Moral Questions

Introduction to Moral Reasoning

T O M R E G A N

1. Som e W ays Not to A nsw er M oral Questions M oral Judgm ents and Personal Preferences: Som e people like clas­

sical m usic; others do not. Som e people think bourbon is just great; others detest its taste. Som e people will go to a lot o f trouble to spend an afternoon in the hot sun at the beach; others can think of n othing worse. In all these cases d isagreem ent in preference exists. Som eone likes som ething; som eone else does not. Are moral disagreem ents, d isagreem ents over w hether som ething is m orally right or wrong, the sam e as d isagreem ents in preference?

It does not appear so. For one thing, w hen a person (say, John) says he likes som ething, he is not denying what another person (Jane) says, if she says she d oes not like it. Sup pose John says "I [John) like bou rbon ," and Jane says "I [Jane] do not like b ourbon ." Then clearly Jan e does not deny w hat John says. T o deny w hat John says, Jan e would have to say "Y o u [John] d o not like b ourbon ," w hich is not what she says. So, in general, w hen two persons express conflicting personal preferences, the one d oes not deny w hat the other affirm s. It is perfectly possible for two conflicting expressions of personal preference to be true at the sam e time.

W hen tw o people express conflicting ju d gm ents about the m o­ rality of som ething, how ever, the d isagreem ent is im portantly different. Suppose John says "A bo rtion is alw ays w ron g," while Jane says "A bo rtion is never w ron g." Then Jane is denying what John affirm s; she is denying that abortion is alw ays w rong, so that, if w hat she said w ere true, what Jo h n said would have to be false. Som e philosophers have denied this. They have m aintained that m oral ju d gm ents should be understood as expressions of personal preferences. Though this view deserves to be m entioned with respect, it is doubtful that it is correct. W hen people say that som ething is m orally right or w rong, it is alw ays appropriate to ask them to give reasons to support their judgm ent, reasons for accept­ ing their ju d gm ent as correct. In the case o f personal preferences, how ever, such requests are inappropriate. If John says he likes to go to the beach, it hardly seem s apt to press him to give reasons to

In trod u ction to M oral R eason ing / 31

supp ort his judgm ent; indeed, it hardly seem s that he has m ade a ju dgm en t at all. If he says abortion is alw ays w rong, how ever, a ju d g m ent has been expressed, and it is highly relevant to press John for his reasons for thinking w hat he does. If he w ere to reply that he had no reasons, that he just did not like abortions, it would not be out o f place to com plain that he speaks in a m isleading way. By saying that abortion is w rong, John leads his listeners to believe that he is m aking a ju d gm ent about abortion, not m erely expressing som e fact about him self. If all that he m eans is that he personally does not like abortions, that is w hat he should say, not that abortion is wrong.

This d ifference betw een conflicting expressions of personal p reference and conflicting m oral judgm ents points to one way not to answ er m oral questions. Given that m oral judgm ents are not just e xpressions o f personal preference, it follow s that moral right and w rong cannot be determ ined by finding out about the personal preferences of som e particu lar p e rso n —say, John. This is true even in the case o f ou r ow n preferences. O ur personal preferences are im portant certainly, but we do not answ er moral questions by saying w hat we like or dislike.

M oral Judgm ents and Feelings: Closely connected with personal preferences are a person's feelings, and som e philosophers have m aintained that w ords like 'rig h t' and 'w ron g ' are devices we use to express how we feel about som ething. On this view, when Jane says that abortion is never w rong, w hat she conveys is that she has certain positive feelings (or at least that she does not have any feelings o f d isapproval) toward abortion, w hereas when John says abortion is alw ays wrong, what he conveys is that he does have feelings of disapproval. This position encou nters problem s of the sam e kind as those raised in the previous section. It is alw ays appropriate to ask that support be given for a moral judgm ent. It is not appropriate to ask for support in the case of m ere expressions of feeling. True, if John is sincere, one can infer that he has strong negative feelings about abortion. But his saying that abortion is alw ays w rong does not appear to be sim ply a way of venting his feelings. As in the case of a p erson's preferences, so also in the case o f a person 's feelings: neither by itself provides answ ers to moral questions.

