Corporate responsibility and governance
Corporate governance practices have
improved in Asia since the Asian Financial
Crisis although disparity exists across the
region. Besides promoting economic growth
and financial stability, corporate governance
will become even more important over
the next decade as investors place greater
emphasis on environmental, social and
governance issues.
History is littered with numerous examples of
corporate collapses arising from poor corporate
governance practices. Although the corporate
governance movement began in the 1970s in
the United States, it only attracted a great deal
of attention and interest in the aftermath of the
corporate and banking scandals in the 1990s and
early 2000s. Poor governance impedes economic
growth and increases financial market volatility;
both the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis (“AFC”)
and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (“GFC”)
underscore this fact and the consequences of
weak governance.
Research shows that during the AFC, countries
with the lowest corporate governance were also
those which experienced the largest currency
depreciation and stock market decline. Following
this, policymakers in the region undertook a series
of structural reforms to strengthen their economies
to deal with future external shocks. Apart from
financial and corporate restructuring, many
adopted new laws to address corporate bankruptcy
and governance. This led to stronger balance
sheets in both the public and private sectors which
allowed the Asian corporates to fare better during
the GFC.
20 YEARS ON FROM AFC --------------- A joint biennial corporate governance watch survey
conducted by the Asian Corporate Governance
Association and CLSA shows the overall breadth
and depth of corporate governance practices
have improved across Asia since the AFC. Yet the
disparity in ranking across the region is significant;
Philippines and Indonesia have to do much more
to bridge the gap. The survey also indicates that
countries such as Singapore and Hong Kong
come out tops due to robust legal, regulatory and
economic institutions (see fig.1).
Out of all the assessed categories, corporate
culture ranked the lowest across the region while
accounting and auditing scored the highest due
to the acceptance of international accounting
and auditing standards by governments and
independent audit regulation (see fig.2).
TRACKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA
Fig.1: CG watch market scores: 2010 to 2016
Fig.2: Market category scores (CG watch 2016)
Business culture is different in Asia compared to the
Western nations. Many companies do not engage
in open communication with shareholders to
avoid unwanted attention. This holds true for the
listed companies that are majority family-owned;
related party transactions, cross-shareholdings and
minority shareholder rights are some of the key
areas that will come under scrutiny.
(%) 2010 2012 2014 2016 Change 2014 vs 2016 (ppt)
Direction of CG reform
Australia - - - 78 - -
1. Singapore 67 69 64 67 (+3) Mostly sunny, but storms ahead?
2. Hong Kong 65 66 65 65 - Action, reaction: the cycle of Hong Kong life
3. Japan 57 55 60 63 (+3) Cultural change occurring, but rules still weak
4. Taiwan 55 53 56 60 (+4) The form is in, now need the substance
5. Thailand 55 58 58 58 - Could be on the verge of something great, if...
6. Malaysia 52 55 58 56 (-2) Regulation improving, public governance failing
7. India 49 51 54 55 (+1) Forward movement impeded by vested interests
8. Korea 45 49 49 52 (+3) Forward movement impeded by vested interests
9. China 49 45 45 43 (-2) Falling further behind, but enforcement better
10. Philippines 37 41 40 38 (-2) New policy initiatives, but regulatory ennui
11. Indonesia 40 37 39 36 (-3) Losing momentum after progress of recent years
(%) Total CG rules and
practices Enforcement
Political and regulatory
Accounting and auditing
CG culture
Australia 78 80 68 78 90 74
1. Singapore 67 63 63 67 87 55
2. Hong Kong 65 63 69 69 70 53
3. Japan 63 51 63 69 75 58
4. Taiwan 60 54 54 64 77 50
5. Thailand 58 64 51 45 77 50
6. Malaysia 56 54 54 48 82 42
7. India 55 59 51 56 58 49
8. Korea 52 48 50 53 70 41
9. China 43 38 40 36 67 34
10. Philippines 38 35 19 41 65 33
11. Indonesia 36 35 21 33 58 32
Fig.4: Minimum shareholding requirement to request an EGM
INTERESTING OBSERVATIONS --------------- A standard approach to corporate governance
is difficult due to varying regulatory, cultural
and economic differences between countries.
Nonetheless most countries tend to adopt these
six OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in
their national corporate governance frameworks:
1. Ensuring the basis of an effective corporate governance framework
2. Rights of shareholders
3. Equitable treatment of shareholders
4. Role of stakeholders
5. Disclosure and transparency
6. Responsibilities of the board
The implementation mechanism, however, varies
across jurisdictions. The framework, for example,
can be on a ‘binding’, ‘voluntary’ or ‘comply
or explain’ basis. Under the ‘comply or explain’
approach, companies have to comply with the
general principles of the corporate governance
codes under the stock market listing rules but
non-compliance is allowed based on the premise
of full disclosure.
Fig.3 shows that more countries prefer the
principles-based ‘comply or explain’ approach as it
is less rigid and allows companies to go beyond the
minimum requirements. On the flipside it can be
ambiguous and too broad to be an effective guide.
The rules-based ‘binding’ approach, on the other
hand, provides clarity and standardisation but may
not be suitable for all companies.
On the issue of rights of shareholders, the OECD
surveyed the minimum shareholding requirement
for a shareholder to request an extraordinary
general meeting (“EGM”); more than half require
a minimum 5% shareholding while within Asia the
majority stipulated 10% (see fig.4).
