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155© The Author(s) 2019 J.-F. Caron (ed.), Kazakhstan and the Soviet Legacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6693-2_8

CHAPTER 8

The Art of!Managing Religion in!a!Post- Soviet Soft Authoritarian State

Hélène!Thibault

This chapter aims at presenting a religious topography of contemporary Kazakhstan by focusing on the moderate!Islamic religious revival follow- ing independence and the subsequent attempts made by the state to con- trol it. With a remaining Russian population of approximately 25%, Kazakhstan is considered to be one of the most Russi"ed and secularized countries of Central Asia. Since its independence in 1991, the Kazakhstani authorities have implemented policies aimed at promoting national tradi- tions, and in particular, the Kazakh language. In parallel, we observe a renewed interest for Islam among the population. However, the society remains strongly in#uenced by 70!years of atheism imposed by force and this interest translates into a moderate increase of religious practice. Despite this moderate Islamization, the authorities fear a politicization and radicalization of Islam and attempt to channel religious feelings toward an Islam that is considered patriotic, in line with national values and shielded from external in#uences. The state has reinforced its control over religious organizations and practices, through the Spiritual Direction of Muslims in Kazakhstan, an institution inherited from Soviet times which acts as an

H. Thibault ( ) Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan e-mail: [email protected]

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of"cial clergy. This control is exercised in a context of moderate authori- tarianism, which generates tensions in the country. This chapter opens with a historical account of religious dynamics to illustrate how state-reli- gion relations in Kazakhstan possess a unique character due to the legacy of Marxist atheism. The second part paints a portrait of the religious diver- sity in the country and the tensions inherent to this cohabitation. It will reveal that the most dramatic tensions are not inter- confessional but con- cern the different interpretations of Islam.

RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IN!HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Before the conversion to Islam in the ninth century, the nomadic peoples of Central Asia practiced a variant of paganism, locally known as Tengri (Tengri means sky in many Turkic languages) and strongly connected to natural elements and the souls of ancestors. The shaman was a central "gure of the religious life which consisted in “ways of understanding and manipulating the world in order to maintain the central sacred value of (communal) life and (communal) well-being” (DeWeese 2010: 37). Islamization in Central Asia took place progressively from the ninth cen- tury with the Arab conquest. At that time, the territory of Kazakhstan was under the authority of different Turkic tribes, united in a confederation. Despite the military character of the conquest, conversions were not nec- essarily forced and on the contrary, conversion came with some advantages that locals were interested in such as tax exemption and access to circles of power since Islam was the religion of power, literature, and science at that time. The progressive Islamization of the Golden Horde starting from the eleventh century gave an impulse to the implementation of Islam on the territory of Central Asia. However, we must wait until the fourteenth cen- tury before Islam becomes the of"cial religion of the khans’ court. Despite its of"cial status, the practice of Islam remained strongly in#uenced by ancient rituals and traditions such as the worship of ancestors and saints (DeWeese 2010). History teaching in Kazakhstan, which is strongly in#u- enced by Soviet tradition, tends to underline the super"cial conversion to Islam and undermine its historical signi"cance for peoples of Kazakhstan (Morrison 2014).

In the nineteenth century, the Russian imperial expansion reorganized the socio-religious environment. The Russian military campaign in Central Asia started with the subjugation of the Kazakh territory in 1837 and ended when Russia defeated the Turkmens in 1881 (Fourniau 1994: 56).

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Already at the time, religious communities were regulated by a state authority in Russia, the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly, established under Catherine the Great in 1788. This Assembly oversaw religious ser- vices and the registration of religious personnel and communities. However, in 1868, the Russian authorities decided to exempt Kazakhs because they feared that they could fall under the in#uence of Tatar Muslims and potentially form an alliance (Werth 2013). At the beginning of the twentieth century, a movement of Kazakh intellectuals, which ideas intersect with Islam, nationalism, and secularism, gained momentum. Inspired by Jadidism, a group of reforming Muslim intellectuals active in the Russian Empire, Kazakh intellectuals urged the masses to "ght oppres- sion, reject their colonized status and open up to the world. Their empha- sis was mostly on Kazakh language but they also moderately encouraged Islam, seen as an integral part of the national identity (Uyama 2013).

At the height of the revolutionary frenzy, Muslims of the Russian empire mobilized and organized in May 1917, the Congress of all Muslims of Russia in Moscow. The Congress gathered almost 1000 participants, among which, were 200 women. Participants denounced Russian imperi- alism and claimed more autonomy for Muslims. Other demands were very progressive and included, for instance, an eight-hour working day, right to vote for women and the abolishment of polygamy. Even if the Muslim identity was defended, it was understood that Islam did not provide suf- "cient cohesion to form a nation and discussions reaf"rmed the impor- tance of socialism in national construction (Daulet 1989). The Bolsheviks did not keep their promises and their rule dismantled! ethno-religious communities since religion and nationalism were considered utterly counter-revolutionary.

