Research Questions & Variables MAIN ONE

Sociological Perspectives 2014, Vol. 57(4) 450 –469

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Social Production of Difference

Othering Obama: Racial Attitudes and Dubious Beliefs about the Nation’s First Black President

Daniel Tope1, Justin T. Pickett2, Ryon J. Cobb3, and Jonathan Dirlam4

Abstract The literature on descriptive representation indicates that the election of black political leaders may prompt white enmity. We assess this claim by examining the relationship between whites’ racial attitudes and their likelihood of othering Barack Obama by labeling him as a Muslim and/or a noncitizen interloper. The findings reveal that both symbolic racial resentment and traditional racial attitudes are associated with othering Obama. In addition, the results reveal that the relationship between racial resentment and othering is substantially mediated by the use of seemingly nonracist frames based on emotional reactions and negative expectations about an Obama presidency. Conversely, much of the effect of belief in traditional antiblack stereotypes was transmitted directly to othering Obama without the use of justificatory frames. Despite claims of racial progress, our findings suggest that racial sentiments—both overt and symbolic— continue to play a major role in politics.

Keywords Barack Obama, descriptive representation, racial resentment

The extent to which racial attitudes shape contemporary politics continues to be the subject of fierce scholarly debate (e.g., Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000). In particular, analysts have focused on the distinction between symbolic and overt forms of racial prejudice (Huddy and Feldman 2009). An important theme in the race literature has been that because the normative racial discourse changed from the Jim Crow to the post–civil rights era, racial language has become more subtle and opaque (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Bonilla- Silva 2010). Accordingly, race analysts have come to focus largely on symbolic forms of racism, such as racial resentment (Sears and Henry 2005). Yet some suggest that old fashioned overt racism persists and thus should not be discounted (Huddy and Feldman 2009).

1Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA 2University at Albany, State University of New York, Albany, NY, USA 3University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA 4Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

Corresponding Author: Daniel Tope, Department of Sociology, Florida State University, 429 Bellamy Building, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2270, USA. Email: [email protected]

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The election of the United States’ first black president provides a unique opportunity to con- tribute to this debate. Barack Obama’s rise elicited considerable enthusiasm and hope among his supporters. Some commentators went so far as to suggest his election might signal the dawn of a postracial era where racial barriers had largely subsided for black Americans (e.g., Thernstrom 2008). Indeed, some research has indicated that Obama represented a counter to black stereo- types and thereby helped to diminish prejudice among some whites (Columb and Plant 2011; Welch and Sigelman 2011).

Despite these findings, other studies revealed that Obama’s election provoked racial fears for some individuals. For example, a 2009 poll indicated that 65 percent of Republicans thought Obama’s policies would privilege blacks over whites (The Economist 2009). Another study showed that about 30 percent of whites were troubled by the very idea of an Obama presidency (Redlawsk, Tolbert, and Franko 2010). In addition, David Redlawsk et al. (2010:9) found that “the likelihood of feeling troubled by Obama as the first Black president is very high for those white voters who explicitly express a belief that Obama’s policies will advantage Black people.”

The extant literature suggests that racial attitudes shape whites’ views of black political can- didates and elected officials (Block 2011; Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990; Tesler and Sears 2010). Notwithstanding reported declines in overt racism (e.g., Schuman et al. 1997), whites are less likely to associate minority politicians with Americanness (Devos and Banaji 2005). One study revealed that many individuals were more apt to associate United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair with Americanness than they were Barack Obama (Devos, Ma, and Gaffud 2008). Related research has shown that antiblack attitudes predict whites’ policy opinions (Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Krysan 2000) and foster unfavorable views about legislation attributed to Obama (Knowles, Lowery, and Schaumberg 2010).

In light of the foregoing, it is likely that racial attitudes shape a range of beliefs about President Obama. While much has been written on evaluations of candidates and presidents, much less systematic research has addressed individuals’ adoption of particular frames used to “other” political actors. Since he became a presidential candidate in 2008, conspiratorial assertions about Barack Obama rapidly spread. Chief among the Obama conspiracies have been (1) that he is secretly a Muslim and (2) that he is not eligible to be the president because he was not born in the United States. Despite contrary evidence, these characterizations persist.

Othering refers to the general process of demarcating an out-group and thereby reaffirming in-group membership (Schwalbe et al. 2000). In particular, it involves efforts to label individuals as members of potentially threatening out-groups. Othering is present in all systems of inequality (e.g., race, gender, class). For that reason, such expressions need not be grounded in ethnocen- trism. Yet in the present case, othering seems to be a symbolic expression of ethnocentrism likely shaped in part by contemporary implicit and explicit racial discourse (Bonilla-Silva 2010). As such, the othering themes addressed herein may be part of a broader culture of ethnocentrism as elaborated by Donald R. Kinder and Cindy D. Kam (2010; also see Kam and Kinder 2012).

In what follows, we assess whether racial attitudes determine individuals’ propensity to label Obama as a Muslim and/or a noncitizen. Our focus on othering is particularly apposite in light of scholarly arguments that many of Obama’s detractors view him “not merely as a racial threat, but as a racist threat”—a potential menace to the racial order (Barreto et al. 2011; Enck-Wanzer 2011:26). Moreover, we contrast both symbolic and overt racial attitudes and their relationship to othering Obama and examine the degree to which the relationship between racial attitudes and othering is mediated by several intervening factors.

