Prior research has indicated that information transparency in governments depends on institutional and environmental factors. Nonetheless, previous studies show heterogeneity in the results, and the academic researchers cannot make consistent conclusions. It makes it difficult to know the behavior of governments regarding their information policies. Therefore, making use of meta-analysis techniques, we integrate the empirical results reported by studies to determine the factors favoring the disclosure of public financial information via two modes of information disclosure— online versus hard-copy format. Several moderating effects— administrative culture, accounting regime, impact of measure used on determining variables, and level of government—have been considered and analyzed for their influence on the degree of correlation between the determinants and the disclosure of public financial information in both modes of information disclosure. Our study does not only show that the variables analyzed are positively associated with the disclosure of public financial information, but also that this depends on the context in which the research is conducted. The administrative style and the level of government are the main moderating effects that influence the results of analyzed studies.

Introduction

E-government facilitates interaction between the governments and the public, providing information and equipping citizens to take an active role in public affairs ( Flyverbom, 2015 ). Strategic plans for the implementation of e-government are intended to generalize the use of new technologies in the field of public administration and to create an environment enabling citizens to communicate their views or complaints regarding public issues to influence the development or implementation of public policy ( Birchall, 2015 ).

The importance attributed to e-government regarding improved accountability and information transparency in the framework of New Public Management (NPM) reforms has motivated various studies seeking to identify factors that determine a greater level of disclosure of public financial information, using two communication channels, hard copy (paper-based documents; Evans & Patton, 1987 ) and through the use of information and communication technologies (ICT), fundamentally the Internet ( Caba, Rodríguez, & López, 2008 ).

Nevertheless, despite the best endeavors of previous research, there exists considerable heterogeneity in the results, and conclusive evidence has yet to be obtained regarding the influence of the above-mentioned factors. Possibly, inconsistency in study design could account for the uneven results ( Pomeroy & Thornton, 2008 ). Whatever the reason, there is as yet insufficient empirical evidence of the validity and generality of these results to clearly establish the influence of the above-mentioned factors, in quantitative terms, on the disclosure of public financial information in both modes of information disclosure.

This article addresses this issue by means of an objective analysis of two aspects: (a) the communication channel used to disclose public financial information and (b) the influence that studies’ characteristics could have had on the conclusions obtained (i.e., the moderating effects) when the public financial disclosure was analyzed in those studies. This analysis was conducted by testing the statistical validity of the empirical results of 51 articles (see Table 1 ) in a meta-analysis to determine the underlying causes of the variations and contradictions identified.

Table 1. Main Characteristics of the Studies Analyzed.

Authors/studies	Countries	Online vs. hard copy	Level of government	Financial condition (sign; significance)	Intergovernmental transfers (sign; significance)	Political competition (sign; significance)	Size (sign; significance)	Municipal wealth (sign; significance)
Baber (1983)	United States	Hard copy	State	+; Nonsignificant	—	+; Nonsign./sign.	+; Significant	—
Evans and Patton (1983)	United States	Hard copy	Local	Mixed results	—	—	+; Nonsign./sign.	—
Ingram (1984)	United States	Hard copy	State	+; Nonsignificant	+; Nonsignificant	+; Nonsignificant	+; Nonsignificant	+; Significant
Baber and Sen (1984)	United States	Hard copy	State	−; Nonsignificant	—	+; Nonsign./sign.	—	—
Robbins and Austin (1986)	United States	Hard copy	Local	+; Significant	−; Nonsignificant	—	+; Significant	−; Nonsignificant
Ingram and DeJong (1987)	United States	Hard copy	State	+; Significant	+; Significant	—	+; Significant	—
Evans and Patton (1987)	United States	Hard copy	Local	+; Significant	—	Mixed results	Mixed results	—
Giroux (1989)	United States	Hard copy	Local	—	—	−; Nonsignificant	—	Mixed results
Dwyer and Wilson (1989)	United States	Hard copy	Local	−; Nonsign./sign.	—	—	+; Nonsignificant	—
Banker, Bunch, and Strauss (1989)	United States	Hard copy	Local	+; Significant	+; Nonsignificant	—	—	Mixed results
Copley (1991)	United States	Hard copy	Local	+; Significant	−; Significant	—	+; Significant	—
Carpenter (1991)	United States	Hard copy	State	+; Significant	—	−; Nonsignificant	+; Significant	—
Feroz and Wilson (1992)	United States	Hard copy	Local	—	—	—	+; Nonsignificant	—
Cheng (1992)	United States	Hard copy	State	−; Nonsignificant	−; Nonsignificant	Mixed results	+; Significant	+; Nonsignificant
Giroux and Deis (1993)	United States	Hard copy	Local	Mixed results	−; Nonsign./Sign.	—	—	—
Lim and McKinnon (1993)	United States	Hard copy	Local	—	—	—	+; Significant	—
Allen and Sander (1994)	United States	Hard copy	Local	—	—	—	+; Nonsignificant	—
Christiaens (1999)	Netherlands	Hard copy	Local	+; Nonsignificant	—	—	+; Significant	+; Nonsignificant
McLelland and Giroux (2000)	United States	Online	Local	—	+; Significant	—	+; Significant	—
Taylor and Rosair (2000)	Australia	Hard copy	State	—	—	—	Mixed results
Ryan, Stanley, and Nelson (2002)	United States	Hard copy	Local	—	—	—	+; Nonsign./sign.	—
Giroux and McLelland (2003)	United States	Hard copy	Local	+; Nonsign./sign.	Mixed results	—	Mixed results	+; Nonsignificant
Gore (2004)	United States	Hard copy	Local	+; Significant	—	—	+; Significant	—
Gore, Sachs, and Trzcinka (2004)	United States	Hard copy	Local	+; Significant	—	—	+; Significant	—
Smith (2004)	United States	Hard copy	Local	Mixed results	—	Mixed results	+; Nonsignificant	Mixed results
Laswad, Fisher, and Oyelere (2005)	New Zealand	Hard copy/online	Local	+; Nonsignificant	—	−; Nonsignificant	+; Nonsignificant	+; Nonsignificant
Malone (2006)	United States	Hard copy	Local	Mixed results	—	—	+; Significant	+; Significant
Justice, Melitski, and Smith (2006)	United States	Online	State/Local	—	—	—	+; Significant	—
Styles and Tennyson (2007)	United States	Online	Local	+; Significant	—	—	+; Significant	+; Significant
Mills, Carslaw, and Mason (2007)	United States	Hard copy	Local	—	+; Significant	—	—	—
da Costa Carvalho, Jorge, and Fernandez (2007)	Portugal	Hard copy	Local	Mixed results	+; Significant	—	Mixed results	—
Pina, Torres, and Royo (2007)	EU	Online	Local	—	—	—	+; Significant	—
Steccolini, Anessi-Pessina, and Nasi (2008)	Italy	Hard copy	Local	—	—	—	+; Nonsignificant	—
Gandía and Archidona (2008)	Spain	Online	Local	—	—	+; Significant	+; Significant	+; Significant
Caba, Rodríguez, and López (2008)	Spain	Online	Local	+; Significant	−; Nonsignificant	+; Nonsignificant	−; Nonsignificant	—
Cárcaba and García (2008)	Spain	Online	Local	Mixed results	—	+; Significant	+; Significant	—
Serrano, Rueda, and Portillo (2009)	Spain	Online	Local	+; Nonsignificant	—	+; Significant	+; Significant	+; Significant
Pina, Torres, and Royo (2009)	EU	Online	Local	—	—	—	+; Significant	—
Pina, Torres, and Royo (2010)	EU	Online	Local	—	—	—	+; Significant	—
Cárcaba and García (2010)	Spain	Online	Local	Mixed results	—	+; Significant	+; Significant	—
Guillamón, Bastida, and Benito (2011)	Spain	Online	Local	+; Nonsignificant	+; Significant	—	+; Significant	Mixed results
Martani and Lestiani (2012)	Indonesia	Online	Local	—	+; Nonsignificant	—	+; Significant	+; Significant
Albalate (2013)	Spain	Online	Local	+; Nonsignificant	—	—	+:Significant	—
Caamaño-Alegre, Lago-Peñas, Reyes-Santias, and Santiago-Boubeta (2013)	Spain	Online	Local	+; Nonsignificant	—	+; Significant	+; Nonsignificant	—
Rios, Benito, and Bastida (2013)	International	Online	State	+; Nonsignificant	—	−; Nonsignificant	+; Significant	—
Wehner and Renzio (2013)	International	Online	State	—	—	+; Significant	—	—
Caba Pérez, Rodríguez Bolívar, and López Hernández (2014)	OECD countries	Online	State	−; Nonsign./Sign.	—	+; Significant	+/−; Nonsignificant	+; Nonsignificant
Keerasuntonpong, Dunstan, and Khanna (2015)	New Zealand	Online	Local	—	—	—	+; Significant	+; Nonsignificant
Da Costa Bairral, Coutinho e Silva, and Dos Santos Alves (2015)	Brazil	Online	State	—	+/−; Nonsignificant	—	−; Nonsignificant	—
Lowatcharin and Menifield (2015)	United States	Online	Local	—	—	—	+; Significant	+; Nonsignificant
Garcia-Tabuyo, Sáez-Martín, and Caba-Pérez (2015)	Central America	Online	Local	—	—	—	+; Nonsignificant	—

Note. The studies contribute more than one observation to the sample because they include different estimations with different data sets, different explanatory variables, or different models. “+; Nonsignificant” = the variable offers a positive relationship and is statistically nonsignificant. “+; Nonsign./Sign.” = the variable offers a positive statistically significant relationship and a positive statistically nonsignificant relationship. “+; Significant” = the variable offers a positive relationship and is statistically significant. “−; Nonsign./Sign.” = the variable offers a negative statistically significant relationship and a negative statistically nonsignificant relationship. “−; Nonsignificant” = the variable offers a negative relationship and is statistically nonsignificant. “−; Significant” = the variable offers a negative relationship and is statistically significant. “Mixed results” = the variable offers all options when different studies are analyzed, that is, the variable has a positive, statistically significant and nonsignificant relationship, and it has a negative statistically significant and nonsignificant relationship. EU = European Union; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development.

In short, the use of the meta-analysis technique in this article seeks to investigate the effectiveness of previously identified factors for public financial disclosure via hard-copy format and compares it with the effectiveness of these factors through the Internet, regardless of the conditions under which the prior studies were carried out. The meta-analysis was conducted in a sample of individual quantitative studies. We incorporate different models and variables to explain the relationships between different levels of information disclosure and incentives of financial reporting, considering the two different communication channels used for information disclosure (online via the Internet or hard copy).

