Social Psychology
bola63
Topic1CulturalDifferences.pdf
Culture and the Distinctiveness Motive: Constructing Identity in Individualistic and Collectivistic Contexts
Maja Becker, Vivian L. Vignoles, Ellinor Owe, Rupert Brown, Peter B. Smith, and Matt Easterbrook
University of Sussex
Ginette Herman and Isabelle de Sauvage Université Catholique de Louvain
David Bourguignon Paul Verlaine University–Metz
Ana Torres and Leoncio Camino Federal University of Paraı́ba
Flávia Cristina Silveira Lemos Federal University of Pará
M. Cristina Ferreira Salgado de Oliveira University
Silvia H. Koller Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
Roberto González, Diego Carrasco, Maria Paz Cadena, and Siugmin Lay
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Qian Wang Chinese University of Hong Kong
Michael Harris Bond Polytechnic University of Hong Kong
Elvia Vargas Trujillo and Paola Balanta Universidad de Los Andes
Aune Valk Estonian Literary Museum
Kassahun Habtamu Mekonnen University of Addis Ababa
George Nizharadze Free University of Tbilisi
Marta Fülöp Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Camillo Regalia, Claudia Manzi, and Maria Brambilla
Catholic University of Milan
Charles Harb American University of Beirut
Said Aldhafri Sultan Qaboos University
Mariana Martin University of Namibia
Ma. Elizabeth J. Macapagal Ateneo de Manila University
Aneta Chybicka University of Gdańsk
Alin Gavreliuc West University of Timisoara
Johanna Buitendach University of KwaZulu Natal
Inge Schweiger Gallo Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Emre Özgen, Ülkü E. Güner, and Nil Yamakoğlu Bilkent University
The motive to attain a distinctive identity is sometimes thought to be stronger in, or even specific to, those socialized into individualistic cultures. Using data from 4,751 participants in 21 cultural groups (18 nations and 3 regions), we tested this prediction against our alternative view that culture would moderate the ways in which people achieve feelings of distinctiveness, rather than influence the strength of their
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology © 2012 American Psychological Association 2012, Vol. 102, No. 4, 833– 855 0022-3514/12/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0026853
833
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
motivation to do so. We measured the distinctiveness motive using an indirect technique to avoid cultural response biases. Analyses showed that the distinctiveness motive was not weaker—and, if anything, was stronger—in more collectivistic nations. However, individualism– collectivism was found to moderate the ways in which feelings of distinctiveness were constructed: Distinctiveness was associated more closely with difference and separateness in more individualistic cultures and was associated more closely with social position in more collectivistic cultures. Multilevel analysis confirmed that it is the prevailing beliefs and values in an individual’s context, rather than the individual’s own beliefs and values, that account for these differences.
Keywords: identity, motivation, culture, distinctiveness, self-concept
A common view in personality and social psychology is that people strive to distinguish themselves from others and that they have a basic motive to achieve distinctiveness. However, this view has been challenged in cross-cultural psychology, where it is sometimes asserted that the strength of this motive varies by culture. In some cultures, it is claimed, people want to be distin- guished as individuals, whereas in others, people want to be part of larger entities and may even seek to avoid distinctiveness from other members of those entities (Triandis, 1995; see also Kim & Markus, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Nevertheless, until now this assertion has not been tested appropriately. In this article, we examine whether and how the motive for distinctiveness may be moderated by culture.
Distinctiveness as a Core Psychological Motive
The concept of distinctiveness plays a central role in several social psychological theories of self and identity processes. For
example, uniqueness theory (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980) posits that people need to see themselves as unique and different from others in the interpersonal domain. In intergroup contexts, social identity theory proposes that people’s actions can often be understood as attempts to maintain or restore distinctiveness for their ingroup in relation to some outgroup(s) (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Brewer’s (1991) optimal distinctiveness theory suggests that competing needs for inclusion and distinctiveness underlie people’s choices of, and satisfaction with, group memberships: People prefer groups that are neither so large as to threaten people’s need to be distinct nor so small as to frustrate their need to feel included.
Reflecting the commonality among these theories, the need for distinctiveness is conceptualized here as an identity motive. Moti- vated identity construction theory (MICT; Vignoles, 2011; Vi- gnoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006) is based on the idea that identity is constructed through a complex interplay of cognitive, affective, and social interaction processes, all of which
This article was published Online First January 30, 2012. Maja Becker, Vivian L. Vignoles, Ellinor Owe, Rupert Brown, Peter B.
Smith, and Matt Easterbrook, School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom; Ginette Herman and Isabelle de Sauvage, Unité de psychologie sociale et des organisations, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; David Bourguignon, Laboratoire INTERPSY-ETIC, Paul Verlaine University–Metz, Metz, France; Ana Torres and Leoncio Camino, Department of Psychology, Federal Univer- sity of Paraı́ba, João Pessoa, Paraı́ba, Brazil; Flávia Cristina Silveira Lemos, Department of Psychology, Federal University of Pará, Belém, Pará, Brazil; M. Cristina Ferreira, Department of Psychology, Salgado de Oliveira University, Sao Goncalo, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Silvia H. Koller, Department of Psychology, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil; Roberto González, Diego Carrasco, Maria Paz Cadena, and Siugmin Lay, School of Psychology, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile; Qian Wang, Department of Psychology, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China; Michael Harris Bond, Department of Applied Social Sciences, Polytechnic University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China; Elvia Vargas Trujillo and Paola Balanta, Department of Psychology, Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia; Aune Valk, Estonian Literary Museum, Tartu, Estonia; Kassahun Habtamu Mekonnen, Department of Psychology, University of Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; George Nizharadze, Department of Social Sciences, Free Uni- versity of Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia; Marta Fülöp, Institute for Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary; Camillo Regalia, Claudia Manzi, and Maria Brambilla, Centre for Family Studies and Research, Catholic University of Milan, Milan, Italy; Charles Harb, De-
partment of Social and Behavioral Sciences, American University of Bei- rut, Beirut, Lebanon; Said Aldhafri, Department of Psychology, Sultan Qaboos University, Al Khoudh, Muscat, Oman; Mariana Martin, Depart- ment of Human Sciences, University of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia; Ma. Elizabeth J. Macapagal, Department of Psychology, Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines; Aneta Chybicka, Department of Cross-Cultural Psychology, University of Gdańsk, Gdańsk, Poland; Alin Gavreliuc, Department of Psychology, West University of Timisoara, Timisoara, Romania; Johanna Buitendach, School of Psychol- ogy, University of KwaZulu Natal, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa; Inge Schweiger Gallo, Department of Social Psychology, Universidad Com- plutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain; Emre Özgen, Ülkü E. Güner, and Nil Yamakoğlu, Department of Psychology, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey.
Preliminary analyses have been presented at the 4th African Region Conference of the International Association of Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP), Cameroon, Central Africa, 2009; the 20th Congress of the IACCP, Australia, 2010; the British Psychological Society Social Psychol- ogy Conference, Winchester, United Kingdom, 2010; and the Society for Personality and Social Psychology Conference, San Antonio, Texas, 2011. This work was funded by Economic and Social Research Council (United Kingdom) Grant RES-062-23-1300 to Vivian L. Vignoles and Rupert Brown.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Maja Becker, who is now at the CLLE (CNRS, UTM, EPHE), “Cognition, Langues, Langage et Ergonomie,” Maison de la recherche, 5 allées A. Machado, 31058 Toulouse Cedex 9, France. E-mail: mbecker@univ- tlse2.fr
834 BECKER ET AL.
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
occur within particular cultural and local meaning systems. These processes are understood to be guided by particular motives or “tendencies toward certain identity states and away from others” (Vignoles, 2011, p. 405). According to MICT, the motive for distinctiveness has a guiding influence on these processes of identity construction, together with at least five other motives. Specifically, the theory proposes that people are generally moti- vated to achieve and maintain feelings of self-esteem, continuity, distinctiveness, belonging, efficacy, and meaning within their identities.
Regarding the distinctiveness motive, there is substantial evi- dence of the many ways that people seek to construct and maintain distinctiveness of both individual and group identities (for reviews, see Lynn & Snyder, 2002; Vignoles, 2009). People typically remember information better if it distinguishes the self from others (Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Rogier, 1997), are most likely to mention their more distinctive attributes when asked to describe themselves (McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1976), and consider their more dis- tinctive attributes as especially self-defining (Turnbull, Miller, & McFarland, 1990; Vignoles et al., 2006). People also maintain and enhance distinctiveness of their group identities by ingroup ste- reotyping (van Rijswijk, Haslam, & Ellemers, 2006), by derogat- ing ingroup imposters and deviants (Jetten, Summerville, Hornsey, & Mewse, 2005; Marques & Paez, 1994), and by discriminating against outgroups (Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004). When feel- ings of distinctiveness are threatened or undermined, people typ- ically report reduced psychological well-being, and they attempt in various ways to restore distinctiveness (Fromkin, 1970, 1972; Jetten et al., 2004; Markus & Kunda, 1986; Pickett, Silver, & Brewer, 2002; Powell, 1974; Snyder & Endelman, 1979).
Vignoles et al. (2006) reported four studies among diverse groups of participants in the United Kingdom and Italy that showed the influence of the motive for distinctiveness on identity construction even when controlling for the influence of five other identity motives. Each participant freely listed 12 aspects of his/her identity (e.g., “woman,” “friend,” “musician,” “ambitious”) and then rated each identity aspect for its perceived centrality within identity as well as the extent to which it satisfied each of the six identity motives proposed in MICT. In all four studies, participants typically perceived as more central and self-defining those aspects of their identities that they felt distinguished them to a greater extent from others. The effect of distinctiveness on perceived centrality remained significant after accounting for the effects of other identity motives (for self-esteem, continuity, belonging, ef- ficacy, and meaning), and a longitudinal test of the model showed that distinctiveness had a significant prospective effect on per- ceived centrality, whereas the reverse causal direction was not supported.
Distinctiveness and Culture
However, all of this evidence for distinctiveness-seeking comes from European and North American research. Cross-cultural the- orists have suggested that the motive for distinctiveness may be culturally specific. Indeed, in his classic text on cultural individ- ualism and collectivism, Triandis (1995) has proposed that the motive for distinctiveness will be stronger in individualistic cul- tures and weaker in collectivistic cultures. Underlying this predic- tion is the assumption that identity motives are derived from
internalization of cultural values—that people who live in cultures where distinctiveness is valued will come to internalize this value, and it is for this reason that they will seek to construct distinctive identities (see, e.g., Breakwell, 1987; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980).
In contrast with this position, others have proposed that the need for distinctiveness is a “universal human motive” (Brewer & Pickett, 1999, p. 85). Vignoles and collaborators (Vignoles, 2009; Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000) have argued that establishing some form of distinctiveness is a logical precondition for the existence of a meaningful sense of identity in any cultural meaning system. This suggests that people would be motivated to seek distinctiveness, whether they are living in a collectivistic or an individualistic culture. Brewer and Roccas (2001) have even argued that distinctiveness strivings may be stronger in collectiv- istic cultural settings, compared to individualistic ones, as the motive will be more frustrated—and thus aroused—in the context of a cultural system where distinctiveness is not valued or is even discouraged (for a similar argument, see Lo, Helwig, Chen, Ohashi, & Cheng, 2011).
However, even if the distinctiveness motive is culturally uni- versal, Vignoles et al. (2000) suggested that cultural systems may come to emphasize different forms of distinctiveness, and these emphases should be reflected in the identities of cultural members. They proposed that distinctiveness can be constructed in three ways: through difference, separateness, or social position, as illus- trated in Figure 1. The most common way of operationalizing distinctiveness in psychology is as difference, that is, distinctive- ness in qualities such as abilities, opinions, personality, and ap- pearance. In contrast, social position refers to distinctiveness in one’s place within social relationships, including kinship ties, friendships, roles, and social status. Separateness refers to distinc- tiveness in terms of boundedness or distance from others, includ- ing physical and symbolic boundaries, and feelings of privacy, independence, and isolation. Although they viewed the motive for distinctiveness as universal, Vignoles et al. hypothesized that cultural beliefs and values would moderate the ways in which this motive is satisfied. In other words, the strength of the motive would be similar across cultures, but people would find different ways of satisfying the motive—ways that fit their own cultural meaning systems.
More precisely, Vignoles et al. (2000; Vignoles, 2009) hypoth- esized that difference and separateness would be emphasized and valued more as sources of distinctiveness in individualistic cul- tures, reflecting the Western concept of the person as unique and bounded (Geertz, 1975). On the other hand, they hypothesized that
Figure 1. Sources of distinctiveness (adapted from Vignoles et al., 2002).
835CULTURE AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS MOTIVE
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
social position would be emphasized and valued more in collec- tivistic cultures, where the place of the individual within a network of social relationships is a significant aspect of the concept of personhood (e.g., Ho, 1993; Hsu, 1985).
Measuring Distinctiveness-Seeking Across Cultures
Evidence for cultural differences in the distinctiveness motive is mostly limited to a small number of studies using explicit self- report measures of need for uniqueness (NFU). Yamaguchi, Kuhl- man, and Sugimori (1995) reported somewhat lower mean NFU scores among Japanese and Korean undergraduates compared to Americans, although statistical significance was not tested. Burns and Brady (1992) found significantly lower mean NFU scores among Malaysian than U.S. business students; however, this dif- ference appeared only on the Lack of Concern for Others subscale, suggesting a cultural difference in concern for social acceptance rather than in the desire for uniqueness per se. Tafarodi, Marshall, and Katsura (2004) found no difference between Japanese and Canadian undergraduates in overall NFU scores, although Japa- nese participants scored lower on items reflecting “desire to be different.” These findings thus provide only limited evidence for cultural variation in the distinctiveness motive.
