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Toward greater cultural sensitivity in developmental psychology

Joan G. Miller, Jessica Engelbrecht, Zhenlan Wang, and Gen Tsudaka

New School for Social Research

ABSTRACT With the increased attention given to culture in recent years in developmental psychology, there remains a need to overcome limitations of certain existing approaches. Such limitations include tendencies to adopt approaches to culture that are overly global, ignore its symbolic aspects, and that reduce culture to an individual difference variable that can be assessed by conventional psychological scale measures. In the present article, we focus on theoretical and methodological challenges involved in conceptualizing and measuring culture. In the first sec- tion, we discuss theoretical work on culture, including how to define culture and considera- tions to take into account when operationalizing culture, such as attending to its symbolic aspects, its embodiment in everyday social practices, and its dynamic nature. In the second section, we describe the theoretical and methodological approaches that we have adopted in incorporating culture in our own cross-cultural developmental research. Finally, in conclusion, we identify key challenges that arise in integrating attention to culture with psychological work in neuroscience, making the case for the continued importance of attention to culture even with the move toward neurologically based accounts of developmental processes.

The first author and her colleagues (Hiroko Akiyama and Shagufa Kapadia) recently applied to the National Science Foundation (NSF) for an investigation that included US, Japanese, and Indian populations. The first round of reviews received identified failure to assess culture as a major concern. We responded by resubmitting our grant application with the inclusion of an additional study that involved undertaking a content analysis of cultural products, in particular of graduation speeches given at the US, Japanese and Indian schools in which the proposed empirical stud- ies would be undertaken. The reviewers reacted posi- tively to this new additional planned study, but reiterated their earlier concerns. They did not consider such an assessment of everyday cultural products to be a valid index of culture and felt that we had ignored their directive to assess culture empirically. In our third submission, we acquiesced to what we understood the reviewers expected and included individual difference scale measures of individualism- collectivism in all of the planned studies in the three- study investigation. This satisfied the reviewers and led to NSF funding the project.

In the present article, we critically address this ten- dency within psychology to privilege individual differ- ence measures of culture focused on the individualism-collectivism dichotomy and highlight the need to adopt approaches that recognize the col- lective nature of cultural systems and that are more culturally sensitive. In the first section of the chapter, we discuss work on culture theory, including how to define culture, and challenges that arise in operation- alizing culture. In the second section, we describe ways that we have addressed these challenges in incor- porating culture in our own research, while in the concluding section we highlight the need to give greater weight to cultural considerations in the grow- ing body of applied research on neuroscience.

Theoretical considerations and challenges in culture theory

Theorists have long acknowledged the importance for psychologists to understand culture (Jahoda, 1980). In this section, we argue for the need to take into account both symbolic and ecological aspects of

CONTACT Joan G. Miller [email protected] New School for Social Research, New York City, New York, USA This article was originally published with errors, which have now been corrected in the online version. Please see Correction (https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10888691.2020.1800200). � 2020 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 2021, VOL. 25, NO. 1, 1–13 https://doi.org/10.1080/10888691.2020.1789348

culture and we highlight key challenges involved in operationalizing culture.

Incorporating symbolic views of culture

Historically, theorists in psychology have adopted eco- logical views that treat culture as functionally adapted to the objective affordances and constraints of the environment. Ecological perspectives are congruent with the field’s longstanding embrace of evolutionary frameworks (e.g., Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2000; Collins & Hartup, 2013; Kenrick et al., 2005). In an early example of such a model, the Whitings’ Six Cultures study of child development linked culture to the eco- logical environment through the mechanism of indi- vidual personality (Whiting & Whiting, 1975). The Whitings provided evidence, for example, that rich natural ecologies give rise to societies with complex social structures, which result in children participating in social practices, such as formal schooling, that emphasize competitiveness and promote egoistic behavioral tendencies. In a later influential framework, Bronfenbrenner (1979) forwarded an ecological model that identified major social contexts affecting human development, including the microsystem of the imme- diate family environment, the exosystem of social sys- tems, such as the parent’s workplace, that impact the child vicariously; and the macrosystem of cultural beliefs, societal resources and political trends.

Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model and other major ecological frameworks have proved important in sensitiz- ing developmental psychologists to contextual influences and in offering process accounts of how social experien- ces affect child development. For example, the stage- environment fit model (Eccles & Roeser, 2009) provided insight into ways middle schools, which span grades 6–8, have more positive effects on student outcomes than do junior high schools, which span grades 7–9. In delaying student exposure to the pressures of high school during the stressful period of middle adolescence, middle schools provide an environment that is more sensitive to the needs of middle adolescents than are junior high schools.

