presentation

Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill

J hn Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was the leading English philosophe o K ' h' 1 r of the nineteenth century. Whereas _ant s et ica system concentrates

exclusively on the reason for an act10n and does not take account of its results, Mill's system focuses only on consequences. Mill defend utilitarianism, the view that the supreme principle of morality is to ac: so as to produce as much happiness as possible, each person counting equally. By "happiness" Mill means pleasure and the absence of pain. He grants, however, that some pleasures are more worthwhile than oth- ers. "It is ... better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." His evidence for this claim is that anyone who knew the lives of both would choose the former rather than the latter.

Utilitarianism provides a means of dealing with the quandary of conflicting obligations. For instance, suppose you promised to meet someone for lunch but on the way encounter a child in need of imme- diate aid. What should you do? Utilitarianism solves the problem by telling you to give priority to helping the child because that course of action will produce more happiness. Shouldn't we keep our promisesr Mill says that usually we should because the practice of keeping one's promises produces important social benefits. An exception should be made, however, on those occasions when more happiness will be pro- duced by not keeping a promise.

What Utilitarianism Is

· · · creed which accepts as the foundation of morals "utility" or t e greate

st happiness principle" holds that actions are right in

proportion as they tend to h d to d h promote appiness· wrong as they ten pro uce t e reverse of ha · ' e

PPllless. By happiness is intended plea5ur

From John Stuart Mill, Utilitari~ism 0863).

118

CHAPTER 15 UTILITARIANISM 1] 9

and the absence of pain· by h · · · · . , un app1ness, pain and the pnvat1on of

pleasure. To give a clea~ view of the moral standard set up by the ~heory, rr.mch ~ore reqmres to be said; in particular, what things it mcludes m the ideas of pain and pleasure, and to what extent this is left an open questi~n. But t~ese supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of hfe on which this theory of morality is grounded- na~ely, that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things des1~able as ~~ds;_ and that all desirable things (which are as numer- ous 1n the utihtanan as in any other scheme) are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.

Now such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dis- like. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure-no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit-they de~ignate as utterly mean and groveling, as a doctrine worthy only of swine ....

But there is no known ... theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writ- ers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily plea- sures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former-that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other and, as it may be called, higher ground with entire consistency. It is quite compati- ble with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that, while in estimating all other things quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.

If I am asked what I mean by difference in quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desir- able pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently ~c- quainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer 1t, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater a mount of

.. - 4 ......

•.

1~0 PART II MORAL 'I llf,ORJES

rli sco ntent , and wou ld n~t resign it for any qu~nti_ty of ~he other sure which their nal'ure 1s capabl~ o~, w_e are J~5tified 1n ascribi:1ea. the 1:,rcfr rrcd cn ioyment a superio rity m quality so far outw . g tri

:i • • • t· II e1ghi quan tity as to render 1t, 111 companson, o sma account. n~ Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are

bl f · · e9ua11 acqu ainted with and equally capa e O apprec1atmg and e . . y h llJoy,n hoth do give a most marked preference to t e manner of exj g

. . l . F h Stene which employs their high er facu ties. ew uman creatures e . would conse nt to be chan ge d into any of the lower ammals for a prorn·

' 1 . . ISe Of the full est all owance of a beasts p easures; no mtelhgent hu l . d rnan being wou ld consent to be a foo, no mstructe person would b

. d . l e an ignoramus, no person of feel mg an conscience wou d be selfish and base , even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dune or th e ra scal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theire, They wou ld not resign what they possess more than he for the mo:~ complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in comma wi th him. If they ever fancy they would: it is only in cases of unhap~ piness so extreme that to escape from 1t they would exchange their lot for alm ost any other, however undesirable in their own eyes. A being of high er faculties requires more to make him happy, is capa- ble probably of more acute suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more poi nts, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabili- ties, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of ex istence . ...

Jt is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better Lo be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool , or th e pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know th eir own sid e of the qu estion. The other party to the comparison knows both sides .

It may be objected that many who are capable of the higher plea- sures occasiona ll y, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less va lu able; and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue se nsual indulge nces to the irtjury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good. It may be further objected that many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble, as they advance in years, sink into indolence and selfishness. But I do n_ot believe that those who undergo this very common change voluntanly

CHAPTER 15 UTILITARIANISM 121

choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to the higher. I believe that, before they devote themselves exclusively to the one, they have already become incapable of the other. Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favorable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for in- dulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones to which they have access or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned whether anyone who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of plea- sures ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower, though many, in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both.