Obama as Other

Owing in large part to the media campaigns waged against him, notions of Barack Obama’s “otherness” in terms of both race and religion are commonplace. In 2008, prominent media

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pundits, celebrities, and members of Congress engaged in discussions commonly characterized as Birtherism—the salacious idea that Barack Obama is not a U.S. citizen and is thereby ineli- gible to serve as president (Berlet 2010; Enck-Wanzer 2011; Hughey 2012). This sensational rumor swirled in the popular media and persisted well beyond the presidential campaign. Indeed, by April 2010, a national poll revealed that 80 percent of respondents had heard these conspirato- rial stories and roughly a quarter of respondents believed them (Harris Polls 2010). And in 2012, several state governments debated removing Obama from their presidential election ballots because of his supposed invalid citizenship status. Despite Obama’s repeated assertions of legal citizenship and the availability of his verified certificate of live birth, the Birther conspiracy continued.

A second prominent rumor—with clear ethnic overtones—about Barack Obama also per- sisted. This widely disseminated story suggested that despite his repeated identification as Christian, his regular attendance at a Christian church, and having his daughters baptized at that church, Obama was secretly a Muslim. This is particularly notable in light of the extreme anti- Muslim sentiments that have emerged in the United States in the years following the World Trade Center bombing. Kam and Kinder (2012:334), for instance, reported that the 2008 American National Election Study showed that white Americans had more negative feelings toward Muslims than toward all but three of the other 24 groups examined illegal immigrants, homo- sexuals, and atheists (see also Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009; Panagopoulos 2006; Tesler 2011). A 2010 Pew Research Center survey found that about 18 percent of the population believed that Obama was a Muslim. In addition, a study by Barry A. Hollander (2010) showed that politi- cal conservatives who were not black, had lower levels of education, and subscribed to biblical literalism were likely to subscribe to the Obama as Muslim rumor (also see Block and Onwunli 2010). Attempts to mark political opponents as “other” are certainly not new. Yet, the Muslim charge at a time when the United States was at war in the Middle East and with the 9/11 terrorist attacks still in recent memory struck a particularly othering conspiratorial tone.

The persistence of the aforesaid dubious frames about the president is remarkable, especially given that similar beliefs have not emerged in relation to other presidents in contemporary times. An investigation into the determinants of these beliefs is warranted. In light of Barack Obama’s status as the first black president, it is conceivable that the othering themes directed at him are related to racial attitudes (Enck-Wanzer 2011).

Theoretical Background and Prior Research

Although numerous theoretical formulations exist to describe the contours of racial politics, our focus is on what is known as black descriptive representation—the presence of black elected officials (Reeves 1997). In particular, we are interested in white responses to these officials. When subordinate groups gain power or are perceived to do so, they are often viewed as a politi- cal threat by dominant group members (Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958). Studies suggest that many whites view increased black political representation as endangering their interests (Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004; Block 2011; Lublin 1997; Scherer and Curry 2010; for an alternative account, see Hajnal 2007).1 It thus follows that a black president likely constitutes a substantial symbolic threat for some whites. For our purposes, the key questions then become (1) whether racial attitudes shape whites’ articulation of the perceived other embodied in Barack Obama, and if so, (2) whether symbolic and explicit prejudice have similar effects.

Symbolic Prejudice: Racial Resentment

Scholarship on contemporary racial attitudes focuses largely on “symbolic” racial prejudice. This literature argues that because the United States’ evolving racial norms increasingly forbid the

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expression of blatant racism, whites use subtler methods to express racial enmity (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears and Henry 2005; Sears et al. 2000). Although symbolic racism has been cast in numerous forms, we focus on racial resentment which is one of the leading conceptual frame- works. Racial resentment is conveyed through white contempt toward black calls for social change as well as against policies that may serve to ameliorate racial inequality (Bobo et al. 1997; Henry and Sears 2002).

Racial resentment may be defined as a refined form of prejudice that merges whites’ belief in traditional values such as the protestant work ethic with whites’ negative feelings about blacks. The idea that blacks fail to get ahead in society because they do not try hard enough and fre- quently take what they have not earned are key components of this belief system (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Racial resentment has proven a reliable determinant of resistance to a range of policies such as affirmative action, school busing, child saving initiatives, and social spending (Pickett, Chiricos, and Gertz 2014; Sears et al. 2000).2 Indeed, research has shown that symbolic racism is typically more strongly associated with racial policy (e.g., affirmative action) resistance than traditional forms of racism, such as beliefs in innate black inferiority (Krysan 2000; Sears et al. 2000).3

Racial attitudes have also been shown to have a powerful influence on whites’ political candi- date preferences. For instance, related research on black descriptive representation suggests that the election of black officials may enhance perceived levels of economic and/or political threat posed by blacks (e.g., Sears, Citrin, and Kosterman 1987; Terkildsen 1993). Indeed, findings reveal that black descriptive representation can negatively influence white political attitudes and participation (Barreto et al. 2004; Orey 2001; Scherer and Curry 2010; but see Hajnal 2007). In addition, Lublin (1997) suggested that the election of black officials can prompt white political backlash.

The theories underlying this literature have taken on somewhat different forms and arrived at varying conclusions. Nevertheless, a substantial literature suggests that increases in black politi- cal power should amplify white resentment of blacks and prompt white animus or resistance (Hajnal 2001; Lublin and Tate 1995). Nicholas Valentino and Ted Brader (2011), for example, showed that among many whites, Obama’s election, by reducing perceived racial discrimination, increased racial resentment and antiblack affect. It should thus not be surprising that Michael Tesler and David Sears (2010:5) reported that with respect to the 2008 election, “Public opinion and voting behavior . . . were considerably more polarized by racial attitudes than at any other time on record.” Accordingly, we hypothesize that the presence of an African American president should result in a positive association between racial resentment and othering Barack Obama (Hypothesis 1).