RELIGION IN!SOVIET TIMES Marxism-Leninism is an ideology openly hostile to religions as evidenced by Marx’s famous formula of “Religion is the opium of the people”. Marxism-Leninism denounces religion as an instrument used by ruling classes to keep the working class and peasants in servitude and ignorance. The Soviet transformative project had the objective to eliminate religion in order to create a society free from the clergy’s yoke, free from conserva- tive traditions and beliefs obstructing scienti"c advancement. From the "rst years of formation of the USSR, during and after the civil war, the clergy was rapidly sidelined, arrested, or outright eliminated. Shrines were

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destroyed or converted and religious worship was strongly discouraged (Keller 2001). The denigration of religion also involved the emancipation of women, who were considered doubly oppressed by the patriarchal soci- ety and by Islam (Massell 2015). However, the Soviet period was not characterized by the complete suppression of religious life but rather by a strict control of religious practices, coupled with an omnipresent anti- religious state propaganda which denigrated all religions. The Soviet man- agement of religion also varied depending on the time period, regions, and the leaders’ attitudes toward faith. The international conjuncture too in#uenced the authorities’ stance toward religion (Tasar 2017). After an initial period of intense repression, the Soviets toned down their anti- religious campaigns and tolerated a certain form of religious practice, which was strictly regulated by different religious administrations across the USSR. There were two types of institutions, one administrative, the other, spiritual, which were governed by the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, adopted in 1929. In Central Asia, the Spiritual Direction of Muslims of Central Asia (known as SADUM in Russian), was created in 1943. The Direction was headed by a Mufti, based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Not long after its creation, regional repre- sentations called Qaziyats, were set up in all the other Central Asian republics. They possessed the authority to nominate the religious person- nel in their respective republics. Overall, the SADUM was responsible to rule over issues of religious dogma and transmit their positions to the greater public in the form of fatwas. The SADUM issued recommenda- tions on mullahs’ obligations and carried out compliance checks and dis- missed personnel if necessary. Finally, it was responsible for approving the importation of religious literature as well as printing and distribution (Sadur 1989: 437). Paradoxically, religious beliefs and rituals were con- stantly delegitimized and ridiculed by the regime which used propaganda and education campaigns, mobilizations of all kinds to convey an anti- religious message. Those focused on the backwardness of religious beliefs and how religions were an obstacle to socio-economic development. In that regard, Islam was not targeted more than the other confessions since for the Soviet authorities, all religions were equally pernicious.

Another important institution served as a link between the govern- ment and religious institutions. Created in 1918, the Committee for Religious Affairs, which had branches in all republics and regions, was responsible for authorizing the registration and establishment of places of worship and inform the government on the religious situation. The

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Committee was also regularly answering to the KGB. The control of religious communities was more or less strict depending on the decade and before 1965, the Committee was rather cooperative and tolerant. However, in 1965, the Khrushchev administration implemented a series of repressive measures such as the closing of places of worship and the arrest of religious "gures as well as renewed anti-religious propaganda efforts (Tasar 2017). Though some of the directives coming from Moscow were not always strictly implemented and local authorities had some latitude. Many rituals such as Islamic funerals and circumcisions were tolerated and party of"cials also took part in them without fear of getting in trouble (Ro’i 2000: 694). For that reason, many scholars talk about a “parallel” religious life in the USSR. In the 1980s, there were around 200 of"cial (state-sanctioned) mosques in Central Asia (Abdulgani 1989: 405) but scholars estimate that this represented only 1% of the actual number of mosques. Others were underground mosques that local unof"cial mullahs opened for local parishioners and operated more or less secretly (Ro’i 2000: 288).

The imposition of a brutal and accelerated modernization process in the USSR led to profound socio-political transformations. Religious prac- tice was considerably reduced but did not disappear completely. Above all, the political and economic autarchy that prevailed in the Soviet Union resulted in religious isolation and Soviet Muslims remained disconnected from the rest of the Muslim world for decades. Beyond repression, what is important to remember from the Soviet era is the idea of a rigorous super- vision of religious practices and discourses and a delegitimization of the place of religion in the society.

As the USSR collapsed, the signi"cance of religion was part of the dis- cussions concerning the future of the newly independent republics. Some observers predicted a strong religious resurgence but what we saw was a moderate Islamic revival, especially in Kazakhstan. Religion was margin- ally instrumentalized by elites in the process of state consolidation and legitimation. Religion was used as a common identity marker but the respective Constitutions of the new states con"rmed their secular charac- ter and the perpetuation of state control over religion. In Kazakhstan, in addition to guaranteeing the exclusion of religion from the public sphere, the constitution formalizes the prohibition to establish political parties on a religious basis. On the one hand, this legal provision is tributary of the Soviet legacy and on the other hand of the multiethnic character of the Kazakhstani society.

