

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 1768-2004

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“full-fledged social movement” or “the type of social movement that first emerged in Western Europe and North America at the end of the eighteenth century.” It certainly simplified the text.

Fortunately for friendship and future collaboration, in the book that most resembles this one with respect to argument and content, my friend and collaborator Sidney Tarrow explicitly disavows undertaking the social movement’s history (Tarrow 1998: 3). This book therefore picks up where Tarrow’s splendid survey of social movements leaves off. *Social Movements, 1768–2004* provides a historical survey of social movements from their eighteenth-century origins into the twenty-first century, ending with speculations about possible futures for social movements.

In order to avoid encumbering the text with references to my own previous publications, I have borrowed evidence freely from my earlier work, mostly without citing it. I have adapted a few passages from *Stories, Identities, and Political Change* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), and *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), but at least 95 percent of the text is quite new.

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I

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS POLITICS

“Building a strong pro-democracy social movement,” editorialized Zimbabwe’s *Harare Daily News* on 5 December 2002,

is always the task of civil society when operating under an oppressive political environment. . . . A starting point would be to be able to define a social movement. As the name suggests, social movements are inclusive organisations comprised of various interest groups. Social movements will contain the significant strata of society such as workers, women’s groups, students, youth and the intellectual component. These various interest sectors of society will be bound together by one common grievance which in most cases will be the commonly perceived lack of democracy in a specific political setting. This has been particularly the case within the last two decades of the South African antiapartheid struggle and more relevantly in the last four years in Zimbabwe. The only significant difference between the Zimbabwean situation and the antiapartheid social movement in South Africa is that the former tends to be less defined and less focused. In fact, in Zimbabwe people can sometimes be forgiven for thinking that the social movement has been split. (*Harare Daily News* 2002: 1)

Leaders of the opposition to Robert Mugabe’s violent, vindictive regime in the Zimbabwe of 2002 deplored the splits that the regime’s twinning of repression with co-optation had produced among their beleaguered country’s suffering citizens. They looked to South Africa’s earlier and more successful mass mobilization against apartheid as a model. They called for a larger, more effective social movement in opposition to tyranny and in favor of democracy. For the newspaper’s presumption in giving the opposition voice, Mugabe’s regime closed down the *Harare Daily News* in September 2003. On 17 September, regime forces arrested about one hundred people who dared to march through Harare protesting the newspaper’s closing and calling for a new constitution (*Economist* 2003b: 46).

As the Zimbabwean opposition sought to solve a political problem by calling for a social movement, it had plenty of company elsewhere. In 1997, the Manchester-based socialist journal *International Viewpoint* called for a “European social movement” to back workers’ rights as the European Commission moved toward cuts in social spending (*International Viewpoint* 1997). Through the following years, European activists—socialist and otherwise—continued to call for a genuine movement at a continental scale. A Europe-centered but worldwide network called Jubilee 2000 campaigned for eradication of Third World debt. According to one of its organizers:

A global social movement was built, united around this one issue. By 2000, after just four years of campaigning, there were Jubilee 2000 campaigns, of varying strengths and character, in 68 countries. The national campaigns were autonomous but shared overall goals, symbols, and information—and a tremendous sense of solidarity. The campaigns were based in countries as diverse as Angola and Japan, Colombia and Sweden, Honduras and Israel, Togo and the United States. The ability to cooperate and coordinate our campaigning was greatly enhanced by use of the Internet. (Pettifor 2001: 62; emphasis in original)

By 2004, many Europeans were looking hopefully at mobilization against global capital as the movement that would redeem the dashed hopes of European workers and the troubles of Third World countries as well.

Latin America and Asia chimed in as well: In March 2002, the website of the Costa Rica-based antidiarrhea group Rehydration Project posted an article by Sabir Mustafa, associate editor of the Dhaka *Financial Express*. Mustafa titled his article “Diarrhoea Control Becomes a Social Movement in Bangladesh” (Mustafa 2002). The article reported that great numbers of Bangladeshi “schoolteachers, religious leaders, voluntary organizations, village doctors, rural groups and even local auxiliary police forces” are actively promoting antidisease measures (especially oral rehydration therapy) to save children’s lives.

The hopeful appeal to social movements also rises across North America. In 1999, Canadian activist Murray Dobbin called for “building a social movement in Canada” to make sure that where the left-leaning New Democratic Party actually took office it did not abandon its constituency:

The most basic understanding of state theory tells us that when a social democratic party wins “power” in an election it really does no such thing. Senior bureaucrats, virtually all of whom are now schooled in neo-liberal ideology, operate as a fifth column to sabotage progressive policies. As well, when transnational corporations threaten a capital strike, as they did in Ontario and carried out in BC [British Columbia], NDP governments don’t have the “power” to stop them.

That is where social movements come in. And if we can’t get thousands of people into the streets (without having to spend hundreds of thousands of dol-

lars and do months of organizing) we can expect NDP governments to cave in to the very real power of corporations, exerted with breathtaking ferocity and on a daily basis. When it comes to social movements effectively confronting corporate power we have failed almost as badly as the NDP. (Dobbin 1999: 2)

By the turn of the twenty-first century, people all over the world recognized the term “social movement” as a trumpet call, as a counterweight to oppressive power, as a summons to popular action against a wide range of scourges.

It was not always so. Although popular risings of one kind or another have occurred across the world for thousands of years, what the *Harare Daily News* described as “inclusive organisations comprised of various interest groups” existed nowhere in the world three centuries ago. Then, during the later eighteenth century, people in Western Europe and North America began the fateful creation of a new political phenomenon. They began to create social movements. This book traces the history of that invented political form. It treats social movements as a distinctive form of contentious politics—contentious in the sense that social movements involve collective making of claims that, if realized, would conflict with someone else’s interests, politics in the sense that governments of one sort or another figure somehow in the claim making, whether as claimants, objects of claims, allies of the objects, or monitors of the contention (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001).

Social Movements, 1768–2004 shows that this particular version of contentious politics requires historical understanding. History helps because it explains why social movements incorporated some crucial features (for example, the disciplined street march) that separated the social movement from other sorts of politics. History also helps because it identifies significant *changes* in the operation of social movements (for example, the emergence of well-financed professional staffs and organizations specializing in the pursuit of social movement programs) and thus alerts us to the possibility of new changes in the future. History helps, finally, because it calls attention to the shifting political conditions that made social movements possible. If social movements begin to disappear, their disappearance will tell us that a major vehicle for ordinary people’s participation in public politics is waning. The rise and fall of social movements mark the expansion and contraction of democratic opportunities.

As it developed in the West after 1750, the social movement emerged from an innovative, consequential synthesis of three elements:

1. a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities (let us call it a *campaign*);
2. employment of combinations from among the following forms of political action: creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering (call the variable ensemble of performances the *social movement repertoire*); and

3. participants' concerted public representations of WUNC: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies (call them *WUNC displays*).

Unlike a one-time petition, declaration, or mass meeting, a *campaign* extends beyond any single event—although social movements often include petitions, declarations, and mass meetings. A campaign always links at least three parties: a group of self-designated claimants, some object(s) of claims, and a public of some kind. The claims may target governmental officials, but the “authorities” in question can also include owners of property, religious functionaries, and others whose actions (or failures to act) significantly affect the welfare of many people. Not the solo actions of claimants, object(s), or public, but interactions among the three, constitute a social movement. Even if a few zealots commit themselves to the movement night and day, furthermore, the bulk of participants move back and forth between public claim making and other activities, including the day-to-day organizing that sustains a campaign.

The social movement *repertoire* overlaps with the repertoires of other political phenomena such as trade union activity and electoral campaigns. During the twentieth century, special-purpose associations and crosscutting coalitions in particular began to do an enormous variety of political work across the world. But the integration of most or all of these performances into sustained campaigns marks off social movements from other varieties of politics.

The term WUNC sounds odd, but it represents something quite familiar. WUNC displays can take the form of statements, slogans, or labels that imply worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment: Citizens United for Justice, Signers of the Pledge, Supporters of the Constitution, and so on. Yet collective self-representations often act them out in idioms that local audiences will recognize, for example:

- *worthiness*: sober demeanor; neat clothing; presence of clergy, dignitaries, and mothers with children;
- *unity*: matching badges, headbands, banners, or costumes; marching in ranks; singing and chanting;
- *numbers*: headcounts, signatures on petitions, messages from constituents, filling streets;
- *commitment*: braving bad weather; visible participation by the old and handicapped; resistance to repression; ostentatious sacrifice, subscription, and/or benefaction.

Particular idioms vary enormously from one setting to another, but the general communication of WUNC connects those idioms.

Of course all three elements and their subdivisions had historical precedents. Well before 1750, to take an obvious case in point, Europe's Protestants had repeatedly mounted sustained public campaigns against Catholic authorities

on behalf of the right to practice their heretical faith. Europeans engaged in two centuries of civil wars and rebellions in which Protestant/Catholic divisions figured centrally (te Brake 1998). As for the repertoires, versions of special-purpose associations, public meetings, marches, and the other forms of political action existed individually long before their combination within social movements. We will soon see how social movement pioneers adapted, extended, and connected these forms of action. Displays of WUNC had long occurred in religious martyrdom, civic sacrifice, and resistance to conquest; only their regularization and their integration with the standard repertoire marked off social movement displays from their predecessors. No single element, but the *combination* of repertoire and WUNC displays within campaigns, created the social movement's distinctiveness.