Symbolic racism provides for the same racialized outcomes—discrimination, opposition to policies for reducing inequality—as traditional forms of prejudice. However, what is unique about symbolic prejudice is that its connection to such ends is primarily indirect through ostensi- bly race-neutral beliefs. Stated differently, symbolic prejudice allows individuals to justify— both to themselves and to others—their support/opposition to policies that have clear racial consequences without ever openly endorsing a racist ideology (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears et al. 2000). For racially resentful persons, the underlying motivation for racialized policy prefer- ences can be portrayed as stemming from principled beliefs rather than racial concerns. Supporting this contention, research on contemporary racetalk argues that racial language is mostly subtle and outwardly nonracial (Hill 2008; Myers 2005). Moreover, and crucial for our study, the litera- ture reveals that whites frequently deploy an array of ostensibly nonracist rhetorical frames and stories to sanitize their expressed beliefs (Bonilla-Silva 2010). This pattern is evident in both popular and political discourse.

Changes in acceptable language have diminished conduits for the political expression of tra- ditional overt racism. In the absence of such an outlet, seemingly nonracist frames often supplant

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traditional racism. Therefore, political discourse even on explicitly racial policies (such as affir- mative action), for instance, have come to revolve around issues such as deservingness and work ethic rather than race per se (Mendelberg 2001; Winter 2008). Stated more explicitly, whites may have principled opposition to a particular policy, political official, or candidate but those who subscribe to contemporary symbolic racial norms often engage in the construction of seemingly nonracist justifications lest they appear to have offensive racial motives (Brandt and Reyna 2012). Yet it is crucial to note that the extant literature emphasizes that the use of such frames are not necessarily grounded in intentional deception. Rather, the use of nonracist frames and justifi- cations has become a customary aspect of the structure of contemporary racial discourse (Bonilla- Silva 2010). It follows that if the just described logic of racetalk is correct, then racial sentiments—whether intentional or not—should often be channeled or partially explained through alternative frames. That is, to abide by discursive racial norms, whites should often use seemingly nonracist justifications or stories to buttress views that could be perceived as racially biased—such as othering a member of a racial/ethnic minority group.

Two particular frames have drawn our interest. First, there has been increased interest in the role of emotions in political research (e.g., Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001). Emotions are wrapped up in the stories individuals construct to understand their lives (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Moreover, research on racial resentment has often suggested a role for emotions even when they were not directly measured. Paul Sniderman, Gretchen Crosby, and William Howell (2000) noted that racial views are saturated with emotions. And David Sears (1988:70) argued that racial resentment is related to “fear, . . . anger, distaste, disgust, contempt, apprehension, unease, or dislike.” In addition, findings by Jennifer S. Lerner and Larissa Z. Tiedens (2006) illustrate that confidence about a source of threat or targets of blame results in anger (see also Banks and Valentino 2012; Tesler 2013). And another study found that priming anger in respon- dents led them to rate out-groups more negatively (DeSteno et al. 2004). Frames that are infused with seemingly nonracist emotional appeals—especially anger—are thus a likely candidate link- ing racial resentment with othering. We therefore propose that expressing anger about things Barack Obama has done likely mediates the relationship between racial resentment and othering (Hypothesis 2).

Second, some frames adopted by whites may be cast as general perspectives on race relations. This storyline is evident in research showing how dominant group members project racial moti- vations onto minority group members. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2002, 2010) elaborated on this perspective arguing that some whites declare that the behavior of minorities, as opposed to whites, is laden with racial motivations. Accordingly, prior research has shown that white inter- view respondents are more apt to see racialized behavior among blacks than whites and argue that the racial (or even racist) behavior of minorities is at the root of social distance between racial and ethnic groups. Bonilla-Silva argues that this professed concern for race relations serves an exculpatory function for whites imbuing them with racial innocence. We thus propose that subscribing to the frame that Obama will favor blacks or instigate poorer race relations will medi- ate the relationship between racial resentment and propensity to other Obama (Hypothesis 3). We present our conceptual mediation model for symbolic prejudice in Figure 1.4

Explicit Prejudice: Traditional Racism

While the bulk of recent research on racial attitudes focuses on subtle resentment, more tradi- tional racial stereotypes, such as beliefs in innate black deficiencies, remain politically important. Research suggests that while whites have become less likely to voice blatant racial stereotypes (Schuman et al. 1997), many still harbor what might be called traditional prejudices or what has sometimes been labeled traditional or old fashioned racism (Tesler 2013). Multiple studies have shown the continued political and policy relevance of traditional racism (Cribbs and Austin 2010;

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Huddy and Feldman 2009; Perkins 2009; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Pickett and Chiricos 2012). For instance, research by Mark Peffley, Jon Hurwitz, and Paul M. Sniderman (1997:30– 31) suggests that whites subscribing to racial stereotypes are more likely to “judge Blacks more harshly than similarly described whites in the areas of welfare and crime policy.” Martin Gilens (1995) found that whites’ traditional racism was a determinant of opposition to social spending. Furthermore, a recent study argues that antiblack racism “appears to have been an important component of the 2008 election, considerably reducing Obama’s share of the vote” (Pasek et al. 2009:982).