Measuring Distinctiveness-Seeking
A concern with these studies is that the measurement of distinc- tiveness motivation is based on participants’ self-reports in re- sponse to direct questions about how much they want to be different from others. As noted by Vignoles (2009), explicit NFU scales may be measuring the subjective value placed on unique- ness and difference rather than the respondent’s underlying psy- chological motives. People are generally aware of their values, whereas they may or may not be aware of their motives, and the two do not necessarily coincide. For example, when research participants in North America and Western Europe claim to value being unique and different from others, this may be a way of conforming with prevailing social norms—ironically, by saying that they want to be different from others, these participants are fitting in with their social environments rather than distinguishing themselves from others (see Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002; Salvatore & Prentice, 2011). Hence, it may be preferable to mea- sure the distinctiveness motive using more indirect techniques— perhaps especially when looking at cultural differences (for related arguments, see Hofer & Bond, 2008; Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009).
Kim and Markus (1999, Study 3) tested the hypothesis of cultural differences in preferences for uniqueness without asking participants directly how much they wanted to be unique. They asked travelers at an airport to complete a short survey, offering them the choice of a pen in return. Participants were presented with five pens that were identical except for their external color. The ratio of uncommon (unique) to common (majority) colored pens was 1:4 or 2:3. Participants were categorized as American or East Asian (Korean or Chinese), and results indicated that Americans were more likely to choose the uncommon pens than were East Asians. This finding has been cited frequently as providing evi- dence for a stronger preference for uniqueness among Westerners
(e.g., Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007; Walsh & Smith, 2007).
However, the dependent measure of pen choice is open to alternative interpretations. East Asian participants could have viewed the unique pen as more desirable, just as the Americans did, but had other reasons for not choosing it. Indeed, Yamagishi, Hashimoto, and Schug (2008) have shown that, rather than cultural differences in preference for uniqueness, these results are better explained by cultural differences in the behavioral strategies that individuals rely on in ambiguous situations: Compared to Ameri- cans, East Asians are more likely to be concerned about how they will be evaluated by other individuals, which makes them choose the unique pen less frequently. Beyond this debate about the interpretation of the findings, the different colored pen in this paradigm only relates to one of the three sources of distinctiveness identified by Vignoles et al. (2000). Therefore, even if Kim and Markus (1999) are right in their interpretation, this only shows cultural variation in striving for difference (as one possible source of distinctiveness). It does not necessarily indicate variation in striving for distinctiveness as such.
Vignoles and Moncaster (2007) devised an alternative way of measuring individual differences in the strength of the distinctive- ness motive (and other identity motives), also without asking participants directly how much they wanted to be distinctive. As in the studies of Vignoles et al. (2006) described earlier, participants listed freely a number of aspects of their identities, and then they rated each identity aspect for its perceived centrality within their subjective identity structures—that is, the extent to which they perceived it as important and self-defining—and for the degree to which it provided feelings that would satisfy each of the motives they were interested in—for example, the extent to which it made them feel that they were distinguished in any sense from other people (for satisfaction of the distinctiveness motive). As in the earlier studies, the motive satisfaction ratings were used to predict the relative priority given to different aspects of identity within participants’ subjective identity structures, but Vignoles and Mon- caster’s analyses focused on individual differences rather than testing the overall strength of each motive across their sample. They reasoned that people with a relatively strong motive for distinctiveness should show a relatively strong tendency to prior- itize those aspects of their identities that they considered to dis- tinguish them most from others and to marginalize those aspects of their identities that did not satisfy this motive (for an illustration, see Figure 2: Participant A); in contrast, this tendency should be weaker among those with a weaker motive for distinctiveness (see Figure 2: Participant B). Thus, individual differences in the strength of association between distinctiveness ratings of aspects of identity and their perceived centrality within subjective identity structures could be used as an indirect measure of individual differences in the strength of the distinctiveness motive.
Scores on this indirect measure have been used successfully to predict several theorized outcomes of the distinctiveness motive, including individual differences in national favoritism (Vignoles & Moncaster, 2007) and in the preference for more or less distinctive relationship partners (Petavratzi, 2004). Yet, they are largely in- dependent of explicit self-reports of NFU (Eriksson, Becker, & Vignoles, 2011), indicating that they are not simply measuring participants’ beliefs about how much they want to be distinctive, or the subjective value they place on uniqueness. Although the mea-
836 BECKER ET AL.
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
sure is derived from explicit self-reports about the perceived centrality and the distinctiveness of different aspects of identity, participants are unlikely to be aware of the statistical patterns within their responses that are the focus of the measurement. Hence, the measure arguably can be characterized as an implicit measure (a similar example is the Name Letter Task, which is derived from explicit self-report data but is widely understood as a measure of implicit self-esteem; see Krause, Back, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011; LeBel & Gawronski, 2009).
This approach to measuring identity motives is also well suited for cross-cultural research. Because analysis is focused on within- participant relationships in the data, this measurement technique is insulated from several common sources of methodological bias in cross-cultural research, including the reference-group effect (Heine et al., 2002) and acquiescent response bias (Smith, 2004a). In the only cross-cultural study to date, Eriksson et al. (2011) found no difference between British and Swedish participants on this indirect measure of the distinctiveness motive, despite the fact that they did find national differences on an explicit self-report scale of NFU that were partially mediated by individuals’ value orientations. Thus, superficial differences in self-reported distinctiveness-seeking were not replicated at this underlying level.
Measuring Culture
An additional concern about previous studies into culture and distinctiveness is their restricted operational definition of culture. With the exception of Eriksson et al. (2011), all of the cross- cultural studies reviewed above have been based on bicultural comparisons between North American and East Asian participants, assumed to represent differences on the broad cultural dimension of individualism– collectivism. Although bicultural comparisons undoubtedly provide a valuable starting point in cross-cultural
research, exclusive reliance on studies of this kind is problematic for several reasons.
First, no pair of nations can possibly represent the world’s individualistic and collectivistic cultures more generally. Even if they are carefully selected, they will still inevitably differ from each other in many ways apart from their levels of individualism– collectivism. Moreover, East Asian nations, such as Japan and South Korea, are relatively atypical of the world’s collectivistic cultures, both in their relative affluence and in their Confucian philosophical heritage. Just as one would not draw conclusions about the personality dimension of introversion– extraversion by comparing the behavior of a single introvert with that of a single extravert, so it is necessary to study a sample of cultural groups— and to sample these groups as widely as possible—if one wants to draw firmer conclusions about the implications of a given cultural dimension (Smith, Bond, & Kağitçibaşi, 2006).
Although many researchers still base their characterization of national cultures on anecdotal evidence (or sometimes, it has been argued, on stereotypes; see Takano & Osaka, 1999), several em- pirically based national indices of individualism– collectivism have been published by cross-cultural organizational psycholo- gists. The best known of these is Hofstede’s (1980) individualism index; however, Hofstede derived this measure from data collected around 40 years ago for an entirely different purpose, and the items have questionable face validity as a measure of individualism– collectivism (see Smith et al., 2006). More recently, the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) project has produced nation scores for 18 cultural dimensions based on a survey spanning 62 nations (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). The GLOBE project’s index of in- group collectivism practices is closely related both theoretically and empirically with Hofstede’s individualism index. However, the GLOBE project improved on Hofstede’s methodology in at
Figure 2. Examples of subjective identity structures from two participants. A more positive correlation between the feeling of distinctiveness from other people that an aspect of identity provides and the perceived centrality of that aspect within identity suggests a stronger motive for distinctiveness. Here, Participant A appears to have a stronger motive for distinctiveness than Participant B.
837CULTURE AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS MOTIVE
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
least three ways: (1) the content of their measures was theoretically driven, and scale items were extensively validated across cultures; (2) the data are more recent, accounting for cultural change in the intervening years; and (3) the measures were derived in a more statistically defensible manner (see Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & de Luque, 2006). Thus, although the GLOBE project is less well-known among social psychologists than Hofstede’s work, we believe that the GLOBE scores for in-group collectivism prac- tices provide a better archival index of national differences in individualism– collectivism.
Archival measures are useful for sample selection purposes, but they do not substitute for direct measurement of cultural orienta- tions. Particular samples may not be representative of the broader trend of cultural differences between two or more nations, and so it is important to measure differences between the actual groups sampled on the cultural dimension of interest (Smith et al., 2006). Moreover, cultural orientations can be measured at more than one level of analysis. On one level, they are properties of particular social contexts (organizations, regions, ethnicities, nations) and, thus, should be measured ideally at a contextual level of analysis (see Hofstede, 1980). However, it is to be expected also that individuals will differ in the extent to which they internalize any given cultural orientation. If individual- and group-level effects are modeled together, then it becomes possible to distinguish the effects of internalizing a particular cultural orientation oneself from the effects of living in a particular cultural context (e.g., Gheorghiu, Vignoles, & Smith, 2009).
When measuring individualism– collectivism, it is important to recognize that this broad dimension encompasses a complex as- sortment of more specific differences in domains such as values, beliefs, norms, attitudes, and behaviors, which cluster together only moderately on a cultural level of analysis and hardly at all on an individual level of analysis (see Owe et al., in press). Given that not all of these characteristics will be shared in equal measure by every individualistic or collectivistic culture, Brewer and Chen (2007) have argued that it is preferable to measure different facets of individualism– collectivism separately rather than relying on the very broad and often unreliable measures that have more com- monly been used. In the current study, we focused our measure- ment on two psychological domains that we considered to be especially crucial aspects of the broader distinction between indi- vidualism and collectivism: social values and beliefs about per- sonhood.
In common with many cross-cultural psychologists, Schwartz (1992, 2004) has argued that studying values is an especially efficient way to capture and characterize cultural variation (see also Chinese Culture Connection, 1987; Hofstede, 1980; Smith & Schwartz, 1997). Based on an extensive cross-cultural study of value priorities, Schwartz (1992) concluded that individual differ- ences in value priorities are organized in a circumplex structure, which can be represented in terms of two bipolar dimensions of openness to change versus conservation and self-enhancement versus self-transcendence. This structure has been found in more than 75 nations, and a similar (but not identical) structure can be used to capture cross-national differences in values (Schwartz, 2004). On this contextual level of analysis, the individual-level distinction between openness and conservation values is largely recaptured in a conceptually similar nation-level dimension that Schwartz (2004) has labeled autonomy versus embeddedness (see
also Fischer, 2011; Fischer, Vauclair, Fontaine, & Schwartz, 2010). Crucially, both the individual-level and the nation-level dimensions contrast value priorities of self-direction and stimula- tion—thought to be typical of individualistic cultures—with those of tradition, security, and conformity—thought to be typical of collectivistic cultures (Welzel, 2010). Gheorghiu et al. (2009) found that scores on this dimension derived from representative samples in 21 nations converged very closely with Hofstede’s (1980) individualism index and with the GLOBE project’s scores for in-group collectivism. Nevertheless, Knafo, Schwartz, and Levine (2009) reported that autonomy– embeddedness scores have greater predictive value than global individualism– collectivism, probably reflecting their greater theoretical precision.
In recent years, Bond and Leung (Bond et al., 2004; Leung et al., 2002) have argued that, notwithstanding the importance of cultural differences in values, it is also highly important to examine the nature and consequences of differences in beliefs across cultures. Owe et al. (in press) recently developed a targeted measure to tap into the beliefs about personhood thought to underlie individual- istic and collectivistic ways of thinking. Following research and theory suggesting that members of individualistic cultures are prone to adopt a “de-contextualized” view of personhood com- pared to members of collectivistic cultures (e.g., Miller, 1984; Shweder & Bourne, 1984; Triandis, Chan, Bhawuk, Iwao, & Sinha, 1995), they devised a new measure of contextualism beliefs. This measure showed an equivalent factor structure across 19 nations and between individual and national levels of analysis, indicating that the dimension of contextualism beliefs could be used validly to characterize both individuals and national groups. National scores on this measure converged with archival indices of national individualism– collectivism and predicted incremental variance in national differences in several theoretically relevant outcomes (corruption, in-group favoritism, and differential trust of in-group and out-group members) after accounting for the contri- bution of autonomy– embeddedness values. Thus, it seems that autonomy– embeddedness values and contextualism beliefs are distinct and complementary facets within the broader construct of individualism– collectivism.
A further issue that requires consideration is the relationship between individualism– collectivism and national economic wealth. Because cultural individualism is strongly correlated with economic development (Hofstede, 2001; Weber, 1905/1958), it may be useful to measure these dimensions together so as to distinguish their effects (Smith, 2004b). However, there is little or no consensus currently about how best to treat this issue in statis- tical analyses. For example, Hofstede (1980, 2006) has proposed that one should partial out affluence when looking at the correlates of national individualism, whereas Javidan et al. (2006) have argued that to do so may be removing meaningful cultural vari- ance, because economic development could be a consequence as well as a cause of individualism.
Research Aims
Extending previous research by Vignoles et al. (2006) on iden- tity motives and on the motive for distinctiveness in particular (Eriksson et al., 2011; Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2002), the central purpose of the current study was to examine how the operation of the distinctiveness motive can be influenced by
838 BECKER ET AL.
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
the cultural context surrounding the person. Our study was con- ducted among participants in 21 cultural groups, spanning 19 nations across four continents.
We measured the strength of the distinctiveness motive using an extended and culturally decentered version of the methodology of Vignoles and Moncaster (2007). In addition to modeling within- participant relationships between the distinctiveness and perceived centrality of identity aspects, we also modeled the relationships between distinctiveness and the positive affective valence of iden- tity aspects. We should acknowledge that Vignoles et al. (2006) did not find a positive relationship between distinctiveness and positive affect on average across their Western European partici- pants; however, our main focus in the current study was on individual and cultural differences in this relationship, not on its mean level. We reasoned that participants with a stronger motive for distinctiveness would show a relatively stronger tendency to be more happy about those aspects of their identities that distin- guished them more from others and less happy about those aspects of their identities that distinguished them less from others; in contrast, those with a weaker motive for distinctiveness would show a weaker tendency, or perhaps even the reverse. Thus, within-participant relationships of distinctiveness with perceived centrality and of distinctiveness with positive affect would serve as two separate indicators of differences in the strength of the motive for distinctiveness. We expected that, on average, participants would be motivated to achieve a sense of distinctiveness within their identities and, thus, that they would perceive as more central to their identities, and be happier about, those identity aspects that are associated more strongly with a general sense of distinctive- ness.