Some overlapping political phenomena also emerged in the time of social movements. As later chapters will show in detail, political campaigns with their parties and electoral contests interacted extensively with social movements at times yet developed their own bodies of rights, obligations, personnel, and practices. At various times in the nineteenth century, workers in capitalist countries generally acquired rights to organize, assemble, strike, and speak collectively, sometimes winning those rights by means of social movement campaigns, performances, and WUNC displays. Organized interest groups such as manufacturers and medical professionals similarly achieved special political rights to speak and act collectively, although rarely by social movement means. Mostly, groups that already commanded substantial resources, connections, and prestige acquired rights through direct negotiation with governments.

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, most states that had established churches conceded to new religious sects at least the rights to assemble and speak if not to enforce their doctrines or practices on members. Separatist communities—religious, political, or lifestyle—have sometimes emerged from social movements, although most regimes have either repressed or contained such communities energetically. Organizations participating in social movements, furthermore, sometimes moved into these other political spheres: conducting political campaigns, establishing labor unions, creating durable interest groups, becoming religious sects, or forming separatist communities. These overlaps should not keep us from recognizing that after 1750 a distinctive body of law and practice grew up around social movements as such.

Interpretations of Social Movements

In a book titled *History of the French Social Movement from 1789 to the Present* (1850), German sociologist Lorenz von Stein introduced the term “social movement” into scholarly discussions of popular political striving (von Stein 1959). At first it conveyed the idea of a continuous, unitary process by which the whole working class gained self-consciousness and power. When von Stein wrote, Marx and Engels's *Communist Manifesto* (1848) had recently adopted just such a meaning

in its declaration that “All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority” (Marx & Engels 1958: I, 44).

Nevertheless, political analysts also spoke of social movements in the plural; in 1848, the German journal *Die Gegenwart* [The Present] declared that “social movements are in general nothing other than a first search for a valid historical outcome” (Wirtz 1981: 20). Most nineteenth-century analysts of social movements differentiated them by program, organization, and setting. Engels himself adopted the plural in his preface to the *Manifesto*’s English edition of 1888, remarking that “Wherever independent proletarian movements continued to show signs of life, they were ruthlessly hunted down” (Marx & Engels 1958: I, 26). From the later nineteenth century, political analysts not only regularly pluralized social movements but also extended them beyond organized proletarians to farmers, women, and a wide variety of other claimants (Heberle 1951: 2–11).

Names for political episodes gain weight when they carry widely recognized evaluations and when clear consequences follow from an episode’s acquisition of—or failure to acquire—the name. To call an event a riot, a brawl, or a case of genocide stigmatizes its participants. To tag an event as a landslide election, a military victory, or a peace settlement generally polishes the reputations of its organizers. When either happens widely, critics or supporters of disputed actions regularly try to make the labels stick: to label an enemy’s encounter with police a riot, to interpret a stalemate as a military victory, and so on. As our reports from Zimbabwe, the European Union, Bangladesh, and Canada suggest, the term “social movement” has acquired attractive overtones across the world. Consequently, participants, observers, and analysts who approve of an episode of popular collective action these days frequently call it a social movement, whether or not it involves the combination of campaign, repertoire, and WUNC displays.

In the cases of episodes of which parts clearly do meet the standards, furthermore, three confusions often arise.

1. Analysts and activists often extend the term “social movement” loosely to all relevant popular collective action, or at least all relevant popular collective action of which they approve. Feminists, for example, retroactively incorporate heroic women of the centuries before 1750 into the women’s movement, while for environmental activists any popular initiative anywhere on behalf of the environment becomes part of the worldwide environmental movement.
2. Analysts often confuse a movement’s collective action with the organizations and networks that support the action, or even consider the organizations and networks to *constitute* the movement, for example by identifying the environmental movement with the people, interpersonal networks, and advocacy organizations that favor environmental protection rather than the campaigns in which they engage.

3. Analysts often treat “the movement” as a single unitary actor, thus obscuring both a) the incessant jockeying and realignment that always go on within social movements and b) the interaction among activists, constituents, targets, authorities, allies, rivals, enemies, and audiences that makes up the changing texture of social movements.

Inflation of the term to include all sorts of popular collective action past and present, conflation of the movement with its supporting population, networks, or organizations, and treatment of movements as unitary actors do little harm in casual political discussion. In fact, within social movements they often aid recruitment, mobilization, and morale. But they badly handicap any effort to describe and explain how social movements actually work—especially when the point is to place social movements in history. That is the task at hand.

Let me make my own claims crystal clear. No one owns the term “social movement”; analysts, activists, and critics remain free to use the phrase as they want. But a distinctive way of pursuing public politics began to take shape in Western countries during the later eighteenth century, acquired widespread recognition in Western Europe and North America by the early nineteenth century, consolidated into a durable ensemble of elements by the middle of the same century, altered more slowly and incrementally after that point, spread widely through the Western world, and came to be called a social movement. That political complex combined three elements: 1) campaigns of collective claims on target authorities; 2) an array of claim-making performances including special-purpose associations, public meetings, media statements, and demonstrations; 3) public representations of the cause’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment. I am calling that historically specific complex a social movement. This book traces the history of that complex.

Despite incessant small-scale innovation and variation from one political setting to another, the social movement’s elements evolved and diffused as a connected whole. In that sense, the social movement has a history. The social movement’s history distinguishes it from the history of other political forms such as electoral campaigns, patriotic celebrations, displays of military force, investitures of public officials, and collective mourning. When this book refers to social movements, then, it does not mean all popular action, all the actions people ever take on behalf of a cause, all the people and organizations that back the same causes, or heroic actors that stand astride history. It means a particular, connected, evolving, historical set of political interactions and practices. It means the distinctive combination of campaign, repertoire, and WUNC displays.

By these exacting standards, do the Zimbabwean, European, Bangladeshi, and Canadian mobilizations with which we began qualify as social movements? Yes, mostly. In 2002 and 2003, Zimbabwe’s opposition was using such procedures of social movement claim making as demonstrations, meetings, and press releases in the face of a regime that treated any such claims as subversive. The Bangladeshi rehydration campaign straddled the boundary between routine governmental

public health measures and popular mobilization through associations, marches, and meetings. Confronted with an increasingly powerful European Union and the internationalization of capital, European workers were conducting difficult experiments in the extension of familiar national social movement routines to an international scale, as European organizers involved themselves energetically in coordinating worldwide campaigns concerning Third World debt, AIDS, and hundreds of other issues. By the turn of the twenty-first century, Canadian activists—including wary supporters of the New Democratic Party—could look back on almost two hundred years of associating, demonstrating, meeting, and making WUNC-style claims. Across important parts of the world, the social movement has become a familiar, generally reliable vehicle of popular politics (Buechler 2000, Edelman 2001, Ibarra & Tejerina 1998, Mamdani & Wamba-dia-Wamba 1996, Ray & Korteweg 1999, Tarrow 1998, Wignaraja 1993).

Partly because of the social movement's unquestioned contemporary prevalence, students of particular social movements have shown little interest in the locations of those movements within the larger history of the social movement as a form of politics. On the whole, analysts of social movements treat them as expressions of current attitudes, interests, or social conditions rather than as elements of longer-run histories. True, students of such nineteenth-century movements as antislavery, temperance, and suffrage have had to place them in their historical contexts and follow their historical developments (see, for example, d'Anjou 1996, Buechler 1990, Drescher 1986, 1994, Eltis 1993, Gusfield 1966, McCammon and Campbell 2002, Young 2002). Self-styled histories of regional, national, or international labor movements often reach back well before the nineteenth century's glory days for precedents and frequently sweep in a wider range of social movements than those focusing specifically on workers' welfare (see Bogolyubov, R'izhkova, Popov, & Dubinskii 1962, Dolléans & Crozier 1950, Kuczynski 1967a, 1967b, Zaleski 1956).

Broad surveys of protest, violence, and political conflict likewise regularly transect the zone of social movement activity (see Ackerman & DuVall 2000, Botz 1976, 1987, Brown 1975, Gilje 1987, 1996, Grimsted 1998, Lindenberger 1995, McKivigan & Harrold 1999, Mikkelsen 1986, Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly 1975, R. Tilly 1980, Walton & Seddon 1994, Williams 2003). Nearby, the reflecting mirrors of an abundant historical literature on policing, surveillance, and repression often capture social movements at unusual angles (see Balbus 1973, Broeker 1970, Bruneteaux 1993, Earl, Soule, & McCarthy 2003, Emsley 1983, Emsley & Weinberger 1991, Fillieule 1997b, Goldstein 1983, 2000, 2001, Gurr 2000, Huggins 1985, 1998, Husung 1983, Jessen 1994, Liang 1992, Lüdtke 1989, 1992, Monjardet 1996, Munger 1979, 1981, Palmer 1988, Storch 1976, Wilson 1969).

Some particular social movement performances—notably French and Irish marches and demonstrations—have attracted first-rate histories (Blackstock 2000, Farrell 2000, Favre 1990, Fillieule 1997a, Jarman 1997, Mirala 2000, Pigenet & Tartakowsky 2003, Robert 1996, Tartakowsky 1997, 1999). Broader social and political histories, furthermore, commonly pay attention to social movements as

they trace their overall historical trends (e.g., Anderson & Anderson 1967, Cronin and Schneer 1982, González Calleja 1998, 1999, Hobsbawm 1975, 1988, 1994, Montgomery 1993). All these kinds of historical study will serve us well in later chapters. Even taken together, however, they do not provide a coherent history of the social movement as a political phenomenon parallel to, say, the histories of legislative elections, political parties, revolutions, or coups d'état.