Traditional antiblack racism has important implications for white Americans’ political prefer- ences in the Obama era. Indeed, Michael Tesler (2013:121) found that traditional racism influ- enced by “Obama’s rise to prominence” was a major predictor of partisan candidate preferences. Corresponding research by Leonie Huddy and Stanley Feldman (2009) found that traditional overt racial attitudes were linked with a disinclination to support Barack Obama in the 2008 Democratic Primary. It is thus conceivable that traditional racism would diminish support for Barack Obama on multiple fronts given that adherents to this traditionalist view would likely oppose a president from a group they deem inferior. We therefore propose that individuals evinc- ing higher levels of traditional racism should have a greater propensity to label Barack Obama as a Muslim and/or noncitizen other (Hypothesis 4). Here the use of frames should be less salient, and thus the relationship between traditional prejudice and othering should be more direct. Stated differently, whites who are overtly racist should have little need to express their racial enmity through seemingly nonracist frames. Hence, the use of framing should be a much less common feature in the case of traditional as opposed to symbolic racial attitudes. Our conceptual model for the relationship between traditional racism and othering is presented in Figure 2.

Method

To test our hypotheses, we draw on data from the 2007 to 2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP; Jackman and Vavreck 2009). That project involved a collaborative effort on the

OtheringExplicit Prejudice

Figure 2. Conceptual direct effect model.

Racial Resentment

Negative Expectations Frame

Negative Emotions Frame

Othering

Figure 1. Conceptual mediation model.

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part of 27 research teams to field a national Internet panel survey of registered U.S. voters during the months leading up to and immediately following the 2008 presidential election. Yougov Polimetrix administered the survey online in six waves between December 2007 and November 2008. Respondents were oversampled in both battleground states and states with early primaries. The current study analyzes data from both the Common Content portion of the CCAP and team- specific content collected in the October 2008 wave of the survey. The sample upon which our study is based includes all white respondents for whom complete data on the measures used in this study are available (N = 1,595). In the analyses, we employ sampling weights to maximize sample representativeness of the general population.

Dependent Variable

Our outcome of interest, Othering of Obama, gauges the extent to which respondents’ endorse characterizations of Obama that are consistent with the construction of him as a threatening out- sider. We focus here on what are probably the two most recurrent, but nevertheless inaccurate, descriptions of Obama: that he was not born in the United States and that he is a Muslim. Two questions in the CCAP asked respondents (1) whether Obama was born in the United States and (2) whether he was Christian, Muslim, Jewish, or something else. We used the responses to these two questions to create an ordinal variable with the following three response categories: 0 = does not endorse either characterization, 1 = endorses only one of the two characterizations, and 2 = endorses both characterizations. As can be seen in Table 1, the majority (69 percent) of respon- dents in our sample endorse neither characterization, whereas 17 percent endorse one character- ization and 14 percent believe Obama was born outside the United States and is also a Muslim.5

Intervening Variables

We examine three intervening variables. Two measures, Obama Will Favor Blacks and Obama Will Worsen Race Relations, measure whites’ expectations about the racialized consequences of an Obama presidency. These variables tap race-relations frames that, per our hypotheses, should mediate the effects of symbolic prejudice. The first of these two variables is measured with the following question: “Which of the following groups in society do you think will be favored if Barack Obama is elected president . . . blacks?” where 0 = no and 1 = yes. The second of these two variables is measured with the following question: “The United States has just elected its first black president. What does this mean for race relations in America?” The original response categories were as follows: 1 = race relations will quickly improve, 2 = race relations will slowly improve, 3 = things will stay the same, 4 = race relations will slowly get worse, and 5 = race rela- tions will quickly get worse. We recoded the responses to put them on a bipolar scale, where posi- tive values indicate a perceived worsening of race relations: −2 = race relations will quickly improve, −1 = race relations will slowly improve, 0 = things will stay the same, 1 = race relations will slowly get worse, and 2 = race relations will quickly get worse.

The final hypothesized mediator, Negative Emotional Reactions, taps respondents’ emotional reactions to things Obama said or did during the campaign. It is derived from a question that asked,

We want you to think about the things that the presidential candidates have said and done over the last few months . . . And what about Barack Obama? Have the things he has said and done over the last few months made you feel . . . (1) angry, (2) hopeful, (3) proud, (4) ashamed?

Respondents who responded affirmatively to a given item were coded “1” on that item and those who said no were coded “0.” We reverse coded the two positive items (i.e., hopeful and

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proud). Next, we summed the responses to this question to generate a summary measure (α = .79) with values that ranged from 0 to 4, where 0 = not angry, hopeful, proud, and not ashamed, and 4 = angry, unhopeful, not proud, and ashamed.6

Independent Variables

We focus on the effects of two key independent variables that constitute distinct forms of racial prejudice. The first, Racial Resentment, is an indicator of what scholars describe as symbolic or modern racism (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay 1986). In the CCAP, the following four-item question was asked in three separate waves (March, September, and October):

Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements: (1) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for African Americans to work their way out of the lower class; (2) Many other minority groups have overcome prejudice and worked their way up. African Americans should do the same without any special favors; (3) Over the past few years, African Americans have gotten less than they deserve; (4) It’s really a matter of some

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N = 1,595).

Variables M SD

Dependent variables Othering of Obama 0.44 0.72 Endorse neither belief—69 percent Endorse one belief—17 percent Endorse both beliefs—14 percent Negative emotional reaction to Obama 2.02 1.46 Obama will worsen race relations −0.21 1.01 Obama will favor blacks 0.62 0.49 Independent variables Racial resentment 3.66 1.07 Relative racial stereotypes 0.73 1.33 Control variables Individual characteristics Male 0.51 0.50 Age 51.62 14.66 Education 3.55 1.47 Income 8.40 3.38 Born-again 0.15 0.36 Patriotism −0.01 0.81 Conservatism 3.29 1.19 Republican 0.37 0.48 Fox TV consumption 1.33 2.38 County characteristics Percent voting Republican 46.67 13.32 Percent black 10.71 10.63 Unemployment rate 4.65 1.25 Educational inequality 23.01 3.20 Population structure 0.00 1.92 South 0.28 0.45

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people not trying hard enough; if African Americans would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

We recoded the responses to these items in each of the three waves so that higher values indi- cate greater racial resentment. Next, we created three separate indices—one for each of the waves—by averaging across responses to the four items in each wave (Cronbach’s αs = .86, .86, and .88 in the March, September, and October waves, respectively). Finally, we averaged across these three separate indices to develop a global measure of Racial Resentment (Cronbach’s α = .95).