Financial Transparency in Governmental Entities and Forms of Information Disclosure: Hard Copy Versus Online

This study addresses two scenarios for the disclosure of financial information: via the Internet or as hard copy (paper-based documentation). Many studies focusing on the latter question have analyzed the factors underlying the decision by the U.S. Government to comply with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in preparing its financial reports ( Baber & Sen, 1984 ; Evans & Patton, 1987 ) or consolidated financial statements ( Cheng, 1992 ; Giroux, 1989 ).

In contrast, recent studies of public-sector financial information disclosure via the Internet have examined administrative reforms conducted under the NPM framework and concluded that the adoption and implementation of ICTs tends to favor innovation within public organizations, improving their transparency and accountability ( Caba et al., 2008 ; Cárcaba & García, 2008 ). Indeed, Internet-based reporting has produced a shift from “push” to “pull” communications in relations between government and citizens ( Mergel, 2013 ). The former “push” paradigm was characterized by the provision of batch-processed, producer-driven information, whereas in the “pull” system, information is tailored and citizen-driven ( Mergel, 2013 ). These changes are consistent with those taking place elsewhere under NPM frameworks, with general-purpose information giving way to made-to-measure data (see Figure 1 ).

Figure 1. Trends in governmental financial information reporting.

Source. Adapted from Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales ( ICAEW; 1998 ).

The Internet has the potential to revolutionize information disclosure due to its global reach, versatility, interactive capacity, and speed ( Jensen & Xiao, 2001 ), and the web is currently perceived as providing the best available platform for information stewardship and disclosure for both financial and nonfinancial information (see Figure 1 ). Indeed, as opposed to hard-copy format, the Internet is a good channel of communication to make information accessible to a great number of users at a low cost as well as to centralize users’ demands for information, allowing them to satisfy their need for information when they must make financial decisions. The Internet can disclose continuous financial data and improve the flexibility of information provided by financial statements by introducing figures or elements that make the information more attractive and comprehensible for users (see Figure 1 ). So, the disclosure of financial information through the Internet could help public administrators be publicly accountable and promote dialogue regarding the use of public financial resources.

Nonetheless, despite the importance of online reporting for improving transparency and accountability in the area of public-sector financial information (see Figure 1 ), to date, the volume of information disclosed online appears to be about the same as that provided in hard-copy format ( Rodríguez Bolívar, Caba, & López, 2015 ). Indeed, as in the private sector ( Ziek, 2009 ), little progress seems to have been made in online reporting, and online public financial information consists mainly of the display of hard-copy annual reports in an electronic format ( Rodríguez Bolívar, Caba, & López, 2007 ). Thus, the level of technology and the disclosure environment are associated with the presentation format, but not with information content.

Thus, despite the potential benefits of online reporting, doubts have been expressed about whether it is designed or used to effectively disseminate information. For example, as investigation has found in the private sector ( Unerman & Bennett, 2004 ), online information may not be accessible to some of the user groups most strongly affected by government activity due to the lack of technology, infrastructure, education, or language skills needed to use the government’s official websites. In this regard, it has been observed that the level of Internet pervasiveness is a major determinant of Internet-based information disclosure; where general levels of Internet use are higher, users will expect the government to provide more information online ( Caba et al., 2008 ; Gandía & Archidona, 2008 ).

As researchers have found in the area of private business ( Debreceny, Gray, & Rahman, 2002 ), the environment regarding the disclosure of financial information may favor such disclosure or may hinder it. Thus, Rodríguez Bolívar et al. (2015) and Pina et al. (2010) concluded that differences in cultural variables could produce differing patterns of accounting and would show varying levels of disclosure from one country to another. In addition, expectations of online reporting in developed countries may not be identical to those in developing countries because of the “digital divide” arising from populations’ ability to access the Internet.

Finally, the Internet could generate higher quality financial reporting if better technical use were made of the potential to disclose information online. Thus, the technical use of the Internet could be a significant factor to improve hard-copy disclosure ( Litan & Wilson, 2000 ). In this regard, empirical research on the private business sector ( Beattie & Pratt, 2003 ) has indicated that various user groups, such as auditors, demand Internet-based disclosure because of the additional information that can be provided electronically, the value of navigation and search aids, and the portability of information in different formats.

According to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC; 1999) and the Business Reporting Research Project (BRRP; 2002) , websites differ considerably from traditional media. With this in mind and together with the above considerations, we sought to inquire whether the results obtained by individual studies might be influenced by the modes of disclosure through which their information was accessed. Empirical evidence of this heterogeneity can be observed when the variables analyzed are income per capita (see the conclusions of Christiaens, 1999 and Giroux & McLelland, 2003 in contrast to those of Caba et al., 2008 and Gandía & Archidona, 2008 ) or the transfers received from other governments (see Ingram & DeJong, 1987 and Robbins & Austin, 1986 , on one hand, and Laswad, Fisher, & Oyelere, 2005 and Caba et al., 2008 , on the other).

In many cases, earlier studies have provided little theoretical underpinning for their analysis, and problems can arise when interpreting and integrating the findings. In the present article, the mode of disclosure is the main attribute to analyze regarding governments’ incentives for financial reporting, and we have tested this assumption using meta-analysis techniques.

Meta-Analysis Techniques to Identify the Incentives for Financial Transparency

Incentives for Financial Transparency in Information Disclosure by Governments

Since the mid-1970s, many studies have analyzed the factors conducive to more and better disclosure of public financial information. These studies have mainly been based on agency theory, neoinstitutional theory, and legitimacy theory ( Carpenter & Feroz, 2001 ; Feroz, Carpenter, & Cheng, 2007 ). The key idea underpinning agency theory is that differences exist between the interest of policymakers and public managers, on one hand, and the interests of ordinary citizens, on the other. These differences force public representatives to be held accountable for their actions and to demonstrate that they have acted according to their responsibilities ( Thompson, 1998 ). This theory has been influential in public-sector reforms based on the NPM tenets and promotes the use of government financial statements as instruments for external users (citizens) to inform themselves of the actions taken by policymakers and public managers ( Mack & Ryan, 2006 ).

In contrast, neoinstitutional theory has been applied to explain the adoption of innovations in management accounting ( Carpenter & Feroz, 2001 ). According to this theory, organizations seek to adopt structures and practices that are considered legitimate and socially acceptable, thus producing homogeneous practices and structures ( Feroz et al., 2007 ; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991 ). Information disclosure becomes a symbol of trust and modernity, constituting a trend adopted by governments with the aim to project an image of good governance and transparency ( Hoffman, 1999 ).

Finally, legitimacy theory ( Suchman, 1995 ) argues that the legitimacy of the organization’s actions is influenced by dissemination of information to stakeholders ( Archel, Husillos, Larrinaga, & Spence, 2009 ). In particular, the greater the chance of negative impacts of a public policy, the greater the need to try to influence the process through information disclosure ( Patten, 1992 ).

Regarding the determining factors of public-sector reporting, there are different incentives to disclose public financial information, such as internal-external, political-economic, managerial, and social factors. In this article, we group these factors into two main categories: (a) institutional— financial condition, intergovernmental transfers, and political competition, and (b) environmental— organization size and municipal wealth (see Figure 2 ). Institutional factors are linked to the assumptions of the agency and neoinstitutional theories because they are related to the need of governments in performing structures and practices with the aim of demonstrating that they are accomplishing their duty of transparency and accountability on the use of the public financial resources. The implementation of ICTs is being promoted by international organizations as fundamental pillars of the innovations in the public-sector management driven to improve transparency and trust on the use of public finances. By contrast, environmental factors are strongly linked to the assumptions proposed by agency and legitimacy theories, because they are centered on the pressures and demands for financial information made on government agencies by citizens. Also, public managers could use the disclosure of public information with the aim of influencing the negative opinions of the public-sector management in the municipality.

Figure 2. Incentives for the disclosure of public financial information and moderating effects of empirical investigations.

Note. ME = moderating effects.

This difference between institutional and environmental factors is relevant because it enables us to determine whether information transparency and accountability policies are applied by public organizations through the greater disclosure of public financial information that depends mainly on an organizational decision or whether, on the contrary, the environment affecting these government organizations has greater significance. These factors will be analyzed in both modes of information disclosure examined in this article.

Financial condition

One of the variables most commonly analyzed in this field is the government’s financial condition, which is positively related to the motivation of public managers to provide information transparency ( Baber, 1983 ; Ingram, 1984 ). This variable is included in our analysis of financial information disclosure because it is an integral component of the financial credibility of governmental agencies vis-à-vis external agents ( Baber, 1983 ; Ingram, 1984 ), as well as the government’s capacity to meet its payment commitments ( Giroux & Deis, 1993 ). Taking into account the agency theory approach, public managers must respond to greater demands for information disclosure to minimize conflicts of interest ( Baber & Sen, 1986 ; Gore, 2004 ; Zimmerman, 1977 ).

Previous research has defined financial condition as the capacity of governments to finance the provision of public services and programs, and it is measured in relation to the level of public borrowing ( Caba et al., 2008 ; Guillamón, Bastida, & Benito, 2013 ). In fact, higher levels of debt may represent a burden of future interest costs and principal repayments that would reduce a governmental agency’s ability to meet demand for services and thus increase the fiscal pressure on future generations of taxpayers ( Rodríguez Bolívar, Navarro Galera, Alcaide Muñoz, & López Subirés, 2016 ). For this reason, the evaluation of debt burden has become an integral component of public managers’ responsibility ( Styles & Tennyson, 2007 ), and investors and creditors are more interested in determining the ability of the government to repay its debt ( Daniels & Daniels, 1991 ). Besides, given asymmetric information whereby investors are unable to fully determine the default risk characteristics of issuers, public managers could use increased disclosure to reduce the cost of capital ( Gore, 2004 ). Therefore, in accordance with agency theory ( Zimmerman, 1977 ), to generate positive signals about their performance with the aim of attracting financial funds from investors and creditors, public managers are encouraged to disclose public financial information as a mechanism to allow their actions to be monitored ( Cárcaba & García, 2008 ).

In addition, several authors argue that one cause for a lack of trust in government is that citizens are not often provided with enough factual documentation about government processes and performance ( Cook, Jacobs, & Kim, 2010 ). Perhaps, it is produced because when government performance is fully revealed, no state is fully successful in the eyes of its citizens ( Schick, 2003 ). Nonetheless, giving citizens the possibility to monitor policymaking and scrutinize its results will enhance the legitimacy of the institutional structures—neoinstitutional theory approach ( Curtin & Meijer, 2006 ). To achieve this aim, previous studies have highlighted that citizens are likely to want more accountability from government and more information about where their money is spent ( Ipsos MORI, 2010 ).