For particular countries and periods, some general historical surveys of social movements as such do exist (see, for example, Ash 1972, Bright and Harding 1984, Burke 1988, Castells 1983, Clark 1959, Clark, Grayson, & Grayson 1975, Duyvendak, van der Heijden, Koopmans, & Wijmans 1992, Fredrickson 1997, Gamson 1990, Kaplan 1992, Klausen & Mikkelsen 1988, Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni 1995, Lundqvist 1977, Nicolas 1985, Tarrow 1996, Wirtz 1981). In one of the sharpest available statements on the subject, John Markoff sets the explanatory problem deftly:

Social movements as we know them today were beginning to flourish in England by the late eighteenth century and during the nineteenth century took root in Europe, North America, and elsewhere. To understand why, we need to consider many linked changes: a strengthened government but a weakened king; a people organizing themselves to assert claims on that government; a political elite prone to claim that it ruled in the name of the people; transportation improvements and commercial relations linking distant people; the beginnings of widespread literacy and new communication media leading people separated in space to feel themselves moving to a common rhythm. (Markoff 1996b: 45)

In general, however, such surveys subordinate the history to some other line of analysis, such as S. D. Clark's demonstration of divergence in the paths of Canadian and U.S. movements after the 1830s and William Gamson's investigation of whether American political opportunities narrowed during the twentieth century. Markoff himself subordinates his analysis of the formation and transformation of social movements to the spread of democracy. I draw on these surveys repeatedly, as well as on historical studies of particular movements. I give special attention to chronologies and catalogs such as Gamson's because they provide material for comparison and systematic evidence of change (Tilly 2002b). Still, the following historical analysis has required a good deal of interpolating, synthesizing, and borrowing from my own historical research.

Social movement history poses an acute version of a characteristic problem in political analysis. Social movements unquestionably have a distinctive, connected history. This book pursues just that history. The pursuit brings on two strong—and quite opposite—temptations. From one side beckons the seductive temptation to treat the social movement as a phenomenon *sui generis*, and to search for general laws of its operation. Similar temptations beset students of revolutions, strike waves, and election campaigns. The search for grand laws in human affairs comparable to the laws of Newtonian mechanics has, however, utterly failed.

Some such laws might conceivably exist (in the form, let us say, of evolutionary and/or genetic universals), but they surely do not operate at the levels of particular structures or processes such as churches, corporations, revolutions, or social movements. Anyone who wants to explain political structures and processes in the present state of knowledge does much better sorting out the more limited causal mechanisms that produce change, variation, and salient features of those structures and processes. The effort necessarily depends on turning away from “laws” of social movements toward causal analogies and connections between distinctive aspects of social movements and other varieties of politics (Goldstone 2003, Tilly 2001a, 2001b). Explanations of social movements and their history must mesh with explanations of other sorts of contentious politics.

That effort, however, calls up the opposite temptation: having noticed smaller-scale regularities in social movements, one may see social movements everywhere. Considered separately, campaigns, performances such as public meetings or petitions, and WUNC displays such as badge wearing and ostentatious sacrifice often occur outside of social movements: within churches, schools, corporations, intellectual communities, and elsewhere (Binder 2002, Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald 2004, Davis & Thompson 1994). Sometimes, by analogy, they even attract the label “movement.” Take the so-called militia movement in the United States of the 1990s. Across the United States, hundreds of small, loosely connected groups wore military garb, conducted war games, distributed apocalyptic texts, declared their independence from U.S. jurisdiction including the obligation to pay taxes, and prepared for the Armageddon their leaders predicted for the year 2000. The Southern Poverty Law Center, which keeps tabs on such groups, counted 858 militias across the country at their peak in 1996, a number that shrank to 143 by 2003 (*Economist* 2003a: 22).

If such groups took up the full combination of campaigns, social movement performances, and WUNC displays, then they would enter the terrain of social movements properly speaking. If, on the other hand, some of them organized as the Militia Party, began running candidates in local or state elections, and started buying time on local television stations, they would have opted for yet another available form of public politics: the electoral campaign. In the absence of such unlikely shifts in strategy, instead of declaring that the activities of militias “really are” social movements, it forwards the work of explanation more effectively to recognize them as constituting another form of contentious politics. That recognition allows us to study their similarities to social movements but also to see what distinctive explanatory problems they pose.

The respectable worlds of science and medicine similarly generate analogies to social movements from time to time, but mostly without forming full-fledged social movements. Take just one example: recent disputes over water in the Klamath River Basin, near the California-Oregon border. The headwaters of the Klamath, including the desert-surrounded Upper Klamath Lake, supply irrigation for many dry-earth farmers in the uplands. But they also drain into the lowland region where salmon breed and where the Klamath Tribes insist on treaty rights to

fishing established by an 1864 settlement with the United States. In 2002, a report of the National Academy of Sciences concluded that there was “no sound scientific basis” for terminating irrigation flows in favor of sending more water to downstream fisheries. The scientists’ statement satisfied neither side, including the biologists lined up with one group of water users or the other. “The report’s conclusion,” remarked *Science* magazine’s reporter from Klamath Falls, Oregon,

sparked an outcry in this small farming community that federal agencies are supporting “junk science,” and it bolstered calls for reforming or scrapping the Endangered Species Act (ESA). But over the past year, it has also sparked another, more muted outcry, this one among fisheries biologists. They contend that the report’s analyses were simplistic, its conclusions overdrawn, and—perhaps worst of all—that the report has undermined the credibility of much of the science being done in the region if not fueled an outright antisience sentiment. (Service 2003: 36)

Opposing groups of advocates are clearly conducting campaigns and occasionally employing such performances as press conferences to publicize their claims. If the farmers, the biologists, or members of the Klamath Tribes started to combine public campaigns, social movement performances, and WUNC displays in sustained claims on federal authorities or the National Academy of Sciences, they would move their struggles onto the terrain of full-fledged social movements. They, too, could conceivably take up the public politics of electoral campaigns—or, for that matter, move in the direction of regularly constituted interest groups by creating lobbyists, Washington offices, and newsletters broadcasting their causes. In the meantime, however, we will understand their actions better if we recognize analogies and differences without simply treating the Klamath Basin controversy as one more variety of social movement. The same goes for analogous struggles within corporations, churches, schools, intellectual disciplines, art worlds, and neighborhoods (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald 2004). In exactly that sense, the historical project of tracing the social movement’s distinctive politics forms part of the larger program of explaining contentious politics at large.

Toward Historical Explanations

This project, therefore, has four interdependent aspects. First, we must trace the origins and transformations of the social movement’s major elements: campaigns, repertoires, and WUNC displays. How, for example, did the now-familiar street demonstration take shape and even acquire an uneasy legal standing in most democratic countries? Second, we must uncover the social processes that encourage or inhibit proliferation of social movements. Given the significant but still incomplete correspondence of democratization and social movements, for instance, what causal connections explain that correspondence? Third, we must examine how

the elements of social movements interacted with other forms of politics. To what extent and how, for example, did industrial strikes, electoral campaigns, and social movements intersect and influence each other? Finally, we must show what causes important aspects of change and variation in social movements. Does the emergence of professional political brokers, for instance, help explain the formation of a specialized, connected sector of social movement organizations in leading capitalist democracies (Ibarra 2003, Meyer & Tarrow 1998)? Close historical analysis helps answer all four sorts of questions.

Following that line of inquiry, here are the book's main arguments.

From their eighteenth-century origins onward, social movements have proceeded not as solo performances, but as interactive campaigns. Like electoral campaigns, popular rebellions, and religious mobilizations, they consist of interactions between temporarily connected (and often shifting) groups of claimants and the objects of their claims, with third parties such as constituents, allies, rival claimants, enemies, authorities, and various publics often playing significant parts in the campaigns' unfolding. We will never explain social movements' variation and change without paying close attention to political actors other than the central claimants, for example the police with whom demonstrators struggled, collaborated, and codeveloped their strategies.

Social movements combine three kinds of claims: program, identity, and standing. Program claims involve stated support for or opposition to actual or proposed actions by the objects of movement claims. Identity claims consist of assertions that "we"—the claimants—constitute a unified force to be reckoned with. WUNC (worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment) performances back up identity claims. Standing claims assert ties and similarities to other political actors, for example excluded minorities, properly constituted citizens' groups, or loyal supporters of the regime. They sometimes concern the standing of other political actors, for example in calls for expulsion of immigrants or their exclusion from citizenship. Program, identity, and standing claims conform to partly separate codes built up from a regime's particular political history; Zimbabweans and Canadians do not—and cannot—signal collective worthiness in exactly the same way.

The relative salience of program, identity, and standing claims varies significantly among social movements, among claimants within movements, and among phases of movements. A good deal of negotiation within social movements, indeed, centers on the relative prominence the different claims will receive: do we, for example, present ourselves as a durable alliance of rights-deprived people who are currently lining up against this governmental program (but tomorrow might line up in support of another), or as a diverse cross section of the general population whose main connection consists of the harm that all of us will receive from this particular program and who therefore may never again join in making claims?

Democratization promotes the formation of social movements. By democratization, let us mean development of regimes featuring relatively broad and equal

citizenship, binding consultation of citizens with respect to governmental policies, personnel, and resources, and at least some protection of citizens from arbitrary actions by governmental agents (Tilly 2004). Democratization actually limits the range of feasible and effective popular collective action. Democratic institutions, for example, generally inhibit violent popular rebellions (Tilly 2003: chap. 3). But empowerment of citizens through contested elections and other forms of consultation combines with protections of civil liberties such as association and assembly to channel popular claim making into social-movement forms.

