Maritime Security
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Transportation7.pptxMass Transit on Fixed Rails and Guideways
Chapter 7
Week 9
©2013, CRC Press/ Taylor & Francis
Mass Transit History
Horse drawn trolleys led city growth
Subways, subway-surface cars and elevated trains were twentieth century methods for moving workers to jobs
Short haul passenger rail connected outer suburbs to inner cities
Cable cars and monorails remain as tourist attractions
Light rail focuses on transit oriented development
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Mass Transit
Self-powered
Operating on tracks or guideways
Electric powered
Environmentally friendly
No air pollution at point of usage, unlike diesel busses
Fixed route and fixed station locations
Some operate in street right-of-way and cause traffic congestion
Some operate in their own right-of-way but at grade an cause traffic blockages at crossings
Many systems removed after WW II
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Mass Transit
1970s gas crisis led to new appreciation of mass transit
Commuter rail shared tracks with freight rail
Cities added new subway lines – New York and San Francisco
Light rail added in Los Angeles and San Diego
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Components
Trolleys = 456 directional route miles
Light rail systems had 1,477 directional route miles
Commuter rail had 7,561 directional route miles.
13,000 vehicles in urban mass transit service on rails
6,494 commuter rail cars and locomotives
Transit rail vehicles traveled 762 million miles in 2008
Commuter rail travelled 337 million miles.
Mass transit rail systems accounted for 18,931 million passenger miles in 2008
Commuter rail accounted for another 11,032 million passenger miles.
By 2002 more than six thousand agencies operated bus, rail, ferry and other transit systems.
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Locations
At grade, elevated and subways, may use tunnels
Limited access and egress points – through existing buildings, dedicated stations
Right-of-way is within 25 feet of the track
Can only go backward or forward on the track, sometime single set
For subways and elevated lines and in tunnels, repair, recovery or rescue vehicles have to use the same track
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Trolleys, Streetcars and Trams
Developed in nineteenth century for urban travel
First steam and cable but then electricity
“Trolley” is the part that contacts the electric rail
San Francisco, Philadelphia an New Orleans still have trolleys
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Trolleys, Streetcars, Trams
Trolleys have to travel on fixed tracks
Schedule is usually intervals between arrival rather than times schedule
“Mixed traffic” is when trolley and cars share the same street
Safety problems
Rails are slippery when wet
Drivers needing to turn left have to cross trolley tracks
Riders have to walk across lanes of traffic to access the trolley, which typically stops near the corner
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Light Rail
Uses existing street rights-of-way to create rapid transit
Operate as single cars or sets
Generally have their own operating space, with grade separation from traffic, or fenced area
Freeway can carry about 2,000 cars per hour , an average light rail car can carry 20,000 riders per hour
Cars crossing tracks at intersections are protected with left turn lane and left turn signal
Riders usually have pedestrian crossing to reach the platform, separated from traffic
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Subways, Underground, Metro, Tube
Underground commuter systems powered by electricity
1863, London, world’s first; 1904, New York; 1907, Philadelphia
Extensive infrastructure: tunnels beneath city streets, stations, electric wires & transformers, ventilation systems
Large operating rooms where signals, lighting, ventilation and power are coordinated
Entrances at street level
Stations at the basement level of surrounding buildings
Ticket purchasing options
Information kiosks.
Stations may have a single entry to a single line, with a cross over to the opposite direction track, or multiple corridors leading to several systems in both directions.
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Subways, Underground, Metro, Tube
Security challenges
Limited access, generally by stairs, so difficult to evacuate during rush hour
ADA elevators
Some deep systems have escalators, but heat or ice and snow at the top can stop operation
Log corridors require lighting and ventilation, making power outage a crisis
Challenge for EMS response
Carrying equipment an patient long distances
Challenge for Fire personnel wearing SCBA
Challenge for police patrol
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Subway tunnels
Limited access
Often under water or through rock
Deep systems may have multiple escalators, susceptible to power outage and breakdowns
Usually accessible only at station portals, although older systems may have cross overs.