This demand for information has intensified as a result of the recent global financial crises in which many governments have increased public expenditure to stimulate the economy ( Rodríguez Bolívar et al., 2016 ). They want reports to contain information that would help them develop their own evaluations of financial position ( Hary & Antonio, 1999 ), which could improve the credibility and integrity of public finance and contribute to effective management of public resources—neoinstitutional theory approach. In this sense, Brusca and Montesinos (2006) affirmed that citizens could control public management at election time, as the information can reflect the results of public policies and, consequently, serve as a vehicle for communicating the economic effect of political management.

However, no conclusive evidence of this relationship has been reported. The results show that if debt levels rise, politicians make use of diverse channels of information disclosure as a way to demonstrate a government’s ability to meet its obligations to creditors. Thus, the Internet provides an effective mode of disseminating information and enables creditors to readily monitor government activities ( Debreceny et al., 2002 ). In contrast, however, other studies have found no significant association between these two variables ( Guillamon, Bastida, & Benito, 2011 ; Serrano, Rueda, & Portillo, 2009 ). Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a positive relationship between financial condition and the disclosure of public financial information

Intergovernmental transfers

Intergovernmental transfers is another variable that previous research has considered a possible determinant of financial information disclosure, as these transfers are subject to control by the central or supranational institutions that disburse the funds ( Copley, 1991 ; Ingram, 1984 ; Ingram & DeJong, 1987 ). According to previous research in the field of the agency theory, the receipt of such funds by central or supranational governments requires the recipient to disclose information to account for the use of the funds received, seeking to demonstrate that public managers have acted according to their responsibilities ( Ingram & DeJong, 1987 ). Thus, governments in need of this funding are obliged to provide high quality public financial reports because their fund providers demand to see how the transferred funds are used, thus achieving more and better accountability ( Ingram, 1984 ; Ingram & DeJong, 1987 ).

With respect to the hard-copy disclosure of financial statements, Giroux and Deis (1993) found a negative relationship with intergovernmental funding, which suggests that cities receiving intergovernmental transfers have less incentive to disclose financial information. However, Copley (1991) concluded that resources obtained from other public bodies must be accountable to the providing authority, to demonstrate that the assigned funds have been used in accordance with the objectives of the program for which they were granted. In the case of online information disclosure, a variety of results have been reported; Caba et al. (2008) do not consider intergovernmental revenues to be a significant variable regarding the disclosure of financial information, but in this respect, Guillamon et al. (2011) found a positive and statistically significant relationship. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a positive relationship between transfers and funds received from other public organizations and the disclosure of public financial information.

Political competition

Political competition is a variable that has been widely analyzed with respect to the disclosure of financial information. After taking office, politicians often ignore their preelection promises, giving priority to their own interests rather than the public good, fully aware of the difficulty for citizens to exercise imminent, effective control ( Cárcaba & García, 2008 ). However, the existence of political rivals presenting strong opposition to the party in power can increase the long-term costs of this opportunistic behavior ( Baber, 1983 ; Evans & Patton, 1987 ), and the public managers are forced to justify their actions. Opposition parties in this situation will call on the ruling political party to exercise responsible management and will advise the public of any divergences from its election program ( Giroux, 1989 ; Serrano et al., 2009 ). Therefore, the existence of alternative officeholders and the corresponding risk of defeat in future elections will reduce the deviation from the interests of voters and other political agents ( Zimmerman, 1977 ). Accordingly, the governing party will closely observe the degree of implementation of its preelection promises to remain in office for several terms and the greater the political competition, the more incentive it will have to do so ( Baber, 1983 ; Caba et al., 2008 ; Gandía & Archidona, 2008 ). In consequence, taking into account the legitimacy theory approach, the government has an interest in voluntarily demonstrating its commitment to efficient management and will make use of different modes of information disclosure ( Cárcaba & García, 2010 ; Laswad et al., 2005 ).

Nevertheless, previous studies of the hard-copy disclosure of financial statements and its relationship to political competition have reported conflicting evidence ( Carpenter, 1991 ); some have obtained mixed results ( Cheng, 1992 ; Smith, 2004 ), and another found a relationship with a nonsignificant negative sign ( Giroux, 1989 ). However, all the evidence points in a single direction in the studies that have examined online information transparency. All are agreed that political competition within governments encourages public managers to be more responsive to the needs of the electorate, who then offer a greater amount of information ( Caamaño-Alegre, Lago-Peñas, Reyes-Santias, & Santiago-Boubeta, 2013 ; Cárcaba & García, 2008 , 2010 ). Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a positive relationship between political competition and the disclosure of public financial information.

Size

From the standpoint of agency theory ( Zimmerman, 1977 ), large governments have a high degree of information asymmetry, and thus high agency costs and a great conflict of interest with citizens. Thus, to reduce agency costs, governments should disclose more information ( Baber, 1983 ; Serrano et al., 2009 ). In addition, large cities must provide services to a greater number of citizens, and have more resources at their disposal to do so. Accordingly, citizens will demand a greater volume of information to discover how well the government fulfills its duties ( Giroux & McLelland, 2003 ).

From the empirical point of view, although Christiaens (1999) and Ingram and Robbins (1988) reported significant positive relationships between disclosure levels in hard-copy format and the size of government, other authors ( Robbins & Austin, 1986 ) found no significant association. In any case and in general, empirical evidence shows that large municipalities are more likely to disclose financial information in hard copy and to facilitate public access to this information ( Copley, 1991 ; Giroux & McLelland, 2003 ; Gore, 2004 ). For the online disclosure of financial information, the empirical evidence is overwhelming; most empirical studies conclude that cities with large populations make greater use of the Internet than smaller cities to provide financial information ( Gandía & Archidona, 2008 ; Guillamón et al., 2011 ). In this respect, Moon and Norris (2005) argued that governments of large cities are more likely to adopt e-government, because they are under great pressure to find the most effective and efficient way of providing services and information. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 4 (H4): There is a positive relationship between the size of public organizations and the disclosure of public financial information.

Municipal wealth

Finally, decisions regarding information disclosure may be affected by circumstances external to the local government, such as income per capita. It has been shown that with increasing local income, the population expects better service and more information to confirm that their taxes are being spent effectively ( Cheng, 1992 ; Giroux, 1989 ; Giroux & McLelland, 2003 ; Ingram, 1984 ). Under this milieu, legitimacy theory could support the interest of public managers and policymakers to disclose financial statements with the aim of confirming citizens the management of public finances and of influencing citizens’ opinions regarding the negative impacts of public policies.

In the case of the hard-copy disclosure of financial information, opinions are divided ( Evans & Patton, 1987 ; Smith, 2004 ). Thus, Giroux and McLelland (2003) reported a significant relationship with municipal income levels for a study conducted in 1996 but not for one conducted in 1983; Ingram (1984) found this variable was significantly related to municipal wealth, but the relationship was nonsignificant for Robbins and Austin (1986) and Giroux (1989) . In contrast, the empirical evidence reported in studies of online information disclosure leads us to conclude that in cities where income per capita is high, residents are motivated to demand information ( Caamaño-Alegre et al., 2013 ; Serrano et al., 2009 ; Styles & Tennyson, 2007 ). In this regard, too, Ho (2002) argued that cities with a low income per capita are not likely to adopt a progressive web design, due to low demand for online services. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 5 (H5): There is a positive relationship between municipal income levels and the disclosure of public financial information.

Moderating Effects Identified in Previous Research on Financial Transparency

The conditions under which empirical investigations are implemented, for example sample size, country analyzed, year of publication, theoretical basis, and so on, must be taken into account, because these moderating effects may prove inconsistent results (see Table 1 ). Therefore, a methodology is needed to identify the statistically significant factors that are independent of the underlying considerations of the studies in which they were examined, and determine possible incentives to the disclosure of public financial information that influence public managers in their design of information transparency strategies. Thus, designing public policies to take such incentives into account will enable public managers to comply with their duty to be accountable.

Accounting for our analysis of the literature review, we conclude that there are five essential modulating effects under which different investigations have been implemented and that could have influenced the results. The first is the one analyzed in section “Meta-Analysis Techniques to Identify the Incentives for Financial Transparency,” namely, the hypothesis that the modes employed for the disclosure of financial information (hard copy versus digital) may have influenced the findings of previous empirical studies (ME1—see Figure 2 ). In addition to this moderating effect, another four were also considered: the administrative culture of the countries from which we obtained the study data, the accounting regimes adopted by the countries studied, the measurement unit utilized to quantify determinants analyzed, and the level of government constituting the research focus.

Administrative culture

The tenets of NPM have been implemented worldwide, but in widely varying forms ( Pina et al., 2010 ). These differences are due to divergent concepts of state and of the doctrine of separation that underlies administrative thinking. Thus, implementation of NPM models conforms to common patterns in countries that share certain cultural values and are in accord with the national context, which influences the role played by the state and its relationship with its citizens. This, in turn, contributes to the importance granted to transparency and a government’s duty to be publicly accountable ( Kickert, 1997 ).

Prior research has highlighted differences in governments’ degree of involvement with the citizenry, the emphasis on the implementation of NPM reforms, and the bureaucratic structures and legal systems as well as differences in administrative culture that affect the evolution of e-government ( Rodríguez Domínguez, García, & Gallego, 2011 ), both to provide online public services ( Torres, Pina, & Acerete, 2006 ) and to publicly disclose financial information ( Pina et al., 2009 , 2010 ; Rodríguez Bolívar et al., 2015 ).

Based on Hofstede (2001) , administrative cultures are considered as patterns of behavior acquired and transmitted by human groups in the public sector; such patterns underline cultural values, beliefs, and principles, resulting in shared understandings, and legitimize the function of their acts. Indeed, national culture is an important driver for the way people think and act in any given society ( Hofstede, 2001 ) and also for the e-government diffusion ( Zhao, Shen, & Collier, 2014 ). In addition, studies on transparency overlook the effect of cultural differences between countries on how transparency is viewed and related to citizen attitudes ( Bouckaert & van de Walle, 2003 ). The administrative culture affects government transparency ( Rodríguez Bolívar et al., 2015 ), and it has been demonstrated that government transparency fits less in countries with national cultures that possess higher power distances and long-term orientation ( Grimmelikhuijsen, Porumbescu, Hong, & Im, 2013 ). In fact, in contexts of high power distance, relations between leaders and citizens can be viewed as paternalistic in the sense that citizens are said to perceive themselves as largely dependent upon (and by extension vulnerable to) their government ( Park & Shin, 2005 ). Therefore, we would expect a meta-analysis to reveal discrepancies in the disclosure of public financial information between different countries, in accordance with the corresponding administrative culture (ME2—see Figure 2 ).