Social movements assert popular sovereignty. Although particular movements differ fiercely over who counts as "the people," the whole apparatus of campaign repertoire, and WUNC displays embodies the more general claim that public affairs depend, and should depend, on the consent of the governed. The claim is not necessarily democratic, since ethnic, religious, and nationalist movements sometimes invest their powers in charismatic leaders rather than democratic deliberation yet still insist that those leaders embody the will of the people at large. Such movements, furthermore, often reject whole categories of the local population as unworthy of belonging to "the people." But the stress on popular consent fundamentally challenges divine right to kingship, traditional inheritance of rule, warlord control, and aristocratic predominance. Even in systems of representative government, as we will soon see, social movements pose a crucial question: do sovereignty and its accumulated wisdom lie in the legislature or in the people's claims to represent?

As compared with locally grounded forms of popular politics, social movements depend heavily on political entrepreneurs for their scale, durability, and effectiveness. The local routines of retaliation, rebellion, and resistance that prevailed across most of the world before the era of social movements drew on widely available local knowledge and existing interpersonal networks. The social movement combination of campaigns, WUNC displays, and coordinated performances, in contrast, always results at least in part from prior planning, coalition building, and muting of local differences. As we will soon see, smart political entrepreneurs figured in campaigns, social movement performances, and WUNC displays from the very birth of social movements. During the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, however, professional political organizers, brokers, and partly autonomous nongovernmental organizations took on increasingly prominent parts in promotion of social movements—to the dismay of populist critics. Ironically, a good deal of twentieth- and twenty-first-century social movement work therefore went into disguising the entrepreneurial effort in favor of images portraying the spontaneous emergence of WUNC.

Once social movements establish themselves in one political setting, modeling communication, and collaboration facilitate their adoption in other connected settings. Transfers often occur within the same regime from the initial foci of social movements—more often than not claims on national governments—to other objects of demand or support such as local leaders, landlords, capitalists, or religious figures. Social movement strategies also transfer among regimes as political

organizers, exiles, and members of international religious groups collaborate across national boundaries and as rulers of authoritarian regimes (especially those that claim to rule on behalf of a coherent, united people) find themselves under pressure from other countries to concede something to their critics. Colonies of countries that already have established social movements provide inviting environments for infusion of social movement activity.

The forms, personnel, and claims of social movements vary and evolve historically. Three distinguishable but interacting sources of change and variation in social movements produce variation in time and space. First, overall political environments (including democratization and dedemocratization) alter in partial independence of social movement activity and affect its character. Second, within the interactions that occur in the course of social movements (for example, interactions between demonstrators and police), change occurs incrementally as a consequence of constant innovation, negotiation, and conflict. Third, participants in social movements—including not only activists but also authorities and other objects of claims—communicate with each other, borrowing and adapting each other's ideas, personnel, assistance, rhetorics, and models of action. They also borrow, adapt, and innovate as they compete with each other for advantages or constituencies. Sometimes the borrowing and adaptation take place over great distances and between quite disparate social movements (Chabot 2000, Chabot & Duyvendak 2002, Scalmer 2002b). Changes in political environments, incremental changes within the social movement sphere, and transfers among movements interact to produce substantial change and variation in the character of social movements.

The social movement, as an invented institution, could disappear or mutate into some quite different form of politics. Just as many forms of popular justice and rebellion that once prevailed have quite vanished, we have no guarantee that the social movement as it has prevailed for two centuries will continue forever. Since the social movement spread with the growth of centralized, relatively democratic states, for example, either governmental decentralization, extensive privatization of governmental activities, eclipse of the state by transnational powers, or widespread dedemocratization could all put the social movement as we know it out of business. Indeed, with the set of changes that people loosely call “globalization” occurring, citizens who count on social movements to make their voices heard must look very hard at the future.

This book follows these arguments through a straightforward historical analysis. Chapter 2 looks at the eighteenth-century invention of the social movement, concentrating on North America and England but looking briefly at other parts of Western Europe as well. Chapter 3 surveys the nineteenth century, during which extensive national and international movements grew up in the West and some also formed in European colonies. Chapter 4 moves up to the twentieth century, a time of worldwide proliferation in social movement activity. Chapter 5 follows up with the twenty-first century, focusing on the expansion of international communication and coordination among social movement activists.

At that point, the book's broadly chronological analysis ends in favor of pressing questions raised by the history. Chapter 6 analyzes what the previous chapters tell us about mutual influences of democratization and social movements: when, how, and why democratization promotes social movements, but also under what conditions and how social movements advance democratization or dedemocratization. Finally, chapter 7 draws together conclusions in the form of possible futures for the social movement. Between here and there we will see that social movements have a dramatic history all their own, one that today's participants in social movements almost never recognize and will gain handsomely from recognizing.

Perhaps social movements are splitting: on one side, older styles of action and organization that sustain continuous political involvement at points of decision-making power; on the other, spectacular but temporary displays of connection across the continents, largely mediated by specialized organizations and entrepreneurs. If so, we must think hard about the effects of such a split on democracy, that faithful companion of social movements throughout their history.

6

DEMOCRATIZATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

No social movements occurred in Kazakhstan this year. None occurred last year, and none will occur next year. Plenty of conflict, however, has occurred in Kazakhstan recently. Cossacks have been demanding more autonomy; Russians, guarantees of their language and privileged positions; members of Kazakh hordes, rights to priority in their homeland; Muslims, the Islamization of public life; and many contenders, larger shares of graft or contraband. Since the inauguration of formally competitive elections in 1989, multiple parties have appeared on Kazakh ballots. Responding in 1999 to reporters' questions about forthcoming parliamentary elections, President (and Soviet holdover) Nursultan Nazarbayev portrayed himself as a democratic teacher:

Of course, when we have such economic hardships, political forces in the country become more active. For the first time in the history of Kazakhstan, there will be parliamentary elections by party lists. That is normal, but if the political struggle becomes more acute in the period to elections, I think I myself, as leader of the country, must educate my nation on how to introduce democracy to the country. We never had any sort of democracy before. (Radio Free Europe 1999: 2)

As he administered that education, schoolmaster Nazarbayev rapped knuckles energetically. In preparation for the series of hastily scheduled national elections then at issue, which were to begin on 10 October, Nazarbayev arranged prosecution for tax evasion of former prime minister and likely rival Akezhan Kazhegeldin. Kazakh courts obligingly disqualified Kazhegeldin's candidacy on the ground of his participating in an unsanctioned political meeting. Kazhegeldin left the country. Early in September, Russian authorities acted on a Kazakh extradition request by arresting Kazhegeldin when he arrived in Moscow on a flight from London (Miller & Levine 1999).

Kazhegeldin was not the only victim of Kazakh repression. Human Rights Watch's 1999 Kazakhstan report recounted:

- 273 state violations of the country's own Law on the Press during 1997;
- detention, prosecution, and disqualification of numerous opposition politicians in 1997 and 1998;
- police beatings;
- suppression of unsanctioned demonstrations; and
- numerous other state infringements of civil liberties.

All occurred in the name of national security (Human Rights Watch 1999; see also CSCE 1998, Olcott 1997, United Nations 1995). Nazarbayev's own security forces deploy violence in virtual immunity from judicial control. As of 2002, the U.S. Department of State reported that

the Government's poor human rights record worsened, and it continued to commit abuses. The Government severely limited citizens' right to change their government and democratic institutions remained weak. Members of the security forces mistreated detainees on some occasions. Police tortured, beat, and otherwise mistreated detainees. Government officials acknowledged that abuses by police constituted a serious problem. Prison conditions remained harsh; however, the Government took an active role in efforts to improve prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners. The Government continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention, and prolonged detention was a problem. Corruption in the judiciary remained deeply rooted. Amendments to several laws governing the authority of prosecutors further eroded judicial independence by, among other provisions, allowing prosecutors to suspend court verdicts. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights, and new legislation granted prosecutors broad authorities to monitor individuals. (U.S. Department of State 2002: 1)

When a new Kazakh political party called All Together formed in 2003, its leader turned out to be media magnate Dariga Nazarbayeva, the president's daughter and possible successor (*Economist* 2003c: 41). As a result, nothing much resembling a social movement goes on in Kazakhstan these days (Tilly 1999). Nor, for that matter, have the remaining fragments of the Soviet Union seen much social movement activity since 1989 (Barrington 1995, Beissinger 1993, 1998a, 1998b, Drobizheva, Gottemoeller, Kelleher, & Walker 1996, Kaiser 1994, Khazanov 1995, Laitin 1998, 1999, McFaul 1997, Nahaylo & Swoboda 1990, Smith, Law, Wilson, Bohr, & Allworth 1998, Suny 1993, 1995).

Breakaway Soviet republic Belarus, for instance, looked as though it would produce an entire social movement sector during the early 1990s. Alexander Lukashenka won the Belarus presidency in a 1994 popular election as a crusader against "corruption." But as soon as he had consolidated his hold on office, Lukashenka instituted censorship, smashed independent trade unions, fixed elections, and subjugated the legislature. He thus reversed the country's modest previous democratic gains (Mihalisko 1997, Titarenko, McCarthy, McPhail, & Augustyn 2001). Opposition leaders and journalists soon found themselves liable to arbi-

trary imprisonment, torture, kidnapping, and murder (Human Rights Watch 2000: 249–53, Karatnycky 2000: 76–78).