Ventilation using forced air, fans, pneumatic action of trains with air intakes at sidewalk level
Tunnels are lit by electric light bulbs that are triggered by the train’s passage, leaving the tunnels dark between trains
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Elevated Systems
Chicago most famous “El”
Above ground on limited access tracks
“Cat walks” for repair and maintenance along some segments
Access through second story of existing buildings or through stations above streets
Access by stairs and elevators with ADA accommodations
Open air ventilation
Emergency access by ladders possible
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Tourist-Oriented Systems
Cable cars
Cable runs under the street
Motorman engages and disengages the car to the cable for passenger access
Handbrake holds steady on inclines
Monorails
Use urban air space to save ground level for cars
Single rail on elevated track, system usually timed for cars to pass at stations
Disney uses monorails from hotels to parks
Seattle’s was built for the 1962 World’s Fair
Tokyo’s was built for the 1964 Olympics
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Heavy Passenger Rail
Heavy rail commuter trains
share tracks with freight railroad companies
Variety of cars
traditional railway carriages
double-decker cars offering WiFi, tables, restrooms and bicycle storage.
Commuter trains are generally self-propelled
Electricity or diesel engines
Trains may be on a push-pull system using a locomotive, which may be electric or diesel.
Commuter rail usually travels longer distances at higher speeds and at a higher cost than light rail systems.
Light rail stations may be a mile or less apart to support a walking environment
Commuter rail stations are usually ten or more miles apart, supported by bus line connections or car parks.
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Heavy Passenger Rail
Open system, may use tunnels or bridges, may be fenced in urban area
Grade crossings in less populated areas, over or under crossings for busy streets
Access through stations which may be at grade, elevated or underground
Stations are frequently multi-modal exchange points
bus stops
taxi stands
parking lots for commuters’ cars
“kiss and ride” lots with short term parking for picking up commuters
Access to other mass transit systems like subways or light rail.
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Break
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Cyber System Controls: CI Interconnections
Mass transit rail-based systems almost all operate on electricity from the public grid.
Electric power transmission and distribution is dependent on SCADA systems.
Many of mass transit’s computer-based systems transmit information over telephone or wireless systems to the computers, and communications systems are also dependent on SCADA infrastructure.
Ability of rail-based mass transit systems to operate effectively is based on systems dependent on computer functionality.
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Cyber System Controls
Modern rail-based mass transit systems rely on computer controls
train schedules and announcements
Signals and switches
ventilation, heating and air conditioning
ticketing and access to stations.
Some systems even operate the cars by computer without human drivers.
Modern security systems have computer tie-ins
closed circuit television
fire alarms, smoke detection systems and intrusion detection alarms
SCADA systems – Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition-they are dependent on computer functionality (SCADA, n.d.), and are crucial to the safety and security of passengers and employees.
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Threats to Rail-Based Transit Systems
Mid-1980s- the threats to rail-based transit systems
homeless people living in the stations
unruly youths annoying and threatening other passengers
graffiti defacing cars and station walls
violent criminal acts = robbery, drug dealing and shooting.
Targeted enforcement campaigns like New York City Transit’s have largely eliminated the worst criminal violence from rail-based urban mass transit systems
In this same period in other nations terrorists had targeted rail-based mass transit,
Goal to hurt the economy or the government’s credibility, not to injure passengers.
IRA waged a war of terror against British interests for over eighty years
targeting the London subway system and commuter rail throughout the county
IRA would contact law enforcement with enough warning time to remove people but not to protect the system.
British tube riders accepted the inconvenience and cooperated with evacuations.
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21st Century – Transit as Site, Weapon and Victim
International terrorism has focused on rail-based transit
Liberation groups like the Chechan rebels and Tamil Tigers, 1990s into 21st century
Rise of Islamist terrorists = spread of violence against all types of transportation.
Jenkins’ = 1920-1997
639 attacks or threats against commuter systems, stations, tunnels and bridges
1970- 2009 chronology - attacks against transportation since 1970, and train derailments since 1920
522 attacks against rail-based mass transit alone
434, or 83%, used explosives or incendiary devices.