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DIVERSITY AND!RELIGIOUS PRACTICE Kazakhstanis rarely miss an occasion to recall that Kazakhstan hosts more than 128 ethnic minorities, which have linguistic rights and access to edu- cation in their native language for some. The peaceful cohabitation and this message of tolerance is a common theme in the discourses praising the legacy of the current (and sole) president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who managed to maintain social peace in such a diverse country. In 2003, Astana hosted the Congress of the leaders of world and traditional reli- gions. From this meeting came the idea of building a Palace of Peace and Reconciliation in Astana, an impressive futuristic pyramid which was com- pleted in 2009. Interestingly, the propensity to celebrate religious cohabi- tation through the organization of international events was also used diplomatically by the Soviet authorities (Walters 2005, 26). According to the President: “The four sides of our Palace are oriented to the four sides of the world. In some sense this construction embodies independent Kazakhstan that friendly embraces all people of all nations and practicing different religions”.1 However, the social fabric underwent many changes since independence. The proportion of ethnic Russians has dramatically decreased from 40% in 1991 to 24% today. Their emigration is sustained year after year and even increased slightly in 2016 (Pannier 2016). Those migration movements are transforming the religious landscape of Kazakhstan. There are currently 63% Kazakhs, 24% Russians, 3% Uzbeks, 2% Ukrainians, 1.5% Uighurs, 1.3% Tatars, 1% Germans, and 4.5% others. We thus "nd 70% of Muslims, 26% of Christians (mostly Orthodox), 2% of atheists, and 2% belonging to other religions (CIA 2018).

Like its other Soviet counterparts, the number of places of worship has exploded in Kazakhstan in the last few years. The number of mosques went to 63!in 1991 to 2570!in 2017 and the number of Churches is now of 333 (Danilin 2017). Religious education is not part of the school cur- riculum but religious education is dispensed in sixteen medresses and one Islamic University—Nur Mubarak in the former capital, Almaty. Religious practice has increased but remains moderate. Despite popular beliefs, recent statistics from the Pew Center (2018) show that younger genera- tions are not necessarily more religious. On the contrary, the older people get, the more religious they become. Among the 95% of Kazakhstanis who declare to believe in God, only 15% of adults who are below 40!years old

1 http://astana-piramida.kz/en/

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pray regularly and 26% of adults who are older than 40 pray daily (Pew 2018: 66).2 Because Kazakhstan is a large and!diverse country, we need to distinguish between regions. Indeed, people in the Southern cities of Almaty and Taraz, as well as Aktobe in the West, are more religious. Interestingly, it is also in these regions which have been the theater of ter- rorist attacks that people reported feeling more religious instability (Nadirova et!al. 2014). Another indicator of moderate religious practice is the number of pilgrims to Mecca. Kazakhstan barely reaches the number of Kazakhstani pilgrims allowed to Mecca. The current quota set by Saudi Arabia is currently 4000 but could be higher, according to the size of Kazakhstan’s population. President Nazarbayev only performed his pil- grimage in 2004. The discrepancy between the number of mosques and the moderate practice of Islam can be explained by the fact that Islam is seen more as an important cultural marker than as a strict dogma that should regulate social life. For instance, many newly married couples who normally do not attend religious services go to the mosque to perform the religious marriage Nikah. As such, it can be said that the Soviet seculariza- tion project has achieved its goals of creating secular subjects and that this effect has long-lasting consequences.

This moderate religious revival comes along a moderate promotion of Islam at the state level which contributes to the promotion and normaliza- tion of this religious identity. After the Soviet ideology was dismissed, elites sought new identity markers and turned their attention to religion, culture, and ethnic identities. Typically, Central Asian elites underline the cultural Islamic heritage while also performing state control of religion through Soviet-style institutions and condemning foreign interpretations of Islam (Khalid 2006; Roy 2010; Thibault 2018). In Kazakhstan, the valorization of Islam has been moderate given that a signi"cant portion of the population is not Muslim and that the society is very secular.

The country’s Muslim identity also serves in diplomacy. Kazakhstan joined the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 1995 and even chaired it in 2011. In the "rst years of independence, Kazakhstan opened its fron- tiers to various Arab missionary groups but their presence has been less and less tolerated over the years for fear of religious “contamination”. Indeed, Islam as practiced in Arab countries is generally considered as foreign to Kazakhstanis, whose practice of Islam is more moderate and

2 In comparison, in Tajikistan, respectively 40 and 59% of adults younger and older than 40 years old pray daily (Pew 2018: 67).

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intertwined with local traditions. The state promotion of a Muslim identity is aligned with an idealized conception of the secular nation. Finally, pro- motion is also done via the construction of mosques, partly or entirely sponsored by the state, as well as the restoration of one of the most visited mausoleums in Central Asia, that of Ahmad Yasawi, in the city of Turkestan in southern Kazakhstan. The Islamic "nance sector is also supported by the state since the 2000s. In 2011, Nursultan Nazarbayev declared that the global economic crisis had shown that the Islamic economic and "nan- cial model was stable and viable (Botoeva 2018: 248). More recently, the government has reconverted the site of the universal exhibition that Kazakhstan hosted in 2017 into a global "nancial center. Modeled on the centers of Singapore and Dubai that have English as the main language, it allows exemptions from visas and taxes and lets "nancial players experi- ment with new products or cryptocurrencies or use the center as a place of international mediation. One of these ambitions is to boost the develop- ment of Islamic "nance in Kazakhstan. On that matter, Achilov mentions that in the long run, Islamic institutions can become important social actors in Kazakhstan, through the development of the "nancial sector, in which believers can elaborate business strategies consistent with their faith (Achilov 2015).