Four major styles of management culture in governmental entities have been distinguished: Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Southern European, and Nordic countries, the latter is regarded as a mixed form of the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic administrative cultures ( Kickert, 1997 ). The term Anglo-Saxon is applied to countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. South American countries considered include Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Paraguay. The term Continental European is used to refer to Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Portugal, and Spain, and the Nordic category also includes Denmark and the Netherlands ( Pina et al., 2010 ).

In the present study, after analyzing all the articles in the sample (see Table 1 ), two main groups were differentiated: (a) articles focusing on the Anglo-Saxon style of administrative culture and (b) all other articles. This differentiation makes sense if we consider that sample studies in our research come mainly from the Anglo-Saxon countries (31 studies) and from Continental European countries (10 studies). In addition, three sample studies come from other different cultures, and five of them analyze the governments of the European Union (EU) and others worldwide. These last studies are not considered in our analysis of the moderating effect of administrative culture, as they address diverse administrative cultures together.

Accounting regime

Although, we have accounted for the different practices about disclosing public financial information and have emphasized the implementation of NPM reforms with the moderating effect of administrative culture, we think that countries with similar cultures do exist, but have different accounting requirements; for example, the United States has adopted the Governmental Accounting Standard Board (GASB), and Australia has implemented the Australian Accounting Standard Board (AASB)—both of them have an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture.

In previous research, empirical evidence shows these contradictions. In this sense, Gore (2004) analyzed the hard-copy disclosure of public financial information in the United States, and the results showed that large municipalities are likely to disclose financial information by hard copy and to facilitate public access to this information. However, Taylor and Rosair (2000) did not find clear evidence about the influence of organizational size on disclosure of public financial information in Australian local governments. However, Styles and Tennyson (2007) affirmed that policymakers were motivated to disclose public financial information to demonstrate to creditors in the United States of local governments’ ability to meet their obligations; however, Laswad et al. (2005) found no significant association between the financial condition and disclosure of public financial information in New Zealand’s local governments.

Taking into account these contradictory results, we considered the accounting regime was a moderating effect, as legal requirement and accounting practices could influence hard copy versus digital financial reporting. In this sense, after analyzing all the articles in the sample, two main groups were differentiated: (a) articles that analyzed U.S. governments with the GASB accounting regime and (b) articles that analyzed countries with their own accounting system. In this regard, Keerasuntonpong, Dunstan, and Khanna (2015) has presented the exception, analyzing New Zealand local governments, which have adopted International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) at the time of research (ME3—see Figure 2 ).

Impact of measure used on determining variables

In the literature, the use of different measurement to define the variables can produce conflicting findings ( Pomeroy & Thornton, 2008 ). In this regard, studies have highlighted the problems of multidimensionality of accounting and reporting choice—an aspect not easily described using specific quantitative indices—as well as problems regarding the measurement of data ( Carpenter, 1991 ; Cheng, 1992 ). Thus, and in agreement with Carpenter (1991) and Serrano et al. (2009) , we found measurement of the variable “political competition” led to heterogeneous results regarding its association with financial information disclosure. While Baber (1983) and Ingram (1984) suggested that the effect of parliamentary political competition on disclosure of financial information was positive, the obtained results were not statistically significant when political competition was measured in terms of lobby groups ( Baber & Sen, 1984 ). In addition, greater divergence of results is obtained when the incentive being analyzed is a financial condition expressed as municipal indebtedness ( Baber & Sen, 1984 ; ME4—see Figure 2 ).

Level of government

Another of the moderating effects that could produce the heterogeneity observed among different studies is the level of government under analysis (statewide or municipal). At the local level, citizens are increasingly interested in being informed of the actions taken by municipal governments, as these actions and reforms have direct impact on their daily lives ( Piotrowski & Van Ryzin, 2007 ). Accordingly, a study of the situation in the United States reported widespread interest in having access to information to understand the realities of municipal management ( Thomas & Streib, 2003 ).

In addition, local governments offer a large number of public-sector services, which must often be adapted to citizens’ needs, to make public-sector services more efficient and effective ( Zafra, López, & Hernández, 2009 ). In addition, these governments undertake management reforms to introduce technological changes ( Connolly, Bannister, & Keamey, 2010 ). Therefore, assuming the relations between government and citizens can be of different degrees of intensity ( Edmiston, 2003 ), the empirical results obtained and the relations observed among the variables analyzed may vary accordingly (ME5—see Figure 2 ).

In brief, Figure 2 shows a scheme of the theoretical foundation of the hypotheses contained in previous research by sorting determinants according to institutional factors and environmental factors. In this sense for our study, we tested the influence of these determining factors on the disclosure of public financial information by proposing five hypotheses. Nonetheless, to account for variability within the results and in findings of previous research regarding the influence of these factors, in this study, we analyze whether they are affected by the five considered moderating effects.

Sample Selection

In this study, we first conducted a comprehensive analysis of all publications listed in the categories of Public Administration, Information Science, Computer Science and Information Systems, and Business and Finance, indexed by the Institute for Scientific Information for the period 1980 to 2015. To do this, we examined the title, the abstract, the keywords, and the introduction of each article to ensure that the stated research goals were relevant to our investigation. In the few cases in which application of these discrimination criteria was not decisive, we read the entire article.

A systematic search was then made of the ABI/INFORM, EJS Ebsco, Blackwell, Scopus, Emerald/Insight, SpringerLink, ScienceDirect, Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Econlit, Ecopapers, and Business Source Premier databases, using descriptors and keywords, such as “public financial reporting practices,” “voluntary disclosure,” “government accounting,” “local government,” and “accounting disclosure.” Then, to avoid the non-inclusion of relevant research, even after carrying out these two steps, we selected the most significant articles identified in the first and second searches and performed an exhaustive analysis of the references they cited.

To be included in our sample, studies had to provide the information needed to perform the meta-analysis technique, namely the Pearson or Spearman ( r) correlations for the relations between the different variables and the disclosure of public financial or public economic-financial information. When r statistics were not reported, but other statistics were transformable into r statistics, we applied formulas given by Lipsey and Wilson (2001) .

Some of the articles extracted did not provide the statistical information needed for the meta-analysis technique, and so the authors in question ( Cárcaba & García, 2008 , 2010 ; Pina et al., 2009 , 2010 ) were contacted and requested to supply the missing information. Thus, all 51 of the articles initially identified were included in the sample for final analysis. It should be noted that the meta-analysis technique does not require a large number of studies to produce useful results ( Lipsey & Wilson, 2001 ), and so our review of previous research highlighted some meta-analytical studies based on a smaller sample than our own ( Bel, Fageda, & Warner, 2010 ; García & Sánchez, 2010 ; Pomeroy & Thornton, 2008 ).

Research Method

According to Hunter and Schmidt (2004) , meta-analysis is a robust statistical technique that is used to accumulate and integrate results obtained from previous statistical analyses to draw overall conclusions. This technique enables the researcher to achieve clear, coherent conclusions, systematically extracted from previous research and highlighting points common to all that would be difficult to identify by descriptive analysis alone ( Rosenthal, 1979 ). Hence, through the use of appropriate statistical procedures, we can identify the moderator variables explaining the heterogeneity of earlier results ( Stanley, 2005 ). In this regard, the moderator variables are factors inherent to the study design, such as sample size, data of publication, country in which the study was carried out, and so on, which may influence the findings of these individual studies and, therefore, explain variation in the results ( Stanley, 2005 ).

We used the meta-analytic technique developed by Hunter and Schmidt (2004) , calculating, first, three magnitudes: (a) the weighted mean correlation coefficient, ρ = Σ Ni ri / Σ Ni; (b) the total observed variance, S2r

= Σ Ni ( ri − ρ)2 / Σ Ni; and (c) the sampling error variance, S2r

= (1 − ρ2)2 k / Σ Ni, where Ni is the number of observations in each sample, r is the effect size for the sample, and i and k are the numbers of effect sizes. Larger sample sizes are given more weight to reduce sampling error, which declines as the sample size increases ( Hunter & Schmidt, 2004 ). In this sense, the mean correlation is the weighted average of each of the correlations provided in the studies. In our study, it is showing the relationship between the variable analyzed and the disclosure of public financial information. In addition, the total observed variance and the sampling error variance are two intermediate magnitudes that are used to evaluate whether empirical correlations are homogeneous.

The correlations were examined taking into account the content of the variables and not the names used for them, as there are similar variables that frequently appear under different denominations, such as the size of public organizations for which the population size can be used ( Gore, 2004 ; Ingram, 1984 ) or the level of assets and revenue ( Serrano et al., 2009 ) or the financial condition of public organizations, which are valued using diverse measures ( Laswad et al., 2005 ; Serrano et al., 2009 ). In the same way, considering the measurement units for the different variables, we used the definitions provided by the authors as a reference. In addition, the dependent variable— disclosure of public information—is measured through the list of items as performed by researchers in prior studies ( Gandía & Archidona, 2008 ; Pina et al., 2010 ).

To evaluate whether empirical correlations are homogeneous, two tests were used: (a) the 75% rule, according to which if 75% of the observed variance across studies can be explained by sampling errors: (100) S2e

/ S2r ≥ 75, there is no true variance in the studies, and thus, the association is nonmodulated and homogeneous (i.e., if this statistic is less than 75%, it would mean that the association is not homogeneous and variability does exist, which is influenced by other factors such as moderating effects); and (b) the Q statistic: ( k) ( S2r) / ( S2e) = ( NS2r) / (1 − ρ2)2, where k is the number of effect sizes included in the analysis, S2r is the total observed variance, S2e

is the sampling error variance, N is the total sample size of the effect sizes, and ρ is the mean correlation coefficient. This statistical function has a chi-square distribution with ( k −1) degrees of freedom, and a significant Q would indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of homogeneity. In other words, if this statistic were statistically significant, it would mean that the association is not homogeneous, so we have to search the moderating effects that cause variability within the results.

The hypothesis of homogeneity is rejected in many cases, and so to limit the Type I error rate, we utilized a random effect model ( Hunter & Schmidt, 1990 ), using (S2 r/ k)−−−−−√

as the standard error to create a 95% confidence interval (CI) around the mean effect size and to assess the significance of the null hypothesis, H0: ρ = 0.

In our analysis, no correction is made for statistical artefacts other than sampling error, such as range restriction and measurement unreliability, because this information was not provided in the analyzed studies. This is a characteristic limitation of research studies in the financial accounting field, which, however, are not usually subject to the problems of reliability that affect other areas, such as psychology or business management ( García & Sánchez, 2010 ). Moreover, some researchers do not believe this type of correction should be applied ( Rosenthal, 1979 ).

However, we do analyze the existence of possible publication bias. The meta-analysis may be subject to the implicit existence of these biases, and editors and reviewers may be attracted by the publication of studies showing a significant relationship between the variable of interest. This outcome is more likely to occur in large sample studies, which would distort any analysis based on the empirical observation of the variables ( Stanley, 2005 ). The lack of nonsignificant published studies has been termed the “file-drawer problem” ( Rosenthal, 1979 ), and publication bias would tend to overestimate the number of significant results on a given topic.

