home (rather than at work), and that the husband should identify with his role at work (rather than at home); moreover, when the wife is also working outside the home and the husband is also working inside the home, each is just bestowing on the other a "favor" in doing "more" than what is expected of them. Egalitarian men and women feel that each other's work both inside and outside of the home are equally important. Transitional men and women believe that although men and women could take on similar roles, negative emotions should not emerge if one decides to not help with a role that is not, by traditional norms, his or hers to take on.

For example, a wife has no right to get angry with her husband if he does not help much around the home because that is primarily her role to assume.

Interestingly, Hochschild found that sometimes people's feelings undetermined rather than reinforced their gender ideology. For example, a husband might come to resent his wife for not caring for the home and children as much as he thinks she should, even though he believes that her career is just as important as his. In this way, his egalitarian beliefs on the surface conflicts with his internalization of traditional feeling rules that apparently lay underneath his surface ideology. Alternatively, a woman might feel guilty for not spending enough time with her children, again indicating that the egalitarian ideology collide with traditional feeling rules. What Hochschild showed is how individuals enact persistent lines of feelings and behaviors to resolve such discrepancies. She labeled these *gender strategies*. Individuals either actively evoke or suppress certain feelings or engage in certain actions to change their feelings to better fit how they should feel. In the example of the husband resenting his wife for not being at home as much as he thinks she should, he might either change his inward feelings from negative to positive (from resentment to satisfaction) or press his wife to spend more time at home.

Research Using Hochschild's Analysis

Cahill and Eggleston's (1994) research on the emotion management of wheelchair users in public is a good example of Hochschild's ideas. Cahill and Eggleston showed how wheelchair users manage their emotions with "walkers" in public encounters and, in so doing, minimize the strain and potential conflict that could arise between themselves and "walkers." They gathered data through participant observation while using a wheelchair in public, conversational interviews, and they also gathered published autobiographical accounts from wheelchair users such as books and articles in edited volumes.

Wheelchair users desire to be independent in an environment in which physical barriers make access difficult. They do not want to be dependent on others for help, but sometimes need the assistance of others in situations to accomplish their goals such as being seated at a restaurant in which entrance involves navigating up a flight of stairs. The reaction of walkers to wheelchair users may range from treating wheelchair individuals as invisible and effectively ignoring them to treating them as visible and overextending help and sympathy. Not surprisingly, such responses shore up negative feelings for wheelchair users, and they must manage their emotions to show that they are moral actors, that is, persons who are sensitive to the norms of the situation, which involves being emotionally reserved in public places.

Cahill and Eggleston identified the different strategies that wheelchair users employ to manage their emotions. They indicated that humor is one of the most common and effective ways in which public anxiety and awkwardness are alleviated. Wheelchair users may make themselves the butt of jokes when, for example, they are unable to navigate around awkward and tight spots such as entering a stall in a restroom. Onlookers as well as the wheelchair user may grow increasingly uncomfortable as the wheelchair user persists in wrestling with the chair to meet his or her needs, and the wheelchair user may laugh out loud or poke fun at himself or herself to ease the tension.

Another emotion management strategy that wheelchair users invoke involves poise and grace. For example, when a wheelchair user hears a child blurt out questions to a parent as to why the person is in a wheelchair, the wheelchair user may tactfully act deaf to the child's questions. When others treat a wheelchair user as a nonperson – for example, restaurant personnel may ask a wheelchair user's companion where the wheelchair user would like to be seated, would like to drink, or would like to order rather than direct these questions to the wheelchair user – the wheelchair user may suppress his or her angry response to maintain civility in the situation. As another example, the companion of the wheelchair user may become angry at the mistreatment that the wheelchair user is receiving, and the wheelchair user may respond by trying to calm his or her companion.

Wheelchair users' management of their emotion in situations where they need assistance is particularly complex. On the one hand, wheelchair users sometimes are forced to ask others for help, and asking for help may induce guilt because they feel they have imposed on others. To avoid feeling guilty, wheelchair users may take unnecessary risks or expend needless energy rather than requesting help. On the other hand, others may spontaneously offer assistance to wheelchair users in instances where they do not need it, and wheelchair users may mask their resentment with deferential gratitude. They do not want to appear to be ungrateful; so, they will publicly express what they may not privately feel.

Cahill and Eggleston point out that the emotion management strategies that wheelchair users rely on in situations services others because it does not challenge others' tactless and sometimes thoughtless behavior. Instead, people can maintain the view that they are kind and caring even when their actions may be hurtful. Although the emotion management strategies of wheelchair users aid in the maintenance of smooth social relations, what occurs on the surface may not reflect what lies just below. Appearances can be deceiving.