The second independent variable measures a more traditional form of racial prejudice, namely, the perception that blacks tend to be lazier and less intelligent than whites. A question asked respondents to rate different groups, two of which were whites and blacks, “On the following scale, where 1 means you think almost all of the people in that group are ‘lazy’; and 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group is ‘hardworking.’” A subsequent question asked respon- dents to rate members of the same groups in terms of whether they 1 = “tend to be unintelligent” or 7 = “tend to be intelligent.” We recoded the ratings so that higher values indicated greater laziness and less intelligence. To generate a measure of the perceived laziness of blacks, relative to whites, we subtracted respondents’ ratings of whites’ laziness from their ratings of blacks’ lazi- ness (i.e., black laziness–white laziness). Positive values on the resulting variable indicate respondents perceive that blacks tend to be lazier than whites. Negative values indicate the oppo- site. We constructed an identical measure for the ratings of whites’ and blacks’ intelligence (i.e., black unintelligence–white unintelligence). The two separate relative stereotypes measures were highly correlated (r = .75). Thus, we averaged the two variables to generate a general Relative Racial Stereotypes measure, on which higher scores indicate that a respondent rates blacks as tending to be lazier and less intelligent than whites.

Control Variables

We control for several potential sources of spuriousness identified in extant theoretical and empirical work (see, for example, Kinder and Sanders 1996; King and Wheelock 2007; Taylor 1998). First, we control for respondents’ gender (Male = 1), Age, Education, and Income. Age is measured in years. Education is measured as follows: 1 = did not graduate high school, 2 = graduated high school, 3 = some college, 4 = two-year college degree, 5 = four-year college degree, and 6 = postgraduate work. Income is equal to the respondent’s total household income, where 1 = less than $10,000 and 14 = $150,000 or more.

Controls are also incorporated for whether respondents report being a born-again Protestant (Born-again = 1), their level of Patriotism, their degree of Conservatism, their partisan identifi- cation (Republican = 1), and their amount of Fox News Consumption. Patriotism is measured with the following three questions: (1) “Please evaluate the following statement: There are some things about America that make me feel ashamed of America,” where 1 = agree, 2 = disagree, and 3 = neither; (2) “When you see the American flag flying, does it make you feel . . . 1 = extremely good, 2 = very good, 3 = somewhat good, and 4 = not very good?”; and (3) How important is it to you that you are an American?” where 1 = extremely important and 5 = not important at all. We recoded responses to these three items so that higher values indicate greater patriotism. We then standardized the responses and averaged across them to create a summary measure with a Cronbach’s alpha of .73.

Conservatism is a measure of respondents’ personal political ideology, where 1 = very liberal, 2 = liberal, 3 = moderate, 4 = conservative, and 5 = very conservative. Fox News Consumption is measured as the total number of time periods during which the respondent reported watching Fox

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News the previous day. The specific question asked, “We are interested in the kinds of things people watch on TV. Did you watch any of these stations at these times yesterday? Eleven sepa- rate time periods were listed as follows: 4:00 p.m., 4:30 p.m., 5:00 p.m., 5:30 p.m., 6:00 p.m., 6:30 p.m., 7:00 p.m., 8:00 p.m., 9:00 p.m., 10:00 p.m., and 11:00 p.m. A respondent’s value on the Fox News Consumption variable is equal to the number of affirmative answers given, and thus can range from 0 to 11.

Finally, because context shapes racial attitudes and political values (McVeigh 1999; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Taylor 1998), we control for the characteristics of the counties in which the respondents reside.7 Percent Voting Republican is an indicator of the local political climate. It is equal to the percentage of the county population that voted for John McCain in the 2008 presidential election. Percent Black is the percentage of black residents in the county, as recorded in the 2010 U.S. Census. Unemployment Rate is a variable that gauges local economic condi- tions. It is equal to the average unemployment rate in the county in 2007. Educational Inequality was estimated using county-level census data to calculate the coefficient of variation as a mea- sure of inequality across school years. Following Rory McVeigh (2004), school years were com- piled into seven categories, and the midpoint of these categories were used to estimate the coefficient of variation with 19 years assumed to be the midpoint in the last open-ended cate- gory.8 Population Structure is an indicator of the size and density of the local population. It is a composite index created by summing standardized, log transformed versions of the county popu- lation size and county population density in 2010. We also control for residence in a southern state (South = 1). Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics for all of the measures described above. Table 2 displays the bivariate correlations between these variables.

Analytic Strategy

Recall that our outcome measure is the Othering of Obama. This measure is ordinal with three response categories. We therefore use ordinal logistic regression. In addition, an examination of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) indicates that multicollinearity is not a concern in our mod- els. In what follows, the analyses (1) assess whether our two measures of racial prejudice predict “othering” beliefs about Obama, namely, that he was born outside the United States and is a Muslim and (2) examine the extent to which the hypothesized intervening variables carry the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable.