Whereas ecological views of culture are valuable, it is important for developmental researchers to recog- nize that culture reflects symbolic meanings and not only adaptive affordances and constraints (D’Andrade, 1984; Geertz, 1973; Sahlins, 1976; Shweder & LeVine, 1984). From a symbolic perspective, culture represents a system of shared meanings embodied in artifacts and practices. Culture, in this view, is seen as includ- ing not only knowledge and prescriptive norms, but also constitutive meanings that define and thus bring

into being social realities (Searle, 1969). This social reality-creating role of culture is broad in that it extends not only to social activities that depend on collective agreement for their existence (e.g., the inter- related concepts of marriage, bride, and wedding rings), but to psychological phenomena. In this regard, it is recognized that many core psychological concepts reflect cultural distinctions embodied in nat- ural language categories (Miller, 1999). Barrett (2012), for example, made this observation in highlighting the role of cultural meanings in emotional experience:

Every single experience of emotion or perception of emotion, necessarily involves invoking shared meaning, even if there is no one there to explicitly share with in the immediate moment. … if people agree that a particular constellation of facial actions (e.g., a scowl), cardiovascular response (e.g., a blood pressure increase) and an appraisal (e.g., a feeling of offense) is anger in a given context, then it is anger in that context… If some people do not have a concept of anger, then this constellation will never exist as anger for those people (i.e., it is not that they are truly angry and don’t know it); if they have some other category that is shared within their culture for that constellation in a given context, and that category knowledge is applied, then the instance becomes that mental category instead (p. 420).

In an empirical illustration of such a process, Bartlett demonstrated that individuals perceive the same facial display as a different emotional expression when the display is labeled with a different emotion term, such as with the terms “surprise”, “fear” or “anger”. From a symbolic perspective, theorists also recognize that cultural meanings and practices may be non-rational in not solely reflecting functional utility or logic (Shweder, 1984). In providing an illustration of such a process, Sahlins (1976) for example, noted how the edibility of particular animals reflects cultural definitions of personhood that determine the animal’s status as foods versus as pets and that override bio- logical considerations of nutritional value.

The importance of adopting a symbolic view of cul- ture is to expand the considerations that are taken into account in psychological explanation. It is recognized that researchers must attend not only to objective affor- dances and constraints but to cultural meanings that affect how such contextual factors are understood. To give an example, American parents consider a low stu- dent-teacher ratio as desirable, in judging that this facili- tates children receiving individual attention from teachers. In contrast, while recognizing that a low stu- dent-teacher ratio affords greater individual attention for students, Chinese and Japanese parents consider the practice as undesirable in judging it non-conducive to

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children gaining experience in being a group member (Tobin et al., 1989).

A symbolic view of culture is also important in developing more dynamic approaches to cultural change. Ecological approaches view societies as evolving over time as a function of enhanced wealth and eco- nomic development. This type of approach, for example, explained the emergence of individualism as a functional adaptation to societal modernization and economic development (e.g., Triandis, 1989). Nisbett and his colleagues (Nisbett et al., 2001) offered a similar ecological account for the emergence of analytical versus holistic cognition. In this account, the reliance on agri- culture, such as the rice agriculture of southern China, was seen as functionally requiring cooperation and thus contributing to the rise of cultural interdependence. In contrast, the reliance on herding and fishing in ancient Greece was seen as functionally requiring personal agency and thus as contributing to the rise of cultural individualism (see also Talhelm et al., 2014).

This same type of ecological explanatory framework has been applied in explaining social class differences. In experiencing relative scarcity of social and material resources, lower class populations are viewed as depend- ent on each other for survival and as experiencing a lesser sense of personal control than is the case among middle and upper class populations who, with their greater social and material resources, are viewed as more self-reliant and as experiencing greater personal control. Congruent with this claim that social class differences mirror differences between collectivist versus individual- istic cultures, adults with working class as compared with middle class background have been found to be more likely to show the situational attributions and holistic patterns of attention observed among Asian collectivist populations (Bowman et al., 2009; Kraus et al., 2009).

From a symbolic perspective, however, it is recog- nized that cultural meanings and practices are not based solely on functionality, and that cultural shifts are marked by historical processes and not solely by proc- esses of adaptation. Whereas an increasing emphasis on values related to self-expression is associated with global- ization and modernization, fundamental cultural values nonetheless have been observed to persist. For example, in a major cross-national survey, Inglehart and Baker (2000) showed that the cultural heritage of a society, such as its maintaining Protestant, Roman Catholic, Confucian, or Communist cultural outlooks, endures despite modernization and globalization.

Challenges to the claim that social class differences can be fully explained as causal adaptations to condi- tions of life is highlighted by research demonstrating

that social class differences assume culturally variable forms. In a comparison of European-American sam- ples of different social class backgrounds, Kusserow (1999) showed that whereas upper-middle class parents emphasized a form of “soft individualism” that is normative in contemporary developmental the- ories, working class and lower class groups showed distinctive forms of “hard individualism”. This work and related research documenting differences related to ethnicity within social class groups (Laureau, 2011) highlights the need to take into account not only eco- logical influences, but also symbolic cultural values and practices.

