Presentation

Discussion Article

Assessing Cultural and Regime-Based

Explanations of Russia’s Foreign Policy.

‘Authoritarian at Heart and Expansionist by

Habit’?

ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV

Abstract

Scholars disagree on how to interpret Russia’s assertive foreign policy. According to some observers,

Russia’s authoritarian culture and political system have historically required the Kremlin to depend on

the Western threat image at home and to engage in revisionist behaviour abroad. These observers

recommend that Western nations abstain from engaging Russia as an equal contributor to shaping the

global system. This article assesses the validity of the authoritarian expansionism theory by comparing

it to other prominent perspectives on foreign policy, realism and constructivism. The article argues

that, by perceiving Russia’s historical and institutional distinctness as fundamentally threatening to the

West, the theory overlooks important sources of foreign policy contestation at home and potentially

varying directions abroad. The article selects the historically important cases of the Crimean War, the

Cold War and the Russia–Georgia War to demonstrate the theory’s flaws and to highlight the role of

factors other than Russia’s authoritarianism in the nation’s foreign policy.

RUSSIA’S INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR CONTINUES TO provoke lively disagree-

ments among scholars and policy makers alike. While some view Russia as largely

accommodationist and non-threatening to the West, others perceive the Kremlin’s

objectives as expansionist and disrespectful towards existing international rules.1 The

arrival of Barak Obama to power in the USA and his attempts to ‘reset’ relations with

Russia have yet to clarify the question of the motives for the Kremlin’s international

behaviour. Those on the sceptical side argue that the reset advocates misread Russia’s

intentions and undermine Western allies (Kramer 2010a, 2010b; Cohen 2010; LeVine

2010). According to this line of reasoning, Russia’s authoritarian culture and political

The author thanks the editors of Europe-Asia Studies and two anonymous reviewers for their

comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply. 1For examples of scholarship on Russia’s foreign policy, see Trenin (2009), Mankoff (2009),

Tsygankov (2010), Lucas (2009), Bugajski (2009) and Kanet (2009).

EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES

Vol. 64, No. 4, June 2012, 695–713

ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/12/040695-19 ª 2012 University of Glasgow

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2012.671568

system require the Kremlin to depend on the Western threat image at home and to

engage in revisionist behaviour abroad (Shlapentokh 2009; Cohen & Dale 2010;

Shevtsova 2010). It leads to the conclusion that the Western nations are better off

trying to contain or transform Moscow, rather than engaging with it as an equal

contributor in shaping the global system.

Behind the policy debate about Russia’s intentions are profound theoretical,

historical and ethical questions. Is a more democratic Russia likely to act in

accordance with the United States and Europe in international affairs? Does an

authoritarian Russia necessarily present a threat to the West? Should Russia’s cultural

and regime-based difference serve as a sufficient basis for excluding the nation from the

list of partners and potential allies? More generally, should a difference in political

system and values—whether it concerns Russia, China, Iran or another country—be

treated by Western nations as potentially threatening their values and interests?

This article seeks to assess the validity of the authoritarian or expansionist Russia

approach by comparing it to two other prominent perspectives on foreign policy:

realism and constructivism. Instead of focusing on Russia’s domestic authoritarian-

ism, realism and constructivism study the foreign-policy impact of international

anarchy and norms, respectively. I argue that as a guide to understanding Russia’s

international behaviour, the theory of authoritarian expansionism is at best

insufficient and at worst misleading. By emphasising Russia’s purportedly autocratic

nature, it overlooks important sources of contestation within the nation’s political

system and the potentially varying directions of its foreign policy. By perceiving

Russia’s historical and institutional distinctness as fundamentally threatening the

West, the theory of authoritarian expansionism also displays the tendency to deny

Russia its own interests and stakes within the international system. As a result, many

of the theory’s advocates blame Moscow for everything that has gone wrong in

relations with Western nations and invariably offer policy advice that amounts to

isolating or containing Russia.

The article is organised in four parts. The next section reflects on the theory of

authoritarian expansionism’s assumptions and historical evolution. After identifying

the theory’s propositions and intellectual roots, I offer an analysis of several biases

from which it suffers. I then move to an empirical analysis by selecting three cases of

Russia’s foreign policy that have been important to the progression of the theory of

authoritarian expansionism. My interpretation of these seminal cases—the Crimean

War, the Cold War and the Russia–Georgia War—highlights the role of factors other

than Russia’s authoritarianism. The conclusion summarises the article’s findings and

calls for a more complex and dynamic understanding of Russia than the theory of

authoritarian expansionism-based understanding.

The theory of Russia’s authoritarian expansionism

Authoritarian expansionism and other theories of Russia’s foreign policy

The central claims of the theory of authoritarian expansionism may be summarised in

terms of two main propositions—one of a descriptive and one of a causal nature. The

descriptive proposition states that Russia’s main foreign-policy objectives include

696 ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV

the preservation and expansion of the country’s imperial borders and institutions.

The causal proposition comes in two distinct versions. Version One links Russia’s

expansionism to its authoritarian culture and propensity to impose itself onto other

nations. The latter is expressed through the political regime’s overconfidence and

readiness to act unilaterally, rather than in the spirit of international cooperation.

Version Two places emphasis on the leadership’s low confidence and internal

insecurity. The regime’s insecurity and preoccupation with political survival lead to a

diversionary form of expansionism. This version assumes the public to be generally

passive and uninterested in the state’s international activities.