Jennifer Pierce's (1995) analysis of emotion labor in law firms is another good application of Hochschild's thesis. Pierce, a student of Hochschild, conducted case studies of two law offices: a private law firm and an in-house corporate legal department. Because work is often gendered within

the legal profession, with men working as litigators and women working as paralegals, Pierce focused on trial lawyers and litigation paralegals.

She identified the emotion labor of each worker. The lawyers, whom she labeled "Rambo Litigators," reflect the hypermasculinity associated with trial lawyers, who have a two-prong task to accomplish. On the one hand, they have to research their cases, write their pleas, and defend their clients to juries and judges as well as deal with witnesses. Good legal strategizing and skill are needed to be successful. On the other hand, there is an emotional dimension to their work. Self-presentations involve displays of aggression and other assertive acts to intimidate, but softer emotions, or what Pierce labeled "strategic friendliness," are also required. In the latter case, lawyers must be nice and polite, even playing dumb with a witness, to create a certain impression for the jury. Rather than bullying or scaring the witness into submission, a lawyer will extend niceties to witnesses in acts designed to manipulate and control the perceptions of the audience to eventually win them over. Strategic friendliness even extends to the ginger treatment of one's client (to keep their business) and interaction with jurors (to get their votes).

The female paralegals, who Pierce labeled "mothering paralegals," must engage in emotion work that reveals nurturance. Pierce identified two major components of emotion labor: deference and caretaking. Deference to lawyers includes (1) being treated as an adversary and hence being subject to interrogation, intimidation, and distrust just like opposing counsel, clients, and witnesses; (2) being interrupted often by attorneys; and (3) being treated as invisible and ignored. Caretaking involves (1) being pleasant; (2) being reassuring not only to the lawyer, but also to the lawyer's witnesses and clients; (3) showing gratitude to other people in the firm on the lawyer's behalf; and (4) being an arbiter of an attorney's feelings toward other people (e.g., proclaiming that the lawyer is "just having a bad day"). When trial lawyers lose their temper, yell, or scream, the paralegals are expected to stay calm, understand, comfort, and be nurturant.

By being deferential and mothering, Pierce argued, the women are reproducing the gender relations that make up the law-firm hierarchy. Men are in the positions of power in the firms, and they expect to receive support and nurturance from women. Women are in the positions of powerlessness in the firms, and they are expected to give support to the powerful. When women violate these emotion norms by not being deferential or mothering, they are criticized for their "unprofessional behavior" and are sanctioned through, for example, a reduction in their annual raise.

Pierce also investigated the emotion norms when men and women are doing the same job (both are litigators or paralegals) to see whether or not they are held to the same standard of emotions. She found a double standard. As litigators, men are expected to be aggressive and manipulative and women are expected to be nonaggressive, nonintimidating,

and kind. When women act aggressively and ruthlessly like their male counterparts, they are seen as unfeminine and domineering. Thus, they are placed in a double bind. If they are polite to witnesses on cross-examination, they are seen as not being forceful enough, whereas if they are aggressive, they are admonished for "being phony."

Pierce found that women litigators are of three types: (1) those who seek to reshape the adversarial role to fit their care orientation (about one fourth of the female litigators), (2) those who are both adversarial and care oriented (about 60% of the female litigators), and (3) those who adopt the male, adversarial role (roughly 15% of the female litigators). Most women litigators merge the male and female models. For example, they take on the adversarial role in the courtroom and are combative to opposing counsel, but outside of the courtroom, they treat staff and colleagues with care and concern.

Whereas women litigators struggle with how to do their job, male paralegals seem to have less of a problem. This finding is probably due to the fact that when men work as paralegals, their high status of being a man coupled with expectations for masculinity mean that they are not held to the same standards as women paralegals, nor are they treated the same as women paralegals. Male paralegals are more likely than female paralegals to socialize with the attorneys outside of the office; they are not required to mother clients and nurture lawyers; and they are asked to serve in a more advisory role to lawyers. Male paralegals are less invisible than female paralegals because they are more likely to be mistaken for attorneys; they are also taken more seriously and not treated as if they are uninformed or stupid. They remain more affectively neutral with the lawyers, maintaining more of a distance from both the attorneys and their cases. Rather than being pleasant, they are simply polite.

Male and female paralegals engage in a series of strategies to resist or cope with the feeling rules of their job. Clearly, they are treated as second-class citizens, particularly the women paralegals, and feelings of anger and alienation are expected to emerge from such treatment. Pierce identified five coping strategies that they employ: (1) infantilization of attorneys, (2) personalizing their relationships with attorneys, (3) being nice, (4) defining themselves as occupational transients, and (5) rationalizing their career goals. The first three are employed more by women paralegals, and the latter two are used more by male paralegals. In "infantilization," the women paralegals denigrate the attorneys when they are not around by describing them as "jerks" or "dweebs" but also "babies" or "children" whom they have to baby-sit. By criticizing the attorneys and making fun of them, the paralegals elevate their own status and obtained a sense of superiority, while also releasing hostility.