The *Annual Register* described the Belarusian social movement situation for 2000 in this way:

In Belarus, Russia's closest ally, supporters of the opposition came under continued pressure. A large-scale demonstration took place peacefully in March, although some journalists and foreign observers as well as opposition activists were arrested. President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who had been out of the country at the time, subsequently dismissed the Interior Minister and described the arrests as "a misunderstanding and a mistake." Former Prime Minister Mikhas Chygir received a three-month prison sentence in May for what he insisted were politically motivated charges. In June two opposition leaders received suspended prison sentences for their part in organising a demonstration the previous October. (*Annual Register* 2000: 133–34)

With public confirmation from his ally, Russian president Vladimir Putin, to be sure, Lukashenka told the rest of the world that his regime was functioning democratically. But by the early twenty-first century the small space that had opened up for Belarusian social movements in 1991 was closing rapidly. As a politically battered world staggered into 2004, neither in the Soviet Union's old central territories (Russia and Belarus) nor in its Central Asian borderlands (Kazakhstan and neighboring countries) were social movements thriving.

I report this unsurprising news because during the early 1990s many observers of communist regimes' last days thought that the destruction of centralized superstructures in those states would rapidly open the way to social movements, which would then facilitate construction of a democratic civil society. Many analysts followed an analogy with the market's expected transformation of economic activity. Through most of the former Soviet Union, neither the explosion of social movements nor the sweeping market transformation has happened (Nelson, Tilly, & Walker 1998). In fact, as of 2004 most of the world's people still lacked access to social movements as a way to voice popular claims. Despite Tiananmen and a variety of subsequent popular struggles, to take the most obvious point, the quarter of the world's population living in China during the early twenty-first century had no regular recourse to social movements (Bernstein & Lü 2002). Where democracy fell short, social movements remained sparse.

Previous chapters repeatedly identified a broad correspondence between democratization and social movements. Social movements originated in the partial democratization that set British subjects and North American colonists against their rulers during the eighteenth century. Across the nineteenth century, social movements generally flourished and spread where further democratization was occurring and receded when authoritarian regimes curtailed democratic rights. The pattern continued during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries: the maps of full-fledged social movements and of democratic institutions overlapped greatly.

Yet we have also learned that social movements do not necessarily espouse or promote democracy. Movements form far more frequently around particular interests and grievances than around demands for democratization as such. From early on, relatively democratic movements regularly provoked undemocratic countermovements such as the United Kingdom's early-nineteenth-century opponents of Catholic rights. In more or less functioning democracies, furthermore, social movements recurrently pursue antidemocratic programs such as exclusion of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. Sometimes they even pursue the abolition of democracy itself in the name of a totalitarian creed such as Mussolini's Fascism and Hitler's Nazism.

Circumstances in which democracy and social movements do *not* coincide set an especially perplexing challenge to the tracing of their causal connections. Chapter 4 demonstrated, for example, that across the historical cases analyzed by Ruth Collier, democratization and social movements sometimes preceded and sometimes followed each other; neither depended entirely on the other's existence. Social movements occasionally form in democratic crevices of segmented or otherwise authoritarian regimes, as we have seen in Indonesia and the Philippines. In moments of partial democratization—witness many of the Soviet satellite states in 1989—social movements can form without necessarily becoming permanent features of the political landscape. Clearly, more than a mechanical relationship between democracy and social movements is operating. How does it work?

The incomplete overlap of social movements and democratization poses three questions that are crucial both for explaining social movements and for gauging their futures.

1. What causes the broad but still incomplete correspondence between social movements and democratic institutions?
2. To what extent and how does democratization itself cause social movements to form and prosper?
3. Under what conditions, and how, do social movements actually advance democracy?

(Question number 3 forces us to think about a further unpleasant question we have so far mostly avoided: Under what conditions, and how, do social movements damage democracy?) It is time to reflect on the social movement's history in search of answers to these pressing questions. In order to do so, we have to think about the character and causes of democratization before moving on to relations between democratization and social movements.

How Will We Recognize Democracy and Democratization?

Like almost all other regimes elsewhere in the world, former members of the Soviet Union generally claim to be democracies. Article 1 of the Kazakh constitution, for instance, reads as follows:

The Republic of Kazakhstan proclaims itself a democratic, secular, legal and social state whose highest values are an individual, his life, rights and freedoms.

The fundamental principles of the activity of the Republic are public concord and political stability; economic development for the benefit of all the nation; Kazakhstan patriotism and resolution of the most important issues of the affairs of state by democratic methods including voting at an all-nation referendum or in the Parliament. (Kazakhstan 2003)

Clearly, constitutions alone will not tell us whether regimes qualify as working democracies. Even today, visibly viable democracies remain a minority among the world's forms of rule.

How will we recognize democracy and democratization when we see them? Many widely used definitions of democracy concentrate on the character of relations among citizens: whether they are just, kind, considerate, egalitarian, and so on. Others stress legal criteria: contested elections, representative institutions, formal guarantees of liberty, and related political arrangements (for reviews of definitions and measures, see Collier & Levitsky 1997, Geddes 1999, Inkeles 1991, Lijphart 1999, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi 2000: 55–59, Vanhanen 2000). Here, however, let me insist that, like tyranny and oligarchy, democracy is a kind of regime: a set of relations between a government and persons subject to that government's jurisdiction. The relations in question consist of mutual rights and obligations, government to subject and subject to government.

Democracies differ from other regimes because instead of the massive asymmetry, coercion, exploitation, patronage, and communal segmentation that have characterized most political regimes across the centuries they establish fairly general and reliable rules of law (Tilly 2004). A regime is democratic to the extent that:

1. regular and categorical, rather than intermittent and individualized, relations exist between the government and its subjects (for example, legal residence within the government's territories in itself establishes routine connections with governmental agents, regardless of relations to particular patrons or membership in specific ethnic groups);
2. those relations include most or all subjects (for example, no substantial sovereign enclaves exist within governmental perimeters);
3. those relations are equal across subjects and categories of subjects (for example, no legal exclusions from voting or officeholding based on gender, religion, or property ownership prevail);
4. governmental personnel, resources, and performances change in response to binding collective consultation of subjects (for example, popular referenda make law); and
5. subjects, especially members of minorities, receive protection from arbitrary action by governmental agents (for example, uniformly administered due process precedes incarceration of any individual regardless of social category).

Thus democratization means formation of a regime featuring relatively broad, equal, categorical, binding consultation and protection. Note the word *relatively*: if we applied these standards absolutely, no regime past or present anywhere in the world would qualify as a democracy; all regimes have always fallen short in some regards when it has come to categorical regularity, breadth, equality, consultation, and protection. Democratization consists of a regime's moves *toward* greater categorical regularity, breadth, equality, binding consultation, and protection, and dedemocratization consists of moves *away* from them.

If democracy entails relatively high levels of breadth, equality, consultation, and protection by definition, as a practical matter it also requires the institution of citizenship (Tilly 1999). Citizenship consists, in this context, of mutual rights and obligations binding governmental agents to whole categories of people who are subject to the government's authority, those categories being defined chiefly or exclusively by relations to the government rather than by reference to particular connections with rulers or to membership in categories based on imputed durable traits such as race, ethnicity, gender, or religion. It institutionalizes regular, categorical relations between subjects and their governments.

Citizenship sometimes appears in the absence of democracy. Authoritarian regimes such as Fascist Italy institutionalized broad, regular, categorical and relatively equal relations between subjects and their governments but greatly restricted both consultation and protection. Powerful ruling parties and large police apparatuses inhibited democratic liberties. Citizenship looks like a necessary condition for democratization but not a sufficient one.

Our survey of the nineteenth century showed the United Kingdom, Scandinavia, the United States, Switzerland, and Argentina all instituting limited degrees of citizenship—still exclusive in many regards, but diminishing the political influence of patron-client ties, outright coercion, and membership in culturally defined communities, at least within the charmed circle of those who enjoyed any political rights at all. In these terms, democratization means any net shift toward citizenship, breadth of citizenship, equality of citizenship, binding consultation of citizens, and protection of citizens from arbitrary action by agents of government.

The Empirical Problem

What does our historical survey tell us about relations between democratization and social movements? Without far more extensive catalogs and chronologies of social movement claim making than are currently available, we have no hope of looking closely at point-by-point empirical relationships between democratization and social movements. We can, nevertheless, draw together threads from the earlier histories to think about the scale (number of simultaneous participants, localities, and/or actions) and scope (variety of programs, identities, sites, performances, and WUNC displays) involved in social movements. The nineteenth

century showed us the French street demonstration coming into its own as authoritarian top-down controls weakened, while France in 1968 showed us French workers and students creating a temporary democratic opening on their own initiative. Similar partial stories in previous chapters suggest a broad sequence of this sort:

1. *little or no democratization*: no social movements
2. *incipient democratization*: campaigns, repertoires, or WUNC displays bearing partial resemblances to those of social movements, but no full-fledged combinations of campaigns, repertoires, and WUNC displays
3. *further democratization*: social movement combinations in limited sectors (for example students in Indonesia) without general availability of social movement means to other claimants
4. *extensive democratization*: widespread availability of social movement programs, repertoires, and WUNC displays across programs, identities, and localities
5. *incipient international democratization*: internationalization of social movement claim making

Figure 6.1 sums up this argument. It portrays the stages as overlapping ovals to emphasize that in any given regime at a particular point in time different political actors vary with regard to their involvement in different sorts of social movement activity. It also draws the “no social movements” oval very broadly to stress both that most historical regimes have lacked social movements and that historically some relatively democratic regimes have operated without social movements.