From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of the two modes of existence is,the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its conse- quences, the judgment of these who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be ad- mitted as final. And there needs to be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity. What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the _ intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the gen- eral suffrage of those who are familiar with both? ...

I must again repeat what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happi- ness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. "To do as you would be done by," and "to love your neighbor as your self," constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place

122 PAR T II TH E ORIES MORAL

. ractically, it may be called) the inte\ . . ess or (as, speaking P ossible in harmony With the ini.

1

. the happm individual as nearly as K t ed ucation and opinion, Which est o~ e;;rwhole;I and, secondly, t h:racter, should so use that PoWer est o t st a power over human c . dividual an indissoluble asso. have so va · d of every m t

ablish in the mm . d the good of the whole, espe. as to es . happmess an h . . between his own . d the practice of sue modes of c1at1on h pmess an h • . II between his own ap. d for the universal appines,

oa y . d os1ttve as regar . h 'b• nd uct negative an P ' b able to conceive t e poss1 Ii-co , 1 he may e un P

rescribes; so that not on y . 1 ith conduct opposed to the h. lf consistent Y w ity of happiness to tmse • . . lse to promote the general b 1 that a direct 1mpu . . general good, ut a so . . f the habitual motives of actton, good may be _in every md1v1dual ~:;e: ith may fill a large and promi- and the senuments connec:d t ' entient existence. If the tmpugn- nent place in every human . emg s s d 't to their own minds in •i· · rahty represente 1 ers of the uu 1tanan mo d r on possessed this its true character, I know not what recommen a I • to it· by any other morality they could possibly affirm to be wantmg t ' what more beautiful or more exalted developments of human na ur; any other ethical system can be supposed to foster; or what sprin_g~

0 action, not accessible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on for givmg effect to their mandates. .

The objectors to utilitarianism cannot always be charged with rep- resenting it in a discreditable light. On the contrary, those among them who entertain anything like a just idea of its disinterested char- acter sometimes fi nd fault with its standard as being too high for humanity. They say it is exacting too much to requ ire that people shall always act from the inducement of promoting the general inter- est of society. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals and confound the rule of action with the motive of it. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them; but no system of ethics requires that the soJe motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hun- dredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so done if the rule of duty does not condemn them. It is the more unjust to utilitarianism that this particular misapprehension should be made a ground of objection to it, inasmuch as Utilitarian moral- ists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming tha, the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the actioo, though much With the worth of the agent. He who saves a fel!ow creature from drown- ing does what is mora!Jy right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the friend that

CHAPTER 15 UTILITARIANISM 123

tr~sts him is guilty ~fa crime, even if his object be to serve another fnen~ to whom he 1s under greater obligations . But to speak only of _ac~ions _d~ne fr~m the motive of duty, and in direct obedience to pnnc1pl~: It.Is a ~•sap_prehension of the utilitarian mode of thought t~ conceive It a_s nnplying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large. The greatest major- ity of good actions are intended not for the benefit of the world but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up;, and the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violat- ing the rights , that is, the legitimate and authorized expectations, of anyone else. The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue: the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale-in other words, to be a public benefactor-are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or hap- piness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to. Those alone the influence of whose actions extends to society in general need concern themselves habitually about so large an object. In the case of abstinences indeed-of things which people forbear to do from moral considerations, though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial-it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is of a class which, if practiced generally, would be generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it. The amount of regard for the public interest implied in this recognition is no greater than is demanded by every system of morals, for they all enjoin to abstain from whatever is manifestly pernicious to society ....

Again, utility is often summarily stigmatized as an immoral doc- trine by giving it the name of "expedien~y," ~nd t~ki~g advantage of the popular use of that term to contrast It with pnno~le. But the ex- pedient, in the sense in which it is opposed to the nght, generally means that which is expedient for the particular interest of the agent himself as when a minister sacrifices the interests of his country to keep hi,mself in place. When it means ~nythi~g bett~r than this, it means that which is expedient for some immediate obJect, so1:1e tem-

b t Whl.ch vi·olates a rule whose observance 1s expe-porary purpose, u . . . . d

. · h h. h r degree The expedient, 1n this sense, instead ient 1n a muc 1g e · . f b

· h th. ng wi·th the useful 1s a branch of the hurtful. o e1ng t e same 1 '

124 PART II THEORIES MORAL ·~

d . t for the purpose of getting b expe ,en ' . °"" 't would often e t or attaining some object imme•· Thus I barrassmen , . B . \ti, O

mentary em h to tell a he. ut masmuch a, th some m I s or ot ers, b' e I U seful to ourse ve 't1've feeling on the su ~eq of Veracity ate y I of a sens1 h c . I