To analyze publication bias in our sample selection and to assess the stability of the results, we followed Rosenthal’s (1979) technique to determine the fail-safe number N. A fail-safe N indicates the number of nonsignificant, unpublished (or missing) studies that would need to be added to a meta-analysis to reduce an overall statistically significant observed result to nonsignificance ( Rosenberg, 2005 ). If this number is large relative to the number of observed studies, one can feel fairly confident in the summary conclusions. Thus, the fail-safe N can indicate stability of the relationship.

We also wish to determine whether the time factor influences the moderating effects considered in this empirical study. Therefore, the studies in the sample are divided into those published between 1983 and 1999 (when all the articles in question analyzed the disclosure of economic and financial information in hard-copy format) and studies published between 2000 and 2015. In the latter case, we differentiated between studies considering the disclosure of financial information in hard-copy format versus empirical studies that analyzed the online disclosure of this information.

Analysis of Results

Institutional Factors

Financial condition

As can be seen in Table 2 , the question of financial condition has been widely considered in this field; thus, a total of 111 observations present an average correlation of .087 and a CI = [.073, .103], which indicates a positive and statistically significant relation, confirmed by z value ( z = 11.04, ρ < .001), to the level of disclosure of financial information in the public sector irrespective of the mode of information disclosure. Moreover, as reflected in the N (fail-safe) value, the stability of the data is confirmed; thus, publication bias does not exist. Therefore, these results confirm the relationship expressed in H1 (see Figure 2 ). However, the explanatory power of the error variance (59.76%) is limited, and it means that the relationship is nonhomogeneous and influenced by the existence of moderating effects—chi-square statistic ( Q = 185.736, ρ < .001). Thus, we have to search which of the considered moderating effects could modulate the analyzed relationship (see Figure 2 ).

Table 2. Meta-Analytic Data on the Determinant Factors of the Disclosure of Public Financial Information.

Independent variable	K	M correlation (ρ)	% S2e/ S2r	Confidence interval (95%)	χ2 k-1	Fail-safe N
				Minimum	Maximum
Financial condition	111	.087 ***	59.76	.071	.103	185.736 ***	6,236 *
Hard copy	89	.098 †	66.09	.080	.115	134.662 **
Online	22	.040 ***	50.52	.002	.077	43.547 **
Intergovernmental transfers	47	.115 ***	37.01	.105	.124	126.982 ***	12,504 *
Hard copy	36	.118 ***	32.60	.108	.127	110.426 ***
Online	11	.010	100	−.047	.066	2.598
Political competition	68	.091 ***	21.64	.069	.113	314.259 ***	2,174 *
Hard copy	44	.034 †	58.54	.007	.061	75.166 **
Online	24	.201 ***	12.09	.163	.239	198.541 ***
Size	116	.166 ***	19.09	.152	.180	607.701 ***	28,900 *
Hard copy	75	.154 ***	18.51	.136	.173	405.247 ***
Online	41	.184 ***	20.74	.162	.207	197.700 ***
Municipal wealth	46	.087 ***	67.27	.062	.112	68.380 **	1,019 *
Hard copy	28	.094 ***	65.55	.053	.134	42.713 ***
Online	18	.083 ***	70.73	.052	.115	25.449 ***

†

p < .1. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Table 2 also shows that this relationship is greater when financial disclosure is made in hard-copy format than when it is provided online (ρ = .098 vs. ρ = .040); in both cases, the relationship is positive and statistically significant. Therefore, when the financial condition is healthy, that is, the debt is reduced and its costs do not besiege the public organization, the public managers are interested in informing citizens about the public good management and accountability. However, the level of variability has increased, although the heterogeneity has not disappeared as shown by the chi-square statistic ( Q = 134.662, ρ < .05). In other words, we cannot affirm that the modes of dissemination (ME2) are a moderating effect in the relationship between financial condition and the disclosure of public financial information.

These differences are even more apparent in Table 3 . In this sense, the influence is stronger in countries with an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture (ρ = .100 vs. ρ = .067) than in non-Anglo-Saxon countries, and a comparable result is obtained for online information disclosure (ρ = .104 vs. ρ = .032). In both cases, the heterogeneity disappears (chi-square statistic is nonsignificant). Accordingly, the administrative culture modulates the relationship between financial condition and the disclosure of public financial information (ME2).

Table 3. Meta-Analytic Data on the Relation Between Analyzed Variables and the Disclosure of Public Financial Information (Online vs. Hard Copy).

Independent variable	Hard copy	Online
	K	M correlation (ρ)	% S2e/ S2r	Confidence interval (95%)	χ2 k-1	K	M correlation (ρ)	% S2e/ S2r	Confidence interval (95%)	χ2 k-1
				Minimum	Maximum					Minimum	Maximum
Financial condition
Administrative culture a
Anglo-Saxon	83	.100 ***	67.81	0.082	0.119	122.406 **	5	.104 ***	100	0.006	0.201	1.137
Non-Anglo-Saxon	6	.067 †	53.30	0.006	0.130	11.256 †	14	.032	34.71	−0.011	0.075	40.334 ***
Accounting regimes
GASB	83	.100 ***	67.81	0.082	0.110	122.406 **	—	—	—	—	—	—
Others	6	.067 †	53.30	0.006	0.130	11.256 †	19	.040	59.44	−0.130	0.211	31.965 **
Measure used
Financial viability	14	.087 ***	66.28	0.040	0.133	21.122 †	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ratio total debt	69	.100 ***	74.06	0.080	0.119	93.165 †	15	.043	39.47	−0.004	0.090	38.007 **
Leverage	4	.175 ***	100	0.088	0.261	1.180	6	.014	100	−0.051	0.079	1.504
Level of government b
State government	24	.116 ***	100	0.058	0.174	9.280	—	—	—	—	—	—
Local government	65	.096 ***	51.85	0.077	0.114	125.363 ***	17	.053 **	50.11	0.013	0.093	33.924 **
Local government c
Anglo-Saxon	59	.099 ***	52.11	0.079	0.118	113.222 ***	—	—	—	—	—	—
Non-Anglo-Saxon	6	.067 †	53.30	0.004	0.130	11.256 †	—	—	—	—	—	—
Intergovernmental transfers
Administrative culture
Anglo-Saxon	32	.118 ***	29.60	0.108	0.128	108.100 ***	—	—	—	—	—	—
Non-Anglo-Saxon	4	.102 ***	100	0.029	0.176	2.147	11	.010	100	−0.047	0.066	2.598
Accounting regimes
GASB	32	.118 ***	29.60	0.108	0.128	108.100 ***	—	—	—	—	—	—
Others	4	.102 ***	100	0.029	0.176	2.147	10	.002	100	−0.059	0.063	0.303
Measure used
Current and capital transfers	5	.127 ***	91.43	0.117	0.137	5.469	4	.010	100	−0.095	0.114	0.676
Ratio intergovernmental receipts	31	.029 *	44.92	−0.003	0.061	69.017 ***	7	.010	100	−0.058	0.077	1.899
Level of government
State government	6	.072 *	100	0.016	0.187	2.007	6	−.002	100	−0.077	0.072	1.367
Local government	30	.118 ***	27.85	0.108	0.128	107.738 ***	5	.026	100	−0.060	0.112	1.175
Local government
Anglo-Saxon	26	.118 ***	24.65	0.109	0.128	105.474 ***	—	—	—	—	—	—
Political competition
Administrative culture d , e
Non-Anglo-Saxon	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	.143 ***	100	0.098	0.188	5.469
Accounting regimes
GASB	44	.034 †	58.54	0.007	0.061	75.166 **	—	—	—	—	—	—
Others	—	—	—	—	—	—	22	.196 ***	11.31	0.158	0.234	194.471 ***
Measure used
Ratio candidates/available position	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	.291 ***	9.18	0.242	0.229	196.117 ***
Percentages of victories	10	.075 *	58.43	−0.002	0.153	17.115 *	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dichotomous variable	21	−.004	100	−0.035	0.027	18.263	2	.192 **	95.28	0.070	0.315	2.099
Indices of political competition	5	.248 ***	100	0.132	0.364	1.281	4	.137 ***	100	0.085	0.188	0.854
% seats held by minority party	6	.219 ***	100	0.113	0.325	3.185	—	—	—	—	—	—
Level of government
State government	21	.219 ***	100	0.159	0.278	16.746	9	.470 ***	5.13	0.424	0.517	175.351 ***
Local government d	23	−.009	100	−0.039	0.021	17.668	15	.116 ***	91.58	0.073	0.159	16.379
Size
Administrative culture e
Anglo-Saxon	69	.182 ***	22.61	0.163	0.201	305.214 ***	11	.100 ***	53.53	0.067	0.133	20.550 *
Non-Anglo-Saxon	6	−.096 f	23.02	−0.155	−0.037	26.059 ***	14	.301 ***	36.34	0.264	0.339	38.520 ***
Accounting regimes
GASB	67	.182 ***	22.00	0.163	0.200	304.537 ***	6	.083 ***	21.11	0.048	0.118	28.428 ***
IPSAS	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	.299 ***	100	0.204	0.295	0.246
Others	8	−.037 ***	17.89	−0.089	0.016	44.723 ***	28	.264 ***	25.36	0.235	0.292	110.415 ***
Measure used
Registered inhabitants	20	.294 ***	23.02	0.256	0.332	86.865 ***	10	.286 ***	38.98	0.244	0.327	25.654 **
Population logarithm	43	.130 ***	31.54	0.109	0.151	136.350 ***	18	.291 ***	35.59	0.252	0.329	50.578 ***
Total revenue	6	.459 ***	100	0.382	0.536	3.519	3	.210 ***	75.29	0.090	0.330	3.985
Total assets	3	.530 ***	100	0.446	0.613	1.611	2	.186 *	50.15	0.026	0.345	3.988 *
Number of public employees	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	.117 ***	100	0.047	0.186	3.908
Level of government
State government	17	.341 ***	28.16	0.296	0.386	60.376 ***	—	—	—	—	—	—
Local government	58	.125 ***	20.14	0.105	2.115	287.933 ***	28	.194 ***	15.41	0.171	0.218	181.746 ***
Local government c
Anglo-Saxon	52	.153 ***	25.58	0.132	0.174	203.262 ***	11	.100 ***	25.56	0.067	0.133	43.029 ***
Non-Anglo-Saxon	6	−.096 f	23.02	−0.155	−0.037	26.059 ***	13	.307 ***	34.64	0.269	0.346	37.525 ***
Municipal wealth
Administrative culture
Anglo-Saxon	27	.098 ***	63.58	0.057	0.139	42.463 ***	11	.069 ***	100	0.035	0.103	7.071
Non-Anglo-Saxon	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	.158 ***	53.04	0.076	0.241	9.426 *
Accounting regimes
GASB	27	.098 ***	63.58	0.057	0.139	42.463 ***	5	.060 ***	68.70	0.024	0.096	7.278 ***
IPSAS	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	.113 ***	100	0.012	0.214	0.172
Others	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	.169 ***	55.72	0.091	0.247	10.767 †
Measure used
Per capital citizens’ income	18	.105 ***	67.86	0.057	0.152	26.525 †	8	.035 ***	42.11	0.000	0.052	18.997 ***
Own revenue per capita	8	.124 ***	77.26	0.042	0.206	10.355	10	.124 ***	77.26	0.042	0.206	10.355
Level of government
State government	9	.270 ***	100	0.182	0.357	2.438	—	—	—	—	—	—
Local government	19	.052 *	81.40	0.007	0.098	23.342	16	.081 ***	66.95	0.050	0.112	23.897 ***
Local government
Anglo-Saxon	18	.055 *	77.07	0.009	0.101	23.354	11	.069 ***	100	0.035	0.103	7.071
Non-Anglo-Saxon	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	.158 ***	53.04	0.076	0.241	9.426 *

Note. GASB = Governmental Accounting Standard Board; IPSAS = International Public Sector Accounting Standards; EU = Economic Union; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development.