Results

Theories from the black descriptive representation literature suggest that whites may react nega- tively to the presence of black elected officials. In addition, the literature on contemporary racial discourse suggests that whites often voice seemingly nonracist frames when making statements about racial/ethnic minorities. We bring these themes together and test our hypotheses about racial attitudes and mediating factors in Table 3.

Table 3 presents the regression results for the ordinal logistic regression predicting whites’ othering of Obama. They show the estimated effects of the two measures of racial prejudice, net of the controls, on the degree to which whites endorse “othering” beliefs about Obama. Specifically, these estimates contrast the log odds of being in a higher category on the outcome variable—endorsing one belief rather than none and endorsing both beliefs rather than only one—with the log odds of falling in a lower category. In light of our theoretical discussion of possible distinctions between those who express racial resentment and those who express tradi- tional racism, we address this contrast when discussing each model.

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Tope et al. 461

Model 1 shows that, net of other factors, both racial resentment and traditional stereotypes are associated with othering Obama (p < .001). The effects of the two measures of racial attitudes on othering are both of a sizable magnitude. To illustrate, the odds ratios (not shown) reveal that the odds of being in a higher category on the outcome variable—that is, of endorsing a larger number of othering characterizations—increase by 135 percent with each unit increase in Racial Resentment (odds ratio = 2.351). Likewise, the findings indicate that each unit increase on the Relative Racial Stereotypes measure increases the odds of falling into a higher category on the outcome variable by 22 percent (odds ratio = 1.223).

We turn now to our mediation hypotheses. As a preliminary step, we examined whether the measures of symbolic and explicit prejudice were associated with whites’ perceptions of the racialized consequences of an Obama presidency and whites’ emotional reactions to things Obama has said and done. These models are shown in the appendix. They show that Racial Resentment is significantly related to all three mediators, whereas Relative Racial Stereotypes is only associated with expectations about the racialized consequences of an Obama presidency.

To test for mediation, we used the Sobel–Goodman (henceforth Sobel) method available in STATA that follows the logic described in Reuben Baron and David Kenny (1986). Variables are considered mediators if they carry some part of the effect from an independent variable, here racial attitudes, onto a dependent variable, in our case othering Obama. Model 2 in Table 3 exam- ines the extent to which the relationship between racial resentment and othering is mediated by negative emotional reactions (i.e., anger) toward Obama. The model shows that negative emo- tions are predictive of othering (β = .639, p < .001). The odds ratio for this effect (not shown)

Table 3. Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Predicting Whites’ Othering of Obama (N = 1,595).

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

Variables b RSE b RSE b RSE b RSE b RSE

Reactions to Obama Negative emotional reaction — — .639*** .089 — — — — .476*** .100 Obama will worsen race relations — — — — .611*** .086 — — .412*** .094 Obama will favor blacks — — — — — — .699** .213 .322 .215 Racial attitudes Racial resentment .855*** .117 .562*** .114 .596*** .118 .824*** .120 .439*** .117 Relative racial stereotypes .201*** .053 .224*** .057 .169** .053 .184*** .053 .188** .056 Individual characteristics Male −.432** .158 −.514** .166 −.433* .167 −.430** .158 −.493** .171 Age .018*** .005 .020*** .005 .016** .005 .019*** .005 .018** .006 Education −.046 .052 −.081 .056 −.058 .053 −.029 .052 −.072 .057 Income −.070** .022 −.087*** .024 −.083*** .022 −.072** .022 −.092*** .024 Born-again .270 .166 .230 .164 .321 .166 .261 .161 .273 .165 Patriotism .055 .142 .003 .148 .078 .144 .002 .145 .007 .148 Conservatism .386*** .097 .152 .111 .299** .099 .352*** .098 .139 .111 Republican .286 .173 .017 .190 .236 .181 .224 .173 .030 .192 Fox TV consumption .024 .028 .004 .033 .008 .030 .018 .028 −.003 .033 County characteristics Percent voting Republican .011 .007 .004 .007 .006 .008 .008 .007 .001 .008 Percent black .009 .010 .008 .009 .011 .010 .008 .010 .008 .010 Unemployment rate −.033 .065 −.045 .065 −.068 .071 −.034 .067 −.059 .069 Educational inequality .019 .021 .023 .022 .028 .022 .019 .021 .028 .023 Population structure −.170*** .048 −.200*** .047 −.172*** .049 −.182*** .050 −.200*** .048 South −.054 .194 −.055 .207 −.091 .203 −.017 .195 −.055 .214 Nagelkerke R2 .355 .405 .395 .365 .423

Note. b = unstandardized regression coefficient; RSE = robust standard error clustered by county. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 (two-tailed).

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462 Sociological Perspectives 57(4)

reveals that each unit increase in negative emotions increases the odds of endorsing a larger rather than smaller number of othering characterizations about Obama by 89 percent (odds ratio = 1.894). And the Sobel test shows that emotions significantly mediate the relationship between racial resentment and othering (z = 3.97, p < .001). Also, as we suspected, the mediation test shows that negative emotions did not play mediating role between belief in explicit stereo- types and othering.

Model 3 examines the mediating potential of believing that Obama will worsen race rela- tions. The model shows that all else equal, this belief is significantly predictive of othering (β = .611, p < .001). A one-unit increase in the Obama Will Worsen Race Relations variable is associated with an 84 percent increase in the odds of endorsing a larger rather smaller number of such characterizations (odds ratio = 1.843). Supporting our hypothesis, the Sobel test reveals that stating Obama will worsen race relations significantly mediates the relationship between racial resentment and othering (z = 3.974, p < .001). In addition, and contrary to our expecta- tions, the Sobel test shows that indicating that Obama will worsen race relations plays a modest partial mediation role (z = 2.433, p < .05) between subscribing to explicit stereotypes and othering.