W hy Thinking It Is So Does N ot M ake It So; The sam e is true about w hat som eone thinks. Q uite aside from his feelings, John, if he is sincere, does think that abortion is alw ays wrong. N evertheless, if

32 / Tom Regan

his ju d gm ent (“A bortion is alw ays w ron g") is a moral judgm ent about the w rongness of abortion, w hat he m eans cannot b e "I [John] think that abortion is w ron g ." If it were, then he would not be affirm ing som ething that Jane denies, w hen she says "A bo rtion is never w rong." Each would m erely be stating that each thinks som ething, and it is certainly possible for it both to be true that John thinks that abortion is alw ays w rong and, at the sam e time, that Jane thinks that abortion is never w rong. So if John is denying w hat Jane affirm s, then he cannot m erely be stating that he thinks that abor­ tion is alw ays w rong. Thus, the fact that John thinks abortion is w rong is just as irrelevant to establishing its w rongness as the fact that he feels a certain way about it. And the sam e is true concerning the fact that we think what w e think. O ur thinking som ething right or w rong does not m ake it so.

The Irrelevance o f Statistics: Som eone m ight think that though w hat one person thinks or feels about m oral issues does not settle m atters, w hat all or m ost people think or feel does. A single ind i­ vidual is only one voice; w hat m ost or all people think or feel is a great deal m ore. There is strength in num bers. Thus, the correct method for answ ering questions about right and w rong is to find out what m ost or all people think or feel; op inion polls should be conducted, statistics com piled. T h at will reveal the truth.

This approach to moral questions is deficient. All that opinion polls can reveal is what all or m ost people think or feel about som e m oral q u e stio n —for exam ple, "Is capital punishm ent m orally right or w rong?" W hat such polls cannot determ ine is w hether w hat all or m ost people think about such an issue is true or that w hat all or m ost people feel is appropriate. There m ay be strength in num bers, but not truth, at least not necessarily. . . . M erely to establish that all (or m ost) people think that, say, capital punishm ent is m orally justified is not to establish that it is m orally justified. In tim es past, m ost (possibly even all) people thought the world is flat. And possibly m ost (or all) people felt pleased or relieved to think of the w orld as having this shape. But w hat they thought and felt did not m ake it true that the world is flat. The question of its shape had to be answ ered w ithout relying on what m ost people think or feel. There is no reason to believe m oral questions d iffer in this respect. Q uestions o f right and w rong cannot be answ ered just by counting heads.

The A ppeal to a M oral A uthority: Suppose it is conceded that we cannot answ er moral questions by finding out what som eone (say,

In trod u ctio n to M oral R easo n ing / 33

John) thinks or feels; or by finding out what all or m ost people think o r feel. A fter all, a single individual like John, or m ost or all people like him, m ight think o r feel one way when he or they should think or feel differently. But suppose there is a being w ho never is m istaken when it com es to moral questions: if this being ju d ges that som ething is m orally right, it is m orally right; if it is judged wrong, it is w rong. N o m istakes are made. Let us call such a being a "m oral au th ority." M ight appealing to a m oral authority be a satisfactory way to answ er moral questions?

M ost people who think there is a moral authority think that this being is not an ordinary person but a god. T his causes problem s im m ediately. W hether there is a god (or gods) is a very controver­ sial question, and to rest questions of right and w rong on what a god says (or the gods say) is already to base m orality on an intellec­ tually unsettled foundation. The d ifficulties go d eeper than this, how ever, since even if there is a god who is a moral authority, very serious questions must arise concerning w hether people have understood (or can understand) w hat this authority says about right and w rong. T he d ifficulties that exist w hen Jew s and Christians consu lt the Bible ("G o d 's revelation to m an ") can be taken as illustrative. Problem s of interpretation abound. Som e who think that d rinking is w rong think they find evidence in the Bible that G od thinks so too; others think they find evidence that He does not. Som e w ho think that hom osexuality is declared w rong by God cite w hat they think are supporting chapters and verses; others cite other chapters and verses that they think show God does not think hom osexuality is w rong, or they cite the sam e passages and argue that they should be interpreted differently. The gravity o f these and kindred problem s of interpretation should not be underestim ated. Even if there is a moral authority, and even if the god whom Jew s and C hristians w orship should happen to be this authority, that would not m ake it a sim ple m atter to find out what is right and w rong. The problem o f finding out what God thinks on these m atters would still remain. In view o f the fundam ental and long­ stand ing d isagreem ents concerning the correct interpretation o f the Bible, this would be no easy matter.

Problem s of interpretation aside, it is clear that the correct m ethod for answ ering m oral questions does not consist in discover­ ing w hat a m oral authority says. Even if there is a moral authority, those w ho are not m oral authorities can have no reason for thinking that there is one unless the ju d gm ents of this supposed authority

34 / Tom Regan

can be checked for their truth or reasonableness, and it is not possible to check for this unless w hat is true or reasonable can be know n independently of any reliance on w hat the supposed authority says. If, how ever, there m ust be som e independent w ay of know ing w hat m oral ju d gm ents are true or reasonable, the intro­ duction of a m oral authority will not succeed in providing a method for answ ering m oral questions. That m ethod will have to illum inate how w hat is m orally right and w rong can be know n independently of the supposed m oral authority, not how this can be know n by relying on such an authority.