The two versions assume diverse types of expansionism and have distinct policy

implications. While Version One identifies what might be called ‘expansionism from

strength’ or ‘missionary expansionism’, Version Two describes expansionism that is

driven by weakness or desperation and seeks to divert the internal public’s attention

from the regime’s lack of legitimacy and effectiveness. The two versions also differ with

respect to the perception of cooperation of Western nations with Russia (see Table 1).

While both versions are sceptical of the possibility of developing a robust relationship

with Russia, Version One—by highlighting broad authoritarian support for inter-

national expansionism—is considerably more pessimistic than Version Two.

The description of Russia’s international objectives and main causes of behaviour

abroad by the theory of authoritarian expansionism contrasts with other theories of

Russia’s foreign policy. In particular, the theory of authoritarian expansionism differs

from realist and social constructivist theories. Realists typically emphasise material

capabilities and the status of a great power as state international objectives. Scholars

working in this tradition view the Russian state as acting within the same constraints

of an international anarchical system that defines the choices of other states. Although

internal factors such as ideology, nature of government and political culture matter as

well, their role is to specify, and sometimes to cover for but never to contradict,

‘genuine’ national interest. Realists view national interest as a geopolitically enduring

reality, rather than something open to interpretations, and define such interest as a

preservation and enhancement of power within the existing international system. For

instance, realists have argued that the Soviet leaders, while employing a revolutionary

ideology and acting under a totalitarian system of government, defended Russia’s

traditional state interests.2

TABLE 1 PROPOSITIONS ABOUT RUSSIA’S AUTHORITARIAN EXPANSIONISM

Type of propositions

Descriptive proposition Russia pursues an expansionist foreign policy Causal propositions 1. Active authoritarian culture is a cause of the regime’s confidence and

missionary expansionism 2. Passive authoritarian culture is a cause of the regime’s insecurity and

diversionary expansionism

2For realist studies of Soviet foreign policy, see, for example, Ulam (1968), Wohlforth (1993) and

Donaldson and Nogee (1998).

EXPLANATIONS OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 697

To social constructivists, what matters most is not power or material capabilities

objectively defined but what those may mean to the Self in terms of acquiring

recognition from its significant Other. In the Russian context, Europe and the West in

general played the role of the significant Other and prominently figured in Russia’s

debates about national identity by creating the meaningful environment in which

Russia’s rulers defended their foreign-policy choices.3 Constructivists argue that

although state behaviour is shaped by power calculations, such behaviour can only be

understood in contexts of everyday interactions and socio-historical development.

Even if anarchy is ‘out there somewhere’, constructivists say, we ought to focus on

everyday interactions for understanding what anarchy means and how social contexts

of power are being formed and unformed. Constructivist scholars of Soviet foreign

policy therefore view such policy in terms of signalling to the Western nations the

Kremlin’s desire for equality and recognition (Nation 1992; Ringman 2002).

Table 2 compares the theory of authoritarian expansionism to other theories of

Russia’s foreign policy.

Evolution of the theory of authoritarian expansionism

The context and the long history of the theory of Russia’s expansionism may be

traced to European reactions to Nicholas’s suppression of Polish demands for

independence in 1830–1831. Russia did not limit itself to suppressing what was then

an internal revolt, but also played a prominent role during the nationalist revolu-

tions of the 1840s in Europe. In 1846, Russia led the way in suppressing the Polish

uprising in Kraków, which was a part of the Hapsburg state under the Vienna

convention. In July 1848, Nicholas suppressed revolutions in the Danubian

Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia—partly to assist Turkey in defeating the

Romanian nationalist movement. In 1849, Russia provided Austria with financial

and diplomatic assistance to strengthen its position in Italy and Nicholas committed

almost 200,000 troops to help the Hapsburgs to suppress the revolt in Hungary

(Riazanovsky 1959, p. 248).

TABLE 2 THEORIES OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

Westernising state Great power Authoritarian

expansionist state

Russia’s international objectives

Recognised part of the Western world

Capabilities and status of a great power

Empire and geopolitical expansion

Main causes of Russia’s foreign policy

Western influences

International anarchy Domestic authoritarianism

3For a development of this argument, see Neumann (1996), English (2000), Hopf (2002), Clunan

(2009) and Larson and Shevchenko (2010).

698 ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV

By suppressing internal opposition to the monarchical rule, Nicholas acted within

the constraints of the Holy Alliance and had no hegemonic ambitions of his own.4

Although Russia acted in a multilateral spirit and only did what the system expected

the Tsar to do, Nicholas was labelled the Gendarme of Europe. Such a presentation of

Russia was partly a product of the continent’s power struggle. Britain and France were

not satisfied with the Vienna system and each sought to challenge Russia’s rise as a

great power competitor (Taylor 1954, p. 61). No less significant, however, was Russia’s

and Europe’s growing divergence in values. European liberals now associated Poland,

and other nations that challenged monarchies, with progressive values, and Russia

with imperialism and repression. Russia was now deemed too ‘barbaric’ and

‘autocratic’ (Malia 1999, p. 99). Today, scholars such as John LeDonne continue to

argue that during the 1830s and 1840s the Russians were ‘dangerously close to the

establishment of their hegemony in the Heartland’, and that Russia’s ‘expansionist

urge’ remained ‘unabated until 1917’ (LeDonne 1997, pp. 314, 348).