Our first main aim was to investigate whether the strength of the distinctiveness motive, measured in these two ways, is moderated by culture. As discussed above, we estimated cultural orientation toward individualism– collectivism by measuring two different aspects of culture—autonomy-embeddedness values and contex- tualism beliefs—to establish whether our findings were suffi- ciently robust to generalize across these alternative measures. Hence, we tested the effects of cultural values and beliefs on the strength of the motive for distinctiveness in separate, parallel analyses. Moderation of the strength of within-participant relation- ships between distinctiveness and perceived centrality or between distinctiveness and positive affect by these measures of cultural orientation would indicate that the strength of the distinctiveness motive varies by culture, whereas the absence of moderation effects would signify that the motive is independent of these values and beliefs. Given the lack of consensus in the literature about how best to treat the relationship between individualism– collectivism and national affluence, we opted for the more conservative route of controlling for affluence; however, we also conducted parallel analyses that do not control for affluence (reported in Footnotes 5–10). Additionally, to control for the possibility that our samples might be differentially affluent within their respective nations, we included and controlled for an individual-level self-report measure of socioeconomic status.
Three competing predictions were tested, derived from the lit- erature reviewed above. From a relativist perspective (e.g., Trian- dis, 1995), it has been proposed that the motive for distinctiveness will be stronger among individuals in more individualistic cultures (Hypothesis 1 [H1]), on the basis that individualistic cultures
portray distinctiveness as a desirable attribute. In direct contrast, from a universalist perspective, Brewer and Roccas (2001) have proposed that the motive will be stronger among individuals in more collectivist cultures (Hypothesis 2 [H2]), on the basis that collectivistic cultures will provide fewer opportunities to satisfy this motive, leading to frustration and hence to greater arousal of the motive. Our own perspective (e.g., Vignoles et al., 2000) suggests that the strength of the motive for distinctiveness should be relatively similar across individualistic and collectivistic cul- tures (Hypothesis 3 [H3]) because the motive is understood to be universal, and because different cultural systems are understood to provide different— but equally viable—ways of satisfying the motive.
Our second main aim was to clarify whether distinctiveness is achieved in different ways, depending on cultural context, testing Vignoles et al.’s (2000; Vignoles, 2009) predictions regarding sources of distinctiveness. Consistent with previous research in the United Kingdom (Vignoles et al., 2002), we expected that partic- ipants would perceive as providing a greater sense of distinctive- ness those identity aspects that made them feel different or sepa- rate from others or that gave them a specific social position. Crucially, we examined whether cultural orientation toward individualism– collectivism would moderate the extent to which individuals used difference, separateness, or social position as sources of distinctiveness, again controlling for effects of individ- ual and national wealth. Across cultures, we expected to observe that distinctiveness is constructed in different ways, depending on cultural orientations toward individualism– collectivism. More precisely, as we have discussed above, the importance of differ- ence and separateness as sources of distinctiveness was expected to be stronger among individuals in more individualistic cultures (Hypothesis 4 [H4], Hypothesis 5 [H5]). The importance of social position as a source of distinctiveness was expected to be stronger among individuals in less individualistic cultures (Hypothesis 6 [H6]).
We had no strong a priori expectations regarding whether the hypothesized moderation effects would be found at the cultural or at the individual level—in other words, whether or not these differences would be dependent on individuals’ personal internal- ization of the relevant cultural beliefs and values; nevertheless, our multilevel design allowed us to explore this question by differen- tiating between effects of individual differences and effects of living in a given cultural context. We return to this issue in the discussion.
Method
Participants and Procedure
A total of 5,254 late adolescents in 21 cultural groups partici- pated in the study. Ninety-six individuals were excluded because they reported having lived less than 10 years in the country or being 25 years of age or more, thus leaving a sample of 5,158. (Individual-level sample sizes are slightly lower in our analyses because of missing data on some variables.) The mean age of the overall sample was 16.74 years, and 55% of participants were female (additional descriptive data, including sample size, gender, and age distribution for each sample, can be found in Table 1). In most cases, each cultural sample was from a different nation.
839CULTURE AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS MOTIVE
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
However, given the size and diversity of Brazil, regional samples from five different sites were included from this nation. Based on initial analyses, we distinguished three cultural profiles within the Brazilian data: The most individualistic profile was found among participants from Porto Alegre (Southern coastal region), whereas the participants from Belem (Northern inland region), Rio de Janeiro, and João Pessoa (Southeastern and Northeastern coastal regions) showed an intermediate profile, and the participants from Goiânia (Central, inland region) showed a more collectivistic profile.1 The data were divided according to these distinctions in cultural orientation, and three Brazilian cultural groups were used in all subsequent analyses. All participants were students in high schools or equivalent, except in the Philippines, where, to match the age range of participants from other nations, it was necessary to sample university students. The participation of mainly high school students means that the samples are likely to have been somewhat more representative of their respective cultures than would have been the case had university or college students been sampled, given that overall participation rates are higher for upper secondary than for tertiary education (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2010). Participants were re- cruited voluntarily at their schools and were not compensated in any way. In nations where this was an ethical requirement, parental consent was obtained in advance. Participants were told that the questionnaire formed part of a university project on beliefs, thoughts, and feelings; however, they remained uninformed about the specific purpose of the research and about its cross-cultural character. Administration of the questionnaire was usually in smaller groups or whole classes, although individual administra- tion was used for cultural groups where the local research team thought this was necessary.
Measures
Measures were included within a larger questionnaire concern- ing identity construction and cultural orientation. Only the mea- sures relevant to this article are described here. The questionnaires were translated from English into the main language of each country, indicated in Table 1. Independent back-translations were made by bilinguals who were not familiar with the research topic and hypotheses. Ambiguities and inconsistencies were identified and resolved by discussion, adjusting the translations where nec- essary.
Generation of identity aspects. First, participants were asked to freely generate 10 answers to the question “Who are you?” (hereafter, these answers are referred to as identity aspects), using an adapted version of the Twenty Statements Test (TST; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). This part of the questionnaire was located at the very beginning of the questionnaire, so that re- sponses would be constrained as little as possible by theoretical expectations or demand characteristics. It was printed on a page that folded out to the side of the main answer booklet, so that participants could see their identity aspects during the ratings that followed.
Previous studies using the TST methodology to access identity content have sometimes been criticized for priming an individu- alized, decontextualized, introspective “self” that may be closer to
1 These three groups differed both on openness (vs. conservation) val- ues, F(2, 711) � 14.97, p � .001, �2 � .04, and contextualism beliefs, F(2, 711) � 9.83, p � .001, �2 � .03. All pairwise comparisons indicated significant differences ( ps � .026). Descriptives for these samples on the cultural orientation variables are provided in Table 1.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Each Cultural Sample
Sample N % female M age M subjective
wealth M openness to change
(vs. conservation) values M contextualism
beliefs GNI per capita
Questionnaire language
Belgium 246 68 17.33 4.05 1.20 �.46 41,110 French Brazil, Belem, Rio de Janeiro, João Pessoa 400 62 16.69 3.77 1.11 �.24 5,860 Portuguese Brazil, Goiânia 123 49 14.85 3.66 0.68 .03 5,860 Portuguese Brazil, Porto Alegre 210 65 16.95 4.10 1.44 �.49 5,860 Portuguese Chile 394 47 16.21 4.65 0.97 �.77 8,190 Spanish China 227 48 15.88 3.58 0.46 �.56 2,370 Chinese Colombia 203 43 15.84 4.40 1.27 �.59 4,100 Spanish Estonia 234 59 16.86 4.35 1.23 �.14 12,830 Estonian Ethiopia 249 45 17.57 3.62 0.17 .12 220 Amharic Georgia 246 58 16.11 4.27 0.67 �.58 2,120 Georgian Hungary 238 52 16.49 4.45 1.23 �.73 11,680 Hungarian Italy 318 52 17.75 4.24 0.49 �.31 33,490 Italian Lebanon 295 46 17.07 4.55 0.67 �.41 5,800 Arabic Namibia 96 64 17.30 3.45 0.14 �.75 3,450 English Oman 248 49 16.51 4.83 0.07 �.27 12,860 Arabic Philippines 296 66 17.38 4.23 0.14 .41 1,620 English Poland 249 57 17.24 4.54 0.97 �.64 9,850 Polish Romania 220 49 17.08 4.79 0.74 �.51 6,390 Romanian Spain 223 53 16.44 4.59 1.19 �.72 29,290 Spanish Turkey 197 50 16.52 4.10 0.19 �.10 8,030 Turkish United Kingdom 246 76 16.66 4.20 1.24 �.68 40,660 English
Total 5,158 55 16.74 4.25 0.79 �.40
Note. GNI per capita � gross national income per capita in U.S. dollars.
840 BECKER ET AL.
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
Western than to other cultural conceptions of self-hood (see Smith, 2011). To achieve a culturally decentered version of this task, we held extensive discussions with study collaborators. As a result, we reworded the original question “Who am I?” into “Who are you?” We also developed a new, decentered version of the instructions following this question:
In the numbered spaces below, please write down 10 things about yourself. You can write your answers as they occur to you without worrying about the order, but together they should summarize the image you have of who you are. Your answers might include social groups or categories you belong to, personal relationships with others, as well as characteristics of yourself as an individual. Some may be things that other people know about, others may be your private thoughts about yourself. Some things you may see as relatively important, and others less so. Some may be things you are relatively happy about, and others less so.
We indeed found individual characteristics (e.g., “sociable,” “in- telligent,” “shy”), social roles, and interpersonal relationships (e.g., “friend,” “son,” “pupil”) as well as social categories (e.g., “girl,” “human being,” “British”) among common answers.
Ratings of identity aspects. Participants were then asked to rate each of their identity aspects on a number of different dimen- sions. Each dimension was presented as a question at the top of a new page, with a block of 11-point scales positioned underneath to line up with the identity aspects. Two questions were included to tap the cognitive and affective dimensions of identity construction, respectively. A first question measured the perceived centrality of each identity aspect within participants’ subjective identity struc- tures (“How important is each of these things in defining who you are?”; scale anchors were 0 � not at all important, 10 � extremely important). A second question measured positive affect in relation to each identity aspect (“How happy or unhappy do you feel about each of these things?”; scale anchors were 0 � extremely unhappy, 10 � extremely happy).
Four questions measured the association of each identity aspect with feelings of distinctiveness: general distinctiveness (“How much do you feel that each of these things distinguishes you—in any sense—from other people?”; scale anchors were 0 � not at all, 10 � extremely), social position (“How much does each of these things give you a particular role or position in relation to others?’; scale anchors were 0 � not at all, 10 � extremely), difference (“How much does each of these things make you a different kind of person from others?”; scale anchors were 0 � not at all, 10 � extremely), and separateness (“How much does each of these things create any sort of boundary between yourself and others?”; scale anchors were 0 � not at all, 10 � extremely).
To ensure that distinctiveness was not made salient before participants answered the perceived centrality and affect measures, these measures were placed before the measure of distinctiveness, separated by several pages of intervening measures. Similarly, the measures for social position, difference, and separateness were placed after the general distinctiveness item in another section of the questionnaire. These four questions related to distinctiveness were interspersed among 19 other rating questions related to other identity motives (e.g., belonging and self-esteem).
Portrait value questionnaire. We used a short version of this questionnaire, created by Schwartz (2007; see also Schwartz & Rubel, 2005, Study 1). The 21-item scale incorporates statements
presented as short descriptions of a person. Respondents are asked to indicate how much each description is or is not like them. The 6-point response scale ranges from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not like me at all); however, we reverse-coded all items so that higher scores would reflect greater endorsement of the value portrayed in the item. As recommended by Schwartz and Rubel (2005), we then ipsatized the responses by centering each participant’s item scores around his or her mean across all the items (i.e., subtracting the participant’s mean on the scale from his or her score on each item) to eliminate individual differences in response style.2
These ipsatized scores were used to create a measure of the bipolar value dimension of interest to the present study: openness to change versus conservation values (12 items: overall � � .69, Mdn � � .68).3 Sample items for this dimension were as follows: “He/she looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He/she wants to have an exciting life,” and “It is important to him/her to always behave properly. He/she wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong” (reversed). As described above, nation-level scores from this bipolar dimension can be used as an indicator of individualism– collectivism (Gheorghiu et al., 2009; Welzel, 2010).4
Contextualism. This scale, developed by Owe et al. (in press), taps into the beliefs about personhood that are thought to underlie cultural collectivism. It measures beliefs about the impor- tance (vs. unimportance) of social and contextual attributes in defining a person. The scale consists of six balanced items, in-
2 All models presented were also computed with non-ipsatized scores for values and beliefs, and the results were the same. Full details of these analyses are available from the first author on request.
3 On each of our cultural orientation measures, a number of samples had mediocre individual-level reliabilities. This is a common problem for measures of cultural difference and has been argued to be a foreseeable downside of any measure with sufficient bandwidth among the items to provide validity in a variety of cultures (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995). Particularly relevant to the Portrait Value Questionnaire used here, Fontaine, Poortinga, Delbeke, and Schwartz (2008) found that samples from less developed nations deviate more from the theoretical structure of the value model than samples from more developed nations. As a consequence, lower individual-level reliabilities on our measure of open- ness (vs. conservation) would be expected in samples with lower scores on this same dimension. Of importance here is that even if individual-level reliabilities of our measures of cultural orientation are mediocre in some of the cultural samples, the cultural-level reliabilities are very good (openness [vs. conservation]: � � .84; contextualism beliefs: � � .94). Given that our main findings draw on effects situated on this higher level of analysis, poor reliabilities on the individual level do not challenge these findings.