2. The Ideal M oral Ju d g m e n t. . . W hat now need s to be described is an approach to m oral questions that is not open to the objections raised against the m ethods considered so far. T he approach described in w hat follow s turns on how the follow ing question is answ ered: "W h at requirem ents would som eone have to m eet to m ake an ideal moral ju d gm ent?" Considered ideally, that is, w hat are the cond itions that anyone would have to satisfy to reach a moral ju d gm ent as free from fault and error as possible? Now, by its very nature, an ideal m oral ju d gm ent is just th a t—an ideal. Perhaps no one ever has or ever will com pletely m eet all the requirem ents set forth in the ideal. But that does not m ake it irrational to strive to com e as close as possible to fulfilling it. If w e can never quite get to the finish, w e can still m ove som e d istance from the starting line.

There are at least six different ideas that m ust find a place in our d escription o f the ideal m oral judgm ent. A b rief discu ssion o f each follow s.

a. C onceptual C larity: . . . If som eone tells us that euthanasia is alw ays w rong, w e cannot d eterm ine w hether that statem ent is true b efore we understand w hat euthanasia is. Sim ilar rem arks apply to other controversies. In the case o f abortion, for exam ple, m any think the question turns on w hether the fetus is a person; and that will depend on w hat a person i s —that is, on how the concept 'p erson ' should be analyzed. Clarity by itself may not be enough, but thought cannot get far w ithout it.

h. Inform ation: W e cannot answ er m oral q uestions in ou r closets. M oral questions com e up in the real w orld, and a know ledge of the real-w orld setting in w hich they arise is essential if we are seriously

In trod uction to M oral R eason ing / 35

to seek rational answ ers to them. For exam ple, in the debate over the m orality of capital punishm ent, som e people argue that con­ victed m urderers ou ght to be executed because, if they are not, they m ay be (and often are) paroled; and if they are paroled, they are m ore likely to kill again than are other released prisoners. Is this true? Is this a fact? W e have to com e out of our closets to answ er this (or to find the answ er others have reached on the basis of their research); and answ er it we m ust if we are to reach an informed ju d gm ent about the m orality o f capital punishm ent. . . . The im por­ tance of getting the facts, of being inform ed, is not restricted just to the case o f capital punishm ent by any m eans. It applies all across the broad sw eep o f moral inquiry.

c. R ationality: Rationality is a difficult concept to analyze. Fun­ dam entally, how ever, it involves the ability to recognize the connection betw een different ideas, to understand that if some statem ents are true, then som e other statem ents m ust be true while others m ust be false. Now, it is in logic that rules are set forth that tell us when statem ents do follow from others, and it is because of this that a person w ho is rational often is said to be logical. W hen w e speak of the need to be rational, then, we are saying that we need to observe the rules of logic. T o reach an ideal moral ju d g ­ ment, therefore, w e must not only strive to m ake our judgm ent against a background of inform ation and conceptual clarity; we m ust also take care to explore how our beliefs are logically related to other things that we do or do not believe. . . . To fall short of the ideal m oral ju d gm ent by com m itting oneself to a contradiction is to fall as far short as one possibly can.

d. Im partiality: Partiality involves favoring som eone or som e­ thing above others. For exam ple, if a father is partial to one of his children, then he will be inclined to give the favored child more than he gives his other children. In som e cases, perhaps, partiality is a fine thing; but a partiality that excludes even thinking about or taking notice o f the needs, interests, and d esires of others seem s far from w hat is needed in an ideal moral judgm ent. The fact that som eone has been harm ed, for exam ple, alw ays seem s to be a relevant consideration, w hether this som eone is favored by us or not. In striving to reach the correct answ er to moral questions, therefore, we must strive to guard against extrem e, unquestioned

36 / Tom Regan

partiality; otherw ise we shall run the risk o f having ou r judgm ent clouded by bigotry and prejudice.

e. Coolness: All of us know w hat it is like to do som ething in the heat of anger that w e later regret. N o d oubt w e have also had the experien ce of getting so excited that w e do som ething that later on we w ish w e had not done. Em otions are pow erful forces, and though life would be a dull w asteland w ithout them , w e need to appreciate that the m ore volatile am ong them can m islead us; strong em otion is not a reliable guide to doing (or judging) w hat is best. This brings us to the need to be "c o o l." 'B ein g cool' here m eans "n o t being in an em otionally excited state, being in an em otionally calm state of m ind ." The idea is that the hotter (the m ore em otion­ ally charged) we are, the m ore likely we are to reach a m istaken m oral conclusion, while the cooler (the calm er) we are, the greater the chances that w e will avoid . . . m aking m istakes.