Such was the political context for the emergence of the theory of authoritarian

expansionism in the liberal West. The Polish question did not go away, and the Polish

elite led another uprising in 1863, during which the European powers, again, opposed

Russia’s effort to manage the issue and preserve existing territorial boundaries.5

Intellectually, the view of Russia as a barbaric expansionist power was supported by

foreign travellers, such as the Marquis de Custine, who began to promote this view

even before the Polish uprising. The United States had begun to develop negative

perceptions of Russia after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, as immigrant

groups (especially Jewish ones) engaged in anti-Russian lobbying in the United States

to ‘liberate’ Russia from autocracy and anti-Semitism.6 The perception of Russia as a

dangerous autocratic power grew stronger as Alexander III and Nicholas II sought to

preserve their influence in the Balkans. As theories of authoritarian Panslavism began

to develop in the early twentieth century,7 scholars became convinced of the primacy

of ‘Panslavist imperialism’ in the Tsar’s outlook (Geyer 1987; Tuminez 2000).

The social revolution in Russia in October 1917 provided another powerful impetus

for developing the perception of the country as an expansionist autocracy. The Soviet

Union diverged from the West in terms of internal institutions and it challenged the

West’s sense of military security. The Bolsheviks’ dissolution of the Constituent

Assembly in January 1918, its doctrine of world revolution, and the establishment of

the Communist International (Comintern) in 1919 in order to spread communist ideas

and set up new communist parties abroad, all contributed to the perception of Soviet

Russia as perpetuating—in the most dangerous way—the mode of authoritarian

expansionism. Even after the Bolsheviks had renounced the idea of world revolution

4While Prussia wanted to help Austria in exchange for dominating Germany, Russia had no such

conditions and was assisting Austria out of Holy Alliance obligations (Taylor 1954, p. 30). 5For example, in April 1863, Britain, France and Austria each sent similar notes to the Russian

government asking for Poland to be given independence and for its borders to include Lithuania and

Ruthenia (Seton-Watson 1967, p. 435). 6In 1911 the American government even abrogated the commercial treaty with Russia (Foglesong

2007, pp. 43–44). 7For overviews of Panslavist theories, see Kohn (1953), Petrovich (1956), Duncan (2000) and

Tuminez (2000).

EXPLANATIONS OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 699

and dissolved the Comintern, the majority of the West’s politicians and scholars could

not change their mind about the Soviet system. Scholars became convinced that the

idea of peaceful coexistence was a Soviet cover for an ideological expansion or an

offensive war on the West. A classic statement of this position can be found in George

Kennan’s (1961, p. 179) condemnation of ‘a regime, the attitude of which towards

Western governments, psychologically and politically, was equivalent to that which

would prevail toward an enemy in time of war’. Many observers rejected the position

that the Soviet leaders’ attitudes reflected a defensive response to the equally hostile

Western governments, citing the Soviet Union’s authoritarian ideology as the reason

for their distrust. For Kennan, Western governments came to hate the Soviet leaders

‘for what they did ’, whereas the Bolsheviks hated the Western states ‘for what they

were, regardless of what they did’ (Kennan 1961, p. 181, emphasis in original). This

distinction has become common in Western scholarship of Soviet foreign policy since

the Cold War.8

Despite the end of the Cold War, many observers have continued to interpret Russia

as an authoritarian state with expansionist instincts, and not as a normal state or one

abiding by acceptable rules of international behaviour. Conservative representations

of the Russia-threat argument tend to focus on the nation’s political culture (Pipes

1997; Odom 2001; Cohen 2007), while more liberal interpretations place responsibility

for Russia’s ‘anti-Western’ policies on the Kremlin’s leadership (Council on Foreign

Relations 2006; Lapidus 2007; Legvold 2007, p. 98; Wallander 2008). Conservative

perception was especially visible in justifications of expanding NATO to the east by

incorporating former parts of Russia’s sphere of influence. For example, the New York

Times columnist William Safire (1994) pursued the ‘window of opportunity’ argument

by insisting on the need to extend alliance membership to Poland, Hungary, the Czech

Republic, the Baltic states and ultimately Ukraine, because ‘Russia is authoritarian at

heart and expansionist by habit’. It had to be done promptly, he added, ‘while Russia

is weak and preoccupied with its own revival, and not later, when such a move would

be an insufferable provocation to a superpower’ (Safire 1994). Richard Pipes provided

the perspective of an academic and historian. He reminded his readers about Russia’s

‘heavy burden of history’ and failure to make ‘a clean break with its Soviet past’ (Pipes

1997, p. 67). To Pipes, Russians are yet to ‘overcome not only the communist legacy

but also that of the czars and their partner, the Orthodox Church, which for centuries

collaborated in instilling in their subjects disrespect for law, submission to strong and

wilful authority, and hostility to the West’ (Pipes 1997, p. 70). He then cautioned

against viewing the country as a potential ally, as Russia might still return as an enemy

‘if those who guide its destiny, exploiting the political inexperience and deep-seated

prejudices of its people, once again aspire to a glory to which they are not yet entitled’

(Pipes 1997, p. 78).