According to figure 6.1, at lower levels of democratization and through most of history no social movements form at all. Earlier chapters have recognized that, taken separately, claim-making campaigns, individual social movement performances such as the public meeting or the petition drive, and concerted public WUNC occurred in a wide variety of regimes long before the mid-eighteenth century. But they have also documented the initial *combination* of campaigns, repertoires, and WUNC displays in Great Britain and North America between the 1760s and the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The figure incorporates a distinction that has likewise served us helpfully in earlier chapters: between a) intermittent resemblances of particular claims, performances, or WUNC displays in the public politics of undemocratic regimes to similar claims, performances, or WUNC displays of regimes in which social movements regularly occur; b) combinations of the three in particular political mobilizations within regimes that have not institutionalized social movements; and c) full-scale availability of social movement campaigns, repertoires, and WUNC displays to a wide variety of claimants within a regime. Drawing on recent developments, the figure adds yet another level: d) the internationalization of social movement activity.

Overall, then, figure 6.1 argues that in the course of democratization resemblances generally precede combinations, particular combinations precede full availability of social movements, and availability within national regimes precedes in-




Figure 6.1 Scale and Scope of Social Movements at Different Degrees of Democratization

ternationalization. It also argues that availability and internationalization only take place within regimes having extensive democratic institutions and practices. In the absence of systematic evidence on the actual distribution of social movements across the world of the last two centuries, all stages of the argument take risks.

Stage 5 takes the greatest risks of all. The record of early-twenty-first-century social movements leaves open two possibilities that would blatantly contradict it. First, considering the political arena defined by international centers of power, it is not obvious that democratization is occurring internationally; categorically defined breadth, equality, consultation, and protection could actually be declining at the international scale as power shifts from states to international bodies and networks and as nationally grounded categories, breadth, equality, consultation, and protection thereby lose their impact. Second, as chapter 5 suggested, internationalization of power relations might in fact be reducing the efficacy of social movements at the local, regional, and national scales as it narrows the scope of effective social movement action to just those groups and networks that can organize large international collaborations. That eventuality would oblige us to interpret internationalization as a reversal of the long-term trends that for more than two centuries favored broad correspondence between social movements and democratization. Internationalization could be bringing dedemocratization.

What causes the strong but still incomplete correspondence between democratization and social movements? First, many of the same processes that cause democratization also independently promote social movements. Second, democratization as such further encourages people to form social movements. Third, under some conditions and in a more limited way social movements themselves promote democratization. Before examining those three causal paths, however, we must review what causes democratization in the first place.

Why Does Democratization Ever Occur?

To put the matter very schematically, in currently undemocratic regimes four social processes create favorable conditions for the establishment of political arrangements involving regular, categorical relations between subjects and governments, relatively broad and equal participation, binding consultation of political participants, and protection of political participants, especially members of vulnerable minorities, from arbitrary action by governmental agents. The four processes include:

- increases in the sheer numbers of people available for participation in public politics and/or in connections among those people, however those increases occur;
- equalization of resources and connections among those people, however that equalization occurs;

- insulation of public politics from existing social inequalities; and
- integration of interpersonal trust networks into public politics.

None of these constitutes democratization in itself, but all of them promote democratization, especially if they occur together. Let us consider each of the four in turn.

Increases in numbers and connections among potential political participants. When rulers form a tiny elite that governs through patronage, sale of state-controlled resources, and/or brute force, democracy has little chance to flourish. But circumstances such as defense against common enemies, calls for increased resources to support war or public works, demographic increase within the ruling class, expanding communications, and forceful demands for inclusion on the part of excluded parties push rulers to expand the circle of participants in public politics.

When that happens, ironically, the overall proportion of the subject population that is connected to and socially adjacent to the newly included (and therefore in a strengthened position to demand inclusion as well) usually increases. We have seen that sort of enlargement occurring with the British Reform Act of 1832, which brought merchants, smaller property owners, and masters into the governing coalition but excluded ordinary workers, many of whom had backed the Reform campaign. We have also seen how Chartism gained its edge from the fact that its coalition partners in the pro-Reform mobilization of 1830–1832 acquired power but then enacted legislation regulating the poor while denying workers political rights.

Equalization of resources and connections among potential political participants. If overall inequality between categories—male and female, religious affiliations, ethnic groups, and so on—diminishes for whatever reason, that equalization facilitates broad, equal involvement of category members in public politics as it discourages their unequal treatment by governmental agents. It thus boosts both protection and citizenship. Relevant resources and connections certainly include those provided by income, property, and kinship, but they also include literacy, access to communications media, and organizational memberships; when any of these equalize across the population at large, they promote democratic participation.

Equalization of resources and connections among potential political participants encourages both political competition and coalition formation. Together, competition and coalition formation promote establishment of categorically defined rights and obligations directly connecting citizens to agents of government in place of particular communal memberships and patron-client ties; legal establishment of electorates provides the most visible examples, but a similar enactment of legally equivalent categories commonly occurs in the licensing of associations, authorization of public meetings, policing of demonstrations, and registration of lobbyists.

The very articulation of rules for these activities produces categories rather than particularistic arrangements and thereby encourages collective seekers of rights to argue on the basis of their similarities to members of privileged categories rather than their valuable and distinctive properties. Women who struggled for political rights in Western countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries regularly pointed out that the rules and justifications backing male rights to vote and hold office provided no defensible rationale for excluding females from the same rights. For all the celebration of queer culture, gays and lesbians regularly insist on their political similarities to previously excluded minorities and demand rights that are already available to other categories of the population.

Competition and coalition formation also inhibit the pursuit of control over governmental activities, resources, and personnel by means other than those categorically defined rights and obligations; blatant use of personal connections or brute force becomes corruption. Eventually the sheer expansion and partial equalization of the British ruling classes made it advantageous for dissident members of the new elite to join forces with excluded people as a makeweight against the old landed classes.

Insulation of public politics from existing social inequalities. Democratization does not, however, depend on radical leveling of material conditions; the partial democracies of today's rich capitalist countries—all of which maintain extensive material inequalities—testify as much. Over the long run of democratization, indeed, erection of barriers to translation of existing inequalities by race, gender, ethnicity, religion, class, or locality into public politics has no doubt played a much larger part than material leveling. If barriers arise to the direct translation of persisting categorical inequalities into public politics (for example, through the institution of the secret ballot and the creation of coalition parties that cross lines of gender, race, or class), those barriers contribute to the creation of a relatively autonomous sphere of public politics within which categorically defined breadth, equality, binding consultation, and protection have at least a chance to increase. Although white male Americans fiercely excluded women and blacks from nineteenth-century public politics, adoption of a rigorously geographical system of representation, continuous movement of people to the frontier, and formation of patchwork political parties all blunted the direct translation of categorical differences within the white male population into public politics.

Despite residential segregation and despite gerrymandering, formation of heterogeneous political units and electoral districts similarly inhibits direct translation of categorical inequalities into public politics. We saw a primitive version of this representation effect in Great Britain, where the chiefly territorial allocation of parliamentary seats—by no means a democratic innovation back when barons and bishops forced the English king to hear their complaints, conditions, and demands—simultaneously gave voice to disfranchised British subjects and provided incentives for members of Parliament to seek expressions of popular support for dissident positions. As Parliament gained power relative to the Crown and great patrons during the eighteenth century (once again no triumph for democratization

in its own terms), the insulating effects of territorial representation increased. Similarly, broadly shared jury duty, military service, school enrollment, and responsibility for public works need not originate in democratic practices but cumulatively tend to promote democratization by insulating public politics from existing social inequalities.

Trust networks and democratization. Trust networks figure more subtly, but no less potently, in democratization. As many democratic theorists have sensed, connections between interpersonal trust networks and public politics significantly affect democratization (Buchan, Croson, & Dawes 2002, Edwards, Foley, & Diani 2001, Landa 1994, Levi & Stoker 2000, Seligman 1997, Uslaner 2002, Warren 1999). Trust is the knowing exposure of valued future outcomes to the risk of malfeasance by others. Risk is threat multiplied by uncertainty. People frequently confront short-term risk without creating elaborate social structure; on their own they leap raging rivers, engage in unsafe sex, drive while drunk, or bet large sums of money. When it comes to the long-term risks of reproduction, cohabitation, investment, migration, or agricultural enterprise, however, people generally embed those risks in durable, substantial social organization. To that extent, they trust others—they make the reduction of threat and/or uncertainty contingent on the performance of other people they cannot entirely control. Such sets of relations to others constitute networks of trust.

When people commit themselves to risky, consequential long-term enterprises whose outcomes depend significantly on the performances of other persons, they ordinarily embed those enterprises in interpersonal networks whose participants have strong incentives to meet their own commitments and encourage others to meet theirs. Such networks often pool risks and provide aid to unfortunate members. They commonly operate well, if and when they do, because members share extensive information about each other and about their social environment, because third parties monitor transactions among pairs of members, and because exclusion from the network inflicts serious harm on members who fail to meet their commitments. Trade diasporas, rotating credit circles, skilled crafts, professions, lineages, patron-client chains, and religious sects often exhibit these characteristics. They couple easily with control over systems that generate inequality in work, community, and private life (Tilly 1998).