The position is borne out by com m on experience. People w ho are in a terribly excited state m ay not be able to retain their rational­ ity. Because o f their deep em otional involvem ent, they m ay not be able to attain im partiality; and because they are in an excited em otional state, they may not even care about learning what happened or why. Like the proverb about shooting first and asking questions later, a lack o f coolness can easily lead people to ju d ge first and ask about the facts afterw ards. The need to be "co o l," then, seem s to m erit a place on ou r list.

/. Correct M oral Principles: The concept o f a m oral principle has been analyzed in d ifferent w ays. At least this much seem s clear, how ever: For a principle to be a moral principle (as distinct from, say, a scientific or legal principle), it must d eclare how all rational, free beings ou ght to act. The explanation o f why a m oral principle can apply only to free beings (those having free w ill) is as follow s. Beings w ho lack free will cannot control how they behave; the only way they can behave is as they do behave, w hich m akes it pointless to say how they ought to behave. Beings who have free will, how ­ ever, can control how they behave; it is up to them w hether they choose to act in one way rather than another; and thus it is m ean­ ingful to say that they ought or ou ght not to act in certain ways.

The explanation of why moral principles are restricted to ra­ tional beings is sim ilar. The w hole point of a moral principle is to provide rational guidance to b eings faced w ith choices am ong

In trod u ctio n to M oral R eason ing / 37

various alternatives. It would therefore be senseless to think that m oral principles apply to things (for exam ple, sticks and stones) incapable of being guided by w hat is rational. O nly rational beings can be guided by rational principles. Thus, it is only to rational b eings that m oral principles can apply.

Now , it is com m only thought that hum an beings have free will and are rational beings. At least this is com m only thought to be true o f m ost hum ans. Sm all babies and severely m entally deficient hum ans, for exam ple, are unable to m ake free choices based on reason. Thus, they cannot be guided by moral principles, and moral principles cannot apply to their conduct. M ost hum ans, how ever, do have the capacity to reason. W hether they also have free will is far less certain. The existence of free will is one of the oldest and m ost controversial o f philosophy's problem s, one that is well beyond the scope of this anthology. For present purposes, it is enough to realize that m oral principles can apply only to rational, free b eings and that the contributors all assum e that their readers are likely to be am ongst those beings to w hom these principles do apply.

How does the idea o f a correct m oral principle relate to the con­ cept of an ideal m oral judgm ent? In an ideal moral judgm ent, it is not enou gh that the ju d gm ent be based on com plete inform ation, com plete im partiality, com plete conceptual clarity, etc. It is also essential that the ju d gm ent be based on the correct or the most reasonable m oral principle(s). Ideally, one wants not only to make the correct judgm ent, but to m ake it for the correct re a s o n s .. . .

3. N orm ative Ethics P hilosophers engaged in norm ative ethics attem pt to go beyond the questions concerning method that arise in m eta-ethics; the goal they set them selves is nothing short o f d eterm ining what are the correct m oral p rin cip les—those principles, that is, by w hich all free, rational beings ou ght m orally to be guided. Thus, there is an im portant connection betw een the goal of norm ative ethics and the concept o f an ideal m oral judgm ent. An ideal moral judgm ent, we have said, m ust be based on correct moral principles, and it is just the question 'W h at principles are the correct ones?' that is at the heart o f norm ative ethics. U nless the norm ative ethical philosopher succeeds in stating w hat are the correct m oral principles, there can be no hope of even approaching the ideal moral judgm ent.

38 / Tom Regan

W hat then are the correct m oral principles? Not surprisingly, a variety of answ ers has been offered. Not all of them can be consid­ ered here, and no one can be considered in m uch detail. But enough can be said to m ake som e im portant ideas intelligible.