Beyond the state promotion of religion, Islam appears to provide a common identity, a social capital which regulates interactions within cer- tain communities. The cult of saints and mausoleums lead to meetings and exchanges and their activities are at the heart of regional political and economic dynamics. Bigozhin shows us in particular how the wardens of traditional mausoleums, who are often descendants from sacred lineages (qozha) seek the patronage of political and economic elites to build, main- tain and develop their mausoleum (Bigozhin 2018). Certain religious institutions and groups provide a cohesive ensemble of shared values for believers who reject secular lifestyles. In fact, more and more halal shops and services are being developed in Kazakhstan, including restaurants, shops, and service providers. Data from the agriculture and food process- ing industry show that the halal food market is estimated to more than $ 3 billion, which represents about 13% of food and beverage expenditures in Kazakhstan (World Food 2017).

A similar dynamic is unfolding in the neighboring countries. In Tajikistan, faith enables the formation of social connections and the cre- ation of solidarity circles. Economic uncertainty and the decline of the welfare system after independence leave the "eld open for the creation of

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new solidarities around religious communities. Also, in a context characterized by heavy corruption, the display of one’s faith, and by asso- ciation, one’s virtue, is a way to prove oneself socially (Thibault 2018). However, rigorist interpretations of Islam, manifested for instance, by an assiduous practice, different praying methods, as well as exterior signs such as long beards, short trousers, and hijabs, are perceived negatively by a great portion of the population. These are often interpreted as signs of radicalism. This negative perception resonates in the circles of power.

NON-TRADITIONAL ISLAM AND!RADICALIZATION The communal character of certain religious groups generates strong con- nections and reinforces a sense of solidarity between members but!similar solidarity networks can be developed among Islamic radical groups. Recent research has shown that contrary to previous understanding, radicalization does not necessarily only happen online on social media (Tucker 2016) but via real-life social networks (Tucker 2018) in which individuals are drawn by people they already know. In a number of villages in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, entire families, sometimes up to 40 people, left for Syria or Iraq. A Kazakh family became famous for the wrong reasons in 2014 when the Islamic State (ISIS) published a video showing several Kazakh children receiving both theological and military training. Another particularly disturbing video released in 2015 showed a Kazakh child of about 12!years old shooting two Russian hostages at close range. According to of"cial "gures, between 250 and 400 Kazakhstani citizens have joined the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (Tucker 2016: 2) of which one-third are women (Bondal 2017). However, other sources estimate that 500–1000 individuals from Kazakhstan left the country to "ght alongside ISIS.!If this number appears to be high, we should recall that a similar number of Tajikistanis (Lemon 2015: 68) and Belgians (van San 2018: 39) also joined ISIS.!With respectively 8 and 11 million inhabitants, these smaller countries have disproportionally contributed to the jihadist movement in comparison to Kazakhstan. Despite that, with the expected military defeat of ISIS in the Middle East, the authorities fear the return of militants who could in#uence and mobilize individuals vulnerable to radical ideas.

Kazakhstan has been the target of few radical individuals! in the last decade. Since 2008, 18 deadly attacks have claimed 134 lives in Central Asia. Of these, nine occurred in various regions of Kazakhstan, but mainly in Aktobe and in the country’s former capital, Almaty (Lemon 2018). The

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most tragic incidents occurred in 2011 and 2016!in the city of Aktobe, a city of 400,000 inhabitants located in the oil-producing region. On 17 May 2011, an individual linked to extremist networks committed a suicide bombing inside the state security’s of"ces. Later in June, two policemen were murdered, and a police operation to arrest the suspects turned into a shooting incident causing several deaths. Shortly afterward, a police of"- cer stalking a suspect in Aktobe was shot dead inside a house, in which a man then blew himself up. These incidents resulted in the death of 19 people, including "ve members of security forces and two bystanders (Lillis 2011). In 2016, even more dramatic events unfolded in Aktobe again. On June 5, a group of 25 men raided two gun shops before attack- ing a local military unit. As a result of this attack and the following police response, eight civilians, three policemen, and 18 suspects were killed. President Nazarbayev described the suspects as followers of a radical pseudo-religious movement (Orazgaliyeva 2016). On July 18!in Almaty, Ruslan Kulikbayev, an ex-convict, killed ten persons (eight policemen and two civilians) in a police station in Almaty. The killer admitted that this attack was a retaliation against the mistreatment of Muslims in Kazakhstan (Toleukhanova 2016). Following these events, President Nazarbayev ordered the adoption of stronger national security legislation and pro- posed the creation of a new ministry of religion.