The study of Rios et al. (2013) was not included when we analyzed “Administrative Culture,” because this article analyzed the budget transparency of state public administration around the world, and there are different styles of public administration in this sample.

Rios et al. (2013) was the only study about budget transparency of state public administration.

The online studies about financial condition and size analyzed local governments, and so the results are the same as in the case of “Local Administration.”

The hard-copy studies about political competition analyzed local governments in Anglo-Saxon “Administrative Culture,” and so the results are the same as in the case of “Local Administration.”

Pina et al. (2007 , 2009 , 2010 ); Caba Pérez et al. (2014) ; Rios et al. (2013) ; and Wehner and Renzio (2013) have not been included when we analyzed “Administrative Culture” and “Accounting Regimes,” because they analyzed the transparency in EU countries, OECD countries, and from the international perspective.

The moderating effect of “Administrative Culture” when it is analyzed in the disclosure of public financial information in hard copy is significant at the 12% level.

†

p < .1. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

In addition, we can see that the use of different accounting requirements also influences the analyzed relationship, although the heterogeneity has not disappeared. So, as the degree of variability persists and the statistical tools do not show clear evidences of this influence, we could affirm that the accounting regimes do not show evidence of modulation in the analyzed relationships (ME3).

Taking into account the measurement unit used to quantify the financial condition, we can see that the total debt ratio and leverage offers the most statistically significant positive association, followed closely by financial viability, when hard-copy information disclosure was analyzed. In this case, all of them show statistically significant positive association, and the variability within the results has disappeared. In the case of online information disclosure, the financial condition does not have much influence. This relationship is not significant in the case of measured leverage, but the heterogeneity has disappeared. Therefore, we could affirm that the measure used to quantify the financial condition modulates the analyzed relationship (ME4).

Furthermore, in the case of hard-copy information disclosure, financial condition is an incentive that exerts a stronger influence on state governments (ρ = .116 vs. ρ = .096) than on local ones. In the former case, the variability within the data has disappeared (chi-square statistic is nonsignificant), so the level of government analyzed (ME4) in the studies could have influenced the relationship of the financial condition. Moreover, in local governments, this incentive exerts a stronger influence in countries with an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture (ρ = .099 vs. ρ = .067) than in those with other types of administrative cultures.

With respect to online financial information, our review cannot be as detailed as in the case of hard-copy information disclosure because there is no representative sample found in studies examining this question for countries with an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture and for state governments. However, the data available seem to indicate that public managers in local governments are motivated to disclose information in hard-copy format, rather than online.

Upon analyzing the data and taking into account the year of publication of each study (see Table 4 ), we see that in more recent years, financial condition has come to exert a strong influence on public managers to disseminate information in hard-copy format, especially in countries with an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture. However, no such change in influence is apparent with respect to the online disclosure of public information, although here, too, the influence is strong in countries with an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture. Nevertheless, managers in local governments are more likely to represent the financial condition of their organizations in hard-copy format, rather than online (ρ = .149 vs. ρ = .040).

Table 4. Meta-Analytic Data on the Relation Between Analyzed Variables and the Disclosure of Public Financial Information (Published Studies 1983-1999 vs. 2000-2015).

Independent variable	Published studies 1983-1999 (Hard copy)	Published studies 2000-2015
		Hard copy	Online
	K	M correlation (ρ)	% S2e/ S2r	Confidence interval (95%)	χ2 k-1	K	M correlation (ρ)	% S2e/ S2r	Confidence interval (95%)	χ2 k-1	K	Mean correlation (ρ)	% S2e/ S2r	Confidence interval (95%)	χ2 k-1
				Minimum	Maximum					Minimum	Maximum					Minimum	Maximum
Financial condition	63	.084 ***	80.74	.064	.104	78.027	26	.149 ***	53.44	0.111	0.186	48.651 *	22	.040 ***	50.52	.002	.077	43.547 **
Administrative culture a
Anglo-Saxon	62	.084 ***	78.94	.064	.104	78.538	21	.191 ***	73.62	0.147	0.235	28.526	5	.104 *	100	.007	.200	1.151
Non-Anglo-Saxon	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	.064	44.39	−0.002	0.130	11.263 *	12	.042 †	37.91	−.001	.086	31.656 ***
Accounting regimes
GASB	62	.084 ***	78.94	.064	.104	78.538	21	.191 ***	73.62	0.147	0.235	28.526	—	—	—	—	—	—
Others	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	.064	44.65	−0.002	0.130	11.199 ***	19	.040	59.44	−.130	.211	31.965 **
Measure used
Financial viability	7	.029	41.98	−.040	.099	16.676 *	7	.136 ***	100	0.074	0.199	2.302	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ratio total debt	52	.082 ***	100	.060	.103	49.870	17	.212 ***	69.00	0.163	0.261	24.639 *	15	.043	39.47	−.004	.090	38.007 **
Leverage	4	.221 ***	100	.137	.304	0.164	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	.014	100	−.051	.079	1.504
Level of government
State government	11	.096	100	.011	.182	3.026	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Local government	52	.083 ***	68.94	.063	.103	74.423 *	26	.149 ***	53.44	0.111	0.186	48.651 *	17	.053 **	49.84	.013	.093	34.100 **
Intergovernmental transfer	23	.009	37.43	−.028	.047	61.446 ***	13	.126 ***	100	0.116	0.136	11.474	11	.010	100	−.047	.066	2.598
Administrative culture
Anglo-Saxon	23	.009	37.43	−.028	.047	61.446 ***	9	.126 ***	100	0.116	0.136	8.887	—	—	—	—	—	—
Non-Anglo-Saxon	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	.102 **	100	0.030	0.175	2.160	10	.002	100	−.059	.063	2.079
Accounting regimes
GASB	23	.009	37.43	−.028	.047	61.446 ***	9	.126 ***	100	0.116	0.136	8.887	—	—	—	—	—	—
Others	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	.102 **	100	0.030	0.175	2.160	10	.002	100	−.059	.063	0.303
Measure used
Current and capital transfers	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	.126 ***	100	0.116	0.136	8.885
Ratio intergovernmental receipts	23	.009	37.43	−.028	.047	61.446 ***	4	.102 **	100	0.030	0.175	2.160	11	.010	100	−.047	.066	2.598
Level of government
State government	6	.072	100	−.042	.186	2.048	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Local government	17	.002	29.00	−.038	.042	58.618 ***	13	.126 ***	100	0.116	0.136	11.474	10	.002	100	−.059	.063	2.079
Political competition	40	.030 †	55.11	.001	.058	72.581 ***	4	.089 a	100	−0.006	0.183	0.048	24	.201 ***	12.09	.163	.239	198.541 ***
Administrative culture a
Anglo-Saxon	40	.030 †	55.11	.001	.058	72.581 ***	4	.089 a	100	−0.006	0.183	0.048	—	—	—	—	—	—
Non-Anglo-Saxon	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	.116 ***	90.91	.074	.158	16.499
Accounting regimes
GASB	40	.030 †	55.11	.001	.058	72.581 ***	4	.089 a	100	−0.006	0.183	0.048	—	—	—	—	—	—
Others	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	22	.196 ***	11.31	.158	.234	194.471 ***
Measure used
Ratio candidates/available position	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	.291 ***	9.18	.242	.229	196.117 ***
Percentages of victories	10	.075 *	58.43	−.002	.153	17.115 *	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dichotomous variable	17	−.015	100	−.048	.018	12.393	4	.089 *	100	−0.005	0.183	1.792	2	.192 **	95.28	.070	.315	2.099
Indices of political competition	5	.248 ***	100	.132	.364	1.281	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	.137 ***	100	.085	.188	0.854
% seats held by minority party	6	.219 ***	100	.113	.325	3.185	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Level of government
State government	21	.219 ***	100	.162	.275	17.102	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	.470 ***	5.13	.424	.517	175.351 ***
Local government	19	−.020	100	−.052	.012	1.072	4	.089 a	100	−0.006	0.183	0.048	15	.116 ***	90.91	.074	.158	16.499
Size	48	.164 ***	18.01	.143	.186	266.451 ***	29	.124 ***	21.52	0.089	0.160	134.728 ***	41	.184 ***	20.74	.162	.207	197.700 ***
Administrative culture a
Anglo-Saxon	45	.166 ***	17.01	.145	.187	264.572 ***	24	.239 ***	80.79	0.200	0.278	29.708	11	.100 ***	25.56	.067	.133	43.029 ***
Non-Anglo-Saxon	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	−.109 ***	20.32	−0.107	−0.103	24.605 ***	14	.301 ***	36.34	.264	.339	38.520 ***
Accounting regimes
GASB	45	.166 ***	17.01	.145	.187	264.572 ***	22	.255 ***	3.42	0.212	0.297	643.716 ***	6	.083 ***	21.11	.048	.118	28.428 ***
IPSAS	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	.299 ***	100	.204	.295	0.246
Others	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	−.042 ***	15.70	−0.096	0.013	44.573 ***	28	.264 ***	25.36	.235	.292	110.415 ***
Measure used
Registered inhabitants	17	.312 ***	26.40	.271	.353	64.389 ***	3	.220 ***	15.46	0.060	0.380	19.409 ***	10	.286 ***	38.98	.244	.327	25.654 **
Population logarithm	16	.216 ***	100	.167	.264	8.516	27	.113 ***	23.46	0.094	0.132	115.091 ***	18	.291 ***	35.59	.252	.329	50.578 ***
Total revenue													3	.210 ***	75.29	.090	.330	3.985
Total assets	3	.530 ***	100	.446	.613	1.611	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	.186 *	50.15	.026	.345	3.988 *
Number of public employees	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	.117 ***	100	0.047	0.186	3.908	7	.117 ***	100	.047	.186	3.908
Level of government
State government	14	.418 ***	26.16	.366	.471	53.519 ***	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	.118 ***	100	.060	.175	9.682
Local government	34	.142 ***	19.25	.121	.164	176.604 ***	25	.114 ***	19.02	0.075	0.153	131.43 ***	29	.198 ***	15.53	.175	.222	186.753 ***
Municipal wealth	21	.079 ***	54.73	.033	.126	38.370 **	7	.135 ***	100	0.057	0.214	3.234	18	.083 ***	70.73	.052	.115	25.449 ***
Administrative culture
Anglo-Saxon	20	.084 ***	52.86	.036	.132	37.833 **	7	.135 ***	100	0.057	0.214	3.234	11	.069 ***	100	.035	.103	7.071
Non-Anglo-Saxon	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	.158 ***	53.04	.076	.241	9.426 *
Accounting regimes
GASB	20	.084 ***	52.86	.036	.132	37.833 **	7	.135 ***	100	0.057	0.214	3.234	5	.060 ***	68.70	.024	.096	7.278 ***
IPSAS	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	.113 ***	100	.012	.214	0.172
Others	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	.169 ***	55.72	.091	.247	10.767 †
Measure used
Per capital citizens’ income	12	.088 ***	53.69	.028	.148	22.350 **	6	.134 ***	100	0.056	0.213	3.262	8	.035 ***	42.11	.000	.052	18.997 ***
Own revenue per capita	8	.124 ***	77.26	.042	.206	10.355	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	.124 ***	77.26	.042	.206	10.355
Level of government
State government	9	.270 ***	100	.029	.510	2.489	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Local government	12	.014	83.84	−.004	.033	14.313	7	.135 ***	100	0.057	0.214	3.234	16	.081 ***	66.95	.050	.112	23.897 ***