Challenges

Recent years have seen the emergence of a range of distinctive theoretical perspectives associated with cul- tural psychology (e.g., Cole, 1996; Rogoff, 2003; Markus et al., 1996; Miller, 1997; Shweder, 1990). Challenges exist, however, in developing views of cul- ture that go beyond individual difference approaches and that are more sensitive to local meanings.

Beyond individual difference measures of culture As illustrated in the opening paragraph of this essay, the most common way of operationalizing culture in psych- ology is to adopt individual difference scale measures, such as the independent-interdependent self-construal scale (SCS) developed by Singelis (1994). In this approach, culture is treated as an attitudinal or personal- ity measure that can be assessed by a self-report index.

Individual difference approaches to culture are appealing in that when culture is assessed as an indi- vidual difference measure it can be directly empirically related to psychological outcome measures that are assessed within the same study participants. In this regard, it was our failure to incorporate an individual difference measure of culture in each of the studies in our larger investigation that led the NSF reviewers to treat our proposed content analysis of cultural prod- ucts as an inadequate index of culture.

An additional part of the appeal of individual dif- ference approaches to culture is that they appear to enable culture to be tapped in a way that meets the standards of parsimony and predictive power that are central to psychology. For example, individual differ- ence measures of individualism/collectivism purport to capture the most central aspects of these cultural outlooks, just as a global measure of personality, such as the MMPI, purports to capture the most central facets of personality. To achieve this aim, individual

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difference measures of culture are formulated in decon- textualized terms that refer to generalized behavioral tendencies. This can be seen, for example, in the widely used Self-Construal Scale (SCS) measure of independ- ence/interdependence developed by Singelis (1994). To illustrate, a representative interdependent item on the SCS of “I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact” references a cross-situational behav- ioral tendency to respect all authority figures.

Treating culture as an individual difference meas- ure, however, fails to capture the anthropological insight that culture is a collective process. This indi- vidual difference type of stance introduces a circular- ity into the inference process, with psychological outcome measures of interest to an investigator treated as being explained by what is, in actuality, also a psychological measure – i.e., by an individual differ- ence attitudinal measure of culture.

The stance of treating culture as an individual dif- ference variable is also reductive in portraying individ- ual psychological processes as mapping directly onto the shared meaning systems of cultural groups, a pos- ition which assumes that the perspective of the indi- vidual totally mirrors that of their culture. Such a stance has contributed to the tendency for many developmental psychologists to dismiss cultural learn- ing as a passive process that is incompatible with the active nature of the constructivist accounts that have dominated developmental psychology in the contem- porary era (e.g., Turiel, 2002).

Finally, this type of approach has contributed to cul- ture being viewed as giving rise to highly generalized cross-situational differences in outlook, such as in pre- dictions that East Asian populations will consistently display holistic perceptual and behavioral orientations more frequently than North American populations (e.g., Nisbett et al., 2001). Such a perspective, however, fails to take into account the contextual dependence of psy- chological phenomena and respects in which the mean- ing of particular contextual factors affects the types of cross-cultural differences observed. For example, Cousins (1989) demonstrated that Japanese made fewer abstract attributions than did Americans on the Twenty Statements Test (TST), a de-contextualized task that directs respondents to answer the probe “Who am I?” However, Japanese were observed to interpret this probe as unnatural and to feel that it must be supplemented with contextual qualifications to be meaningful. Specifically, when administered a contextually based version of the TST that required describing oneself both while at home and while at school, Japanese made

more abstract attributions (e.g., “I am an earthling”; I am a child of Buddha”) than did Americans.

It is also important for researchers to go beyond individual difference approaches and to treat culture as a collective process. In doing this, researchers need not abandon the goal of empirically assessing culture. They also adopt more focused approaches that tap specific cultural products or practices rather than attempting to capture all aspects of a culture. In an illustration of this type of approach, Tsai and her colleagues (Tsai et al., 2007) undertook a statistically based textual comparison of the affect portrayed in American as compared with Taiwanese children’s storybooks, thus showing that psychologists can approach the analysis of cultural products empirically. Their analyses revealed that American as compared with Taiwanese storybooks por- trayed more excited expressions, wider smiles, and more arousing activities. This supported their claim that visions of ideal affect that had been found to differ among adults (Tsai et al., 2006) were being communi- cated to children, in part, through the contrasting por- trayal of affect in American as compared with Taiwanese storybooks. However, as noted, this kind of textual analysis assessed only a sampling of what are actually myriad cultural practices that may embody the type of cultural differences under consideration. Thus, for example, as Tsai and her colleagues themselves acknowledge, it would have been possible to examine a wide range of other cultural products or practices that are related to this cultural difference in valued affect, including patterns of parent-child interaction. Treating culture as a collective process then does not achieve the seemingly highly generalized predictive power associ- ated with psychological scale measures of culture. However, it embodies a greater sensitivity to context, and avoids the cultural determinism inherent in indi- vidual difference approaches.