C o n s e q u e n t i a l Theories: O ne way to begin the search for the correct m oral principle(s) is to think about cases w here w e all believe that som ething w rong has been done. H ow ever, it is im portant to understand that the class of persons referred to by the expression 'w e all believe' is not necessarily as universal as it m ight at first appear. For suppose that H enry's b elief or ju d gm ent is based on very sketchy inform ation, or w as formed in the heat of anger, or is a product of unquestioned prejudice. Then H enry's b elief does not com pute, so to speak; that is, b ecause H enry's ju d gm ent falls so far short o f the ideal m oral judgm ent, w e are justified in (that is, we have good reasons for) exclud ing it. Thus, the persons referred to by 'w e all believe' are not ju st anybody and everybody; they are only those persons w ho m ost fully satisfy the first five cond itions of the ideal moral ju d gm ent explained previously — those w ho are concep­ tually clear, inform ed, rational, im partial, and cool. It is the beliefs o f these persons, not the beliefs of those w ho are prejudiced, say, that provide us w ith a place to begin the search for the final elem ent in the ideal m oral ju d g m e n t—nam ely, the correct m oral principle(s). So, by saying that a place to begin this search is w ith "w h a t we all b eliev e," w e do not contradict w hat w as said earlier about the irrelevance of statistics. W hat w as said there still rem ains true: M erely to establish what all (or m ost) people think or believe about m oral q uestions is not to establish what is right or w rong, let alone why it is.

So let us begin with a case w here those w ho m ost fully ap­ proach the requirem ents of im partiality, conceptual clarity, etc. would all agree that som ething w rong has been done. For exam ple, im agine that Beth has a favorite record. She enjoys listening to it and likes to share it w ith her friends. Sue likes the record too, and could afford to buy it, only then she could not afford to buy som e­ thing else she wants but does not need. So, Sue steals the record. As a result, Beth experien ces som e unhappiness. W hen she thinks about the m issing record, she is d istraught and frustrated, and the enjoym en t she would have had, if Sue had not stolen the record, is canceled. Beth, then, is w orse off, both in term s o f the unhappiness she experien ces and in term s o f lost enjoym ent. Thinkin g along these lines has led som e philosophers to theorize that w hat m akes

In tro d u ction to M oral R eason ing / 39

stealing w rong is that it is the cau se o f bad resu lts—for exam ple, it causes such experien ces as the frustration and disappointm ent Beth feels.

Next im agine this case. Sup pose there is a certain country that forbids black people from being in public after six o'clock. Bill, who is black, could get a job and support his fam ily if the law did not prevent his free m ovem ent. As it is, he is chronically unem ployed, and he and his fam ily suffer accordingly. Thus, like the case of stealing, here we again have som ething that is the cau se o f bad results, and som e philosophers have theorized that it is this fact that m akes the law in question unjust.

M any philosophers have not stopped w ith the cases of stealing and injustice. Roughly speaking, the one com m on and peculiar characteristic o f every w rong action, they have theorized, is that it leads to bad results, w hereas the one com m on and peculiar charac­ teristic o f every right action, again roughly speaking, is that it leads to good results. P hilosophers w ho accept this type of view com ­ m only are referred to as consequentialists, an appropriate name, given their strong em phasis on the results or consequences of actions. Theories o f this type are also called teleological theories, from the G reek telos, m eaning "e n d " or "p u rp o se," another fitting name, since, according to these thinkers, actions are not right or w rong in them selves; they are right or w rong, according to these theories, if they prom ote or frustrate the purpose of m orality —nam ely, to bring about the greatest possible balance of good over evil.

Now, in norm ative ethics, w hen som eone advances a principle that states w hat m akes all right actions right and all w rong actions w rong, they do so in the cou rse o f ad vancing a norm ative ethical theory. Theoretically, there are at least three different types of teleological, norm ative ethical theories.

1. Ethical egoism : A ccording to this theory, roughly speak­ ing, w hether any person (A) has done what is m orally right or w rong d ep end s solely on how good or bad the consequences o f A 's action are f o r A. How others are af­ fected is irrelevant, unless how they are affected in turn alters the consequences for A.

2. Ethical altruism : A ccording to this theory, roughly speak­ ing, w hether any person (B) has done w hat is m orally right or w rong depends solely on how good or bad the

40 / Tom Regan

consequences of B 's action are for everyone except B. How B is affected is irrelevant, unless how B is affected in turn alters the consequences for anyone else.

3. Utilitarianism : A ccording to this theory, roughly speak­ ing, w hether any person (C) has done w hat is m orally right or w rong d epends solely on how good or bad the consequences o f C 's action are fo r everyone affected. Thus, how C is affected is relevant; but so is how others are af­ fected. How everyon e concerned is affected by the good or bad consequences is relevant.

These are not very exact statem ents o f these three types of teleologi- cal, norm ative ethical theories, but enough has been said about tw o o f th e m —nam ely, ethical egoism and ethical altru ism —to enable us to understand why m ost philosophers find them unsatisfactory. Both seem to fall far short of the ideal o f im partiality, ethical egoism b ecause it seem s to place arbitrary and exclusive im portance on the good or w elfare of the individual agent, and ethical altruism b ecau se it seem s to place arbitrary and exclusive im portance on the good or w elfare of everyone else. M oreover, both theories arguably lead to consequences that clash with undoubted cases of wrong action. This is perhaps clearest in the case o f ethical egoism . Pro­ vided only that, all things considered, stealing the record did not lead to less than the b est results f o r Sue, w hat she did w as not m orally wrong, according to ethical egoism . But that is som ething we would m ost likely deny. Faced w ith the choice b etw een accept­ ing ethical egoism or giving up that w hat Sue did w as w rong, most philosophers choose to reject the theory and retain the conviction.