The Kremlin’s international assertiveness in the wake of the coloured revolutions in

the former Soviet region has instilled additional fears in both conservative and liberal

8For important exceptions, see revisionist scholarship on the West–Soviet relations (Holloway 1984;

Gartoff 1985; Cohen 1985; Kolko 1994). For analysis of Western scholarship as reflective of an

enemy’s perception, see Oren (2002) and Foglesong (2007). For a recent study of Sovietologists, see

Engerman (2010).

700 ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV

Western analysts. Russia has been frequently viewed as reviving the lost empire, ‘back-

pedalling’ on democracy and challenging the West’s vital interests in the world

(Brzezinski 2004; Council on Foreign Relations 2006; Cheney 2006; Satter 2007; Lucas

2009; Bugajski 2009). Russia’s intervention in Georgia in August 2008 provided a

fresh pretext for resorting to the theory of authoritarian expansionism. Although

Russia has legitimate interests in the Caucasus, many scholars and commentators

explained the Kremlin’s intervention either in terms of Russia’s expansionist

determination to secure full control over Georgia’s territory and resources (Asmus

2010; Blank 2009; Cornell & Starr 2009b, p. 8; Sherr 2009), or the Kremlin’s perceived

insecurity in response to the coloured revolutions and its search for internal legitimacy

(Cohen 2007; Lapidus 2007; Allison 2008; Ambrosio 2009; Filippov 2009). As a result,

both conservative and liberal perspectives were sceptical about Moscow entering

cooperative arrangements with Western nations voluntarily. As an authoritarian

revisionist state, it was expected instead that Russia would use available opportunities

to upset American plans to remain the dominant world power. If this reasoning

is correct, it is suggested, American policy makers would be wise to abandon any

search for partnership with post-Soviet Russia and stay firm in resisting its power

aspirations.

Critique

The theory of authoritarian expansionism suffers from biases of essentialism, cultural

ethnocentrism and political hypocrisy.

Essentialism

The first problem concerns the theory of authoritarian expansionism’s presentation of

Russia as a never changing entity that is constantly preoccupied with imperialist plans

to subjugate and occupy other nations. This tendency to essentialise Russia and its

foreign policy downplays the role of factors others than the nation’s political culture

or the regime’s strategic design. As a result, little serious consideration is given to the

possibility that Russia’s international assertiveness may be designed as a response to

actions by the West and to seek relatively limited objectives.

For example, despite frequent claims that St Petersburg’s nineteenth-century policy

sought to topple the Ottoman Empire and conquer Constantinople,9 Russia’s eastern

goals were far less ambitious. These objectives included protection of the Orthodox

Christians in the Balkans and the right to have a secure passage of Russian vessels

through the Black Sea. Although inside Russia there had been supporters of the drive

to Constantinople within intellectual and foreign-policy circles, it would be a mistake

to view Russia’s foreign policy as driven by their views. Even after defeat in the

Crimean War, the government did not turn away from Europe as Russia’s hard-liners

had hoped. As Chancellor Alexander Gorchakov’s activities demonstrated, St

9For such claims, see, for example, Kissinger (1994, pp. 140–44), Geyer (1987, p. 65) and MacKenzie

(1993, p. 220).

EXPLANATIONS OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 701

Petersburg wanted recognition of its interests in the Black Sea, which Russia was

prepared to defend even at the cost of German unification.

Even Soviet international policy had more limited goals than many Western

scholars and politicians believed. With the exception of the brief period of the drive for

world revolution, the Kremlin mainly sought to establish the Soviet Union as a great

power and recognised member of the international community, not to expand the

Soviet geopolitical boundaries. The Cold War, including the Soviet occupation of

Eastern Europe, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the military intervention in

Afghanistan in 1979, also cannot be adequately understood without considering

actions by the Western nations. Western suspicion and mistrust toward the Soviet

Union served to strengthen its determination to act assertively. From the willingness

to work with Russia before and during the meeting at Yalta, Great Britain and the

United States soon moved to unilateral and potentially confrontational behaviour.

Ideological differences notwithstanding, Stalin and his entourage did not abandon

their attempts to mend fences with the West until Truman had made public his

doctrine of globally containing communism on 12 March 1947 and the Marshall Plan

had been proclaimed in June of the same year.

It is equally problematic to present Russia’s more recent assertiveness as a part of a

plan by the Kremlin to restore the empire and dominate its neighbours, even at the

price of confrontation with the West. Those accusing Russia of reviving the lost

empire, back-pedalling on democracy and challenging the West’s vital interests in the

world oversimplify the extremely complex process of Russia’s transformation and its

relations with Western nations. In particular, much of Russia’s assertiveness was a

product of the United States’ regime-change policy, efforts to achieve nuclear

superiority and the West’s post-Cold War advancement into what Russia perceived as

the sphere of its geopolitical interests.10 It is misleading to ignore the interactive nature

of Russia–West relations, presenting Russia as an essentialist entity with once-and-

forever formed values and behavioural patterns.

Ethnocentrism

The above-noted essentialist presentation of Russia’s foreign policy in part results

from the theory of authoritarian expansionism’s cultural ethnocentrism. Rather than

viewing other cultural communities as a source of learning, ethnocentric theories tend

to perceive them as a potential threat precisely because of their difference from the self.

Ethnocentrism precludes the theory of authoritarian expansionism from being able to

appreciate Russia’s historical, geopolitical and institutional distinctness because

ethnocentric ideas assume the superiority of their own culture and the inferiority of

others.