Adopting approaches with greater cultural sensitivity An additional challenge for psychological work on cul- ture is to go beyond an over-reliance on the individual- ism-collectivism dichotomy and to adopt approaches that have greater cultural validity. The individualism- collectivism framework gives rise to stereotypical views of cultural variation and has less predictive power than commonly assumed.

The individualism-collectivism framework origi- nated in research by Hofstede (1980) on cross- national corporations, which grew into later work by Triandis on individualism-collectivism (e.g., Triandis, 1989, 1990, 1994). The distinction gained greater

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influence within psychology when it was embraced by mainstream social psychological theorists, with Markus and Kitayama (1991) reintroducing this dis- tinction under the framing of an independent versus interdependent self, and Nisbett and his colleagues (Nisbett et al., 2001) reintroducing it as a contrast between Western versus Eastern cultural outlooks.

The individualism-collectivism dichotomy, however, is of limited cultural sensitivity, as seen, for example, in its assumption that a greater sense of agency is linked to individualism than to collectivism. Forwarding such a view, Triandis (1994) maintained that “Collectivists … are willing to subordinate their personal goals to the goals of the group… people are often more concerned about acting appropriately than about doing what they would like to do” (p. 4). This stance is also seen in scale measures tapping the independent vs inter- dependent self – such as in the following item on the SCS considered indicative of collectivism, “I will sacri- fice my self-interest for the benefit of the group that I am in.” However, this assumption of lesser agency associated with collectivism fails to appreciate that many cultural groups do not share the assumption associated with individualism of an opposition between the group and the self (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1994). They also tend to experience being responsive to family and other ingroup expectations as affectively sat- isfying and agentic rather than as subjectively control- ling (e.g., Rohner & Pettengill, 1985)

The individualism-collectivism dichotomy also has much less predictive power than originally assumed. In a large-scale meta-analysis of research relevant to the individualism-collectivism distinction, Oyserman and her colleagues (Oyserman et al., 2002) found that European Americans did not differ in collectivism from Japanese (see also Matsumoto, 1999). Thus, even though Japan is treated in much empirical work in cul- tural psychology as a prototypic collectivist population (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991), it does not show some of the core outlooks associated with collectivism.

In terms of future research, it is important to adopt more culturally sensitive methods. Such methods include: 1. collaborating with members of the cultural commun- ities under consideration; 2. referencing anthropological and sociological literature about these communities; 3. undertaking participant observation in the communities or other types of behavioral observation; as well as 4. employing open-ended research questions that provide insight into participants’ subjective outlooks.

To achieve greater cultural sensitivity, it is valuable to attend to culturally specific constructs conveyed in natural language categories. Illustrating the value of

this type of approach, Chao and her colleagues (Chao, 1994; Russell et al., 2010) provided evidence that that the type of parenting that is salient in Chinese families reflects such indigenous concepts as chia shun, a term that includes the idea of training. This style of parent- ing does not fit into the categories in the dominant theory of parenting articulated by Baumrind (2013). Whereas Chinese styles of parenting involve continu- ously monitoring and correcting the child’s behavior and on that basis might seem to fit the highly control- ling and emotionally negative mode of authoritarian parenting identified by Baumrind, they differ in giving rise to caring and to positive adaptive outcomes, such as school success.

It is also important to undertake research that con- trasts more than two cultural groups in the same investigation. Currently, support for the individual- ism/collectivism dichotomy has come from comparing responses among one assumed individualistic popula- tion with responses from one assumed collectivism population. However, only by including participants from three or more cultural or sub-cultural groups in the same research design - something that is rarely done in contemporary psychology - is it possible to develop interpretations that go beyond the individual- ism collectivism dichotomy. In an example of such an approach, my colleagues and I compared social sup- port norms among US, Japanese and Indian popula- tions (Miller et al., 2017). Results indicated that the greatest differences in social support outlook occurred between Indian and Japanese populations. In particu- lar, greatest comfort in social support occurred among Indians, followed by significantly lower comfort among Americans, and lowest comfort among Japanese. The work challenged past claims, based on two-culture comparisons (e.g., Kim et al., 2008; Taylor et al., 2004), linking discomfort in social support to an interdependent cultural view of self.

Operationalizing culture in our research

In this section, we describe how we have operational- ized culture in our program of research. Our work has centered on two interrelated goals: to expand con- temporary visions of the normative endpoints and pathways of child development, and to understand the extent to which psychological theories and constructs take culturally variable forms. Although the compara- tive studies of the type that we have undertaken have limitations in their ethnographic sensitivity, we employ such methodological strategies in the

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expectation that comparison is an effective means of drawing implications for existing psychological findings.