It is utilitarianism , then, that seem s to represent the strongest possible type o f teleological theory. Certainly it is the one that has attracted the m ost adherents; not unexpectedly, therefore, it is the one that figures m ost prom inently in the essays in this volum e. It will be w orth ou r w hile, therefore, to exam ine it at slightly greater length.

Utilitarianism : 'T h e Principle o f Utility' is the nam e given to the fundam ental principal advocated by those w ho are called utilitari­ ans. This principle has been form ulated in different ways. H ere is a com m on form ulation:

In trod u ctio n to M oral R easo n ing / 41

Everyone ought to act so as to bring about the greatest pos­ sible balance of intrinsic good over intrinsic evil for every­ one concerned.

A lready it m ust be em phasized that utilitarians do not agree on everything. In particular, they do not all agree on what is intrinsi­ cally good and evil. Som e philosophers (called ethical hedonists) think that pleasure and pleasure alone is intrinsically good (or good in itself), w hereas pain, or the absence o f pleasure, and this alone, is intrinsically evil (or evil in itself). O ther philosophers have different theories o f intrinsic good and evil. These troubled w aters can be bypassed, how ever, since the ideas o f special im portance for our purposes can be discussed independently of w hether ethical hedonism , for exam ple, is true.

Act- and R ule-U tilitarianism : O ne idea of special im portance is the difference betw een act-u tilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism . Acf-utilitarianism is the view that the P rinciple of Utility should be applied to individual actions; rule-utilitarianism states that the Principle o f U tility should be applied m ainly to rules of action. The act-utilitarian says that w henever people have to decide what to do, they ou ght to perform that act w hich will bring about the greatest possible balance of intrinsic good over intrinsic evil. T he rule- utilitarian says som ething different: People ought to do w hat is required by ju stified m oral rules. These are rules that would lead to the best possible consequences, all considered, if everyone w ere to abid e by them. If a justified rule unam biguously applies to a situation, and if no other justified moral rule applies, then the person in that situation ou ght to choose to do what the rule re­ quires, even if, in that particu lar situation, perform ing this act will not lead to the best consequences. Thus, act-utilitarians and rule- utilitarians, d espite the fact that both profess to be utilitarians, can reach opposing m oral judgm ents. An act that is w rong according to the rule-utilitarian, b ecause it is contrary to a justified m oral rule, m ight not be w rong according to the act-u tilitarian's position.

Som e Problem s f o r A ct-U tilitarianism : Is act-utilitarianism correct? M any philosophers answ er no. A m ong the reasons given against this theory is that act-u tilitarianism appears to imply that som e acts that are m ost certainly w rong m ight be right. Recall the exam p le of S u e 's stealing. A ccording to act-utilitarianism , w hether S u e's theft was m orally right or not d epends on this and this alone: W ere the net consequences o f her act at least as good as the consequences that

42 / Tom Regan

would have resulted if she had done anything else? Sup pose they were. Then act-utilitarianism would im ply that what she did was right. Y et her theft seem s clearly wrong. Thus, we again seem to be faced with a choice betw een eith er (a) retaining the conviction that Su e 's theft w as w rong, or (b) accepting the theory o f act- utilitarianism . W e cannot choose to have both. In the face of such a choice, reason seem s to be on the side o f retaining the conviction and rejecting the theory.

A ct-utilitarians actively defend their position against this line of criticism . The debate is am ong the liveliest and m ost im portant in norm ative ethics. The point that bears em phasis here is that rule- utilitarians do not believe that their version of utilitarianism can be refuted by the preceding argum ent. This is because they m aintain that S u e 's theft is w rong b ecause it violates a justified m oral ru le — the rule against stealing. Thus, the ru le-utilitarian hold s that his position not only does not lead to a conclusion that clashes with the conviction that Su e's theft is w rong; this position actually illum i­ nates w hy the theft is w ro n g —nam ely, becau se it violates a rule w hose adoption by everyone can be defended by an appeal to the Principle of Utility.