4 Recent studies of the similarity— or isomorphism— of value structures at an individual and at a nation level have found that, although isomor- phism is not perfect, there is substantial similarity in structure between the two levels of analysis (Fischer, 2011; Fischer et al., 2010). The dimension of openness to change versus conservation values presents relatively higher levels of isomorphism, enabling the use of this dimension when comparing both national samples and individuals, especially if researchers are inter- ested in the broader underlying dimension rather than more specific value types (Fischer, 2011). Nevertheless, based on recommendations by S. H. Schwartz (personal communication, March 1, 2011), the presented analy- ses were also conducted using a shorter scale (omitting two items) for autonomy– embeddedness values (i.e., the culture-level value dimension). The same pattern of results was found using this shorter scale.
841CULTURE AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS MOTIVE
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
cluding, for example, “To understand a person well, it is essential to know about his/her family” and “One can understand a person well without knowing about the place he/she comes from” (re- versed). Participants rated their level of agreement with each statement on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 6 (completely agree). As for values, participants’ ratings were ipsatized to remove differences in response style (overall � � .75, Mdn � � .73; see Footnote 3). The degree of contextualism was used in our analyses as an indicator of collectivism–individualism.
Demographic information. Participants were asked to indi- cate their gender, date of birth, nationality, country of birth, and a number of other demographic characteristics. They were also asked to estimate their family’s wealth relative to other people living in their nation (“Compared to other people in [nation], how would you describe your family’s level of financial wealth?”) on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very poor) to 7 (very rich). To control for national differences in economic development, we included data on gross national income (GNI) per capita, retrieved from the World Bank (2010) report.
Statistical Analyses
Given the nested structure of the data, we used multilevel regression analysis (Hox, 2002) to test our hypotheses. All anal- yses were conducted with HLM 6 (Raudenbush, Bryk, & Cong- don, 2007) using full maximum likelihood estimation with a con- vergence criterion of .000001. Rather than individuals, the primary unit of analysis was identity aspects. Level 1 units were identity aspects (N � 45,406), with individuals as Level 2 units (N � 4,751), and cultures as Level 3 units (N � 21). At Level 1, regression equations were modeled for within-participant variables (perceived centrality, positive affect, general distinctiveness, dif- ference, separateness, and social position). Predictors on this level were centered around participant means, thus ensuring that the within-participant effects that we were interested in were not confounded with between-participant covariance (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998; Raudenbush, 1989). At Level 2, regression coeffi- cients were modeled for individual difference variables (gender, subjective wealth, individual value priorities, and individual con- textualism). Gender was included to control for differences in the gender composition of our samples, but we had no theoretical basis for predicting gender effects. At Level 3, regression coefficients were modeled for culture-level variables (group mean value pri- orities, group mean contextualism, and GNI per capita). Continu- ous variables at Levels 2 and 3 were centered around their grand means, and a dummy code was used for gender (female � –1, male � 1). We used grand-mean centering rather than group-mean centering at Level 2 to provide a more accurate test of Level 3 effects within our models, controlling for the potential confound- ing influence of aggregated individual-level relationships when testing culture-level relationships (Firebaugh, 1980; Hofmann & Gavin, 1998).
Our main hypotheses involved testing cross-level interactions in which variables at Levels 2 and 3 were allowed to moderate the strengths of relationships observed at Level 1. As discussed by McClelland and Judd (1993), it is notoriously difficult to detect moderation effects in correlational studies, and even substantively important interactions may account for seemingly trivial amounts of variance. Hence, in addition to estimating the proportion of
within-participants variance accounted for by our models (calcu- lated as the proportional reduction in the Level 1 error term compared to a null model; Hox, 2002), we have also estimated the magnitude of the Level 1 effects at differing values of our cultural moderators to help readers to evaluate the substantive importance of those interaction effects that relate to our hypotheses (for a similar approach, see Cooper, 2010).
Zero-order correlations for all variables are shown in Appendi- ces A, B, and C. The study included measures of two alternative indicators of cultural individualism– collectivism: openness (vs. conservation) values and contextualism beliefs. As expected, these two measures showed a moderately strong negative correlation at the cultural level (r � –.49, p � .024) and a weak negative correlation at the individual level (r � –.16, p � .001). This provided an opportunity to test the robustness of our findings using competing operational definitions of individualism– collectivism. Consequently, we tested our hypotheses separately with each mea- sure of cultural orientation, and results were compared.
Results
Strength of the Distinctiveness Motive According to Culture
To test the strength of the distinctiveness motive across cultures, we computed a series of models predicting the perceived centrality of identity aspects in subjective identity structures as a function of their distinctiveness. Subsequently, we computed a series of par- allel models predicting positive affect associated with identity aspects. Parameters of these models are shown in Table 2 (per- ceived centrality) and Table 3 (positive affect).
Effects of distinctiveness on perceived centrality. In our first model predicting perceived centrality, we included just the general distinctiveness rating as a predictor at Level 1 (Model 1). As expected, across the sample as a whole, distinctiveness was a significant positive predictor of perceived centrality (B � .33, p � .001), and this model accounted for an estimated 10.8% of within- participants variance in perceived centrality.
Next, we added cross-level interaction effects to test whether the strength of the distinctiveness motive was significantly moderated by either individual or cultural value priorities, providing our first test among the three competing hypotheses H1–H3. Thus, we entered individual scores of openness (vs. conservation) values, gender, and subjective wealth as Level 2 predictors of the Level 1 weight on distinctiveness, and cultural group means of openness (vs. conservation) values and GNI per capita as Level 3 predictors of the Level 1 weight on distinctiveness, to test for cross-level interactions (Model 2). Following standard procedure for testing interaction effects in multiple regression (Aiken & West, 1991), we included the underlying main effects in our models alongside the theoretically important interaction effects.
Compared with Model 1, this model was a significant improve- ment, �2(10) � 39.11, p � .001, but there was no increase in modeled variance at Level 1. Within this model, significant cross- level interactions would mean that the weight of general distinc- tiveness on perceived centrality varied according to individuals’ values, cultural mean values, gender, subjective wealth, or GNI per capita. A negative cross-level interaction effect was found for culture-level openness (vs. conservation) (B � –.02, p � .053).
842 BECKER ET AL.
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
This signifies that the degree to which an identity aspect provided a sense of distinctiveness had a marginally stronger effect on the perceived centrality of that identity aspect in cultures where open- ness values were relatively weaker and conservation values were relatively stronger. In other words, the motive for distinctiveness was marginally stronger in more collectivistic cultures.5 No sig- nificant moderations of the individual-level variables or GNI per capita were found.
To illuminate further the nature of the interaction between culture-level openness (vs. conservation) and distinctiveness, we used a simple slopes technique. The main effect of distinctiveness on centrality was estimated at lower bound (�.10) and higher bound (1.60) values of the moderator. Figure 3A illustrates that the effect of distinctiveness was only very slightly stronger in cultures with the lowest openness (vs. conservation) values (B � .35, p � .001) compared to cultures with the highest scores on this dimen- sion (B � .31, p � .001). Thus, the data were very clearly inconsistent with H1, but they could be interpreted as supporting either H2 (given the marginal interaction) or H3 (given that there was only a very small difference in magnitude of the simple slopes across the range of cultural variation in our sample).
We then ran a parallel model replacing openness (vs. conserva- tion) values with contextualism on both the individual and culture levels (Model 3). This model provided a significant improvement over Model 1, �2(10) � 35.39, p � .001, but again there was no increase in modeled variance. No significant moderation effects by contextualism were found, although the estimated coefficient of the cross-level interaction between culture-level contextualism and
distinctiveness was again in the direction predicted by H2 (B � .03, p � .113). As in the previous model, no significant modera- tions of the individual-level variables or GNI per capita were found.6
We used simple slopes to explore further the relation between culture-level contextualism and distinctiveness. The main effect of distinctiveness on centrality was estimated at relatively low (�.95) and high (.60) values of the moderator. This relation is plotted in Figure 3B. Consistent with H3, the effect of distinctiveness was broadly similar in cultures with the highest contextualism beliefs (B � .36, p � .001) compared to those with the lowest contextu- alism scores (B � .32, p � .001).
Effects of distinctiveness on positive affect. The same three predictive models were run with positive affect replacing per-
5 A similar size negative estimate for the moderation effect of culture- level openness (vs. conservation) values was found when controls were included for the second value dimension from Schwartz’s (1992, 2004) model of human values, self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) values, and when not controlling for GNI per capita, subjective wealth, and gender.
6 The estimate of culture-level contextualism beliefs as a moderator of the slope of distinctiveness on perceived centrality was similar (B � .02, p � .200) when not controlling for GNI per capita, subjective wealth, and gender. An additional model including both openness (vs. conservation) values and contextualism beliefs as moderators resulted in similar esti- mates, moderation by culture-level openness (vs. conservation) (B � –.02, p � .141), and moderation by culture-level contextualism (B � .01, p � .561).
Table 2 Estimated Parameters of Multilevel Regression Predicting Perceived Centrality
Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B SE p B SE p B SE p
Within-participants main effect (Level 1: N � 45,406 identity aspects) General distinctiveness .33 .00 �.001 .33 .00 �.001 .33 .00 �.001
Individual-level main effects (Level 2: N � 4,751 individuals) Openness (vs. Conservation) .02 .01 .209 Contextualism .02 .02 .267 Gendera �.07 .02 �.001 �.07 .02 �.001 Subjective wealth .04 .02 .024 .04 .02 .024
Culture-level main effects (Level 3: N � 21 cultural groups) Openness (vs. Conservation) �.22 .15 .151 Contextualism .08 .22 .705 GNI per capita �.14 .05 .019 �.16 .05 .009
Individual-level moderators of within-participants slope Openness (vs. Conservation) � General Distinctiveness .00 .00 .841 Contextualism � General Distinctiveness .00 .01 .387 Gender � General Distinctiveness .00 .00 .795 .00 .00 .884 Subjective Wealth � General Distinctiveness .01 .00 .194 .01 .00 .169
Culture-level moderators of within-participants slope Openness (vs. Conservation) � General Distinctiveness �.02 .01 .053 Contextualism � General Distinctiveness .03 .02 .113 GNI per capita � General Distinctiveness .00 .00 .271 .00 .00 .440
Residual variance Within-participant level (�2) 4.38 4.38 4.38 Individual level ( ) .89 �.001 .89 �.001 .89 �.001 Culture level ( �) .12 �.001 .07 �.001 .08 �.001
Deviance 201,096 201,057 201,060
Note. GNI per capita � gross national income per capita in units of 10,000 U.S. dollars. a Dummy coded as �1 � female, 1 � male.
843CULTURE AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS MOTIVE
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
ceived centrality as the outcome variable. The first model included just the general distinctiveness rating as a predictor at Level 1 (Model 4). Across the sample as a whole, distinctiveness was a significant positive predictor of positive affect (B � .31, p � .001), and this model accounted for an estimated 6.9% of within- participants variance in positive affect.
Next, we added cross-level interaction effects to test whether the strength of the distinctiveness motive was significantly moderated by either individual or cultural value priorities (Model 5). Again, all main effects were also included. Compared with Model 4, this model was a significant improvement, �2(10) � 153.44, p � .001, and the amount of modeled Level 1 variance increased very slightly to 7.0%. Consistent with H2, a negative cross-level inter- action effect was found for culture-level openness (vs. conserva- tion) (B � –.10, p � .001). This signifies that the degree to which an identity aspect provided a sense of distinctiveness was more closely associated with feelings of positive affect in cultures with weaker openness values and stronger conservation values. In other words, the motive for distinctiveness was significantly stronger in more collectivistic cultures.7 In addition, there was a negative interaction effect of GNI per capita (B � –.02, p � .001), indi- cating that the effect of general distinctiveness on positive affect is stronger in poorer nations. Simple slopes were used to probe the interaction between culture-level openness (vs. conservation) val- ues and distinctiveness. This interaction is plotted in Figure 3A. Supporting H2, the effect of distinctiveness was more than 70% stronger in cultures with the lowest scores for openness (vs. conservation) values (B � .40, p � .001) compared to those with the highest scores on this dimension (B � .23, p � .001).
Within Model 5, all three individual-level moderators were also significant, although effects were very small in magnitude: gender (B � –.01, p � .022), subjective wealth (B � .02, p � .003), and individual-level openness (vs. conservation) (B � .01, p � .019). These interactions indicate that distinctiveness had a slightly stron- ger effect on positive affect among women, among participants from richer families within their respective nations, and among individuals with stronger openness (vs. conservation) values. Given its relevance to our hypotheses, we used the simple slopes technique to estimate the main effect of distinctiveness on affect at the maximum (3.30) and minimum (�1.70) observed values of individual-level openness (vs. conservation). The effect of distinc- tiveness was somewhat stronger at the maximum score for open- ness (vs. conservation) values (B � .35, p � .001) compared to the minimum score (B � .25, p � .001). This provides modest support for H1 at the individual level, in contrast with the culture-level moderation that supported H2.
We then ran a parallel model replacing openness (vs. conserva- tion) values with contextualism on both the individual and culture levels (Model 6). This model provided a significant improvement over Model 4, �2(10) � 106.40, p � .001, and the amount of modeled variance increased very slightly to 7.0%. Supporting H2,
7 Similar estimates for the moderation effect of culture-level openness (vs. conservation) values were found when controls were included for the second value dimension from Schwartz’s (1992, 2004) model of human values, self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) values, and when not controlling for GNI per capita, subjective wealth, and gender.