Social attribution

In early research undertaken by the first author for her dissertation, Miller (1984, 1986, 1987) uncovered cultural variation in the endpoints and developmental trajectory of social attribution and person description. Prior research had documented an age increase in dis- positional attribution (e.g., “she is arrogant”). This type of age trend had been interpreted as universal and as reflective of an age increase in children’s cog- nitive abilities to make dispositional attributions (i.e., a cognitive explanation) and in their exposure to behavioral consistency that provided grounds for making dispositional attributions (i.e., an informa- tional explanation) (e.g., Peevers & Secord, 1973; Scarlett et al., 1971) . In comparisons of the open- ended explanations offered by American and Hindu Indian adults and children (ages 8, 11, and 15 years) (Miller, 1984), an age increase in dispositional attribu- tions occurred only among Americans. Notably, Indians did not merely display the absence of this age pattern – a result that might have reflected arrested development. Rather, Indian adults, as compared with American adults, placed greater emphasis on context- ual factors (e.g., “She is his aunt”; “It was very early in the morning”), with an age increase in contextual attributions observed among Indians and no age change in contextual attributions observed among Americans. Commonalities occurred at young ages, with both American and Indian children emphasizing situationally specific states of the agent that reflected elements of theory of mind (Wellman & Miller, 2006, 2008).

The work by Miller offered a new process explan- ation not only of attributional trends observed among Indians but also of past results observed among Americans. The research showed that social attribu- tion involves culturally variable rather than only uni- versal pattern of age change. The research also demonstrated that developmental differences in social inference result, in part, from enculturation, and not only from children’s increasing cognitive capacities and greater exposure to information.

In terms of the methodological approach to culture adopted in this research, Miller took steps to familiar- ize herself with Indian culture. This involved reading anthropological research on India (e.g. Dumont, 1970; Marriott, 1976; O’Flaherty & Derrett, 1978), as well as undertaking extended fieldwork in Mysore, India.

This fieldwork lasted approximately a year – a time period that was adopted not because such an extended time period was required to complete data collection, but because it provided an opportunity for Miller to experience Hindu Indian culture firsthand. In living with an Indian family during most of this time period, Miller gained insights into everyday social life – which provided a context for sensitively carrying out and interpreting the research she was completing on social attribution, as well as that would inform later cross- cultural comparisons involving the US and India that she carried out over time.

To explore the processes underlying the observed US/India differences in social attribution, Miller (1984) also undertook within-culture subgroup comparisons that focused on identifying whether the observed results could be explained in terms of modernizing influences as compared with of enduring cultural tradi- tions. Miller adopted a methodological strategy, which later came to be termed “triangulation” (Medin et al., 2007), that involves isolating explanatory factors by comparing subgroups that resemble each other on vir- tually all other dimensions except for the hypothesized explanatory element. Miller compared dispositional inferences made among three Indian adult subgroups living in Mysore: a) middle class Hindu Indians; b) lower class Hindu Indians; and c) lower middle class Anglo-Indians. As college graduates with professional occupational backgrounds and extensive mobility, the middle class Hindus had the greatest exposure to mod- ernizing influences. In contrast, in having only elemen- tary school education and working in menial labor occupations, the lower class Hindus had the least exposure to modernizing influences, with the lower middle class Anglo-Indians intermediate in their expos- ure to modernizing influences. However, as a Christian community of mixed Euro-Indian descent, the Anglo- Indians maintained somewhat Westernized cultural outlooks and ways of life. Results revealed that whereas no differences in dispositional attribution occurred between the Hindu subgroups of differing socioeco- nomic status, the Anglo-Indian subgroup more fre- quently made dispositional inferences than did either of the Hindu subgroups. This finding challenged an exclusively functional view of culture in that disposi- tional inference did not vary with socioeconomic status within India. It provided evidence that the use of dis- positions does not represent merely a functional adap- tation to experiential affordances and demands associated with modernization and greater wealth. In turn, support for a symbolic view of culture was seen in the finding that dispositional inference was greater

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among Anglo-Indians than among either the higher or the lower SES Hindu Indian groups. This showed that the US/India differences in dispositional inference reflected enculturation processes, with Anglo-Indians maintaining cultural outlooks shaped, in part, by their enduring Christian cultural heritage.