Through most of human history, participants in trust networks have guarded them jealously from governmental intervention. They have rightly feared that governmental agents would weaken them or divert them to less advantageous ends. Powerful participants who could not entirely escape governmental intervention have created partial immunities through such arrangements as indirect rule. Less powerful participants have characteristically adopted what James Scott calls weapons of the weak: concealment, foot-dragging, sabotage, and so on. Democratization, however, entails a double shift of trust. First, within the political arena citizens trust the organization of consultation and protection sufficiently to wait out short-term losses of advantage instead of turning immediately to nongovernmental means of regaining lost advantages. Second, citizens build into risky long-

term enterprises the assumption that government will endure and meet its commitments. Both are extremely rare circumstances over the long historical run. Within any regime that is not currently democratic, their realization faces enormous obstacles.

In those rare cases where it actually occurs, integration of trust networks into public politics operates within any of three channels: 1) disintegration of previously effective insulated trust networks, as when regional patrons lose their capacity to pay, feed, or arm their clients; 2) formation of commitments directly binding governmental agents and citizens, as when governments establish welfare agencies and citizens begin to rely on those agencies for absorption of long-term risks; or 3) formation of similar commitments between major political actors and their citizen members or clienteles, as when legally recognized trade unions become administrators of workers' pension funds. We witnessed a dramatic instance of integration in the Switzerland of 1848 and thereafter, as the peace settlement of a civil war provided different segments of the Swiss population far greater access and redress with regard to the national government than they had ever exercised before.

In these terms, how should we explain the partial democratization that Great Britain (and then the United Kingdom) experienced after the 1760s? The four general causes of democratization—increases in numbers and connections among potential political participants, equalization of resources and connections among potential political participants, insulation of public politics from existing social inequalities, and integration of trust networks into public politics—all contributed to British democratization, but they contributed quite unequally. Expansion of British capitalism enormously increased the numbers of potential political participants as well as connections among them (Tilly 1995: chap. 2). On balance, despite sharpening material inequalities, the resources and connections provided by concentrated workplaces, urban growth, intensification of communications, and accelerated domestic trade produced some equalization in resources and connections among potential political participants. As compared with depending chiefly on local landlords, parish priests, small masters, and other patrons for political intervention, Parliament's increasing centrality in the British system of power partially insulated public politics from existing categorical inequalities. Rapid growth of a propertyless, wage-dependent, and urbanizing working class, finally, combined with huge expansions of tax payments and military service to undermine old local and segregated trust networks in favor of direct connections between British subjects and their national government.

The same checklist makes less mysterious that democratization has recently receded from its already low level in Kazakhstan: the flight of ethnic Russians from the post-Soviet country has depleted resources and connections, new inequalities have arisen between the (small) privileged segments of the national population and everyone else, President Nazarbayev and his allies have built the distinction between ethnic Kazakhs and others (not to mention the distinction

between Nazarbayev's own clan and other Kazakhs) ever more sharply into public politics, and all but the privileged Kazakh elite have protected their trust networks more and more zealously from public politics. It would take a great reversal of all these processes for serious democratization to begin in Kazakhstan.

Processes That Promote Both Democratization and Social Movements

Some of the extensive historical overlap between democratization and social movements results from the fact that similar processes promote both of them. Recall the four main processes that promote democratization: 1) increases in the sheer numbers of people available for participation in public politics and/or in connections among those people; 2) equalization of resources and connections among those people; 3) insulation of public politics from existing social inequalities; and 4) integration of interpersonal trust networks into public politics. None of these qualifies as democratization in itself; none of them directly entails regular categorical relations, breadth, equality, binding consultation, or protection *within* public politics. But all of them also promote the formation of social movements.

Increases in numbers and connections expand the pool of people that could, in principle, join, support, or at least attend to a social movement campaign. They increase the likelihood that members of minority factions within the ruling class will seek allies outside the established range of powerful political actors. In Western history, dissident aristocrats and bourgeois alike recurrently sought to gain support outside their own circles; cautiously but consequentially, for example, Boston's property owners established alliances with Boston's property-poor workers against British royal power during the 1760s. Such reaching out provides opportunities for any organized group to gain credibility and power through displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment rather than through direct action or activation of patronage ties. Social movements facilitate just such displays, indeed center on them.

Equalization of resources and connections increases the likelihood that people and groups having particular interests or grievances will join with others from other social settings in common campaigns, social movement performances, and WUNC displays. Insulation of public politics from existing social inequalities facilitates the grouping of otherwise diverse participants in common claims with regard to programs, identities, and standing. (Indeed, it makes possible the dramatization of diversity as a social movement's claim to attention.) Finally, integration of interpersonal trust networks into public politics has a dual effect on social movements; it increases the stakes of potential participants in the outcomes of any new movement claims as it facilitates mobilization of already connected people.

Remember how that process works; concretely, it includes the following sorts of changes:

- creating publicly recognized associations, mutual aid societies, parties, unions, congregations, and communities, or seeking recognition for similar organizations that have existed underground;
- pursuing friendship, kinship, shared belief, security, and high-risk enterprises within such organizations;
- permitting family members to serve in national military and police forces;
- promoting careers of family members in public service, including government office;
- seeking (or at least tolerating) government registration of vital events such as births, deaths, and marriages, then using the registration to validate legal transactions;
- providing private information to public organizations and authorities through censuses, surveys, and applications for services;
- entrusting private contracts to governmental enforcement;
- using government-issued legal tender for interpersonal transactions and savings;
- purchasing government securities with funds (e.g., dowry) committed to maintenance of interpersonal ties; and
- relying on political actors and/or government agencies for vital services and long-term security.

Over the long historical run, such commitments of trust networks to public politics have rarely developed. Even in today's democratic countries, they have become common only during the last century or so. In addition to being consequential for individual lives and interpersonal relations, they greatly increase the stakes of network members in the proper conduct of public politics. They create new collective interests. In these ways, they promote social movement activity at the same time as they advance routine democratic functioning outside of social movements. Thus the same broad processes that promote democratization also promote formation and proliferation of social movements.

How Democratization Promotes Social Movements

With their specific forms of associations, public meetings, demonstrations, and the like, social movements emerged from particular histories as historical products of their times and places. They then spread as models to other times and places. Yet some features of social movements give them affinities with democracy in general. In addition to the common causes of democratization and social movements just reviewed, democratization in itself promotes formation and proliferation of social movements. It does so because each of its elements—regularity, breadth, equality, consultation, and protection—contributes to social movement activity. It also does so because it encourages the establishment of other institutions

(e.g., political parties and labor unions) whose presence in turn usually facilitates social movement claim making. Let us take up each of these items in turn.

Formation of more regular and categorical relations between governments and subjects. To the extent that relations between governments and their subjects remain intermittent, mediated, coercive, and particular, incentives to join in collective, public claim making by means of social movement performances and WUNC displays remain minimal, indeed mostly negative. Through much of the Philippines, the previous chapter's survey suggests, people who dared to join in standard social movement claim making would threaten existing authorities, risk their lives, and condemn themselves to futility. Conversely, establishment of regular and categorical relations between governments and subjects—broadly speaking, of citizenship—in itself renders the making of rights-based claims feasible, visible, and attractive. In the Manila region, by contrast with outlying areas of the Philippines, at least a modicum of citizenship seems to have developed, facilitating social movement claim making.

Broadening of rights and obligations within public politics. We have long since noticed that firm rights to assemble, associate, and speak collectively, however they come into being, foster social movement activity. Similarly, broad obligations to vote, serve on juries, perform military service, pay taxes, deliberate on public services, and send children to school help create social connections and shared interests that promote participation in campaigns, social movement performances, and WUNC displays bringing together socially disparate participants.

Equalization of rights and obligations within public politics. To the extent that public politics inscribes social inequalities in the form of differential rights to participate, receive benefits, or enjoy state protection, movement coalitions crossing such boundaries or representing identities not already written into law face serious barriers to organizing and acting publicly. To the extent that such legal reflections of social inequalities disappear from public politics, conversely, barriers to cross-category coalitions and newly asserted identities weaken. During the twentieth century, Indian leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru strove mightily, and with partial success, to exclude caste, religious, linguistic, and gender differences from inscription into public politics. They thus simultaneously defended India's precarious democratization and promoted social movements. To be sure, social movement activists sometimes seek legal inscription for their categories, as when representatives of indigenous peoples propose special rights for their constituents; when such claims succeed, they both diminish democracy and reduce opportunities for other social movements. Whether Hindu nationalists will overturn the democratic accomplishments of their more secular predecessors matters enormously for the futures of Indian democracy and Indian social movements.

Increase in binding consultation of subjects with regard to changes in governmental policy, resources, and personnel. Social movements benefit from consultation because social movement displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment gain weight from the possibility that movement activists or their

constituents will actually acquire some say in governmental decision making. Most obviously, in systems where contested elections make a difference, mobilization and identification of supporters for a new social movement signal the presence of a constituency that an accommodating political party might be able to enlist in its own electorate.

Expansion of protections for subjects, especially members of vulnerable minorities, from arbitrary action by governmental agents. However protection and consultation expand, their combination provides new opportunities for the sorts of claim making in which social movements specialize. The installation of an intensely consultative regime in Switzerland after 1848 encouraged the proliferation of Swiss social movements. Social movements thrive on protection because associations, meetings, marches, demonstrations, petition drives, and related means of action pose enormous risks in the absence of governmental toleration and in the face of massive repression. Secure rights of assembly, association, and collective voice promote social movements, just as their abridgement threatens social movements. Remember how social movements disappeared with the rise of authoritarian regimes in Italy, Germany, Spain, and the Soviet Union.