A good example of a Western ethnocentric theory is that of democratic peace,

according to which democracies do not go to war with each other.11 Critics of the

democratic peace theory pointed out that it reflects American values of what is

10For development of this argument, see Tsygankov (2010, ch. 6). 11For a summary of the debate, see Brown et al. (1996). For other works critical of Western

ethnocentrism in analysing Russia, see Malia (1999), Cohen (2001) and Brown (2010).

702 ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV

‘democratic’ and that those values themselves have been shaped by the United States’

perception of external threats (Oren 1995, 2002). Upon closer inspection, the theory of

democratic peace is a mirror image of the authoritarian expansionism theory. Simply

put, the two theories say that by not fighting each other Western-style democracies

tend to act peacefully and cooperatively abroad, whereas the non-Western

authoritarian systems, such as Russia, are bullish and expansionist exactly because

they are non-democracies. Yet social structures and internal conditions are far more

complex than the two theories present. For example, in the post-communist context,

democratisation is not infrequently accompanied by state weakness, thereby allowing

the re-emergence and the rise of a previously dormant militant ethnic nationalism. As

a result, not only do some of the newly established democracies go to war against each

other, but they may also do so in part as a result of their moving away from

authoritarianism (Mansfield & Snyder 2007). Similarly, authoritarian regimes that

lack popular legitimacy may be cautious enough and abstain from assertive foreign

policy if they perceive such policy as potentially destabilising. Just as authoritarian

regimes may be compatible with building an inclusive national identity and an efficient

economy,12 such regimes may be compatible with a moderate international behaviour.

The highly simplistic treatment of Russia’s political system becomes especially

problematic in the post-Soviet context. Indeed, if judged by the degree of public

support, rather than by institutionalisation of effective checks and balances, Russia’s

political system can hardly be called undemocratic.13 Yet Russia’s system is still

emerging, and can hardly be labelled either as an established democracy or as pure

authoritarianism. More nuanced categories and theories need to be developed if we are

to match Russia’s domestic conditions to its foreign policy. Even within the West,

meanings of democracy change over time,14 and it makes little sense to analyse the

Russian post-communist ‘democracy’ by comparing it to the model of Western

societies (McFaul 2001; Fish 2005; Baker & Glasser 2005), rather than to Russia’s own

history.

Hypocrisy

The essentialism and ethnocentrism of the authoritarian expansionism theory also feed

into questionable policy recommendations. Presenting Russia as an autocratic power

that invariably threatens the outside world leaves other countries with few options

regarding engaging Russia. If Russia—especially in presentation of Version One of the

theory of authoritarian expansionism—was, is and will remain an autocratic and anti-

Western imperialist state, then the West must either contain or confront it. Such

recommendations do not only tend to perpetuate the tense state of West–Russia

relations; they are also politically hypocritical because they deny Russia interests and

12For an argument against universality of economic and political openness for advancing economic

growth, see Bremmer (2006). 13Public support for President Putin was consistently high, ranging from 70% to 80% during the

2000s. In addition, some polls showed that almost half (47%) of Russians thought that the country

needed a distinct kind of democracy that would correspond to Russia’s national traditions and specific

qualities, and only 17% were against a democratic form of government (Interfax, 18 December 2007). 14On contested meanings of democracy in the United States, see Foner (1998) and Oren (2002).

EXPLANATIONS OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 703

stakes that the Western nations themselves view as fundamental to their own existence.

Russia’s interests and values are not only perceived as incompatible with those of the

West; they are also viewed as illegitimate and not worthy of recognition.

An example of these kinds of recommendations for Western governments might be

the calls by many advocates of the theory of authoritarian expansionism to punish and

contain the Kremlin following its assertive post-9/11 policy. Disappointed by Russia’s

unwillingness to follow the United States’ international agenda, analysts and members

of the American political class, such as Senator John McCain and Vice President Dick

Cheney, issued multiple statements indicating their concerns with Russia’s new

‘imperialism’ and energy ‘blackmail’.15 Steps were proposed, such as revoking Russia’s

membership in the G8, severing its ties with other Western institutions, banning

private investments and recognising the independence of secessionist territories (in

the case of Chechnya) (McCain 2003; Frum & Perle 2003, p. 263; Pipes 2004;

Edwards & Kemp 2006; Council on Foreign Relations 2006). These would amount to

a policy of containing Russia or returning to where the two nations were during the

Cold War.

Blaming Russia alone for the breakup of the post-9/11 international coalition is

insufficient at best and misleading at worst; and recommendations to contain or

punish Moscow are counter-productive. Denying Russia its political and energy

interests and the right to set an independent foreign policy is sure to come with large

political and economic costs. Such an approach is not likely to discipline a Russia that

continues to be in a position not to yield to external pressures. Continuous treatment

of Russia as a potential threat, rather than a legitimate member of international

society, may indeed bring to power in Moscow those who are interested in

exacerbating relations with the West. Politically, it may generate a prolonged cycle

of hostilities shaped by Russia and the West’s clashing perceptions of each other’s

intentions. NATO expansion, as well as military interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, has

already done its share of damage in this respect. Hard-line nationalists in Russia will

only be grateful to hawkish pundits and politicians for assisting them in constructing

an image of the West as a threat.

Three illustrations

This section reviews several cases of Russia’s assertiveness in order to highlight

empirical problems with employing the theory of authoritarian expansionism for

interpreting Russia’s behaviour. I have selected cases across historical eras—the

Crimean War, the Cold War and the Russia–Georgia War—which have been critically

important to the theory’s establishment and progression.