Note. GASB = Governmental Accounting Standard Board; IPSAS = International Public Sector Accounting Standards; EU = Economic Union; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development.

Pina et al. (2007 , 2009 , 2010 ); Caba Pérez et al. (2014) ; Rios et al. (2013) ; and Wehner and Renzio (2013) were not included when we analyzed “Administrative Culture,” because they analyzed the transparency in EU countries, OECD countries, and from the international perspective.

†

p < .1. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Intergovernmental transfers

The funds and grants received by governments is a factor that has been studied in detail by many researchers; we found an average correlation of .115 and a CI = [.105, .124] (see Table 2 ). Although some authors conclude that the receipt of funds from other public agencies may discourage public managers from disclosing economic and financial information ( Giroux & Deis, 1993 ), our results indicate that public managers are motivated to disclose information when public administrators receive funds and grants irrespective of the mode of information disclosure. In addition, the file-drawer test shows that this association is robust and not influenced by publication bias, which confirms H2. However, as the previous variable showed, the limited explanatory power of the error variance (37.01%) suggests a high degree of heterogeneity ( Q = 115.609; ρ < .01) and the existence of factors moderating the relationship in question (see Figure 2 ).

Table 2 shows that although intergovernmental funds are an incentive for public managers when economic and financial information is published as hard copy, this is not the same when the mode of disclosure is online. In this sense, the heterogeneity has disappeared (chi-square statistic is nonsignificant); so, with such empirical evidence, we could affirm that the environment in which financial information is disclosed does exert a moderating effect and influences the relationship between transfers and funds received and the disclosure of public financial information (ME1).

Table 3 shows that the receipt of funds from another public body is an incentive that influences public managers to disclose information in hard-copy format, and its influence is greater in countries with an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture (ρ = .118 vs. ρ = .102). The results also indicate that public managers of municipal governments disclose more financial information in hard copy to justify the use of received funds (ρ = .118 vs. ρ = .072). In both cases, the variability within the data has disappeared (chi-square statistic is nonsignificant). Therefore, with this empirical evidence, we can affirm that the administrative culture and the level of government are moderating effects and have influence in the analyzed relationship (ME2 and ME5).

In contrast, taking into account the accounting regimes, the results are very similar to those of the administrative culture variable. Results show that the public managers of countries that have their own accounting systems have little motivation to disclose financial information online. However, the results are very different when the information is released as hard copy. Public managers are more inclined to disclose managerial information in countries using GASB’s accounting regime. So, we could affirm that the countries’ accounting requirements and practices is a moderating effect on the analyzed relationship (ME3).

Regarding the measurement unit used, the association between grants received and the disclosure of public financial information is stronger when quantified through current and capital transfers rather than through ratio intergovernmental receipts. Also, we can observe that the variability within the data has disappeared (chi-square statistic is nonsignificant); so, the measure used to quantify the intergovernmental transfers modulates the analyzed relationship (ME4).

In Table 4 , we observe that the receipt of funds from other government agencies and the justification for their use is an incentive to disclose financial information in hard-copy format and that this accountability requirement has increased over time; hence, the relationship is stronger in recently published articles than articles published between 1983 and 1999 (ρ = .126 vs. ρ = .009). Few studies have been published regarding the disclosure of information through the Internet, but the results available in this respect seem to show that there is no statistically significant relationship.

Political competition

Regarding political competition (see Table 2 ), the average correlation presented is .091, CI = [.069, .113], although this positive association is statistically significant and stable (fail-safe, as shown by the N value), and so there is a positive relationship between political competition and the disclosure of public financial information irrespective of the mode of information disclosure (H3 should be accepted). However, the observed variance (21.64%) reveals a high degree of heterogeneity in the studies analyzed ( Q = 314.259; ρ < .001). Therefore, we believe it is necessary to search for the moderating effects that this variability may have produced within the reported findings.

In this sense, Table 2 shows that the public managers have more motivation when financial information is disclosed online (ρ = .201 vs. ρ = .034), than when it is provided in hard-copy format; in both cases, the relationship is statistically significant. In addition, for the particular case of online disclosure of financial information, the heterogeneity has not disappeared. So, with these empirical tests, we could not affirm that the format chosen for information disclosure has a moderating effect on the reported results (ME1).

The results described in Table 3 show that political competition is an incentive for state governments to disclose financial information in hard copy and online; in both cases, the relationship observed is positive and statistically significant. However, this relationship is stronger when the information is disclosed via Internet than via hard-copy format (ρ = .470 vs. ρ = .219). In summary, these empirical results show that the administrative culture and the level of government both constitute moderating effects on the results reported in the studies of this question (ME2 and ME5).

In the case of accounting regimes, there are no studies regarding the disclosure through hard-copy format with their own accounting regimes and studies about the disclosure through the Internet with GASB’s accounting regimes, although the results available in this respect seem to show conclusive evidence that the accounting requirements is a moderating effect.

However, when we focus on the measurement unit used, we can see that the indices of political competition and percentage of seats held by the minority party offer the most statistically significant positive association, followed distantly by percentages of victories, when hard-copy information is analyzed. When the online information disclosure is analyzed, the ratio of candidates and dichotomous variable offer the most statistically significant positive associations, followed closely by indices of political competition. In most cases, the variability within the data has disappeared (chi-square statistic is nonsignificant), so we affirm that the measure used to quantify the political competition modulates the analyzed relationship (ME4).

In Table 4 , we see that over time, political competition has come to exert a great influence on public managers to disclose information, in any format, although this influence is strongest with respect to online disclosure.

Environmental Factors

Size

The variable “size of the government” presents an average correlation of .166 and CI of [.152, .180], and the relation is positive and statistically significant ( z = 9.53, ρ < .001). Moreover, the N fail-safe value reflects the stability of the relationship (see Table 2 ). These findings lead us to affirm that there is a positive relation between the size of government and the disclosure of public financial information irrespective of the mode of information disclosure (H4). However, the significance of the chi-square statistic ( Q = 607.701, ρ < .001) suggests other factors might modulate this association, thus, we have to search for moderating effects that influence the analyzed relationship (see Figure 2 ).

The above table also shows that the relationship is stronger when information is disclosed via the Internet than when it is provided as hard copy (ρ = .184 vs. ρ = .154; ρ = .001). However, the data variability persists (chi-square statistic is significant), so we cannot conclude that the channel used for disclosing financial information affects the results (ME1).

Table 3 shows that when the information is provided in hard-copy format, the size of the government affects positively to the disclosure of financial information in countries that act under an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture (ρ = .182 vs. ρ = .096). However, in the case of online information disclosure, the size of the population addressed by government action positively influences information transparency; this ratio is higher among governments where the administrative culture is non-Anglo-Saxon (ρ = .307 vs. ρ = .100). In contrast, when we focus on the level of government, we see that state administrators are more motivated to disclose information as hard copy, while local government officials seem to be more motivated to disclose online. Due to the persistence of variability (chi-square statistic is significant), the mode of information disclosure and the level of government cannot be considered moderating effects (ME2 and ME5).

Taking into account the accounting regimes (see Table 3 ), we can see that the relationship is strongest when the information is disclosed via the Internet and, especially, when the country has adopted the IPSAS, followed closely by the case in which the country has adopted its own accounting standard (ρ = .299 vs. ρ = .264). Also, when the information is disclosed in hard copy, a negative significant relationship exists in cases of the country adopting its own accounting standards. In this sense, we can see that the heterogeneity has disappeared, so the accounting regimes adopted by the countries influence the analyzed relationship (ME3).

Regarding the measurement used to quantify the size of government, we can see that the relationship is stronger when this variable is quantified by the total revenue and the total assets than when this variable is quantified by the registered inhabitants and the population logarithm, and, in the case of hard-copy information, is statistically significant and positive in all cases. Meanwhile, in the case of online information, this relationship is stronger when the academic researcher used registered inhabitants and a population logarithm to quantify the size of government than when this variable is quantified by the total revenue, the total assets, and the number of public employees, which is statistically significant and positive in all cases. Also, Table 3 shows that there is no variability within the data, so we can affirm that the measurement modulates the analyzed relationship (ME4).

In Table 4 , we can see that in governments where the Anglo-Saxon administrative culture prevails, a greater population size encourages information disclosure, and this influence has increased over time. In addition, we confirm that in countries with a non-Anglo-Saxon administrative culture, this relation is negative and statistically significant for the hard-copy provision of information, but is positive and statistically significant for online disclosure.