Those threats have pushed the government to invest considerable resources in the "ght against extremism. In 2013–2017, the budget of the national program to "ght against religious extremism and terrorism was of almost one billion dollars and the current plan (2018–2022) has a similar budget (Syundyukova 2018). The state policy in the "ght against violent terrorism focuses on the correct understanding of “good” and “authen- tic” Islam versus a “fake” versus “foreign” one. The problem is said to be in the poor religious knowledge of Kazakhstanis who cannot distinguish between the two (Beissembayev 2016). However, scholars argue that radi- calism has little to do with religious sentiments and for some, it appears when “old values are abandoned and new ones have taken shape yet”, which is the case in Kazakhstan since the collapse of the USSR (Sanseeva 2017). Others argue that for both men and women, fraternity and group solidarity seem very determinant in the motivations of socially or eco- nomically marginalized individuals who are drawn to extremist ideas and groups (Orazabayeva 2015; Tucker 2018). Finally, Beissembayev’s research (2016) which is based on interviews with individuals convicted for terrorism reveals an important connection between their petty criminal

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past and their implication within extremist circles. Similar research has also shown the prevalence of criminal antecedents among European jihadists (Basra and Neumann 2016). This explanation matches the pro"le! of Ruslan Kulikbayev, the 2016! Almaty shooter, who had been to prison twice for theft and possession of illegal arms.

The authorities are also concerned with ISIS even this group does not have a physical presence in Kazakhstan, nor anywhere!in post-Soviet!Central Asia. Its active presence in the region is limited to Afghanistan and to some extent in Pakistan (Giustozzi 2018). Other radical groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Jamaat Tablighi have been operating in the region since the late 1990s. Founded in East-Jerusalem in 1953 and exiled in Great Britain since the 1980s, the Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Freedom) aims at establishing a world caliphate. They propose to achieve this through peaceful methods and reject the use of violence. The refusal to participate in electoral politics and their approach can be considered fundamentalist in the sense that it focuses on a bottom-up social transformation aiming at the creation of a world caliphate governed by Sharia. However, the party is considered as a threat in many countries given that it does not recognize the legitimacy of nation-states and the current political order. Its presence in Central Asia is evident but discreet since the party is on the list of extremist organizations in all the Republics. In 2006, Karagiannis esti- mated the number of Kazakhstani sympathizers to 1000 (Karagiannis 2007: 302). Its presence appeared to be stronger in the South, the most densely populated region where the majority of the population is below 30!years old. According to Karagiannis,!the party!was particularly attrac- tive to Uzbek refugees who have #ed the political and religious repression in their country in the 1990s. Widespread poverty in the region also con- tributed to the popularity of the party. In 2004, 23% of the population of South Kazakhstan lived under the poverty line (Karagiannis 2007: 306). While Hizb ut-Tahrir often made the news in the years 2000 but it is no longer the case in the 2010s. It is unclear if this is due to its decline or because its members have gone underground because of repression. Over the past 10!years, 160 members of this organization have been convicted in Kazakhstan (Eurasia Daily 2017). Jamaat Tablighi, a peaceful, yet fun- damentalist missionary organization is also considered as an extremist organization and since 2015, 65 people have been imprisoned because of their association with this movement (Corley 2018). In 2018, there were 550 people imprisoned on charges of extremism or terrorism-related offenses in Kazakhstan (Razdykov 2018).

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In recent years, public discourses have identi"ed Sala"sm as the new threat to the established order. The term Sala"sm comes from the Arabic word salaf, which means ancestors, and refers to an ultra-conservative branch of Islam according to which the followers practice a “pure” Islam, like at the time of the prophet. Some underline the inherent violent char- acter of Sala"sm while others recognize its multiple declinations, from pietism to jihadism (Khalid 2006). In fact, Sala"sm appears to be the post- Soviet version of Wahhabism, which represented the Islamic threat in the USSR (Knysh 2004). Contrary to Tajikistan, Sala"sm is not of"cially banned in Kazakhstan and the state discourses tend to refer to a mixture of Sala"sm and “non-traditional” or “destructive” religious movements to designate undesirable trends. But de"ning what is non-traditional brings a lot of challenges. Indeed, who possesses the authority to determine what is acceptable or not? In January 2018, Nurlan Yermekbayev, the then!Kazakhstani Minister of Religious Affairs declared:

Among the external attributes of destructive religious movements, we could include elements that are characteristic of radical movements in Islam. For instance, to preach intolerance, wear clothes that cover the face, some types of beards and short trousers. (Sevostyanova 2018)

These attributes are known to be common among very pious Muslims. This statement echoes the president’s speech at the occasion of a meeting with representatives of the Spiritual Direction of Muslims in Kazakhstan few months before. Nazarbayev suggested that these types of clothes were contrary to national Kazakh traditions and even made it a question of national security:

If young people follow rules that are foreign to our people, what will happen with the state? We will not allow this. Independent Kazakhstan should have a bright future, the nation should be united, the country should be secular and develop furthermore. We will not tolerate those who are opposed to this. These are not only the state’s interests but also those of the Kazakhstani people, it’s its future. (Tengrinews 2017)

Here, religious practice is associated with danger. It is understood that individuals who do not dress according to national traditions do not abide by the Nation’s civic values and therefore, represent a threat. This ideo- logical shortcut creates a lot of tensions within the society, and this type of

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discourse is likely to alienate those who do not follow Hana" Islam or wear those types of clothes. By identifying the plurality of interpretations of Islam as a problem, Islam becomes a security problem, in other words, the state securitizes religious practice (Omelicheva 2011). However, the state does not only punish, but also de"nes adequate religious rites and practices. In Kazakhstan, many institutions bear this responsibility. The following section provides an overview of the management of religion and illustrates the absence of state neutrality in matters of religion.