The early developmental commonality and cultur- ally variable developmental endpoints identified in this research importantly led to subsequent theoretical elaborations of the theory of mind framework. In rec- ognition that an emphasis on dispositional attribution is not a universal endpoint of theory of mind, Wellman and Miller (2006, 2008) broadened the the- ory of mind framework both conceptually and cultur- ally. Conceptually, they forwarded the theoretical argument that deontic considerations (involving notions of obligation and permission) and not only mentalistic considerations (involving beliefs and desires) form part of the child’s early theory of mind understandings universally. For example, in analyses based on the CHILDES database of speech samples of English-speaking 2-5 year old children, Hickling and Wellman (2001) observed that young children made as frequent reference to beliefs and desires (e.g., “wanting”) as to socio-conventional considerations (e.g., “obligation”), as seen in a 3-year old’s remark, “I want to obey” (Wellman & Miller, 2008, p. 118). Wellman and Miller also highlighted the importance of examining other culturally variable developmental pathways in theory of mind understandings.

Development of knowledge of emotion display rules

Our recent work has provided evidence both of other early cross-cultural developmental commonality and of other culturally variable age changes in social cog- nition. We assessed the development of verbal emo- tion display rule knowledge among elementary school children, adolescents, and adults in the US and Japan (Wice et al., 2019). Our research sampled emotion display rules directed to protecting the welfare of others - a topic extensively studied in past research (e.g., Hayashi & Shiomi, 2015), as well as a type of display rule having considerable salience in Japan, but to our knowledge not previously studied in develop- mental psychology. This new case involved regulating emotions in a situation bearing on conflicting opin- ions about a matter of taste. The issue concerned whether to directly express how one feels, such as to express that one dislikes a movie that a friend com- municates that they like, versus to adjust one’s

expressed emotional reaction to avoid conflicting with the opinion of the other party. Results revealed that, with increasing age, children in both cultures placed greater emphasis on the need for welfare-oriented dis- play rules. However, culturally variable developmental changes occurred in the conflicting opinions situation. Namely, a developmental increase into adulthood occurred among Japanese in the tendency to adjust one’s emotion expression to align with that of one’s communicative partner, with no developmental change observed in this tendency among Americans.

In terms of the approach to culture adopted in this research, we employed many of the methodological strategies associated with going beyond the individual- ism/collectivism dichotomy and developing more ethno- graphically sensitive understandings. The American lead author (Matthew Wice) brought to the research his first-hand knowledge of Japanese culture, having lived and worked in Japan for three years prior to undertak- ing graduate study and becoming fluent in Japanese. The research was undertaken collaboratively with Japanese scholars: the developmental psychologist Tomoko Matsui, the social psychologist Minoru Karasawa, and a social psychology doctoral candidate, Gen Tsudaka. These collaborators were actively involved in all aspects of the project, including data collection and writeup. The research was informed by knowledge of Japanese cultural practices, with efforts made to cap- ture subtlety in the responses observed. We showed, for instance, that Japanese adults adopted neutralizing rather than masking strategies in relation to the conflict- ing opinions scenario. Adoption of neutralizing strat- egies provided a way to avoid directly expressing a conflicting opinion, without having to resort to false- hood. This was seen in responses such as “that song is really popular these days, isn’t it?” to a question about whether one likes a particular song. Providing evidence for the cultural sensitivity of this finding, this type of subtle verbal strategy has been identified as an import- ant linguistic tool in Japanese culture more generally (Maynard, 2005).

Development of interpersonal motivation

In a program of cross-cultural research, Miller and her colleagues demonstrated that Indians more fre- quently than Americans categorized responsiveness to the needs of ingroup members as a role-related duty as compared with a matter of personal choice (Miller & Bersoff, 1995, 1998; Miller et al., 1990). Subsequent research revealed that Indian adults more fully inter- nalized duty to family and friends than did Hindu

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adults. In particular, whereas American adults reported feeling a lesser sense of choice and satisfac- tion when they helped family and friends in response to social expectations as compared with doing so spontaneously, Indian adults reported the same high levels of choice and satisfaction in both cases (Miller et al., 2011). This research challenged the somewhat pejorative claim that a strong sense of obligation to in-group members is associated with a lesser sense of agency than is individualism, with Indians shown to give greater weight to role obligations than did Americans but also to experience agentic feelings in fulfilling such obligations. Highlighting cultural insensitivity in certain measures, the research also uncovered methodological biases in widely used Self Determination theory (SDT) scales, which score items tapping obligation or duty – such as the motive of “she was supposed to do this” – as external reasons, similar to sanctions or punishment. When certain cul- tural populations, like Indians, endorse acting out of an internalized sense of role related duty on such scales, they are then scored as low in agency. This constitutes a miscoding in that Indians’ sense of role related duty to family and friends is internalized and not an external motive.