Crimean War

The advocates of the theory of authoritarian expansionism have advanced two

assumptions regarding the decision by Russia to go to war with the Ottoman Empire.

15For analysis of anti-Russian currents within the American political class and media circles, see

Tsygankov (2009) and English and Svyatets (2010).

704 ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV

First, they have argued that the Tsar’s ultimatum to the Sultan over the rights of

Orthodox Christians was predetermined by Russia’s traditional desire to conquer

Constantinople.16 Second, they have assumed that the autocratic nature of St

Petersburg’s decision making precluded any serious opposition to the Tsar’s plan.

Evidence for these assumptions is far from conclusive.

Nicholas did not seek to topple the Sultan. The Tsar’s objectives were more limited

and included the defence of the rights of Russia’s co-religionists residing within the

Ottoman Empire, preservation of the prestige of a European power, and the right to

maintain a fleet in the Black Sea. More than a third of the Ottoman Empire’s

population—approximately 13 million people—was Orthodox Christian, and the

Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardzhi provided Russia with special rights to protect Orthodox

Christians within the Ottoman Empire. Although these rights were not clearly defined,

Article 7 obligated the Porte to ‘give the Christian faith and its churches firm

protection’, and it granted ‘the Ministries of the Russian Imperial Court [the right] to

protect all interests of the church built in Constantinople’.17 As a member of the Holy

Alliance, Russia also viewed its commitment to the rights of Orthodox Christians as

consistent with its European obligations. In Nicholas’s perception, he was challenging

the Sultan on the issue of the Holy Places to return the Ottoman principalities to the

European Concert.18 Finally, the Tsar sought to confirm Russia’s control over the

Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which was vital to Russia’s economic

ties to Europe. The Crimean War resulted less from Russia’s expansionism and more

from the West and Russia’s incorrect perceptions of each other’s motives, as well as

from Nicholas’s overconfidence.

It would be equally wrong to assume that Nicholas’s assertiveness met no opposi-

tion at home. Advocates of a more restrained policy within the political class included

Nicholas’s most influential advisors, such as Count Nesselrode and Baron Brunnow,

who urged him to be cautious in negotiations with the Ottomans and consultations

with Austria and Prussia. On the other side of the political spectrum, Slavophiles

proclaimed the Crimean War to serve the ‘holy’ purpose of reviving Russia’s Christian

mission and pressured the Tsar to extend military support for the Balkan Slavs—

advice that Nicholas never accepted.19

Cold War

The early Cold War provides another seminal case of the theory of authoritarian

expansionism which places emphasis on the Soviet expansionist ideology and

16See for example, Kissinger (1994, pp. 140–44), Geyer (1987, p. 65) and MacKenzie (1993, p. 220). 17For the text of the agreement, see Dmytryshyn (1974, pp. 97–107). 18The Tsar’s stated objectives were that ‘all the Christian parts of Turkey must necessarily become

independent, must become again what they [formerly] were, principalities, Christian states, as such re-

enter the family of the Christian states of Europe’ (Vinogradov 1993, p. 170). 19Part of it was that Nicholas was wary of the Slavophiles’ insistence on abolition of serfdom.

Domestic censorship for the Slavophiles remained tight, and the war objectives were kept as limited

and status-quo oriented. Disappointed in Nicholas and the course of the war, the Slavophiles soon

began to withdraw their support (for details, see Curtiss 1979, pp. 557–60). The Tsar also rejected plans

from his own court to attack Constantinople (Fuller 1992, pp. 235–36).

EXPLANATIONS OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 705

totalitarian structure of Josef Stalin’s decision making (Kennan 1961; Kissinger 1994).

Again, the reality is far too complex to be adequately expressed by supporters of the

theory of authoritarian expansionism.

The historical record shows that Soviet international objectives after World War II

were limited and shaped by the state’s perception of strategic interests, rather than

communist ideology.20 Before the end of 1945, Stalin acted with restraint and

generally in the spirit of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements as he interpreted them. He

was willing to tolerate Poland’s independence, although not outside the Soviet area of

influence (Suny 1998, p. 344). He also planned no communist takeovers in Europe and

advised the leaders of communist parties in Italy, France, Hungary and Bulgaria to

cooperate with national governments and not to expect to assume power within the

foreseeable future (Roberts 1999, p. 19; LaFeber 1997, p. 20)—partly because he

wanted to prevent the strengthening of independent communist centres (Daniels 1985,

p. 220). In addition—and consistent with the agreement on the division of influence he

had devised with Churchill—Stalin refused to interfere in Greece (Pikhoya 2007, p.

146). He further abstained from interfering in Finland, which he viewed as

maintaining a generally ‘friendly’ international posture (Alperovitz 1971, p. 22).

Outside Europe, Stalin advised Chinese communists to enter into a coalition with their

enemies, the nationalists (Roberts 1999, p. 19). He also refused to defy the United

States by intervening in Japan and landing in Hokkaido, as some of his advisers

encouraged him to do after Truman had dropped two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima

and Nagasaki in August 1945 (Suny 1998, p. 345).