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Rail-Based Mass Transit
Most attacks against rail-based mass transit have been in other countries
Madrid, London, Mumbai, Moscow
Plots against NYC Transit, PATH thwarted so far…
US mass transit = open system, concentration of people
Attack = loss of life, psychological damage
Circulatory system of urban environment, economic engine
NYC Transit = $400 million/day
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Cyber Systems
HSPD-7: CI/KR
National Cyber Alert System
. “[P]hysical access to network switches and jacks related to SCADA provides the capacity to bypass the security on control software and control SCADA networks.”
Firewalls, VPN to protect interconnected CI/KR
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Attacks Against Rail-Based Systems
Passengers cannot flee easily, constrained by tracks, fences, elevation or tunnels.
Light and air depend on power from the outside, although generator back-up systems may be provided
Electric vehicles require electricity from the community grid to move
Large groups, contained for periods between stations
Small arms and explosives like surface transit
Stations and service corridors offer more hiding places
Remote control or times devices
Limited air exchange makes biological weapons attractive
Challenge to prevent, recognize and apprehend
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Actual Events
Criminals and mentally ill still greatest threat
Terrorists more efficient
Small arms, chemical, fire, explosives
Disrupted events planned for biological
Cyber is future potential attack mode
Jenkins’ chronologies of mass transit to 1920.
Attacks on surface transportation increased over the past 25 years
Israel most attacks; India and Pakistan most fatalities.
600 attacks 1920 and 1997 on rail-based mass transit, commuter rail and light rail
27% of the attacks against vehicles
13% of the attacks against stations.
The IRA in the United Kingdom and the Algerian extremists in France
Aum Shinrikyo chemical attack on Tokyo subway lines
Starting in 1993 Islamic extremists plots against on the New York City subway systems.
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Actual Attacks
Long Island Railroad Murders, 1993
Mentally ill man
Small arms
Random targets
Dead and wounded
Slow response to uninjured passengers
Psychological injuries
Aum Shinrikyo, 1995
Religious cult
Chemical Sarin
Targeted trains that converged on the Tokyo subway station that served the police department
Deaths, injuries
Slow response to event and clean-up
Injured contaminated hospitals, taxis; trains went on to other stations
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Actual Attacks
Arson on Korean Subway, 2003
Mentally ill, suicidal man
Burning liquid
Materials in car toxic when burned
Burned electric circuits locked doors, trapped passengers inside car
Dead, injured missing
70 incinerated in car, 50 died on stairs trying to escape
Slow communications
Fire in station cut lighting and ventilation
European IEDs
Madrid, 2004 used left behind IEDs in backpacks with cell phone timers; Al Qaeda sympathizers
London, 2005 was suicide bombers; Al Qaeda sympathizers
Moscow, 2010 was Chechan rebels, suicide bombers
All mass carnage for a political cause
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Security Strategies for Rail-Based Systems
Fixed routes and schedules
Cannot deviate from rails
Specified stations, tunnels, bridges
More predictability but better focus for technology – cameras, lights, alarms
Prevention is hard
Response and recovery plans easier
Redundancy and dual purpose plans.
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Security Cycle
Minor intrusions are important indicators
“See Something, say Something” needs to be enlarged to include reports of vandalism
Create partnerships for rapid information exchange with internal personnel and those from other agencies
Street repair, utility repair and grounds maintenance personnel from other companies can be a resource
Employees are also “eyes and ears” Train operators,
ticket sellers
station cleaning crews
Vendors – newspapers and food
Conscious of changes in passenger behavior, breakdowns of equipment, operational problems with facilities.