In a recent three-study investigation, we examined the developmental trajectory of these culturally con- trasting psychological endpoints observed among col- lege age adults in the assumed relationship between meeting social expectations and acting in an agentic way (Goyal et al., 2019). In this study, we assessed responses of US and Indian children (ages 7-8 years and 10-11 years) to a helping situation that we pre- sented in an illustrated children’s picture book that we had created in ways to appear local. The picture book portrayed a girl who gives her teddy bear to her younger brother to comfort him, with this help offered spontaneously (spontaneous condition) as compared with after the mother asked the girl to help the brother (social expectations condition). Commonality occurred in the youngest age group, with Indian and American children sharing a view of personal agency as compat- ible with meeting social expectations. However, qualita- tive developmental change, i.e., change in kind, occurred among Americans, who at older ages aban- doned their earlier views of agency as being compatible with fulfilling social expectations and instead came to view personal agency as in conflict with social expecta- tions. In contrast, quantitative developmental change, i.e., change in degree, occurred among Indians who at older ages deepened the understandings of social expectations that they had held early in development.

In a second investigation, we demonstrated that Indian parents viewed social expectations as compatible with personal agency whereas American parents viewed them as in conflict with personal agency. In a third study that involved a content analysis of children’s real life storybooks, we showed that only American and not Indian storybooks portrayed social expectations as being in conflict with individual autonomy.

In terms of implications, the results challenge sim- ple “fax” models of cultural learning that promote an over-socialized view of the person in portraying encul- turation as a passive process incompatible with an active agent. Our research showed that the early com- monality in outlooks observed among Indian and American children could not be fully explained in terms of children passively incorporating cultural mes- sages to which they were exposed. In particular, young children were exposed early in development to con- trasting cultural views of agency in the form both of storybooks and in the outlooks of their parents. However, compatible with recent evidence of young children spontaneously developing early relational outlooks (e.g., Tomasello, 2007, 2009), our work implied that young children do not passively absorb cultural message but actively interpret them in inte- grating them with their emerging sense of self.

In terms of efforts to promote the cultural sensitiv- ity of our work, our research team included members of the cultural communities being compared. To enhance the ecological validity of our stimuli, we con- structed picture books that presented children with a story about family life that was familiar in each cul- tural context. We also prepared both Indian and American versions of the storybooks, with the text written in each native language and hand-drawn pic- tures of story characters made to appear local.

Sacrifice during emerging adulthood

In a recent investigation, we compared readiness to sacrifice to family between European-American and Chinese emerging adults (Wang & Miller, 2020). In a first study, we sampled real life examples of sacrifice, which revealed that Chinese emerging adults make higher cost sacrifice to their parents than do European-American emerging adults. Higher cost sac- rifice involved the emerging adult making changes in their life plans, such as in giving up attending an out- of-town graduate school in order to remain living near to their family, whereas lower cost sacrifice involved making changes only in their daily plans, such as in giving up attending a social gathering to

8 J. G. MILLER ET AL.

spend time with their mother. In a follow-up study in which we employed the real life examples of sacrifice as common stimuli, we showed that a sense of family obligation motivated high cost sacrifice among Chinese emerging adults but not among European- American emerging adults.

Our research provided evidence of cultural differ- ences in readiness to sacrifice that had not been uncovered in past research on this topic, which had either relied on scale measures or sampled only low cost instances of sacrifice. Also, our finding that fam- ily obligation mediated the responses of Chinese emerging adults revealed a contrasting trend than observed in past research among Asian-Americans.

In terms of enhancing the cultural validity of our measures, we tapped real life examples of sacrifice, thus avoiding the decontextualized questions charac- teristic of most scale measures. For example, on the widely used Attitudes toward Family Obligation Scale (Fuligni & Pedersen, 2002), the sole item assessing sacrifice is phrased as “make sacrifices for your fam- ily”. However, this item does not specify the type of sacrifice under consideration. Thus, if two cultural groups give similar responses to this scale item, it is likely that the specific instances that they have in mind would differ in cost, if not also in other signifi- cant aspects. Our research also highlighted the importance of recognizing that immigrants do not merely adopt outlooks that reflect a combination of their earlier and contemporary cultural context but outlooks that reflect hardships and other experiences associated with the immigration process itself.

Culture and neuroscience

We briefly consider here the implications of culture for contemporary applied work in neuroscience within psychology. Increasing attention is being paid to neurological issues in developmental settings. This is seen, for example, in research being done on neuro- logical aspects of such clinically significant phenom- ena as autism (e.g., Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005), traumatic brain injury (e.g., Lambregts et al., 2018; Levy & Milgram, 2016), attention deficit disorder (Chan et al., 2010; Gong et al., 2015), and perinatal risk (Geva & Feldman, 2008). Funding agencies, such as the NIMH, increasingly favor the adoption of neurological measures in these types of applied inves- tigations and in work on basic theory in psychology more generally. However, it is important to acknow- ledge cultural biases, which may give rise to

deterministic stances, associated with the embrace of neuroscience within psychology.