Model 4 addresses the extent to which believing that Obama will favor blacks mediates the relationship between racial resentment and othering. The model suggests a positive association between this belief and othering (β = .699, p < .001). Endorsing this belief increases the odds of adopting a larger rather smaller number of othering characterizations by 101 percent (odds ratio = 2.011). Yet interestingly, the Sobel test suggests that this sentiment neither plays a role in mediating the relationship between racial resentment and othering nor does it play a role with respect to subscribing to traditional stereotypes and othering.

Model 5, which includes all three mediators in the same equation, provides a comprehensive assessment that reaffirms our initial hypotheses that both racial resentment and subscribing to traditional racial attitudes are associated with othering Obama. The evidence here largely sug- gests that, as hypothesized, symbolic racial prejudice motivates whites’ “othering” of Obama by fostering concern about the racialized consequences of his election and negative affect in response to things he has said and done. By contrast, explicit prejudice appears to have a more direct effect on whites’ endorsement of beliefs that serve to construct Obama as a threatening outsider. Yet, the fact that concerns about the stability of race relations under Obama provides a small media- tion channel between traditional antiblack stereotypes and othering suggests that the effects of explicit prejudice are more nuanced than we predicted, occurring through both direct and indirect channels. Nevertheless, as we predicted and at least for the frames examined herein, the effect of racial resentment upon othering seems to be more substantially influenced by intervening factors.9

Discussion

The literature on black descriptive representation suggests that the election of black political leaders may prompt white animosity. In this study, we examined one form of white reaction to black political leadership—the repeated characterization of Barack Obama as a Muslim and/or a noncitizen interloper. Initially, we examined the role that both symbolic and explicit racial atti- tudes have played in the process of othering Obama. We then assessed the extent to which several intervening frames served as an indirect conduit to express whites’ racial enmity toward Obama. Below we discuss the principal implications of this study.

First, we found that symbolic prejudice or racial resentment is strongly associated with other- ing Obama. Yet higher levels of traditional antiminority views are also associated with casting Obama as an outsider who is not qualified to be president. Such characterizations presumably

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Tope et al. 463

supply increased motivation for opposing both his presidency and his policies through voting and protest. This finding fits with a broader concern among some whites about the potential out- come—problematic race relations and favoritism toward blacks—of increased black political influence (Reeves 1997; Sears and Henry 2005). These results are consistent with Leonie Huddy and Stanley Feldman’s (2009) argument that traditional racism continues to be politically conse- quential and that the overemphasis of late on symbolic racial resentment should not overshadow the continued role of more overt prejudice in politics.

Second, our analyses revealed that several frames served as partial mediating mechanisms that helped transmit some portion of racial attitudes to dubious characterizations of Obama. In par- ticular, for racially resentful whites, negative emotional frames about Obama and concerns about his potential to harm race relations appear to foster characterizations of Obama as a threatening outsider who is not qualified to be president. What is more, much of the effect of belief in tradi- tional stereotypes was transmitted directly to othering without the use of the frames we exam- ined. Yet, stated anxiety about Obama’s potential threat to race relations served as a modest partial mediator between belief in traditional stereotypes and othering Obama. Hence, while our results with respect to mediation were somewhat mixed, they largely supported our contention that subtle racial resentment is often linked to seemingly nonracist frames that can serve to sani- tize what might appear to be racially biased views. Conversely, those evincing traditional stereo- typical views seem less likely to rely on seemingly nonracist frames when casting Barack Obama as a Muslim or noncitizen.

Together, our findings suggest three important avenues for additional inquiry. First, research is needed that evaluates whether, as would be expected on the basis of group threat theory (see Blalock 1967), the adoption of “othering” beliefs about Obama in fact translated into more intense behavioral mobilization (e.g., voting and campaign donations) against his presidency in the 2008 and 2012 elections. Second, given the evidence that racism may have diminished among some segments of the population during the course of Obama’s campaign and presidency (Goldman 2012), future investigations should explore whether views on Obama’s citizenship and religion have been similarly dynamic. Finally, studies are needed that explore whether the relationships observed herein between general racial attitudes, spe- cific emotional and cognitive reactions to public figures, and threat-oriented beliefs about specific individuals are observed for other minority politicians, such as black mayors or senators.

Some argue that the United States has progressed from its overtly racialized past (Schuman et al. 1997). Yet, like other analysts (e.g., Hutchings and Valentino 2004, we contend that racial sentiments—both overt and symbolic—continue to play a major role in politics and in evalua- tions of prominent political figures. The symbolism of Obama as the United States’ first black president makes racial sentiments one of the most important forces that shape how he is per- ceived by whites. These findings complement and extend related research that suggests that racial attitudes shape candidate evaluations and policy preferences (e.g., Lewis-Beck and Tien 2008, 2009).

Finally, some research shows that black politicians with moderate race-neutral positions, who also gain strong job performance records, are ultimately de-racialized (e.g., Hajnal 2007). Yet for Obama, it remains to be seen whether this is a possibility at least in the near term. At this point, such a positive outcome seems unlikely for a figure that has been so thoroughly and persistently othered and whose very presence has elicited visceral threat-oriented responses among some citi- zens. Indeed, in light of the United States’ rapidly shifting demographics and Tesler and Sears’ (2010:9) caution that “the election of Barack Obama may well have been the watershed to another of America’s periodic hyperracial political eras,” we should expect that racial and ethnic forces will shape U.S. politics for the foreseeable future.