Employees and vendors should receive the same security vigilance training as mass transit staff
Create central pit of contact for information from all station and system employees
Report damage, vandalism and unusual behavior
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Security Cycle
Law Enforcement Personnel
Situational awareness in stations
Collaborate with other law enforcement agencies on petty crime, gang activity, terrorism threats
Technology operators
Fire and smoke alarms. Intrusion detection, cameras
Communication with law enforcement or security for quick response
Operators collect data and provide to central POC
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Security Cycle
Information collected must be analyzed in a central point for patterns
Leads to creation of proprietary intelligence
Analysts need to collaborate with local fusion center, read FTA’s weekly bulletins, DHS newsletters
Local crime, damage to the system and presence of unexpected persons can lead to useful intelligence to create security enhancements like changes of personnel deployment, redirection of cameras and lighting, e.g copper wire thefts
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Training on Policy Changes
Staff must be made aware of new threats and policy changes
Brief bulletins for simple changes- reporting path, us of cameras
Briefing training on bigger policy changes- access control, security system enhancements
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Security Technologies
Consider cost-benefit
Dual use like enhanced or redundant lighting, back-up power for ventilation, roving patrols, fire protection
Single purpose item consideration
Response to identified threat
Many technologies and all not equally effective
Employment of security strategies requires engineering advice
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| Functions | Relative Effectiveness | Costs | Physical or Operational | Strategy | Benefits/ Dual use |
| Minimum Strategies | |||||
| Lighting | High | Medium | Physical | Deter | Anti-theft, safety |
| Ventilation enhancements | High | Very High | Physical & Operational | Mitigate | Safety |
| Fire Detection System | Medium | Low | Physical | Detection | Safety |
| Fire Protection System | High | High | Physical & Operational | Mitigate | Safety |
| Cameras | High | Medium | Physical Operational | Deter and Interdict | Traffic surveillance, facility design efficiency |
| Security Awareness training: employees and passengers | High | Low | Operational | Deter, Mitigate | Safety, Security |
| Roving patrols | Medium | Low | Operational | Deter, Detect, Interdict | Safety, Security |
Excerpt from Security Strategies for Rail-based Mass Transit
©2013, CRC Press/ Taylor & Francis
Human Element
Some systems operate without human action once installed – ventilation
Some need human interface on schedule, e.g. camera tape management
Vehicle cameras for accident liability, also for criminal apprehension
Gets help to drive and passengers in an emergency if monitored
Cameras recorded and monitored in parking areas, platforms, passageways
Presence of a camera may deter crime
Monitored cameras are only as good as the observer
Dual use cuts down on routine crime and vandalism
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Human Element
Roving patrols
Randomness to defeat criminal surveillance
Change number of personnel and direction of patrol
LIRR free rides to armed law enforcement commuters
Random inspection of commuters’ baggage
VIPR teams for any transit system
High visibility apprehensions
Petty crime, vandalism
Perimeter control
Station and platform patrol
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Explosives Detection
Jenkins considers threat to mass transit
Behavioral assessment
DHS Hostile Intent Detection
SPOT program
Nin-intrusive evaluation of stress, fear or deception
Suicide Bomber Recognition and Response Guides
Random sweeps through crowds using dogs
Portable detection units for left behind items
Probable cause to swab something in someone’s possession- might be the behavioral clues
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Training and Exercises
What to report and how to report it
System Security Awareness for Transit Employees
Emergency and Security Plan
Medical
Fire
Crime
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Training and Exercises
Passenger training on what to report and how to report it
Cell phone cameras can help transit security but may lead to social media involvement
See Something, Say Something messages
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Cyber Security
Intrusion
Intentional hacking
Viruses
Physical access to system components
Remote or automated control of systems
Firewalls, anti-virus software and redundant manual controls of mechanical, electrical and communications systems offer protection
Human element
No USB drives at work
No internet access from SCADA computers
Safeguard passwords
Physical locks kept locked
Doors not propped open
Change codes and passwords regularly
Hot sites and cold sites for COOP
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Summary
In the open environment of rail-based mass transit perfect security is not possible.
Steps can be taken to encourage public participation in the security of the system.
Employees can become partners in observation and reporting suspicious objects and people. Mitigation measures can be taken to lessen the likelihood of damage and the amount of damage from crime or attack.
Deterrence, detection and interdiction systems can be applied.
Rapid response will limit damage and losses, and a recovery plan will limit economic impacts.
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