MANAGING RELIGION The Constitution adopted in 1992 recognizes the secular character of the state. However, like its neighbors, the Kazakhstani Constitution goes a step further by forbidding the establishment of political parties based on ethnic or religious grounds. Secularism in Kazakhstan corresponds to the assertive type of secularism as proposed by Kuru, in which the state does not limit itself to being neutral toward all religions but “plays an ‘assertive’ role as the agent of a social engineering project that con"nes religion to the private domain” (Kuru 2011: 571). This managerial vision of the reli- gious sphere can be partly explained as a remnant of the Soviet legacy. This management is executed via three institutions: the Law on religious activi- ties and religious associations, the Ministry of social development and the Spiritual Direction of Muslims in Kazakhstan (SDMK). The "rst two are formal state institutions whereas the SDMK has an ambiguous status. Other religions, such as Orthodoxy and Catholicism, also have their own of"cial clergy, and even though they maintain close relations with the authorities, the nomination of their respective head is made in accordance to the rules of their Churches.

Being a secular country, Kazakhstan does not have an of"cial religion and yet, the Spiritual Direction of Muslims in Kazakhstan acts as an of"cial clergy. Inherited from the USSR, this institution bears the same name as its Soviet predecessor.3 The SDMK is headed by the Grand Mufti Ser!kbay Satybaldyly Oraz since 2017. He is seconded by two aides called Naib Muftis. The institution is divided into seven administrative departments. The most signi"cant of them is probably the department of fatwas which is responsible for providing recommendations on a wide range of topics concerning the practice of Islam such as the appropriate behavior to adopt

3 Other countries!of the former Soviet Union, including Russia, have similar institutions.

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during Ramadan, suitable clothing for women, the dangers of Islamic extremism, and so on.

The responsibilities of the SDMK are the following:

• the promotion and suf"cient dissemination of Islam and the sermons of the prophet Muhammad,

• the preservation of the understanding between Muslims of Kazakhstan,

• the preservation of Shari’a canons within religious organizations, • solving the problems of Muslims, • the training of specialists to teach the population, • the establishment of links with religious organizations of foreign

countries, associations, educational institutions, and • the publication of religious literature and textbooks.4

The SDMK also nominates its regional representatives as well as the imams in each province and in many of the large cities (18 imams in total). The religious personnel also act as unifying "gures, for example, when natural disasters strike, regional imams call on believers to donate money to help. Their positions are rather conservative on a number of topics, including homosexuality, abortion, and the place of women in the family. However, some of these conservative positions are in line with those of the society. From a theological point of view, the SDMK promotes Hana"sm, an Islamic school of jurisprudence that is considered traditional in Central Asia. The Spiritual Directorate seeks to extend and standardize this school throughout the territory of Kazakhstan and rejects Sala"sm as well as Su"sm, despite the historical presence of the latter, in the name of a unitar- ian and rationalist conception of religion (Fathi 2007: 235).

Representatives of the SDMK often express their support of govern- ment’s initiatives to "ght against extremism. In 2015, the Spiritual Direction elaborated a “Concept of the development of religious educa- tion until 2020”, meant to spread the teaching of Hana"sm but also to integrate secular disciplines into the curricula of religious educational institutions. This way, the status of madrassas can be raised to that of col- leges and graduates can apply for public service positions. This initiative also aims to reduce the number of Kazakhs pursuing religious studies abroad (Nurseitova 2017).

4 http://www.muftyat.kz/ru/kmdb.

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In 2013, the SDMK adopted a position on the hijab, consistent with that of the authorities:

In Kazakhstan, women traditionally covered their heads with scarves whereas older women wore kimesheks.5 The Kazakhs had their own traditional national clothes corresponding to Sharia. Therefore, we need to stick to this. And there is no need for our women to adopt Arab or Pakistani styles, the point is that the aurat6 must be covered. (Azan 2013)

In 2016, the SDMK supported the Ministry of Education’s controver- sial decision to forbid hijabs in schools, which created resentment in some communities. Following this decision, the Direction reminded the public that according to Shari’a, minors do not have the obligation to wear a headscarf, and should only do so after they reach puberty, that is to say, when they reach the majority.7 The SDMK urged parents to abide by school rules. The fatwa also stated:

Our Constitution and other laws regulate public relations and give citizens freedom to choose their religion. And Muslims, at the behest of Allah, abide by the law and treat it with respect. Since the laws and regulations of a secu- lar society are the guarantee of equal rights for all and of the direction of the citizens’ life. The Spiritual administration asks Allah the Almighty to strengthen the unity and harmony of the people and spare the country from turmoil. (Tengrinews 2016b)

Indeed, many of the position adopted by the Spiritual administration are in line with those of the government and we see that this institution’s independence is limited. It seems important to recall however that the SDMK operates under the strict framework of the Law on religious activi- ties and religious associations inherited from Soviet times.