One way in which psychological investigators embrace deterministic stances is by adopting a default assumption of universality as they seek to identify the neurological processes ‘underlying” particular develop- mental changes or psychological effects. To give an example, Pfeifer et al. (2010) offered a neurological account for what they assumed was a universal develop- mental shift toward a trait-oriented view of self over the transition from adolescence to adulthood. They observed that during self-knowledge retrieval, American adolescents show greater activation in the medial pos- terior parietal cortex (mPFC) and medial posterior par- ietal cortext (mPPC) than do American adults, and concluded that adults’ lesser activation of the mPFC and mPPC is associated with their adopting a more decontextualized and trait oriented view of self than do adolescents. However, the researchers did not consider the possibility that age changes to an adult trait psych- ology are culturally variable. As explained earlier, in this regard, it has been demonstrated that an age change in an emphasis on dispositional attribution does not occur in India (Miller, 1984, 1987). This implies that the neuroscience explanation of the age change offered by Pfeifer and her colleagues is less conclusive than they had claimed. While the neurological maturational changes identified by Pfeifer and her colleagues are likely universal, the way these neurological changes link to psychological correlates is more open. Notably, this conclusion is compatible with what is known about the brain – i.e., that brain regions are broadly, if not modu- larly, defined and not dedicated to a single function or form of processing. As Miller and Kinsbourne (2012) argue, the same neurologically based maturational shift identified by Pfeiffer and her colleagues could be associ- ated both with the developmental attributional patterns found in the US as well as with the contrasting develop- mental attributional patterns found in India.

An additional way in which neurological evidence may be incorporated in a deterministic way is by using neurological methods to pursue a confirmatory agenda that raises the profile of existing theoretical claims without taking into account evidence that chal- lenges these claims. This type of stance may be seen, for example, in recent research by Kitayama and his colleagues (Han et al., 2013; Kitayama & Uskul, 2011) that is drawing on neurological evidence to support links between culture and ecological factors. In for- warding this model, Kitayama and Uskul (2011) are reiterating the same causal claims not only that they had articulated in introducing the distinction between

APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 9

independent/interdependent cultural views of self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) but that have been argued for by Nisbett in work on the East-West dichotomy (e.g., Nisbett et al., 2001) and in work by Triandis (1990, 1994) on individualism/collectivism. This claim asserts that ecological factors, such as a dry climate combined with high residential mobility and low population density, are associated with nomadic and herding lifestyles that give rise to cultural independ- ence, with the opposite types of causal processes linked to cultural interdependence. In their recent model, Kitayama and Uskul (2011) add a neurological link to this longstanding functional model. Drawing on evidence for the intrinsic plasticity of the brain (Shaw & McEachern, 2001), the argument is made that repeated engagement in culturally variable tasks linked with independence vs interdependence modify neural connectivity in ways that reflect this cultural dichotomy and serve the goal of biological adaptation (see Figure 1 in Kitayama & Uskul, 2011). This stance, however, serves to reinforce existing claims about individualism/collectivism, while breaking little new theoretical or empirical ground. It is notable, for example, that despite an earlier meta-analysis by Oyserman and her colleagues (Oyserman et al., 2002) challenging the empirical adequacy of claims made about individualism/collectivism, and charges that this dichotomy gives rise to stereotypic views (Buchtel, 2014), this recent neurologically based model treats the individualism/collectivism dichotomy as fully empirically supported. This embrace of neuroscience is deterministic in reinvigorating this dichotomy and reinforcing its insensitivity to cultural variation out- side the present European-American/East Asian cul- tural contrast, and in taking into account only causal and not also symbolic views of culture.

The social policy implications drawn from neuro- logical findings also are deterministic in cases in which they downplay the impact of culturally variable socialization processes. An example of this type of stance may be seen in recent arguments that brain maturation occurring during adolescence sets limits on the resistance of adolescents to the influences of their peers in risk taking situations and is a process that cannot be moderated by education or other environmental influences (Steinberg, 2007). However, this policy implication fails to take into account cross- cultural evidence showing that adolescent risk tasking varies markedly cross-culturally (e.g., Piko & Fitzpatrick, 2006). Thus, even with the presence of uni- versal processes of brain maturation occurring among

adolescents, adolescent risk taking is clearly affected by culturally variable processes of socialization.

In sum, cultural considerations become, if anything, more important, not less important, with the move toward neurologically based accounts of phenomena in applied developmental science and in work on basic developmental processes. It remains critical to develop more nuanced understandings of cultural meanings and practices and to go beyond the present over-reliance on individual difference scale measures of culture. While developmental psychology has long given both theoretical and empirical attention to eco- logical models of context, there is a need to give greater attention to symbolic models of culture. Even as the field is making groundbreaking advances in identifying neurological aspects of clinically significant phenomena, it remains critical to bring a culturally nuanced perspective to that work.

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