Municipal wealth

The “municipal wealth” variable presents a positive and statistically significant relationship ( z = 8.13, ρ < .001, as shown by the CI of [.062, .112]), and therefore we can affirm that there is a positive relation between municipal wealth and the disclosure of public financial information irrespective of the mode of information disclosure (H5— Table 2 ). Furthermore, the fail-safe test confirms the stability of this relationship. Thus, we conclude that the economic status of the population has a positive and statistically significant influence (ρ = .087, ρ < .001), moderating the disclosure of economic and financial information in the public sector, although the Q value (68.360; ρ < .05) suggests the existence of other factors that could modulate this association—see Figure 2 .

The results presented in Table 2 show that municipal wealth is an incentive that exerts a stronger influence in the case of hard-copy information disclosure ( r = .094 vs. r = .083) than in online format. In this case, the explanatory power of the error variance has no increase and the level of heterogeneity is the same, and so we cannot affirm that the mode employed for the disclosure of public financial information is not a moderating effect, because it has no influence on the data (ME1).

Table 3 shows that municipal wealth is a determinant factor in government information disclosure in non-Anglo-Saxon administrative cultures, and that it exerts a stronger influence with respect to online information disclosure (ρ = .158 vs. ρ = .069). In turn, public managers in countries with an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture are more motivated to disclose information in hard-copy format (ρ = .098 vs. r = .069). Moreover, this variable has a stronger influence in state administrations with respect to the provision of information as hard copy (ρ = .270 vs. ρ = .052) than in local governments, although the latter are more motivated to disclose information online (ρ = .081). In these cases, the variability on the data has disappeared, so the format in which the information is provided and the level of government are both moderating effects on the findings reported (ME2 and ME5).

However, the accounting regime adopted by the country shows a stronger relationship when the information is disclosed by the Internet, and this relationship is greater when the country adopted its own accounting requirement, followed closely by the countries that adopted the IPSAS. In this case, the heterogeneity has disappeared (chi-square statistic is nonsignificant), so the accounting regimes adopted by the countries have influence on the analyzed relationship (ME3).

When we focus on the measurement used to quantify the municipal wealth, the relationship is stronger when this variable is measured by countries’ own revenue per capita than when it is measured by per capita citizens’ income irrespective of whether the information is disclosed via the Internet or in hard-copy format. In this sense, the variability has disappeared (chi-square statistic is nonsignificant), so we can affirm that the measurement modulates the analyzed relationship (ME4).

In Table 4 , it can be seen that municipal wealth has had a stronger influence in more recent studies, and especially so regarding the online disclosure of information. Thus, governments with an Anglo-Saxon administrative culture have been shown to be more motivated than non-Anglo-Saxon governments to disclose hard-copy information according to more recent studies and are also more strongly motivated when the disclosure is made online.

Discussion and Conclusion

With respect to financial condition, public managers are motivated to disclose and justify their management role by reporting financial information and to reduce the cost of debt to increase resources available for other programs ( Zimmerman, 1977 ); that is, they will have an interest in disclosing information voluntarily to reduce information asymmetries and, thus, the risk perceived by external agents, which in turn will reduce the cost of borrowing ( Gore, 2004 ). This result supports the view that agency theory is relevant for explaining disclosure of public-sector financial reporting, because government financial statements are used by external users to inform themselves of the financial condition of public agencies ( Mack & Ryan, 2006 ).

Moreover, recent studies have shown that public managers face increasing demands from citizens for financial information, especially in view of rapid changes taking place in the technological innovations that have led to alternative mechanisms of accountability ( Schillemans, Van Twist, & Vanhommerig, 2013 ). Taking into account the assumptions of neoinstitutional theory and legitimacy theory, policymakers and public managers have adopted innovations in management and accounting and have implemented the new technologies that have favored the transparency and accountability, as a result of the global tendencies in adopting homogeneous practices and structures. Also, they try to inform about management of governmental organizations and their financial health in order to the possible influence in citizenry’s opinion.

In our study, this influence is exerted more strongly in countries where the administrative culture is Anglo-Saxon, and this factor motivates public managers to disclose financial information both online and as hard copy. This association is modulated by the administrative culture, a finding that is consistent with previous studies ( Rodríguez Bolívar et al., 2015 ) and is according to the height of the level of information disclosure by public bodies where Anglo-Saxon tradition prevails; in common law countries, the government relies heavily on markets as sources of capital ( La Porte, Demchak, & De Jong, 2002 ), and so there is a highly developed tradition of public financial accountability and transparency. Therefore, public managers, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, should establish financial transparency policies to reduce the pressure to which they are exposed.

In addition, in countries where governmental accounting standards have been professionalized, the direction and extent of changes to the standards will depend on the number of organizations involved and the strength of support for the financial standard bodies within these organizations ( Cheng, 1992 ). These financial standard bodies have a notable influence on the public-sector accounting reform implemented to improve public financial accountability and transparency ( Cheng, 1992 ). In this regard, according to the ideas of neoinstitutional theory, public-sector organizations have had to face external pressures and adopt these standards and practices issued by these financial standard bodies that are considered legitimate and socially acceptable.

Furthermore, the results obtained show that financial condition has a more positive influence on the public managers of state rather than local governments. This evidence leads us to believe that either the contextual and environmental factors or the pressure exerted by stakeholders in state officeholders provides greater accountability when debt levels are high and prompts these officials to release financial statements. Indeed, according to the neoinstitutional theory, organizations must respond to external pressure or innovative trends, and, as information disclosure is a symbol of trust and modernity, this constitutes a trend that governments should adopt in response to those factors ( Hoffman, 1999 ). For this reason, state government administrators are more motivated to minimize government debt and the costs arising from it, as this will reduce the pressure on them to disclose information and, at the same time, reduce the tax burden on the population—a situation that would probably be favorably viewed at election time ( Laswad et al., 2005 ) and maintain the country’s credit rating (legitimacy theory approach).

Also, our results indicate that, over time, the government’s financial condition is increasingly a factor that influences public managers to disclose financial information to defend the policies adopted and show that the government’s situation is financially sustainable ( Rodríguez et al., 2014 ). This result may be a consequence of the economic and financial crisis that has severely impacted governments and society in recent years. In fact, from the point of view of the legitimacy theory, public managers could disclose public information with the aim of showing the management and financial situation of governments, seeking to change the possible negative impact of management cuts. These findings underline the need to create transparency policies and portals to communicate financial information effectively.

With respect to intergovernmental transfers, meta-analytic data show that intergovernmental grants have a great influence on public financial information disclosed by local authorities, who are obliged to account for transfers received from state or supranational administrations, usually in hard-copy format. In fact, these entities are particularly motivated to disclose public economic and financial information and to demonstrate that the funds received have been used in accordance with the requirements of the program for which they were assigned ( Copley, 1991 ), thus corroborating the efficiency of their management and the good use of resources ( Robbins & Austin, 1986 ). In brief, the principal–agent relationship discussed in agency theory is also seen here; local government agents need to justify the use of financial resources to demonstrate they have acted according to their responsibilities. Moreover, this pressure has increased over time, perhaps as a result of the greater control exercised over public finances in response to the present economic and financial crises.

In addition, public-sector financial transparency and accountability are greater when the government has no absolute majority, and opposition political parties demand the full disclosure of public financial information to exercise their role of financial control and present effective opposition. Moreover, highly competitive political environments are conducive to the adoption of communication strategies via websites and technological reforms and to the provision of high levels of information transparency ( Tolbert, Mossberger, & McNeal, 2008 ), thus allowing the continuous monitoring of governance, which in turn can benefit from the use of new technologies, as shown by our findings.

Currently, this is especially relevant at the central government level, perhaps due to economic crisis and fiscal distress experienced by central governments in many countries, which put politicians under more pressure to disclose information. According to the neoinstitutional theory, politicians in central government play a leading role in this question, which constitutes models for municipal politicians regarding transparent management and the performance of their financial duties ( Rodríguez Domínguez et al., 2011 ).

Regarding the size of the government and taking into account the pronouncements of agency theory, public managers are pressured by the population to disclose information on their performance ( Moon & Norris, 2005 ) and to accept a high level of control ( Evans & Patton, 1987 ; Serrano et al., 2009 ). In addition, the preparation and disclosure of financial information is costly ( Herian, Hamm, Tomkins, & Pytlik, 2012 ) and represents a fixed cost for the organization. In comparison to small- and medium-sized cities, larger ones can afford to invest financial and technical resources that are necessary to prepare and disclose financial information and, consequently, are more likely to provide such information. Therefore, expenditure by large governments can and should be devoted to adopting needed measures for offering appropriate financial transparency.

Finally, the results obtained confirm that municipal wealth is a variable that is positively associated with the level of disclosure of public information, and so municipalities with a higher per capita income disclose a greater volume of public financial information ( Giroux & McLelland, 2003 ; Ingram, 1984 ). In addition, previous investigations have shown that wealthier governments have greater access to this information through the implementation of new technologies; thus, there is a relationship between per capita income and access to new technologies ( Ho, 2002 ). Hence, the associations found in our meta-analytic study are strongest with respect to information disclosed online. Therefore, access to the Internet and the public financial information disclosed via this mode depend to a large extent on municipal wealth and on the per capita income of the population ( Serrano et al., 2009 ). This result could be explained by the legitimacy theory, since public managers seek to transmit the perception that their actions meet stakeholders’ expectations through the dissemination of information ( Archel et al., 2009 ), and they, therefore, improve citizens’ access to information and acquire legitimacy before a well-informed and educated citizenry.

In regard to the findings made in this study, future research could usefully identify the main stakeholders who influence information disclosure and make use of surveys to directly examine the need for public-sector financial information. Nevertheless, the present article represents a first step toward achieving a framework to design the complex econometric model previously mentioned, and our findings show that the five variables analyzed should be included in any future econometric model in this area.

All these considerations lead us to inquire whether it is possible to construct a single model of incentives for the disclosure of public financial information, one that is valid for all environments. Nonetheless, it appears that the disclosure of state information consistently disappoints: There is never enough of it ( Fenster, 2015 ). Open Data projects could help to solve this problem, especially for the disclosure of public financial information. In this regard, the English Open Data experiment has especially targeted financial information and would be a useful place to start to examine behavioral and institutional factors that are important to the research questions proposed in this article. Therefore, future studies should further investigate such aspects by adding new variables and seeking effects that might modulate the relations we have examined and subsequently develop a framework enabling public managers and citizens to obtain a useful instrument that will facilitate government accountability.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was carried out with financial support from the Regional Government of Andalusia (Spain), Department of Innovation, Science and Enterprise with Research Project (number PII-SEJ-7700).

References

Albalate del Sol D. (2013). The institutional, economic and social determinants of local government transparency. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 16(1), 90-107.