Som e Problem s f o r R u le-U tilitarianism : O ne success does not gu ar­ antee that all goes well, and m any philosophers think that rule- utilitarianism , too, is inadequate. T he m ost im portant objection turns on consid erations about justice. The point o f the objection is that rule-utilitarianism apparently could ju stify rules that would be grossly unjust. To m ake this clearer suppose there were a rule that discrim inated against persons becau se of the color o f their skin. Im agine this rule (R): "N o one with black skin will be perm itted in public after six o 'clo ck ." If w e think about R, its u nfairness jum ps out at us. It is unjust to d iscrim inate against people sim ply on the basis o f skin color. H ow ever, although it is clear that R would be unjust; m ight not R conceivably be justified by appealing to the Principle o f U tility? Certainly it seem s possible that every on e's acting according to R m ight bring about the greatest possible balance of intrinsic good over intrinsic evil. True, black people are not likely to benefit from everyon e's acting according to R. N ever­ theless, on balance, their loss m ight be m ore than outw eighed by non -black' gains, especially if blacks are a sm all m inority. Thus, if ru le-utilitarianism could be used to justify flagrantly unjust rules, it is not a satisfactory theory.

In trod uction to M oral R eason ing / 43

Can the rule-utilitarian meet this challenge? P hilosophers are not unanim ous in their answ er. As w as the case with the debate over the correctness of act-utilitarianism , this debate is too extensive to be exam ined further h e r e .. . .

N onconsequentialism : 'N onconsequ en tialism ' is a nam e fre­ quently given to norm ative ethical theories that are not form s of consequentialism . In other words, any theory that states that moral right and w rong are not determ ined solely by the relative balance of intrinsic good over intrinsic evil com m only is called a nonconse- quentialist theory. Theories o f this type are also called deontological theories, from the G reek deon, m eaning given "d u ty ." Such theories m ight be either (a) extrem e or (b) m oderate. An extrem e deontologi- cal theory holds that the intrinsic good and evil of consequences are totally irrelevant to d eterm ining what is m orally right or w rong. A m oderate non consequentialist theory holds that the intrinsic good and evil o f consequences are relevant to d eterm ining what is m orally right and w rong but that they are not the only things that are relevant and m ay not be o f greatest im portance in som e cases. A great variety of nonconsequentialist theories, both extrem e and m oderate, have been advanced. W hy have som e philosophers been attracted to such theories?

The Problem o f Injustice: A central argum ent advanced against all form s o f consequentialism by m any nonconsequentialists is that no consequentialist theory (no form o f ethical egoism , ethical altruism , or utilitarianism ) can account for basic convictions about ju stice and in ju stice—for exam ple, that it is unjust to deny Bill his liberty just b ecau se he is black. The point these d eontologists m ake is that to treat Bill unjustly not only is w rong; to treat him unjustly is to w rong or harm him. Fundam entally, according to these thinkers, it is b ecause people are wronged or harm ed when treated unjustly, quite apart from the value of the consequences this may have for everyone else involved, that all consequentialist theories ultim ately prove to be deficient.

Sup pose these d eontologists are correct. Som e deontological theory would then be called for. A num ber o f such theories have been advanced. Som e theorists, follow ing the lead of the G erm an philosopher Im m anuel Kant (1 7 2 4 —1804), have argued that injustice is w rong because it fails to show proper respect for free, rational beings; in particular, it involves treating such beings as m ere m eans to som eone else's end. Precisely what it m eans to treat som eone w ithout "p ro p e r resp ect" or as a "m ere m eans" is not

44 / Tom Regan

transparent. . . . T o understand this position requires understand ing the idea of basic moral rights.

Basic M oral Rights versus C orrelative M oral R ights: Basic m oral rights are rights that do tiot fo llo w fr o m any m ore b asic m oral princi­ ple. In particular, these rights do not follow from the Principle of Utility. It is d ifficu lt to overem p hasize this point. A utilitarian m ight be able to consistently m aintain that people have m oral rights in a certain sense; possibly he or she could allow that m oral rights are correlated w ith d u tie s —for exam ple, correlated w ith S u e 's duty not to steal B eth 's record is B eth 's m oral right not to have Sue (or anyone else) steal from her. H ow ever, for a utilitarian, m oral rights cannot be basic; at the very m ost they can be correlated w ith those d uties that, given the Principle o f Utility, w e are supposed to have. Those w ho believe in basic m oral rights are of another m ind. For exam ple, if the right to life is a basic m oral right, then this right, not the Principle of Utility or any other m oral principle, is the ground or basis of the duty not to take the life o f another person. In a word, basic m oral rights, if there are any, are them selves the ground s of m oral duties, not vice ivrsa.

Both those who believe in b asic moral rights and those w ho be­ lieve that moral rights are correlated w ith m oral d uties can agree on certain points about m oral rights. In particular, both can agree that the concept of a m oral right d iffers from the concept o f a legal right. An explanation of som e principal differences follow s.