The "rst years of independence were characterized by great freedom of religion and attempts to strengthen the law started later in the early 2000s. In 2004 and 2005, the government adopted amendments that introduced

5 This is a traditional white high-top hat worn with a white shawl that covers the hair and neck.

6 This is an Arabic word that refers to the private parts of a women’s body that must be hidden.

7 The age of puberty comes earlier than the age of majority, which is 19!in Kazakhstan. It is not clear if SDMK’s mistake is intentional or a sign of its misapprehension of women’s reality.

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mandatory registration of religious organizations and missionaries. Failure to register and an insuf"cient number of members (less than ten), resulted in the banning of the activities of several organizations. The law also stated that the Committee of Religious Affairs (a sub-division of the Ministry of Justice) was responsible for reviewing the religious material used by orga- nizations for the purpose of excluding destructive sects (Kassenova 2018: 128).

In 2005, the government adopted a new law to "ght against extremism which focused heavily on religious extremism de"ned as “inciting religious hatred or discord, including violence or calls for violence, and any reli- gious practices that pose a threat to security, life, health, morals and rights and citizens’ freedoms”. As underlined by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in its preliminary opinion on pro- posed amendments, the legal de"nition of extremism was ambiguous and gave the courts too much latitude when interpreting the law. The OSCE also recommended that only violent extremism be criminalized (OSCE/ ODIHR 2016).

Terrorist attacks in Aktobe in 2011 led the government to strengthen the law on religion. In October 2011, the Law on religious activities and religious associations replaced the 1992 Law on freedom of conscience and religious associations. The new law underlined the importance of Hana" Islam and Orthodoxy in the “development of culture and spiritual life of the people of Kazakhstan”. Legally, this does not imply that other reli- gions are undesirable but certainly accentuate the congruence of those two faiths and the national identity. Other minority movements such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and Hare Krishna often face repression as their mem- bers are often brought to justice on charges of proselyting, but also harassed on the basis of administrative offenses (Corley 2017).

The law canceled the registration of all religious organizations and forced them to register again according to the new requirements. The minimum number of members has been established at 50 at the local level, 500 at the provincial level and 5000 at the national level. By law, it is for- bidden to perform collective prayers outside designated areas and to dis- tribute religious literature outside the of"ces and buildings of a given organization, even if the literature has been approved by the local authori- ties, a control which has been made mandatory. Those amendments have made proselytizing very complicated and penalize small and minority reli- gious movements. Finally, the law prevents religious associations to

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participate in the activities of political parties as well as to support them "nancially.8

The Ministry of religious affairs and civil society of Kazakhstan has been founded in September 2016 as a reaction of the Almaty and Aktobe attacks in 2016. The government judged that the situation required the creation of an institution entirely dedicated to religious issues and the Ministry has been mandated to update the law on religion. The responsibilities of the Ministry were previously under the authority of the Committee for Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Culture and Sport. However, in April 2018, it has been renamed the Ministry of Social Development and the religious element has been removed from the name.

At the moment of its creation, Nurlan Yermekbayev was the Minister but he was nominated Minister of Defence in April 2018 and replaced by Darkhan Kaletayev. The Ministry has the responsibility of elaborating and implementing policies concerning non-governmental and non- commercial sectors but also to maintain and reinforce secular principles in the country. Another important task is to sustain the interactions with religious associations to promote a new interfaith agreement in the coun- try. Notable changes include the interdiction of public display of symbols associated with destructive religious movements. That includes certain clothes, but the law is not very precise as to what these clothes are, except that it speci"es clothes that hide a person’s face. The new law introduced conditions for pursuing religious instruction abroad, criminalizes dese- cration of the feelings and dignity of believers and non-believers, and prohibits state of"cials from openly demonstrating their religious beliefs. Changes also include the “humanization of administrative sanctions” which results in providing warnings to offenders prior to the imposition of "nes and the suspension of activities for violations. The law proposes a new coordination with local and/or foreign religious associations to pre- vent minors from participating in religious activities without their par- ents’ consent. Finally, the law simpli"es registration of religious associations but raises the minimum membership threshold to 250 (Nurseitova 2018b). Some of those proposals are problematic because they do not provide a speci"c de"nition of what constitutes a destructive religious symbol or what quali"es as an act of desecration. These legisla- tive changes were passed by the Kazakhstani Majilis (Parliament) in May 2018 but not approved by the Senate in September 2018 because of their

8 http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31067690#pos=3;-274.

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controversial nature. The senators returned the draft to the Majilis and requested amendments in order to remove two clauses. The "rst con- cerns the use of “advertisement” to promote destructive religious move- ments, including external attributes and garments that demonstrate their belonging to destructive religious movements. It was rejected on the basis that its implementation by law- enforcement institutions was too problematic. The second one concerns the provision according to which the citizens of Kazakhstan can receive religious education abroad only after receiving a religious education in the Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan Today 2018). These proposed amendments demonstrate a certain understanding that legal uncertainty can eventually lead to abuses, and the authorities are worried of their reputation and potential backlash even if the Chairman of the Committee of Religious Affairs of the Ministry, Yerkin Ongarbayev, insisted that 80% of these changes came from recommendations made by the public and are therefore representa- tive of a social consensus (Nurseitova 2018a).