Creation of complementary institutions. Democratization commonly fosters creation of crucial institutions that in their turn independently promote social movement mobilization. The most obvious and general of these are electoral campaigns, political parties, labor unions, other trade associations, nongovernmental organizations, lobbies, and governmental agencies committed to support of specific constituencies rather than the general public. Such institutions generally facilitate social movements by providing vehicles for their mobilization, by establishing allies that back social movement claims without participating directly in movement campaigns, by locating receptive friends within government, and/or by reinforcing legal precedents for social movement campaigns, performances, and WUNC displays.

The connections are neither necessary nor universal. One-party regimes, for example, frequently stamp out social movements, just as corporatist regimes often build labor unions directly into the governing structure. On the average, nevertheless, formation of complementary institutions in the course of democratization further facilitates social movement activity. In the United States, the influence clearly ran in both directions: social movements that broke with existing parties affected parties and other institutions as the operation of those institutions repeatedly provided support for social movements (Clemens 1997, Sandets 1999, Skocpol 1992).

The corollary also follows: when regimes dedemocratize, they offer less room to claims made in the social movement style. Italy under Mussolini, Germany under Hitler, and Spain under Franco all experienced sharp curtailment of what had been festivals of social movement activity under their previous regimes. To be more precise, these new authoritarian regimes selectively incorporated some performances from the social movement repertoire—notably the association, the march, the demonstration, and the mass meeting—but placed them so securely

institutions

under central government control that they lost their meaning as autonomous assertions of WUNC. Noting that very process, political theorists of the generation following World War II mistakenly portrayed it as a transition from atomized mass society to authoritarianism. The first part (atomized mass society) was wrong, the second part (authoritarianism) right. In fact, Italy, Germany, and Spain made transitions from often undisciplined but burgeoning organized activity (some of it in standard social movement format) to highly coordinated central control.

When and How Social Movements Promote Democratization

A number of the same processes that promote democratization, then, also foster social movements, and vice versa. Democratization in itself further promotes social movements. That set of connections helps explain the affinity of social movements with democratization. It does not, however, answer the most difficult question with which we began: what about the *direct causal impact* of social movements on democracy and democratization? Precisely because of the broad covariation of democracy and social movements, reasoning from correlations will not resolve the problem. We have no choice but to close in on causal processes.

Which ones? In fact, my earlier survey catalogued the likely candidates: those processes that cause shifts from particularized and/or mediated to categorical and direct relations between citizens and government, broadening and equalization of relations among political actors, reduced penetration of social inequalities into public politics, and increasing integration of trust networks into public politics. The question now alters, however: which among our array of democracy-promoting processes do social movements themselves activate or reverse, under what conditions, and how? Remember that the great bulk of the social movements we have surveyed pursued particular interests rather than general programs of democratization. Remember also that a substantial minority organized around explicitly antidemocratic claims such as the abridgement of rights for members of particular racial, ethnic, or religious categories. It will therefore not suffice to look for social movements that explicitly demanded democracy and to ask when and how they made gains. We must ask under what conditions and how social movement claim making actually promoted expansion of democratic relations and practices.

Once relatively high-capacity governments began practicing direct rule by means including representative institutions, however narrow the representation, they set a powerful dialectic into motion: governments bargained with legislatures for authorization to gather resources for pursuit of governmental activities, bargained with groups of citizens for the actual delivery of those resources, sought the collaboration of major political actors in the levying of resources and the execution of programs, and established procedures for recognition of political actors. However grudgingly or unconsciously, they thereby created incentives and opportunities for new or previously unauthorized actors to assert their existence

and for minority factions within legislatures to form coalitions with outside actors. Electoral logic provides the most obvious example of such effects: coordinated public displays of WUNC signal the existence of potential voting blocs that could collectively influence outcomes of future elections.

Increasingly, political entrepreneurs inside and outside of legislatures discovered that they could add weight to their proposals, complaints, and demands by organizing public displays of popular backing for those proposals, complaints, and demands. Our review of the Philippines in 2001 leaves unclear how large a part elite manipulation behind the scenes played in People Power II. At least in the Manila region, nevertheless, the Philippine adventure reveals both opponents and supporters of Joseph Estrada adding weight to their claims by means of dramatic public displays. Over the long run of social movements, to the extent that such displays verified the presence of worthy, united, numerous, and committed sets of supporters, they constituted at once threats to politics as usual and promises of new allies for beleaguered legislative minorities.

Without a general conscious design, the organization of performances in the form of public meetings, marches, voluntary associations, petition drives, and pamphleteering promoted additional effects:

- establishment of standard practices by which political activists formed and broadcast collective answers to the identity questions “Who are you?” and “Who are we?” and “Who are they?”;
- development of problem-solving ties among activists in the very process of preparing and executing public performances;
- incorporation of existing organizations such as churches and mutual aid societies into these new forms of political activity; and
- development of procedures by which governmental agents responded differentially to performances and identity claims—negotiating boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate performances, recognizing some actors while refusing to recognize others, applying facilitation or repression, co-opting, channeling, infiltrating, or subverting various groups.

Together, these additional effects established social movements as regular participants in public politics. But they also created new social ties among activists, between activists and their constituencies, between activists and agents of government. Outside of any collective demands that activists made for democratization, the new social ties became crucial sites of democratization.

How so? The internal dynamics of social movements activated all three classes of democracy-promoting processes—processes that democratized public politics directly by broadening and equalizing collective political participation, processes that insulated public politics from existing social inequalities, and processes that reduced insulation of trust networks from major political actors. To the extent that social movement activism promoted establishment of recognized but autonomous collective political actors involving socially heterogeneous members and

integrating their own distinctive trust networks, its democratizing effects increased. Conversely, to the extent that governments managed to destroy, deflect, disperse, ignore, or co-opt social movement coalitions and their trust networks, democratization suffered. After the profusion of French social movement activity during the 1930s, for instance, the German occupation of 1940–1944 rapidly closed down almost all visible social movements, which in turn contributed to the country's dedemocratization during those terrible years (Gildea 2002, Jackson 2001, Tartakowsky 1997).

In summary, proliferation of social movements promotes democratization chiefly in regimes that a) have created relatively effective direct rule through a central administration rather than governing through privileged intermediaries or communal segments, and b) have established at least a modicum of democratization, however that happened. The two conditions make it possible for the combination of campaigns, WUNC displays, and social movement performances to wield an impact on public politics, whereas their absence presents insuperable barriers to social movement effectiveness. In these circumstances, social movement strategies sometimes promote democratization directly by mobilizing effective claims on behalf of protected consultation. Despite the eventual dumping of working-class participants, Britain's social movement-based Reform mobilization of 1830–1832 did nudge the British regime toward greater categorically defined breadth, equality, binding consultation, and protection while establishing a precedent and model for subsequent prodemocracy mobilizations.

But, as our historical surveys have shown, such explicit, effective prodemocracy social movements rarely form; far more often, social movement participants make claims on behalf of more particular programs, identities, or standing, claims that in themselves have no necessary connection with democratization. Blocking construction of a highway, supporting or opposing abortion, forwarding the rights of indigenous people, and demanding better schools by social movement performances certainly take advantage of democratic liberties, but they do not necessarily advance democracy.

Cumulatively, nevertheless, several kinds of social movement campaigns contribute to democratization. That happens, on the average, when they:

- create coalitions that cross important categorical boundaries within public politics (example: visible members of the Filipino ruling class join with ordinary Manilaños in opposition to Joseph Estrada);
- form a pool of brokers with skills in coalition-formation and boundary-crossing (example: church- and association-based nineteenth-century American activists bring together feminists, abolitionists, and supporters of temperance); and
- simultaneously a) establish connections within previously unmobilized and excluded categories of citizens, especially those embedded in segmented trust networks, and b) form alliances between those newly mobilized groups and existing political actors (example: Indian reformers recruit support from members of impoverished, stigmatized castes).

In short, social movements promote democratization when—either as explicit programs or as by-products of their action—they broaden the range of participants in public politics, equalize the weight of participants in public politics, erect barriers to the direct translation of categorical inequalities into public politics, and/or integrate previously segmented trust networks into public politics. Great Britain during the late 1820s and early 1830s looks like a place where social movements promoted democratization in most of these ways. Conversely, social movements promote dedemocratization when they narrow the range of participants in public politics, increase inequalities among participants in public politics, translate existing categorical inequalities more directly into public politics, and/or insulate trust networks from public politics. Alas, India during the early twenty-first century looks like a place where polarized, segmented Hindu and Muslim social movement activity might actually be dedemocratizing the national regime.

Taking such effects into account, we can hold out the hope that early-twenty-first-century mobilizations against world financial institutions will promote democratization at an international scale by drawing a wide range of new, previously marginalized groups into international public politics. We can hope that in such countries as Kazakhstan, Belarus, and China the standard democratizing processes—increases in the numbers and connections of people available for participation in public politics, equalization of resources and connections among those people, insulation of public politics from existing social inequalities, and integration of interpersonal trust networks into public politics—will eventually promote both democracy and social movements.

At a world scale, nevertheless, we can equally worry that highly selective access to NGOs and electronic communication will instead introduce fresh inequalities into international public politics and thus promote dedemocratization. To the extent that national governments lose the power to implement social movement programs, moreover, democracy will generally decline at the national level. Without a combination of vigilance and favorable developments over which democrats and activists themselves exercise only partial control, the futures of democracy and of social movements remain insecure.

Modes

- Intervention
- Replacement of Elites (from above)
- Negotiated transition (S. Africa/Chile)
- From Below (social movement activism - Indonesia)