4. Legal Rights and M oral Rights First, m oral rights, if there are any, are universal, w hile legal rights need not be. Legal rights depend upon the law' o f this or that country and w hat is a m atter o f legal right in one country may not be so in another. For exam ple, in the United States any citizen eighteen years old or old er has the legal right to vote in federal elections; but not everyone in every nation has this sam e legal right. If, how ever, persons living in the United States have a m oral right to, say, life, then every person in every nation has this sam e moral right, w hether or not it is also recognized as a legal right.

Second, moral rights are equal rights. If all persons have a moral right to life, then all have this right equally; it is not a right that som e (for exam ple, m ales) can possess to a greater extent than others (for exam ple, fem ales). N either, then, could this m oral right be possessed to a greater extent by the inhabitants o f one country (for exam ple, on e's ow n) than by the inhabitants of som e other

In tro d u ction to M oral R eason ing / 45

country (for exam ple, a country with w hich on e's ow n country is w aging w a r ) .. . .

Third, m oral rights are inalienable, m eaning they cannot be transferred to a n o th e r—for exam ple, they cannot be lent or sold. If Bill has a m oral right to life, then it is his and it cannot becom e anyone else's. Bill m ay give his life for his country, sacrifice it in the nam e o f science, o r destroy it him self in a fit o f rage or despair. But he cannot give, sacrifice, or destroy his right to life. W hether he can do anything that, so to speak, cancels his right (the m ore com m on term inology is 'forfeit his right') is an im portant and difficult q u e s tio n .. . .

5. Legal Ju stice and M oral Justice M oral and legal rights are connected in im portant ways w ith moral and legal justice. Legal justice requires that one respect the legal rights o f everyone, w hile m oral justice d em ands that every one's m oral rights be honored. The tw o —legal justice and moral ju s tice — do not necessarily coincide. Law s them selves may be m orally unjust. For exam ple, a country m ight have a law that unfairly d iscrim inates against som e o f its inhabitants b ecause of their sex; im agine that it denies that wom en have a legal right to life but guarantees this legal right to all m ales. Then legal justice is done in this country if this law is enforced. But it does not follow that moral ju stice is done. That d epends not on w hether there is a law in this country, but on w hether the law recognizes and protects the moral rights o f the cou ntry 's inhabitants. If it does, then the law is both legally and m orally just; if it does not, then, though the law may be legally just, it lacks moral ju s tic e .. . .

6. What are Rights? W hether rights are moral or legal, basic or correlative, the question rem ains: W hat are rights? How is the concept o f a right to be analyzed ? V arious answ ers have been given, ranging from the view that rights are an individ ual's entitlem ents to be treated in certain w ays to the view that they are valid claim s that an individual can m ake, or have m ade on his or her behalf, to have o n e 's interests or w elfare taken into account. W hat is com m on to these answ ers is that a right involves the idea o f a ju stified constraint upon how others may act. If Beth has a right to x, then others are constrained not to interfere with her pursuit or possession o f x, at least so long as her pursuit or possession o f x does not com e into conflict with the rights

46 / Tom Regan

of others. If it does, Beth may be exceeding her rights, and a serious m oral question would arise. But aside from cases o f exceeding on e's rights and, as may som etim es be the case, o f forfeiting them , the possession of a right by one individual places a justified lim it on how other individuals may treat the person possessing the right. W hether rights are entitlem ents or valid claim s, and w hether they are basic or correlative, rights involve a justified constraint or lim itation on how others m ay a c t . . . .

One R ole o f the Principle o f Utility: All but the m ost extrem e non­ consequentialist can allow that an appeal to the Principle of Utility is alw ays relevant even if not alw ays decisive. Possibly utility has a role to play when the rights o f innocent persons conflict. T o illus­ trate this possibility, suppose a hijacker has attached to an innocent hostage a time bom b that, if it goes off, will kill ten other innocent persons; and suppose that the only possible way to prevent the bom b from going off is to kill the hostage. W hat ou ght to be done? If we kill the hostage, w e kill an innocent person; but if we do not kill the hostage, ten innocent persons will be killed. The innocence o f the persons involved may not be enou gh to give us moral direction. Possibly an appeal to the Principle o f Utility would. The point is, even if there are basic m oral rights, and even if the utilitar­ ian cannot account for them , one could both believe in b asic moral rights an d allow that the Principle of U tility should play som e role in ou r thinking about w hat is right and w ro n g —for exam ple, in cases w here the basic moral rights of innocent people c o n f lic t.. . .