CONCLUSION Despite numerous religious restrictions, Kazakhstan has a moderate atti- tude in comparison to some of its neighbors, except for Kyrgyzstan which is the most liberal country in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, condemnations are usually milder, ranging from warnings and administrative "nes to a few years of imprisonment (usually a maximum of eight), whereas in Tajikistan, condemnations for extremism can go up to 25! years (Thibault 2018). Kazakhstani lawmakers are also more moderate concerning religious prac- tice. In Tajikistan, Sala"sm has been added to the list of terrorist organiza- tions even if it is not an organized movement such as Al-Qaeda or ISIS for instance. Because of the diffuse aspect of Sala"sm, which is more a way of life than a political project, it is dif"cult to detect it and even more prob- lematic to prosecute people because of their beliefs. The former Minister of religious affairs of Kazakhstan said the following about Sala"sm:

Sala"sm is not an organization, it is a religious movement, a belief system. In some countries based on Sharia, religious movements close to Sala"sm exist as traditional movements. For what concerns us, contemporary national theologians agree that Sala"sm has a destructive potential in Kazakhstan. (Tengrinews 2016a)

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Despite this dubious interpretation of Sala"sm, changes of wordings in the judicial terminology represent an encouraging sign of political recep- tiveness. The identi"cation of non-Hana" religious currents from “non- traditional” to “destructive” gives a certain freedom to peaceful believers who do not necessarily adhere to Hana"sm, which is considered to be the traditional Islamic school of thought in Kazakhstan and which is strongly promoted by the state. In Kazakhstan, even if the state-religion relations are strongly in#uenced by the securitization of Islam, they are also charac- terized, like in Soviet times, by the cooperation of religious personnel who have complementary interests, rather than authoritarian control (Achilov 2015; Bissenova 2016).

However, in 2017, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (IRFA) put Kazakhstan on the list of Tier-2 countries for having tolerated “particularly severe violations of religious freedom” meaning systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious free- dom (Freedom 2018). Interdictions and restrictions used as a way to pre- vent extremism are not very effective. On the contrary, they are often counterproductive and foster more resentment among people who feel that their religious beliefs are under attack and that the society or the government considers them as deviants. The decision of forbidding girls to wear hijabs in schools has created a lot of resentment in particular. Some parents and children have even de"ed the decision of the ministry of education but ended up being "ned. As a result of the implementation of this new rule, many girls have dropped of school, especially in Aktobe and Southern Kazakhstan (Zhursin 2018). In some regions marked by poor economic performance and few perspectives, discontent can grow even stronger. Also, this religious control takes place in a broader authori- tarian context and the anti-terrorist efforts can easily be used to justify authoritarianism. Central Asian governments have the tendency to associ- ate all dissident movements with radical Islam in order to justify their repressive policies and methods. Freedom of expression and press have been decreasing year after year in Kazakhstan, a decline that has been coupled with a stronger censorship of the Internet.9 In 2017, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and civil society alone has analyzed the content of 10,174 Internet resources. Among them, 3555 sources containing illegal material were identi"ed (Khabar 2018). In most cases, the content of the website is subsequently made unavailable to Kazakhstani residents.

9 Kazakhstan is ranked 157th (out of 180) in the 2017 World Press Freedom Index.

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Kazakhstan faces challenges similar to other countries which "ght against radicalization and try to maintain a balance between the respect of indi- vidual liberties and the responsibility to protect. Abusive electronic sur- veillance and arrests conducted without mandates are symptoms of the erosion of democratic principles in many western democracies as well. The systematic surveillance and monitoring of the Internet can lead to excesses and makes it possible to censure not only extremist and destruc- tive ideas but also opposition groups that criticize the government. It is the case with certain parties such as the Democratic choice for Kazakhstan, which leader is in exile and which website is blocked in the country. Access to social media such as Facebook and VKontakte is also frequently con- strained (Baidildayeva 2018).

Religion, especially Islam, continues to be perceived as a social phe- nomenon which bears a threatening potential. Kazakhstan has been the target of a few radicals but the actions of these individuals do not indicate an extended network of radical Islamists connected to global jihad. Domestic issues such as unemployment, poverty, and feelings of injustice are likely to explain those manifestations of violence. In this context of democratic limitations, the government does not respect the plurality of religious interpretations which might foster the alienation of citizens who already feel marginalized. The anticipated return of ISIS "ghters who are radicalized, well-trained and accustomed to violence is a legitimate con- cern as their presence in the country can be destabilizing. However, because the society is largely secular, the support for violent militancy is extremely limited and the Kazakhstani society is unlikely to be vulnerable to ISIS’ radical ideas. Overall, balancing religious freedom and the respon- sibility to protect is a delicate act, especially in a soft authoritarian state which seeks legitimacy both domestically and internationally.

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