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464 Sociological Perspectives 57(4)

Appendix Analyses of the Effects of Racial Attitudes on Whites’ Beliefs about an Obama Presidency and Emotional Reactions to Things Obama Has Done (N = 1,595).

Model 1: Obama will favor blacks

Model 2: Obama will worsen race relations

Model 3: Negative emotional reactions

Variables b SE Standard

coefficient b SE Standard

coefficient b SE Standard

coefficient

Racial attitudes Racial resentment .307** .088 .145 .311*** .032 .330 .458*** .043 .334 Relative racial stereotypes .215** .073 .133 .075** .029 .104 .007 .028 .007 Individual characteristics Male .051 .139 .011 −.018 .049 −.009 .099 .062 .034 Age −.005 .005 −.039 .001 .002 .015 −.000 .002 −.003 Education −.081 .055 −.055 .004 .018 .006 .038 .022 .040 Income .031 .024 .048 .014 .008 .050 .017 .010 .040 Born-again .234 .223 .037 −.000 .077 −.000 .098 .079 .024 Patriotism .213 .118 .078 −.047 .042 −.038 .039 .049 .022 Conservatism .182* .081 .098 .146*** .033 .176 .373*** .036 .308 Republican .747*** .184 .158 .145* .065 .069 .588*** .084 .192 Fox TV consumption .164*** .043 .173 .022 .012 .053 .034* .015 .056 County characteristics Percent voting Republican .027*** .008 .158 .007* .003 .089 .010** .003 .093 Percent black .016 .008 .076 −.002 .003 −.020 .000 .004 .002 Unemployment rate .033 .060 .019 .046 .025 .058 .012 .026 .010 Educational inequality .006 .023 .009 −.010 .008 −.032 −.006 .009 −.012 Population structure .062 .052 .053 −.002 .020 −.005 .021 .024 .027 South −.512** .190 −.102 .069 .071 .031 .007 .091 .002 χ2 266.75*** — — Nagelkerke R2 .322 — — R2 — .346 .586

Note. Model 1 is estimated with logistic regression. Models 2 and 3 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression. b = unstandardized regression coefficient; SE = robust standard error clustered by county. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 (two-tailed).

Acknowledgment

The authors thank the editor(s) and reviewers for their feedback, Terrence Hill for advice on mediation analysis, and Hernan Ramirez for comments on a prior draft.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. Studies by Zoltan Hajnal (2001, 2007) provide important exceptions. He examines the relationship between white racial attitudes and black mayors. His “information hypothesis” suggests that fear of and a general lack of information about black candidates can prompt white resistance. But because

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Tope et al. 465

mayors must be responsive to a broad constituency, whites learn that the presence of a black mayor is not to their detriment. This new information, Hajnal argues, provides actual experience with a black incumbent that can diminish racial fears and stereotypes (also see Columb and Plant 2011).

2. Our study is subject to the criticisms evident in the broader literature on racial resentment. The ongo- ing debate suggests that symbolic forms of racism may overlap with conservative political ideology (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997). Yet more recent research suggests that racial resentment is a unique measure in its own right apart from conservatism and views about the appropriate role of the state (Tarman and Sears 2005; Valentino and Sears 2005).

3. Some may be concerned that symbolic racism is not much different from traditional racism. While these measures tend to be correlated, extant theory and research suggest that they are distinct. White support for symbolic racism is much greater than support for traditional racism. Fewer than 10 percent of whites openly subscribe to traditional racism (Henry and Sears 2002; Kinder and Sanders 1996). In addition, factor analyses have shown that traditional racism and symbolic racism constitute two separate dimensions of racial attitudes (Sears and Henry 2005; also see Sears, van Laar, Carillo, and Kosterman1997).

4. We use the terms “intervening variable” and “mediator” interchangeably. 5. There is the possibility that respondents may voice but not actually believe these characterizations of

Obama. Nevertheless, we suggest there is value in using responses to these survey items to test theories that link racial attitudes to othering.

6. We cannot rule out the possibility that our mediators might constitute additional measures of racial resentment. Yet we have no theoretical reason for assuming that this is the case. Indeed, there is a sub- stantial literature focused on the theoretical and empirical uniqueness of measures of racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears and Henry 2003).

7. The Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) data include respondents’ ZIP codes but not their specific county of residence. We thus used the ZIP codes to match respondents to counties. A minority of the ZIP codes crossed county lines. In these cases, we matched respondents to the primary county for that ZIP code—that is, the county that included the largest proportion of the ZIP code.

8. The coefficient of variation was estimated with a STATA program “ineqdeco” that can be used to cal- culate inequality.

9. Endogeneity is a potential concern in our analyses. Moreover, because our data are cross-sectional, we

must rely on theory to draw inferences about the direction of the predicted and observed effects.

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Author Biographies

Daniel Tope, PhD, is an associate professor of sociology at Florida State University. His research focuses on politics, race, and work. His current projects address the role of racial attitudes in politics as well as the determinants of state variations in social and economic policy.

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Justin T. Pickett, PhD, is an assistant professor in the School of Criminal Justice at the University at Albany, The State University of New York (SUNY). His research interests center broadly on public opinion about criminal justice. He is currently comparing different methods for measuring ambiguity in risk percep- tions and examining the role of intergroup contact as a determinant of Israeli Jews’ views about conciliatory solutions to the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict.

Ryon J. Cobb, PhD, is a postdoctoral scholar at the Roybal Institute on Aging at the University of Southern California. His research interests are in minority health and aging, social epidemiology, social psychology, and race and ethnic relations.

Jonathan Dirlam, MA, is a doctoral student in sociology at Ohio State University. His interests are in crime, deviance, health, and research methods.

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