Fig.3: Corporate governance implementation mechanism
Coverage: 45 OECD
and non-OECD jurisdictions
Coverage: 45 OECD
and non-OECD jurisdictions
7%
11%
33%
27%
84%
53%
Up to 3%
Binding Binding
Up to 3%5%
Comply or explain Comply or explain
5%10%
Others Voluntary
10%More than 10% 20%
17%
9%
9%
31%
4%
50%
55%
9%
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore & Thailand
China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore & Vietnam
Thailand
China, India, Philippines & Vietnam
Taiwan, Korea & Philippines
Korea & Philippines
Hong Kong
Coverage: 11 Asian countries
Coverage: 11 Asian countries
Fig.6: Directors’ qualification requirements in Asia
The equitable treatment of all shareholders is
just as important and one way to assess this is to
look at related party transaction and the approval
process associated with it; 59% of jurisdictions
require board approval for certain types of
related party transactions. A similar percentage
requires shareholder approval as an alternative or
complementary feature (see fig.5).
Another area that warrants close examination
is the board of directors; structure, size,
independence and maximum term of office are
some of the categories that come under scrutiny.
Countries typically have a one-tier board system
but more are now choosing to institute a two-
tier system that delineates the supervisory and
management functions. The size of the board varies
with caps on minimum rather than the maximum
number of directors. On the independence feature,
the survey shows that most prefer to have at least
50% of independent directors. But within Asia,
more countries have kept this ratio at 33%.
Still on this topic, the qualifications of the
directors matter and these are implemented by law
or code. Most jurisdictions require the entire board
of directors to be qualified. Within Asia, 100% of
the countries in the survey require a Fit and Proper
clearance while half additionally require minimum
education and training as well as professional
experience (see fig.6). Interestingly, gender
representation data from a Credit Suisse Research
Fig.5: Within Asia, more countries require both board and stakeholder approval for related party transactions
Shareholding and board approval
Fit and proper test
China
China
Taiwan
Taiwan
Korea
Indonesia Singapore
Hong Kong
Hong Kong
Thailand
Korea Thailand
India
India Philippines
Vietnam
Malaysia Vietnam
Vietnam
Indonesia
Taiwan
Malaysia
Indonesia
Singapore
Malaysia Philippines Singapore
Philippines
Shareholder approval
Minimum education and training & professional experience
Board approval
Fig.7: Women in senior positions in Asia
in 2016 showed that Korea lagged the region
while Thailand topped in terms of women in senior
positions (see fig.7).
WHY IT MATTERS? --------------- According to an Ernst & Young survey1, 39%
of the investors will rule out an investment
immediately if there is a history of poor corporate
governance. This number will likely increase as the
millennial generation becomes the key driving force
for the global economy. Millennials are known
to strongly value corporate social responsibility
(“CSR”) initiatives.
According to the European Commission,
CSR is a concept whereby companies integrate
social and environmental concerns in their business
operations and in their interactions with their
stakeholders on a voluntary basis. An increasing
number of companies are including CSR initiatives
as part of their overall corporate governance
practices. This in turn allows them to infuse ethical
norms and accountability measures into their
business practices.
Corporate governance expectations have
also increased since the GFC with a number of
jurisdictions opting to embrace investor stewardship
codes, first implemented by the United Kingdom
in 2010. The code which is directed at institutional
investors came into being, prompted by questions
on whether a more active shareholder involvement
in investee companies would have helped prevent
or lessen the crisis. Most stewardship codes are
voluntary and according to the Ernst and Young
report dated 2017 it is still too early to gauge if
they have had an impact on improving corporate
governance. Nevertheless the adoption of these
codes should encourage investor engagement,
improve disclosure and transparency and
contribute to the long-term success of companies.
Going forward, the world will see the growth
and impact of millennials as a socio-economic
group become meaningful. Individuals born after
1980 will constitute the largest age demographic in
the world at more than 2 billion, versus 1.4 billion
Gen Xers and 1.2 billion Baby Boomers. By 2020,
they will account for around 50% of the global
workforce – 75% by 2025 – and they will inherit
the largest intergenerational transfer of wealth
we have ever seen with more than USD30 trillion
of global wealth to be handed down
(see Millennials and Artificial Intelligence).
Given this generation’s attention to
environmental, social and corporate governance
(“ESG”), and community engagement in general,
investment strategies that integrate ESG principles
and/or thematics resonating to millennials should
be a major part of the future product offerings
(see Mainstreaming ESG investing in Asia).
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Female representation on boards Female representation on senior management
Chicago | Ho Chi Minh City | Hong Kong | Jakarta | Kuala Lumpur | London | Luxembourg | Mumbai | Seoul | Shanghai | Singapore | Taipei | Tokyo
Sources: 1Ernst & Young Global Limited – Investors see long-term financial benefits in companies with high ESG ratings, as at 2017. Fig.1 - 2. Asian Corporate Governance Association. Fig.3 - 6. Eastspring Singapore and OECD Survey of Corporate Governance Framework in Asia, as at 2017, and OECD Corporate Governance Factbook, as at 2017. Please note that the data for a number of countries come with individual conditions and requirements. Please note that the summary charts shown may not necessarily have taken into consideration all specific requirements in certain countries. For full details, please refer to [http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporate-governance-factbook.html and https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/OECD-Survey-Corporate-Governance-Frameworks-Asia.pdf]. Fig.7. Credit Suisse Research, as at 2016.
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