. ation in ourse ves h nceeblement oft at ,eehng one of cu uv f I and t e e " . . ne of the most use u' h' hour conduct can be mstrumental• IS o . h • s to w 1c ' t he most hurtful, t mg . t ntional deviation from truth does

even unm e ' . f h and inasmuch as any, . th trustworthmess o uman asser. d eakenmg e - that much towar w . . al support of all present social Wei!. tion, which is not only ~he prmfc1ph' h does more than any one thing h . ffic,ency o w ,c . being, butt e msu k back civilization, virtue, everythmg on that can be named to eep h 1 est scale depends-we feel that . h iness on t e arg which human app d t of a rule of such transcendent . l . c r a present a van age, the v10 at1on,

10

. h h ho for the sake of conve-

~7!':!~:cii~:~~ :;~;~~':::~ ~~:: i:~iv~d:a1,' does whaht depehnds ~n

1 . d d · flict upon t em t e ev1 ,

him to deprive mankind of the goo ' an m . each involved in the greater or less reliance which they can place m other's words, acts the part of one of their worst en_em,~s. Yet that even this rule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions IS acknowl- edged by all moralists, the chief of which is when the withholdmg of some fact (as of infonnation from a malefactor, or of bad news from a person dangerously ill) would save an individual (especially an indi- vidual other than oneself) from great and unmerited evil, and when the withholding can only be effected by denial. But in order that the exception may not extend itself beyond the need, and may have the least possible effect in Weakening reliance on veracity, it ought to be recognized and, if possible, its limits defined; and, if the principle of utili_ty is good for anything, it must be good for Weighing these con- fl1c11ng UIIht1es agamst one another and marking out the region Within which one or the other preponderates.

Again, defenders_ of utility. of ten find themselves called upon to reply to such obJec11ons as thlS-that there is not tirne p ·

. . , rev1ous to ac11on, for calculat1~g and Weig?ing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happmess. This IS exactly as if anyone '"er t h · · · 'bl · ,. e o say t at It IS unpossi e to guide our conduct by Christianity be h .

. . . cause t ere 1s not time, on every occasion on Which anything has to b d d h h h

e one, to rea t roug t e Old and New Testaments. The answer t th b' . . h h h o e o ~ec-t1on IS t at t ere as been ample time namely the Who}

- . . ' ' e Past dura. t1on of the human species. Dunng all that time mankind h b I

· b • ave een earn mg y experience the tendencies of actions on '"hi· h .

' •v C experi- ence all the prudence as Well as all the morality of life are dep d

en ent.

C HAP TE R l .~ UT JLI TA RI AN IS M 125

P~ople ta lk as if th e ~omm ence ment o f thi s co u rse of ex pe ri e nce had hith erto b een put off, a nd as if, at th e mo me nt when so me ma n feels tempte d to_ m e?dle with th e pro perty o r life o f ano th e r, he had to begin con std e nng for the first time wheth er murder and theft are injuriou s to hum a n h appiness. Eve n th en I do no t think th at he would find th e question ver y pu zzling; but, at all events, th e matte r is now don e to his h a nd. It is truly a whim sical supposition that , if ma nkind were agreed in considering utility to be the test of morality, th ey would remain without any agreement as to what is useful , and would take no measures for having their notions on the subject taught to the young and enforced by law and opinion. There is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard whatever to work ill if we suppose uni- versal idiocy to be conjoined with it; but on any hypothesis short of that, mankind must by this time have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some actions on their happiness; and the beliefs which have thus come down are the rules of morality for the multitude, and for the philosopher until he has succeeded in finding better. That philoso- phers might easily do this, even now, on many subjects; that the. re- ceived code of ethics is by no means of divine right; and that mankind have still much to learn as to the effects of actions on the general happiness, I admit or rather earnestly maintain. The c~rollaries fro~ the principle of utility, like the p~ecepts of ev~ry practical art, admit of indefinite improvement, and, m a progressive state of the. human mind, their improvement is perpetually going on. But to con~ider the rules of morality as improvable is one thing; to pass over th~ m_t~rme- diate generalization entirely and endeavor to te~t each mdiv1d~al

· d' tl by the first principle is another. It 1s a strange notion action Irec y . . . that the acknowledgment of a first principle is mcons1stent ':1th the d . . f econdary ones To inform a traveler respectmg the a m1ss1on o s · . I d k lace of his ultimate destination is not to forbid the use of. an ~ar s