Table 3 Estimated Parameters of Multilevel Regression Predicting Positive Affect
Variable
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B SE p B SE p B SE p
Within-participants main effect (Level 1: N � 45,406 identity aspects) General distinctiveness .31 .01 �.001 .31 .01 �.001 .31 .01 �.001
Individual-level main effects (Level 2: N � 4,751 individuals) Openness (vs. Conservation) .05 .02 .007 Contextualism .03 .02 .162 Gendera .08 .02 �.001 .07 .02 �.001 Subjective wealth .08 .02 �.001 .08 .02 �.001
Culture-level main effects (Level 3: N � 21 cultural groups) Openness (vs. Conservation) �.23 .12 .079 Contextualism .10 .18 .592 GNI per capita �.14 .04 .006 �.15 .04 .003
Individual-level moderators of within-participants slope Openness (vs. Conservation) � General Distinctiveness .01 .00 .019 Contextualism � General Distinctiveness .00 .01 .950 Gender � General Distinctiveness �.01 .01 .022 �.01 .01 .026 Subjective Wealth � General Distinctiveness .02 .01 .003 .02 .01 .001
Culture-level moderators of within-participants slope Openness (vs. Conservation) � General Distinctiveness �.10 .01 �.001 Contextualism � General Distinctiveness .06 .02 .005 GNI per capita � General Distinctiveness �.02 .00 �.001 �.03 .00 �.001
Residual variance Within-participant level (�2) 6.22 6.21 6.21 Individual level ( ) 1.20 �.001 1.18 �.001 1.18 �.001 Culture level ( �) .09 �.001 .04 �.001 .04 �.001
Deviance 216,838 216,685 216,732
Note. GNI per capita � gross national income per capita in units of 10,000 U.S. dollars. a Dummy coded as �1 � female, 1 � male.
844 BECKER ET AL.
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
a positive cross-level interaction effect was found for culture-level contextualism (B � .06, p � .005), indicating again that the motive for distinctiveness was stronger in more collectivistic cultures. Moderations by GNI per capita, gender, and subjective wealth were consistent as found in Model 5. However, no individual-level moderation by contextualism beliefs was found. Simple slopes were used to probe the interaction between culture-level contex- tualism and distinctiveness. This interaction is plotted in Figure 3B. Supporting H2, the effect of distinctiveness was over 30% stronger in cultures with the strongest contextualism beliefs (B � .37, p � .001) compared to those with the weakest contextualism beliefs (B � .28, p � .001).8
Sources of Distinctiveness Satisfaction According to Culture
To test for cultural differences in the construction of distinc- tiveness, we next computed multilevel regression models predict- ing general distinctiveness ratings using the three different sources of distinctiveness: difference, separateness, and social position. Parameters of these models are shown in Table 4. Model 7 in- cluded just these three ratings as Level 1 predictors of the general distinctiveness ratings. As hypothesized, all three sources of dis- tinctiveness were significant predictors of the general distinctive- ness ratings (Bs from .07 to .39), indicating that, overall, differ- ence, separateness, and social position can serve as sources of a general feeling of distinctiveness, and this model accounted for an estimated 23.2% of within-participants variance in distinctiveness.
Next, we tested cross-level interaction effects to see whether the weight of general distinctiveness on each of the three sources was significantly moderated by either individual or cultural values, providing our first test of hypotheses H4 –H6. Thus, we entered individual scores of openness (vs. conservation) values, gender, and subjective wealth as Level 2 predictors of the Level 1 weights, and cultural means of openness (vs. conservation) values and GNI per capita as Level 3 predictors of Level 1 weights on the three sources of distinctiveness, again controlling for all underlying main effects (Model 8). Compared to Model 7, this model pro- vided a significant improvement in fit, �2(20) � 301.23, p � .001,
and accounted for an estimated 23.8% of the within-participants variance in distinctiveness ratings. Crucially, we found a pattern of significant cross-level interaction effects consistent with our pre- dictions: Supporting H4 and H5, difference (B � .05, p � .001) and separateness (B � .04, p � .001) were more important in cultures with higher openness (vs. conservation) values; support- ing H6, social position was more important in cultures with lower openness (vs. conservation) values (B � –.06, p � .001). Individual-level moderations were also found, although these were much smaller in magnitude; the effect of difference was slightly stronger among participants with stronger openness (vs. conserva- tion) values (B � .02, p � .001), whereas the effect of separateness was slightly stronger among participants with weaker openness (vs. conservation) values (B � –.02, p � .001). Gender (B � –.02, p � .002), subjective wealth (B � .02, p � .001), and GNI per capita (B � .03, p � .001) also moderated the weight of general distinctiveness on difference, suggesting that difference was more important among women, among participants from richer families, and among respondents from richer nations.9
Simple slopes were used to probe the interaction between culture-level openness (vs. conservation) values and sources of distinctiveness. The main effects of these sources were estimated at relatively low (�.10) and high (1.60) values of the moderator. These interactions are plotted in Figure 4A, which illustrates how the effects of difference and separateness were clearly stronger in
8 The estimate of culture-level contextualism beliefs as a moderator of the slope of distinctiveness on positive affect was similar (B � .08, p � .001) when not controlling for GNI per capita, subjective wealth, and gender. An additional model including both openness (vs. conservation) values and contextualism beliefs as moderators resulted in a similar esti- mate for the moderation by culture-level openness (vs. conservation) (B � –.10, p � .001). However, the moderation by culture-level contextualism was no longer significant (B � –.01, p � .638).
9 The same pattern of results was found when controls were included for the second value dimension from Schwartz’s (1992, 2004) model of human values, self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) values, and when not controlling for GNI per capita, subjective wealth, and gender.
Figure 3. Sense of distinctiveness as a predictor of perceived identity centrality and positive identity affect, depending on values (Panel A) and beliefs (Panel B) in participants’ cultural environment. Vertical dotted lines represent observed minimum and maximum values for openness (vs. conservation) values and contextualism beliefs, respectively.
845CULTURE AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS MOTIVE
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
cultures with higher openness (vs. conservation) values (B � .42, p � .001, and B � .11, p � .001, respectively) compared to cultures with lower values on this dimension (B � .34, p � .001, and B � .04, p � .001, respectively). The effect of social position, on the other hand, showed the opposite pattern; it was considerably weaker in cultures with higher openness (vs. conservation) values (B � .08, p � .001) than in cultures with weaker scores on this dimension (B � .19, p � .001).
We subsequently ran a parallel model replacing openness (vs. conservation) values with contextualism on both the individual and culture levels (Model 9). This model provided a significant im- provement over Model 7, �2(20) � 220.51, p � .001, and ex- plained an estimated 23.6% of within-participant variance of the measure of general distinctiveness. Crucially, we found a pattern of cross-level interactions similar to those in the preceding anal-
ysis, although not identical. In particular, difference was more important in cultures with lower contextualism beliefs (B � –.08, p � .001) supporting H4, whereas social position was found to be more important in cultures high on contextualism beliefs (B � .05, p � .005) supporting H6. As in the preceding analysis, the slope of difference was also significantly moderated by gender (B � –.02, p � .001), subjective wealth (B � .02, p � .001), and GNI per capita (B � .03, p � .001), suggesting that distinctiveness was more strongly based on difference among women, among partic- ipants from richer families, and in richer nations. Unlike the previous analysis, the slope for separateness was not significantly moderated by contextualism beliefs; thus, H5 was supported when individualism– collectivism was operationalized in terms of values but not in terms of beliefs. However, we did find a moderation effect of GNI per capita (B � .01, p � .039), suggesting that
Table 4 Estimated Parameters of Multilevel Regression Predicting General Distinctiveness Ratings
Variable
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
B SE p B SE p B SE p
Within-participants main effects (Level 1: N � 45,406 identity aspects) Difference .39 .01 �.001 .38 .01 �.001 .38 .01 �.001 Separateness .07 .00 �.001 .07 .00 �.001 .08 .00 �.001 Social position .14 .00 �.001 .14 .00 �.001 .14 .00 �.001
Individual-level main effects (Level 2: N � 4,751 individuals) Openness (vs. Conservation) .04 .02 .038 Contextualism .03 .02 .204 Gendera �.03 .02 .134 �.04 .02 .098 Subjective wealth .03 .02 .232 .03 .02 .211
Culture-level main effects (Level 3: N � 21 cultural groups) Openness (vs. Conservation) �.51 .22 .036 Contextualism .46 .33 .177 GNI per capita �.19 .08 .029 �.22 .08 .015
Individual-level moderators of within-participants slopes Openness (vs. Conservation) � Difference .02 .00 �.001 Openness (vs. Conservation) � Separateness �.02 .00 �.001 Openness (vs. Conservation) � Social Position .00 .00 .411 Contextualism � Difference .00 .01 .863 Contextualism � Separateness .00 .00 .772 Contextualism � Social Position �.01 .00 .181 Gender � Difference �.02 .01 .002 �.02 .01 .001 Gender � Separateness .00 .00 .264 .01 .00 .192 Gender � Social Position .00 .00 .862 .00 .00 .813 Subjective Wealth � Difference .02 .01 .001 .02 .01 �.001 Subjective Wealth � Separateness .00 .00 .746 .00 .00 .891 Subjective Wealth � Social Position .00 .00 .653 .00 .00 .718
Culture-level moderators of within-participants slopes Openness (vs. Conservation) � Difference .05 .01 �.001 Openness (vs. Conservation) � Separateness .04 .01 �.001 Openness (vs. Conservation) � Social Position �.06 .01 �.001 Contextualism � Difference �.08 .02 �.001 Contextualism � Separateness �.01 .01 .618 Contextualism � Social Position .05 .02 .005 GNI per capita � Difference .03 .00 �.001 .03 .00 �.001 GNI per capita � Separateness .01 .00 .123 .01 .00 .039 GNI per capita � Social Position .00 .00 .449 .00 .00 .804
Residual variance Within-participant level (�2) 3.68 3.65 3.66 Individual level ( ) 1.87 �.001 1.87 �.001 1.87 �.001 Culture level ( �) .30 �.001 .17 �.001 .18 �.001
Deviance 196,390 196,089 196,169
Note. GNI per capita � gross national income per capita in units of 10,000 U.S. dollars. a Dummy coded as �1 � female, 1 � male.
846 BECKER ET AL.
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
distinctiveness was more strongly based on separateness among participants from richer nations.10
Main effects of the three sources of distinctiveness were esti- mated at relatively low (�.95) and high (.60) values of culture- level contextualism beliefs. These interactions are plotted in Figure 4B and show that the effect of social position was clearly stronger in cultures with higher contextualism beliefs (B � .18, p � .001) compared to cultures with weaker contextualism beliefs (B � .11, p � .001). The effect of difference, on the other hand, was considerably weaker in cultures with higher contextualism beliefs (B � .30, p � .001) compared to cultures with lower contextualism beliefs (B � .43, p � .001).
Discussion
Strength of the Distinctiveness Motive Across Cultures
Participants from 21 cultural groups across four continents generally gave priority in their subjective identity structures to those aspects of their identities that provided them with greater feelings of distinctiveness: In particular, they perceived these identity aspects as more important for their self-definitions and associated them with more positive affect compared to those identity aspects that they perceived as distinguishing them less from others. Consistent with the view that establishing distinctive- ness is a precondition for the construction of a coherent sense of identity in any cultural context (Vignoles, 2009; Vignoles et al., 2000), our results suggest that individuals strive for a distinctive identity, whichever cultural meaning system they are surrounded by. Effects of distinctiveness on perceived centrality of identity aspects and on identity-related affect were estimated to be signif- icant at p � .001 across the full range of variation in cultural beliefs and values sampled in our study. Hence, even if people are not necessarily aware of it, it seems that distinctiveness-seeking processes generalize robustly to cultural contexts well beyond the Western European and North American contexts where the major- ity of previous studies into distinctiveness-seeking have been conducted (reviewed by Lynn & Snyder, 2002; Vignoles, 2009).
Unlike most previous studies into culture and distinctiveness seeking, our approach to measuring the distinctiveness motive here did not rely on explicit measures of self-reported NFU. Instead, we used a more subtle approach to measuring this motive, tapping into the influence of distinctiveness-seeking on identity construction and the affective importance of distinctiveness within identity. Vignoles (2009, 2011) has argued that explicit measures are more likely to reflect the extent to which individuals value particular identity states such as distinctiveness (or uniqueness) rather than the strength of their underlying motives. Thus, Eriksson et al. (2011) showed differences between samples of British and Swed- ish participants on an explicit scale of NFU—which were partially accounted for by differences in value priorities— but participants in both samples tended to prioritize to a similar extent those aspects of their identities that provided a greater sense of distinc- tiveness. Our results add to this, showing that the underlying motive to attain a distinctive identity is relevant across a much larger range of cultural contexts.11
Nevertheless, we did find some evidence that the strength of the distinctiveness motive varied meaningfully with cultural orienta- tion. At the individual level of analysis, there was a slight tendency
10 The same pattern of effects of contextualism was found when not controlling for GNI per capita, subjective wealth, and gender. An addi- tional model including both openness (vs. conservation) values and con- textualism beliefs as moderators resulted in similar moderations of the slope for difference (culture-level openness [vs. conservation], B � .03, p � .020; culture-level contextualism, B � –.05, p � .026) and separate- ness (culture-level openness [vs. conservation], B � .04, p � .001; culture- level contextualism, B � .01, p � .574). However, only the moderation by values remained significant for the slope of social position (culture-level openness [vs. conservation], B � –.06, p � .001; culture-level contextu- alism, B � .00, p � .912).