The really radical turn in the Soviet attitude toward the West did not take place

until the Marshall Plan was officially proclaimed in June 1947. ‘There is little

evidence’, wrote Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, ‘that before the

Marshall Plan Stalin had any master plan for immediate expansion’ (Zubok &

Pleshakov 1996, p. 130). Even after Truman had proclaimed his new doctrine in

March 1947, Stalin was hoping to continue political ties and negotiations with the

United States and Great Britain. In April, during a long meeting with State Secretary

George Marshall, Stalin argued for a possible compromise on ‘all the main questions’

and insisted that ‘it was necessary to have patience and not become pessimistic’

(Kissinger 1994, p. 444). Marshall, however, was of a different opinion, and in his

radio address on 28 April he indicated that the United States was no longer in a mood

to deliberate and was planning to take decisive actions (Kissinger 1994, p. 445). On 5

June he delivered his Marshall Plan speech, in which he pledged financial assistance for

the post-war reconstruction of the European continent. In response, Stalin and

Molotov articulated their alternative to Western policy by creating a separate bloc

with the Eastern European states and suppressing any opposition to their policy

within the region. At home, the new course meant a return to the pre-war system of

mass mobilisation and repressions.

In addition, the Soviet power structure, as highly centralised as it was, did allow for

opposition to the policy of assertiveness. Immediately following the war, Stalin’s most

20This is not to say that ideology was unimportant. Yet, it was more important as ‘the internal lens

through which the state viewed the very legitimacy of its actions’ (Gaddis 1997, p. 290) than as a

justification for hard-line actions toward the West.

706 ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV

impatient comrades wanted him to cross the Elbe and occupy some parts of the

Western European nations—advice that he rejected as impractical.21 From the other

side of the political spectrum, a former Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov and the

ambassador to the United States Andrei Gromyko defended the ‘liberal’ approach

that included more respect for the choices of Eastern European states and more

extensive negotiations with the Western ones (Zubok & Pleshakov 1996, pp. 29–30;

Pikhoya 2007, pp. 106–8). What exacerbated the situation, making it ever more

difficult to prevent a full-fledged political confrontation, was the two sides’

international ambitions and mistrust of each other’s intentions. Stalin’s geopolitically

limited ‘socialist imperialism’ was met with the West’s global ‘democratic imperial-

ism’.22 Had the West been be less revisionist and fearful of the Kremlin’s preparedness

to penetrate the Western nations,23 there was a possibility that Stalin would have

continued with post-war cooperative security arrangements.

The Russia–Georgia War

Similar problems exist with the claims of the theory of authoritarian expansionism

that an autocratic Moscow was seeking to establish imperial control over Tbilisi and

that the war with Georgia was part of a broader geopolitical plan to revive Russia’s

hegemony in the former Soviet region and to challenge the West globally (Asmus 2010,

pp. 9, 14, 217–18; Blank 2009, p. 104; Cornell & Starr 2009b, p. 8; Sherr 2009, p.

224).24

Russia’s relationship with its Caucasian neighbour has evolved through several

increasingly unhappy stages and Moscow’s objectives have been defensive, aiming

mainly to prevent NATO expansion and the inclusion of Georgia and potentially

Ukraine into the alliance. Just as Tbilisi was angry with Moscow’s unwillingness to

honour Georgia’s independence and the right to choose a foreign-policy orientation,

Russia was frustrated with the lack of recognition by the United States and NATO.

While it is plausible to assume the Kremlin’s intention was to gain full control over

Georgia, it is at least as plausible to interpret Russia’s motives as driven by defence

and security considerations. The interests of Russia’s security are at least as helpful in

determining its behaviour and explaining why it limited itself to recognising Abkhazia

and South Ossetia’s independence, but abstained from pursuing the more expansionist

objectives of removing Saakashvili from power and establishing a pro-Kremlin regime

in Tbilisi. The theory of authoritarian expansionism lacks nuance and a sense of

proportion and, by presenting Russia as inherently imperialist and anti-Western, this

theory is less inclined to consider seriously the impact of contemporary developments

and international interactions on Russia’s behaviour.

21For example, General Semyon Budennyi advocated such intervention. Stalin reportedly responded

to Budennyi by posing the rhetorical questions ‘how are we to feed them?’ (Akstyutin 1995). 22The terms of ‘socialist’ and ‘democratic’ imperialism come from Zubok and Gaddis, respectively

(Zubok 2009, ch. 2; Gaddis 1997, pp. 284, 289). 23See, for example, CIA (1948, pp. 4–7) and NSC (1948, pp. 1–2). For analysis of the United States’

inflated assessments of the Soviet threat after the war, see Evangelista (1982). 24Other scholars argued that the war assisted the Kremlin with its internal legitimacy (Allison 2008,

p. 1169; Filippov 2009).

EXPLANATIONS OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 707

Western nations and Georgia too bear responsibility for Russia’s increasingly

assertive behaviour in the Caucasus. By assisting Tbilisi with its political transition

after the Rose Revolution and not interfering with its efforts to restore control over

Adjara, the Kremlin expected Georgia to honour its interests in the Caucasus by not

pressing for immediate military withdrawals, excluding the use of force from dealings

with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and consulting Russia on vital security issues such

as membership in NATO. Soon, however, Tbilisi adopted a strategy of solving

territorial disputes without assistance from Russia and by relying on support from the

United States. By 2004 Washington had provided $1.2 billion in aid in the previous

decade, and deployed military advisors in Georgia. The United States was determined

to secure its access to Caspian oil and strengthen its geostrategic presence in the

Caucasus, which the Kremlin saw as evidence of America’s bias and lack of

recognition of Russia’s role in the region. The United States did little to restrain

Georgia’s militarisation and ambitions to reign in its autonomous regions by force.25

While Russia was increasing its support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, NATO and

US officials did not hide their backing of Tbilisi, and rarely criticised Georgia’s actions

in public. For example, less than a month before the war, the US Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice travelled to Europe. She found no time to visit Moscow, but on 9

July she went to Tbilisi to demonstrate support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and

NATO aspirations.

It is also unrealistic to assume that the Kremlin’s decision-making system was

autocratic enough to exclude a serious debate within the ruling circles. According to

Gleb Pavlovski, one faction within the Kremlin wanted to march on Tbilisi in order to

challenge the West and fully revive Russia’s domination in the Caucasus (Felgenhauer

2009, pp. 178–79). Another faction had more modest objectives, but did consider a

decision to remove Saakashvili. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign

Minister Sergei Lavrov both indicated that they wanted the Georgian President ‘to go’

and at first considered this a condition for a ceasefire (Asmus 2010, pp. 199, 220). Still

another faction seems to have been satisfied with achieving a military victory over

Georgia and recognition of its rebellious provinces.26 The ruling structure was far

from uniform or consolidated.

Towards a better understanding of Russia

The analysis in this article suggests the theory of authoritarian expansionism has a

rather limited ability to understand Russia and its foreign policy. Not only does the

theory tend to misrepresent the direction and scope of Russia’s international actions,

but it is potentially misleading regarding the sources of such actions. Because of its

emphasis on the role of domestic ‘authoritarianism’ in determining foreign policy, the

theory of authoritarian expansionism tends to miss other important sources of state

international behaviour, such as security conditions and actions by outside powers

towards Russia. It is not that the theory of authoritarian expansionism is necessarily

25According to the former Defence Minister Irakli Okruashvili (2007), Georgia planned a military

invasion of South Ossetia in 2006. 26This objective seems to have been favoured by President Medvedev (2008).

708 ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV

wrong, but it is biased and incomplete and therefore potentially wrong. To apply the

late Martin Malia’s (1999, p. 9) diagnosis, ‘the West is not necessarily most alarmed

when Russia is in reality most alarming, nor most reassured when Russia is in fact

most reassuring’. The theory’s tendency to essentialise Russia’s internal conditions and

exaggerate its international ambitions should therefore make analysts pause before

adopting the theory of authoritarian expansionism framework and policy recommen-

dations.

A better approach to Russia would be to devise a more complex classification of

Russia’s foreign policy. The historical record will show that since its emergence as an

independent centralised state, Russia has followed not one but several distinct

trajectories in relations with the West (Tsygankov 2012). From opening a permanent

mission in Rome in the early seventeenth century to the collective security policy

before World War II, Russia frequently sided with a coalition of Western states

against those whom it viewed as challenging Russian values of security. The second

distinct trajectory of Russia’s relations with the West has been that of defensiveness or

balancing through domestic revival and flexible international alliances. It included

Russia’s periods of recovery after the Time of Troubles, the war with Sweden, the

Crimean War, the Communist Revolution and the Soviet disintegration. Finally,

historically Russia has resorted to assertiveness in relations with the West, as

exemplified by the cases considered above of the Crimean War, Cold War and the

Russia–Georgia war of August 2008. The theory of authoritarian expansionism is

applicable only to the third trajectory of Russia’s foreign policy and to a limited

degree.

A better approach to Russia would be one free from crude biases and hypocritical

recommendations. Such approaches should be eclectic and draw from various theo-

retical traditions by incorporating ideas of domestic institutions, considerations of

national security and international recognition as sources of the nation’s foreign

policy.27 The first task ought to be to establish a meaningful context in which Russia

acts and seeks to achieve its goals. Scholarly responsibility demands that we should

establish it by studying the relevant historical, social, psychological and political

contexts behind what ostensibly are ‘autocratic’ decisions. Proceeding from the 200-

year-old vision of Russia by the Marquis de Custine as an essentially aggressive

nation, or engaging in reconstruction of the Kremlin’s motives without sufficient

evidence at hand, is unlikely to facilitate a better understanding of the country or

produce sound policy recommendations. How the Russians themselves describe their

system of commitments to relevant social communities should give us a better clue as

to what the purpose, legitimacy and scope of their actions might be. The second task

should be to analyse the level of power and confidence that provides the state with the

required platform for acting, and it incorporates power capabilities, institutional

capacity and the leadership’s perceptions of actions necessary for implementing the

vision. Even if the domestic belief system supports assertive international behaviour,

Russia may lack the resources to act on it. Finally, a scholar of foreign policy must

carefully monitor the actions of the Western states toward Russia. As constructivism

27For a recent attempt to offer a more sophisticated analysis of relationships between

authoritarianism and foreign policy, see Chambers (2010).

EXPLANATIONS OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 709

teaches us, such external actions may serve the purpose of external legitimisation of

Russia’s behaviour on the international scene. By providing various forms of support

the outside world may have the power to encourage Russia not to resort to revisionist

behaviour. Only such an eclectic approach, sensitive to local systems of perceiving the

outside world, national security interests and the behaviour of outsiders, may bring us

closer to a better understanding of an enormously complex country, such as Russia.

San Francisco State University

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