P . . h ay The proposition that happmess is the and direct10n-posts on t e w · I · d d d . f morality does not mean that no road ought to be a1

en an aim o . thither should not be ad- down to that goal, or that personshgomg th r Men really ought to

d . · rather t an ano e · vised to take one Irecuon h ' b•iect which they would . k' d f nonsense on t is su:., ,

leave off talking a in ° f practical concernment. 1. t n other matters o neither talk nor 1sten ° O . . •s not founded on astron- h h t of navigation 1 Nobody argues t at t e ar . 1 late the Nautical Almanac. •i not wait to ca cu omy because sa1 ors can i'th it ready calculated; and

. . they go to sea w . . Bemg rat10nal creatures, h ea of life with thelf mmds out upon t es all rational creatures go . f •ght and wrong, as well as on

n questions o n made up on the commo

126 PART II THEORIES MORAL

. f wise and foolish. Anct this suons o d h ' d. fficult que . 't is to be presume t ey Wii\ f more 1

ahty, 1 I · · of the ar . human qu h fundamenta pnnc1pie of many ight 1s a d t as t e . h . l

ong as fores h tever we a op . . les to apply It by; t e Illlpos. as d w a rmc1p ntinue to

0

· . bordinate P mon to all systems, can co reqmre su being com m orality, we 'thout them, . particular; but gravely to d ·ng w1 ne m .

sibility of 01

t against any O Id be had, and as if Illan. gumen . 'pies cou . afford no ar h econdary prmn t remain, Without draw-· r o sue s d lways mus . . argue as

I

n . d till now, an a . nee of human hfe 1s as h d emame he expene . . kind a r

1 nclusions from t ched in phllosoph1ca) ing any genera he? k as absurdity has ever rea high a pitch, I t m ,

controversy. • · ·

Of What Sort of Pr~of the Principle

of Utility Is Susceptible d questions about what Q uestions about en s ar~, . d t . e is that happmess IS e-d in other wor s, . . d . .. Th tihtanan oc rm .

things are desirable. e u . d all other things bemg sirable and the on y In d Wh t ought to be required oft e

1 th· g desirable as an en , . h only desirable as means to th~t en . . . t ~hat the doctrine should ful-doctrine, what cond1t1ons is It reqmSI. e l fill-to make good its claim to be heheved. . . . . .

The only proof capable of being given that an object I~ VIs'.ble ts that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is ~ud1ble is t?at eople hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In hke

~anner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself Were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to he an end, nothing cou]d ever con- vince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the gen- eral happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the ge~era] happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all Persons. Bappi- ness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct •nct quently, one of the cntena of morahty.

. . . , conse- But it has not, by this alone, proved itself to be the soJe criterion.

To do that It Would seem, by the same rule, necessary to show only that people desire happiness hut that they never desire not thing else. Now it is palpable that they do desire things Whicha~y~

, In

CHAPTER 15 UTILITARIANISM 127

common_ language, are decidedly distinguished from happiness. They deslfe, for example, virtue and the absence of vice no less really than pleasure and the absence of pain. The desire of virtue is not as universal, but it is as authentic a fact as the desire of happiness. And hence the opponents of the utilitarian standard deem that they have a right to infer that there are other ends of human action besides happiness, and that happiness is not the standard of approbation and disapprobation.

But does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire virtue, or maintain that virtue is not a thing to be desired? The very reverse. It maintains not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be de- sired disinterestedly, for itself. Whatever may be the opinion of utili- tarian moralists as to the original conditions by which virtue is made virtue, however they may believe (as they do) that actions and disposi- tions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue, yet this being granted, and it having been decided, from con- siderations of this description, what is virtuous, they not only place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to the ultimate end, but they also recognize as a psychological fact the pos- sibility of its being, to the individual, a goo~ in ~tself, ':itho~t looking to any end beyond it; and hold that the mind 1s not m a nght sta_te, not in a state conformable to utility, not in the state most conducive to the general happiness, unless it does lov: virt~e i~ ~his ~anner- as a thing desirable in itself, even although, m the md1v1dual inst~nc~, it should not produce those other desirable consequenc~s whICh ~t

d t Oduce and on account of which it is held to be virtue. This ten s o pr , h · . . . ot i·n the smallest degree, a departure from the appi-op1n1on 1s n , · d

. . 1 The 1· ngredients of happiness are very vanous, an ness pnnc1p e. 'd d h of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when consi ere as

eac . t The principle of utility does not mean that any swelling an aggrega e. . · f . . for instance or any given exemption rom given pleasure, as music, ' 11