11 Indeed, consistent with the findings of Eriksson et al. (2011), we note that the same conclusions would not have been drawn had we tested the present hypotheses with a direct measure. As part of a later stage of our study, a subset of respondents (N � 3,272, from 18 of the 21 cultural groups) also completed the Self-Attributed Need for Uniqueness scale
Figure 4. Difference, social position, and separateness as predictors of a general sense of distinctiveness, depending on values (Panel A) and beliefs (Panel B) in participants’ cultural environment. Vertical dotted lines represent observed minimum and maximum values for openness (vs. conservation) values and contextualism beliefs, respectively.
847CULTURE AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS MOTIVE
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
for those individuals with relatively stronger openness (vs. con- servation) values within their respective cultural groups to show a stronger relationship between distinctiveness and positive affect. This provides qualified support for Triandis’s (1995) proposal (H1; see also Kim & Markus, 1999), in that the affective impor- tance of distinctiveness appeared to be stronger among individu- als— but not among cultures—with more individualistic values.12
However, this effect was not especially large, and we found no corresponding effect on the importance of distinctiveness in iden- tity construction or when cultural orientation was measured in terms of beliefs rather than values.
More crucially, we found no such effect at the cultural level of analysis. At this level, contrary to H1, the distinctiveness motive appeared to be stronger among members of collectivistic rather than individualistic cultures (H2; after Brewer & Roccas, 2001). Although the effect sizes were still relatively small, the trend was in the same direction across all four tests that we conducted— predicting both perceived centrality and identity-related affect, and with both operational definitions of individualism– collectivism— and it reached at least marginal significance in three out of four tests. This clearly contradicts the prevailing relativist view on how culture influences identity motives—the idea that identity motives are internalized manifestations of cultural beliefs and values (Breakwell, 1987; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Triandis, 1995). Instead, these results arguably add support to an “oppositional view,” proposing that individuals develop stronger motives for those needs that their cultural environment fails to satisfy (Brewer & Roccas, 2001; Lo et al., 2011). Our evidence suggests that members of more collectivistic cultures—where there is a greater focus on conformity—may have a slightly stron- ger motive for distinctiveness than do members of more individ- ualistic cultures (although in the next section we consider an alternative possible explanation of these findings).
Notably, the stronger association of distinctiveness with positive affect in more collectivistic cultures argues against an alternative explanation of our findings—that perhaps distinctive aspects of identity would have become especially salient to members of collectivistic cultures precisely because of their inconsistency with cultural values, leading to feelings of social discomfort and shame, and perhaps rumination about these undesired parts of identity.13
Had this been the case, participants in more collectivistic nations might still have perceived the more distinctive aspects of their identities as especially central—as we found here— but they surely would have associated them with less rather than more positive affect. Instead, we found that the moderating effect of culture was actually much stronger for predictions of positive affect than it was for predictions of perceived centrality: In fact, when culture was operationalized in terms of values, participants from the most collectivistic cultures in our sample showed a positive relationship between distinctiveness and positive affect that was almost twice as strong as that shown in the most individualistic cultures.
It also does not appear likely to us that the importance of distinctiveness in our collectivistic samples can be reduced to a question of demand characteristics. We took great care to avoid demand characteristics when designing the study. To avoid prim- ing a Western, individualistic conception of self-hood, we devel- oped a culturally decentered alternative to the TST to generate identity content for the current study, making the nature of the task more concrete and contextualized, and emphasizing that relational
and collective as well as personal identity aspects were valid answers. To avoid priming the importance of distinctiveness when participants made their ratings of identity centrality and affect, we placed these ratings before the distinctiveness ratings in the ques- tionnaire, and we interspersed the four distinctiveness ratings among 19 other ratings, so that even if participants looked ahead in the questionnaire, our interest in distinctiveness would not have been easily detected. Even if one imagines that these attempts were not 100% successful, it remains unclear how stable demand char- acteristics in our study design could have affected our cultural samples differentially to produce the pattern of results we found here.
Sources of Distinctiveness Across Cultures
Beyond questions about the strength of the distinctiveness mo- tive across cultures, an important goal of our study was to test whether ways of satisfying this motive would vary across cultures. Based on Vignoles et al.’s (2000) predictions, we expected differ- ence, social position, and separateness to be three alternative ways of constructing a sense of distinctiveness and that people would tend to achieve satisfaction of the distinctiveness motive in ways that best fitted their cultural meaning systems. More precisely, Vignoles et al. (2000; Vignoles, 2009) proposed that difference and separateness would be more available, accessible, and valued in individualistic cultures, whereas social position would be more so in collectivistic cultures.
Our results support Vignoles et al.’s (2000) theoretical model of difference, social position, and separateness as alternative ways of constructing a general feeling of distinctiveness, with all three sources emerging as significant predictors of the extent to which participants viewed aspects of their identities as distinguishing them from others. On average across our cultural samples, differ- ence was found to be the strongest source of distinctiveness. This
(SANU; Lynn & Snyder, 2002), an explicit, self-report measure of the “need” for distinctiveness. We used scores from the SANU as a dependent variable in an additional set of analyses. Results showed that individuals with stronger openness (vs. conservation) values reported that they had a stronger NFU (B � .09, p � .001), whereas there was no effect of culture-level values. No individual- or culture-level moderation effects were found of contextualism beliefs on SANU scores. Thus, in contrast with our more subtle and indirect approach to measuring identity motives, differences in individuals’ self-reports of their need for distinctiveness appear to depend on how much an individual values distinctiveness, but they are seemingly not influenced directly by group-level values or beliefs. This additional set of analyses show how results largely differ depending on the explicit versus more indirect character of the scale used to measure distinctiveness. For reasons outlined earlier in this article (based on Vignoles, 2009, 2011), we believe that an indirect measure is a more valid indicator of underlying identity motives.
12 An additional analysis revealed that this individual-level moderation effect was only found when controlling for the opposing culture-level moderation. Hence, it should be interpreted as an effect of individuals’ relative positions on the value scale within their respective cultural groups, not their absolute positions, as H1 would predict. In contrast, the corre- sponding culture-level moderation effect was found irrespective of whether or not we controlled for the individual-level moderation.
13 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer of a previous version of this article for suggesting this possibility.
848 BECKER ET AL.
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
is in line with the focus in the psychological literature on differ- ence as a source of distinctiveness (e.g., Lynn & Snyder, 2002), although it may also reflect the relatively young age of our sam- ple—which is also true of the samples of college students that have participated in many previous studies of distinctiveness-seeking. More crucially, in support of Vignoles et al.’s predictions, cultural orientation moderated how distinctiveness was achieved: Whereas people in more individualistic cultures tended to construct distinc- tiveness more in terms of difference (H4), people in more collec- tivistic cultures tended to construct distinctiveness more in terms of social position (H6). These findings were observed with both values-based and beliefs-based measures of cultural orientation.
The findings regarding separateness as a source of distinctive- ness were somewhat more complex, although they were also broadly in line with the predicted pattern. Overall, separateness was a much weaker source of distinctiveness than difference and social position. One possible speculation is that separateness may become more important at later stages in life and that the young age of the present sample explains the relatively small contribution of separateness as a source of distinctiveness. Only partially sup- porting H5, we found that the importance of separateness as a way of achieving a sense of distinctiveness was higher in cultures with more individualistic values and among participants from richer nations, whereas it did not vary with contextualism beliefs. The latter result does not support Vignoles et al.’s (2000) hypothesis that beliefs about personhood would predict the extent to which separateness is used as a way to achieve a sense of distinctiveness. Rather, it appears that it is in richer nations, and where indepen- dence is not just believed in but valued, that people start to use separateness as a basis for identity construction. These results also support arguments against a monolithic view of individualism– collectivism; they show that it is important to measure diverse facets of individualism– collectivism rather than assuming that each facet will show the same pattern of effects (see Owe et al., in press).
Notably, the fact that distinctiveness is constructed differently in different cultural contexts may provide an alternative explanation of our finding that distinctiveness had a more positive affective significance in collectivistic cultures. If different cultures provide different ways of satisfying this motive, then there is no reason to assume—as Brewer and Roccas (2001) do—that some cultures will be more likely to frustrate the distinctiveness motive. From our perspective, some forms of distinctiveness (i.e., difference, separateness) may be less available in collectivistic cultures, but other forms of distinctiveness (i.e., social position) will be more so. Thus, there is no particular reason to expect that the distinc- tiveness motive will be chronically more aroused in collectivistic cultures.
Rather than trying to explain why distinctiveness was a stronger predictor of positive affect in collectivistic cultures, we suggest that it may be more productive to ask why distinctiveness was a weaker predictor of positive affect in individualistic cultures. One important difference among the three sources of distinctiveness in our model is that they are likely to be differentially satisfying to other identity motives—particularly the motive for belonging, as one would expect this to be frustrated by identity aspects that separate one from others, but satisfied by identity aspects that give one a clear social position (Becker et al., 2011; Vignoles et al., 2000). We believe that participants in individualistic cultures may
have been more affectively ambivalent about distinctiveness be- cause they were basing their distinctiveness to a greater extent on characteristics that would probably have undermined satisfaction of the motive for belonging—and feelings of belonging are an important source of positive affect.
Distinctiveness and Levels of Universality
So, is the motive for distinctiveness a psychological universal? Norenzayan and Heine (2005) have presented a framework of different levels of universality ranging from non-universals, which are pure cultural inventions, to “accessibility universals,” for which there is strictly no cultural variability. In between these two extremes, we suggest that the motive for distinctiveness can be described as a “functional universal”; it is used in the same way across cultures—it serves as a guide to identity construction pro- cesses— even if the size of this effect may be subject to cultural variation—slightly stronger, if anything, in more collectivistic cultures. This indeed speaks in favor of a universalist view on distinctiveness and, by extension, on identity motives in general (see also Brewer, 1991; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003; Vignoles, 2011).
Nonetheless, over and above this universal quality of the under- lying motive for distinctiveness, we have observed systematic cultural variation in the ways in which the motive is satisfied. This illustrates the importance of concentrating on the right level of abstraction to discover universal psychological principles (Ken- rick, Nieuweboer, & Buunk, 2010; Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). More precisely, it supports Vignoles’s (2009, 2011) portrayal of identity motives—including the distinctiveness motive—as “cul- turally flexible universals.” He argues that people in all cultures are guided by a common set of underlying identity motives (thus, they are universal) but that cultural groups will develop different, culturally attuned ways of satisfying the motives (thus, they are flexible). In this way, the same underlying motive can have very different consequences in different cultural environments, leading to important cross-cultural variation in the outcomes of identity processes. A similar view has been introduced by Kenrick et al. (2010) with their metaphor of the human mind as a coloring book—the outlines of the book being there from the start but cultural norms defining the particular colors drawn inside these outlines. The rationale of culturally flexible universals could be extended to other identity motives as well; some research on self-esteem (e.g., Sedikides et al., 2003) and continuity (e.g., Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, & Hallett, 2003) is already taking a similar route.
Considering Culture on Multiple Levels of Analysis
To take culture into account when studying psychological pro- cesses is not a straightforward task. To date, much cross-cultural research consists in describing psychological differences between samples of two or more different nationalities—which, although not representative samples, are typically assumed to reflect some posited national profile in terms of culture—and speculating on possible explanations of this variation (Bond, 2009). We used a more theoretically driven approach to studying psychological pro- cesses across cultures.
849CULTURE AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS MOTIVE
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
We measured cultural orientations in a larger number of nations and used both individual scores and group-level means of contin- uous measures of culture as moderators in our analyses. This has two obvious advantages over the common approach of two-nation comparisons. First, by measuring cultural orientation, we avoid treating samples as reflecting national cultural profiles and, in- stead, acknowledge their non-representative and more specific character. Second, our multilevel approach to culture makes it possible to test whether it is the “climate” of values and beliefs that prevails in a given context or the individual cultural member’s personal internalization of those values and beliefs that makes the difference. Many studies do measure cultural orientations, but they are confined by sampling limitations to examining individual-level mediation, thus presupposing that culture has its effects through a process of individual internalization. A multilevel methodology involving many cultural groups is necessary to distinguish effects of cultural orientation on individual and contextual levels of anal- ysis. Thus, our study enables an actual test of explanations of cultural variation in terms of dimensions of psychological culture.
Although our data analytic strategy equally allowed finding individual-level and cultural-level effects, stronger moderation effects were observed at the cultural level of analysis, with the individual-level effects in most cases being vanishingly small. In other words, while controlling for any potential effects of individ- ual differences in values or beliefs, it was found that the mean values and beliefs of each specific cultural sample had an effect on how distinctiveness was constructed by the individuals within that cultural group. Even in the case of values, for which it would be expected that individuals’ priorities largely reflect and internalize the prevalent cultural values of the environment they are raised in (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), results show that it is mainly a cultural level of analysis that carries explanatory power over these pro- cesses. Thus, the differences we found in ways of constructing a sense of distinctiveness cannot be attributed to individuals’ inter- nalization of cultural beliefs and values—instead, they appeared to be effects of living in a particular cultural context where certain things are believed and valued.14
This raises interesting questions about the processes that may be underlying these contextual effects on the construction of individ- ual identities. One possibility, suggested by the recently emerging intersubjective culture perspective (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010), is that others’ beliefs and values may have influenced identity construction through individuals’ percep- tions of what is normatively believed and valued in their cultural contexts. According to Chiu et al. (2010), perceived cultural norms have an important psychological impact over and above individ- uals’ personal beliefs and values for a variety of reasons: because consensual ideas are interpreted as correct and natural, because social identification with a given cultural group will lead individ- uals to embrace the group’s norms, and as a result of social accountability to others. Although these predictions have been well-supported across a growing number of studies, we are not convinced that intersubjective perceptions will prove to be the mechanism explaining our current findings. Crucially, numerous studies reviewed by Chiu et al. have shown that the intersubjective perceptions of others’ beliefs and values that form the main focus of the intersubjective culture approach frequently do not corre- spond with actual variation in others’ beliefs and values—which provided the moderation effects in our study.
Moreover, researchers so far have usually measured these inter- subjective perceptions at an individual level of analysis—in other words, individuals may differ in their perceptions of the same cultural environment, and it is through individual-level psycholog- ical mechanisms leading to individual-level responses that these perceptions are expected to account for differences both within and across groups. In contrast, the effects that we found were located at the cultural level of analysis, explaining differences in identity construction across cultural groups but not within groups. This suggests that our results might be explained better by an approach that focuses on the emergent properties of cultures as social systems rather than one that focuses on cultures as targets of individual perceptions.
One such systemic approach is the niche construction approach to culture described by Yamagishi (2010). This perspective (for- merly known as the institutional approach to culture) suggests that we might understand the different constructions of distinctiveness observed here as aspects of social institutions or niches—self- sustaining systems of shared beliefs, incentives, and social prac- tices. In social systems where people’s values are focused on obligations toward others and where a contextualized concept of the person prevails, an individual’s everyday life and the incen- tives surrounding his or her actions will be strongly organized around aspects of their social position—whatever their personal beliefs and values—and hence, in such contexts, it may be rela- tively adaptive to place a greater emphasis on such aspects when thinking about who one is in relation to others. In contrast, in social systems where people’s values are focused on self- direction and autonomy and where a decontextualized concept of the person prevails, an individual’s daily experiences and incen- tives will be focused to a greater extent on his or her personal characteristics and preferences, and so in these contexts, it may be adaptive to focus to a greater extent on differences in personal characteristics when thinking about one’s identity.
14 We should acknowledge that our capacity to detect individual-level effects may have been weakened somewhat by the mediocre individual- level reliabilities of our measures in some samples (see Footnote 3). This would likely have reduced the size of the effects that we were able to observe at the individual level, resulting in some loss of statistical power on this level of analysis, and reducing somewhat our ability to control for the potential confounding influence of aggregated individual-level moder- ation effects when testing the culture-level moderation effects. Yet, most of the individual-level moderation effects were so small that they failed to reach significance even with a sample size of 4,751 individuals—indeed, many of the these effects were estimated at exactly .00. Although lower reliabilities might weaken these effects, they would not be expected to eliminate them entirely given that we had a sufficient sample size to detect even very small effects. We should also emphasize that not only were the effect sizes different at the two levels of analysis but the actual pattern of findings was different. Thus, even if the true individual-level moderation effects were substantially stronger than those reported here, aggregating these effects to the cultural level still could not account for the pattern of culture-level effects observed here. Hence, we are confident that our results truly represent effects of living within a particular cultural context— independent of one’s personal, internalized values and beliefs—and that they are not simply artifacts of the differential reliability of our measures across the levels of analysis.
850 BECKER ET AL.
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
Limitations and Future Directions
We should note several limitations of the current study. First, our findings are based on cross-sectional data, and so we cannot be certain about the causal direction of our findings. Although Vi- gnoles et al. (2006) have previously provided longitudinal evi- dence for the causal role of the distinctiveness motive in identity construction, the focus of the current study was on the magnitude of the observed relationships, not their causal direction.
Second, our participants were mostly high school students, and thus the results may not generalize to older and/or less advantaged groups. Although high school students are likely to be more diverse in terms of socioeconomic status and ethnic diversity than university students, they are still a selective group, especially in some nations. Moreover, in the sample from the Philippines, which was the second poorest nation in the study, participants were in fact university students. Thus, in this nation in particular, it is likely that our participants were from more advantaged social groups. In terms of age, one might expect that emphases in identity construction would change according to life stage (e.g., Erikson, 1980), and thus we should be cautious about generalizing the present results to other age groups. In an ongoing study, we are currently collecting data from an adult sample, which should enable us to examine how the distinctiveness motive operates and is satisfied among adults in diverse cultural contexts.
Third, with a multilevel approach to data analysis, it is important to consider sample sizes on each level of analysis. Although the number of participants in this study was high, our Level 3 sample size was relatively low (21 cultural samples). So far, there is no consensus in the literature regarding power calculations for mul- tilevel modeling, but it has been suggested that around 20 samples provide sufficient power to detect cross-level interactions in mul- tilevel analysis (Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998). Indeed, Maas and Hox (2005) concluded from their two-level simulation study that, even for relatively small Level 2 sample sizes, estimates of regression coefficients, standard errors of the latter, and variance components appear to be accurate. In the case of the present study, low statistical power did not seem to be a problem, as most of our hypothesis tests yielded clear results based on conventional criteria of statistical significance. Still, our findings included one margin- ally significant result, relating to whether culture-level contextu- alism beliefs moderate the importance of the distinctiveness as a predictor of perceived centrality. Hence, it will be valuable to test whether this result is replicated in future research involving a larger sample of cultural groups.
In future research, it would also be desirable to collect data on intersubjective perceptions of cultural beliefs and values in addi- tion to participants’ own beliefs and values. This would allow us to evaluate to what extent the contextual moderation effects that we observed here are mediated by individuals’ perceptions of cultural norms, as suggested by the intersubjective culture ap- proach, or to what extent they may be better explained by macro- level, systemic processes. Additionally, it will be important to examine to what extent a similar approach can be applied to other identity motives. According to MICT (Vignoles, 2011; Vignoles, Manzi, Regalia, Jemmolo, & Scabini, 2008; Vignoles et al., 2006), the distinctiveness motive is just one of at least six motives that guide the processes shaping identity, and each of the other five motives is predicted to function similarly as a “culturally flexible
universal.” Further analyses from the current study, and from our ongoing study among adults, will test to what extent motives for self-esteem, continuity, belonging, efficacy, and meaning general- ize across cultures with differing values and beliefs, as well as the routes to motive satisfaction that different cultures provide for some of these other motives.
To conclude, the current study demonstrates the importance of attending to the multifaceted nature of distinctiveness-seeking and of taking cultural context into account when investigating the operation of the distinctiveness motive. In particular, the results show how, within any given cultural context, individuals construct their sense of distinctiveness in culturally appropriate ways. In line with the idea of “universalism without the uniformity” (Shweder & Sullivan, 1993), it seems that people across the world seek the same thing, only in different ways.
References
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Becker, M., Easterbrook, M., Vignoles, V. L., Owe, E., Brown, R., Smith, P. B., . . . Bourguignon, D. (2011, July). Motivational conflict between distinctiveness and belonging: Fundamental or cultural? Paper pre- sented at the 16th General Meeting of the European Association of Social Psychology, Stockholm, Sweden.
Bond, M. H. (2009). Circumnavigating the psychological globe: From yin and yang to starry, starry night. In S. Bekman & A. Aksu-koc (Eds.), Perspectives on human development, family, and culture (pp. 31– 49). doi:10.1017/CBO9780511720437.006
Bond, M. H., Leung, K., Tong, K., de Carrasquel, S. R., Murakami, F., Yamaguchi, S., . . . Lewis, J. R. (2004.). Culture-level dimensions of social axioms and their correlates across 41 cultures. Journal of Cross- Cultural Psychology, 35, 548 –570. doi:10.1177/0022022104268388
Breakwell, G. M. (1987). Identity. In H. Beloff & A. Coleman (Eds.), Psychology survey 6 (pp. 94 –114). Leicester, United Kingdom: British Psychological Society.
Brewer, M. B. (1991). The social self: On being the same and different at the same time. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 475– 482. doi:10.1177/0146167291175001
Brewer, M. B., & Chen, Y. R. (2007). Where (who) are collectives in collectivism? Toward conceptual clarification of individualism and col- lectivism. Psychological Review, 114, 133–151. doi:10.1037/0033- 295X.114.1.133
Brewer, M. B., & Pickett, C. L. (1999). Distinctiveness motives as a source of the social self. In T. R. Tyler, R. M. Kramer, & O. P. John (Eds.), The psychology of the social self (pp. 71– 87). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Brewer, M. B., & Roccas, S. (2001). Individual values, social identity, and optimal distinctiveness. In C. Sedikides & M. B. Brewer (Eds.), Indi- vidual self, relational self, collective self (pp. 219 –237). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Burns, D. J., & Brady, J. (1992). A cross-cultural comparison of the need for uniqueness in Malaysia and the United States. The Journal of Social Psychology, 132, 487– 495. doi:10.1080/00224545.1992.9924728
Chandler, M. J., Lalonde, C. E., Sokol, B., & Hallett, D. (2003). Personal persistence, identity development, and suicide: A study of Native and non-Native North American adolescents. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 68(2, Serial No. 273).
Chinese Culture Connection. (1987). Chinese values and the search for culture-free dimensions of culture. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychol- ogy, 18, 143–164. doi:10.1177/0022002187018002002
Chiu, C.-Y., Gelfand, M. J., Yamagishi, T., Shteynberg, G., & Wan, C. (2010). Intersubjective culture: The role of intersubjective perceptions in
851CULTURE AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS MOTIVE
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
cross-cultural research. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5, 482– 493. doi:10.1177/1745691610375562
Cooper, M. L. (2010). Toward a person � situation model of sexual risk-taking behaviors: Illuminating the conditional effects of traits across sexual situations and relationship contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98, 319 –341. doi:10.1037/a0017785
Erikson, E. H. (1980). Identity and the life cycle. New York, NY: Norton. Eriksson, E. L., Becker, M., & Vignoles, V. L. (2011). Just another face in
the crowd? Distinctiveness seeking in Sweden and Britain. Psycholog- ical Studies, 56, 125–134. doi:10.1007/s12646-010-0030-5
Firebaugh, G. (1980). Groups as contexts and frog ponds. In K. H. Roberts & L. Burstein (Eds.), Issues in aggregation (pp. 43–52). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Fischer, R. (2011). Value isomorphism in the European Social Survey: Exploration of meaning shifts in values across levels. Journal of Cross- Cultural Psychology. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/ 0022022111413276
Fischer, R., Vauclair, C.-M., Fontaine, J. R. J., & Schwartz, S. H. (2010). Are individual-level and country-level value structures different? Test- ing Hofstede’s legacy with the Schwartz Value Survey. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 41, 135–151. doi:10.1177/ 0022022109354377
Fontaine, J. R. J., Poortinga, Y. H., Delbeke, L., & Schwartz, S. H. (2008). Structural equivalence of the values domain across cultures: Distinguish- ing sampling fluctuations from meaningful variation. Journal of Cross- Cultural Psychology, 39, 345–365. doi:10.1177/0022022108318112
Fromkin, H. L. (1970). Effects of experimentally aroused feelings of undistinctiveness upon valuation of scarce and novel experiences. Jour- nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 521–529. doi:10.1037/ h0030059
Fromkin, H. L. (1972). Feelings of interpersonal undistinctiveness: An unpleasant affective state. Journal of Experimental Research in Person- ality, 6, 178 –185.
Geertz, C. (1975). On the nature of anthropological understanding. Amer- ican Scientist, 63, 47–53.
Gheorghiu, M. A., Vignoles, V. L., & Smith, P. B. (2009). Beyond the United States and Japan: Testing Yamagishi’s emancipation theory of trust across 31 nations. Social Psychology Quarterly, 72, 365–383. doi:10.1177/019027250907200408
Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1999). Is there a universal need for positive self-regard? Psychological Review, 106, 766 –794. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.4.766
Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Peng, K., & Greenholtz, J. (2002). What’s wrong with cross-cultural comparisons of subjective Likert scales? The reference-group effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 903–918. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.903
Ho, D. Y. F. (1993). Relational orientation in Asian social psychology. In U. Kim & J. W. Berry (Eds.), Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context (pp. 240 –259). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Hofer, J., & Bond, M. H. (2008). Do implicit motives add to our under- standing of psychological and behavioral outcomes within and across cultures? In R. M. Sorrentino & Susumu Yamaguchi (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition across cultures (pp. 95–118). Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Elsevier.
Hofmann, D. A., & Gavin, M. B. (1998). Centering decisions in hierar- chical linear models: Implications for research in organizations. Journal of Management, 24, 623– 641. doi:10.1177/014920639802400504
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s consequences: International studies of work-related values. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behav- iors, institutions and organizations across nations. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Hofstede, G. (2006). What did GLOBE really measure? Researchers’
minds versus respondents’ minds. Journal of International Business Studies, 37, 882– 896. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400233
House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.). (2004). Culture, leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hox, J. J. (2002). Multilevel analysis techniques and applications. Mah- wah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Hsu, F. L. K. (1985). The self in cross-cultural perspective. In A. J. Marsella, G. DeVos, & F. L. K. Hsu (Eds.), Culture and self: Asian and Western perspectives (pp. 24 –55). New York, NY: Tavistock.
Javidan, M., House, R. J., Dorfman, P. W., Hanges, P. J., & Sully de Luque, M. (2006). Conceptualizing and measuring cultures and their consequences: A comparative reviews of GLOBE’s and Hofstede’s approaches. Journal of International Business Studies, 37, 897–914. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400234
Jetten, J., Postmes, T., & McAuliffe, B. J. (2002). “We’re all individuals”: Group norms of individualism and collectivism, levels of identification and identity threat. European Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 189 – 207. doi:10.1002/ejsp.65
Jetten, J., Spears, R., & Postmes, T. (2004). Intergroup distinctiveness and differentiation: A meta-analytic integration. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 862– 879. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.6.862
Jetten, J., Summerville, N., Hornsey, M. J., & Mewse, A. J. (2005). When differences matter: Intergroup distinctiveness and the evaluation of impostors. European Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 609 – 620. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.282
Kenrick, D. T., Nieuweboer, S., & Buunk, A. P. (2010). Universal mech- anisms and cultural diversity: Replacing the blank slate with a coloring book. In M. Schaller, A. Norenzayan, S. J. Heine, T. Yamagishi, & T. Kameda (Eds.), Evolution, culture, and the human mind (pp. 257–272). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Kim, H., & Markus, H. R. (1999). Deviance or uniqueness, harmony or conformity? A cultural analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 785– 800. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.4.785
Kitayama, S., Park, H., Sevincer, A. T., Karasawa, M., & Uskul, A. K. (2009). A cultural task analysis of implicit independence: Comparing North America, Western Europe, and East Asia. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 236 –255. doi:10.1037/a0015999
Knafo, A., Schwartz, S. H., & Levine, R. V. (2009). Helping strangers is lower in embedded cultures. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 40, 875– 879. doi:10.1177/0022022109339211
Krause, S., Back, M. D., Egloff, B., & Schmukle, S. C. (2011). Reliability of implicit self-esteem measures revisited. European Journal of Person- ality, 25, 239 –251. doi:10.1002/per.792
Kreft, I., & de Leeuw, J. (1998). Introducing multilevel modeling. Thou- sand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Kuhn, M. H., & McPartland, T. S. (1954). An empirical investigation of self-attitudes. American Sociological Review, 19, 68 –76. doi:10.2307/ 2088175
LeBel, E. P., & Gawronski, B. (2009). How to find what’s in a name: Scrutinizing the optimality of five scoring algorithms for the name-letter task. European Journal of Personality, 23, 85–106. doi:10.1002/per.705
Leung, K., Bond, M. H., de Carrasquel, S. R., Munoz, C., Hernandez, M., Murakami, F., . . . Singelis, T. M. (2002). Social axioms: The search for universal dimensions of general beliefs about how the world functions. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 33, 286 –302. doi:10.1177/ 0022022102033003005
Leyens, J.-P., Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Rogier, A. (1997). Personality traits that distinguish you and me are better memorized. European Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 511–522. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199709/ 10)27:5�511::AID-EJSP827�3.0.CO;2-7
Lo, C., Helwig, C. C., Chen, S. X., Ohashi, M. M., & Cheng, C. M. (2011). A needs-based perspective on cultural differences in identity formation. Identity, 11, 211–230. doi:10.1080/15283488.2011.594782
852 BECKER ET AL.
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
Lynn, M., & Snyder, C. R. (2002). Uniqueness seeking. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology (pp. 395– 410). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Maas, C. J. M., & Hox, J. J. (2005). Sufficient sample sizes for multilevel modeling. Methodology: European Journal of Research Methods for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1, 86 –92. doi:10.1027/1614- 2241.1.3.86
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224 – 253. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.98.2.224
Markus, H., & Kunda, Z. (1986). Stability and malleability of the self- concept. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 858 – 866. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.4.858
Marques, J. M., & Paez, D. (1994). The “black sheep effect”: Social categorization, rejection of ingroup deviates, and perception of group variability. European Review of Social Psychology, 5, 37– 68. doi: 10.1080/14792779543000011
McClelland, G. H., & Judd, C. M. (1993). Statistical difficulties of detect- ing interactions and moderator effects. Psychological Bulletin, 114, 376 –390. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.114.2.376
McGuire, W. J., & Padawer-Singer, A. (1976). Trait salience in the spontaneous self-concept. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 743–754. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.33.6.743
Miller, J. G. (1984). Culture and the development of everyday social explanation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 961– 978. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.46.5.961
Norenzayan, A., & Heine, S. J. (2005). Psychological universals: What are they and how can we know? Psychological Bulletin, 131, 763–784. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.131.5.763
Owe, E., Vignoles, V. L., Becker, M., Brown, R., Smith, P. B., Lee, S. W. S., . . . Jalal, B. (in press). Contextualism as an important facet of individualism– collectivism: Personhood beliefs across 37 national groups. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. doi:10.1177/ 00220022111430255
Petavratzi, F. (2004). Implicit and explicit distinctiveness motivation and romantic partner preferences (Unpublished BA dissertation). University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom.
Pickett, C. L., Silver, M., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). The impact of assim- ilation and differentiation needs on perceived group importance and judgments of ingroup size. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 546 –558. doi:10.1177/0146167202287011
Powell, F. A. (1974). The perception of self-uniqueness as a determinant of message choice and valuation. Speech Monographs, 41, 163–168. doi: 10.1080/03637757409375831
Raudenbush, S. W. (1989). “Centering” predictors in multilevel analysis: Choices and consequences. Multilevel Modelling Newsletter, 1(2), 10 –12.
Raudenbush, S. W., Bryk, A. S., & Congdon, R. T. (2007). HLM 6: Hierarchical linear and nonlinear modeling. Lincolnwood, IL: Scien- tific Software International.
Salvatore, J., & Prentice, D. (2011). The independence paradox. In J. Jetten & M. J. Hornsey (Eds.), Rebels in groups: Dissent, deviance, difference and defiance (pp. 201–218). Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell.
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 1– 65). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Schwartz, S. H. (2004). Mapping and interpreting cultural differences around the world. In H. Vinken, J. Soeters, & P. Ester (Eds.), Comparing cultures: Dimensions of culture in a comparative perspective (pp. 43– 73). Boston, MA: Brill.
Schwartz, S. H. (2007). Value orientations: Measurement, antecedents and consequences across nations. In R. Jowell, C. Roberts, R. Fitzgerald, & G. Eva (Eds.), Measuring attitudes cross-nationally: Lessons from the
European Social Survey (pp. 161–193). London, England: Sage. doi: 10.4135/9781849209458.n9
Schwartz, S. H., & Bardi, A. (2001). Value hierarchies across cultures: Taking a similarities perspective. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32, 268 –290. doi:10.1177/0022022101032003002
Schwartz, S. H., & Rubel, T. (2005). Sex differences in value priorities: Cross-cultural and multimethod studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 1010 –1028. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.89.6.1010
Sedikides, C., Gaertner, L., & Toguchi, Y. (2003). Pancultural self- enhancement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 60 –79. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.1.60
Shweder, R. A., & Bourne, E. J. (1984). Does the concept of the person vary cross-culturally? In R. A. Shweder & R. A. LeVine (Eds.), Culture theory: Essays on mind, self, and emotion (pp. 158 –199). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Shweder, R. A., & Sullivan, M. A. (1993). Cultural psychology: Who needs it? Annual Review of Psychology, 44, 497–523. doi:10.1146/ annurev.ps.44.020193.002433
Singelis, T. M., Triandis, H. C., Bhawuk, D. P. S., & Gelfand, M. J. (1995). Horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism and collectivism: A theoretical and measurement refinement. Cross-Cultural Research, 29, 240 –275. doi:10.1177/106939719502900302
Smith, P. B. (2004a). Acquiescent response bias as an aspect of cultural communication style. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35, 50 – 61. doi:10.1177/0022022103260380
Smith, P. B. (2004b). Nations, cultures, and individuals: New perspectives and old dilemmas. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35, 6 –12. doi:10.1177/0022022103260460
Smith, P. B. (2011). Cross-cultural perspectives on identity. In S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & V. L. Vignoles (Eds.), Handbook of identity theory and research (pp. 249 –265). doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-7988-9_11
Smith, P. B., Bond, M. H., & Kağitçibaşi, Ç. (2006). Understanding social psychology across cultures: Living and working in a changing world. London, England: Sage.
Smith, P. B., & Schwartz, S. H. (1997). Values. In J. W. Berry, M. H. Segall, & Ç. Kağitçibaşi (Eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural psychology (2nd ed., Vol. 3, pp. 77–118). Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Snyder, C. R., & Endelman, J. R. (1979). Effects of degree of interpersonal similarity on physical distance and self-reported attraction: A compari- son of uniqueness and reinforcement theory predictions. Journal of Personality, 47, 492–505. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1979.tb00628.x
Snyder, C. R., & Fromkin, H. L. (1980). Uniqueness: The human pursuit of difference. New York, NY: Plenum Press.
Stephens, N. M., Markus, H. R., & Townsend, S. S. M. (2007). Choice as an act of meaning: The case of social class. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 814 – 830. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.93.5.814
Tafarodi, R. W., Marshall, T. C., & Katsura, H. (2004). Standing out in Canada and Japan. Journal of Personality, 72, 785– 814. doi:10.1111/ j.0022-3506.2004.00280.x
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of inter- group relations (pp. 7–24). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.
Takano, Y., & Osaka, E. (1999). An unsupported common view: Compar- ing Japan and the U.S. on individualism/collectivism. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 2, 311–341. doi:10.1111/1467-839X.00043
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism and collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Triandis, H. C., Chan, D. K.-S., Bhawuk, D. P. S., Iwao, S., & Sinha, J. B. P. (1995). Multimethod probes of allocentrism and idiocentrism. International Journal of Psychology, 30, 461– 480. doi:10.1080/ 00207599508246580
Turnbull, W., Miller, D. T., & McFarland, C. (1990). Population- distinctiveness, identity, and bonding. In J. M. Olson & M. P. Zanna
853CULTURE AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS MOTIVE
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
(Eds.), Self-inference processes: Ontario Symposium on Personality and Social Psychology (Vol. 6, pp. 115–133). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (2010). UNESCO Institute for Statistics Data Centre. Retrieved from http:// stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId� 143&IF_Language�eng
van Rijswijk, W., Haslam, S. A., & Ellemers, N. (2006). Who do we think we are? The effects of social context and social identification on in- group stereotyping. British Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 161–174. doi:10.1348/014466605X39475
Vignoles, V. L. (2009). The motive for distinctiveness: A universal, but flexible human need. In S. J. Lopez & C. R. Snyder (Eds.), Oxford handbook of positive psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 491– 499). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Vignoles, V. L. (2011). Identity motives. In S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & V. L. Vignoles (Eds.), Handbook of identity theory and research (pp. 403– 432). doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-7988-9_18
Vignoles, V. L., Chryssochoou, X., & Breakwell, G. M. (2000). The distinctiveness principle: Identity, meaning, and the bounds of cultural relativity. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 337–354. doi: 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0404_4
Vignoles, V. L., Chryssochoou, X., & Breakwell, G. M. (2002). Sources of distinctiveness: Position, difference and separateness in the identities of Anglican parish priests. European Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 761–780. doi:10.1002/ejsp.119
Vignoles, V. L., Manzi, C., Regalia, C., Jemmolo, S., & Scabini, E. (2008). Identity motives underlying desired and feared possible future selves. Journal of Personality, 76, 1165–1200. doi:10.1111/j.1467- 6494.2008.00518.x
Vignoles, V. L., & Moncaster, N. J. (2007). Identity motives and in-group
favouritism: A new approach to individual differences in intergroup discrimination. British Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 91–113. doi: 10.1348/014466605X85951
Vignoles, V. L., Regalia, C., Manzi, C., Golledge, J., & Scabini, E. (2006). Beyond self-esteem: Influence of multiple motives on identity construc- tion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 308 –333. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.90.2.308
Walsh, P. E., & Smith, J. L. (2007). Opposing standards within the cultural worldview: Terror management and American women’s desire for uniqueness versus inclusiveness. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 31, 103–113. doi:10.1111/j.1471-6402.2007.00335.x
Weber, M. (1958). The Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism. New York, NY: Scribner’s. (Original work published 1905)
Welzel, C. (2010). How selfish are self-expression values? A civicness test. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 41, 152–174. doi:10.1177/ 0022022109354378
World Bank. (2010). GNI per capita 2007, Atlas method. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD
Yamagishi, T. (2010). Micro-macro dynamics of the cultural construction of reality: A niche construction approach to culture. In M. J. Gelfand, C.-Y. Chiu, & Y.-Y Hong (Eds.), Advances in culture psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 251–308). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Yamagishi, T., Hashimoto, H., & Schug, J. (2008). Preferences versus strategies as explanations for culture-specific behavior. Psychological Science, 19, 579 –584. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02126.x
Yamaguchi, S., Kuhlman, D. M., & Sugimori, S. (1995). Personality correlates of allocentric tendencies in individualist and collectivist cul- tures. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 26, 658 – 672. doi:10.1177/ 002202219502600609
854 BECKER ET AL.
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
Appendix A
Zero-Order Correlations Between Ratings of Identity Aspects (N � 51,580) for Perceived Centrality, Positive Affect, General Distinctiveness, Difference,
Separateness, and Social Position
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Perceived centrality — .46 .33 .29 .05 .35 2. Positive affect .48 — .26 .29 �.08 .43 3. General distinctiveness .36 .29 — .45 .17 .31 4. Difference .30 .29 .50 — .20 .43 5. Separateness .09 �.02 .21 .28 — .09 6. Social position .35 .41 .39 .53 .22 —
Note. Values below the diagonal use raw ratings, and values above the diagonal use participant mean-centered values. All coefficients are significant at p � .001.
Appendix B
Zero-Order Correlations Between Individual-Level Variables (N � 5,158)
Variable 1 2 3 4
1. Openness (vs. Conservation) values — 2. Contextualism beliefs �.16��� — 3. Gendera �.06��� .04�� — 4. Subjective wealth .06��� �.02 .05��� —
a Dummy coded as �1 � female, 1 � male. �� p � .01. ��� p � .001.
Appendix C
Zero-Order Correlations Between Culture-Level Variables (N � 21)
Variable 1 2 3
1. Openness (vs. Conservation) values — 2. Contextualism beliefs �.49� — 3. GNI per capita .37 �.26 —
Note. GNI per capita � gross national income per capita in U.S. dollars. � p � .05.
Received September 16, 2010 Revision received August 16, 2011
Accepted September 23, 2011 �
855CULTURE AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS MOTIVE
T hi
s do
cu m
en t i
s co
py ri
gh te
d by
th e
A m
er ic
an P
sy ch
ol og
ic al
A ss
oc ia
tio n
or o
ne o
f i ts
a lli
ed p
ub lis
he rs
. T
hi s
ar tic
le is
in te
nd ed
s ol
el y
fo r t
he p
er so
na l u
se o
f t he
in di
vi du
al u
se r a
nd is
n ot
to b
e di
ss em
in at
ed b
ro ad
ly .