In contrast to the "baby-sitting" strategy, some women paralegals redefine their working relationship as being more personal. In this

redefinition, the women come to see themselves as "indispensable" and "special," thereby making all of the emotion work and mistreatment tolerable. The third strategy is similar to the second strategy, but operates on a more general level. Here, the paralegals are less interested in creating a personal relationship with lawyers as in fostering a pleasant and humane climate. Doing "niceties" is in the service of creating a pleasant work environment for everyone.

Men paralegals used different coping styles. Some are more likely to define themselves as occupational transients, seeing their current paralegal work as a means to another end (such as law school, business school, or graduate school). As a consequence, they can tolerate emotion work because it is temporary. Other men see the paralegal profession as a good alternative to the legal profession, which, in their minds is characterized as full of attorneys who hate their jobs, work long hours, engage in boring tasks, and evidence no social life.

More generally, Pierce showed that the amount of emotion labor varies for men and women; in many ways, these differences reproduce gender relations in the broader society. There is a gendered emotional division of labor, and when this is maintained, it reproduces the status hierarchy, with men in the positions of power and women in the positions of less power. When women assume a role traditionally held by men such as the "Rambo Litigator," they face more obstacles to their success than do men who assume a role traditionally held by women ("the mothering paragon"). Thus, the job is *not* the same when men and women do it. This finding echoes Hochschild's (1983) argument in her earlier work that emotion work is not as important for men as it is for women, primarily because women lack the status, power, and material resources of men. As a result, in a world where they lack resources, women often make a resource out of feeling and offer it to men in return for the material resources the women lack.

MORRIS ROSENBERG ON EMOTIONS AND REFLEXIVITY

The Theory

Morris Rosenberg was a major theorist on the self and self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1979). His self-esteem scale is still one of the most commonly utilized measures in research on the self. Late in his career and just before his untimely death, Rosenberg began to study emotions (Rosenberg, 1990, 1991), particularly the reflexivity that often comes from emotional responses.

Reflexivity is the ability of individuals to see themselves as objects by reading the responses of others to their behaviors. Through reflexivity, individuals become self-aware and derive a sense of who they are from the

standpoint of others. Rosenberg identifies two kinds of reflexivity: (1) cognitive reflexivity, or the ability to perceive, attend to, evaluate, and analyze content that involves any aspect of the self; and (2) agentive reflexivity, or the capacity to control or regulate self. According to Rosenberg (1990), reflexivity can be directed at either the whole self or the different parts of the self. In the latter, reflexivity can be directed at external aspects of the self, which others see (e.g., physical characteristics, behavioral dispositions), or internal aspects of the self, which are more privileged (thoughts, emotions). Rosenberg became particularly interested in reflexivity that is directed at one's emotions.

Rosenberg's central thesis is that reflexivity changes the physiological nature of human emotions. Through the reflexive process, a person's emotions are transformed into something different. Rosenberg (1990) identifies three ways in which the reflexive process transforms emotions: (1) emotional identification, (2) emotional displays, and (3) emotional experiences. In *emotional identification*, reflexivity is cognitive, with individuals making interpretations, inferences, or attributions to understand their inner feelings. In *emotional displays*, reflexivity is reflected in individuals' regulation of emotional gestures to produce a certain effect on the audience, a point that has an affinity with Hochschild's surface acting. In *emotional experiences*, reflexivity appears in internal states of arousal, an idea similar to Hochschild's deep acting. Each of these is examined in turn.

Emotional Identification. Rosenberg (1990) points out that often people's internal states of arousal are ambiguous, with the result that they turn to information in the environment to help them make sense of what they are feeling. The ambiguity in feelings may be due to the fact that different emotions arise from similar physiological responses, as might be the case for the increased heart rate from a person who is being attacked but who is not sure whether he or she is experiencing anger or fear (Ekman, 1984). Alternatively, people may be feeling multiple emotions in a situation, as when one feels mournful and relieved at the death of a loved one. People also may be confused as to what they are feeling because they are unable to identify the specific sources of the different emotions. Faced with this ambiguity over emotional experience, people must *think about* their feelings and, hence, become reflexive.

Rosenberg (1990) argues that there are three cognitive factors that influence emotional identification: (1) causal assumptions, (2) social consensus, and (3) cultural scenarios. Causal assumptions emerge from the socialization process. Adults and peers teach culturally specified connections among stimuli/events and the outcomes generated. As these assumptions are learned and stored in memory, individuals develop what Rosenberg calls an emotional logic. People learn, for example, that when someone offers an insult, the sensation of heart pounding is to be labeled anger (rather