. 1 health is to be looked upon as means to a co ec- pa1n, as for examp e h , . and to be desired on that account. . h' termed app1ness, . tlve somet 1ng . . d r themselves· besides bemg

d · d d desirable m an ior ' They are esire an d y· t e according to the utilitarian means, they are a part of the en : . ir 'part of the end, but it is ca- doctrine, is not naturally a~d ohngma hy live it disinterestedly it has

. . and m t ose w o . pable of becoming so, h . h d not as a means to happ1-. d . d and c ens e ' become so, and 1s esire .

f th . r happmess. . ness, but to a part O ei ember that virtue 1s not the h . f ther we may rem To illustrate t IS ur ' d h' h 1· f it were no t a means to . 11 ns an w IC only thing origina Y a mea '

128 PART II MORAL THEORIES L d emain indifferent, but Which bya

1 Id be an r • . 8 Soti anything else wou to comes to be desired for Itself, ¾d ha-

' t ·s a means 1 h t at tion with what

1 1

. .t What for examp e, s aU We say of h ost mtens1 y. ' . t , too with the utm . thing originally more des1rabJe ab , There 1s no ou1 love of money. h f glittering pebbles. Its Worth is So)

1

b t any eap o e) money than a ou . h . .11 buy· the desires for other things than h' wh1c It WI ' that of the t mgs f atifying. Yet the love of money is

001

. h · · a means o gr . itself, wh1c It is . £orces of human hfe, but money is, in f h t ongest movmg . . . one o t e s r . d £ 'tself- the desire to possess It 1s often d · ed m an ori ' . many cases, es1r · 1 't and goes on increasing When all h the desire to use , . stronger t an . d beyond it to be compassed by It, are d · hich pomt to en s ' . . the . eSires w en be said truly that money is desired not for fallmg off. It may,

th ' f th end From being a means to

h ke of an end, but as part O e · . h . .

1

es~ . b -1 If principal ingredient oft e 10d1-happmess, II has come to e_' se a be said of the ma. vidual's conception of happmess. The same may

1

£ jority of the great objects of human life: power, for examp _e, or ;'."e, except that to each of these there is a certain amount of ''?me iate pleasure annexed, which has at least the semblan~e of bemg natu- rally inherent in them-a thing which cannot be said of money. Std!, however, the strongest natural attraction, both of power and of ~ame'. is the immense aid they give to the attainment of our other WJShes, and it is the strong association thus generated between them and all our objects of desire which gives to the direct desire of them the intensity it often assumes, so as in some characters to surpass rn strength all other desires. In these cases the means have become a part of the end, and a more important part of it than any of the things which they are means to. What was once desired as an instru- ment for the attainment of happiness has come to be desired for its own sake. In being desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as part of happiness. The person is made, or thinks he would be made, happy by its mere possession and is made unhappy by failure to obtain it. The desire of it is not a different thing from the desire of happiness any more than the love of music or the desire of health. They are included in happiness. They are some of the elements of which the desire of happiness is made up. Happiness is not an ab- stract idea but a concrete whole; and these are some of its Parts. A.nd the utilitarian standard sanctions and approve, their being so. Life would be a poor thing, very ill provided With sources of happiness, if there were not this provision of nature by which things originally indifferent, but conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the satis- faction of our primitive desires, become in themselves sources of

CHAPTER 15 UTILITARIANISM 129

pleasure more valuable than the primitive pleasures, both in perma- nency, in the space of human existence that they are capable of cov- ering, and even in intensity.

Virtue, according to the utilitarian conception, is a good of this description. There was no original desire of it, or motive to it, save its conduciveness to pleasure, and especially to protection from pain. But through the association thus formed it may be felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other good; and with this difference between it and the love of money, of power, or of fame- that all of these may, and of ten do, render the individual noxious to the other members of the society to which he belongs, whereas there is nothing which makes him so much a blessing to them as the cultiva- tion of the disinterested love of virtue. And consequently, the utilitar- ian standard, while it tolerates and approves those other acquired desires, up to the point beyond which they would be more injurious to the general happiness than promotive of it, enjoins and requires the cultivation of the love of virtue up to the greatest strength possible, as being above all things important to the general happiness.

It results from the preceding considerations that there is in reality nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happi- ness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself until it has become so. Those who desire virtue for its own sake desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or be- cause the consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for both rea- sons united, as in truth the pleasure and pain seldom exist separately, but almost always together-the same person feeling pleasure in the degree of virtue attained, and pain in not having attained more. If one of these gave him no pleasure, and the other no pain, he would not love or desire virtue, or would desire it only for the other benefits which it might produce to himself or to persons whom he cared fo r.

We have now, then, an answer to the question, of what sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible.