Final Hist

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The Vietnam --

Nunn McGinty Reader Series

CONTENTS

PART I: 1943-1952

Roosevelt and Stalin Discuss the Furure of French Rule in Indochina, Teheran Conference

Franklin Roosevelt Memorandum ·ro Cordell Hull

Franklin Roosevelt on French Rule in Indochina, Press Conference

Abdication of Bao Dai, Emperor of Annam

Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vier-Nam

Report by rhe National Security Council on ,he Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina

Memorandum from General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense on rhe Strategic Assessment of Southt>ast Asia

US, Depanmem of State, Press Release on an Economic Aid Mission to Indochina

George Kennan, Memoirs

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Acheson and British Ambassador Oliver Franks

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southea.sr Asia, NSC 124/2

Eisenhower on che Scraregic Unk berween French Forces in Europe and Viemam

President Eisenhower's Remarks on rhe Importance of lndochina at the Governors' Conference

jjj

iv THE VIETNAM WAR

NSC Staff Smdy on United States Ol>jeccives and Courses of Action w irh Re-speer co Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia

PART IT: 1953-1954

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Scaff on the Navarre Concept for Operations in lndochina

Joint Franco·American Communique., AdditionaJ United Scates Aid for France and Indochina

US, National Security Council, NSC 5405, "United Scates Objectives and Courses of Action with Respecr ro Sourheasr Asia ..

Telegram from Secretary of Srate Dulles to Dillon and Aldrich on Conversations with the French

President Eisenhower's News Conference, February 10, 1954

President Eisenhower's News Conference, April 7, 1954

President Eisenhower's News Conference, May 12, 1954

US, National Security Council, Action No. 1074-a, on Possible US lmervenrion in Indochina

US, Army Position on NSC Action No. 1074-a

Report by Secretary of State Dulles on Geneva and Indochina, NSC 195th Meecin_g

Memorandum from Secretary of rhe Army, Robert T. Stevens, on Indochina

Nacional Intelligence Estimate-91, " Probable Developments ia Indochina Through 1954"

Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles to rhe Paris Delegacion

US, Central Intelligence Agency, SNIJE 10--4-54, "'Communisr Reaccions ro Certain Courses of Action with Respect to Indochina,"

Telegram from Smirh in Moscow ro Secretary of State Dulles on Molotov's Views

103

105

107

109

129

143

Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Meeting with [Pierre] Mendes-France, 23 June, 1954

The Geneva Conference

Telegram from Secretary of Stare Dulles on the Need to Inform Diem About Negotiations

Telegram from Secrerary of State Dulles with Text of a Letter to Mendes-France

Minutes of Zhou Enlai's Meeting wirh [Pierre] Mendes-France, 17 July, 1954

U.S. lnvolvemenr in ,he Franco-Viet Minh War

PART ID: 1954-1960

Memorandum for the President's Special Commirree, "Mi~tary Implications of the US Position on Indochina in Geneva ..

Indochina: Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problem of Resroring Peace in lndo-China

Indochina: Statemenc by rite Under Secretary of State at rhe Concluding Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference

Indochina: Unificarion of Vier-Nam Through Free Elections: Starement by the Secretary of Stare a.t a News Conference

Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy at the Conference on Vietnam Luncheon in the Hotel Willard, Washington, D.C.

Eisenhower's Views on the Popularicy of Ho Chi Minh

President Dwight D. Eisenhower on che Likelihood that Ho Chi Minh would Win a National Election in Viemam in 1955

Memorandum for the Record

Memorandum of Discussion a, the 246th Meeting of the National Securiry Council, Washingron

Le Duan, "Duong Loi Cach Mang Ml.ien Nam," [The Parh of Revolution in rhe Souch]

Manifesto of the Eighteen, Saigon

Co n1e 11ts v

149

159

185

187

191

195

229

231

237

241

243

245

253

255

259

261

265

271

Vi THE VIETNAM WAR

Letter from the Secretary o f Defense's Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) ro President Diem

The Strategic Hamlet Program

Kennedy and McNamara Prepare for War

Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for Meeting with the President of the United States on Current US Military Actions in South Viemarn

JCS Memorandum on the "Srrategic llmporrance of the Southeast Mainland"

Response to a Question on American Involvement in Sourh Vietnam, President Kennedy's News Conference

Memorandum to Presidenr Kennedy from Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith on Viemam

Memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara from L.l.. Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Cbiefs o f Staff, on Ambassador Galbraith's Memo.randum

President Kenned y's News Conference, Response ro a Question About Criticisms by 5"nator Mansfield on US Southeast Asian Policy

Michael V. Forrestal, .Memorandum for the President, "'A Report on South Viemam.,

US, Central Intelligence Agency, National lnrelligence Estimate 53~3, "Prospects in South Viemam"

The Overrhrow of Ngo Dinh Diem

Cable from US Department of State 10 Ambassador Lodge Supporring a Coup in South Viemam

Lodge Cable to 5"crerary Rusk on U.S. Policy Toward a Coup

Memorandum of Conversation

lnsrructions for Ambassador Lodge on Dealing with Diem Regime Repression

Secretar)' of Defense, Robert McNamara, Memorandum for the President, "'Viemam Situation"

Was Kennedy Planning to Pull Our of Viemam'

2 79 281

285

291

295

303

311

315

319

323

325

337

339

351

353

355

361

365

371

Telephone Conversation Berween President Johns.on and Senator Ric ha rd Russell

Telephone Conversacion Becween President Johnson and rhe President•s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Presidenr•s Message ro Congress

Text of Joinr Resolution (The Tonkin Gulf Resolution), August 7, Department of Stare Bull etin

W.P. Bundy, Second Draft of "Next Courses of Action in Southeast Asia ..

$NIE 53-2-64, The Situation in South Vietnam

Cable (Saigon 11 2 9) from the Saigon Embassy to the Deparrmenr of State on rhe Dere.riorating Situation in South Vietnam

Personal Note from W.W. Rosrow to Roberr McNamara on ":Vlilirary Dispositions and Poliitical Signals"

Briefing by Ambassador Taylor on the Currenr Situation in South Vietnam

McNaughton•s Observations abour South Viemam

Haas Morgenrhau, a.\Y/e Aie Deludin_g Oursehres in Viemam"

Clare M. Clifford Lener to the President May 17, 1965

Memorandum for rhe Presidem from George Ball, "A Compromise Solution in South Vietnam.,.

Nation: The Debate

Report by McNamara After Visit to Viemam

Notes for Memorandum from McNamara to Lyndon Johnson, "Recommendations of Additional Deployments ro Vietnam"

The Advisory Build-Up

Telegram from the Commander in Chief, Paci£c (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Selected Press Reactions to the Honol ulu Conference

Co ntents v i i

375 377

389

395

399

401

409

417

419

423

435

437

44 7

449

457

461

465

471

483

485

493

yjjj Tl-IE VlETNAM WAR

Statement by Secretary R,uk Before the Senate 501 Committee on foreign Relations on 1'-fay 9, 1966, "Background of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia"

Moscow and the Vietnam Peace Talks 505

Ao Analysis of the Viernamese Communists' Strengths, Capabilities, 509 and \Vilt to Persist in Their Present Strategy in Vietnam

Memorandum for rhe Director, The Outlook ln Vietnam 513

Intelligence Memorandum Pacification in the Wake 519 of the T et Offensive in Sourh Viemam

Memorandum of Conversation, !v1eeuing 525 of President-Elect Nixon with Henry Cabot lodge, Stader Hilton Hotel, Washington, DC

Conversations between rhe Soviets and the Viemamese, 1969 527

~1eeting Bet\\1een Presidential Assistant Kis.~inger 533 and Ambassador Dobrynin

Memorandum of Conversation (USSR) 545

Ron Ridenhour Lener 553

Peers Reporr Directive for Investigation from C.,neral Wesonoreland 559

Peers Report Summary 561

Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia 575 President Richard M. Nixon

PART VO: I9T2-I975 583

~1eeting Bet\\1een Presidential Assistant Kis.~inger 585 and Ambassador Dobrynin

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker's Cable Concerning 593 Corruption in South Viemam

Excerpts from the Paris Accord.s 595

Ominous Developments in Viernam 601

Assessment of C.,neral Fred C. Weyand's Report on Viernam 605

President Ford's Speech on the Fall of Vietnam 611

President Minh's Inaugural Address in Saigon Palace 613

"lessons of Viernam" by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 617

~ RU."lfCH UNION FORCES

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MILES

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Indocbina,.July 19 54

P A R T I

1943-1952

ROOSEVELT AN D STALIN DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF

FRENCH RULE IN INDOCHINA, TEHERAN CONFERENCE

November 28, 1943

The President [FDRJ said that Mr. Churchill was of the opinion that France would be very quickly reconstructed as a strong nation, but he did not personally share this view s ince he felt that many years of hon- est labor would be necessary before France would be re-established. He said the first necessity for the French, not only for the Government but the people as well, was to become honest citizens.

Marshal LJosef] Stalin agreed and went on to say that he did not pro- pose to have the Allies shed blood to restore Indochina, for example, to the old French colonial rule. He said that the recent events in the Lebanon [where the French ended their mandate] made pubLlc service the first step toward the independence of people who had formerly been colonial sub- jects. He said that in the war against Japan, in his opinion, that in addi- tion to military missions, it was necessary to fight the Japanese in the politic,il sphere as well, particularly in view of the fact that the Japanese had granted the least nominal independence to certain colonial areas. He repeated that France should not get back Indochina and that the French mus t pay for their criminal collaboration with Germany.

The President said he was 100% in agreement with Marshal Stalin and remarked that after 100 years of French rule in Indochina, the inhab- itants were worse off than they had been before.

The President continued on the s ubject or colonial possessions, but he fe lt it would be better not to discuss the q uestion or Ind ia with M r. Churchill , since the latter had no solution of that q uestion, and merely p roposed to defer the entire question to the end of the war.

Marshal Stalin agreed that this was a sore spot with the British.

FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT MEMORANDUM TO

CORDELL HULL January 24, 1944

Isaw Ha lifax [lord Halifax, British ambassador to the United States! last week a nd told him quite frankly that it was perfectly true that I had, for over a year, expressed the opinion that Inda-C hina should not go back to France but that it should be administered by an intemational trusteeship. France has had the country-thirty miUion inhabitants fo r nearly one hundred years, and the people a re worse off th an they were a t the beginning.

As a matter of interest, I am wholeheartedly supported in this view by Generalissimo Chiang Ka i-shek [of Chimaj and by Marshal Sta lin . I see no reason to play in with the British Foreign Office in th is matter. The only reason they seem to oppose it is tlhat they fea r the effect it would have on their own possessions and those of the Durch. They have ne,•cr liked the idea of trusteeship because it is, in some instances, aimed at future independence. This is true in the case of lndoChina.

Each case must, of course, stand o n its own feet, but the case of lndo- C hina is perfectly dear. France has milked it for o ne hundred years. The people of JndoChina a re entitled to something better than that.

FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT ON FRENCH RULE IN INDOCHINA,

PRESS CON FEREN CE February 23, 1945

With the lndo-Chinese, there is a feeling they ought to be indepen-dent but are not ready for it. I suggested at the time [19431, to Chiang, that Jndo-China be set up under a trusteeship-have a Frenchman, one or rwo lndo-Chinese, and a Chinese and a Russian because they are on the coast, and maybe a Filipino and an American- to educate them for self-government. It took fifty years for us to do it in the Philippines.

Stalin liked the idea. China liked the idea. The British don't like it. It might bust up their empire, because if the lndo-Chjoese were to work together and eventually get their independence, the Burmese might do the same thing to England. The Frencb hav-e talked about how they expect to recapture Inda-China, but they haven't got any shipping 10 do it with. It would only get the British mad. Chiang would go along. Stalin would go along. As for the British, it would only make the British mad. Better to keep qujet just now.

ABDICATION OF BAO DAI, EMPEROR OF ANNAM

August, 1945

T he happiness of the people of Vietnam!

The Independence of Vietnam ! T o achieve these ends, we have declared ourself ready for a ny sacrifice

and we desire that o ur sacr ifice be useful to the people. Considering that the unity of a ll our compatriots is at this time our

country's need, we recalled tO our people on August 22: " ln this decisive hour of our nationa l history, union means life and division means death."

In view of the powerful democratic spirit growing in the north of our kingdom, we feared that conllict between north and south could be inevitable if we were to wait for a National Congress to decide us, a nd we know that this conflict, if it occurred, would plunge o ur people into suffering a nd would play the game of the invaders.

We cannot but have a certa in fee ling of melancholy upon thinking of o ur glo rious ancestors who fought without respite for 400 years to aggrandise o ur country from Thuan Hoa ro H atien.

Despite this, and strong in o ur convictions, we have decided to abdi- cate and we transfer power to the democratic Republican Government.

Upon leaving our throne, we have o nly three w ishes to express:

I. We request that the new Government rake care of the dynastic temples a nd royal tombs.

Source: La Republiquc JHanoiJ, Issue no .1 {Octobo- I. l 945), rr.1nsb.ted in Hamid R. l-.aacs (ed.}, New Cycle in Asia ( 1947), pp. 161-162.

10 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

2. We request the new Government to deal fraterna lly with all the parties and groups which have fought for the independence of our country even though they have nor closely fo llowed the popular movement; to do this in order to give them the opportunity to participate in the recornstrucrion of the country and to demon- strate that the new regime is built upon the absolute unjon of the entire population.

3. We invite all parties and groups, a ll classes of society, as well as the royal family, ro solidarize in unreserved support of the demo- cratic Government with a view to consolidating the national inde- pendence.

As for us, during twenry years' reign, we have known much bitterness. Henceforth , we shall be happy ro be a free citizen in an independent country. We shall a llow no one to abuse our name or the name of the royal family in order to sow dissent among our compatriots.

Long live the independence of Vietnam! Long live our Democratic Republic!

DECLARATION OF INDEPEN DENCE OF THE DEMO CRATIC REPUBLIC

OF VIET- NAM September 2, 1945

A ll men are created equa l; they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights; among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.

This immortal statement was made in the Declaration of lndependence of the United States of America in 1776. ln a broader sense, this means: All the peoples on the earth are equal from birth, all the peoples have a right to live, to be happy and free.

The Declaration of the French Revolution made in 1791 on the Rights of Man and the Citizen a lso states: "All men a re born free and with equal rights, and must a lways remain free and have equal rights. "

Those are undeniable truths. Nevertheless, for more than eighty years, the French imperia lists,

abusing the standard of Liberty, Equa liry, and Fraternity, have violated our Fatherland and oppressed our fel low citizens. They have acted con- trary to the ideals of humanity and justice.

In the field of politic.s, they have deprived our people of every demo- cratic liberty.

They have enforced inhuman laws; they have set up three distinct poLl t- ical regimes in the North, the Center, and the South of Vier-Nam in order to wreck our national unity and prevent our people from being united.

12 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

They have built more prisons than schools. They have mercilessly sla in our patriors; they have drowned our uprisings in rivers of blood.

They have fette red public opinion; rhey have practiced obscurantism against our people.

To weaken our race they have fo rced us to use opium and a lcohol. In the fie ld of economjcs, they have fleeced us to the backbone, impov-

erished our people a nd devastated o ur land. They have robbed us of o ur rice fields, our mines, our forests, and our

raw materials. They have monopolized the issuing of bank notes and the export trade.

They have invented numerous un justifiable taxes and reduced our people, especia lly our peasantry, to a state of extreme poverty.

They have hampered the prospering of o ur national bourgeoisie; they have mercilessly exploited our workers.

In the autumn of 1940, when the Japanese fasc isrs vio lated Indochina's territory to establish new bases: in their fight against the Allies, the French imperia lisrs went down on their bended knees and handed over o ur country to them.

Thus, from that dare, our people were subjected to the double yoke of the French and the Japanese. Their s uffe rings and miseries increased. The result was that, from the end of lasr year to the beginning of th is year, from Quang Tri Province to the North of Viet-Nam, more than rwo mil- lion of o ur fe Uow citizens rued from starvation. On March 9 [1945], the French troops were disarmed by the Japanese. The French colonialists either fled or surrendered, showing char nor only were they incapable of "prorecring" us, but char, in the span of five years, they had twice sold our country to rhe J apanese.

On several occasions before March 9, the Vier Minh League urged the French to a lly themselves with it against the Japanese. Instead of agreeing ro this proposal, the French colonia lists so intensified their terrorist activities against the Viet Minlh members that before fleeing they massa- cred a great number of our political prisoners deta ined at Yen Bay and Cao Bang.

Notwithstanding all this, o·ur fe llow citizens have always manifested toward the French a tolerant and humane attitude. Even after the Japanese Pursch of March, 1945, the Viet Minh League helped many Frenchmen to cross the frontier, rescued some of them from Japanese jails, and protected French lives and properry.

Declaratio11 of lndepe11dence. Viet-Nam 13

From the a utumn of 1940, o ur country had in fact ceased ro be a French colony and had become a Japanese possession. After the J apanese had s urrendered ro the Allies, o ur wh ole people rose ro regain our national sovereignty and ro found the De mocratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The truth is that we have wrested our independence from the J apanese and not from the French. The French have fled, the J apanese have capit- ulated, Emperor Bao Dai has abdicated. O ur people have broken the chains which fo r nearly a century have fettered them a.nd have won inde- pendence for the Fatherland. Our people at the same time have over- thrown the monarchic regime that has reigned supreme for dozen.s of centuries. In its place has been established the present Democratic Republic.

For these reasons, we, members of the Provisional Government, rep- resenting the whole Vietnamese people, declare that from now on we break off all relations of a colonial character with France; we repeal all the internationa l obligation that Fra nce has so fa r subscribed ro on behalf of Viet-Nam, and we abolish all the special rights the French have unlawfully acquired in o ur Fatherland.

The whole Vietnamese people, animated by a common purpose, are determined to fight ro the bitter end against any attempt by the French colonialists ro reconquer their country. We are convinced that the Allied nations, which at Teheran a nd San Francisco have acknowledged the principles of self-dete rmination and equality of nations, will not refuse ro acknowledge the independence of Viet-Nam.

A people who have courageously opposed French domination for more than eighty years, a people who have foug ht side by side with the Allies against the fascists during these last years, such a people must be free a nd independent.

For these reasons, we, members of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, solemnly declare ro the world that Vier-Nam has the right to be a free and imdependent country- and in fact it is so already. The entire Vietnamese people are determined to mobilize all their physical and mental strength, to sacrifice their li ves and prop- erty in o rder to safeguard their independence and liberty.

REPORT BY THE N ATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE

POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT

TO INDOCHINA 2 7 February 1950

THE PROBLEM

1. To undertake a determination of a ll practicable United States mea- sures tO protect its security in Indochina and to prevent the expan- sion of communist aggression in chat area.

A NALYSIS

2. It is recognized that the threat of communist aggression against Indochina is only one phase of anticipated commun ist plans to seize all of Southeast Asia. It is understood that Burma is weak internally and could be invaded without strong opposition or even that the Government of Burma could be subverted. H owever, lndochina is the a rea most immediately threatened. It is a lso the only area adjacent t0 communist China whjch contains a large European army, which along with native troops is now in armed conJlict with the fo rces of comm unist aggression. A decision to contain commun ist expansion at the border of Indochi na must be

16 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

considered as a parr of a wider srudy to prevent communist aggression into other parts of Sourheasr Asia.

3. A large segment of the lndochinese narionalist movemenr was seized in 1945 by Ho Chi Minh, a Vietnamese who under various aliases has served as a communist agenr for thirry years. He has attracted non-communist as well as communist elemenrs to his support. In 1946, he att,empted, bur failed to secure French agree- ment to his recognition as the head of a government of Vietnam. Since then he bas directed a guerrilla army in raids against French installations and lines of communication. French forces which have been attempting ro restore law and order found themselves pitted agrunsr a detennined adversary who manufactures effective arms locally, who recei\led supplies of arms from outside sources, who maintained no capital or permanent headquarters and who was, and is able, to disrupt and harass almosr any area within Viernam (Tonkin, Anna.m and Cochinchina) at will.

4. The Unired States has, sunce the Japanese surrender, pointed out to the French Government thar the legitimate nationalist aspirations of the people of Indochina must be satisfied, and that a return to the prewar colonial rule is not possible. The Department of State has pointed our to the French Government rhat it was and is nec- essary ro establish and support go,•ernments in lndochina particu- larly in Viernam, under leaders who are capable of atttacting to their causes the non-communist nationalist followers who had drifted to the Ho Chi Minh communist movement in the absence of any non-communist nationalist movement around which to plan their aspirarions.

5. ln an effort to establjsh stability by political means, whe.re military measures had been unsuccessful, i.e., by attracting non-communist nationalists, now followers of Ho Chi Minh, ro the support of anti-communist narionalist leaders, rhe French Government entered inro agreements with the governments of the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia to elevate their starus from protectorares ro that of independent stares wirrun the French Union. The Scare of Vietnam was fanned, w;th similar starus, out of the former French prorecrorares of Tonkin, Annam and the former French Colony of Cochinchina. Each srare received an increased degree of autonomy

Report by NSC 011 tl,e Positio,r of US with Respect to l11docbi11a 17

and sovereignry. Further steps cowards independence were indi- cated by rhe French. The agreements were ratified by the French Government on 2 February 1950.

6. The Governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were officia lly recognized by the United States a nd the United Kingdom on February 7, 1950. Other Western powers have, or are committed to do likewise. The United Stares has consistently b rought to the attention of non-communist Asian countries the danger of com- munist aggression which threatens them if communist expansion in lndochina is unchecked. As th;s danger becomes more evident it is expected to overcome the reluctance that they have had to recognize and support the three new states. We are therefore con- tinuing to press those countries ro recognize the new states. On January 18, I 950, the Chinese Communist Government announced its recognition of the H o Chi M;nh movement as the legal Government of Vietnam, while on January 30, 1950, the Soviet Government, while maintaining diplomatic relations with France, similarly announced its recognition.

7, The newly formed Stares of Viernam, Laos and Cambodia do nor as yet have sufficient poLltical stability nor military power to pre- vent the infiltration into their areas of H o C hi Minh's forces. The French Armed Forces, while apparently effectively utilized at the present time, can do little more than ro maintain the status q uo. Their Strength of some 140,000 does, however, represent an army in being a nd the only military bulwark in that area against the further expansion of communist aggression from either internal or external forces.

8. The presence of Chinese CommuniSt troops along the border of lndochina makes ir possible for arms, material and troops to move freely from Comm unist China to the northern Tonkin area now controUed by H o C hi Minh. There is a lready evidence of move- ment of arms.

9. In the present stare of affairs, it is doubtful that the combined native lndochinese and French troops can successfully contain Ho's fo rces should they be strengthened by either Chinese Communist troops crossing the border, or Communist-supplied a rms and mate- rial in quantity from outside lndochina strengthening H o's forces.

18 PART I: r.943 -1.95 2

CONCLUSIONS

10. It is important to United Scates security interests that all practi- cable measures be taker, to prevent further communjst expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat_

11. The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Commurust domination if Indochina were controlled by a Commi,nist-dominated government. The balance of Southea~t A.~ia would then be in grave hazard.

12. Accordingly, the Departments of State and Defense should prepare as a matter of priority a program of all practicable measures designed to protect United Scates security interests in lndocruna.

MEMORANDUM FROM GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE

SECRETARY OF DEFEN SE ON THE STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 10 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia

The Jo int Chiefs of Staff have studied your memorandum, dared 10 March 1950, with its enclos ures, in which you requested their views regarding:

a. The strategic importance, from the military point of view, of Southeast Asia;

b. NSC 64, a report by the Depanrment of Stare on the position of the United Stares with respect to Indochina, which is now before the National Security Council for consideration;

c. The measures that, &om the military point of view, might be taken to prevent Commurust expansion into Southeast Asia;

20 PART l: r.943 -1.95 2

d. The. order of magnirude and means of implemenration of s uch measures; and

e. A French aide-memoire on the subject of a id for Indochina, dated 16 February 1950.

1. In light of U.S. strategic concepts, the integrity of the offshore island cha in from Japan to lndochina is of critical strategic impor- tance to the United Stares.

2. The mainland stares of Southeast Asia also are at present of criti- cal strategic importance to the United States because: a. They are the major somces of certain strategic materials required

fo r the completion of United States stock pile projects; b. The area is a crossroad of communications; c. Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line of containment of

communism stretching from Japan southward and around to the Indian Peninsula. The security of the three

[Section missing]

forces are allied with them. ln addition, rhe generally inadequate indigenous forces of the independent states are actively engaged in attempting to maintain internal security in the face of Communist aggression tactics.

S. lr appears obvious from intelligence estimates that the situation in Southeast Asia has deteriorated and, without United Stares assistance, this deterioration will be accelerated. ln general, the basic conditions of pol itical and economic stability in this area, as well as the military and interna l security conditions, are unsatisfactory. These factors are closely interrelated and it is probable that, from the long-term point of view, politica l and economic stabi lity is the conrrolling factor. On the other hand, the military situation in some areas, particularly Indochina, is of pressing urgency.

6. With respect to the measures which, from the United States mili- tary point of view, might be taken to prevent Communist expan- sion in Southeast Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend early implementation of military aid programs for lndocbina, Indonesia, Thaihnd, the Philippines, and Burma. Malaya might also be included provided the British by their actions in the areas in Asia

Memo f rom General Omar Bri1dle y 21

where they have primary interes.t evince a determined effort 10 resist the expa nsion of communism a nd present sufficient militar y justification for a id. The effectiveness of these military aid pro- grams would be g reatly increased by appropriate public state- ments of United States Policy in Southeast Asia.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the military aid from funds a lready a llocated by the President for the stares of Southeast Asia be delivered at the earliest practicable dare. They further recommend that t he presently unallocated portion of the President's emergency fund under Section 303 of Pub lic Law 329 (81st Congress, 1st Session), be planned and programmed as a matter of urgency.

8. Precise determination of t he amou:nts req uired for military aid, spe-

cial covert operations, and concomitant economic and psycho logi- cal programs in Southeast Asia cannot be made at this time since the financial requirements wiU, 10 a large extent, depend on the success of a id and other programs now in the process of implementation. In the light of t he world situa tion, however, it would appear that mili- tary aid programs and other measures will be necessary in Southeast Asia at least during t he next fiscal year and i11 at least t he same gen- eral over-all o rder of magnitude. T!1e Joint C hiefs of Staff, therefore, strongly recommend that appropriations fo r over-all use in the. gen- er al area of Asia be sought for the next fiscal year in terms similar to those under Section 303 of Public Law 329 (8 1st Congress, 1St Session). It is believed that approximately $100,000,000 will be required for the military portion of this program.

9. ln view of the history of military a id in China, the Joint C hiefs of Staff urge that t hese a id programs be subject, in a ny event, to the following conditions: a. That United Stares military aid not be g ranted unconditionally;

rather, that it be carefully controlled and that the a id program be integrated with political and economic programs; a nd

b. That requests for military equipment be screened first by an officer designated by the Depar tment of Defense and on d uty in the recipient state. These requests should be subject to his determination as to the feasibility and satisfactory coordination of specific military operations . It should be understood that military aid will only be cons idered in connection w ith such

22 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

coordinated operational plans as are approved by the represen- tative of the Department of Defense on dury in the recipient country. Further, in conformicy with current procedures, the final approval of all programs for military materiel will be sub- ject to the occurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a Southeast Asia Aid Committee be appointed with State, Defense and ECA representa- tion which will be responsible for tbe development and implemen-

tation of the program for the general area of Southeast Asia. Requests for aid should be screened by the field representatives of the committee in consultation with the local a uthorities in the countries concerned.

11. Present arrangements for military aid to Indonesia through the military attaches and to the Philippines through the Joint United States Military Aid GroUJp appear to be satisfactory and should be continued.

12. A small military aid group should be established in Thailand ro operate in conformity with the requirements in paragraph 9 above.

Arrangements for military aid should be made directly with the Thru Government.

13. In view of the very unsettled conditions in Burma, the program for military rud ro that country should, for the time being at least, be modest. The arrangements should be made after consultation with the British, and could well be handled by the United Stares Armed Forces attaches to that country. Arrangements for military aid to Malaya, if and when authorized, should be handled similarly except that request should, in the first instance, originate with British authorities.

14. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the political implications involved in military aid to Indochina. Ir must be appreciated, how- ever, that French armed forces of approximately 140,000 men are in the field and that if these were ro be withdrawn this year because of political considerations, the Bao Dai regime probably could not survive even with United States aid. If the United Stares were now ro insist upon independence for Vietnam and a phased French withdrawal from that country, this might improve the political situation. The French could be expected ro interpose objections to, and certainly delays in, such a program. Conditions in Indochina, however, are unstable and the s ituation is apparently

Memo f rom General Omar Bri1dley 23

deteriorating rapidly so that the urgent need for at least an initial increment of military and economic aid is psychologically overrid- ing. The J oint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend the provision of military aid to Indochina at the earliest practicable date under a program to implement the President's action approving the allo- cation of 15 million dollars for Indochina and that corresponding increments of political and economic aid be programmed on an interim basis without prejudice to the parrem of the policy fo r additional military, political and economic a id that may be devel- oped later.

15. 1n view of the considerations set forth in paragraph 14 above, the J oint Chiefs of Staff recommend the immediate establishment of a small United States military aid group in Indochina, to operate in conformity with the requirements in paragraph 9 above. The J oint Chiefs of Staff would expect the senior member of this group to sit in consultation with military representatives of France and Vietnam and possibly of Laos and Cambodia. In addition to screening requem for materiel, he would be expected to insure full coordination of military plans and efforts berwe:en the French and Viecname.se forces and ro supervise the allocation of material. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe in the possibiliry of success of a prompt coordi- nated United Stares program of military, political, and economic a id to Southeast Asia and feel that such a success might well lead to the gaining of the initiative in the struggle in that general area.

16. China is the viral strategic area in Asia. The Joint Ch iefs of Staff are firmly of the opinion that attainment of United Stares objectives in Asia can only be achieved by ultimate success in China. Resolution of the situation facing Southeast Asia would therefore, be facili- tated if prompt and continuing measures were undertaken to reduce the pressure from Communist China. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the evidences of renewed vitality and apparent increased effectiveness of the Chinese Nationalist forces.

17. The J oint Chiefs of Staff suggest the following measures with military implications: a. An increased number of courtesy or "show the Aag" visits to

Southeast Asian stares; b. Recognition of the "port closure" of Communist China sea-

ports by the Nationalists as a de facto blockade so long as it is

24 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

effective. Such action should remove some of the pressure, direct and indirect, upon Southeast Asia; should be of assistance ro the anti-Communist forces engaged in interference with the lines of communication to China; and should aggravate the economic problems and general unrest in Communist China;

c . A program of special covert operations designed ro interfere with Communist activities in Southeast Asia; and

d. Long-term measures to provide fo r Japan and the other off- shore islands a secure source of food and other strategic materi- als from non-Communist held areas in the Far East.

18. Commenrs on the French aide-memoire of 16 February 1950, are contained in the substance of this memorandum. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur i:n the French s uggestion for conversations between the "French and American General Staffs" on the subject of b1dochina since the desired ends will best be served through conferences in Indochina among the United States military aid group and military representatives of France, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are nor unmindful of the need for collaboration and consultation with the British and French Governmenrs on Southeast Asia matters and recommend, there- fore, that military representatives participate in the forthcoming tripartite discussions on Southeast Asia to be held at the forthcom - ing meeting of the Forei.gr, Ministers.

FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: Isl OMAR N. BRADLEY

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

US, DEPARTMENT OF ST A TE, PRESS RELEASE ON AN

ECONOMIC AID MISSION TO INDOCHINA

FOR THE PRESS

May 25, 1950 No. 545

25 May 1950

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U.S. FORMALLY ANNOUNCES INT ENT T O ESTABLISH AN ECONOMIC AID MJSSION T O THE THREE ASSOCIATED STATES

OF INDOCHINA

On WedJ1esday, May 24, Charge d'Affaires Edmund Gullion delivered the following letter tO the C hiefs of State of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia or their representatives at Saigon. Simultaneously, Ambassador Bruce delivered an identical letter to the President of the French Union in Paris.

The text of the letter fo llows:

I ha\'e rhe honor co inform you char tht> Go\lernmenc of rhe Unired States has decided to initiate a program of ,economic aid co the States of

Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. M y •Government has reached this

26 PART I: r.943-1.952

decision in order to assist Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to restore sta-

bility and pursue their peaceful and democratic developmem.

With these purposes in mind, the United Stares Co\lernmenr is esirablish-

ing, witb headquarrers in Saigon and associated with United States

Legation, a special economic mission to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

This m ission will have rhe responsibility of working with rhe Go\femmenrs

of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and witb the French High Commissioner

in developing and carrying our a coordinated program of economic aid

designed to assist rhe rhree counuies in restoring their normal economic

life. The members of the Ame:ric.an economic mission will at aU times be

subject ro rhe authority of rhe Go\'ernment of rhe United States and will nor become a parr of rhe administrations of the Associated States.

The Government of the United Sraces recognizes that chis American assis-

tance will be complementary to the effon made by rhe three Associated

States and France, w ithour any intention of substitution. American aid is

designed to reinforce the joinr effon of France and the governments and peoples of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, on whom rests the primary

responsibility for the restoration of security and stability.

United States economic aid ,vill be granred in accordance with separat e

bilateral agreemems berween each of the Associated States and rhe

United s tares of America . The approval of these agreements w ill be sub-

jeer to legal conventions existing between the Associared Scates and

France. initial economic aid operations, however, may begin p rior ro

the conclusion of these agreements.

Tht> United States Government is of the opinion that it would be desir-

able for the three govemmen ts and the French High Commissioner ro

reach agreement among themselves for the coordination of rho.se mat-

ters relating to the aid program that are of common interest. 111e

American economic mission will maintain contact with the three Associated States, w ith the french High Commissioner ia Indochina

and, if desired, with any bod.y which may be set up by the Associated

States and France in connection with the aid program.

Press Release on a11 Econ o mic Aid Missio11 to l11docbi11a 2 7

Mr. Robert Blum has heen appointed C!hiei of rhe United Stares special

economic mission to Cambodia, Laos, and Viernam.

Identical letters are being addressed roday to the governments of

Cambodia, Laos, Viemam and the President of the French Union.

The letter of intent refers only 10 economic aid whjch will be based on the recommendations of the Griffin mission which recently made a sur- vey trip to Southeast Asia and carried on consultations with the leaders and technicians of Indochina.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced the policy of United States aid to Indochina at Paris on May 8 when he released this statement fol- lowing an exchange of views with Foreign Minister Schuman of France:

The Foreign Minister and 1 have just had an exchange of views on the

situation in Indochina and are in general agreement both as to rhe

urgency of the situation in char area and as co the necessity for remedial

action. We have noted rhe face rhar the problem of meeting the rhrear

to the security of Viernam, Cambodia and Laos which now enjoy inde~

pendence within the French Union is primarily the responsibility of

France and the go,•ernmenrs and peoples of Indochina. The United

States recognizes that the solution of the Indochina problem depends

both upon the resmration of security and upon the de\felopment of

genuine nationalism and that United States assistance can and should

contribute ro these major objectives.

The United Stares Government con\finced thac neither national indepen·

dence nor democratic evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism~ considers the situation to be such as ro warrant its accord·

ing economic aid and military equipmenr to the Associated States of

lndochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and

permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic

de\felopmenr.

GEORGE KENNAN, MEMOIRS, 1950-1963

There remains the question of Southeast Asia. This, too, was on our minds, even in 1950 and 1951 though primarily in connection with the question as to the amount of suppo~t, if any, that we should give to the French, who were then fighting m1Uch the same sort of fight, and against much the same adversary that we, in the years following 1964, found ourselves fighting.

Here, at least, I agreed wholly and unreservedly with Walter Lippmann. We had, I felt, no business trying to play a role in the affairs of the main- land of Southeast Asia. The same went for the French. They had no prospecrs. They had better get out.

"In lndo-China," I complained to the Secretary of State in the memo of August 21, 1950,

we are gerting ourselves into the position of guaranteeing the French in

an undertaking which neither they nor we, nor both of us together, can

win .. . . We should let Schuman [Robert Schuman, French Foreign

Minister] know ... rhar rhe closer view we have had of the problems of

this area, ln the course of our efforrs of the past few months ro support

the French position there, has convince-cl us that char positioa is basi·

cally hopeless. We should say char we will do everything in our power

to avoid embarrassing the French in their problems and to .support them

in any reasonable course they would like to adopr looking m its liquida-

tion; bur chat we cannot honestly agree with chem chat rhere is any real

hope of their remaining successfully in lndo-Chiua, and we feel thar

Source: Memoirs. 1950.1963 New York: P:.1mheon Books. 1972, pp. 58..(,0.

30 PART I: r.943-1.952

rather than have their weakness demonstrated by a continued costly and unsuccessful effon to assert their will b}1 force of arms, it would be preferable to permir the turbuJent polhical currents of that country to

find their own level, unimpeded by foreign uoops or pressures, even ar the probable cost of an eventual deal between Viet~Nam and Viet-Minh,

and rhe spreading over the whole country of Vier-Minh authority, pos-

sibly in a somewhat modified form . We might suggesr that the mosr

promising line of withdrawal, from the standpoint of their prestige,

would be to make the problem one of some Asian regional responsibll · ity, in which the French exodus couJd be conveniently obscured.

This judgment with regard to the fo lly of a possible intervention in Vietnam rested, incidentally, nor just on the specific aspects of that situ- ation as we faced it in 1950, but on considerations of principle, as well. In a lecture delivered earlier that year (May 5 ) in Milwaukee, I had said- this time with reference to the pleas for American intervention in China:

I wonder how many of you realize what that reall>• means. I can con-

ceive of no more ghastly and fateful mistake, and nothing more calcu-

lated to confuse the issues in rhis world rodar rhan for us ro go into another great country and try to uphold by force of our own blood and

ueasures a regime wb.ich had clearly losr the confidence of its own people. Nothing could have pleased our enemies more . ... Had our

Go\lernment been carried away by these pressures, ... I am confident char mday the whole struggle against world communism in both Europe

and Asia would have been hopelessly fou led up and compromised.

Little did I realize, in penning these passages, tbat I was defining, fifteen years before the event, my own position with relation to the Vietnam War.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN

SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON AND BRITISH AMBASSADOR

OLIVER FRANKS 17 June 1952

DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE SECRETARY

Following his telephone conversation with. Sir Oliver Franks today, which is reported separately, the Secrerary saw General Bradley and Mr. Perkins. Later Sir Oliver dropped in at the office following a meeting in Mr. Jessup's office. He asked if he could see the Secretary for a few minutes ro get the further report on the matter of talks on Southeast Asia. He repeated what he rold us earlier that he had had a second message from London following the report which the Embassy had sent of Mr. Perkin's conversation with Mr. Steele ..

The Secretary said that he had talked about this matter with General Bradley this afternoon and that Friday was the only day which General Bradley could possibly meet and that was very inconvenient for Mr. Acheson. He said, therefore, he thought that any talks were impos- sible to arrange. H e then said that he would be glad to talk ro Sir Oliver right at that moment and see where we stood.

The Secretary reviewed the situation and the talks which rook place in Paris. He said that in the earlier meetings which had taken place on Southeast Asia, everyone had started from a different point and there had been little in the way of conclusion reached. He said that he felt what was needed now was political decisions.

3 1

32 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

The Secretary then analyzed the situation as we saw it. H e said that if the Chinese came into Indochina in force, we would have to do some- thing. We could not remain passive. He srud that none of the things we could do were very pleasant ones and we felt that a warning was highly desirable. He srud that we felt we should not give a warning, however, if there had been no agreement on what we did in the event the Communists moved in anyway. He said this: would make us look very silly and would weaken the effect of any other warnings.

He srud it was dear that it was futile and a mistake tO defend Indochina in Indochina. He said we could not have another Korea. He said it was also true we could not put ground forces in lndochina. We do not have them and we could not afford t0 immobilize such forces as we had. He said we could take air and naval action, however, and had dis- cussed whether this should be confined 10 approaches.

He concluded that our onl}• hope was of changing the Chinese mind. H e said that we could strike where it hurts China or we could set up a blockade against trade. He said we had concluded that our mission would not be to destroy the Communist regime. He also said that we fully realized the danger of bringing the USSR into the show,

The Secretary concluded that there was no point in getting our military people into any talks. He srud we must get political decisions first. He said that if firm decisions could not be reached that we perhaps could reach tentative decisions. He said that it had been dear at Paris that he was some- what "ahead of the play" while the French and the British had urged us t0 discuss these matters and had wanted discussions before decisions were made. When the question actually came up, they were not ready to talk.

The Secretary remarked thar Mr. Letourneau had said in Paris that the military talks had reached some decision as to how to evacuate the wounded, etc., in the event of difficulties. He said that our Navy had talked to Mr. Let0urneau regarding port sizes, cap,~city of ships, etc., with regard to evacuation.

Sir Oliver said he thought he understood the point, would report back tO London and would let us know if there were anything further on it.

Mr. Acheson said that if his analysis were wrong and the British Chiefs of Staff had any different one, he would be glad to hear of it.

S: LDBattle

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

AND COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST

ASIA, NSC 124/2

June 25, 1952 NSC 124/2

25 June 1952

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCil. ON UNIT!ED STATES OBJECTIVES

AND COURSES OF ACTJON \VITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

References: A. NSC 124/ 1 B. NSC 124 and Annex to NSC 124 C. NSC Action Nos. 597, 614 and 655 D. Memos for NSC from Executi'Ve Secretary, same s ubject, dated

June 24 and June 25, 1952 E. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "United

States Objectives and Cours-es of Action With Respect 10

34 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia, " dated March 4, Apri l 15, April 30 and May 21, 1952

F. NSC 48/5 G. NSC64 H. SE-22 and SE-27

At the 120th Council meeting with the President presiding, the National Security Council and the Acting Secretary of the Treasury adopted NSC 124/1, subject to changes in paragraphs 2-a, 3,5, 10-c-(2), 10-c-(3 ), 11 -(1), 11 -(3), and 12 thereof, as incorporated in the enclosure (NSC Action No. 655).

In adopting NSC 124/1, as amended, the Council a nd the Acting Secretary of the Treasury noted the following statement by the Acting Secretary of Defense with respect to the views of the Joint Secretaries regarding NSC 124/1:

In our opinion, if rhis policy is to be truly effeccive, it must be dearly recognized that the U.S. policy "to make it possib le for the French ro

reduce rhe degree of thelr panicipacion in the milttary, economic and

political affairs of the Associated States" (par. 8-d) must be emphasized

and reemphasized co the French at each and e\fery political, economic or

military aegotiation which the U.S. Go\lernment enters into with d1e Government of France, especially those negotiations which deal with

rhe providing of U.S. economic or military aid to France or m

Indochina.

The report, as amended and adopted, was subsequently submitted to the President for consideration. The President has this date approved NSC 124/1, as amended and enclosed herewith, a nd directs its imple- mentation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of tbe Secretaries of State and Defense.

Accordingly, NSC 64 and paragraph 14 of NSC 48/5 are superseded by the enclosed report. The enclosure does not supersede, but supple- ments the statement of the current objective with respect to Southeast Asia contruned in paragraph 6-g of NSC 48/5.

NSC o tt US Objutivt!s a1td Courses of Actio 11 with Respec t to Soutbt!ast Asia 3.5

It is req11ested that special security precaittions be observed in the handling of the e11clos11re, and that aaess to it be restricted 011 a 11eed- to-k11ow basis.

James S. lay, Jr. Executive Secretary

cc: The Secret.ary of the Treasury The Acting Director of Defense Mobilization

25JUNE 1952 STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ON UNITED STATES OBJECTNES AND COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEA.',T ASIA•

OBJECTIVE

1. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia &om passing into the coittftlunist orbit, :tnd to assist them to develop the wi ll :trtd ability to resist communism from within and without and ro contribute to the strengthening of the &ee world.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. Communist domination, bi• whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endan- ger in the longer term, United Sta.res security interests. a. The loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to communist

control as a consequence of overt or covert Chinese Communist aggression would have critical psychological, political and eco- nonuc consequences. In the absence of effective and timely counteraction, the loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively swift submission to or an alignment with com- murusm by the remaining count ries of this group. Furthermore, an alignment with commurusm of the rest of Southeast Asia and India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East (with the

• Southeast Asia is used herein to mean the area embracing Burma, Thailand, Indochina., Malaya, and Indonesia.

36 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

probable exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey) would in all probability progressively fo llow. Such widespread alignment would endanger the stability and security of Europe.

b. Communist control of a ll of Southeast Asia would render the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore is land cha in precarious and would serio usly jeopardize fundamenta l U.S. security interests in the Far East.

c. Southeast Asia, especia lly Malaya and Indo nesia, is the princi- pal world source of natural rubber and tin, and a producer of petroleum a nd other str:uegically important commodities. The rice exports of Burma and Thailand are critically important to Malaya, Ceylon and Hong Kong and are of considerable sig- nificru1ce to J apan a nd India, all important areas of free Asia.

d. The loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Ma laya and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political pressures in J apan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to communism.

3 . It is therefore imperative that an overt attack on Southeast Asia by the Ch inese Communisrs be vigorously opposed. ln order to pursue the military courses of action envisaged in this paper to a favo rable conclusion within a reasonable period, it will be necessary 10 divert military strength from other a reas thus reducing our military capa- bility in those areas, with the recognized increased risks involved therein, o r to increase our military forces in being, or both.

4. The danger of an overt military attack against Southeast Asia is inherent in the existence of a hostile and aggressive Communist China, but such an attack is less probable than continued commu- nist efforts to achieve domination through subversion. The pri- mary threat to Southeast Asia accordingly arises from the possibil- ity that the situation in Indochina may deteriorate as a result of the weakening of the resolve of, o r as a result of the inability of the governments of France and of the Associated States to continue to oppose the Viet Minh r,ebellion, the military strength of which is being steadily increased by virtue of aid furnished by the Chinese Communist regime a nd its a llies.

5. The successful defense of Tonkin is critica l to the retention in non- Communist hands of mainland Southeast Asia. However, should Burma come under communist domination, a communist military

NSC o tt US Objutivt!s a1td Courses of Actio 11 with Respec t to Soutbt!ast Asia 37

advance through Thailand mig;ht make Indochina, including Tonkin, militarily indefensible. The execution of the following U.S. courses of action with respect to individual countries of the area may vary depending upon the route of communist advance into Southeast Asia.

6. Actions designed to achieve ouI objections in Southeast Asia require sensitive selection and application, on the one hand to assure the optimum efficiency through coordination of measures for the general area, and on the other, ro accommodate to the greatest practicable extent 10 the individual sensibilities of the several governments, sociaJ classes and minorities of the area.

COURSES OF ACTION

Southeast Asia

7. With respect to Southeast Asia, the United States should: a. Strengthen propaganda and cultural activities, as appropriate,

in relation ro the area to foster increased aJignment of the people with the free world.

b. Continue, as appropriate, programs of economjc and technical assistance designed to strengthen the indigenous non-commu- nist governments of the area.

c. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to restore and expand their commerce with each other and with the rest of the free world, and stimulate the flow of the raw material resources of the area to the free world.

d. Seek agreement with other nations, indurung at least France, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, for a joint warning to Communist China regarding the grave consequences of Chmese aggression against Southeast Asia, the issuance of such a warn- ing to be contingent upon the p.rior agreement of France and the UK to participate in the courses of action set forth in paragraphs I0c, 12, 14f (1) and (2), and 15c (1) and (2), and such others as are determined as a result of prior trilatera l consultation , in the event such a warning is ignored.

e. Seek UK and French agreemenr in principle that a naval block- ade of Communist China should be included in the minimum courses of action set forth in paragraph 10c below.

38 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

f. Continue to encourage and support closer cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia, and between those countries and the United States, G reat Britain, France, the PhiJjppines, Austra lia, New Zea land , South Asia and J apan.

g. Strengthen, as appropriate, covert operations designed to assist in the achie,,emenr of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia.

h. Continue activities and operations designed to enco urage the overseas Chinese communit ies in Southeast Asia to organize and activate anti-comm unist groups and activities witrun their own communities, to resist the effects of para llel pro-communjst groups and activities and, generally, to increase their orientation toward the free world.

i. Take measures to promote the coordinated defense of the area, and encourage and s upport the spirit of resistance among the peoples of Southeast Asia to Chinese Communist aggression and to the encroachments of local communists.

I· Make dear to the Am erican people the importance of Southeast Asia to the security of the Un ited States so that they may be prepared for any of the courses of action proposed herein.

Indochina

8. With respect to Indochina the Un ited Stares should: a . Cont inue to promote internationa l support for the three

Associated States. b. Continue to assure the French that the U.S. regards the

French effort in Indochina as one of great strategic impor- tance in the general international interest rather than in the purely French interest, and as essential to the security of the free world, not on ly in the Far East but in the M_idd le East and Europe as well.

c. Continue to assure the French that we are cognizant of the sac- rifices entailed for Fra nce in car rying out her effort in Indochina and that, without overlooking the principle that France has the prima ry responsibility in Indochina, we will recommend to the Congress appropriate military, economic and financial aid to France a nd the Associated States.

NSC o tt US Objutivt!s a1td Courses o f Actio 11 with Respec t to Soutbt!ast Asia 39

d. Continue to cultivate friendly and increasingly cooperative rela- tions with the Governments of France and the Associated States at all levels w ith a view to maintaining and, if possible, increas- ing the degree of influence the U.S. can bring to bear on the po)jcies and actions of the French and lndochinese a uthorities to the end of directing the course of events toward the objec- tives we seek. Our influence w ith the French and Associated States should be designed co further those constructive polfrical, economic and social measures which will tend to increase the stabilit)' of the Associated States and thus make it possible for the French to reduce the degree of their participation in the military, economic and politica l affairs of the Associated States.

e. Specifically we should use our influence with France and the Associated States to promote positive political, military, economic and social policies, a mong which the fo llowing a re considered essentia l elements: ( 1) Continued recognition a ndl carrying out by France of its

primary responsibility for rhe defense of Indochina. (2) Further steps by France and the Associated States toward

the evolut ionary development of the Associated States. (3) Such reorganization of French admin istration and represen-

tation in Indochina as will be conducive to an increased fee ling of responsibility on the part of the Associated States.

(4) Intensive efforts to develoiP the anmies of the Assocjated States, including independent logistical and administrative ser\lices.

(5) The development of more effective and stable Governments in the Associated States.

(6) Land reform, agrarian and industria l credit, sound rice mar- keting systems, labor development, foreign trade and capital formatio n.

(7) An aggressive military, political, and psychological program to defeat or seriously reduce the Viet Minh forces.

(8) US-French cooperation in publicizing progressive develop- ments in the foregoing policies in Indochina.

40 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

9. In the absence of large scale Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina, rhe United States should: a . Provide increased aid on a high priority basis for the French

Union forces without· relieving French authorities of their basic military responsibility for the ddense of rhe Associated Stares in order to: ( 1) Assist in developing indigenous armed forces which will

eventually be capable of maintaining internal security w ith- out assistance from French units.

(2) Assist the French Union forces to maintain progress in rhe restoration of internal security against the Viet Minh.

(3) Assist the forces of France and the Associated States to defend Indochina against Chinese Communist aggression.

b. ln view of the immediate urgency of the situation, involving possible large-scale Chinese Communist intervention, and in order that rhe United States may be prepared to take whatever action may be appropriate in such circumstances, make the plans necessary to ca.rry out the courses of action indicated in paragraph 10 below,

c. ln the event that information and circumstances point to the con- clusion that France is no longer prepared to carry the burden in Indochina, or if France presses for an increased sharing of the responsibility for lndoChina, whether in the UN or directly with the U.S. Government, oppose a French withdrawal and consult with the French and British concerning further measures to be taken to safeguard the area from communjst domination.

10. ln the event that it is determined, in consultation with France, that Chinese Communist forces (including volunteers) have overtly intervened in the conflict in b1docbi11a, or are covertly participat- ing to such an extent as to jeopardize retention of rhe Tonkin Delta area by French Union forces, the United States should rake the following measures ro assist these forces in preventing the loss of Indochina, to repel the aggression and to restore peace and security in Indochina. a. Support a request by France or the Associated Stares for

immediate action by the United Nations which wonld include a UN resolution declaring that Communist China has commit- ted an aggression, recommending that member states take

NSC o tt US Objutivt!s a1td Courses o f Actio 11 with Respec t to Soutbt!ast Asia 41

whatever action may be necessary, without geographic limita- tion, ro assist France and the Associated States in meeting the aggression.

b. Whether or not UN action is immediately forthcoming, seek the maxin-ium possible international support for, and par- t icipation in, the minimum courses of military action agreed upon by the parties to the joint warn ing. These minimum courses of action are set forth in s ub-paugraph c immedi - ately below.

c. Carry our the following minimum courses of military action, either under the auspices of the UN or in conj unction with France and the United Kingdom and any other friendly governments: (1) A resolute defense of lndoduna itself to which the United

States would provide such air and naval assistance as might be practicable.

(2) Interdiction of Chjnese Communist communication lines including those in China.

(3) The United States would eicpect to provide the major forces for task (2 ) above; but would expect the UK and France ro provide at least token forces therefor and ro render such other assistance as is normal between allies, and France to carry the burden of providing, in conjunction w ith rhe Associated Stares, the ground forces for the defense of Indochina.

11. ln addition to the courses of action set forth in paragraph 10 above, the Unitted Stares s houlld take the following military actions as appropriate to the situation: a. If agreement is reached pursuant ro paragraph 7-e, establish-

ment in conjunction with the UK and France of a naval block- ade of Communist China.

b. lnrensi6cation of covert operations to rud anti-communist guer- rilla forces operating against Communist China and to interfere with and disrupt Chinese Communist lines of communication and military supply areas.

c. Utilization, as desirable and feas ible, of anti-communist Chinese forces, including Chinese Nationalist forces in military opera- tions in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China proper.

42 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

d. Assistance to the British to cover an evacuation from H ong Kong, if required.

e. Evacuation of French Union civil and military personnel from the Tonkin delta, if required.

12. If, subsequent to aggression against Indochina and execution of the minimum necessary courses of action listed in paragraph 10-c above, the United States determines jointly with the UK and Frru1ce that expanded military action against Communist C hina is ren- dered necessary by tbe situation, the United States should take air and naval action in conjunction with at least France and the U.K. against all suitable military targets in China, avoiding insofar as practicable those targets in area.s near the boundaries of the USSR in order not to increase the risk of direct Soviet involvement.

13. ln the event the concurrence of tbe United Kingdom and France to expanded mi~tary actio111 against Communist China is not obtained, the United Stares should! consider taking unilateral action.

EISENHOWER ON THE STRATEGIC LINK BETWEEN

FRENCH FORCES IN EUROPE AN D VIETNAM

Serious problems were plaguing o ur n ation in Korea and Vietnam. In the fo rmer, indecisive and costly figb ring still dragged on. In Vietnam the French had not yet convinced the world that the struggle was between those w ho stood for freedom on one side and Communist rebels, sup- ported by the power of Red China, on the other. Consequently a consid• erable portion of world opinion viewed the war there as merel y a French effort to continue their prewar domination in the region. Until this point was clarified, it was difficult for any Western nation, including our own, to offer or provide any help to the French and loyal Vietnamese.

This was a matter that had troubled me greatly when I was serving as military commander of NATO in 1951-52. In that period the French government had fo und it necessary to deplete their NATO military con• tingent by a number of battalions so as to reinforce promptly French troops in Vietnam. In expressing my disappointment in that development I had strongly urged the government to interpret, publicly, their Far Eastern war effort in terms of freedom versus Communism. Tltis could be done on ly through a French public commitment assuring to the Vietnamese, unequivocally, the right of determining their own political future. Such a pronouncement, I argued, would earn the approva l of the Free World as well as its moral and greater material s upport.

Source: Dwight 0. Eisenhower, Mamlate forCha11ge: 19.SJ.1956 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & C.Ompany, Inc., 1963), p. 109)

44 PART I: 1943 - 1952

During my service in NATO a considerable number of responsible officials in France had assured me of their complete agreement with this view. General de Larrre de Tassigny, who was then the commander of French forces in Vietnam, had. come to the United States, at my urging, just a few months before his death and in a nationally televised speech in this country made just s uch a statement. But because his government did not follow with a public political pronouncement, the matter was still subject to misinterpretation and an American support for the French in that region could not achieve unanimous domestic approval. Nonetheless, recognizing the necessity of stopping Communist advances in that country, we starred immediately after my inauguration to devise plans for strengthening the defenders politically and militarily within the proper limits.

PRESIDEN T EISENHOWER'S REMARKS ON THE

IMPORTANCE OF INDOCHINA AT THE GOVERNORS '

CONFERENCE August 4, 1953

• • •

!could go on enumerating every kind of problem thar comes before us daily. l et us rake, though, for example, one simple problem in the for- eign field. You have seen the war in lndochina described variously as an outgrowth of French colonialism and its French refusal to treat indige- nous populations decently. You find it a.gain described as a war between the communists and the other elements in southeast Asia. But you have a confused idea of where it is located- Laos, or Cambodia, or Siam, or any of the other countries thar are involved. You don't know, really, why we are so concerned with the far-off southeast corner of Asia.

Why is ir? Now, first of all, the lasr great population remaining in Asia that has nor become dominated by the Kremlin, of course, is rhe sub-continent of lndia, including the Pakistan government. Here are 350 million people still free. Now lee us assume that we lose lndochina. If lndochina goes, several things happen right away. The Malayan peninsula, the lasr little bir of the end banging on down there, would be scarcely defensible-and tin and tungsten that we so greatly value from thar area would cease coming. Bur all lndia would be outflanked. Burma would certainly, in its weakened condition, be no defense. Now, India is

46 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

surrounded on that side hy the Communist empire. Iran on its left is in a weakened condition. I believe I read in the paper this morning that Mossadegh's move toward getting rid of his parliament has been s up- ported and of course he was in that move supported by the T udeh, which is the Communist Parry of lra.n. All of that weakening position around there is very ominous for the United Stares, because finally ii we lost all that, how would the free world hold the rich empire of lndones.ia > So you see, somewhere along the line, this must be blocked. Ir must be blocked now. Thar is what the French a re doing.

So, when the United States votes $400 million to help that war, we are nor voting for a giveaway program. We are voting for the cheapest way that we can to prevent the occurrence of something that would be of the most terrible significance for the United States of America--0ur security, our power and ability to get ce.rrain things we need from the riches of the Indones ian territory, and from southeast Asia.

• • •

NSC STAFF STUDY ON UNITED ST A TES OBJECTIVES

AND COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT T O COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA >:· February 13, 1952

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the policy of the United States toward the countries of Southeast Asia, and in particular, the courses of action which may be taken by the United Stares to strengthen and coordinate resistance to communism on the part of the governments and peoples of the area, to prevent Chinese Communist aggression, and to meet such aggression should it occur.

ANALYSIS

I. Consequences to The U nited States of Communist Domination of Southeast Asia

2. Communist domination of Southeast Asia, whether by means of overt invasion, subversion, or accommodation on the part of the

,. The term Southeast Asia is used herein to mean Indochina, Burm:i, Thailand, the M3lay Peninsula, and Indonesia.

48 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

indigenous governments, would be critical ro United Stares security interests. Communist success in this area would spread doubt and fea r among other threateSled non-communist countries as ro the abil- ity of the. United States and the United Nations ro hair communist aggression elsewhere. Ir would strengthen the claim that the advance of communism is inexorable a nd encourage countries vulnerable to Soviet pressure to adopt policies of neutralism or accommodation. Successful overt C hinese: Communist aggression in this area, espe- cially if achieved w ithout encountering more than token resistance on the part of the United States or the United Nations, would have critical psychological and political consequences which wo uld prob- ably include the relatively swift alignment of the rest of Asia and thereafter of the Middle East ro communism, thereby endangering the stability and security of Europe. Such a communist success might nullify the psychological advantages accruing to the free world by reason of its response to the aggression in Korea.

3. The fall of Southeast Asia would underline the apparent economic advanes to Japan of associa tion with the communist-dominated A.~ian sphere, Exsion of Japan from trade with Southeast Asia would serio usly affect the panese economy, and i11crease Japan's dependence on United States aid. In long run the loss of Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, could ilt in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely ific ult to prevent J apan's evenrua I accommodation to the Soviet Bloc.

4. Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, is the principal world source of natural rubber and tin. Access ro these materia ls by the Western Powers and their denial ro the Soviet Bloc is impor- tant at all rimes and p articularly in the event of global war. Communist control over the rice surpluses of the Southeast Asian mainland wou ld provide the USSR with a powerful economic weapon in its relations with other countries of the Far East. Indonesia is a secondary source of petroleum whose importance would be enhanced by the denial to the Western Powers of petro- leum sources in the Middle East. Malaya is the largest net do llar ear ner for the United Kingdom, and its loss would seriously aggra- vate the eco nomic problems fac ing the UK.

5. Communist control of a ll of Southeast Asia would render the United States position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious

NSC 011 US Obj ective s Co,1rses of A cti o n with Respect to Co mmm,ist Aggressio u 49

and would seriously jeopardize fundamental United States security interests in the Far East. The extension of commurust power via Burma would augment the communjst threat 10 India and Pakistan and strengthen the groups within those countries which favor accommodation. H owever, suc:b a.n event would probably result in a stiffer attitude toward communism on the part of the Indian gov- ernment.

6. Communist dorination of mainland Southeast Asia would place unfriendly forces astride the most djrect and best-developed sea and air routes between the Western Pacific and India and the Near East. In the event of global war, the development of Soviet subma - rine and air bases in mainland Southeast Asia nught compel the detour of U.S. and allied shipping and air transportation in the Southeast Asia region via considerably longer a lternate routes 10 the south. Trus extension of friendly lines of communjcarion would hamper U.S. strategic movements in this region and rend 10 isolate the major non-communjst bases in the Far East-the off- shore island chain and Australia-from existing bases in East Africa and the Near and Middle fast, as well as from potential bases on the Indian su b-continenr.

7. Besides disrupting established lines of communication in the area, the denial of actual military facili'ties in mainland Southeast Asia- in particular, the loss of the major naval operating bases at Singapore-would compel the utilization of less desirable peripheral bases. Soviet exploitation of the naval and air bases in mainland Southeast Asia probably would he limited by the diffic ulties of logistic support but would, nevertheless, increase the threat 10 existing lines of communication.

Il. Regional Strategy

8. The continued integrity of the individual countries of Southeast Asia is to a large extent dependen-r upon a successful coordination of political and military measures for the entire area. The de,•elop- ment of practical measures aimed at preventing the absorption of these countries into the Soviet orbit must therefore recognize this interdependence and must, in general, seek courses of action for the area as a whole.

50 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

9. However, ir must be recognized rhar the governments and peoples of Southeast Asia have: little in common other than their geo- graphic proximity and their newly awakened nationalism and anti-colonialism. For the mosr part, their economies are competi- tive rather than complementary. The countries are divided inter- nally and from each ocher by language and ethnic djHerences. The several nationalities and tribal groups a re the heirs of centuries of warfare, jea lousy, and m utual distrust. In addition, their present governments are sharply divided in their attitudes toward the cur- rent East-Wesr struggle. The governments of the three Associated States of Indochina are nor recognized by any other Asian scares except Nationalise C hina and Thailand.

JO. In the strategic sense, the defense of Tonkin is important to rhe defense of mainland Southeast Asia. If Communise forces should s ucceed in driving the French Union forces from Tonkin, military action in the remainder of Indochina might have ro be limited co delaying action and the perimeter defense of certain coastal areas pending reinforcement o r evacua tion. With the appearance of communist success, native support wou ld probably swing increas- ingly co the Vier Minh.

11. Thailand has no common border w ith China and no strong inter- nal communjst element .. It adjoins areas of Indochina now con- trolled by the Vier Minh, bur the border areas are remote and difficult. H ence, communist seizure of Thailand is improbable except as a result of the prior loss of either Burma or Indochina.

12. C,0mmunisc control of either Indochina or Burma wou ld expose Thailand ro infiltration and severe political pressures as weU as to the threat of direct arrack. Unless substantial o utside a id were forth - coming, ir is possible char in such a case, political pressure alone would be suffic ient to bring about the accommodation of Thailand to inre.rnationaJ communism within a year. However, subStantial aid, together wirh assurance of support by the United Stares and the UN might be sufficient ro preserve a non-communist government in Thailand in spite of any form of pressure short of overt attack.

13. Thailand would be difficult ro defend against an overt attack from the ease by way of rne tradjcional invasio n route through Cambodia. Thailand is more defensible against attack from Burma owing ro the mountainous terrain a nd poor communications of

NSC 011 US Obj ective s Co,1rses of A cti o n with Respect to Co mmm,ist Aggressio u 5 1

the Thai-Burmese border. In either case it might be. possible to defend an area in southern Thailand centering on Bangkok. Since any attack on Thailand would necessarily be preceded by commu- nist encroachment on Indochina or Burma, the defense of Thailand would probably be part of a broader pattern of hostilities.

14. If the loss of Thailand followed tile loss of Burma, the defense of Indochina would be out-flanked; and any substantial communist fo rces based on Thailand would render the position of the French Uruon Forces in Indochina untenable in the long run. If the collapse of Thailand fo llowed the loss of lndochina, the psychological and political consequences would accelerate the deterioration of Burma. However, the military consequences in such a case would be less immediate, owing to the difficult terrain of the Thai-Burmese border country.

15. Communist control of Thailand would aggravate the already seri- ous security problem presented by the Thai-Malayan border and greatly increase the difficulties of the British security forces in Malaya. However, assu,rung control of the sea by the Western Powers, Malaya offers a defensible position against eycn a full- scale land attack. The Kra Isthmus of the Malayan Peninsula would afford the best secondary line of defense aga inst total com- munist domination of Southeast Asia and the East Indies. Such a defense would effectively protect Indonesia against external com- munist pressure. By thus defending Malaya and Indonesia, the anti-communist forces would continue to hold the most important strategic material resources of the area, as well as strategic air and naval bases and lines of communication.

16. The strategic interdependence of the countries in Southeast Asia, and the cumu lative effect of a successful communist penetration in any one area, point to the importance of action designed to fores tall any aggression by the Chinese Communists. The most effective possible deterrent would be a joint warni11g by the United States and certain other governments regarding the grave consequences of Ch inese aggress;on against Southeast Asia, and implying the threat of retaliation against Communist China itself. Such a warning should be issued in conjunction with othe.r nations, including at least the Un;ted ((jngdom, France, Australia and New Zealand. Participation in such a warning involves a ll the

52 PART I: r.943 - 1.952

risks and disadvantages of a precommitmenr to take action in future and unknown circumstances. However, these disadvan- tages must be weighed aga inst the alternative of a costly effort to repel Chinese invasion after it has actually occurred. A second, but probably less effective, means of attempting to deter such an invasion would be to focus world attention on the continuing threat of Chinese Communist aggression aga inst Southeast Asia and to make clear to the Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments the fact that the United States views the situation in Southeast Asia with great concern .. In fact, statements along these lines have already been made. Such means might also include a Peace Observation Commission, if desired and requested by the coun- tries concerned, public addresses by U.S. officials, and • show the flag" visits by nava l and air units.

17. The C hinese Nationalist forces represent considerable reserve upon which to draw in the event of military action against Communist C hina. The deficiency in equipment and training seri- o usly limits the possible employment of these fo rces at present, however, continuation of our training and supply efforts should ser ve to alleviate these deficiencies. The manner of employment of these forces is beset not only with military but also w ith political difficulties. Hence the decision as to the best use of these forces cannot be made at this time. Nevertheless, we should be prepared to make the best practicable use of this military augmentation in light of the circumstances existing at the time.

ill. lndocbina

18. ln the long run, the secUJrity of Indochina against communism will depend upon the develoiPment of native governments able to com- mand the support of the masses of the people and national armed forces capable of relieving the French of the major burden of maintaining internal security. Some progress is being made in the fo rmation and development of national armies. However, the Vietnamese Government has been slow to assume its res ponsibili- ties and has continued to suffer from a lack of strong leadership. It has had to contend with: (a ) lingering Vietnamese suspicion of any French-supported regime, combined with the apathetic and

NS C 0 11 US Obj ectives Courses of Actio 11 with Re spect t o C ommunist Aggressio 11 53

"fence s itting" attitude of the bu lk of the people; (b) the difficulty, common to all new and inexperienced governments, of training the necessary personnel and building an efficient administration; and (c) the failure of factiona l and sectional groups to unite in a concerted national effort.

1 9. The U.S. economic a id program for lndochi11a has as its objectives to increase production and thereby off-set the military drain on the economy of the Associated Stares; to increase popular support fo r the Government by improving tile effecti veness of Government services; to make the Government and the people a ware of America's interest in their independence and welfare; and to use economic aid as a means of supporting the military effort. Because of their strained budgetary situation, the Associated States cannot meet the local currency costs of the projecrs; about 60 percent of the program funds is, therefore, devoted to importing needed com- modities which a re sold to generate counterpart.

20. The military situation in Indochina continues to be one of sta le- mate. lncreased U.S. aid ro the Franco-Vietnamese forces bas been an essential factor in enabling them to withstand recent commu- nist attacks. However, Chinese aid to the Vier Minh in the form of logistic support, tra ining, and technical advisors is increasing a t least at a comparable rare. The prospect is for a continuation of the present sta lemate in rhe absence of intervention by important forces other than those presently engaged.

21. While it is unlikely under the present circumstances that the French will suffer a military defeat in lndochina, there is a distinct possibility rhar the French Government will soon conclude that France cannot continue indefinitely to carry the burden of her total military commitments. From the French point of view, the possible means of lessening the present burden include: (1 ) a settle- ment with the communists in Indochina; (2) an agreement to inter- nationalize the actioo in Indochina; (3) reduction of the NATO obligations of France.

22. A settlement based on a military armistice would be more compli- cated in Indochina than in the case of Korea. Much of Indochina is not firmly under the control of either s ide, but subject to occa- sional forays from both. Areas controlled by the opposing s ides are interspersed, and lines of contact are fluid. Because of the

54 PART I: r.943 -1.95 2

weakness of the native governments, the dubious attitudes of the population even in areas under French control, and the certainty of continued communist pressure., it is highly probable that any settlement based on a withdrawal of French forces would be tan- tamount to handing over Indochina to communism. The United States should therefore continue to oppose any negotiated settle- ment with the Viet Minh.

23. ln the event that information and circumstances point to the con-

clusion that France is n.o longer prepared to carry the burden in Indochina, or if France presses for a sharing of the responsibility for Indochina, whether in the UN or directly with the U.S. Government, the United States should oppose a French withdrawal and consult with the French and &ritish concerning further measures to be taken to safeguard the a r ea from communist domutation. In antici- pation of these possibilities, the United States should urgently re-examine the situation with a view to determining:

a. Whether U.S. participation in an international undertaking would be warranted.

b. The general nature of the contributions which the United States, with other friendly governments, might be prepared to make.

24. A cessation of hostilities in Korea would greatly increase the logistical capabihty of the Chinese Communists to s up port mili- tary operations in Indochina. A Korean peace would have an even more decisive effect in increasing Chinese air capabifaies in that area. Recent intelligence reports indicate increased Chinese Communist ,rulitary activity i11 the Indochinese border area. If the

Chinese Communists directly intervene w ith large forces over and above those introduced as individuals or in small units, the French would probably be driven back to a beachhead around Haiphong. The French should be able to hold this beachhead for only a limited time at best in the absence of timely and substantial outside support.

25. ln view of the world-w;de reaction to overt aggression in Korea, Communist China may prefer to repeat in Indochina the method of " volunteer" intervention .. Inasmuch as the French do not control the border between China and lndocbina nor large areas north of Hanoi, it may be difficult to detect the extent of preparation for such inter- vention. lt is important to U.S. security interests to maintain the

NS C 0 11 US Obj ectives Courses of Actio 11 with Re spect t o C ommunist Aggressio 11 55

closest possible consultation w ith the French Government on the buildup of Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina. The Government of France has agreed ro consult with the United States before it requests UN or other international action to oppose Chinese Communist aggression in Indochina in order that the rwo countries may jointly evaluate the extent of Chinese Communist intervention.

26. If it is thus determined that Chinese Communist fo rces (including volunteers) have overtly intervene,d in the conflict in Indochina, or a re covertly participating ro such an extent as ro jeopardize reten- tion of the Tonkin Delta by the French forces, the United Stares sho uld support the French to the greatest extent possible, p refera - bly under the a uspices of the UN. It is by no means certain that an appropriate UN resolution could be obtained. Favorable action in rhe UN would depend upon a change in the attitude of those gov- ernments which view the present regime in Indochina as a continu- ation of French colonialism. A new communist aggression might bring about a reassessment of the situation on the part of these governmenrsand an increased recognirionof thedanger. Accordingly, it is believed that a UN re.solution to oppose the aggression could be passed in the General Assembly by a small margin.

27. Even if it is nor possible to obtain a UN resolution in such a case, the United Stares should seek the maximum possible international support for and participation in any international collective action in support of France and the Associated States. The United Stares should rake appropriate military action against Commw1ist China as part of a UN collective action or in conjunction with France and the United Kingdom and other friendly govemments. However, in the absence of such sup- port, it is highly unlikely that the Un ited Stares would act unilaterally. lr is probable however, that the United Stares would find some support and roken participation at least from the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries.

28. The U.S. forces w hich would be committed, and the manner of their employment, a s well as the military equipment which could be furn ished ro bolster the French Union forces, would be depen- dent upon certain factors which cannot now be predicted with accuracy. T hese include the extent of progress in U.S. rearmament, whether o r not hostilities in Korea were continuing, and strategic developments in ocher parts of the world. It would be desirable to

56 PART I: r.943-1.952

avoid the use of major U.S. ground forces in Indochina. Other effective means of opposing the aggression would include naval, air a nd logistica l support of the French Union forces, nava l block- ade of Comm unist Chima, and attacks by land- and carrier-based aircraft on military targets in Commun ist China. The latter could be effective against the long, tenuo us, and vulnerable supply lines by which C hinese operations in Indochina would have to be sup- ported . ln the event of a fo rced evacuation, U.S. forces might provide cover and assistance. United Kingdom participation in these measures might well result in the seizure of H ong Kong by the C hinese Communists.

29. It is recognized tha t rbe commitment of U.S. military forces against Commuinisr China would: (a) increase the risk of gene:ral hostili- ties in the Far East, incHuding Soviet pa rticipation under cover of the existing Sino -Sovie t agreements; (b) involve U.S. military forces in a nother Asiatic periphera l action, thus detracting from U.S. capabilities to con duct a global war in the near future; (c) arouse public opposition ro "another Korea"; and (d) imply w ill- ingness ro use U.S. military forces in other critical a reas subject to communist aggtession. Nevertheless, by failing to rake action, the United States would permit the communists to obtain, at little or no cost, a victory of major world consequence.

30. Informed public opin ion m ight support use of U.S. forces in Indochina regardless of sentiment aga inst "another Korea" on the basis that: (a ) Indochina is of far greater strategic importance than Korea; (b) the con fi rmation of UN willingness to oppose aggres- s ion with force, demonstrated ar such a high ost in Ko rea, might be nulli fied by the failure ro co mmit UN forces in Indochina; and (c) a second instance of aggression by the Chinese Comm unists would just.if)• measures. nor s ubject ro the limitations im posed upon the UN iction in Korea.

3 1. The military action contemplated herein would constitute, in effect, a war against Communist China which would be limited only as to its objectives, bur would not be subject to any geo- graphic limitations. Employment of U.S. fo rces in a de facto war with out a fo rmal declaration would raise questions which would make it desirable ro consult with key members of both parties in Congress in order to obtain their prior concurrence in the courses of action co ntemplated.

PART II

1953-1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

ON THE NAVARRE CONCEPT FOR OPERATIONS

IN INDOCHINA 28 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: The Navarre Concept for Operations in Indochina.

1. In a memorandum for you, dared 21 April 1953, subject: "Proposed French Strategic Plan for the Successful Conclusion of the War in Indochina,• the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed o ut cer- tain weaknesses in the LeT ourneau-Allard plan, bur felt that it was workable. During the visit of the U.S. Joint M ilitary Mission 10 Indochina, Lieutenant General Navarre subnutted in writing 10 Lieutenant General O'Daniel, Ch ief of the Mission, a paper enti- tled "Principles for the Conduce of the War in Indochina • append-

ed hereto, which appears co cor rect these weaknesses and which presents a marked improvement in French nulitary chinking con- cerning operations in Indochina.

60 PART II: 1953 - 1954

2. In his report Lieutenant General O ' Daniel stated that, in his opinion, the new French command in Indochina will accomplish under the Navarre concept the decisive defeat of the Vier Minh by 1955 and that the addition of two or more French divisions from outside of Indochina would expedite this defeat. Additions other than in divisional organization would be in error since it is the divisional ream, with its combat proven effec-tivenes.s, which is sorely needed in Indochina. Lieutenant General O'Daniel further reported that French miilitary leaders were most cooperative with the mission, that several agreements were accomplished to improve the effectiveness of the proposed military operations, and that repeated invitations were extended to the U.S. mission ro return in a few months to witness the progress the French will have made.

3. Based on past performances by the French, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reservations in predicting actual results which can be expected pending additional proof by demonstration of continued French support and by .further French performance in Indochina. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that a basic require- ment for military success in lndochina is one of creating a political climate in that country which will provide the incentive for natives to support the French and supply them with adequate intelligence which is vital to the successful conduct of operations in Indochina. lf this is accomplished and if the Navarre concept is vigorously pursued militarily in lndochjna and given wholehearted political support in France, it does offer a promise of miljtary success suf- ficient to warrant appropriate additional U.S. aid required to assist. U.S. support of the Navarre concept should be based on needs of the French Union Forces in Indochina for additional equipment necessary to implement the organization of the "Battle Corps" envisaged by the Navarre concept and necessary support of the planned expansion of indigenous forces, such needs to be screened by the Mlitary Assistance Advisory Group in Indochina. In addition, to improve the chances of success, this support should include continued close liruson and coordination with French military authorities together with friendly but firm encouragement and advice where indicated.

4. In furtherance of the O'Daniel Mission the Joint Chiefs of Staff are receiving Progress Reports from Indochina. Information received

Memo 011 the Navarre Co n cept for Operations 61

from Indochina indicates the French are not pursuing agreements reached between General O'Daniel and General Navarre (includ- ing the Navarre concept) as vigorously as expected by General O 'Daniel and as contemplated by him in his report. Progress reports State that (a) the French have "no plans for a general fa]J offensive beyond limited objective operations dc:signed to keep the enemy off balance," (b) reorganization into regiments and djvision-size units "is stiU in the plannjng stages," (c) there is "no sense of urgency in the training of senior Vietnamese commanders and staff officers," (d) the organization of a training command is awaiting the solution of "politica l problems" and (e) the "organization of the amphibious: plan has nor gone beyond the planning stages."

5. In light of the apparent slowness of the French in following up the Navarre concept and other agreements reached between General Navarre and General O ' Daniel, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that additional U.S. s upport should be conditioned upon contin- ued implementation of French support, demonstration of French intent b)' actual performance in Indochina, and continued French will ingness 10 receive and act upon U.S. military advice. Further, the French should be urged at all levels to support and vigorously prosecute the Navarre concept 10 the maximum extent of their capabilities.

FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: ARTHUR RADFORD,

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JOINT FRANCO-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE, ADDITIONAL

UNITED STATES AID FOR FRANCE AND INDOCHINA

September 30, 1953

The forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina have fo r 8 years been engaged in a bitter struggle to prevent the engulfment of Southeast Asia by the fo rces of international communism. The heroic efforts and sacrifices of these French Union a llies in assuring the liberty of the new ru1d independent states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam has earned the admiration and support of the free world. In recognition of the French Union effort the United States Government has in the past furnished a id of various kinds ro the Governments of France and the Associated States to assist in bringing the long struggle to an early and victorious conclusion.

Tbe French Government is firmly resolved to carry our in full irs dec- laration of July 3, 1953, by which is announced its intention of perfecting the independence of the three Associated States in lndochina , through negotiations wirh the Associated States.

The Governments of France and the United States have now agreed that, in suppon of plans of the French Government for the intensified prosecution of the war against the Vier Minh, the United States will make available ro the French Government prior ro December 31, 1954 additional financial resources not to exceed $385 million. This aid is in addition to funds already earmarked by the United States for a id ro France and the Associated States.

64 PART II : 195 3- 1954

The French Government is determined to make every effort to break up and destroy the regular enemy fo rces in Indochina. Toward this end the government intends to carry through, in dose cooperation with the Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese Governments, the plans for increasing the Associated Stares fo rces while increasing temporarily French fo rces to levels considered necessary to assure the success of exist- ing military plans. The additional United States aid is designed to help make it possible to achieve these objectives with maximum speed and effectiveness.

The increased French effort in Indochina will not entail any basic or permanent alteration of the French Government's plans and progra.rns fo r its NATO forces.

US, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, NSC 5405, "UNITED

STATES OBJECTIVES AND COUR SES OF ACTION WITH

RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA"

NSC 5405 J anuary 16, 1954

16 January 1954

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCil.. ON UNlTiED STATES OBJECTIVES

AND COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

References: A.NSC177 B. NSC Action Nos. 897, 1005 and 1011 C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated

January 12, 1954 D. NSC 124/2 E. NSC 171/1 F. NIE-63/1 and SE-53

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 180th Counci l meeting on J anuary 14, 1954 adopted the statement of pol icy contruned in NSC 177,

66 PART II: 1953 - 1954

subject to the deletion of the last sentence of paragraph 1-a thereof and to the deletion of paragraph 46 (NSC Action No. 1011-a).

In connection with this a.ction the Council also agreed that the Director of Central lnrdligence, in collaboration with other appropriate departments and agencies, should develop plans, as suggested by the Secretary of State, for certain contingencies in Indochina.

The Council at its meeting on January 8, 1954, in connection with its pre- liminary consideration ofNSC 1 n also (NSC Action No. 1005-c and d):

a. Agreed that Lieutenant General John Wilson O'Daniel should be stationed continuously in Indochina, under appropriate liaison arrangements and with sufficient authority to expedite the flexible provision of U.S. assistance to the French Union forces.

b. Requested the Department of Defense, in collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency, urgently to study and report to the Council all feasible further steps, short of the overt use of U.S. forces in combat, which the United States might take to assist in achieving the success of the " Lani el-Na var re" Plan.

The Pres ident has this date approved the statement of policy con- tained in NSC 177, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5405; directs its implementation by all appropriate executive deparnnenrs and agencies of the U.S. Government; and desig- nates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency. A financial appendix is enclosed for Council information.

Accordingly those portions of NSC 124/2 not previously superseded by NSC 171/1 are superseded by the enclosed statement of policy. The enclosure does nor s upersede the c urrent NSC policy on Indonesia con- tained in NSC 171/1.

cc. The Secretary of the Treasury The Director, Bureau of the Budget The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence

JAl'vlES S. LAY, JR. Executive Secretary

NSC Report on Obiectives a11d Courses of Actio11 67

STATEMENT OF POLICY by the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNClL on

UNITED STATES OBJECTNES AND COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA•

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endan- ger in the longer term, United Sta.res security interests. a. In the conflict in Indochina, the Communist and non-Commu-

nist worlds dearly confront one another on the field of battle. The lost of the struggle in Indochina, in addition to its impact in Southeast Asia and in South Asia, would therefore have the most serious repercussions on U. S. and free world interests in Europe and elsewhere.

b, Such is the interrelation of the countries of the area that effec- tive counteraction would be immediately necessary to prevent the loss of any single country from leading 10 submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of Southeast Asia and Indonesia. Furthermore, in the event all of Southeast Asia falls under communism, an alignment with com- munism of India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East (with the probable exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey) could follow progressively. Such widespread alignment would seriously endanger the stability and security of Europe.

c. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia and Indones ia would threaten the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain and would seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far East.

d. The loss of Southeast Asia would have serious economic conse- quences for many nations of the free world and conversely would add significant resources 10 the Soviet bloc. Southeast

• Southeast Asia is used herein to mean the area ,embracing Burma, Thailand, Indochina :and M.1layn. Indonesia is the subject of a separ3te paper (NSC 171/1).

68 PART II : 195 3- 1954

Asia, especia lly Malaya and In donesia, is the pri ncipa l world source of natura l rubber and tin, and a p roducer of petroleum and other stra tegically important commodities. T he rice exports of Burma, Indochina and Thailand a re critically important to Malaya, Ceylon and Hong Kong and are of considerable sig- nificance to J apan a nd India, all importa nt areas of free Asia. Furthermore, this area has an important potential as a market fo r the industrialized countries of the free world.

e . T he loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Ma laya and Indonesia, could result in s uch economic a nd politica l pressures in J apan as to make it excrennely difficult to prevent Japan' s eventual accommodation to communism.

2. The danger of an overt mi litary attack against Southeast Asia is inherent in the existence of a hostile and aggressive Communise China. The use of U.S. fo rces to oppose such an attack would require diversion of military strength from other areas, thus reduc- ing our military capability in those areas, as well as over-all, with the recognized mi litary risks involved therein, or an increase in our military forces in being, o r both, Toward deterring s uch an attack, the U.S. Government has engaged in consultations with France and the United Kingd om on the desirability of issuing to Communise China a joint warning as to the consequences to Communise China of aggression in Southeast Asia. Altho ugh these consultations have not achieved a full measure of agreement a warning to Communist China has in fact been issued, pa rticularly as to Indochina, in a number of public statements. (See Annex A for texts.) [Words iillegiblej Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand in militar y talks on measures which might be taken in the event of overt Chinese Communist aggression against Indochina.

3 . However, overt Chinese Communise attack on any part of Southeast Asia is less probable than continued communist efforts ro achieve domination th ro ugh armed rebellion or subversion. By fa r the most urgent threat ro Southeast Asia arises from the strong possibility that even wit hout overt C hinese Communise interven- tion the situation in Indochina may deteriorate anew as a result of weakening of the resolve of France a nd the Associated States of Indochina to continue to oppose the Viet Minh rebellion, the military strength of which is increased by virtue of aid furnis hed

NSC Report on Obiectives a11d Courses of Actio11 69

by the Chinese Communist and Soviet regimes. Barring overt C hinese Communist intervention or furthe r serious deterioration in Indochina, the outlook in Burma, Thailand, and Malaya offers opportunities for some improvement in internal stability and in the control of indigenous communist forces.

4. The successful defense of Ton kin is the keystone of the defense of mainland Southeast Asia except possibly Malaya. ln addition ro the profound political a nd psychological factors involved, the retention of Tonkin in friendly hands curs off the most feas ible routes for any massive southward advance towards central and Southern Indochina and Thailand. The execution of U.S. courses of action with respect ro individual countries of the area may vary depending upon the route of communist advance into Southeast Asia.

5. Since 1951 the United Stares has greatly increased all fo rms of assistance 10 the French in lndochina, particularly military aid, and has consulted continuously with France with a view ro assur- ing effective use of this a id. Partly as a result of these efforrs, French resumption of the initiative under the "LanielNavarre Plan" has checked at least temporarily deterioration of the French wi ll to continue the struggle. Concurrently the French have moved toward perfecting the independence of the Associated States with- in the French Union. In September 1953 the United States decided tO extend an additional $385 million in aid, in return for a num- ber of strong French assurances, including a commitment rhar the French would vigorously carry forward the "Lan iel-Navarre Plan," with the object of eliminating regular enemy forces in lndochina, and on the understanding that if the "Laniel-Navarre Plan'' were nor executed, the United Stares would retain the right tO terminate this additiona l assistance. (See NSC Action No. 897, Annex B)

6. The French objective in these effor tS is co terminate the wa r as soon as possible so as ro reduce the drain of the lndochina war on France and permit the ma intenance of a position for France in the Far East. By a combination of military victories and political concessions ro the Associated Stares, France hopes ro strengthen these States to the point where they will be able to maintain themse.lves aga inst Communist pressures with gread y reduced French aid. In the absence of a cl,ange in basic French attitudes,

7 0 PART II: 1 95 3- 1954

the Laniel-Navarre Plan may be the last French major offensi,•e effort in Indochina. There is not in sight any desirable alternative ro rhe success of a Franco-Vietnamese effort along rhe lines of the " Laniel-Navarre" Plan.

7. Notwithstanding the commitment and intent of rhe Lanie! Government ro seek destruction of Vier Minh regular forces, a successor French Government might well accept an improve- ment in the military position short of this as a basis for serious negotiation within the next year. Political pressures in France prevent any French Government from rejecting the concept of negotiations. If the Laniel-Navarre Plan fails or appears doomed to failure, rhe French might seek to negotiate simply for the best possible terms, irres pective of whether these offered any assur- ance of preserving a non-Communist Indochina. With continued U.S. economic and material assistance, the Franco-Vietnamese forces are not in danger of being militarily defeated by the Viet Minh unless there is large-scale Crunese Communist inter- vention. In any event, apart from the possibility of bilateral negotiations wirh the Communists, the French will almost certainly continue ro seek international discussion of the Indochina issue.

8. The Chinese Commun;sts will almost certainly continue their present type of support for Viet Minh. They are unlikely to inter- vene with organized units even if the Viet Minh are threatened with defeat by the Franco-Vietnamese forces. In the event the United States participates ,n the fighting, there is a substantial risk that the Chinese Communists would intervene. The Communists may talk of peace negotiations for propaganda pur- poses and ro divide d,e anti-Communists believi11g that any political negotiations and any settlement to which they would agree would increase their chances of eventually gaining control of Indochina.

9. Actions designed ro achieve our objectives in Southeast Asia require sensitive selection and application, on the one hand to assure the optimum efficiency through coordination of measures for the gene_ral area, and on the other, ro accommodate to the greatest practicable extent to the individual sensibilities of the several governments, social classes and minorities of the area.

NSC Report on Obiectives a11d Courses of Actio11 7 l

II. OBJECTIVE

10. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the communist orbit; to persuade them that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to assist them to develop toward stable, free governments with the will and ability to resist communism from within and with- out and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

III. COURSES OF ACTION

A. Southeast Asia in General

11. Demonstrate to the indigenous governments that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and closer affiliation with the nations of the free world.

12. Continue present programs of limited economic and technical assistance designed to strengthen the indigenous non-co,nmunisr governments of tbe area and expand such programs according to the calculated advanrage of such aid 10 the U.S. world position.

13. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to cooperate with, and restore and expand their commerce with, each other and the rest of the free world, particularly Japan, and stimulate the flow of raw material resources of the area to the free world.

14. Continue to make dear, to the extent possible in agreement with other nations including France, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, the grave consequences to Communist China of aggression against Southeast Asia and continue current military consultations to determine the military requirements for counter- ing s uch Chinese Communist aggression.

15. Strengthen, as appropriate, covert operations designed to assist in the achievement of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia.

16. Continue activities and operations designed ro encourage the over- seas Chinese communities in Southeast A.~ia: (a) to organize and ace:ivate anti-communist groups a nd activities within their own communities; (b) ro resist the eHecrs of parallel pro-communist groups and activities; (c) generally, to increase their orientation toward the free world; and, (d) consistent with their obligations and primary allegiance to their local governments, to extend

sympathy and suppo rt to the Chinese National Government as a symbol of Chinese political res istance and as a link in the defense against communist expansion in Asia.

17 . Take measures 10 promote the coordinated defense of Southeast Asia, recognizing that the initiative in regiona l defense meas ures must come from the governments of the area.

18. Encourage and support the spirit of res istance among the peoples of Southeast Asia to Chi:nese Communist aggression, to indigenous Communist insurrection, subversion, infiltration, po litical manip- ulations, and propaganda.

19. Strengthen propaganda and cultural activities, as appropriate, in relation to the area to foster increaased alignment of the peo ple with the free world.

20. Make clear 10 the American people the importance of Southeast Asia to the security of the United Stares so that they may be pre- pared for any of the courses of action proposed herein.

B. lndochioa

I,, the Absence of Chinese Comm1mist Aggression

21. Without relieving France of its basic responsibility for the defense of the Associated States, expedite the provis ion of, and if necessary increase, aid to the French Union forces, under the terms of exist- ing commitments, to assisr them in: a. An aggressive military, political and psychologica l program,

including covert operations, to elimjoare organ ized Viet Minh forces by mid-1955.

b. Developing indigeno us armed forces, including independent logistica l and admini.strative services, whjch will eventually be capable of maintaining internal security without assistance from French units.

Towa rd this end, exert all feasible influence to improve the military capabilities of the French Union-Associated Stares forces, including improved training of local fore.es, effective command and intelligence arrangements, and the repos:ing of increased respons ibility on local military leaders.

NSC Report on Obiectives a11d Courses of Actio11 7 3

22. Continue ro assure France that: (1) the United Stares is aware rhat the French effort in Indochina is vital ro the pr1:servarion of the French Union and of great strategic importance to the security of the free world; (2) the Uni red Stares is fully aware of the sacrifices France is making; and (3) U.S. support will continue so long as France con- tinues to carry our its primary responsibility in Indochina.

23. Encourage further steps by both !France and the Associated Stares to produce a working relationship based on equal sovereignty within the general framework of the French Union. These steps should take into account France's primary responsibility for the defense of Indochina. a. Support the development of more effective and stable govern-

ments in the Associated States, tlhus making possible the reduction of French participation in the affairs of the States.

b. Urge the French to organize their administration and represen- tation in Indochina wirb a view to increasing the feeling of responsibility on the part of the Associated States.

c. Seek to persuade the Associated States that it is not in their best interest 10 undermine the French posirion by making umimely demands.

d. Cooperate with the French and the Associated States in publi- cizing progress toward achieving the foregoing policies.

24. Continue to promote internatio111al recognition and support for the Associated States.

25. Employ every feasible means to influence the French government and people against any conclusion of the struggle on terms incon- sistent with basic U.S. objectives. In doing so, the United States should make clear: a. The effect on the position of France itself in North Africa, in

Europe, and as a world power. b. The free world stake in Indochina. c. The impact of the loss of Indochina upon the over-all strategy

of France's free world partners.

Indochina

FY 1950-53

FY 1954 FY 1955 FY 1956 Burma FY 1950-53 FY 1954 FY 1955 FY 1956 Thailand FY 1950-53 FY 1954 FY 1955 FY 1956 Mala,"' l' Y 1950-53 FY 1954

FINANCIAL APPENDIX POLICY ALTERNATIVE: NO CH INESE COMMUNlST AGGRESSION

E.stimated Expenditures in Co11 11ection wit h US Courses of Action in Southeast Asia (m illions of Dollars)

4 2 3 Technical nod 5

MDAPnnd Financial Sup- Economic Technical ,md 6 1 Common -use port Through Assistance: Economic Information

Total Proarams fot France Grafl( A.'i,;;-l.nance: Loon Activities

969.7 548 375 46 - 0.7 839.5 304 400-500 25 - 0.5

1, 159.5 333 750-800 25 - 1.5 7 13.5 287 400-500 25 - J.5

18.6 2 - 16 - 0.6 4.5 • - 4 - 0.5 0.5 - - - - 0.5 0.5 - - - - 0.5

102.7 88 - 13 J 0. 7 fnJ 49.5 42.5 - 7 - 0.5 53.0 46.0 - 7 ,., - 1.0 52.0 45.0 - 7 ,., - 1.0 0.7 - - - - D. 7 f.nJ 0.5 - - - - 0.5

7 Other fnl

- - - -

- '"" fn4 - - - - - - -

" ... ~

> ,. ...

"' V, "' I "' V, ...

FY 1955 0.5 FY 1956 0.5 Total FY 1950-53 1.092.7 FY 1954 894.0 FY 1955 1.213.5 FY 1956 766.5

PERT I NENT ASSUMPT IONS

[ndochina

- -

639 346 331 331

- - - 0.5 - - - - 0.5 - 375 75 l 2.7 [O\.I -

400-500 36 - 2.0 - 750-800 32 - 3.5 - 400-500 32 - 3.5 -

I. MDAP a11d Co111111011-u se Progra111s (Col. 2) expendirures assume a) elimination of organized resistance by June 1955; b) a period of pacificHion extending for approximately another year; c) a continuance of US assistance for the duration of the major military operations at approximately che same race as in FY 1954.

2. Fina11cial Support through France (Col. 3) expendirures for FY 1950-53 reflecr sraff esrimates of amounts of aid ro France which is attributable ro Indochina.

3. Economic Assistance (Col. 4) includes no specific estimates for rehabilitation on the assumption rhac such costs could be offset against reduced military expendirures.

4. fllfon11atio11al Activities (Col 5) are assumed ro continue in FY 1956 ac a relatively stable rare. 5. Other (see foomores 2 and 3 10 table).

• Less than $500 thousand '"' · Represe:nrs value of end item ship,nentS plus cxpenJitul't>$ for packing. handlin& crating and transport:u-it.ui. t·raining and c.ommon~use i lems l'nz. Estimated costs of OO\'err•operarions not 3\'ailable '° '· FY '1953 onl)' fu.,,. f_c:tin,nted Costs ro the US of evacuation of Chinese troops from Burma not tmti I.able fn.s. 1-\ddirional expendirures of approximately $2.0 million in 1955 and $3.0 million in 1956 might be generated b)' a proposed ro ad program

currentl y under considcrarion

2: "" ("l ,. ' .,, 0

' 0

• 0 .,. ~ . • ' ~ -. • • • • • "- ("l 0

• ' • • • 0

---,. ' ~ 0

• .... ,.,,

26. Reirerare to the. French: a . Thar in the absence of a marked improvemenr in the military

s ituation there is no basis for negotiation wirh any prospect for acceptable rerms.

b. Thar a nominally non-Comm unist coalition regime would eventually rurn the country over ro Ho Chi Minh with no opportunity fo r the replacemenr of the French by the Unired Stares or the United Kingdom.

27. Flatly oppose any idea of a cease-6.re as a preliminary to negotia- tions, because such a cease-6.re would result in an irretrievable dete- rioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position in Indochina.

28. If it appears necessary, insist that the French consult the Vietnamese and obtain their approva l of a ll actions related to a ny response to Viet Minh offers to negotiate.

29. If the French actually en ter inro negotiations w ith the commun ists, insist that the United Stares be consul red and seek to influence the course of the negotiations.

30. In view of the possibili ty of large-scale C hinese Communist inter- vention, and in order tlhat the United States may be prepared ro take wha tever action may be appropriate in s uch circumstances, continue ro keep curre:nr rhe plans necessary to ca rry our the courses of action indicated in paragraphs 31 a nd 32 below. In addit ion, seek UK and French advance agreement in principle that a naval blockade of Comm unist Chjna s hould be included m rhe courses of military action ser forth in paragraph 31 below.

111 the Eve11t of Chinese Comnu,nist ln.terventio ,i

3 1. If the United Sta res, France and rhe Associated Stares determine that Chinese Comm unist forces (including volunteers) have overt- ly intervened in Indochina, or are covertly participating so as ro jeopa rdjze holding the T onkin delta area, the United Sta res (fol- lowing consultation with France, the Associated Stares, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand) sh ould rake the following measures to assist French Uition forces to repel the aggression, ro hold lndochina and ro restore irs secur ity a nd peace: a. Support a request by Fra nce o r the Associated Stares tha t the

United Nations rake immediate actions, including a resolution

NSC Report 011 Objec t ives and Courst!s o( Acti o 11 77

chat Communise China had committed an aggression and a recommendation that member stares cake whatever action may be necessary, without geographic linucation, to assist France and the Associated Stares co meet such aggression.

b. Whether or not the United Nations so aces, seek the maximum international support for participation in military courses of action required by che situation.

c. Carry out the following nunirnum courses of military action, either under UN auspices or as part of a joint effort with France, che UK, and any other friendly govemmencs: (I) Provide, as may be practicable, air and naval assistance for

a resolute defense of Indochina itself; calling upon France and the Associated States to provide ground forces.

(2) Provide the major forces to interdict Chinese Communist communication lines, including chose in China; calling upon the UK and France co provide token forces and such other assistance as is normal among allies.

(3) Provide logistical support to other participating nations as may be necessary.

d. Take the following additional actions, if appropriate co the situation: (I) If agreed pursuant to paragraph 30 above, establish jointly

with the UK and France a naval blockade of Communist China .

(2) Intensify covert operations to aid guerrilla forces against Communist China and to interfere with and d isrupt Chinese Communise lines of communication.

(3) Utilize, as desirable and fea,~ible, Chinese National forces in military operations in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China proper.

(4) Assist the British in Hong Kong, as des irable and feasible. (5) Evacuate French Union cjvil and military personnel from

the Tonkin delta, if require,d. 32. a. [£, after taking the actions outlined in paragraph 31-c above,

the United States, the UK and France determine jointly char expanded military action against Communist China is neces- sary, the United Scates, in conjunction with at least France and the UK, s hould take air and nava l action aga inst all s uitable

7 8 PART II : 1953- 1954

military targets in China which directly contribute ro the war in Indochina, avoiding insofar as practicable targets near the USSR boundaries.

b. If the UK and France do nor agree to such expanded militar y action, the United Sra tes should consider taking such acrion unilateral] y.

33 . If action is taken undeK paragraph 32, the United States should recognize that it may become involved in a n all-o ut wa r with Communist China, and possibly with the USSR and the rest of the Soviet bloc, and should t herefore proceed to rake large-scale mobi- lization measures.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES TO

DILLON AND ALDRICH

SENT TO:

ON CONVERSATIONS WITH THE FRENCH

3 April 1954

AMEMBASSY PARIS 3476 Al\,lEMBASSY LONDON 5175

EYES ONLY DILLON AND ALDRICH

FYI Following are main points made by Secreta ry in long conversation with Bonnet this morn ing.

1) We see no prospect of negotiated settlement at Geneva which does not boil down co one of fo Uowing alternatives: (a) Face-saving for - mula co cover surrender of French. Union forces, or (b) Face-saving formula to cover surrender of Vie-1 Minh.

2) Division of Indochina impractical. QUOTE Mixed UNQUOTE government would be beginning of disaster. Both would lead co (a).

3) In addition co consequences in Southeast Asia solution (a) would create gravest difficulties for France in Europe and North Africa. Future of France as great power is at stake.

80 PART II : 195 3- 1954

4) If we ar e strong and resolute enough to make Chinese Communisrs see clearly that their conquest of Southeast Asia will nor be permirred wirhour danger of exrending war they may desist and accept (b).

5 ) This requires strong coalition of nations (U.S., France, Associated States, UK., Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines) who will recognize threat to their vital interests in area and will be pre- pared to fight if necessary. This presupposes continuation of French military effort in Indochina.

6) If coalition established U.S. would play its full part. 7 ) Establishment and ann ouncement of coa lition should precede

Geneva in order permit us to go there with position of strength . 8) Although UN action nor excluded and UN would in any event need

to be notified in some formal way, we probably could nor count on it. (Soviet veto in SC and long drawn debate in Assembly.)

9) Fo rma l approach to other governments will depend on French desires.

10) Bonnet said he would report immediareJy to his Government and seek rheir views.

DULLES

PRESIDEN T EISENHOWER'S NEWS CONFERENCE

February 10, 1954

• • • Q. Daniel Shorr, CBS Radio: Mr. Prt'.~ident, should your remarks on lndocluna be construed as meaning that you are determined not to become involved or, perhaps, more deeply involved in the war in Indochina, regardless of how that war nnay go?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I am nor going to try to predict the drift of world events now and the course of world events over the next months. I say that I cannot conceive of a greater tragedy for America than to get heavily involved now in an all-out war in any of those regions, particu- larly with large units.

So what we are doing is supporting the Vietnamese and the French in their conduct of that war; because, as we see it, it is a case of independent and free nations operating against the encroachment of communism.

PRESIDEN T EISENHOWER'S NEWS CONFERENCE

April 7, 1954

• • • Q. Robert Richards, Copley Press: Mr. President, would you mind commenting on rhe strategic importance: of Indochina to the free world? I think there has been, across the country, some lack of understanding on just what ir means ro us.

THE PRESIDENT: You have, of course, both the specific and the gen• eral when you ralk about such things.

First of all, you have rhe specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs.

Then you have the possibility that many human beings pass under a dictatorship char is inimical ro the free world.

Finally, you have broader considerations char might follow what you would call the 'falling domino' principle. You have a row of dominoes ser up, you knock over the lirsr one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a begin- ning of a disintegration char would have the mosr profound inJluences.

Now, with respect ro tbe 6rsr one, two of the items from this particular area that the world uses are tin and tungsten. They are very important. There are others, of course, the rubber plantations and so on.

Then with respect to more people passing under this domination, Asia, after all, has already losr some 450 million of its peoples to rhe Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses.

Bur when we come ro the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Penins ula, and Indonesia

84 PART II : 195 3- 1954

fo llowing, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages chat you wou ld s uffe r through loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking really about millions a nd millions and millions of people.

Finally, the geographical position achieved thereby does many things. It turns the so-called island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa, of the Philippines and to the southward; it moves in to threaten Australia and New Zealand.

It cakes away, in its economic aspects, that region that J apan must have as a trading area or Japa:n, in rum, will have only one place in the world to go- that is, toward the Communist areas in order to live.

So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world.

• • •

Q. Robert G. Spivack, New York Post: Mr. President, do you agree with Senator Kennedy that independence must be guaranteed the people of Indochina in o rder co justify an a ll-out effort there?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don 't know, of course, exactly in what way a Senator was talking about this. thing.

I w ill say this: for many years, in talking to different countries, different governments, I have rried to insist on this principle: no out.~ide country can come in and be really helpful unless it is doing something that the local people wane.

Now, lee me call your attention to this independence theory. Senator Lodge, on my instructions, stood up in the United Nations and offered one country independence if they would just simply pass a resolution saying they wanted it, or at least said, ' I would work for it.' They didn't accept it. So I can't say that the associated states wane independence in the sense that the United States is independent. I do not know what they want.

" I do say this: the aspirations of those people must be met, otherwise there is in the long run no fina.l answer to the problem.

Q. Joseph Dear, Capital Times: Do you favor bringing this Indochina sit uation before the United Nations?

THE PRESIDENT: I really can't say. I wouldn' t wane to comment at coo great a length at chis moment, but I do believe chis: this is the kind of thing that must not be handled by one nation trying to act a lone.

PRESIDEN T EISENHOWER'S NEWS CONFERENCE

May 12, 1954

Q. George Herman, CBS Radio: Mr. Pre-sidenr, since we seem to be going into the past, a few weeks ago you told us of your theory of dominoes about Indochina, the neck of the bottle-

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. Mr. Herman: Since the fall of Dien Bien Phu, there has been a certain amount of talk of doing without Indochina. Would you tell us your administration's position; is it still indispensable ro the defense of south- east Asia?

THE PRESIDENT: Again I forget whether it was before this body I ta lked about the cork and the bottle. Well, it is very important, and the great idea of setting up an organism is so as to defeat the domino result. When, each standing a lone, one falls, it has tbc effect on the next, a nd 6na1Jy the w hole row is down. You are trying, through a unifying influ- ence, to build that row of dominoes so rthey can stand the fall of one, if necessary.

Now, so far as I am concerned, I don' t th ink the free world ought to write off Indochina. I think we ought to a ll look at this thing with some optimism and some determination. I repeat that long faces and defeatism don't w in battles.

• • •

US, NATION AL SECURITY COUNCIL, ACTION NO. 10 74-A,

ON POSSIBLE US INTERVEN TION IN INDOCHINA

5 April 1954

SPECI AL SECU RITY PR ECAUTIONS

Problem

NSC ACTION NO. 1074-a (Revis ion of Report distributed April 3)

April 5, 1954

1. To analyze the extent to w hich, a:nd the circumstances and condi- tions under which, the United Stares would be willi ng co commie irs resources in s upport of the effort co prevent the loss of lndochina co the Commun isrs, in concert with the French or in concert with ochers or, if necessa,y, unila terally.

Issues Involved

2. The a nswer co this problem involves four issues: a. Will lndochina be lose co the Comrnunisrs unless the United

States commies combat resources in some form?

b. What are the risks, requirements and consequences of a lterna- tive forms of U.S. military intervention?

c . Should the United States adopt one of these forms of interven- tion rather than allow Indochina ro be. lost to the Communises and if so which a lternative should it choose?

d. When and under what circumsrances should this decision be taken and carried into effect?

Prospect of Loss of Indochina

3. The first issue cums on whether the French Union can and will prevent the loss of Indochina and what further actions, if any, the United States can cake co bolster or assist the French effort. Some of these q uestions were cove.red by the Report of the Special Committee of March 17, 1954. Others are matters of continuous intelligence estimates. At the present time there is clearly a possi- bility that a trend in c.he direction of the loss of Indochina to Communist control may become irreversible over the next year in the absence of greater U.S. participation. There is not, however, any certainty that the French have as yet reached the point of being willing to accept a settlement which is unacceptable to U.S. interests or co cease their military efforts. Moreover, regardless of the outcome of the fight at Dienbienphu, there is no indication that a military decision in Indochina is imm inent. It is clear that the United States should undertake a maximum diplomatic effort co cause the French and Associated States co continue the fight to a successful conclusion.

Risks, Requirements, and Conseq uences of U.S. Intervention

4. The attached Annex addresses itself 10 the second issue: T he risks, requirements and consequences of certa in a lternative forms of U.S. military intervention. In order to permit analysis of military requirements and a llied and hostile reactions, this annex assumes that there will be either: (1) a French and Associated Scares invita- tion to the United Scares co participate militarily; o r (2) an Associated States invitation to the United States after a French

NSC 011 Possible US /n/erve11tio11 in /11dochina 89

decision to withdraw, and French willingness to cooperate in phas- ing out French forces as U.S. forces are phased in. If neither of these assumptions proved valid the feasibil ity of U.S. intervention would be vitiated. If the. French, having decided on withdrawa.l and a negotiated settlement, should oppose U.S. intervention and should carry the Associated States w ith them in such opposition, U.S. inrerl'ention in Indochina would in effect be precluded. lf, after a French decision ro w ithdraw, the Associated States should appeal fo r U.S. military assistance but the French decided not ro cooperate in the phasing in of U.S. forces, a successful U.S. inter- vention would be very difficult.

Desirability and Form of U.S. Intervention

5. The third issue is whether the United States should intervene with combat forces rather than a llow Indochina to be lost to the Communists, and which a lternative ir should select? a. U.S. commitment of combat forces would involve strain on the

basic wescern coa licion, increased risk of war wich China and of general war, high costs in U.S. manpower and money, and pos- sible adverse domestic politic.al repercusions. Moreover, the United States would be undertaking a commitment which it would have tO carry through tO victory. In whatever form it mjghr intervene, the U.S. would have ro take steps at the ourset to guard against the risks inherent in intervention. On the other hand, under the principles laid down in NSC 5405, it is essen- t ial to U.S. security that Indochina should nor fall under Communist control.

b. Of the a lternative courses of action described in the Annex, Course A or B has these ad vantages over Course C. Neither Course A or B depends on the initial use of U.S. ground fo rces. For this reason alone, they obviously would be much more acceptable to the American pLOblic. For the same reason, they would initially create a less serious drain on existing U.S. mi)j. tary forces. But either Course A or B may rum o ur to be ineffec- t ive without the eventual commitment of U.S. ground forces .

90 PART II : 1953 - 1954

c. A political obstacle m Course A or Course B lies in the fact tbat the present French effort is co nsidered by many in Southeast Asia and other pares of the world as essentially co lon ial o r imperialist in character. If the. United States joined its combat fo rces in the Indochina conJlict, it would be most important to attempt to cou11 teract o r modify the present view of this strug- gle. This wou ld also be essential in order co mobilize maxim um support for the war withill Indochina.

d . An ad vantage of Course B over Course A lies in the association of the Asian States in the enterprise which would help to coun- teract the tendency to view Indochina as a co lorual action. T here would be advantages in Course B also in tha t U.S. opinion would be more favorable if the other free nations and the Asian nations we.re also taking part and bearing their fair s hare of the burden.

e . As between UN and regional support it appears that regional grouping would be preferable to UN action, on the ground that UN suppo rt would be far more difficult to get and less likely to remain solid until the desired objeL'rive was reached ,

6 . ln order co make feas ible any regiona l group ing, it will be essential fo r the United States to define more clearly its own objectives with respect to a ny such action. In particular, it would be important to make perfectly clear that this action is not intended as a first step of action to destroy o r overthrow Commun ist Chjna. Ii the other members of a potential regiona l grouping thought that we had s uch a broad objective, t hey wou ld doubtless be hesitant to join in it. The Western powers would not want to increase the risks of general war which would, in their o pinion, fl ow from 311)' such broad purpose. The Asian countries would be equally reluctant to engage in any such broad activity. Both groups would doub t.less want to make very clear chat we object essentially co the expan- sionist tendencies of Communist China and that, if those ceased, we would not go further in attempting co carry on military activi- ties in the Far East. Furthermore, to attract the pa rticipation of Asian States in a regicmal grouping, the United States would undoubtedly have to undertake lasting comm itments for their defense.

NSC 011 Possible US /n/erve11tio11 in /11dochina 9 1

Timing and Circumstances of Decision to Intervene

with U.S. Combat Forces

7. The timing of the disclosure or implementation of any U.S. decision ro intervene in Indochina would be of particular importance. a. In the absence of serio us military deterioration in Indochina, it

is unlikely that France wiJI agree to tbe arrangements envisaged in Alternatives A, B, or C in lighr of the hopes widely held in France and elsewhere that an acceptable settlement can be achieved.

b. On the other hand, inaction until after exhaustive discussions at Geneva, w ithout any indication of U.S. intentions, would rend ro increase the chance of the French go,•ernmenr and people settling, or accepting the inevitability of settling, on unaccept- able terms. Hints of pos.~ible U.S. participation would rend 10 fortify French firmness, but might also tend to induce the Communists to pur forward more acceptable terms.

c. On bala nce, it appears that the United States should now reach a decis ion whether or not to intervene with combat forces, if that is necessary to save Indochina from Communist control, a nd, renrarively, the form and co ndirions of any such intervention. The timing for communication tO the French of s uch decision, or for its implementation, should be decided in the light of future developments.

8. If the United Sta tes should now decide t0 intervene at some stage, the United Stares should now rake these steps: a. Obtain Congressional approva.l of intervention. b. Initiate planning of the militar)' and mobilization measures 10

enable intervention. c. Make publicized U.S. military moves des igned to make the

necessary U.S. air and naval forces readily available for use on short notice.

d. Make maximwn diplomatic efforts to make it clear, as rapidly as poss ible, that no acceptable settlement can be reached in the absence of far greater Communist concessions than are now envisaged.

e. Explore with major U.S. allies- notably the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, a nd with as many Asian nations as possible, such

as Thailand and th.e Philippines, and possibly Nationalist China, the Republic of Korea, and Burma- the formation of a regional grouping.•

i. Exert maximum diplomatic efforts with France and the Associated Stares designed to (1) bring abo ut full agreement between them, if possible prior to Geneva, on the future status of the Associated States; (2 ) prepare them to in vite U.S. and if possible group participation in Indochina , if necessary.

I. GENERAL

Sc.ope of This Annex

ANNEX

NSC Action # 1074a April 5, 1954

1. This Annex seeks to assess the risks, requirements, and conse- quences of alternative. forms of U.S. military intervention in Indochina.

Objective of U.S. Intervention in Indochina

2. The immediate objective of U.S. milita ry intervention in any fo rm would be the destructiom of organized Vietrninb forces by military action limited to the area of Indochina, in the absence of overt Chinese Communist intervention. However, whether or not the action can be limited to Indochina once U.S. forces and prestige have been committed, disengagement will nor be possible short of victory.

• There is no f., g .• or h. in the original text.

NSC 011 Possible US /n/erve11tio11 in /11dochina 93

Risk of Expanding the \Vat

3. The increased risk of such Chinese Communist intervention is assessed under each alternative form of U.S. military intervention. U.S. action in the event that the Chinese Communists overtly imervene in Indochina is covered by existing policy (NSC 5405).

4. The implications of U.S. intervention go far beyond the commit- ment and support of the military requirements identified below under the several alternative courses. To meet the increased risk of Chinese Communist intervention and possibly of general war, measures must be taken inside the United States and in areas other than Indochina to improve the defense posture of the Unjted States. Military measures would indude the increased rea<liness of the existing forces and the re-positioning of U.S. forces outside the United States. Domestic measures would include those outlined below under " Mobilization Implications. • A reexamination and possibly complete revision of U.S. budgetary and fiscal policies would be required.

Availability of Military Fore.cs

5. The military forces required to implement the various courses of action described in this paper are presently assigned missions in support of other U.S. objectives. A decision 10 implement any of these courses would necessitate a diversion of forces from present miss ions. It would also require the mobilization of additional forces 10 assume the functions of tbe diverted forces and to meet the increased risk of general war. The foregoing is particularly true with respect to U.S. ground forces.

Mobilization Implications

6. All the domestic consequences of U.S. intervention cannot be fore - cast, being dependent on such factors as the degree of opposition encountered, the duration of the .conflict and the extent to which other countries may participate, but in va rying degree some or all of the following steps may become necessary: a. Increase in force levels and dra.ft quotas. b. Increase and acceleration of military production.

c. Acceleration of stockpile programs. d. Reimposition of materials and stabilization controls. e. Speed-up of readjness measures for all continental defense

programs. Whether or nor general molbili2ation should be initiated, either at the

outset or in the course of U.S. intervention, is a major question for deter- mination.

Use of N uclear Weapons

7. Nuclear weapons will be available for use as required by the tacti- cal situation and as approved by the President. The estimated forces initially to be supplied by the United Stares under the alter- natives in this paper are based on the assumption of availability. If such weapons are nor available, the force requirements may have to be modified. The poljitical factors involved in the use of nuclear weapons are assessed under the various alternatives ...

Political Conditions

8. U.S. military intervention in concert with the French should be conditioned upon satisfactory political cooperation from the French and French agreement ro grant independence to the Associated Stares in a form that will contribute to their maximum participation in the war. The Associated Stares undoubtedly would nor invite U.S. or allied intervention without lasting guar- antees of territorial integrity. U.S. contribution to a full-scale reconstruction and development program in Indochina must also be anticipated.

(No paragraphs 9 and 10)

• • State considerS the militaf)' tff~•· of use or non•use of nuclear weapons should be made dear in the estimates of militar">' requirements tO assist i.n making a decision.

NS C 0 11 Possible US /n/er v e11ti o 11 in /11d o china 95

II. ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF COMMITMENT OF U.S . COMBAT FORCES FOR OPERATION IN INDOCHINA

A. IN CONCERT WITH THE FRENCH

Assumptions

11. The Associated States and France invite the military participation of the United States.

12. It is impracticable to organize a UN or regional military effort. 13. The military situation in Indochina is approximately as at present,

i.e., stalemate with elements of deterioration. 14. France and the Associated States will carry forward the scale of

military effort envisaged in the Laniel-Navarre Plan.

Mi)jtary Rcquircmc-nts

15. Estimated forces t.o be supplied by U.S. initially. a. Gro1111d fo rces- (None, provided French Union forces afford

adequate security fo r local defense of U.S. forces in Indochina.)

b. Naval forces- (T otal personne.1 strength of 35,000). ( 1) 1 carrier task group plus additional units consisting of:

Amphibious lift for 1 RCT Minecraft Underway replenishment group VPRON' s

c. Air Force f orces- (T otal personnel strength of 8,600) ( 1) 1 fighter wing (3 sqdns. with integral a ir defense capabilityl (2) 1 light bomber wing (3) 1 troop carrier wing (4) 1 tactical control sqdn. (5) 1 tactical recon. sqdn .

16. Com111a11d Arra11gements: Theater Command a. This should be U.S., s ince this command must be a combined as

well as a joint command and U.S. commanders have had con- siderably more experience in commanding combined and joint commands. Further, should it become necessary to introduce U.S. ground forces , it would be much better to have a U.S. com- mander already operating as theater commander rather than

96 PART II: 1953 - 1954

effect a change at the time U.S. ground forces become involved. All services of the United States, France, and the Associated States will have representatives at the combined headquarters. Similar representation will be necessary at the Joint Operations Center (JOC) to be established.

b. Political considerations and the preponderance of French Union forces may dictate the assignment of theater command to the French, at least during the early phase of U.S. participation.

17. Logistic Requirements: This course of action can be logistically s upported with the following effects: a. No delay to NATO deliveries. b. No drain on Army logistic reserves, negligible drain on Air

Force logistic reserves, a partial drain on certain logistic reserves of the Navy, particularly aircraft and ammunition.

c. Some Navy production schedule increases in aircraft and ammunition (depending on extent of operations), some increas- es in Air Force production schedule with emphasis on ammuni- tion, no effect on Army production schedules.

d. No additional facilities at bases in Indochina required. 18. The training of indigenous forces is crucial to the success of the

operation. The United States should therefore insist on an under- standing with the French which will insure the effective training of the necessary indigenous forces required including commanders and staff personnel at a ll levels. The United Scares must be pre- pared to make contributions of funds, materials, instructors and training devices as agreed with the French. A United States pro- gram for the development of indigenous forces would stress the organization of divisional size units. The battalion organization does not particularly well fit the approved concept for operations formulated by General Navarre, nor does it represent the best return in striking power for the manpower investment made. A reasonable, attainable goal in Associated Scates forces which the United States might dev-elop and train is on the order of 330,000 (an increase of I 00,000 over the present forces.) This would be accomplished by a re-organization of the presently formed bat- talions into divisions followed by further training stressing regi- mental and divisional exercises. New units would be developed as necessary to complete the program.

NSC 011 Possible US /n/erve11tio11 in /11dochina 97

Political Aspects

19. French Reaction: The French wou ld expect U.S. military participa- tion in Indochina: a. To relieve them from the prospect of defeat or fail ure in Indochina

and to this extent they would welcome U.S. intervention. b. To highlight the inability of the French to handle the siruation

a lone, with resultant we,ikening of the general international position of France.

c. To lead to a strengthenj11g of the position of the Associated States as against the French, and a weakening of the French Union concept.

d. To tend to result in channeling U.S. suppo rt for the Indochina war directly to the theater of operations, thus reducing the financial benefits to metropolitan France.

e. To increase the risk of Chinese Communist intervention and, through a series of actions and counteractions, to increase the risk of general war with the USS R.

On balance, the French would prefer to find a solution of the Indochina problem which did not involve U.S. military participation, although such solution might in our opinion risk the ultimate loss of Indochina. In the event of U.S. military participation the French could be expected to attempt progressively to shift the military burden of the war to the United States, either by withdrawing their forces o r failing to make good attrition.

20. Associated States Reaction: The Associated States would not be interested in U.S. intervention ulllless they were satisfied (1) such intervention would be on a scale which seemed adequate to assure defeat of the Vietminh organized military forces and to deter Chinese Communist aggression, and (2) the United States would assume lasting respons ibility for their political independence and territorial integrity. On these terms non-Communist Indochjnese leaders would welcome U.S. intervention, and would be unlikely tO s uccumb to Communist peace proposals. The war-weary lndochinese people, however, might be less favorab le, particularly if U.S. intervention came at a time when an end to the lighting seemed otherwise in s ight. The Associated States wou ld expect to

98 PART II : 1953 - 195~

profit fro m U.S. intervention in terms of increased independence from the French, and would constantly seek to enlist U.S. influence in bolstering their position vis-a-vis France. The Indochinese, however, would be worried over the possibility that U.S. interven- tion might invite Chinese Communist reaction and make Indochina a battleground of destruction on the Ko rean scale. Accordingly, they would be expected to oppose the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina.

21. Free World Reaction: The U.K., apprehensive of the possibi lfry of war with Communist China, would approve a U.S. intervention in Indochina only if convinced that ir was necessary fo r the preven- tion of further expansion of Communist power in Asia. Australia and New Zealand would fully support such a U.S. action, and Canada to a lesser extent. Nationa list China and the Republic of Korea would welcome U.S. intervention in Indoch ina, since both would hope that this would lead to general war between the United Stares and Comm unist China . President Rhee, in particu- lar, might be tempted to believe that his chances of involving the United Scares in a renewal of Korean hostilities were greatly enhanced. Tha iland, if assured of U.S. guarantees of adequate permanence wou ld probably permit the use of Thai territo ry and facilities. The Philippines would s upport U.S. intervention. J apan would lend unenthusiastic diplomatic support. India and Indonesia strongly, and Ceylon and Burma to a lesser extent, would disap- prove U.S. intervention_ Other members of the Arab-Asian bloc would be unsympatheti c especially because of seemi11g U.S. sup- port for French colonialism. The NA TO countries, other than those mentioned above, wou ld generally support U.S. military action, bur their s upponr would be tempered by fear of expansion of the hostilities and the effect on the NA TO build-up. The atti- tude of most of the Latin American countries would rend to be noncommittal.

22. Free World Reaction in the Event of U.S. Tactical Use of N11clear Weapons : U.S. al lies would almost certa inly consider that use by the U.S. of nuclear wea pons in Indochina (a) would remove the last hope that these weapons would not be used again in wa r, and (b) would substantially increase the risk of general war. O ur allies would, therefore, doubt the wisdom of the use of nuclear weapons

NSC 011 Possible US /n/erve11tio11 in /11dochina 99

in Indochina and this doubt would develop into strong disap- proval if nuclear weapons were used without their being consulted or against their wishes. On the other hand, France and, if con- sulted, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and possibly the Netherlands, might support such action but only if convinced by the U.S. tbat such action was essential to keep Southeast Asia from falling under Communist control and to preserve the principle of collective securit)'. Other NATO governments, if similarly con- sulted would probably not publicly disapprove of such U.S. action, if they were persuaded during consultation that such action was essential to prevent collapse of the collective security system. Nationalist China and the Republic of Korea would probably approve such action in the hope rhat this would result in general war between the U.S. and Communist China. Japan would almost certainly publicly disapprove. Most Asian states and those of the Arab Bloc would probably object strongly to such U.S. action. Certain of tbese nations led by India, would almost certainly seek to have the UN censure the U.S.

23, Souiei Bloc Reaction; a. The Communist Bloc would almost certainly seek to create dif-

ferences between the United States and the French, and for this purpose would probably put forward " plausible" peace offers to the greatest extent possible in the light of the Geneva Conference. It is unlikely, in the first instance, that the USSR would take any direct military action in response to U.S. par- ticipation in the Indochina war. The Soviet Union would, how- ever, continue to furnish to the Chinese Communists military assistance for Vietminh utilization in Indochina.

b. The Chinese Communists probably would not immediately imervene openly, either with regular or "volunteer" forces, but would s ubstantially increase all other kinds of support. However, if confronted by impending Vietminh defeat, Communist China would tend toward intervention because of the prospect that Communist prestige throughout the world would suffer a severe blow, and that the area of U.S. military influence would be brought to tbe southern border of China. On the other hand, Communist China's desire to concentrate on domestic prob- lems, plus fear of what must appear to Peiping as the virtual

100 PART II: 1953 - 1954

certainty of U.S. counteraction against Communist China itself, would rend to deter overt intervention. The chances are about even that in this situation Communjsr China would decide upon overt intervention ,acher than accept the defeat of the Vietminh.•**

c . Soviet Bloc Reaction i.n the Event of U.S. Tactical Use of N uclear Weapons. lrucial Communist military reactions would probably be substantially the same as in the case of no nuclear weapons. Politically, the Communists would intensify their world-wide campaign co brand the U.S. as an aggressor, with the expecta- tion chat considerable poutical capital could be reali2ed out of the adverse world reactions to U.S. use of nuclear weapons. If U.S. use of nuclear weapons should lead to impending Vietminh defeat, there is a split of opinion within the Intelligence Advisory Cornnuttee as to whether the Crunese Commun ises would accept the risk involved and intervene overtly to save the Communise posit ion in lndo Cruna: three members believe the chances they would not open ly intervene are greater than assessed in par, 23-b above; three members belie1•e the chances are better than even they would openly intervene.

24. Foreign Aid Consideration: Military assistance to finance the French and Associated States military effort and co supply miljtary hardware would contimue at approximately current races (FY 1954 = $800 million; FY 1955 = $ 11 30 million). Expenditures for economic assistance in Indochina would be substantially increased over the present rate of expenditure ($25 million). These figures do nor take into account the cost of U.S. military participation or the possible cost of post-war rehabilitation in Indochina.

[material missing]

• .. For fuller discussion of the split of opinion ·within the lAC on this question, see $£.53~ .. Probable Communist R,eatrions to Certain Possible U.S. Courses of Action in Indochina through 1954" (published December 18, 1953).

NSC 011 Possible US lnler v e11tio11 in l11d o china 101

C. IN THE EVENT Of A PROPOSED FRENCH WlTHDRAWAL, THE UNITED STATES ACTING IN CONCERT WITH OTHERS OR ALONE

Assumptions

37. France refuses ro continue participation in the war in lndodtina. 38. The Associated States invite the military participation of the

United States with others or a lone. 39. There has been no serio us deterioration in the French Union mili-

tary situation prior to U.S. take-over. 40. The French will so phase their withdrawal as to permit orde,rly

replacement of their forces. 41. The Associated States will cooperate fully with the United States

in developing indigenous forces. 42. It may be practicable to organ ize a UN or regional military

effort.

Military Requirements

43. a. Ground forces. (Total personnel strength of 605,000) (I ) Indigenous forces of 330,000. (2) U.S. or a llied forces of six infantry and one airborne divi-

s ion (each the equivalent of a U.S. division in strength and composition) plus necessar y suppo rt personnel totaling 275,000.

b. Air Force forces. (Total personnel strength of 12,000) I air defense fighter wing I light bomb wing

US, ARMY POSITION ON NSC ACTION NO . 1074-A

No Date Given

1. There are important military disadvantages to intervention in Indochina under the assumptions set forth in NSC Action No. 1074-a.

2. A military victory in Indochina cannot be assured by U.S. inter- vention with air and naval forces alone.

3. The use of atomic weaPons in Indochina would not reduce the number of ground forces required tO achieve a military victory in Indochina.

4. It is estimated that seven U.S. divisions or their equivalent, with appropriate naval and air support, would be required to win a victory in Indochina if the French withdraw and the Chinese Communi,;rs do not intervene. However, U.S. military intervention must ta"ke into consideration the capabiliry of the Chinese Communists to intervene.

5. It is estimated that the equivalent of 12 U.S. divisions would be required to win a victory in Indochina, if the French withdraw and the Chinese Communists intervene.

6. The equivalent of 7 U.S. divisiom would be required to win a victory in Indochina if the French remain and the Chinese Communists intervene.

7. Requirements for air and naval support for ground force opera- tions are: a. Five hundred fighter-bomber sorties per day exclusive of inter-

diction and counter-air operations. b. An airlift capabiliry of a one division drop. c. A division amphibious lift.

103

104 PART II: 1953 - 1954

8. One U.S. airborne regimental combat ream can be placed in Indochina in 5 days, one additional d ivision in 24 days, and the remaining divisions in the following 120 days. This could be accomplished partially by reducing U.S. ground strength in the Far East with the remaining units coming from the general reserve in the United States . Conseq uently, the U.S. ability to meet its NATO commitment would be seriously affected fo r a considerable period. The time required to place a total of 12 divisions in Indochina would depend upon the industrial and persormel mobilization measures taken by the government.

REPORT BY SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES ON GENEVA

AND INDOCHINA, NSC 195TH MEETING

6 May 1954

ITEM 1 (FOR DISCUSSION)

REPORT BY MR. DULLES ON GEN.EVA AND INDO-CHINA

1. Secretary Dulles, who was rather pessimistic, in reporting to the President yesterday morning on the Geneva Conference, made the following points: (a) there is no responsible French Government with which to deal; (b) the British have declined to take a position regarding a Southeast Asia reg.ional grouping until after the Geneva Conference; (c) the British however are willing to proceed with secret talks with us regarding the political and military scope of our plans for SEA; (d ) the expected Communist proposal re lndo-China will call for evacuation of a ll fore ign troops and elec- tions to be s upervised by a joint Vierrninh-Viemam Commission; (e) French have no particular form of settlement in mind; UK is still thinking in terms of partition.

2. It is not dear how the NSC discussion will develop, bur it seems desirable that certain questions be clarified at the meeting. They are along this line: a. Should the U.S. resign itself to being unable to influence any

further the French and U.K. positions at Geneva? (i.e., is it still nor poss ible to stiffen their spines by any conceivable

105

106 PART II: 1 95 3- 1954

means- Presidential talks, threats, sending Mr. Dulles back with a new mandare, etc.-so as to assure they will nor accept a dangerous compromise.)

b. Is or is nor the U.S. prepared 10 commit its combar forces in rhe near furure, in some form of regional effort if possible, ro save the partition or loss of Indo-China? (A decision in principle seems necessary now. As the situation is at present we are say- ing we wi ll consider this if the parliaments of Australia, New Zealand, etc. agree, but it is not clear whether we mean before or after Indo-China is losr.)

c. Is the U.S. prepared 10 acquiesce in the clearly engineered Communist aggression in and raking over of lndo-China- with Red Chinese s upport-even though we evaluate this loss as very serio us to the free world and even though we have rhe milirary means ro redeem the situation? (The A-bomb)

3 . The Jo int Chiefs of Staff sent you a memorandum several days ago (see TAB A) recommending that you "secure governmental accep- rance" of the following position:

ln che evenr of a cease fire in lndochina, che shipment of

military end items under U.S. MDAP ... will immediately

be suspended, excepr for such spares and associated main-

tenance items necessary- ro rhe maintenance of equipment in

operations. The entire question of U.S. a.id co Indochina will

be re-examined in the light of circumstances chen existing.

The Office of the Assisranr Secretary of Defense (lSA) has suggested you forward the memo 10 the NSC saying you concur, but you have not yer acted on rhe marrer. You may wish 10 raise ir during the discussion.

MEMORANDUM FROM SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,

ROBERT T. STEVENS, ON INDO CHINA

19 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SEC RETA RY OF D EFENSE

SUBJECT: Jndo-China

1. I am becoming increasingly concemed over the frequency of State- ments by individuals of influence w ithin and without the government that United States air a nd sea forces alone could solve our problems in Jndo-C hina, and equally so over the very evident lack of apprecia- tion of the logistics factors affecting operations in that area.

2 . Indo-China is a lmost totally devoid of local resources wh ich would be of use to our Armed Forces. It has a tropica l, monsoon climate with pronounced wet and dry seasons and the disease a nd morale hazards are high fo r Caucasian troops. T he population, when not hostile, is untrustworthy. H owever, the p rincipal deficiency of Indo- China as a base for the support of large military operations lies in the inadequacy of irs facilities fo r rthe movement of supplies.

3. T he two principal ports are Saigon and Ha iphong, w ith a com- bined da ily capacity of 15, 100 s ho rt tons. Both are inland ri ver porrs requiring considerable dred ging before maximum potentia l can be obtained. T here are nine secondary ports whose tonnage capacities var y fro m 100 to 1,400 tons.

4 . Because of the inadequacies of the road, ra ilroad, and waterway systems north fro m Saigon, this port would be of ver y little use fo r

107

108 PART II: 1953 - 1954

the support of operations in rhe Tonkin Delta. H aiphong could nor be used without augmentation of its capacity including fuU use of secondary ports and all beaches. T he tonnage capacity of the road and railroad system from H aiphong ro H anoi is even now less than rhe port capacity of H aiphong.

5. Ir would be necessary ro make full use of the air for supply and evacuation as well as for tactical support. Much construction, ro include lengthening and reinforcing of runways, of extreme difficulty during the rainy season, would be necessary. Only three airfields in lndo-China, Haiphong/Cat Bi, Tourane and Tan Sou 1'.'hut (near Saigon) have runways over 7,500 feet long and have reported pave- ment strengths which could support B-45 bomber operations. Eight fie lds can handle transport planes as large as a C-119; an additional seven fields can accommodate C-46's. Sustained operations could nor be undertaken on most of these fields in the rainy season. \Virhin the Delta itself, there are ren airfields of all types of which only one, Car Bi, is currently being used by C-119's or C-54's.

6. Even were it decided ro limit the employment of United States forces to naval and air, which in itself would be a basically faulry milita ry decision, it would devolve upon the Army to perform the bulk of the logistical services and it is essential that the magnitude of the effort required be clearly understood.

7. The adverse conditions prevalent in this area combine all those which confronted United Stares. forces in previous campaigns in the South and Southwest Pacific and Eastern Asia, with the additional grave complication of a large native population, in thousands of viUages, most of which are about evenly divided between friendly and hosrile.

8. The complex nature of these problems would require a major United Stares logistical effort. Ir explodes the myth rhar air and sea forces could solve the lndo-China problems. If Un ired Stares land- based forces are projected any appreciable distance inland, as would be essential, they would require constant local security at their every location, and for their eve_r y activity. The Army would have ro provide these forces, their roral would be very large, and the time ro provide them wou ld be extensive.

ROBERT T . ST EVENS Secretary of the Army

NATIONAL IN TELLIGENCE ESTIMATE-91, c' PROBABLE

DEVELOPMENTS IN INDO CHINA THROUGH 1954 "

4 June 1953

THE PROBLEM

To estimate French Union and Communist capabilities and probable courses of action with respect to Indochina and the internal siruacion throughout Indochina through mid-1954.

ASSUMPTION

There is no major expansion of the Korean war.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Unless there is a marked improvennenc in the French Union military position in Indochina, political s·tabiliry in the Associated States and popular support of the French Union effort against the Viet Minh will decline. We believe that such marked improvement in the military situation is not likely, though a moderate improvement is possible. The over-a ll French Union position in Indochina there- fore will probably deteriorate during the period of this estimate.

2. The lack of French Union military s uccesses,continuing Indochinese distrust of ultimate French political intentions, and popular apathy

109

110 PART II: 1953 - 1954

will probably continue to prevent a s ignificant increase in Indochinese will and ab; Jiry to resist the Viet Minh.

3. We cannot estimate the impact of the new French military leader- ship. However, we believe that the Viet Minh will retain the mili- tary initiative and will continue to attack territory in the Tonkin delta and to make incuxsions into areas o utside the delta. The Viet Minh will attempt to consolidate Communist controt in "Free Laos" and will build up supplies in northern Laos to support fur- ther penetrations and consolidation in that country. The Viet Minh w ill a lmost cerra.inly intensify political warfare, including guerrilla activ ities, in Cambodia.

4. Viet Minh prestige has been increased by the military successes of the past year, and the o rganizational and administrative effective- ness of the regime will probably continue to grow.

5. The French Government will remain under strong and increasing domestic pressure to re-duce the French military commitment in Indochina, and the possibility cannot be excluded that this pres- s ure wi ll be successful. However, we believe that the French will continue without enthusiasm ro maintain their present levels of troop strength through mid-19 54 and will support the planned development of the national armies of the Associated States.

6. We believe that the Chinese Communists will continue and possi- bly increase their present support of the Viet Minh. H owever, we believe th at whether or not hostilities are concluded in Korea, the Chinese Communists wiO I not invade Indochina during th is period. 1

The Chinese Communists will almost certainly retain the capabil- ity to intervene so forcefu lly in Indochina as to overrun most of the Tonkin delta a rea before effective assistance could be brought to bear.

7. We believe that the Communist objective to secure control of all Indochina will not be a ltered by an armistice in Korea or by Communist "peace" tactics. However, the Communists may decide that "peace" maneuve_rs in Indochina would contribute to the attainment of Communist global objectives, and to the objective of the Viet Minh.

L The Deputy Director for lntellige:net>, 111e Joint Staff, believes that the inreUigence available is insufficient to permit a conclusion at this time thnt the Chinese Communists will or will not invade Indochina prior co mid~ 1954.

Probable Developme11ts ;,. l11dochi11a through 1954 111

8. If present trends in the Indochinese situation continue through mid- I 954, the French Union political and military position may subsequently deteriorate very rap;dly.

DISCUSSION

The C urrent Situation

9. Military Sit11t1tion.1 The Vier Minh occupation of the mountainous Thai country of northwestern Tonkin in late 1952 and the follow- up thrust into northern Laos in April l 953 demonsrrate that the Viet Minh have retained the ,nilitary initiative in Indochina. Although the Viet Minh did not defeat any large French Union forces in these operations, they did force the French co withdraw the bulk of their offensive striking power from the Tonkin delta and disperse it in isolated strong points, dependent on air trans- port for logistic support. Ar the same time, strong Viet Minh guer- rilla elements plus two regular Viet Minh divisions s ufficed to contain the 114,000 regular French Union forces remaining in the Tonkin delta. The Viet Minh now appear to have withdrawn the bulk of their regular forces from Laos. They probably have left behind political cadres, some regular forces, and well-s upplied guerrilla units in the areas which they overran in order to consoli- date Communist political and military control, to prepare bases for future operations, and to pin down French Union garrisons.

JO. The invasion of Laos may have been undertaken as part of a long- range Communist design to develop unrest in Thailand and ulti- mately gain control of all Southeast A~ia. Viewed solely in terms of the Viet Minh objective to win all of Indochina, however, the Viet Minh offensive in Laos is an extension of the 1952 winter's offensive in northwestern Tonkin, and represents a shifr in Vier Minh military tactics. This shift in tactics is probably largely explained by the inabi lity ro defeat the main French Union forces in the Tonkin delta by direct assault. Faced with this position of

2.. See Annex A for Estimated French Union Strengths and Dispositions. See Annex B fo: Estimated Viet Minh Strt:ngth.s and Dispositions; See Annex C for French far Eastern Air Force Strengths and DiSp()Sitions; and See Annex O for french Far Eastern Naval Strengths and Dispositions.

112 PART II: 195 3- 1954

strength, the Vier Minh began during 1952 ro rurn the bu lk of their regular forces toward the conquest of nortbwestem Tonkin and northern Laos, areas lightly held by isolated French Union garrisons.

11. ln this manner, the Vier M inh probably hope ro retain the military and political initiative and, by dispersing French Union forces, to prevent either a clean-up by the French Un ion in the Tonkin delta or offensive operations by the French Union against Viet Minh troop concentrations and supply installations outside the delta. The Viet Minh may well believe that by gradua lly extending their base areas in lightly defended regions of Laos, Cambodia, and central Vietnam they can keep French Union forces dispersed and pinned down indefinitely. In rime, they probably expect to sap the morale of the Vietnamese and the French and finally so alter the balance of power as to make possible successful Viet Minh attacks against the key areas of Tonkin and south Vietnam .

12. The deployment of four d ivis ions into Laos by the Viet Minh and the fact that the French did not attack their long and exposed lines of communication typify the over-all situation in Indochina. French Union forces srilO outweigh the Viet Minh in numbers, fire- power, and materiel. F,ench ability to a ir lift troops and equip- ment, although strained at the present time, provides the French Union with tactical flexibility in planning defensive and offensive operations. Tbe Viet Minh, however, by their skill in guerrilla war, their ability to move rapidly and ro infiltrate and control areas under nominal French occupation, have caused the French to com- mit large forces throughout lndochina ro static defense, thus seri- ously reducing French ability to rake the offensive.

13. Vier Minh regular forces in nortbem Indochina have continued their gradual evolution from lightly armed guerrilla bands to a regularly organized milita ry force. They have made noticeable advances in the development of fie ld communications, and unit firepower has increased although they still possess on ly limited amounts of artillery. Viet Minh combat effectiveness is still limited by a lack of medical supplies and an inability to susta in major military operations.

14. Nlilitary aid from the US has enabled the French Union to equip adequately their regular ground forces. The French air forces, with

Probable Developme11ts ;,. l11dochi11a through 1954 113

US logistical support, and with no air opposition, have maintained a fair degree of effectiveness in paratroop operations, supply by air drops, and daylight attacks on enemy supply dumps. French naval forces have improved in combat effectiveness and have maintained control of the seacoasts and inland warerwa ys. However, rhe Vier Minh have the continuing capabilfry ro threaten control of the inland waterways by a minjng campaign. Some Vietnamese National Army units have performed creditably in combat, bur desertion and "missing in action" figures remain high. For the most pare, Vietnamese National Guard and other local security forces lack the firepower, discipline, and leadership to hold posi- tions alone against regular Viet Minh Wlits which infiltrate the Tonkin delta.

15. Although French Union military capabilities have improved slight- ly, the French Union military effort has been inhibited by consid- erations of domestic French policies, French security in Europe, and fear of involvement in a war with Communist China. These considerations have caused French commanders in Indochina to forego aggressive military operations that would emai l heavy casualties and have prevented them from obtaining reinforcements on a scale that might make possible the defeat of the Viet Minh.

16. The development of the Vietnamese National Army, promised by the French in 1949, has been retarded by a shortage of officers and non-commissioned officers, by French lack of faith in the Vietnamese and by French fiscal problems. There has also been an unwillingness among many Vietnamese leaders, not inclucling Premier Tam, to undertake a major mobilization effort until the French grant further political concessions and until the Vietnamese character of the new army is fully guaranteed.

17. Politica l. Some political progress has been made in Vietnam dur- ing the past year. Premier Tam's administration has enlisted the cooperation of the strongly nationalist Dai Vier leader Nguyen Huu Tn, and nationalist conce_m over Tam's francophilia has to some extent diss ipated. Tam has also added to the political vital- ity of Vietnam by holding loca l elections in secure areas of Vietnam. Another Vietnamese program, undertaken with US eco- nomic assistance, which involves the relocation of scattered vil- lages in the delta into centralized and defensible sites may be an

114 PART II: 195 3- 1954

important step toward the eventual "pacification " of heavily infil- trated areas. The decisions of March 1953 to increase the size of the Vietnamese National Army while expanding the area of Vietnamese strategic and operational responsibility, could also be of major political significance.

18. Despite these advances, Vietnam still lacks the degree of political strength essential for the mobilization of the country's resources. Tarn' s "action" program remains more shadow than substance. Elected local councils have no real power, promised land reform and other social and economic reforms which might generate popular support have nor left the planning stage, and the Vietnamese government is handicapped hy incompetent cabinet ministers and the lack of competent administrators. While Bao Dai refuses to assume active direction of the affairs of stare, he remains hosrile toward new leadership and democratic activities.

19. Of more basic importance in the failure of Vietnamese to rally to the Vietnamese government following the French grant of indepen- dence within the French Union in 1949 have been the fo llowing: a. Many Viemamcse doubt the ability of French Union forces to

defeat the Vier Minh and prefer to remain apart from the struggle. b. The French Government has nor dared to promi~e complete

national independence at some future dare, as demanded by the Vietnamese, because of the fear that the French national assem- bly wou ld then refuse to support a war in a " lost" portion of the French Union.

c. The Vietnamese, despite many evolutionary steps toward com- plete independence since 1949, are generally inclined to believe that the French intend to retain effective control over the affairs of Vietnam.

d. The nationalist appeal and military prestige of the Viet Minh remains strong amon:g significam numbers of the Vietnamese.

20. ln Cambodia, internal political strife has weakened the govern- ment, dissident nationalist e lements have continued to sap popular loyalty to the throne, and the King is demanding greater indepen- dence from the French in order to strengthen his political position at home. Meanwhile, the 9,000 Viet Minh combatants in Cambodia, while under fairly constant attack by French and Cambodian forces, are capable of exploiting disorders which may develop.

Probable Developme11ts ;,. l11dochi11a thr o ugh 1 9 54 115

21. Laotian stability has been upset by the recent Vier Minh incursion. The Laotians are generally hostile ro the Vier Minh bur are unable ro contribute a great deal to the defense of their homeland. A sma ll group of pro-Communist Laotians returned 10 Laos with the Vier Jvlinh during the recent incursion. Ir is led by a disaffected Laotian nobleman, Prince Souphanouvong, and calls itself the " Free Government of Parher Lao" (Laos).

22. Meanwhile, the Vier Minh leadership, with Chinese Comm unist material and advisory assistance since 1949, has demonstrated the necessary zeal, ruthlessness, and tenacity 10 exploit to the maxi- mum the limited resources at their command. The Vier Minh have expanded the area under their complete control and their prestige has probably increased throughout Indochina as a result of mili- tary successes in northwest Tonkin and Laos.

23. lo the areas of Vier Minh occupation, Vier Minh control is believed co be effective, and minimum food requirements are being mer. The Vier Minh have taken on increasingly the conventional characteristics of a "Peoples Republic" and are now engaged in programs to confiscare and redisrrjbute land and to eliminate "trai- tors" and "reactionaries." Although this departure from national front tactics has increased realization char the Vier Minh are under complete Communise domination, the Vier Minh control many vi llages within areas of nominal F<ench Union occupation through terror, compulsion, and thei r continued nationalist appeal.

24. The Vier Minh and the Chinese Communists continue to maintain dose relations. Ir is estimated chat there a re less than a thousand Chinese Communist advisers and technicians with the Vier Minh in Indochina. The Chinese Communist.~ a re providing the Vier Minh w ith military supplies at an estimated average level of 400 to 500 tons per month, and some Vier Minh troops are sent ro Communist C hina for training. Small Chinese Communist units reportedly have entered the mounta inous northwest section of Tonkin on several occasions ro assist the Vier Minh against French-supported native guerrillas, but no Chinese Communist troops have been identified in fo rward areas. There was some evi- dence during the past year that Vier Minh policy statements may be "cleared, " if not written, in Peiping. Close Vier Minh relations with Communist C hina are complemented, superficia lly at lease,

116 PART II: 1953-1954

by equally warm relations with the Soviet Union, but we are unable to determine whether Peiping or Moscow has ultimate responsibility for Viet Minh policy.

Probable Trends in French Union Capabilities and Courses of Action

25. French plans for dealing with the war in Indochina now revolve around the development of national armies in the Associated States, particularly in Vie111am. In March 1953, the Franco- Vietiiamese High Military Council approved a new program call- ing fo r an increase in Vie111amese strength during the current year of 40,000 men, orgaruzed in 54 "commando" battaljons.3 A fur- ther expansion of 57,000 men has been proposed for 1954 and will probably be undertaken if tbe initial reinforcement is success- ful and if equipment is made available by the US. With these additiona l Vietnamese forces, the French hope to undertake wide- spread clearing operations and subsequently 10 orgaruze sufficient mobile groups to begin by early 1955 the destruction of the Viet Minh regular forces in Tonkin,

26. Progress has been made in carrying out the troop reinforcement program thus far, and the Vie111amese may have dose to 40,000 reinforcements recruited, trained, and available for combat by early 1954. H oweve,r, the Vier Minh invasion of Laos and the threat of similar operations will probably keep French mobile reserves deployed outs;de the Tonkin delta in isolated strong points. The addition of 40,000 untested and lightly armed Vie111amese will not offset the absence of these regular French forces, and effective clearing or offensive operations cannot be undertaken until French Union forces are regrouped. Moreover, tbe French military leaderslup has been so dominated by concepts of static defense as to be unable to conduct the planned operations witb the vigor necessary for their success. How the new military leadership may alter this we cannot estimate. Finally, unless the French Union fo rces prove strong enough to provide security for

l . The 40,000 art" to be r«rnited and will represent a net increase in French Union strength. Planned transf'erS of native units from the French Arm>' to the Vietname$e Anny will also strengthen the Vietnamese Anny but wilJ not represent any net increase in French Union Strength.

Probable Developme11ts ;,. l11dochi11a through 1954 11 7

the Vietnamese population, it will nor be possible co sweep the guerrillas our of the areas as planned. Nor only will the populace fail ge,nerally ro provide the intelligence required to rout the guer- rillas but, as in the past, they wilJ frequently give warning of the pr1:sence of the French Union forces, thus permitting the guerrillas co cake cover and later tO emerge when the danger is past.

27. The French are fearfu l chat tbey cannot achieve a military decision in Indochina. Unless the French Union military plans achieve great success during the period of this estimate, the conviction will grow in France that the Indochina problem can on ly be solved through some over-all East-West settlement in rhe Far East. The difficulties of the French financial position impel the French to seek relief from the mounting costs of the Indochina war, and French appre- hensions concerning eventual German rearmament not only make them reluctant co increase the military establishment in Indochina but impel chem to seek the early return of French troops to Europe. The French Government will therefore remain under strong and increasing domestic pressure to reduce its military commitment in Indochina, On the other hand, the French Government is under strong pressure to maintain its position in Indochina. There is still considerable sentiment against abandoning the heavy investment which France has poured into Indochina. More important, there is great reluctance to accept the adverse effects on the cohesion of the French Union and on French prestige as a world power which would accompany the loss of France's position in Indochina. In these circumstances, we belie,•e that tbe French w ill continue without enthusiasm to maintain their present levels of troop strength through mid-1954 and will support the planned develop- ment of the National Armies of the Associated Stares. Ar the same time, France will probably continue co seek maximum financia l and material assistance for the French Union effort whi le resisting any measures which would impair French pre-eminence among the Associated States, including the making of any commitments concerning rhe eventual political status of the Associated States.

28. Political strength in Vietnam may grow s lightly during 1953 as progress is made toward a stronger national army, as rhe Vietnamese assume increasing governmental res ponsibilities, and as Premier Tam's social and political programs serve ro decrease

118 PART II: 195 3- 1954

distrust of French intentions. There will probably a lso be a grnw- ing understanding, and fear, of the true Communise nature and purpose of the Viet Minh. However, these developments will nor bring about a significant increase in Vietnamese will and ability co resist the Viet Minh during the period of chis estimate because the Vietnam leadership cannot in this brief period overcome popular apathy and mobilize tl,e energy and resources of the people. Moreover, if events should persuade Vietnam leaders that no prog- ress toward national independence is possible under the French or that French Union fo rces cannot defeat the Viet Minh, it is prob- able that the political strength of Vietnam would decline rapidly. Substantial Viet Minh military victories in the Tonkin delta or elsewhere in Indochina would a lso produce s uch a decline.

29. In Cambodia, political stability is likely co decline as the result of tension between the monarchy, the politically divided people, and the French colonial administration. Even if French concessions co the King insure his adherence co the French Union, unrest in Cambodia or a Vier Minh penetration into southern Laos might force the deployment of strong French fo rces to Cambodia.

30. ln Laos, political attitudes will be determined almost entirely by military developments. The Laotians will probably remain loyal to the French Union if they are defended aggressively. They will not, however, offer effective resistance co Communist efforts to consob- dare political control if French Un ion forces retreat &om the coun- try or if the French Union forces defend only a few strong points.

Probable Trends in Viet Minh and Chinese Communist Capabilities and Courses of Action

31. Viet Minh Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action. Barring serious Viet Minh military reverses, wh ich could occur if Viet Minh forces should overextend themselves or make frontal attacks on French Union strong points, the Viet Minh regime will proba- bly increase its total srrengrh slightly during the period of thjs estimate. Viet Minh prestige will be increased by their recent gajns in Laos. The organizational and administrative effectiveness of tl,e regime will probably continue to increase with experience and Chinese Communist guidance. The program of expropriation and

Probable Developme11ts ;,. l11dochi11a thr o ugh 1 95 4 119

distribution of lands to tenants now being carried out probably weakens the Viet Minh appeal among some classes, but will prob- ably strengthen Viet Minh controls at the village level and thus facilitate the collection of rice.

32. Jvlilitarily, the Viet /vlinh are unlikely to expand greatly their armed forces because they are already experiencing manpower dif- ficulties. Their combat efficiency probably will increase, however, as the result of a modest augmentation of their unit firepower and a steady improvement in staff planning and coordination of forces. The Viet Minh probably will continue to receive a steady flow of material assistance from the Chinese Communists, and the amount may increase at any rime. The Viet Minh do not have, and prob- ably cannot develop within the period of this estimate, the capabil- ity to make such effective use of heavy equipment-artillery, armor, and aircraft-from the Chinese Communists as to permit successful attacks against strong concentrations of regular French forces. Over a longer period, however, a great increase in Viet Minh capa- bilities, including the development of an air force, is possible.

33, We believe char during the period of chis estimate the CommunistS in lndochina will probably attempt to avoid combat except where they can achieve surprise or great superiority in numbers. They will attempt to consolidate Communist cont rols in " Free Laos" and will build up supplies in northern Laos to support further penetrations and consolidation in that country. U they reach the Thai border, they probably will attempt to organize guerrilla forces among the Viemamese in northeastern Thailand, but we do not believe they will have the capability ro provide much material assistance rosuch forces through mid-1954. The Viet Minh forces in Laos may hope to receive assistance from the Vietnamese popu- lation in Thailand. The Viet Min.h will almost certainly intensify political warfare, including guerrilla activities in Cambodia.

34. We believe that neither the French Union nor the Viet Minh will be able ro win a final military decision in Indochina through mid- 1954. The Viet Minh, with their principal striking forces operating from the Tonkin base area, will probably retain the initiative dur- ing the period of this estimate by maintruning attacks against lightly defended French Union territory. The French Union can hold key positions in Laos and may attempt by attacks against

120 PART II: 1953-1954

Viet Minh lines of communication, to prevent the Viet Minh from moving southward in force towards southern Laos and Cambodia. We believe, however, that Viet Minh guerrillas in southern Laos will develop sufficient strength to control much of the countryside and that guerrilla activities in Cambodia will be intensified. The French Union probably will reduce, but not eliminate, Viet Minh strength in south Vietnam. Viet Minh infiltration of the Tonkin delta will probably be mruntained at a hjgh level and the Viet Minh may undertake major attacks against the delta if they can weaken French defenses: by drawing French strength elsewhere.

35. Unless there is a marked improvement in the French Union military position in Indochina, political stahiliry in the Associated States and popular support of the French Union effort against the Viet Minh wi ll decline. We believe that such marked improvement in the military situation is not likely, though a moderate improvement is possible. The over-all French Union position in Indochina there- fore will probably deteriorate during the period of this estimate.

36. Chinese Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action. The Chinese Communists will have the capability during the period of this estimate to improve airfie Ids in south China, to train Viet Minh piJors, to continue improvement of transportation facilities, and to increase their present level of logistic s upport for the Viet Minh. The Chinese Communists will probably retain their present capability to commit and support logistically 150,000 Chinese Communist troops for an invasion of Indochina. The combat efficiency of this potential invasion force could probably be increased considerably by the use of combat-seasoned troops who have been rotated from Korea in the past year. The abi lity of Chinese Communist forces to sustain offensive operations in Indochina would probably be increased should logistic requjre- menrs in Korea remain at low levels for a prolonged period.

37. A Chinese Communist force of 150,000, added to Viet Minh forces, would probably be able to overrun the Tonkin delta area before effective assistance could be brought to bear. The Chinese Communisrs now have, and will probably continue to have during the period of this estimate, suffic ient jet and piston aircraft, independent of operations in Korea, for small-scale but damaging attacks against French Union installations in Tonkin.

Probable Developme11ts ;,. l11dochi11a through 1954 121

With surprise, they probably could neutralize the French Air Forces in Tonkin. The Chinese Communist air forces do nor appear, however, ro possess rhe caipabiliry ar present of conducting sustained air operations in Indochina because of a lack of improved airfields in south China and stockpiles of supplies. Such prepara· tions would take several months.

38. We believe chat whether or nor hosriliries are concluded in Korea, the Chinese Communists will not invade Indochina during the period of this estimate.• Although they possess the capability, the following considerations militate against intervention by regular Chinese Communise forces or by hrge numbers of Chinese Commui-Ust "volunteers": a. The Communists probably consider char their present strategy in

Indochina promises success in a prolonged struggle and pro• duces certain immediate adva nrages. It diverts badly needed French and US resources from Europe ar relatively small cost to the Communists. It provides opportunities co advance intema• tional Communist interests while preserving the fiction of "autonomous" national liberation movements, and it provides an ,nscrumenc, the Viet Minh, with which Communist China and the USSR can indirectly exert military and psychological pressures on the peoples and governments of Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.

b. Communise leadership is aware that the West, and in particular the US, would probably retaliate againSt Communise China if Chinese Communist forces should invade Indochina. We believe that fear of such retaliation and of the major war which might result are important deterrents co open Ch inese C<Jmmunist intervention in Indochina.

39. We believe that the Communist objective ro secure control of all Indochina wiU not be altered by an armistice in Korea or by Communist "peace" tactics. However, the Communists may decide that "peace" maneuvers in Indochina would contribute co the attainment of CommuniSt global objectives, and to the objec• rive of the Viet Minh.

◄ . The Deputy Director for lnteUigenc.."e, The Joint Staff, believes that the intelligence availa ble is insufficient to permit a conclusion at this time that the Chinese Communists will or will not invade Lndochina prior to mid• l 954.

122 PART II: 1953 - 1954

ANNEX A

ESTIMATED GROUND FORCE STRENGTHS AND DISPOSITIONS AS OIF 1 APRlL 1953•

INDOCHINA

A. FRENCH UNION FORCES

Annam &

Component Tonkin Plate.aux Cocbincbina Cambodia Laos Total Regulars• ~

French Expeditionary 91,000 20,000 45,000 8,000 7,500 171,soo••• Corps (CEF)

Associated 27,000 33,000 20,000 8,500 8,000 96,500

Stares Armies

Associated States Na- 6,000 4 ,000 10,000 4,000 5,500 29,500 tionaJ Guards

Semi-Military

CEF 23,000 6,500 18,000 3,.300 2,400 53,200

Auxiliaries

Vietnam 8,000 10,000 34,000 52,000

Auxiliaries Other Semi-

27,000 7,000 30,000 9,000 6,500 79,500 Military

Totals 182,000 80,500 157,000 32,800 29,900 482,200

• These strengths and dispositions were effective before the Viet Minh im,asion of Laso. Since that time frencb Expeditionary Corps (CE.F) strength in Laos has been increased to l 7,500 and CE.F strength ln Tonkin reduced to 81,000 .

.,. French Union regular forces are organized into a totnl of 'l 18 CE.f battsHons and 95 Associated States battalions. The CEF has 83 infantry, 7 p.1rachute, 8 armored, and I l 9 artillery battalions and l AAA batulion. The Assoicared States ha••C 87 infantry and 4 artillerJ battalions and 4 parachute battalions.

•• • Dots not indude 6,000 french perSonne I deracbed for duty with the Assoicate<l Stare..~ forces as cadres aJ1d adviserS. Composition or rhe 172,000 i..~ as follows: French-51,000; Foreign Legion- 19,000; Africa- 17,000; North African- 30,00-0; native lndochinese-55,000.

Probable Developme11ts ;,. l11dochi11a through 1954 123

ANNEX B

ESTIMATED VIET MINH GROUND FORCE STRENGTHS AND DISPOSITION AS OF 1 APRIL 1953•

B. VIET MINH FORCES

Annam &

Component Tonkin Plateaux Cochinc.hina Cambodia Laos Total

R egulars••

Army 81,000 25,000 13,000 1,000 3,000 123,000

Regional Forces 35,000 14,5000 7,500 3,000 2,000 62,000

(Full-time)

Semi-Military

People's Militia 50,000 34,000 25,000 5,000 1,000 115,000

(Armed)

Torals 166,000 73,500 45,500 9,000 •• • 6,000 300,000

• The!>e g1rengths and dispositio11s ehanged during the Viet Minh incursion into Laos in April. An estimated 30,000 Viet 1Minh regulars moved from Tonkin into Laos and an estimated 10,000 moved from Annam. By mid.May, however, it is believed that aH but 15,000 of the Viet Minh reg ularS had retumed to their base a:reas ln Tonkin and Annam.

n The Viet Minh are org;ani1.ed into 6 infantry di,·lsions., I artillery division, 14 independent reglments and 15 independent batralions. RegionaJ forces are organized in 44 battalions.

• • • Some 3,000 djssident Khmer lssaraks are also active in Cambodi3

124 PART II: 195 3- 1954

ANNEXC

AIR ORDER OF BATTLE- FRENCH AlR FORCE AND NAVAL AIR ARM, FAR EAST

No. and Type Unit Designation Airfield Aircraft Assigned

North Tactical Command

I st/8 Fighrer Squadron Bach M.ai, Hanoi 18 F8F 2nd/8 Fighter Squadron Car Bi, Haiphong 20 FSF

Detachmenr, lst/21 Fighrer Car Bi, Haiphong 7 F8F Squadron

lst/25 Lr. Bomber Squadron Car Bi, Haiphong 15 B-26

Detachmenr, lst/19 Lr. Bomber Car Bi, Haiphong 3 B-26, 1 RB-26 Squadron

80rh Phom Recon. Squadron Bach Mai, Hanoi 1l FSF

Detachmenr, lnd/62 Trans. Bach Mai, Hanoi 12 C-47 Squadron

Derachmenr, lst/64 Trans. Gia Lam, Hanoi 5 C-47, 3 JU-52 Squadron

Detachmenr, lnd/64 Trans. Gia Lam, Hanoi 5 C-47 Squadron

2nd/62 Trans. Squadron Do Son, Haiphong 6 C-47

Center Tactical Command

lst/21 Fighter Squadron Tourane Afld., 12 FSF Tourane

Detachmenr 2nd/9 Fighrer Ban i'vle Thour 5 F8F Squadron Afld., Bau Me

Thout

1st 19 Lr. Bomber Squadron Tourane Afld., 16 B-26, 3 RB-26 Tourane

Detachment, 1 sc/64 Trans T ourane Afld4, 2 JU-52 Squadron Tourane

lst/64 Trans Squadron Nhacrang Afld., 5 C-47, 6 JU-52 Nhacrang

South Tactical Command

2nd/9 Fighrer Squadron Tan Son Nhut, 8 F6F, 10 FSF Saigon

Probable Developme11ts ;,. l11dochi11a through 1954 125

2ncl/64 Trans. Squadron TanSonNhm, 16 C-47 Saigon

Detachment, 1st/64 Trans Tan Son Nhuc, 4 JU-52 Squadron Saigon

Miscellaneous light aircraft and 152 helicopters {used throughout rhe rhree tactical commands for liaison, reconnaissance, medical evacuation and flight training

TOTAL: 345

Naval Air Arm

Carrier based 22 F6F

12 SB2C-5

J\11.iscellaneous other types 28

TOTAL: 62

Aircraft (all rypes) temporarily 179 unoperarional becuase of s hart· ages in personneJ and logistics

GRAND TOTAL: 586

126 PART II: 1953-1954

ANNEXD

FRENCH NAVAL FORCES IN INDOCHINA

Small Aircraft Carrier (CVL)• 1

Gunboat (PC) 2

Escort (PCE) 8

Submarine Chaser (PC) 11

Submarine Chaser (SC) 5

Motor Minesweeper (AMS) 6

Amphibious Vessels:

LST 4

LSIL 13

LSSL 6

LCU 19

Miscellaneous small landing craft 211

Auxiliary Vessels:

ARL 1

AG 1

AGS 1

AR 1

AFDL 1

AVP 2

AO 1

Service Craft 54

French Na,,y Personnel 9,760

Viemam Navy Personnel 277

Mission Aircraft

Probable Developme11ts ;,. l11dochi11a through 1954 12 7

F6F•5 .. 22

SB2C•5 .. 12

PB4Y·2 8

JRF·5 11

5.51 2

Moraine 500 "O" 6

C·47A 1

.. The French have attempted to keep one of 11:heir two carriers in Indochina waterS., subject to overhaul and repair schedules. The ARROMANCH.f.S 9CVL} and the LAFA YETrE (CVL) depa.rted for France in February and Ma)' l953, rtspective.ly? for overhaul o.nd repairs .

.. • Carrier•based aircraft

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES

TO THE PARIS DELEGATION 14 June 1954

SENT TO: Amembassy PAR1S 4579 PRlORITY DULLES

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR AND UNDER SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY FYI

It is true that there is less disposition now than two months or one month ago to intervene in Indochina militarily. This is the inevitable result of the steady deterioration in Indochina which makes the problem of interven- tion and pacification more and more difficult. When unfred defense was first broached, the strength and morale of French and Vietnam forces were such that it seemed that the situation could be held without any great pouring-in of U.S. ground forces. Now all the evidence is that the morale of the Vietnamese Government, armed forces and civilians has deteriorated gravely; the French are forced to contemplate a fall -back which would leave virtually the entire Tonkin Delta population in hostile hands and the Saigon area is faced with political disintegration.

What has happened bas been what was forecast, as for example by my Embassy Paris 4117 TED UL 78 of May U 7 . I there pointed our that prob- ably the French did not really want intervention but wanted to have the possibility as a card to play at Geneva. I pointed out that the Geneva game would doubtless be a long game and that it could not be assumed

129

130 PART II: 195 3- 1954

that at the end the present U.S. position regarding intervention would necessarily exist after the Communists had succeeded in dragging our Geneva by winning military successes in Indochina. This telegram of mine will bear rereading. Thar point of view has been frequently repeated in subsequent cables.

I deeply regret any sense of bitterness on Bidaulr' s part, but I do nor see that he is justified in considering unreasonable the adaptation of U.S. views to events and the consequences of prolonged French and U.K. indecision.

I do nor yet exclude possibility U.S. intervention on terms outlined PARIS 402 and TEDUL 54. UK it seems is now more dispooed to see movement in this direction but apparently the French are less than ever disposed to internationalizing the war.

DULLES

US, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SNIE 10-4-54,

"COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN COURSES OF ACTION

WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA"

15 June 1954

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions co the courses of action and consequent situations indicated below. 1

THE ESTIMATE

PART I

ASSUMPTIONS

A. The treaties of independence between France and the Associated States will have been signed.

1• The assurnptions and estimative requirements stated herein were furnished to the intelligence community for the purposes of this estimate . \Ve interpret the hypotheti• cal action os occurring within the next twelve to eighteen months.

13 I

132 PART II: 195 3- 1954

B. A regional security grouping including at least the Associated States, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, France, and the United States, and possibly inc.luding also New Zealand and the United Kingdom, will have been formed .

C. The Associated States will have publicl)' requested the direct mili- tar)' participation of members of the regional grouping in the war in Indochina.

D. The French will have undertaken to continue at least the present level of their militar)' commitment in Indochina.

REQUIREMENT 1

To estimate the initial Chinese Comm,mist and Souiet reactions to the participation of US air and 11aual forces with French Union forces and token Thai and Philippine forces in coordi,,at.ed ground, naual, and air operations designed to destroy the Com1111111ist military forces in Indochina. Air operations would be limited to large/$ in lndocJ,ina. N,u:lear weapons woi,/d be employed if their use were deemed militarily ad11a111ageoi~s b111 ,me/ear atlat:ks 011 the /ndochi11ese d11il population as a target system would be a11oided.

Chinese Communist Reaction

1. The inter vention of US and allied forces in Indochina probably would cause the C hinese Communists to believe that sooner or later rhe)' would have to decide whether to accept the defeat of the Viet Minh or to intervene in force in order to try to prevent such defeat. Their decision would probably rest mainly, though not exclusivel)', upon their weigbi11g of the risks and disadvantages arising from the Viet Mi:nh defeat against the likelihood of involve- ment in major war with the US and the probable conseq uences of such a war for Comm unist China. Avai lable evidence gives no unmistakable indica tion of what the C hinese Communist decision would be. On balance, however, we believe that the chances are somewhat better than even that the C hinese Commun ist would decide to rake whatever military action they thought required co

Commu11is1 Reactio11s to Certai11 Courses of Action 133

prevent destruction of the Vier Minh, including when and if neces- sary, open use of Chinese Comml!ll1ist forces in Indochina.1, 3

2. The nature of the assumed US action is such that ample warnjng would almost certainly be given in advance of actual operations. The Chinese Communisrs have the capability now tO intervene quickly and in such force as ro d.rive French Union forces our of the Delta. The Chinese Communists might choose to exercise this capability before US intervention could be effected.

3. \Yle believe it somewhat more likely, however, that even if the Chinese Communists had determined not ro accept the defeat of the Vier Minh they would nor intervene openly immediately fol- lowing rhe assumed US intervention. They nughr estimate that US air and naval forces could not, in che absence of US ground forces, decisively airer the course of the war. They might therefore con- sider their intervention unnecessary at this point and might post- pone final decision as to their course of action until they had observed the initial scale and success of tbe allied nufaary opera- tions and had estimated the probable nature and extent of US aims in the conflict,

4. ln trus connection, US use of nuclear weapons in Indochina would tend to hasten the ultimate Chinese Communist decision whether or nor ro intervene. Ir would probably convince the Chinese Communists of US dctermjnation ro obtain a decisive military vic- tory in lndochma ar whatever risk and by whatever means, and of the consequent danger of nuclear attack on C<Jmmunist China. Whether this conviction would precipitate or deter Chinese Communist intervention would depend on the military situation

l. The Deputy Director for lntemgence, The Joint Staff, recommend.~ deletion of the last sentence of this paragraph and would substitute the following: .. However, their decision wouJd be large!)' deter-mined by the Chinese estimate of the probable extent and effect of US initial action."

.l. The Director of lntelljgence, USAf, believes that the last sentence of this paragraph should read as follows: .. Communist China will probably not choose knowingly any course of action likely t0 expose its fundamental national strengths in wnr with a major power. Howe,,er, we believe th.at Communist China's strength for conducting various kinds of warfare is such, and the moti\'t:S and judgment of its leaders are suc-h as ro nuke Communist China's courses of action dangerously unpredictable under outside pre-ss-ure of any appreciable magnjlude."

134 PART II: 195 3- 1954

in Indochina at the rime, the observed military effect of the use of nuclear weapons, and the observed political and psychological effect of such use, particularly its effect on the coherence of the regional security grouping and the Atlantic a lliance.

5. ln any case, the Chinese Communists would almost certainly greatly increase their logistic support, deljvery of arms and equip- ment, and technical assistance to the Viet Minh. The Chinese Communists would probably increase their deliveries of AA weap- ons and might send in. Chinese AA gun crews. Moreover, the Chinese Communists would probably deploy ground and a ir unjts near the Indochina border in order: (a) ro warn the US and its allies, and (b) to have forces ready either to intervene on behalf of the Viet Minh or to defend the southern border of China.

6. Wlule maintaining a posture of military readiness, the Chinese Cofllfllunists would intensify political and propaganda activities designed to exploit anti-Western and anticolonial feelings of the indigenous population of Lndochina and the war-fea rs of neutralist Asian nations and of certain US allies. They would a lso seek to label the US as an aggre-ssor, In the meantime and throughout the period of military operations, the Communists would almost cer- tainly agitate and propagandize fo r a "cease-fire " and political settlement, which wou!d preserve the Communist position and prospects.

Soviet Reaction

7. ln the assumed situation, the USSR probably would estimate that the US action, though limited to air and naval forces, would con- siderably increase the risks of unlimited war between the US and Communist China. The USSR would probably prefer chat such a war not develop o ut of the Lndochina situation. Nevertheless, the USSR would assure Communist China of conrinui11g military assistance. The USSR would a lso give complete diplomatic and propaganda support co Communist China and the Viet Minh regime.

Commuuist Reactio11s to Certai11 Courses of Action 13.5

REQUIREMENT 2

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the success of the operations envisaged in the assumptions above (i.e., to the impending effective destruction of the Comm,mist forces in Indochina).•

Chinese Communist Reaction

8. As stated in Paragraph 1, we believe that the chances a re some- what better than even that the Chinese Communist, in the assumed situation, would intervene militarily to prevent the destruction of the Viet Minh. If they decided to do so, we believe that the exact timing and nature of their action would depend on various factors, bur principally on the scope and character of rhe US/allied opera- tions they were seeking ro counter.5• 6

Soviet Reaction

9. ln this assumed situation, the US.SR would probably continue to support the Chinese Communists. 11 the Chinese Communists intervened openly in support of the Viet Minh, the USSR would rapidly increase military assistance to Communist China. T he Soviet diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against the US would continue full -scale, and the USSR might ask the UN to condemn

◄. The A.:.sistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department or the Anny, believes th3t the res-uJrs in thjs req_ulremen1 could not be achieved by the unbalanced and insuf6e:ient forccS erwlsaged.

s. The Director of lntemgence. USAF, be-lie'\'CS that this paragraph s-hould read as Follows: .. Communist China will probably nor choose- knowingly any courSe of action likely ro expose its fundamental national strengths- in war with a major power. However, we belie,,.e that Communist China's Strength for conducting various kinds of wa.rfare is such, and the motives and judgtnent of its leaderS are s-uch as to make Communist China's cou,ses- of action dangerously unpredictable under outside pressure of any appreciable magnitude."

'· The Deput)' Director for lntellige-nce, The Joint Staff, believes th3t p3ragraph S s-hould read as foUows: .. Communist China would conclude from tOte assumed impending <festructlon of Communist forces in Indochina, b)' limited forre!: employing nuclear and conve:n• tional weapons, that its open mHitar)' intervention would inv-ire an extension of similar action to Communist Chin-a, and would, therefore. probabl)' not intervene miljrarily."

136 PART II: 1953 - 1954

the US as an aggressor. Thinly veiled threats of Soviet involvement in the fighting and references to the Sino-50\~et Treary of 1950 would multiply.

PART II

ASSUMPTIONS

A. The treaties of independence between France and the Associated Stares will have been signed.

B. A regional security grouping including at least the Associated States, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, France, and the United Stares, and possibly including a lso New Zealand and the United Kingdom, will have been formed .

C. The Associated Stares will have publicly requested t he direct mili- tary participation of members of the regional grouping in the war in Indochina.

D. The French will have undertaken to continue at least the present level of their military commitment in Indochina.

E. The Chinese Communists will have openly intervened with mili- tary forces in Indochina in order to counter US direct participation as defined in Requirement I.

REQUIREMENT 3

To estimate Chinese Comm,mist and Soviet reactions to an extemion of allied offensive air operations to include military targets in Communist China directly supporting Communist military operations in Indochina or direc.tly threatening the security of Allied forces in the area. 7 Nuclear weapons would be employed in these operations if it were deemed mili- tarily advantageous to do so, but nuclear attacks on the Chinese c.ivil population as a target. system would be avoided.

Chinese Communist Re.action

10. We consider it probable that before intervening in Indochina the Chinese Communists would have accepted the Likelihood of

7. In this requirtine11t we interpret targets "" directly supporting'" Communist militar)' operations to be genernHy south of the Yangtte River and to consist primarily of transport lines, uoop concentrations, and air fields in the area.

Commuuist Reactio11s to Certai11 Courses of Action 137

US a ir attacks against military targets in C hina. Consequently, they would not feel compel led to withdraw their fo rces from Indochina solely as a result of the initiation of the air operations as.sumed above. At the same time, we believe that the Ch inese Communists, in order to prevent furthe r destruction to this area of China and particularli' to avoid the spread of unlimited US attacks to the whole of C hina, would intensify efforn to induce the US to enter negotiations for a settlement which would preserve the Commun ist position and prospects in Indochina.

11. Meanwhile the Chinese Communists, to the full extent of their capabilities, would prosecute the war on the ground in Indochina and attack allied air bases, aircraft carriers, and other installations directly supporting allied operations in the a rea. They would, however, probably try to keep the war centered in lndocluna a nd, as a consequence probably would confine their attacks to such directly supporting bases and installations.

12. The use of nuclear weapons under the restrictions given above would greatly increase C hinese Communist concern about US intentions but probably would nor by itself cause them to adopt new courses of military action at this time. However, they would threaten nuclear retaliation. They would also exploit to the fu llest resultant ps)'chologica l oppo rtunities and in particular would charge that the US was using weapons of mass destruction on the civilian populatio n.8

8• The Deputy Director for lnrelligence, The Joint Staff, believes this paragraph should read: .. Nuclear weapon attacks on Communist China would undoubtedly resuJt in a much greater Chinese Communist reaction than nuclear att:icks on the Indochinese battle• ground. In addition, such attacks would probably indicate to th<" ChincSe Communists a US walingness to exploit its superiorit)' in nuclear weap0ns and ddivery capability to force tht-m out of Indochina. Sinct the nuc-lear attaek contemplated in this require• ment is of a limited nature, the Chinese Communist rulers would retain control of the go\•emment and countty and, with tht- initial a1tach., they would probabl)' make urgent :ippeals to the USSR for nuclear weapons and additional military assistance. The)' might also increase the tempo of their military operntions and would undoubt- edly endeavor to induce the United States to ente.r negotiations in the hope of fore• stalling further attacks. A Chinese Communist decision to withdraw or not would be dependent primaril)· upon continued or increased US nuclear att:icks and other US action as well as upon Soviet reaction. It is beJjeved, howe\•er, thnt the Chinese CommunistS would be wiHing to withdraw from Indochina rather than be subjttted to further destruction of their homeland."

138 PART II: 1953 - 1954

13. The Chinese Communists would attempt by a ll means possible ro convince other Asia n nations that the US had undertaken ro desuoy the Ch inese Communist regime in order ro th wart its efforts on beha lf of an indigenous independence movement. If the Chinese had not previomsly done so, they would probably appeal tO the UN tO brand US action as a threat to the peace.

Soviet Reaction

14. In this assumed situation, the USSR would greatly increase its milita ry assistance to Communist China, especiaUy supplying modern aircraft and small naval vessels, possibly incl uding subma- rines, with Soviet personnel ro train and advise the Chinese and probably ro participate i.n air defense operations. The USSR would probably not openly commit combat units of the Soviet armed forces and probably would nor release nuclear weapons for Chinese Communist use.

15. The Kremlin would also continue its diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against the US, undertaking in the UN co brand the US as an aggressor if this had nor previously been attempted. The USSR would support Chinese charges concerning the use of nucle- ar weapons aga inst civ ilian populations. At the same rime, the USSR would probably advise the Chinese Comm unists ro negoti- ate for a cessation of hostilities on the basis of the status quo at the rime a nd would try to establish a position as peacemaker.

REQUIREMENT 4

To estimate Chinese Communist aud Soviet reactions to the following additional allied co1<rses of action, 1<ndertaken s11bsequently to those above:

a. Extension of allied offensive air operations to additional selected military targets in Comm11nist China, inc/1<ding the 1<Se of atomic weapon.s under the same conditions as above.

b. Naval blockade of the China coast. c. Seizure or neutralization of Haina11. d. Chinese Nationalist operations against the Chinese mainland.

Commuuist Reactio11s to Certai11 Courses o f Action 139

Chi nese Communist Reaction

16. As a consequence of this allied broadening of the war, the Chinese Communists would probably conclude that tbe US was prepared to wage. unlimited war against them. T hey would continue to defend themselves to the limit of their capabilities and would probably make vigorous efforts to secure tbe full participation of the USSR. At the same time, they would intensify their efforts to end the war by negotiations, and might eventually indicate in some way their w iJlingness to w ithdraw from Indoch ina in order 10 obta in a cease-fire. 9 If unable to obtain a cease-fire agreement, the C hinese Communises would accept the fact of unlimited war with the US and would wage s uch war 10 the full extent of their remaining capabilities.

Soviet Reaction

17. In th is assumed situation, the USSR would contin ue 10 provide mil itary assistance to Commun ist Chi na as ind icated above, but would probably refuse Chinese Commun ist demand for full Soviet pa rt icipation in the war. T he Kremlin would strongly urge the Ch inese Comm unists to negotiate for a cessa tion of hosti li- t ies o n the basis of w ith draw ing from lndochina. 10 If the Chinese Commun ists cou ld nor obta in a cease-fire agreement, the USSR would provide Comm unist Ch ina with mi li tary assistance in every way short of open ly committing combat un its of the Soviet a rmed forces in operations against US and all ied forces outside Commun ist-held territory. The USSR would prov ide military resources and eq uipment fo r C hiin ese Commun ist attacks on US bases or US fo rces anywhere in the Far East. At this stage of the

9• The Deputy Director for lme.lligcnce., The Joint Staff, and the Director of lntelligc:n~ USAF, suggest that the words .. might evt'ntuall)"' in this sentence should be replated with .. would probabl>'·"

to. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G~l, Departmene- of the Army, recommends the deletion of .. on the basis of withdrawing from lndocbina.," believing that at this State of the conflict the Kremlin would notwillingl}' ncquiesc."e in the surrender of any Communjst- held territory ln Lndochina or elsewhe.re.

conflict, the USSR mighr provide Communist China with nuclear weapons and the tecltnical personnel required for their use_ll, 12

I 8. The USSR would continue its diplomatic and propaganda cam- paigns against the US, insisting char the Soviet aim was purely the defense of China against outright aggression. T he USSR would also begin at least partial mobilization of its own milita ry forces on a war basis. It would issue thinly vei led threats of genera l war, suggesting attacks on Western Europe and on the continental US but would probably confine its operations 10 the defense of China so long as the US did nor attack Soviet territory.

REQUIREMENT 5

To estimate Chinese Comm1111ist and Soviet reactio11s to the success of the foregoing operations (i.e., to the impending effective destruction of the Chi11ese Comm,mist capability to c.cmduct military operations outside the borders of Commw1ist China). 13

Chinese Communist Reaction

19. Unless the USSR was willing to make an unlimited commitment of Soviet fo rces to prevent the success of the assumed US and a llied operations, we believe that the Communist Chinese, under the assumed circumstances, would accept any US terms fo r a settle- ment which preserved the integrity of China under rite Chinese Communist regime.

11• U The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and Dirrttor of Intelligence, USAF, believe that this sentence should read:

14 \V/e do not believe that the USSR ,,,.ould release nuclear weapons for Chinese Communist use."

12.. A~tant Chje:f of Staff, G~2, Department of the Army, substitutes for the last sentence: .. Jt is also beljeved that the USSR would give serious consideration to making a sub- stnntially greater military contribution including nuclear weapons and the technjca] perSonnd required for their use."

u. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G~2,. Department of the Am1y 1

belie..,es dun the results assu1ued in this requirement could nor be achieved by the unbalanced and insufficient force en..,isaged.

Commuuist Reactio11s to Certai11 Co u rses of Action 141

Soviet Reaction

20. In this assumed situation, we believe the USSR would urge the C hinese Communists to accept any US terms for a settlement which preserved the integrity of China under the Chinese Communist regime. 14 So long as the fighting continued, however, the USSR would continue its a id to China .

14· The Assistant O,.id of Staff, G~2. Department of the Arm>·• would add .. and retained a Communist foothold in lndochina."

TELEGRAM FROM SMITH IN MOSCOW TO SECRETARY

OF STATE DULLES ON MOLOTOV'S VIEWS

19 June 1954

OITTGOING TELEGRAM 1426

J une 19, 1954

Sent to: SECSTATE DUL TE 202

RPTD INFO: Amembas.~ Moscow 138 EYES ONLY FOR Al\IBASSADOR

I saw Molotov at his villa yesterday evening at my request to inform him of my departure, and because I felt time had come to sound a note of wa ming: Talk lasted more than ho ur and a half. Molotov asked w hat I thought would be best thing to do w ith Conference, to adjourn it tem- porarily or to keep it going. I replied as far as we concerned should be kept going while there was hope of reaching reasonable settlement, but that there was no use referring to "committees" matters of major policy which must be decided by the Conference as a whole. Before my depar- ture I fe lt it would be desirable ro exchange views, in o rder that mis takes of the past should not be repeated as the res ult of misunderstanding of our respective positions. With regard to Korean phase, I had on ly to say that in reserving o ur position re final Chinese proposal had not implied to exclude Communist C hina from future djscussions on Korean

143

144 PART II: 195 3- 1954

question. As matter of fact, China was belligerent there against UN and fo r practical reasons would have to be party to settlement.

Regarding Indochinese phase Molotov said he had impression US avoided reaching solution and .cited in this regard Robertson objection in yesterday's restricted session to acceptance Chou's proposal on Laos and Cambodia. I said that while proposal might be satisfactory in some respecrs it made no mention of Vietminh withdrawal or of adequate supervision. So long as regular Vietminh forces remained in Laos and Cambodia we could not help but view situation in very serious light. Molotov cited Pham Van Dong's remarks regarding withdrawal Vietminh "volunteers" and emphasized importance of beginning direct negotia- tions regarding Laos and Cambodia of type now taking place regarding Vietnam. I regretted that I was not at all convinced that Pham Van Dong really meant what he sa id. His statements sounded well enough, but his written proposals did not bear them out.

I said I wanted 10 make our position on Laos and Cambodia entirely clear. ln addition to regular Vietminh forces in these countries, which I enumerated, there were some dissident elements in Laos and a much smaller number in Cambodia, If regular Vienninh forces were w ith- drawn, elections could be held, with guarantees that individuals would be discriminated against as regards their electoral rights fo r having sup- ported either side. Dissidents would be able to vote for any candidates they chose, Communists included. However, while Vietminh forces remained in these countries, there could be no peace nor could free elec- tions be held.

In private conversations with Mr. Eden and others, Communist dele- gates, in particular Chou En- lai, had taken an apparently reasonable view on Laos and Cambodia, b ut that here again, when we came to the point of trying to get open agreement on specific points we were unable tO do so. I specifically mentioned Chou En-lai's statements ro Eden in which he said that China would have no objections to recognizing the kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia or to these States having forces and arms sufficient to mai111ain security, or their remaining in French Union so long as they were not used as military bases by the United States. We could not disagree with any of this, a lthough if we kept out the Chinese would have to keep out, and these small states would have 10 be a llowed to join w ith their neighbors in whatever regional security arrangements would best protect their integrity without constituting a threat to any one

Telegram from Smitb Jo o,,//es on Molotov's Views 145

else. Chou En-lai might be anxious abotnt possibility of US bases in Laos and Cambodia. We wanted on our part to be sure that these countries were not handed over 10 the Chinese. Molotov said that while he did not know about what attitude Chinese might have on other questions in future, he could assure me that Chinese attitude on this particular ques- tion was not at all unreasonable, and that there was nothing in it which would give rise to conflicts. He added, however, that if we continued to rake a one-sided view and insist on one-sided solutions, he must "in all frankness say that this would not succeed." There were, he said, some differences of view between us on Laos and Cambodia, especia Uy in regard 10 our refusal 10 recognize resistance movements; point he wanted to make, however, was that basis for reaching agreement was present and that agreement could be reached so Jong as neither side "adopted one-sided views o r put forward extreme pretensions. " This, he said, could only lead to other side's doing same.

Resistance movements existed, in Laos and Cambodia, Molotov asserted. About 50% of the territory of Laos was not under the control of official government. It was true that much smaller resistance move- ment existed in Cambodia, He said char in fact conditions in all three Indochinese countries were different-large resistance movement control- ling three-quarters of territory in Viet Nam, s ubstantial movement in Laos controlling, as he had indicated, about half territory, and much smaller movement in Cambodia. I said, with regard to two latter counts solution was simple. Withdraw invading Vietminh forces and let dissi- dent elements elect communist representatives co general assemblies if they wished. But the elections must be actually "free." Regarcfo1g Viet Nam, I said we recognized relative strength of the Vietminh but they were demanding too much. It seems Vietminh demanded all Delta, including both Hanoi and Haiphong. The French were our allies, and we took grave view of this extreme pressure. Molotov said that if French were to have something in South and something in North, and probably in center as weJI, this would add up to three-quarters of country or better, which was wholly unreasonable. He said there was old Russian proverb thar if you try to chase two rabbits ar once you are apt to miss both of them, and added that in this case wanting something in North and in South was like chasing two rabbits. If French were co give way 10 Vietminh in North, they would gain territory probably greater in extent in South in recompense. I said appearan-ce of " partition" was repugnant

146 PART II: 1 95 3- 1954

to US, and that as far as proverb about rabbits went I felt that Vietminh were chasing two rabbits in wanting both H anoi and Haiphong. Vietminh demands for a ll the Delta, o r efforts take it all by force prior to reaching political solution through elections, was serious matter in view of my Government. Molotov disagreed, stating that present French position in area was due only to Vietminh restraint, and that two cities did not even have normal communications between each other. In regard to US aver- sion to partition, he said that this problem could easily be solved by holding elections at once, whjch would decide "one way or t he other." He repeated that important thing in reaching agreement on any of these questions relating Indochina was to be realistic about actual facts, and to avoid putting out one-sided views o r extreme pretensions. If French were encouraged to disregard actual situation and to ask for too much, he said, one could only expect conflict to continue. (He made it clear that he considered US as party likely to do the encouraging.) I replied that US was not one of principals to Indochinese dispute and did not cast decid- ing vote, to which Molotov rema"rked "maybe so, but you have veto, that word I hear you use so often," and went on to say that among other delegations present at Conference there seemed ro be rea l willingness ro reach agreement. Agreement had in fact, he added, very nearly been reached, a lthough he hoped I would realize this was not information for publication. (T his remark, obviously, referred to private French-Vietminh military conversations which I have mentioned.) I said I must emphasize my Government held serio us views on issues involved in Indochina s itu- ation, more serious, perhaps, than did some of other governments repre- sented at Conference. I hope he would give consideration to this, and assist in overcoming some of the deep-rooted s uspicions of Asiatic par- ticipants, which became apparent every time we tried to reconcile formal proposals.

COMMENT:

Throughout conversation Molotov maintained friend ly and mild tone evident in all informal conversations. He is completely sure of himself and of his position. What he had to say regarding Delta, Laos and Cambodia confirms Communist intentions to play a ll the ca rds they hold. His avoidance of endorsing Chou's remarks to Eden concerning Laos and Cambodia indicated ithat s imple withdrawal of Vietminh forces

Telegram from Smith Jo 01,//es on Molotov 's Vietvs 14 7

from these countries was not acceptable and that some form of de facto partition was intended in Laos, at least. His remarks seemed to indicate that Communists have eye on as much as half of country. T his conversa- tion, together with the inflexible position w hich Mob-toy took during his last conversation with me regarding the composition of a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission fo r Indochina, as well as his speech on Tuesday, June 8, and all subsequent s peeches on the Communist side, which rook firm positions on points the Comm unists know 10 be unac- ceptable ro Eden, Bida ulr and me, are highly s ignificant. The recent emphasis by all three Communist spokesmen that France should carry on direct political as well as direct military negotiations with Vietminh show their interest in having a convenient wa>• of holding out fo r greater gains in their direct negotiations with the French as well as within the frame- work of the Conference.

Molotov in effect told France in his J une 8 speech that her position and that of the Government she was suppo rting in Indochina were hope- less and that she had best face up 10 fac ts and capitulate in direct nego- tiations with the Vietminh. His speech, of course, was in large part intended to assist in the de$truction of the French Government for the implications that that would have on the European as weU as the Asiatic scene. Nevertheless, his harsh a nd even insulting language seemed 10 refl ect the confident, nearly triumphan t mood in which he bas been lately. It would be misleading ro ascribe the ha rder line which Mobotov brought back with him from Moscow entirely to Soviet tactical consid- erations in regard 10 the French Government crisis. While the Soviets may think that the blocking of EDC through the destruction of the French Government would reduce future threats to them in Europe, the fact remains tha t the Indochina conflict potentially involves a much more immediate threat of genera l war.

It is probable that initial Soviet tactics were tO forestall US interven- tion in the Delta by some kind of a compromise fo rmula involving Hanoi and Haiphong if it appeared that such intervention were imminent. T he recent raising of the ante in the negotiations here by the Communist side probably reflects an estimate on their part that our intervention is improbable and that they are safe 10 go a head there, keeping, of course, a sharp eye o ur for indications of change in ou r attitude.

While the Communist position on Laos and Cambodia remains more flexible than their position in regard to the Delta, they wi ll get all they

148 PART II: 1953-1954

can in Laos now. In the wlnole are the determining factor for the Communists will continue to be their estimate of the likelihood of US or joint intervention and nothing short of a conviction on their part that this intervention will rake place will stop them from going ahead with their plans for taking all of it eventually, through military conquest, French capitulation, or infiltration.

Realize much of above is repetitious, but it will serve as final summary.

SMITH

MINUTES, ZHOU ENLAI'S MEETING WITH [PIERRE]

MENDES-FRANCE 23 June 1954

DESCRIPTION:

Mendes-Fra nce and Zhou discuss the Indochina issue during their first meeting together. Both men feel they are in agreement with each other regarding several points (establishjng a cease-fire before discussing political issues, that no US military bases should be established in Indochina, elections in Cambodja and Laos, cooperation between France and Vietnam and between the rwo sides in Vietnam ). They end on a positive note, both certain that their few differences of opinion will be worked out.

Tirne: 23 June 1954 Location: French Embassy, Bern Chinese participants: Premier Zhou Enlai, Vice Minister Li Kenong, [Chinese Embassy in Switzerland M;nisterJ Feng Xian, Huan )Gang, Zhang Wenj in (secretary), and Dong Ningchuan (translator) French participants: Pierre Mendes-France, Ambassador [to Switzerland J ean) Chauvel, Luwin, Jacques Gurnermaz, and one translator

Source: CFMA. Record No. 206-Y0007. Obmined 'by CWJliP and tt:.mslated for CWJHP hy Li Xiaobing.

149

150 PART II: 1953 - 1954

MENDES- FRANCE: Ir is said that [you,) Mr. Premier[,] postponed your trip to India for one day in order to come here. I really appreciate it.

ZHOU ENLAI: We are so glad to meet Mr. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister before my brief return to China.

MEND ES-FRANCE: Ir is very good to make this meeting happen quickly. I am very glad about this. The reason is that I'd like to solve all of the problems concerning us quickly. Mr. Premier knows under what kind of circumstance o ur new :national government was established. The French National Assembly has decided on a dare and hopes that a settle- ment will be achieved before this dare. This settlement of course must briI1g about peace.

ZHOU ENLAI: It is for th is reason that the leaders of our two countries have this early meeting to exchange our opinions. I believe this [will be] helpful in making conference progress from now on.

MENDES-FRANCE: Mr. Premier has been attending all the meetings. I couldn't pa rticipate in the conference before. Bur I had the information on your conversations with Mr. Bidault. I'd like to know more about

Mr. Premier's observation and opinion on what measures we should rake in order to achieve peace in Indochina.

ZHOU ENLAI: In the past meetings I have exchanged many opinions with Mr. Bidaulr and Mr. ChauveJ. Nevertheless, I'd still like to talk to the new French prime minister and fo reign minister now about the Chinese delegation's opinion o,i the conference. T he Chinese delegation's purpose of coming and attending this Geneva Conference is to resume and realize peace in Indochina. This is our goal, and we do not ask for anything else. We oppose any enlargement or internationalization of the war. We oppose any use of threatening or provocative methods. They do nor help negotiations. China, however, is nor afra id of threats, as Mr. Prime Minister knows. We need to employ conciliatory methods to help both sides to arrive at an agreement.

Ir is because of this common spirit, we'd like to address my opinions to Mr. Prime Minister.

To solve any problem in Indochina, the first [requirement] is a cease- fire. Military issues are always related to political issues. The miljrary issue is being discussed presently, and the political issue can be discussed later on. After an agreement is reached, the first [step] is to stop the war.

Zh o u Enlai ' s Meeti1tg w i th [ P i erre / M e 11d e s-Fra11c e 151

As Mr. Prime Minister said, the French Parliament has expressed this kind of desire, because the people of France, Indochina, and the world all support this. The current situation in Indochina is that all three coun• tries are involved in the war. They have a similar situation. All of the three countries need a cease-fire, and their people demand independence and national unification. Tbe French government has shown its willing• ness to recognize the independence of the three countries and their national unification. China is willing to see they will stay in the French Union. Our country also intends to establish a friendly and peaceful rela- tionship with France.

The three countries, however, bave different problems. Therefore, we should accept different ways in solving the problems in each coun· rry. Vietnam, for example, needs a general election for its national unification after the war, and rhen [the new national government[ decides on the type of its political system. This will be determined by the Vietnamese people themselves. Regarding Laos and Cambodia, as long as the people in the two countries are still supportive of their cur- rent royal governments, our government will be very happy to see these two countries become part of the normal Southeast Asian countries, like India and Indonesia. I have expressed the same opinion to Mr. (Georges] Bidault.

Of course, on the other hand, we don' t wam co see that these three countries become military bases of the United Stares, or that the United Stares builds up a military pact with chem. This is what we are against. If the United Stares establishes its military base there, we have to check it out, and we can't just )er ir go without checking.

I talked co the foreign ministers of Laos and Cambodia a few da)'S ago. They all assured me chat they don't want any American military base in their countries. I said char was good and encouraged them to make friends with France, as long as France respects their independence.

I also heard that [Minister of Foreign Affairsj Mr. Pham Van Dong, representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, talked to them and expressed that Vietnam will respect the independence and sover- eignty of Laos and Cambodia, and assure a non-aggression between chem and Vietnam. It was very good when I heard they were talking like this.

Politically, the three countries face difkrenr situations. Currently, Vietnam has two govemmenrs. The mi.litary regrouping areas musr be determined, bur ir doesn't (requirej a [political] division. During a period

152 PART II: 1953-1954

of time after the cease-fire, a free election will be held through negotia- tions between the two governments. This is their own domestic affrur. We can show o ur support, even though we can't intervene. Laos and Cambodia a lso need to achieve their unifications through elections. I think the Democratic Republic of Vietnam can agree on tlus point. The question is whether the two royal governments can recognize the resis- tance movements in their counrrries, and unite with the resistance govern- ments in order to achieve rbeir national unifications. The Bao Dai government should approach the Democratic Republic of Vietnam through discussions and negotiations, instead of opposing it. Unfortunately, his !Bao Dru's] political proposal rums exactly at opposi- tion, hegemony, and at inviting the United Nations to intervene. This is unacceptable.

Militarily, the militaq• representatives from both sides a re negotiat- ing the issue of Vietnam. We all hope that a settlement will be reached sooner. Laos and Cambodia have two situations. The first is that they have local resistance forces; it is small in Cambodia, and large in Laos. In Cambodia, the Royal government s ho uld talk directly to the resis- tance forces about cease-fire, neutral nation supervision, and political solutions there. So it should in Laos. ln the meantime, the royal govern- ments s ho uld also join France in the negotiations of both sides to deter- mine the regrouping a reas fo r the loca l forces. This will lead to their political unifications. The second situation is that all the foreign armed fo rces and military personnel should w ithdraw &om these two coun- tries. Vietnam had sent some volunteers over there. If it is still the case at the present, they may follow the resolution provided by the military staff meetings, requiring the w ithdrawal of a ll the foreign troops from all of Indochina.

By now the representatives from both commands have reached an agreement in principle about the military meetings. They will meet and talk intensively in the next three weeks. C urrently, the meetings of the belligerent states became the center of the conference. France and Vietnam are the most important parties from both sides. Our desire is a direct contact of both sides ru1d a signed settlement [ to be reached J soon. All the nations at the conference, including C hina, are willing to make contributions to genuine progress, and [are] firm to oppose any obstruc- tion or destruction.

These a re the main points of my opinion.

Zhou Enlai ' s Meeti1tg with [ Pierre/ Me11des-Fra11ce 153

MENDES-FRANCE: T he Premier's points help me rea lize that the Premier's thoughts o n the issues are very dear. Of course, I can't respond to every point, but some particular po ints s hould be discussed carefully. What made me glad is that our opinions are pretty close on the main points. I heard that the discussions on Laos and Cambodia have made some progress in the past several days. I a lso know that the progress was achieved mostly through the efforts by the delegation under the leader- ship of Premier Zhou. I believe that we don't have any unsolvable prob- lems between us o,•er the issues of Laos and Cambodia.

As the Premier mentioned, coping with the domestic problems in Laos and Cambodia also requires international supervision. Certainly, a solution requires some work, but I don't think it is too difficult to find out.

The problem in Vietnam is diffe rent. The Premier just said that it is tougher. And then the situa tion is not optimistic because the war has been [going on] in that country for so long. Moreover, as the Premier said, the two governments there have their own administrations and armies. The Vietnamese people are divided into two sides, and both sides have been fighting the wa r for many years. One of the points mentioned by the Premier needs to be noticed[:] th a t many problems can be solved through direct contact between both sides. If workable, we certainly wel- come [djrect contact]. In fact, however, it is difficult. Although it is dif- ficult to contact a nd to obtain any resu lt, we will make our vigorous dfort to a rrive at thjs goal. Nevertheless, we agree on thjs direction. T he Premier a lso said that the goa l in this region is unification, and that the methods and procedure can be considered differently. Vietnam is divided into two parts, it is difficult to reach a ny agreement in a short period of time. It is impossible to complete its national unification as soon as the cease-fire becomes effective. T he time issue was just mentioned because the war has been there so long that peace would not be stalled immedi- ately, and that procedure w ill not be that simple, for example, talking about an immediate election. In fact, if the Vietnamese people really want their unification, they have to cooperate and need certain procedures. Generally speaking, [our] goals are not much different in principle.

There is one more final point. I am g lad the Premier made such a s ug- gestion: it is the best to go through two steps. This first is a cease-fire, and the second is a political settlement. I fully agree for the same reasons the Premier stated. For genuine progress, th.e first step is ro concentrate our attention and energy on the cease-fire issue, including the determination

154 PART II: 1953-1954

of regrouping areas. This is a practical solution, it should be. reached quickly. I'd like to ask the Premier if you agree that we have many points in common?

T here is another important point. The Premier raised a concern about establishing American military bases. I fully agree o n this point. I want tO make it clear that we don't intend to establish any American bases in that region. We don't have such a plan.

ZHOU ENLAI: I'd like to explain regarding your points: You had a very good a nswe r to my last point. France has no intention

to establish any American bases. T his is very good not on ly for the three countries, but also good for China, France, and Southeast Asia. All of us hope for a peaceful co-existence and for building a common foundation for the future.

You also said that the military and political solutions in Laos and Cambodia needed international supervision. O ur opinions are the same on this point.

The situation in Vietnam is different and difficult. But I think the military and political principles can be reached first. The problem-solving should deal with the troop regrouping and cease-fire issues first, and then turn to the political settlement. It should be two steps, not one step. The length of each step depends on the effort of both sides, and requires discussions between the two sides. France bears more responsibilities for them to get closer, not confrontational. ti the two sides refuse to make contact or refuse to talk 10 each other, it will slow down the cease-fire. I believe that you have found that the Chinese delegation is pushing the Democratic Republic of Viemam to approach not only France, but also Bao Dai Vietnam. France may find it difficult to ask the iBao Dai government to make contact with the others. The Prime Minister knows where the difficulty comes from. That is the situation. Mr. Chauvel knows [it] even better.

Of course, if we want to satisfy the reasonable requests made by Laos and Cambodia, we sho uld meet the reasonable requests in Vietnam made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. T herefore, the military meetings between both s ides may reach an agreement more easily.

MENDES-FRANCE: I don' t have a whole package of opinions. We have the same opinion on some of the issues. let me repeat this, it is a good thing if we can help t0 put the two Vietnamese governments togeth- er. T he French government really wants to use its influence to facilitate

Zhou Enlai ' s Meeti1tg with [ Pierre/ Me11des-Fra11ce 155

their cooperation. It is, however, very di fficult. \Ve just talked about the long war, a long period of division, so that it is difficult fo r them to come together psychologically and politically. But [they] need ro follow this guideline in order to achieve some settlements. Ir is better fo r them to set up some kind of fo undation fo r imple.menting a cease-fire and troop regrouping. As you know, the negotiations between their military experts are still ongoing. Even though they do n ot seem to be having any major problems, the direction of their meetings is unclear. lf we know what the foundation is and an agreement can be based on it, it would be much easier for us to push Vietnam. So fa r the French-Vietnamese meetings haven't yet made any important progress. Mr. Pham Van Dong made contact w ith Mr. C ha uvel yesterday. Currently, the focus of the confer- ence is on military issues, but there is nor much progress. I am returning to Paris tonight and will meet [French Commander in Chief and Commissioner General fo r Indochina[ General [Pa ul ) Ely. I will surely discuss this issue with him in o rder to fu rther instruct our military repre- sentatives here a nd push the negotiations fo rward. And, if the Vietnamese government could do the same and give new instructions, it would be very good and easy ro reach an agreement, Could [you, Mr.J Premierl,I use your influence over the Vietnamese government to do this like us and help us on this? Once the military experts have made progress in their discussions, arrived at an agreement, and created a fo undation, it will be easy for cliplomacy to proceed.

I have one more point to make. If we go with the Vietnamese govern- ment's proposal o n 25 May suggesting to have two main regrouping areas, on ly the military experts can provide us a foundation for dip lo- matic discussions.

ZHOU ENLAJ: To avoid misunderstanding, I'd like to explain one thing. I said the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Bao Da i government should estab lish their "con.tact," not "cooperation." Since both sides have engaged in the war for many years, it is impossible to talk about any cooperation. Our expectation is that France could influ- ence Bao Dai and make his government contact the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in o rder to red uce difficulties and leave no room for any external disruption. The negotiations on the troop regrouping should now enrer the phase of discussing specific matters. My opin ion is the same as Mr. Prime Minister regarding this issue. The c urre nt discussions should get into specific matters. We know that the militar y

156 PART II: 1953-1954

representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam a lso intend to achieve early and positive results.

I am very glad to bear that Mr. Mendes-France is going to meet General Ely, commander-in-chief of the French exped itionary forces in Indochina, after returning to Paris, and that Genera l Ely will give spe- cific instructions tO the French militaq• representatives at Geneva. T he agreement on the main regrouping areas by both sides will lay the foundation for furthe r diplomatic negotiations. I agree with :vlr. Prime Minister at this point. Regarding the main regrouping areas, [I'd like t0 know] whether Mr. Prime Minister has any specific idea. If you have not decided on this point, [we] don't have t0 ta lk about this issue right now.

MENDES-FRANCE: To avoid any misunderstanding, I'd also like to give an explanation. When I said "cooperation," I meant using "coop- erative" methods to solve problems.

I agree with Premier Zhou Enlai's point. We really hope that the mili- tary staff meetings can move into practical phase quickly, and that the Vietnamese representatives will receive their new and clear instructions from their high command. The determination of the main regrouping areas can be used as the foundation for d iplomatic negotiations. It seems that the main regrouping areas can be decided pretty soon. Regarding particular ideas on the main regrouping areas, I can't make any suggestion right now, because I don't know how the military staff negotiations are going. They are planning to draw a horizontal line from west to east. The line, however, proposed by the Vietnamese staff is much more to Pierre Mendes-France and Zhou Enlai at the Geneva Conference (courtesy PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives) the south than the real situation [reflects]. O ur experts, who know the field situation, have taken note of all the points proposed by the V ietnamese on 25 May. I think it is possible for them tO provide a basis for further diplomatic negotiations. Another [piece of] ev idence is that the negotiations on supervision currently are about practical methods. We chink that, if the objectives of s upervision are known in particular, the problem of supervision could be solved eas- ily. Thus, we sh o,Jd push the negotiations on the regrouping forward and quickly in order to advance the discussions on super visory issues.

ZHOU ENLAI: T hat's right. We should resolve the problem of the regrouping areas first. I have noticed Mr. Prime Minister's stance on these

Zh o u Enlai ' s Meeti1tg w i th [ P i erre / M e 11d e s-Fra11c e 15 7

issues. \Y/e believe that, after the military staff of both sides derail their discussions, the supervisory problem will be solved easily. I have exchanged my opinion on this issue with Mr. Eden. He agrees with my opinion.

Our current efforts shou ld help [the military staff of) both sides to reach an agreement soon, achieving a result within three weeks. This result will bring both belligerent s ides their glorious peace, and realize the desires of the people of France, Vietnam, and the world. All the for- eign ministers can return to Geneva earlier.

MENDES-FRANCE: Three weeks should be the ma)cimum time. During this period, as soon as the military representatives of both sides reach their agreement, they s hou ld inform thei r delegations. Thereby, there will be a few days for the fore ign ministers to return to the conference.

ZHOU ENLAI: The sooner, the better. After my depa rture, Mr. Li Kenong, our vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will be in charge here. I hope that Mr. Chauvel will continue the communication with Mr. Li Kenong.

I am very glad ro meet Mr. Prime Mimister. I really appreciate you are willing to spend time in Bern.

MENDES-FRANCE: This is for our common task for peace.

ZHOU ENLAI: Mr. Mendes-France said in the Parliament that every- thing is for peace and friendship. We fully agree with this point.

MENDES-FRANCE: This is our 6rsr meeting. I hope we will have more contacts later on. I am really happy about this meeting. I'd like to express my appreciation here. Although J am very busy with many things since I have just organized my new cabinet, I really want to come here and meet you.

I have another practical question, thar is, what we are going to tell the reporters. What do you think about this?

ZHOU ENLA I: Mr. Prime Minister can make a suggestion, please.

MENDES-FRANCE: I agree with a news release draft suggested by Mr. Chauvel: "We had a frank conversation on the issue of peace in Indochina, not a negotiation. This conversation may lead to our desire that the Geneva Conference will achieve genuine progress." It seems that not too much besides this can be said.

158 PART II: 1953 - 1954

ZHOU ENLAI: It is good nor to say too much.

MENDES- FRANCE: H opefully, Mr. Li Kenong will contact Mr. Chauvel often later on.

ZHOU ENLAl: I have a wish. Within the next three weeks, if Mr. Mendes-France comes tO Geneva or has other opportunities, I hope you can make a contact with Mr. Pham Van Dong, head of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. We think such a direct contact beneficial.

MENDES-FRANCE: Mr. C hauvel already mer Mr. Pham Van Dong yesterday. Mr. Chauvel told Mr. Pham Van Dong that I' d li ke to meet him. But it is nor clear when and where the meeting can rake place. It may depend on the progress of the conference. I agree that this kind of the meeting is very important. I hope this meeting can happen.

ZHOU ENLAI: I will be happy to pass on Mr. Prime Minister's idea to Mr. Pham Van Dong. We hope that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and France can build a friendship on the foundation of peace.

MENDES- FRANCE: This is also our hope, Mr, Zhou Enlai is a senior and experienced premier and foreign minister. I am a new and inexperi- enced prime minister and foreign mjni~rer . So there are too many tltings to be handled. But I will try my best to establish a friendly relationship between France and China, and between France and Vietnam.

THE GEN EY A CONFERENCE May-July, 1954

I. BACKGROUND TO THE CONFERENCE

On Februar)' 18, 1954, a joint communique from Berlin issued by the United States, G reat Britain, the Soviet Union, and France announced that in late April the Big Four and other parties concerned would meet at Geneva to seek a peaceful solution of the eight-)'ear-old wa r in Indochina. Between those dates, the Western a llies e ngaged in a series of discussions centered around American proposals for direct intervention, while the Communist side-the USSR, Communist China (CPR), and the Viet Minh- worked to ensure that the)' would enter the forthcoming Geneva Conference from a position of strength.

The Eisenhower Administration found as much difficulty in persuad- ing France and Great Britain that fundamental changes in the war were necessary before the start of the conference as in accepting the notion of a negotiated solution in lndochjna. The troubles with France bad begun in mid-1953 when the U.S. Government gave its conditional approva l to the Navarre Plan, wh ich provided for radically new French field tactics and a buildup of the Vietnamese National Army (VNA). American hopes that assistance in money and war materiel would elicit a French commit- ment to a program to attract native Indochinese into close military and political collaboration with the colornia l governments, especially in Vietnam, were not fulliJled. Nor was France hospitable to American sug- gestions for greater involvement of the Military Advisor y Assistance Group (MAAG) in French planning. As was to be the case a lmost throughout the Indochina crisis, France capitalized on American fears of National Assembly rejection of the European Defense Community (EDCI

159

160 PART II: 195 3- 1954

treaty and of a French pull-our from Indochina to gain U.S. aid w ithout having to make commensurate concessions on Vietnamese independence or tactical planning. American attempts to tie aid to such concessions were never fo llowed thro ugh, and whatever leverage o n French policy-making in Indochina the Un ited Stares possessed was left largely unexploited.

For the most part, France's rejection of American condition.~ and sug- gestions was based on the Lanid government's conv iction, implemented zealously by French civil and military authorities in Indochina, that the United States would be intruding in France's domain. A policy of system- atic restrictions on American ,officials in the fie ld prevented the United States from making independent evaluations of rhe war's progress, with the result that rhe Government was for many months badly informed and unwarrantedly optimistic about the French Union army' s chances against the Viet Minh. In late March and April 1954, when it became clear ro Washington that the Navarre Plan had failed and that (in Secretary of State Dulles' words) "united action" was necessary to prevent Indochina from fa lling to the Communists, the French revealed that their distrust of American "interference" exrended ro any plans for overt American air- naval involvement. The Lanie! government was perfectly amenable to localized American intervention at Dienbienphu to save the besieged French a rmy from disaster; but it stood firmly opposed to Dulles' concept of collective (Western-Asian) defense in a secu riry o rganization that would, if necessary, intervene to prevent the "loss" of Indochina_ France's requests for assistance at Dienbienphu were entirely consistent with long- stancling policy in Paris that lo,oked to a negotiated senlement of the war on "honorable" terms at the same time as it hoped to be in the best pos- sible military position at the time negotiations began.

Opposition ro ;'united action" was no less stubborn in London. The British, like the French, were suspicious of American intentions in calling for that a lternative, though fo:r different reasons. To rhe Churchill gov- ernment, the United States, even while proclaiming a strong desire to avoid open conflict with Communist China, was tending precisely in that direction by insisting on the formation of a collective security pact prior to the start of the Geneva Conference. Eisenhower's letter to Churchill on April 4, 1954, could only have reinforced those suspicions, fo r the President described united action as an attempt to make China stop sup- porting the Viet Minh rather than face the prospect of large-scale allied

Th e G e n e va Co n fe r e nc e 161

involvement in Vietnam. Although the British were not asked to make substantial ground troop commitments to a united action, they fe lt that their approval would ultimately condone a widening of the wa r that wou ld risk bringing in the Chinese who, the British argued, could not possibly be expected to cease assistance they had been providing since 1950. London therefore told Dulles it would not approve united action and preferred to await the outcome of rhe negotiations before deciding whether the Indochina situation warranted resort to military alternatives. The British were perfectly willing to talk about regional defense in the Far East, but only after the results were in on the negotiations. Until then, they said, they would limit themselves t-0 providing full diplomatic sup- port to the French in search of a peaceful solution.

Differences among the a llies were therefore acute as the conference opened. The French had cleverly exploited the American assistance pro- gram without having brought in the Americans in full force, yet had also been unable to save Dienbienphu from being overrun on May 7. The British were felt in Washington to have been the primary obstacle to united action; they were accused of having been so blinded by their own self-interest in other areas of Southeast Asia that rhey fa iled to appreciate the vast strategic importance to the Free World of saving Indochina.

Contrasting Comm unist unity on the eve of the conference was more a matter of Sino-Soviet agreement on the desirability of negotiations than of complete accord among the three patties. In the aftermath of Stalin's death, Soviet fore ign policy under Ma lenkov had altered considerably. Domestic priorities no doubt influenced the regime's proclaimed hopes for a reduction in cnternational tension. Peking, more intimately involved in the Viet Minh cause, stepped up its assistance to General Giap's forces between February and April 1954, but also agreed with Moscow on the desirability of conveniI1g an international conference, which C hina would attend, tO end the fighting. The limited available evidence suggests that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRY) alone among the three Communist parties considered the call for negotiations prema- ture and urged that they be preceded by intensified military efforts. H o's much-publicized offer in late November 1953 to talk with the French was intended more to influence French d omestic and official opinion and to demoralize Franco-Vietnamese troops than tO evince sincere interest in a rriving at an equitable settlement. In ensuing months, DRV broadcasts showed a far greater interest in first achieving a clear-cut military victory

162 PART II: 1953-1954

in the Tonkin Delta and parts of Laos than in engaging in discussions while French forces remained scarrered throughout Indochina.

These developments, in very broad outline, provided the backdrop to the Geneva Conference. Srrengrh and weakness seemed ro be the respec- tive characteristics of the Communist and Western positions. Yet these terms a re, as we shall see, not entirely accurate, fo r the interaction between and within the two sides was to make clear that the Geneva Conference would not be the setting for a victor's peace.

IT. THE CONDUCT AND STRUCTURE OF DIPLOMACY

One of rhe first agreements reached at the Geneva Conference occurred in the course of a conversation between V. M. Molotov and Anthony Eden on May 5, when the Soviet foreign minister endorsed the foreign secretary's assertion that this negotiation was the most difficult he had ever encounte,red. Indeed, it seems at fusr glance somewhat paradoxical that the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference (May 8-July 21) should have resulted in a settlement within less than a dozen weeks, given the unusual difficulties facing the negotiators on both sides. Key issues were postponed until the eleventh hour w hile debate wore endlessly on over relatively insignificant matters; contact among the delegations was limited by ideological projudices and political antagonisms, fo rcing some delegates ro acr as mediators no less than as representatives of national interests; and major agreements were reached outside the special frame- work for discussions that the conferees had taken a month to build.

• • •

ill. TH£. DEVELOPMENT OF BARGAINING POSITIONS

A. The United States and the Negotiations

In underwririI1g the Navarre Plan and proceeding with utmost caution in urging France to improve its relationship with the non-Communist Vietnamese nationalists, the United States hoped ro influence Paris ro postpone a commitment to negotiations until French forces were at least on the threshold of military victory. \Vhile aware of the strong pressures on the Lanie! government from the National Assembly and the French public for a peaceful settlement, the United States, clearly influenced by the experience at Panmunjom, sought ro persuade the premier not to let

The Geneva Co11{ere11ce 163

the clamor fo r peace drive him 10 the bargaining table. As la te as December 1953 LanieJ agreed that Was.hington's aversion to premature negotiations was weU-advised; but two months later, at Berljn, his gov- ernment joined with the Soviet Union in calling for an international con- ference to end the Indocmna conflict. T he French government found it could no longer ignore anti-war sentiment at home without jeopardi2.ing its s urvival, while the Americans, however strongly opposed to bringing the war to rhe conference table with victory nowhere in sight and with Communjst China as a negotiating opponent, fe lt compelled to approve the Berlin decision if only to blunt the French threat of scuttling EDC.

Forced to go along with French preference for negotiating with the Comm unists, the United Stares remained unalterably pessimjstic about the probable results. This attitude was first set o ut fully by the J oint C hiefs of Staff in March 1954. (Doc. 23] The Chiefs examined the alter- natives to military victory and found them all infeasible or unacceptable to the United States. A ceasefire prior to a political settlement, the J CS paper states, "would, in a ll probability, lead to a political stalemate attended by a concurrent and irretrievable deterioration of the Franco- Viemamese military position," A coalition government would lead to Comm unis t control by keeping a ny outside assistance from preventing a seizure of power from w ithin. Partition, on the other hand, would mean recognizing Communist success by force of arms, ceding the key Tonlcin Delta to the communists, and, even if confined to only one of the three lndocrunese States, undercutting our containment policy in Asia.

The C hiefs also commented at some length on the difficult question of elections in Vietnam. They rook the position that even if elections could be held a long democratic lines (which they doubted), a Communist vic- tory would almost certain ly result because of Communist territorial conrrol, popular support, and superio r tactics:

Such factors as the prevalence of illiteracy, the lack of suitable educa•

tional media, and the absence of adequate communications in the oudy·

ing areas would render the holding of a truly represenrative plebiscite of

doubtful feasibility. The Communists 1 b y \1irrue of their superior capa·

bility in the fie ld of propaganda, could readily perverr che issue as 1,;,ing

a choice between national independence and French Colonial rule.

Furrhennore, it would be militarily infeasible to prevent widespre.ad

intimidation of \IOters by Communist partisans. While it is obviously

164 PART II: 195 3- 1954

impossible to make a dependable forecast as to the outcome of a free

election, current intelligence leads the Joint Chiefs to the belief that a

settlement based upon free el.ections would be attended by almost cer· rain loss of the Associated Stares to Communist conuol.

The JCS views, together w ith the recommendation that the United States not associate irsclf with any settlement that "would fai l to provide reasonably adequate assurance of the future political and territorial integrity of Indochina ... , " were approved by the Secretary of Defense on March 23.

The JCS position reflected Government policy, for in the remaining months before the Conference the United Stares privately stood opposed to any course of action other than full prosecution of the war. Dulles, speaking with French Ambassador H enri Bonner on April 3, reasoned that a negotiated settlement would lead only to face-saving fo rmulae for either a French or a Vier .Minh surrender. The Secretary termed a division of Indochina " impractical" and a coalition government the "beginning of disaster"; neither arrangement could prevent a French surrender. (Doc 27) The President himse If echoed this either-or approach. Writing to Churchill April 4, Eisenhower proposed: "There is no negotiated solu- tion of the lndochina problem which in essence would not be e.ither a face-saving device to cover a French surrender or a face -saving device to cover a Communist retirement." And, as already observed, it was pre- cisely ro bring about the latter-C hina's "discreet disengagement" from support of the Vier Minh-that the President wanted British cooperation in united actio n.

Concomitantly, the United Stares was concerned that a d isaster at Dienbienphu would propel the French into acceptance of an immediate, unsupervised cease-fire even before the conference was to begin. Dulles obtained assurances from Bida ult that the French would nor agree ro such a cease-fire. Bur the Secretary fo und the British less inflexible, with Eden dou bring the American ·view that a sudden cease-fire would lead either ro a massacre of rhe French by rhe native people or ro large-scale infiltration of French-held terrain by Vier Minh forces. [Doc, 37]

Thus assured by the French but mindful of both French and British preference for trying to bargain with rhe Communists before resorting to further military steps, Washington, in late April and ea rly May, sought tO develop guidelines for the American deJegarion. The National Security

The Geneva Conference 165

Council, less than a week before the opening conference session, carefully examined American a lternatives. Disturbed by what it regarded as peace• at-any-price thinking in Paris, the NSC urged the President ro decide nor to join the Geneva deliberations without assurance from France that it was nor preparing ro negotiate the surr ender of lndochina. Again, the Korean example was foremost: Comm unist tactics at Geneva, the NSC forecast, would likely resemble those at Panmunjom; a cease-fi re might be announced that the Communists would not comply with for lack of effective super vision; the French would wilt before the Communists' pre- dictable dilatory tactics and end by accepting almost any terms.

The NSC t herefor e decided t hat the French had to be pressured into adopting a strong posture in the face oi probable Comm unist intransi- gence. The President was urged to inform Paris that French acqu iescence in a Communist takeover of Indochina wou ld bear not only on France's future position in the Far East, but a lso on its status as one of the Big Three; that abandonment of lndochina would grievously affect both France's position in North Africa and Franco-U.S. relations in that region; that U.S. aid ro France would a utomatically cease upon Paris'

conclusion of an unsatisfactory settlement; and, finally, that Communist domination of Indochina would be of such serious strategic harm ro U.S. interests as ro produce "consequences in Europe as well as elsewhere [without] apparent limitation." ln addition, the NSC recomended that the United States determine immediately whether the Associated States should be approached w ith a view ro continuing the anti-Viet Minh struggle in some other for m, including unilateral American involvement " i f necessary." The NSC clearly viewed the l ndochina situation with extreme anxiety, and its action program amounted ro unprecedented proposals to threaten France with the serious repercussions of a sell-out in Southeast Asia.

Pessimism over the prospects fo r any meaningful progress in talks with the Communists was shared by Secretary Dulles. ln a background briefing fo r newsmen at Geneva, Dulles gave the first officia l indication for public consumptio n that the United Stares would dissociate i~elf from any settlement rather than be party ro unacceptable terms. As to the acceptability of partition, the Secr etary, un views that would change later, said he did nor see how partition could be ar ranged with the fighting not confined to any single area. He as much as ruled out a territorial division when he commented that the United States would only agree to an

166 PART II: 1953-1954

arrangement in which a ll the Viet Minh troops would be placed in a small regroupment area out of harm's way. Bue that arrangement " might not be acceptable to chem," Dulles said coyly.

American opinions on the likely ramifications of a settlement were also made known, and with greater precision, in private. On May 7, for instance, Livingston Merchant of the State Department presented the American view to the Ministers of New Zealand and Australia. Predicting that the French would finally settle for pare of Vietnam and manage co salvage Cambodia and Laos, Merchant said the United States could not accept such a surrender of territory. While we could not prevent the French from making concessions, neither did we have to associate o ur- selves with the results. Thus, both publicly and privately, Admin istration leaders indicated at the outset of the conference that the United States would divorce itself from any settlement that resulted in less than a com- plete French-Vietnamese victo~y.

The first test of U.S. policy came May 5 when the French informed Washington of the proposals they intended to make in the opening round of the Geneva talks on May 8. The proposals included a separation of the "civil war" in Vietnam from the Communist aggressions in Cambodia and Laos; a cease-fire, supervised by a well-staffed international author- ity (but not the UN) and followed by political discussions leading co free elections; the regrouping of regular forces of the belligerents into defined zones (as Lanie! had proposed in a speech on March 5) upon s ignature of a cease-fire agreement; the disarming of a ll irregula r forces (i.e., the Viet Minh guerrillas); and a guarantee of the agreements by "the States participating in the Geneva Conference."

The JCS were first co react to the French plan. The Chiefs strongly felt th at even if the Communises unexpectedly agreed co it, the li kely o ut- comes would still be either rapid French capitulation in the wake of the cease-fire or virtual French s urrender in the course of protracted political discussions. Once more, the Chiefs fell back on the Korean experience, which they said demonstrated the certainty that the Communises would violate any armistice controls, including those supervised by an interna- tional body. An agreement co refrain from new military activities during armistice negotiations would be a strong obstacle co Communist viola- tions; but the Communists, the JCS concluded, would never agree to such an arrangement. On the contrary, they were far more likely co intensify military operations so as to enhance their bargaining position, precisely

The Geneva Conference 16 7

ar rhe rime the French would seek ro reduce. operations ro a void raking casualties. The Chiefs therefore urged that the United Stares nor get trapped into backing a French armjstice proposal rhar the Communists, by voicing approva l, could use ro bind us ro a cease-fire while rhey them- selves ignored ir. The only way to ger satisfactory results was through mjlitary success, and since the Navarre Plan was no longer tenable, the next best a lternative was not ro associate the United States with any cease-fire in advance of a satisfactory political settlement. The first step, the Chiefs beljeved, should be the conclusion of a settlement that would "reasonably assure rhe political and rerrirorial inregrit)' of rhe Associated Stares ... "; only thereafter should a cease-fire be entertained.

As previously, rhe Joint C hiefs' position became U.S. policy wirh on ly minor emendations. The President, reviewing the C hiefs' paper, agreed that the Government could nor back rhe French proposal with irs call fo r a supervised cease-fire that the Com,munisrs would never respect. Eisenhower fu rther concurred w irh the C hiefs' insistence on priority ro a political settlement, with rhe stipulation that French fo rces continue fighting while negotiations were in progress. He added that the United States would continue aiding the French during that period and would , in addit ion, work toward a coal ition "for the purpose of prevenrmg fur - ther expansion of Communist power in Southeast Asia."

These statements of position paved the way for a National Security Council meeting on May 8, wluch ser forth the guidelines of U.S. policy on negotiations fo r the delegation ar Geneva. The decision taken ar the meeting simply underscored whar the President a nd the Chiefs had already stared:

The United States wiU nor associate itself with any proposal from any

source dlrecred toward a cease--fire in advance of an acceptable anuistice agreemenr, including international comroJs. The United Stares could con~

cur in the initiation of negotiations for sucb an armistice agreement. During the course of such negotiations, the French. and che Associaced Scares should

continue to oppose che forces of r:he Viet Minh wirh aU the means at their

disposal. In the meantime, as a means of STrengthening the hands of the

French and rhe Associared States during th.e course of such negotiations, the

Unfred Stares will continue its program of aid and its effort.~ co organize and prompdy activate a Soucheast Asian regional grouping for me purpose of

preventing funher expansion of C'.ommua.isc power in Southeast Asia.

168 PART II: 1953-1954

B. The Communist Proposals

Official American perspectives on the likely pattern of the Geneva negotiations were confirmed when the Vier Minh forwarded their first proposal "package" at the second plenary session on May 10. Pham Van Dong, then the DRV's vice-minister for foreign affairs and already a seasoned negotiator with the French, introd uced his case with the argument that the Viet Minh were the "sttonger" force in "more than three-fourths of the country." He went on to describe the successful administtation of this territory by his government, which he said "rep- resents the will of the entire Vietnamese nation The opposition, the Bao Dai regime, characterized as "the government of the temporarily occu- pied zone," did not enjoy popular support and was merely the too l of the French.

Pham Van Dong did not, however, demand that France concede control of all Vietnam tO the DRY. Instead, Dong urged that France recognize " the sovereignty and independence of Vietnam throughout the territory of Vietnam," a s tatement which amounted to a rejection of the Franco-Vietnamese treaties approved April 28 in Paris by Lanie! and Premier Nguyen 7r rung Vinh. The main points of Dong's proposal for a cease-fire and political settlement in Vietnam were as follows:

(1) Conclusion of an agreement on the withdrawal of a ll "foreign" (i.e., French) troops from the Associated States, to be preceded by the relocation of those troops to regroupment areas

(2) Convening of advisory conferences, to be composed of representa- tives of the "governments of both s ides," in each country of Indochina, w ith the objective of holding general elections leading to the establishment of unified governments

(3) Supervision of elections by loca l commissions (4 ) Prior to the establishment of unified governments, the carrying out

by the opposing parties of "the administtative functions in the distticts which w ill be [temporaril y] under their admin istration.

(5) Cease-fire in a ll lndochjna s upervised by mixed commissions com- posed of the belligerents, the t:ease-fire to take effect upon implenumtation of all other measures. No new forces or military equipment to be introduced into Indochina during the armistice

Th e G e n e va Co 11 {e r e 11c e 169

To placate the French, Dong asserted the DRV's readiness "to exam- ine the question of the entry of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam into the French Union ... "

The meaning of Dong's proposal was clear. A political settlement would precede a military agreement to a cease-fire rather than the reverse, whjch the French preferred. Somewhat irorucally, the Viet Minh position was in line with the American preference for giving priority to a political settlement; but the Viet Minh in effect proposed to stop fighting only when French troops had left Vietnam and a political process favorab le to the Communists had been set up. By fir-st getting rid of the French, and then substituting a ll-Vietnamese consultations for strict control and supervision of the cease-fire, the regroupment, a nd the general elections, the Viet Ntinh could legitimately expect a quick takeover of power from the relatively weak Vietnamese National Army, by then bereft of its French command structure. As Dong well knew, the relocation of French forces in the Tonkin Delta 10 a tighter perimeter was having, and would continue to have, major repercussions on VNA morale. Once the French could be persuaded to withdraw, the VNA would undoubtedly collapse under Vier Minh military pressure. Moreover, in as much as Dong's plan made no allowance fo r the disarming, much less the regrouping, of indig- enous forces on either side, the Viet Mnh would be militarily in a virtu- a lly unassailable position to control any genera l election that might be held. Dong's proposal, then, amounted to a request that the French aban- don Vietnam to a certain fate.

In the same speech, Dong made clear that the DRV's concern extended beyond Vietnam to Cambodia and Laos. By 1954, Viet Ntinh coordination with the Pathet Lao and Free Khmer " resistance forces" had been going on for at least three years, or since the forma l announce- ment on March 11, 1951, of formation of a Viet Minh-Free Khmer- Pathet Lao "National United Front." Viet Minh soldjers and cadres were active participants in the fighting there, w here they p rovided the hard core of the " resistance." In addition, forces under Genera l Vo Nguyen Giap had invaded Laos in April and December 1953, and Cambodia in April 1954 (a move w hich prompted a formal protest by the Roya l Khmer Government to the Secretary General of the UN on April 23). Viet Minh battalions were still active in both countries dur- ing May and J une, with greater priority given operations in Laos. Thus, Dong' s proposals on a settlement in Laos and Cambodia reflected not

170 PART II: 1953 - 1954

simply rhe DR V's assumption of the role of spokesman for the unrepre- sented Free Khmer and Pather Lao movements, bur also d irect Vier M;nh interests in those neighboring kingdoms.

Dong argued that the Pather Lao and Free Khmer forces enjoyed widespread popular support and controlled most of the territory of their respective countries. With cons;derable disronion of history (subsequently corrected by the Laotian and Cambodian delegates), Dong sought to demonstrate that the Pathet Lao and Free Khmer were de facto govern- ments carrying o ut "democratic reforms" in the areas their armies had "liberated." France was therefore advised to recognize the "sovereignry and independence" of those movements no less than of the DRY. French forces alone were ro withdraw from Cambodia and Laos; the Pather Lao and Free Khmer were nor "foreign " troops. The same election procedure offered for Vietnam, without neutral or international supervision, would, Dong proposed, rake place in Cambodia and Laos, thereby granting the Pathet Lao and Free Khmer a status equa l to that of the lawful govern- ments. And during the electoral process, Dong insisted on "conditions securing freedom of activity for patriotic parries, groups, and social orga- nizations • . • " agreement to which would have permitted various Communist fronts to function w ith impuniry. The inclusion of the Pathet Lao and Free Khmer in the DRV's settlement plan-in particular, the demand that they merited political and territorial recognition-very quickly brought the conference 10 a standstill and, much later, compelled the Soviets and Chinese to work against Vier M;nh ambitions.

C. The American Reaction

Pham Van Dong's opening gambit was clearly anathema 10 the Western delegations. Certainly, from the American srandpoim, his proposals mer none of the criteria fo r acceptability outlined by the National Security Council on May 8. Smith said as much at Gene,•a when he spoke on May IO and again at the third plenary session May 12. Accordingly, Smith did not wholeheartedly embrace Bidault' s proposals, for despite giving a general endorsement of the French plan, he departed from it at rwo important junctures. First, he declined to commit the United Stares in advance to a guarantee of the settlement despite Bidaulr' s call for all the participants 10 make such a guarantee; second, he proposed thar national elections in Vietnam be s upervised specifically by an international

The Geneva Co11{ere11ce 17 1

conumss1on " under United Nations auspices." As his speeches made clear, the United States bel ieved the UN should have rwo separate func - tions-overseeing not only the cease-fire but the elections as well. Both these points in Smith's remarks were to remain cardina l elements of American policy throughout the negotiations despite French (and Comrn unjst) efforts to induce their a lteration.

Entirely in keeping with Smith's position at the conference, as well as with the tenor of the Viet Minh proposals, Secrerary Dulles, on May 12, sent Snuth instructions intended to make the Unired States an influential, but unentangled and unobligated, participant. As Dulles phrased it, the Unired States was to be "an interested nation which, however, is neither a belliger- ent nor a principal in the negotiation." Its primary aim would be to:

help the nations of thar area [Indochina J peacefully to enjoy territorial int.egrit)' and political independence under stable and free govenmtents

w ith the opportunity to expand their economies, to realize tbeir legiti·

mate national aspirations, and co develop security through individual and collective defense against aggression, from within and wi[hout. This

implies char these people should 110/ be amalgamated into the Communist bloc of imperialistic dictatorship.

Accordingly, Smith was told, the Un ited States should not give its approval to any settlement or cease-fire "wrucb would have the effect of subverting the existing lawful governments of the three aforementioned states or of penna11e11tly impairing their territorial integrity or of placing in jeopardy the forces of the French Union of Indochina, or which other- w ise contravened the principles stated ... above." [Doc. 47]

The NSC decision of May 8, Smith's comments at the second and third plenary sessions, and Dulles' instructions on May 12 reveal the rigidity of the American position on a Geneva settlement. The Unjted States would not associate itself with any a r rangement that fa iled to pro- vide adequa tely for an internationally s upervised cease-fi re and national elections, that resulted in the partitioning of any of the Associated States, or that compromised the independence and territorial integrity of those States in any way. It would not interfere with French efforts to reach an agreement, but neither would it guarantee or other wise be placed in the position of seeming to support it if contrary to policy. Bedell Smjth was left free, in fact, to withdraw from the conference o r to restrict the

172 PART II: 1953 - 1954

American role to that of observer. [Doc. 47] The. rationale for this approach was clear enough: the United States, foreseeing inevitable pro- traction of negotiations by the Communists in the manner of Korea, would not be. party to a French cession of territory that would be the end result of the Communists' waiting game already begun by Pham Van Dong. Rather than passi,•ely accept that result, the United Stares would withdraw from active involvement in the proceedings, thereby leaving it with at least the freedom to take steps ro recapture the initiative (as by rolling back the Viet Minh at some future date) and the moral purity of having refused to condone the enslavement of more people behind the Iron Curtain. American policy toward negotiations at Geneva was there- fore in perfect harmony with the Eisenhower-DuUes global approach to dealing with the Communi.~t bloc.

Gloomy American conclusions about the conference, and no doubt the extravagant opening Communist demands, were intimately connect- ed with events on the battlefield. A&er the debacle at Dienbienphu on May 7, the French gradually shifted their forces from Laos and Cambodia into the Tonkin Delta, leaving behind weak Laotian and Cambodian national armies to cope with veteran Viet Minh banal ions, As the French sought to consolidate in northern Vietnam, the Viet M;nh pressed the attack, moving several banalions eastward from Dienbienphu. U.S. Army intelligence reported in late May, on the basis of French evalua- tions, that the Viet Minh were redeploying much faster than anticipated, to the point where of 35,000 troops originaUy in northwestern Tonkin only 2,000 remained. Ar the same time, two Viet Minh battalions stayed behind in Cambodia and another ten in Laos; and in both those coun- tries, American intelligence concluded that the Viet Minh position was so strong as to jeopardize the political no less than the military stability of the royal governments.

To thwart the Communist military threat in Vietnam, the French chief of staff, General Paul Ely, told General J. H. Trapnell , the MAAG chief (on May 30), that French forces were forming a new defensive perimeter along the HanoiHaiphong axis; but Ely made no effort to hide the touch-and-go nature: of French defensive capabilities during the rainy season already underway. This precarious situation was con- firmed by General Valluy of r.he French command staff. In a report in early June to U.S., British, Australian, and New Zealand chiefs of sraff assembled in Washington, Valluy held that the Delta was in danger of

The Geneva Co11{ere11ce 173

fa lling to the Communists, that neither Frenchmen nor Vietnamese would fig ht on in tbe south in that eventuality, and that only prompt a llied intervention could save the situation. [Doc. 53] American assess- ments merely echoed those provided by the French. A Nationa l Intelligence Estimate published J une 15 determined that French Union forces, despite a numerical advantage, faced defections on a mounting sca le tha t could become very large if the Vier Minh scored major victo- ries or if the French were believed (and Vietnamese suspicions were rife on this score in Hanoi a nd Sa igon) about to abandon Hanoi and por- tions of the Delta. In sum, the tenor of intelligence reports by French and American sources during this period (from early May through mid- J une) was that the Vier Minh armies were solidly entrenched in por- tions of Cambodia and Laos, were preparing for further advances in the Tonkin Delta, and, if the war were to continue beyond the rainy season, had the capability to des troy positions then being fort ified by French Union forces throughout northern Viernam.

The upshot of this military deterioration throughout much of Indochina was to reinforce the American conviction that the Communists, whi le making proposals at Geneva they knew would be unacceptable to the West, would drive ha rd for important battlefield gains that would thoroughly demoralize French Union troops and set the stage for their withdrawal southward, perhaps precipitating a general crisis of confi- dence in Indochina and a Vier Minh takeover by default. More clearly than earlier in the year, American officials now saw just how desperate the French really were, in part because French field commanders were being far more sincere about and open with information on the actual military situation. But the thickenjng gloom in Indochina no less than at Geneva did not give way to counsels of despa ir in Washington. The Government concluded 1101 that the goals it bad set for a settlement were unrealistic, but rather that the only way to attain them, as the President and the JCS had been saying, was through decisive mi~rary victory in conformity with rhe original united action proposal of March 29. While therefore maintaining its delegation at Geneva throughout the indecisive sessions of May ru1d June, the United Stares once again a lerted France to the possibility of a military a lternative to defeat under the pressure of Comm unist talk-fig ht tactics.

• • •

V. THE MAJOR ISSUES AT THE CONFERENCE, MAY-JUNE

Washington's sense that the conference had essentially gotten nowhere-a view which Smith and Dulles believed was shared by Eden, as already noted-was not entirely accurate; nor was it precisely the thinking of other delegations. Following the initial French and Viet Minh proposals of May 8 and JO, respectively, some progress bad in fact been made, although certainly not of an o rder that could have led any of the chief negotiators ro expect a quick settlement. As the conference moved a head, three major areas of contention emerged: the separation of belligerent fo rces, the establishment of a framework for political settlements in the three Indochinese states, and provision for effective control and supervi- sion of the cease-fire.

• • •

C. Control and Supervision

Painstakingly s low progress toward cease-fires and poljtical settlements fo r the Indochinese states also characterized the work of devising super- visory organs to oversee the implementation and preservation of the cease-fire. Yet here again, the Communist side was not so intransigent as to make agreement impossible.

Three separate but interrelated issues doirunated the cliscussions of control ru1d supervision at crus stage of the conference ru1d afterward. First, there was sharp disagreement over the structure of the supervisory organ: Should it consist solely of joint commissions composed of the bel- ligerents, or should it have supe rimposed above an international a uthority possessing decisionmaking power? Second, the composition of any super- visory organ other than the joint commissions was also hotly disputed: Given agreement to have "neutral" nations observe the truce, which nations might be considered "neutral"? Finally, if it were agreed that there should be a neutral control body, how would it clischarge its duties?

In the original Viet Minh proposals, implementation of the cease-fire was left to joint indigenous commissions, w ith no provision for higher, international s upervision. Veh.emenr French objections led to a second line of defense from the Communist side. At the fo urth plenary session (May 14), Molotov s uggeste-d the setting up of a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) such as existed in Korea, and said he

The Geneva Conference 175

did nor foresee any insurmountable problem in reaching agreement o n its membership. Bur Molotov's revis ion left much to be determined and, from the Western standpoint, much to be desired roo. Serious debate on the control and supervision problem did nor get underway until early June. Ar that time, Molotov expressl y rejected the American plan, supported by the Indochinese delegations and Grear Britain, ro have the United Nations supervise a cease-fire. 1-{e argued tbar the UN had noth- ing to do with the Geneva Conference, especially as moSt of the conferees were nor UN members. Returning to his plan for an NNSC, Molotov reiterated his view that Communist countries could be as neutra l as capitalist countries; hence, he said, the problem was simply one of choos- ing which countries shou ld comprise t he supervisory organ, and sug- gested that the yardstick be those having diplomatic and political rela- tions with both France and the Vier Minh. As to that body's relationship to the joint commissions, Molotov shied away from the Western pro- posal to make them subordinate to the n.eutral commission. "It wou ld be in the interest of our work to recognize," Molotov said, "that these com- missions should act in coordination and in agreement between each other, but should not be subordinate to each other." No such hierarchical relationship had existed in Korea, so why one in Indochina? Finally, the foreign minister saw no reason w hy an NNSC could nor reach decisions by unanimous vote on "important" questions. Disputes among o r within the commissions, Molotov concluded, would be referred to the states guaranteeing the settlement, which wou,ld, if necessary, take " collective measures" to resolve them.

The Western position was stared succinctly by Bidaulr. Again insisting on having "an a uthor ity remote from the hear of the fighting and which wou ld have a final word to say in disputes," Bidault sa id the neutral control commission should have absolute respon.sibiliry for the armistice. It would have such functions as regrouping the regular forces, supervis- ing any dem ilitarized zones, conducting. the exchange of prisoners, and implementiJ1g measures for the non-introduction of war materiel ,nro Indochina. While the joint commission would have an importam role to p lay in these control processes, such as in working out agreement for the safe passage of opposing armies from one zone to another or fo r POW exchange, irs functions would have ro be subordinate ro the undisputed a uthority of a neutral mechanism. Bidaulr did nor specify w hich nations fitted his definition of " neutraliry " and whether they would decide by

176 PART II: 1953 - 1954

majoriry or unanimous vore. These omissions were corrected by Eden a few days later wben he suggested the Colombo Powers (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia), which he argued were all Asian, had all been actively discussing Indochina outside the conference, were five in number and hence impervious to obstruction by a rwo-to-rwo ,·ore (as on the NNSC) or requirement for unanimity, and were truly impartial.

The basis for agreement on the vital question of supervising a cease- fire seemed at this stage nonexistent. The Communists had re,vised their position by admfrring tbe feas:ib iliry of a neutral nations' control organ in addition to joint commissions of the belligerents. But they clearly hoped to duplicate in Indocruna the ineffective machinery they had fo isted on the United Nations command at Parununjom, one in which effective peacekeeping action was basically proscribed by the built-in veto of a fo ur -power authority evenly divided among Communist and non-Communist representatives. The West, on the other hand, abso- lutely refused to experiment again with an NNSC; a neutral organ was vital, but it could not include Communist representatives, who did not know the meaning of neutrality. lf the United Nations was not acceptable to the Communists, the Colombo Powers should be.

However remote these positions, various kinds of trade-0ffs must have been apparent to the negotiators. Despite differing standards of "neutra lity" and "impartia lity," for instance, compromise on the me.rn- bersbip problem seemed possible. The real dilemma was the authoriry of a neutral body. Unless superior to the joint commissions, it wo uld never be able to resolve disputes, and unless it had the power to enforce its own decisions, it would never be more than a11 advisnry organ. Whether some new formula could be found somewhere between the Communists' insis- tence on parallel a uthority and the West' s preference fo r a hierarchical arrru1gement remained to be seen.

On June 19 the Korea phase of the conference ended without reaching a political settlement. The conferees at that point agreed to a prolonged recess by tbe delegation leaders on the understanding that tbe military committees would continue to meet at Geneva and in the fie ld. Eden wrote to the Asian Commonwealth prime ministers that "if the work of the committees is sufficiently advanced, the H eads of Delegations will come back. " Until that time, the work of the conference wou ld go on in restricted session. C ha uvel and Pham Van Dong remained at their poSts; Molotov returned to Moscow; C ho u En-lai, en route to Peking, made

Th e G e n e va Co n fe r e nc e 177

important stopovers in New Delhi, Rangoon, and Nanning thar were ro have important bearing on the conference. Smith remained in Geneva, but turned the delegation over ro Johnson. Ir was q uestionable w hether the Under Secretary would rake over again; gloom was so thick in Washingt0n over the perceived lack of progress in the talks and the con- viction' that the new Mendes-France government would reach a settle- ment as soon as the conference reconvened, that Dulles cabled Smith: " Our thinking at present is that our role at Geneva should soon be restricted t0 that of obser ver .... " [Poe 65] As for Eden, he prepared ro accompany Churchill on a trip t0 Washington for talks relating to the conference and prospects for a Southeast Asia defense pact.

VI. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT

With its preconceptions of Communist negotiating strategy confirmed by the harshness of the first Vier M inh proposals, which Washington did not regard as significantly watered down by subsequent Sino-Soviet altera- tions, and with its military alternatives no longer considered relevant ro the war, the United States begru1 to move in the direction of becoming an influentia l actor ar the negotiations. T his move was nor dictated by a sudden conviction that Western capacity for inducing concessions from the Communist side had increased; nor was the sh ift premised on the hope that we might be able to drive a wedge between the Viet Minh and their Soviet and C hinese friends. Rather, Washingt0n believed that inas- much as a settlement was certain to come about, and even though there was near-equal certainty it could nor support the final terms, basic American and Western interests in South.east Asia might still be preserved if France could be persuaded to roughen its stand. Were concessions still nor forthcom ing- were the Communists, in other words, to stiffen in response to French firmness- the Allies would be able tO consult on their next moves with the confidence ever y reasonable effort ro reestablish peace had been attempted.

As already observed, the American decisio n ro p lay a mo re decisive role at the conference depended on gaining British support. The changing wa r s ituation now made alignment with tbe British necessary for future regional defense, especia lJy as Wash ington was informed of the probabiJ- iry that a partition settlement ( which London had foreseen months before) would place a ll Indochina in or within reach of Communist

178 PART II: 1953 - 1954

hands. The q uestions remained how much territory the Communists could be granted without compromising non-Communist lndochjna's security, what measures were needed 10 guaramee that security, and what other military and political principles were vital to any settlemem which the French would also be willing 10 adopt in the negotiations. When the chief ministers of the United States and Great Brita in met in Washington in late June, these were the issues they had 10 confrom.

The British and American representatives-Eden, Churchill, DuUes, and Eisenhower-brought 10 the talks positions on partition and regional security that, for all the differences, left considerable room for a harmoni- zation of viewpoints. The UK, as the Americans well knew, was never convinced either that Indochina's security was inextricably linked to the securit)' of a ll Asia, or that the Franco-Viet Minh war would ever bring imo question the surrender of all Indochina to the Communists. London considered partition a feasib le solution, but was already looking beyond that to some more basic East-West understanding chat would have the effect of producing a laissez-faire coexistence between the Communist and Western powers in the region. As Eden recalled his thinking at the time, the best way of keeping Communism our of Southeast Asia while still provid- ing the necessary security withiin which free societies might evolve was to build a belt of neutral states assisted by the West. The Communists might not see any advantage 10 this arrangement, he admitted. But:

Lf we could bring about a siru:ation where che Communists believed thar

the.re was a balance of advantage to d1em in arranging a girdJe of neu-

craJ stares, we might ha\le the ingredients of a sertleme.nr.

Once the settlement was achieved, a system for guaranteeing the secu- rity of the neutral states thus formed would be requjred, Eden held. Collective defense, of the kind that would ensure action without unanim- ity among the contracting parties- a system "of the Locarno type"- seemed most reasonable co h.im . These poims, in broad outline, were those presented by him and Churchill.

The United States had from the beginning dismissed the viability of a partition solution. Dulles' public position in his major speech of March 29 that Communist control even of part of Indochina would merely be the prelude co coral domination was fully supported in private by both State and Defense. Nevertheiess, the Government early recognjzed the

The Geneva Co11{ere11ce 179

possibility chat partition, however distasteful, might be agreed co among the French and Communist negotiators. As a result, on May 5, the Defense Department drew up a settlement plan that included provision for a territorial division. As little of Vietnam as possible sho uld be yielded, Defense argued, w ith the demarcation line fixed in the north a nd "defined by some defensible geographic boundary (i.e., the Red o r Black Rivers, or the Annamite Mountains) ln accord with the French position chat evolved from the meeting of Mendes-France's cabinet on J une 24, Defense urged provision fo r a Vietnamese enclave in the Hanoi-Haiphong area or, a lternatively, internationalizat;on of the pore fac ilities these. Fairly well convinced, however, that partition would be frag ile, Defense a lso ca lled for "sanctions" against any form of Communist aggression in Laos, Cambod ia, or Thai land, and for allied agreement to united action in the event the Communises vio lated a cease-fire by conducting subver- sive activities in the non-Communist area of Vietnam.

The Defense proposal amounted co c,onta ining the Communist forces above the 20tl1 parallel while denying them sovereign access to the sea. This position went much further than chat of the French, who also favored a demarcation line geared ro military requirements bur were will· ing to settle on roughJy the 18th parallel. Moreover, when the five-power military staff conference met in Washington in early June, it reported (on the 9th) chat a line midway between the 17th and 18th parallels (from Thakhek in Laos westward to Dong Hoi on the north Vietnam seacoastl would be defensible in the event partition came about. [Qoc. 611 Undercutt ing the Defense plan still furth.er was the French disposition to yield on a n enclave in the Hanoi-Haiphong a rea were the Viet Minh to press for their own enclave in south ern Vietnam. As Chauvel told U. Alexis J ohnson, shou ld the choice come to a trade-off of enclaves o r a straight territorial division, the French preferred the latter. [Doc. 621 Thus, by mid-June, a combination of c;rcumstances made it evident to the Administration that some more flexib le position on the location of the partition line would have to be, and could be, adopted.

American acceptance of partition as a workable ar rangement put Washington and London on even terms. Similarly, on the matter of an overall security "umbrella" for Southeast Asia, the two a llies also fo und common ground. While the United Stares found " Locarno" an unfortu· nace term, the Government did not dispute the need co establish a vigor- o us defense mechanism capable of actin g despite objections by o ne or

180 PART II: 1953 - 1954

more members. Ir will be recalled that the NSC Planning Board, on May 19, had outlined three possible regional g roupings dependent upon the nature and timing of a serclement at Geneva. Now, in late June, cir- cum~tances dictated the advisability of concentrating on the "Group 2 " formula, in wruch the UK, the United Stares, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand would participate but not France ( unless it was decided that the pact would apply to lndochina). The concerned stares would exchange information, act as a un ited front against Communism, provide actual assistance to Asia n members against external attack or "Communist insurrection ," and make use of Asian facilities and/or forces in their defense assistance program.

American planning fo r what was to become SEA TO evinced concern, however, about the commitment of American forces in cases of O:immunist infiltration and subversion. As d,e Planning Board's paper notes, the role of the United Stares and other countries should be limited to support of the country requesting assistance; Asian member nations would be expected to "contribute facilities and, if possible, at least token military contingenr:s." The Board's paper did not represent a final policy statement; but it did reflect American reluctance, particularly on the part of the President and the Joint Chiefs, to have American forces drawn into the kind of local conllict the Administration had steered dear of in Vietnam. On this question of limiting the Western comminnent, the British, to judge from their hostility toward involvement against the Viet Minh, were also in general agree- ment.

Aside from partition and regional security, a basis also existed for agreement to assisting the French in their diplomatic work by the device of some carefully worded warning to the Commun ises. The British, before as well as after Dienbienphu, were firm ly against issuing threats to the Communists that involved military consequences. When united action had 6rst been broached, London rejected raising the threat of a nava l blockade and carrying it o ut if the C hinese continued to assist the Vier Minh. Again, when united action came up in private U.S.-French discussions during May, the British saw no useful purpose in seeking to influence discussions at Geneva by making it known to the Communists that united action would follow a breakdown in negotiations. The situa- tion was different now. Instead of threatening direct military action, London and Washington apparently agreed, the West cou ld profit from an open-ended warning tied to a lack of progress at Geneva. When Eden

The Geneva Co11{ere11ce 181

addressed the House of Commons on J une 23 prior to emplaning for Washington, he said: " It should be clear to a ll that the hopes of agreement [at Geneva] would be jeopardized if active military operations in Indochina were to be intensified while negotiations for an armistice are proceeding at Geneva. If chis reminder is needed, I hope that it may be heeded. • Eden was specifically thinking of a renewed Viet Minh offensive in the Delea, but was not saying what might happen once negotiations were placed in jeopardy.

This rype of warning was sounded again at the conclusion of the Anglo-American talks, and encouragement for it came from Paris. In the same aidememoire of June 26 in which the French Government had requested that the Un ited States counsel Saigon against a violent reaction co partition, Washington was a lso urged to join with London in a decla- ration. The declaration would "state in some fashion or other chat, if it is not possible to reach a reasonable settlement at the Geneva Conference, a serious aggravation of international relations would result [Doc. 661 The French suggestion was acted upon. Eisenhower and C hurchill issued a Statement on J une 29 char "if at Geneva the French Government is confronted with demands which prevent an acceptable agreement regard- ing Indochina, the international situation will be seriously aggravated." In retrospect, the statement may have had a n important bearing on the Communists' negotiating position- a point to which we shall return subseq uenrl y.

The joint Statement referred to "an acceptable agreement," and indeed the ramifications of that phrase constituted the main subject of the U.S.- UK talks. In an unpublicized agreement, the rwo governments concurred on a common set of principles which, if worked into the settlement terms, would enable both to "respect" the armistice. These principles, known subsequently as the Seven Points, were communicated to the French. A.~ reported by Eden, they were:

(1) Preservation ofrhe integrity and independence of Laos a11d Cambodia, and assurance of Vier Minh withdrawal from those countries

(2 ) Preservation of at least the southern ha lf of Vietnam, a nd if pos- sible. an enclave in the Delta, with the line of demarcation no fur - ther south than one running gene.rally west from Dong Hoi

(3) No restrictions on Laos, Cambodia, or retai ned Vietnam "materi- a lly impairing their capacity to mainta in stable non-Communist

182 PART II: 1953 - 1954

regimes; and especially restrictions impairing their right ro main- tain adequate forces for internal security, ro import arms and to employ foreign ad vise rs "

(4) No "political provisions which would risk loss of the retained area to Communist control "

(5) No provision that wou!d "exclude the possibility of the ultimate reunification of Vietnam by peaceful means"

(6) Provision for "the peac-eful and humane transfer, under interna- tional s upervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one zone to another of Viera am"

(7) Provision for "effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement."

The Seven Poinrs represented something of an American diplomatic victory when viewed in the context of the changed Administration posi- tion on partition. While any loss of territory to the Communists prede- termined the official American attitude toward the settlement- Eden was told the United States would almost certainly be unable to guarantee it- the terms agreed upon with rhe British were s ufficiently hard that, if pushed through by the French, they would bring about a tolerable arrangement for Indochina. The sticking point for Washington lay not in the terms but in the unlikelihood chat the British, any more than the French, would actually stand by them against the Communists. Thus, Dulles wrote: " ... we have th.e distiJ1ct impression that the British look upon this [memorandum of the Seven Points] merely as an optimum solution and chat they would rnot encourage the French to hold o ut for a solution as good as this ." T he Secretary observed that the British, during the talks, were unhappy about finding Washington ready only to " respect" the final terms reached at Geneva. They had preferred a stron- ger word, yet they "wanted to express these 7 poinrs merely as a 'hope' without any indication of firmuess on our part." The United States, quire aside from what was said in the Seven Poi11ts, "would nor want to be associated in any way with a settlement which fell materially short of the 7 point memorandum." [Doc. 70] Thus, the seven points, wh ile having finally bound the United States and Grear Britain to a common posit ion on the confe_rencc, did not a llay Washington's anxiety over British and French readiness to conclude a less-than-satisfactory settlement. The pos- sibi lity of a unilateral Americam withdrawal from the conference was still

The Geneva Co11{ere11ce 183

being "given consideration," Dulles reported, even as the Seven Points were agreed upon.

Despite reservations about our Allies' adherence to the Seven Points, the United States still hoped to get French approval of them. On July 6, Dillon telegraphed the French reaction as given him by Parodi, the secretary-general of the cabinet. With the exception of Point 5, denoting national elections, the French were in agreement. They were confused about an apparent conJlict between the elections provision and Point 4, under which political provisions, which would include elections, were not to risk loss of retained Vietnam. In addition, they, coo, felt American agreement merely to " respect» any agreement was too weak a term, and requested clarification of its meaning.

Dulles responded the next day Uuly 7) to both matters. Points 4 and 5 were not in conflict, he said. It was q uite possible that an agreement in line with the Seven Points might still not prevent Indochina from going Communist. The important thing, therefore, was co arrange for national elections in a way that would give the South Vietnamese a liberal breathing spell:

since undoubtedly true rhat elections might evenrualJy mean unification Viernam under Ho Chi Minh this makes it all more imponant they should be onl)1 he.Id as long aher cease-fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation to give democratic elements [in South Viemamj best chance. \Ve believe important chat no date should be set now and espe· ciaUy that no conditions should be accepted by French which would ha,•e

direct or indirect effect of preventing effective international supervision of

agreement ensuring political as well as military guarantees.

And so far as " respect» of that agreement was concerned, the Unjted States and Britain meant they "would not oppose a settlement which conformed to Seven Points .... It does not of course mean we would guarantee such settlement or that we would necessarily support it pub- licly. We consider 'respect' as strong a word as we can possibly employ in the circumstances .... ' Respect' would also mean chat we would not seek directly or indirectly ro upset settlement by force."

Dulles' clarification of the American position on elections in Vietnam, together with his delimitation of the nation's obligation towards a settle- ment, did not satisfy the French completely but sen•ed the important

184 PART II: 1953-1954

purpose. of enLlghrening them as 10 American intentions. Placed beside the discussions with Eden and Churchill, the thrust of American diplomacy at this time clearly was tO leave no question in the minds of our allies as 10 what we considered the elements in a reasonable Indochina settlement and what we would likel)' do once a settlement were achieved.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES

ON THE NEED TO INFORM DIEM ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS

2July 1954

SENT TO: Aillembassy PARIS 39

RPTD CNFO: Amembassy SAIGON 31 Amconsul GENEVA 9

REDEPTEL 4852, June 28; Saigon 2746; Gene,•a 489

It seems ro me that new Vietnamese Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, who has reputation of uncompromising nationalist, is quite in the dark about developments critically affecting country he is trying ro lead. \Y/e fear that if results of French negotiations with Communists are revealed ro him as a fair accompli, the very reaction French wish ro avoid will result.

You should therefore indicate our concern to the French and ascertain their own intentions with respect to consulting him or minimizing his resentment and their views with respect to plans and prospects for main- taining order in South Vietnam.

DULLES

185

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES

WITH TEXT OF A LETTER TO MENDES-FRANCE

10 July 1954

NIACT

SENT TO: AMEMB PARIS 127

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

LIJvilT DISTRIBUTION

7/10/54

Following is personal message from Secretary Dulles to Mendes-France which is to be delivered by Ambassador Dillon tO Mendes-France in per- son as promptly as possible as instructed by separate cable.

BEGIN TEXT: My dear Mr. President:

President Eisenhower (who has been ke:pt closely informed) and I have been greatly moved by your earnest re quest char I or General Bedell Smith should return nexr week to Geneva for what may be the conclu- sion of the Indochina phase of the Conference. I can assure you that our

187

188 PART II: 195 3- 1954

attitude in this respect is dictated by a desire to find the course which will best preserve the traditional fr iendship and cooperation of our countries and which will promote the goals of justice and human welfare and dignity to which our two nations have been traditionally dedicated. We a lso attach great value to preserving the united front of France, Great Britain and the United States whjch has during this postwar period so importantly served all three of us in o ur dea lings with the Communists.

What now concerns us is ithat we are very doubtful as to whether there is a united front in relation to Indochina, and we do not believe that the mere fact that the high representatives of the three nations physically reappear together at Geneva will serve as a substitute for a dear agree- ment on a joint position which includes agreement as to what will hap- pen if that position is not accepted by the Communisrs. We fea r that unless there is the reality of such a united front, the events at Geneva will expose differences under conditions which will only serve to accenruare them with consequent stram upon rhe relations between our two coun- tries greater than if the US does not reappear at Geneva in the person of General Smith or myself.

Beginning early last April the US worked intensively with the French Government and with that of Grear Britain in an effort to create a com- mon position of strength. This. did not prove possible. The reasons were understandable, and derived from fundamental causes which still subsist and inlluence the possibility of achieving at the present time a genuine "united front. "

During the talks of Prime Jvl.inisrer Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden with President Eisenhower and me, an effort was made to find a common position which might be acceptable ro the two of us and, we hoped, to the French Government. This was expressed in the seven-point memorandum of wh ich you are aware. I believe that r.rus represented a constructive contribution. However, I do nor yet feel that there is a united position in the sense that the tluee of us'would be prepared to stand firmly on this as a minimum acceptable solution and to see the negotiations break off and the warfare resume if this position was not accepted by rhe Communist side. We doubt very much that the Communisrs w ill in fact accept this seven-po int position unless they real- ize that the alternative is some common action upon which we have all agreed. So far, there is no such a lternative.

Telegram f r o m Dulles t o Me11d e s-Fra11ce 189

Unde.r these circumstances, we greatly fear that the seven points which constitute a minimum as far as the US is concerned will constitute merely an optimum solution so far as your Government and perhaps the UK are concerned, and char an armistice might be concluded on terms substantially less favorable than those we could respect.

We gather that there is already considerable French thinking in terms of the acceptability of departures from certain of the seven points. For example: Allowing Communist forces to remain in Northern Laos; accepting a Vietnam line of military demarcation considerably south of Donghoi; neutralizing and demilitarizing Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam so as to impair their capacity to maintain stable, non-Communist regimes; accepting elections so early and so ill-prepared and ill-supervised as to risk the loss of the entire area to C-0mmunism; accepting interna- tional supervision by a body which cannot be effective because it includes a Communist state which has veto power.

These are bur illustrations of a whittl;ng-away process, each stroke of which may in itself seem unessential, bur which cumulatively could pro- duce a result quite different from that envisaged by the seven points. Also, of course, rhere is rhe danger thar the same unacceptable result might come about through the Comml!lllist habit of using words in a double sense and destroying the significance of good principles with stul- tifying implementations.

We do not for a moment question the right of the French Government to exercise its own judgment in all of these respects. Indeed, we recognize thar the issues for France are so vital that the French Government has a duty ro exercise its own judgment. I bav-e from the beginning recognized the preponderant interest of your Government as representing the nation which has borne for so many years the burden of a cruel and costly war. However, my Government equally has the duty not to endorse a solution which would seem ro us to impair seriously certain principles which the US believes must, as far as it is concerned, be kept unimpaired, if our own struggle against Communism is to be successfully pursued. Ar the same time, we do not wish to put ourselves in the position where we would seem to be passing moral judgment upon French action or disas- sociating ourselves from the sett.lement at a moment and under circum- stances which might be unnecessarily dramatic.

Jr is also to be considered that if our conduct creates a certain uncer- tainty in the minds of the Communists, this might strengthen your hand

190 PART II: 195 3- 1954

more than our presence at Geneva in a form which would e,xpose probably to the world, and certainly to the Communisrs themselves, differences which the Communists would exploit to the discomfiture of aU three of us.

Under a ll these circumstances, it seems to us that the interests of both of our countries are best served by continuing for the time being the pres- ent type of US representation at Geneva. This consists of able and responsible persons who are in dose contact with the President and me.

U circumstances shou ld a lter so that it appeared that our common interests would be better served if higher ranking officials became our representatives, than we would be a lert to act accordingly.

It is because I am fully aware of the serious and solemn nature of the moment that I have gone into the matter at this considerable length. It is possible that by the first of the week, the Communist position will be sufficiently disclosed so that some of the answers to the forego ing queries can be foreseen. This might clarify in one sense o r another the thinking of us all.

In this connection, let me emphasize that it is our ardent hope that circumstances might become such that consistently with the foregoing either General Bedell Smith or I can personally come to Geneva and stand beside you.

END TEXT

DULLES

MINUTES OF ZHOU ENLAI'S MEETING WITH [PIERRE]

MENDES-FRANCE 17 July 1954

DESCRIPTION:

Zhou Enlai and Mendes-France discuss the defense organization of Southeast Asia. Enlai expresses concern that the United States intends to organize this group, and that increasing U.S. influence and a lliance will make restoration of peace in the region mearungless. Mendes-France responds that the Paris meeting did not consider this fo rmation of this a lliance and that he has no knowledge of U.S. intention to form this a lli• ance. The men a lso briefly discuss resolution of rwo other issues: how to draw the demarcation line and when to hold elections.

Time: Beginning at 4:45 p.m., 17 July I 954 Location: Mendes-France's Mansion Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, Wang Bingnan, and Dong Ningchua_n {transla tor) French participants: Pierre Mendes-France, Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guil lermaz, and one translator

Source: CFMA. Obtained by CWJHP and tran,lmed for C\VIHP by Li Xiaobing.

191

192 PART II: 1953 - 1954

ZHOU ENLA I: Our opinions are gradually getting closer now. We don't have much time, and we should reach some solutions quickly. At the present, the two issues that have been most debated are how to draw the [demarcation] line and when to hold elections. I talked to Mr. Prime Minister during the last two meetings [and said that] that we wanted to push the conference forward for a settlement. l Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.] Now rwo problems remain. The three-person talks tonight and the meeting between Mr. Prime Minister and Mr. Pham Van Dong should find some solutions. However, I'd like now to discuss another problem, that is, the so-called Southeast Asia Defense Pact.

After the Paris meeting, there is some recent propaganda that the United States intends to organize a Southeast Asian group, and that it also push the three countries in Indochina ro participate in the organiza- tion. That is much different from what Mr. Mendes-France, Mr. Eden, and I have been talking about. This problem causes us concern. Our wish is that a restoration of peace will be realized in Indochina, and that Laos and Cambodia will become peaceful, independent, fr iendly, and neutral countries, lf they join America's alliance and establish American bases, then the restoration of peace becomes meaningless. It will increase America's influence, and decrease the influence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This is not beneficial for the Indochinese people or the French people. According to our conversations in the past meetings, I think it shouldn't happen like this. But there are so many rumors out there, as if Paris has some kind of promise. Thus, I' d like to talk to Mr. Prime M;nis ter directly and frankly.

MENDES-FRANCE: I appreciate that Mr. Premier recalls our conver- sations in the p-asr meetings and intends to maintain a consistent stance. I also want to maintain my previous position.

After our two meetings, as Mr. Premier knows, there has been some development in the situation. Our deadline-I should say my deadline- is now coming soon. But we still face many difficulties.

(Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC M;nistry of Foreign Affairs.)

ZHOU ENLAI: I can't talk about this issue in detail. It should be dealt with direcdy by Mr. Pham Van Dong and Mr. Prime Minister.

Zhou Enlai ' s Meeti1tg with [ Pierre/ Me11des-Fra11ce 193

Mr. Prime Minister had said that the c urrent problems are nor o nly ro draw the line, bur also incl uding the political problems. I have told this to Mr. Pham Van Dong and Mr. [Vyacheslavj Molotov. I guess that it may be easier to solve rhe rwo problems if we can connect them together. Tonight's meeting may bring us some resu lts.

MENDES-FRANCE: I can now respond ro Mr. Premier's concerns about the Southeast Asia alliance. I think it unnecessary for Mr. Premier ro worry about this. The Paris meeting did nor consider any kind of Southeast Asia a lliance to include the three countries of Indochina. As far as I know, the United Stares does nor intend to establish any military bases in Indochina. Therefore we don't need ro worry about any change to our previous position in the past mee-rings. Certainly, if rhe war can't be stopped, it will be a different story. If the cease-fire becomes a realiry, some country may come up with its own separate statement ro strengthen its original position. Nevertheless, I want to assure Mr. Premier that we do nor consider a ny SoutheaSt Asia alliance to include the three countries of lndochina. Please trust me, this is my word without any reservation.

ZHOU ENLAI: Thank you fo r your explanation. What we hope to see is the expansion of a peaceful region. If the United States fixes a Southeast Asia pact, including the three. countries of Indochina, then, all of our efforts ro push these compromises will become fruitless. That is why I wa nt to mention my concerns.

MENDES-FRANCE: The best way ro consolidate future peace is ro solve the current problems reasonably. If Laos can be an example, we hope that Laos can join the French Union, and that it won't sign any military pact with other countries. Following the regulations under the France-Laos agreements, no foreign military base ca n be eStablished there. But Laos' problems remain unresolved. The Vietnamese govern- ment put forward some unrea listic requests. They suggested their regrouping area stretch from north ro south nearly 1,000 kilometers. It is difficult to accept. I hope Mr. Premier can give Mr. Pham Van Dong some ad vice as you did on many occasions a nd ask him to make more realistic considerations.

ZHOU ENLA I: It is proper ro discuss the Laos problems with Vietnam's problems such as drawing the (demarcation] line and (when ro hold[ elections. We have read the draft of the second political statement of the French delegation. We think it should include these issues, such as

194 PART II: 1953 - 1954

non-establishment of foreign military bases and no military a lliances with foreign countries. I have mentioned this in my speeches on 16 and 19 June. Otherwise, there won't be any guarantee.

It is said that French militaey representatives have drafted a cease- fire proposal for Laos. [The proposal] requests that, after foreign troops withdraw, local resistance forces should regroup at certain points. Vietnam, however, asks for some pre-determined areas for the regroup- ing of the resistance forces, instead of regrouping at [certain] points. I think chat the military staff through their negotiations can solve this problem. Moreover, chis also relates to the problem of drawing the (demarcationj line in Vietnam. My hope is chat Mr. Mendes-France can talk directly to Mr. Pham Van Dong again. The three-person meeting tonight may a lso discuss chis problem.

MENDES-FRANCE: I have asked the staff of tbe French delegation to contact the staff of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. H opefully, there will be some progress. Of course, the meeting with the two presidents tonight is a lso very important for me.

Mr. Chauvel said a little while ago chat the French delegation staff had suggested to the staff of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's delegation (that France and the DRY should] work together and draft a political statement based on common ground . However, this task is somehow suspended right now. Hopefull.y, Mr. Pham Van Dong can give a push to this cask.

ZHOU ENLAI: Besides political issues, the discussions over the cease- fire should also identify some of the main common points that may pro- duce an agreement. Otherwise, the whole package of the truce agreement can't be put together overnight as a booklet.

MENDES-FRANCE: I fully agree with such an idea.

ZHOU ENLAI: Today is the 17th. It will be a success only if some agree- ments can be achieved on the major issues within the next two days.

MENDES- FRANCE: I am very glad to hear this word. I fully agree.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE FRANCO-VIET MINH WAR

1950- 1954

FOREWORD

This portion of the study treats U.S. policy towards the war in Indochina from the U.S. decision to recognize the Vietnamese Nationalist regime of the Emperor Bao Dai in February, 1950, through the U.S. deliberations on military intervention in late 1953 and early 1954.

SUMMARY

It has been argued that even as the U.S. began s upporting the French in lndochina, the U.S. missed opportunities to bring peace, stability and independence to Vietnam. The issues arise from the belief on the part of some critics that (a) the U.S. made no attempt co seek out and support a democratic-nationalis t alternative in Vietnam; and (b) the U.S. com- manded, but did not use, leverage to move the French toward granting genuine Vietnamese independence.

U.S. Policy and the Bao Dai Regime

The record shows that through 1953, the French pursued a policy which was based on military victory and excluded meaningful negotiations with Ho Chi Minh. The French did, however, recognize the requirement for an alternative focus for Vietnamese nationalist aspirations, and from l 947 forwa rd, advanced the "Bao Dai solution." The record shows that the

195

196 PART II: 1953 - 1954

U.S. was hesitant through 1949 to endorse the "Bao Dai solution" until Vietnam was in facr unified and granted autonomy and did consistently support the creation of a genuinely independent, noncommunist Vietnamese government ro supplant French rule. Nonetheless, the fall of Cllina and the deteriorating French military pasition in Indochina caused both France and the U.S. ro press tlte " Bao Dai solution." In early 1950, after French ratification of the Elysee Agreement granting "Vietnam's indepen- dence," the U.S. recognized Bao Dai and initiated military and economic aid, even before transfer of governmental power actually occurred. Thereafter, the French yielded control only pro forma, while the Emperor Bao Dai adopted a retiring, passive role, and turned his government over to discreditable politicians . The Bao Dai regime was neither popular nor efficient, and its army, dependent on French leadership, was powerless. The impotence of the Bao Dai regime, the lack of any perceptible alterna- tives (except for the communists), the fact of continued French authority and control over the GVN, the fact that the French alone seemed able to contain communism in lndocltina-aU these constrained U.S. promptings for a democratic-nationalist government in Vietnam.

Leverage: France had More Than the United States

The U.S.-French ties in Europe (NATO, Marshall Plan, Mutual Defense Assistance Program) only marginally strengthened U.S. urgings that France make concessions to Vietnamese nationalism. Any leverage from these sources was severely limited by the broader considerations of U.S. policy for the containment of communism in Europe and Asia. NA TO and the Marshall Plan were ot themselves judged to be essential to our European interests. To threaten France with economic and military sanc- tions in Europe in order to have it alter its policy in Indochina was, therefore, not plaus ible. Similarly, to reduce the level of military assistance to the French effort in Indochina would have been counter-productive, since it would have led to a further deterioration in the French military position there. In other words., the.re was a basic incompatibility in the two strands of U.S. policy: (1) Washington wanted France to fight the anti-corrununist war and win, preferably with U.S. guidance and advice; and (2) Washington expected the French, when battlefield vicrory was assured, to magnanimously withdraw from Indochina. For France, which was probably fighting more a colonial than an anti-communist war, and

U.S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 19 7

which had to consider the effects of withdrawal on colonial holdings in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, magnanimous withdrawal was nor too Jjkely.

France, having no such poJjcy incompatibilities, could and did pursue a consistent course with the stronger bargaining hand. Thus, the French were able to resist pressures from Waslungton and through the MAAG in Saigon to create a truly Vietnamese army, to grant the Vietnamese more local autonomy and to wage the war more effectively. MAAG was rele- gated to a supply function and its occasional admonitions to the French were interpreted by them as interference in their internal affairs. Even though by 1954, the U.S. was financing 78% of the costs of the war, the French retained full control of the dispensation of military assistance and of the intelligence and planning aspects of the military struggle. The expectation of French victory over the Vier Minh encouraged the U.S. to "go along" with Paris until the conclusion of the war. Moreover, the U.S. was reluctant to antagonize the French because of the high priority given in Washington's planning to French participation in the European Defense Community. France, therefore, bad considerable leverage and, unless the U.S. supported Paris on its own terms, tine French could, and indeed did, threaten not to join the EDC and to stop fighting in b1docbi11a.

Perceptions of the Communist Threat to Southeast Asia and to Basic U.S. lntcrcsts

American thinking and policy-making was dominated by the tendency co view communism in monolithic terms. The Viet Minh was, therefore, seen as part of the Southeast Asia manifestation of the world-wide com- munist expansionary movement. French resistance to Ho Chi lvLinb, in turn, was thought to be a crucial link in ·the containment of communism. This strategic perception of the communjst threat was supported by the espousal of the domino principle: the loss of a single nation in Southeast Asia to communism would inexorably lead to the other nations of the area falling under communist control. The domino principle, which probably had its origin at the time of the Nationalist withdrawal from mainland China, was at the root of U.S.. policy. Although elements of a domino-like theory could be found in NSC papers before the sta rt of the Korean War, the Chinese intervention in Korea was thought to be an ominous confirmation of its validity. The possibiliry of a large-scale

198 PART II: 1953 - 1954

Chinese intervention in Indochina, similar to chat in Korea, was feared, especia lly after the armistice in Korea.

The Eisenhower Administration followed the basic policy of its prede- cessor, but also deepened the American commitment to containment in Asia. Secretary Dulles purs ued a forthright, anti-communist policy and made it dear that he would not permit the " loss" of Indochina, in the manner the Democrats had allegedly a llowed the " loss" of China. Dulles warned China nor to intervene, and urged the French to drive toward a military victory. Dulles was opposed to a cease-fire and tried to dissuade the French from negotiations with the Vier M inh unti l they had mark- edly improved their bargaining: position through action on the battlefield. The NSC in early 1954 was persuaded char a non-communist coalition regime would eventually turn the country over ro the Vier Mirth. ln con- sequence of this more militant policy, the U.S. Government tended ro focus on the milita ry rather than the political aspects of the French-Vier Minh struggle.

Among the more frequently cited misapprehens ions concerning U.S. policy in Vietnam is the view that the Eisenhower Admin istration flatly rejected inrervcncion in the First Indochina War. The record shows plainly that the U.S. did seriously consider intervention, and advocated it 10 the U.K. a nd other a lljes. With the intensification of the French-Viet Minh war and the deterioration of the French military position, the United Stares was forced to take a position on: first, a possible U.S. mili- tary intervention in order ro avert a Viet M.inh victory; second, the increasingly likely contingency of negotiations between Paris and Ho Chi M;nh 10 end the war through a political settlement. In o rder 10 avoid a French sell-out, and as an alternative to unilateral U.S. intervention, the U.S. proposed in 1954 to broaden the war by involving a number of allies in a collective defense effort through ''united action."

The Intcragcncy Debate Over U.S. Intervention In Indochina

The U.S. Government internal debate on the question of intervention cen- tered essentially on the desirab ility and feasibility of U.S. military action. Indochina's importance to U.S. security interests in the Far East was taken for granted. The Eisenhower Administration followed in general terms the rationale for American interest in Indochina that was expressed by the Truman Administration. Wit h respect to intervention, the Truman

U . S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 199

Administration's NSC 124 of February 1952 recognized char the U.S. might be forced to take some military ac:tion in order to prevent the sub- version of Southeast Asia. In late 1953-early 1954, as the fall of lndochina seemed imminent, the question of intervention came ro the fore. The Defense Department pressed for a derermittation by highest a uthority of the size and nature of the forces the U.S. was willing to commit in lndochina. Some in DOD questioned the then operating assumption that U.S. air and naval forces would suffice as aid for the French. The Army was particularly concerned about contingency planning that assumed that U.S. air and naval action a lone could bring military victory, and argued for realistic estimates of requisite land forces, including the degree of mobilization that would be necessary. The State Department thought that lndochina was so critica l from a foreign policy viewpoint that interven- tion might be necessary. But DO D and the JCS, estimating that air-naval action alone could not srem the s urging Viet Nlinh, recommended that rather than intervening directly, the U.S. should concentrate on urging Paris to train an expanded indigenous army, and should exert all possible pressures-in Europe as well as in Asia -co motivate the French to fight hard for a milirary victory, Many in the U.S. Government (the Ridgway Report stands out in chis group) were wary chat U.S. intervention might provoke C hinese Corrm1unisr intervention. ln the: latter case, even a considerable U.S. deployment of ground forces would not be able to seem the tide in lndoc:hina. A number of special high-level studies were unable ro bridge the evident disparity between chose who held char viral U.S. interest.~ were at stake in lndochina, and chose who we,e unwilling co make a 6nn deci- sion to intervene with U.S. ground forces to assure those interests. Consequently, when the French began pressing for U.S. intervention at Dien Bien Phu, the Eisenhower Administration took the position that rhe U.S. would not intervene unilaterally, but only in concert with a number of European and Far Eastern allies as pa rt of a combined force.

The Attempt 10 Organize "United Action "

This "unjced action" proposal, anno unced publicly by Secretary Dulles on March 29, 1954, was a lso designed co offer rhe Frenc:h an alternative co s urrender at the negotiating table. Negotiations for a political settle- ment of the Franco-Vier Minh war, however, were assured when the Big Four Foreign Ministers meeting in February ar Berlin placed Indochina

200 PART II: 1953-1954

on the agenda of the impending Geneva Conference. Foreign Minister Bidault insisted upon this, over U.S. objections, because of the mounting pressure in France for an end to the seemjngly interminable and costly war. The "peace faction" in Paris became stronger in proportion ro the "peace feelers" let out by Ho Chi Minh, and the lack of French success on the battlefield. U.S. policy was to steer the French away from negotia- tions because of the fear that lndochina would thereby be handed over ro the communist "empire. "

Secretary Dulles envisaged a ten-nation collective defense force to rake "united action" 10 prevent a French defeat-if necessary before the Geneva Conference. Dulles and Admiral Radford were, at first, inclined towards an early urulateral intervention at Dien Bien Phu, as requested by the French (the so-called "Operation Vulture" ). But Congressional leaders indicated they would nor support U.S. militaq• action without active allied participation, and President Eisenhower decided that he would not intervene without Congressiornal approval. In addition to allied partici- pation, Congressional approval was deemed dependent upon a public declaration by France that it was speeding up the timetable for indepen- dence for the Associated Stares.

The U.S. was unable to gather much support for "united action" except in Thailand and the Philippines. The British response was one of hesitation in general, and flat opposition to undertaking military action before the Geneva Conference. Eden feared that it would lead to an expansion of the war with a high risk of Chinese intervention. Moreover, the British questioned both the U.S. domino principle, and the belief that lndoch.ina would be totally lost at Dien Bien Phu and through negotia- tions at Geneva. As for the French, they were less interested in "united action" than in immediate LJ_S. military assistance at Dien Bien Phu. Paris feared that united action would lead to the internationalization of the war, and rake control out of its hands. la addition, it would impede or delay the very negotiations leading towards a settlement which the French increasingly desired. But repeated French requests for direct U.S. intervention during the final agony of Dien Bien Phu failed to alter President Eisenhower's conviction that it would be an error for the U.S. 10 act alone.

Following the fall of Dien Bien Phu during the Geneva Conference, the "domino theory" underwent a reappraisal. On a May 11 press con- ference, Secretary Dulles observed that "Southeast Asia could be secured

U.S. l11 vo lv e me111 ;,, th e Fra11c o -Vi e t Mi1th \Var 201

even without, perhaps, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia." In a further remark that was deleted from the official transcript, Dulles said that Laos and Cambodia were " important but by no means essential" because they were poor countries with meager populations.

(End of Summary)

I. U.S. POLICY AND THE BAO DAI REGIME

A. The Bao Dai Solution

1. The French Predicametrf

French perceptions of the conflict which broke out in December, 1946, between their forces in Indochina and the Vier Minh forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (ORV) began to alternate between boundless optimism and unbridled gloom. In May, 1947, /vLinister of War Coste-Floret announced in Paris rhar: "There is no military problem any longer in Indochina ... the success of French arms is complete." Within six months, though ambitious armored, amphibious, and air- borne drives had plunged into the northern mountains and along the Annam coast, Vier Minh sabotage and raids along lines of communica- tion had mounted steadily, and Paris had come to realize rhat France had losr the military initiative. In the meantime, the French launched political forays similarly ambitious and equally unproductive. Leon Pignon, political adviser ro the French Commander in Indochina, and later High Commissioner, wrote. in January, 1947, that:

Our objective is clear: to transpose co the field of Vietnamese domestic

politics the quarrel we have with the Viet Minh, and ro involve our~

selves as little as possible in rhe campaigns and reprisals which ought to

b., the work of the narive adversaries of that parry.

Within a month, an emissary journeyed into the jungle to deliver to Ho Chi Minh' s government demands tantamount to unconditional sur- render. About the same time, French representatives approached Bao Dai, the former Emperor of Annam, with proposals that he undertake to form a Vietnamese government as an alternate to Ho Chi Minh' s. Being unable to force a military resolution, and having foreclosed meaningful

202 PART II: 1953-1954

negotiations with Ho, the French turned to Bao Dai as their sole prospect fo r extrication &om the growing dilemma in Vietnam.

2. The Ha Long Bay Agreement, 1948 Bao Dai's mandarinal court in Hue, Annam, had been little more than an instrument of French colorua l policy, and-after the occupation by J apan- Of Japanese poliq•. Bao Dai had become Emperor at the age of 12, in 1925, but did not actually ascend the throne until I 932, after education in France. In August, 1945, when the Viet Minh arrived in H ue, he abdi- cated in favor of Ho's Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and accepted the post of "Supreme Adviser" to the new state. In 1946, he left Vietnam, and went to Hong Kong. There, he found himself solicited not only by French representatives, bur by the ORV, who sought him to act on their behalf with the French.

Bao Dai attempted at first to maintain a central position between the two protagonists, but was soon persuaded to decline the Viet Minh over- rures by non-Communist nationalists. A group of these, including mem- bers of the Cao Dai, H oa Hao, Dong Minh Hoi, Dai Vet, and the VNQDD formed a National Union, and declared support for Bao Dai. One authority termed the National Union "a frag ile coalition of discred- ited collaborators, ambitious masters of intrigue, incompetent sectarians, and a smattering of honest leaders without a following. " Among the lat- ter were Ngo Dinh Diem, wbo "for the first and only time, joined a pa"rry of which he was not the founder," and pledged to back the Emperor so long as he pursued independence for Vietnam. Now, having eliminated the Viet Minh support option", Bao Dai became more compliant in his discussions with the French, and the French became correspondingly stiffer in their attitude toward the Viet Minh. Yet, little came of the talks. On December 7, 1947, aboard a French warship in Ha Long Bay, Bao Dai signed an accord with the French, committing the French to Vietnamese political independence so minimally that it was promptly condemned not only by Diem, but a lso by more opportunistic colleagues in the National Union. Bao Dai, in what might have been a political withdrawal, removed himself from the developing intrigue, and Red to European pleasure centers for a four month jaunt which earned him the sobriquet "night club emperor. "

The French, despite lack of cooperation from their elusive Vietnamese principal, sent diplomats to pursue Bao Dai and publicized their resolve

U.S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 203

"to carry on, out.~ide the Ho Chi Minh Government, all activities and negotiations necessary for the restoration of peace and freedom in the Vietnamese countries"- in effect, committing themselves to military vic- tory and Bao Dai. French persistence eventually persuaded Bao Dai to return to Hong Kong, to endorse the formation of a Vietnamese national government prior tO independence, and finally, to returo to Vietnam as the Head of State. French negotiating pressures on him and the National Union included both spurious "leaks" of Franco-Viet Minh settlement talks, and further assurances of intentions to grant Vietnamese autonomy. On June 5, 1948, Bao Dai witnessed the signing of another Bay of Ha Long Agreement. Thereby, France publicly and "solemnly" recognized the independence of Vietnam-but specifically retained control over for- eign relations and the Army, and deferred transfer of other governmental functions to future negotiations; no authority was in fact transferred to the Vietnamese. Agrun Bao Dai retired to Europe, while in Hanoi the French assembled a transparently impotent semblance of native govern- ment. A second summer of war passed in 1948 without dispelling the military miasma over Indochina, and without making the "Bao Dai solu- tion" any less repugnant among Vietnamese patriots, Opposition to ir began to mount among French Leftists. This disenchantment, combi11ed with a spreading acceptance of the strategic view that the Franco-Viet Minh war was a key anti-Communist soruggle, influenced French leaders to liberalize their approach to the " Bao Dai solution."

3. Elysee Agreement, 1949 On March 8, 1949, after months of negotiations, French President Auriol, in an exchange of letters with Bao Dai, reconfirmed independence for Vietnam as an Associated State of the French Union and detailed procedures for unifying Vietnam and pla.ci11g it under Vietnamese admin- istration. Nonetheless, in the Elysee Agreement, France yielded control of neither Vietnam's army nor its foreign relations, and again postponed arrangements for virtually all other aspects of autonomy. However, Bao Dai, apparently convinced that France was now sufficiently desperate in lndochina that it would have 10 honor the Agreements, declared that:

.. . An era of reconstruction and reno\lation will open in Viemam. The country will be given democratic insrirutions that will be called on primarily to approve the presenr agreement . . .. Profound economic and

204 PART II: 1953 - 1954

social reforms will be instituted ro raise the general standard of li\ling and ro promote social justice, which is che condition and guarantee of

order . .. II look forl the union of all Vietnamese regardless of their

politicaJ and religious tendencies, and the generous supporr of France

on which I can count

His public Stance notwithstanding, Bao Dai delayed his return to Vietnam until a Cochinchinese Assembly had been elected (albeit in a farce of an election), and clid. not proceed to Saigon until the French Assembly had approved Cochimchina's joining the rest of Vietnam. ln late June, 1949, Vietnam was lega.lly united under Bao Dai, but the related alteration of administrative functions was slow, and usually only pro fo rma; no genuine power or authority was turned ove.r to the Vietnamese. The State of Vietnam became a camouAage for continued French rule in Indochina. As Bao Dai himself characterized the situation in 1950, "What they call a Bao Dai solution turned our to be just a French solution .... The situation in Indochina is getting worse every day ... "

4. Bao Dai's Govemments The unsavory elements of the coalition supporting Bao Dai dominated his regime. Ngo Dinh Diem and a few other upright narionaliStS refused high government poses, and w;thdrew the.ir support from Bao Dai when their expectations of autonomy were disappointed. Diem's public state- ment criticized the probity of those who did accept office:

The national aspirations of the Vietnamese people will be satisfied only

on the day when our nation obtains rhe same political regime which

India and Pakistan enjoy ... I believe it is only just to reserve the besr posts in che new Viemam for those who have deserved bes't of the coun-

try; I speak of those who resist .

However, far from looking co the "resistance," Bao Dai chose his leaders from among men with srrong identification with France, often men of great and dubious wealth, or with ties with the sub-worlds of French neo-mercamilism and Viet vice. None commanded a popular fo llowing. General Georges Revers, Chief of Sta.ff of the French Army, who was sent to Vietnam to appraise the s ituation in May and June, 1949, wrote that:

U.S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 205

If Ho Chi Minh has been able co hold off French inrervention for so

long, ir is because the Vier Minh leader has surrounded himself with a

group of men of incontestable worth . .. [Bao Dai, by contrast, had J a government composed of rwency representatives of phantom parties, the

best organized of which would have difficuky in rallying rwemy-five

adherents.

Bao Dai himself did next to nothing: to make his government either more representative or more efficient. He divided his time among the pleasures of the resort towns of Dalat, Nina Trang, and Banmethuout, and for all practical purposes, remained outs,ide the process of government.

An American diplomat serving in Vietnam at the time who knew Bao Dai well, characterized ltim in these terms:

Bao Dai, above all, was an interngem man. lnreJlecrually, he could dis-

cuss the complex details of the various agreements and of rhe whole

involved relationship with France as well as or better rhan anyone I

knew. But he was a man who was crippled by his French upbringing.

His manner was too impassive. He allowed himself to be so.Id by the French on an erroneous instead of a valid evolutionary concept. and this

suited his own termperament. He was too congenial, and he was almost

parhologically shy, which was one reason he always liked ro wear dark

glasses. He would go through depressive cycles, and when he was

depressed, he would dress himself in Vietnamese dorhes instead of European ones, and would mjnce no words about the French. His

policy, he said to me on one of these dour occasions~ was one of "'gri-

gnotage," or "nibbling," and he was painfully aware of it. The French,

of course, were never happy that we Americans had good relations with

Bao Dai, and tbey told ltim so. Unfortunately, they also ltad some black-

mail on him, about his relationship with: gambling emerprises in Saigon

and his love of the ffeshpots.

Wltate,•er his virtues, Bao Dai was not a man who could earn the fealty of the Vietnamese peasants. He could not even hold the loyalry of honest nationalists, one of whom, for example, was Dr. Phan Quang Dan-a prominent and able non-Communist leader and early supporter of the. "solutiont and a personal friend of Bao Dai-(Dr. Dan later was

206 PART II: 1953 - 1954

the opposition leader of the Diem era). Dr. Dan reported a couehing con- versation with Bao Dai's mother in which she described her son at a loss tO know whom to trust, and heartsick at the atmosphere of hostility which surrounded him. Yet Dr. Dan resigned as Bao Dai's Minister of Information over the Elysee Agreement, and, though he remained dose tO the Emperor, would not reassume public office for him. Bao Dai him- self furnished an ape description of his political philosophy which may explain why he failed co capture the beans of either beleaguered farmers or serious political leaders- neither of whom could stomach "nibbling" when revolution was required .. Said Bao Dai:

To practice politics is like playing a game, and I have always considered

life a game.

5. The Pau Negotiations, 1950 Yet Bao Dai did work at pressing the French. French officials in face complained to an American writer that Bao Dai spent coo much of his time on such pursuits:

H e has concenuared coo much on gening what he can from us instead

of building up his support among tbe people of the counay ... History

will judge if he did right in putting so much stress on that . . .

From lace June, 1950, unt;l the end of November, Bao Dai stayed close co the series of conferences in Pau, France, designed co arrange the transfer co the Vietnamese of the services of immigration, communica- tions, foreign trade, customs, and finances. The issue of the finance ser- vice was a particularly thorny one, involving as it did lucrative foreign exchange controls. While the French did eventually grant significant con- cessions to the Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians in each area dis- cussed, they preserved "rights of observation" and " intervention " in matters chat "concerned the French Union as a whole." lndced, the French assured themselves full access co government information, license to participate in all government decisions, and litcle reduction in eco- nomic benefits.

Some French commentators viewed Pau as an unmitigated disaster and the assurance of an early French demise in Indochina. As one writer put it:

U.S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 207

By accepting the evenrual restriction of trade within the French Union,

by losing alJ effective authority over rhe issuance of money, by renounc-

ing control over foreign trade, by permining a system of comrolled prices for exporu and imports, we have given the Associated States all

the power they need lf they wish to assure the ruin of our enterprises

and compel their withdrawal without in an)' way molesting our

compatriots.

But a contemporary Vieniamese critic rook a quite different view:

All these conventions conserve in Indochina a privileged position for

French capital, supported by the presence of a powerful fleet and army.

Even if no one talks any more of an Indochinese Federarjon, iris srilJ a

federalism both administrarive and economic (,Monecary Union, Customs Union, Communications Union, etc.) whicb co-ordinates the various

activities of the three Associated Scares. France always exercises conuol

through the representatives she has in all the organs of planning or of

federal surveillance, and through what is in effect rhe righr of veto1 because the presidem or rhe secretary general of these committees is

always elected by joint decision of the four governments and, funher,

because most of the decisions of the committees are made by unanimous

agreement.

Bao Dai's delegates were, however, generally pleased with tbe out- come of Pau. His Prime Minister, Tran Van Huu declared as he signed the conventions that "our independence is now perfect." But to the ordinary

Vietnamese, ro honest Frenchmen, and to the Americans, Tran Yan Huu was proved dramaticaU)• wrong.

B. U.S. Policy Towards Bao Dai

1. Qualified Approval, 1947-1950 The " Bao Dai solution" depended on American support. During the 1950 negot iations in Pau, France, Bao Dai's Prime Minister Tran Van Huu was called back to Indochina by a series of French military reverses in Tonkin. Tran Yan Huu seized the occasion to appeal to the United Scates "as the leading democratic nation," and hoped that the U.S. would:

208 PART II : 1953 - 1954

... bring pressure ro bear on France in order to achie\fe democratic

freedom. \Y/e want rhe right ro decide our own affairs fo r ourselves.

T ran demanded the Elyse,e Agreement be superseded by genuine autonomy fo r Vietnam:

It is not necessary for }'Oung men to die so that a French engineer can be director of the port of Saigon. Many people are dying every day because Viet Nam is not given independence. If we had independence

che people would have no more reason to 6ght.

Tran 's addressing the U.S. thus was realistic, if not jud icious, for the U.S. had already become involved in Indochina as one part of a troubled triangle with France a nd Bao Da i's regime. Indeed, there had been an American ro le in the " Bao Da.i solution" from its inception. J ust before the Ha Long Bay Agreements, the French in itia ti ve had received some support from a December, 1947, Life magazine a rticle by William C. Bullitt, fo rmer U.S. Am bassador to France. Bullitt argued fo r a po J;cy aimed ar ending "the saddest WM" by winiling the majority of Vietnamtse nationalists away from Ho C hi M inh a nd from the Communists through a movement built around Bao Dai. Bullitt's views were w idely accepted in France as a sta tement of U.S. policy, and a direct endorsement, and promise of U.S. a id, fo r Bao Dai. Bao Dai, whether he accepted the Bullitt canard or not, seemed to sense that the U.S. would inevitably be drawn into Southeast Asia, and apparently expected American involve- ment to be accompanied by U.S. pressure on France on behalf of Vietnamese nationalism. But the U.S., though it appreciated France's dilemma, was reluctant initially to endorse the Bao Dai solution until it became a rea lity. T he fo llowing State Department messages indicate the U.S. position:

July 10, 1948 (Paris 3621 co State): . . . France is faced with alcematives of unequivocally and promptly approving principle [otl Viet independence wichin French union and [the] union [of chej chree parts of Vietnam or losing Indochina.

U . S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 209

July 14, 1948 (Srate 2637 to Paris):

.. . Once [Bay of Ha Long) Agreement cogecher w ith change in status

[of] Cochinchina [is] approved, Department would be disposed Ito] consider lending its suppott to extent of publicly approving French

Government's action as forward looking step toward settlement of

troubled situation (in] Indochina and toward realization of aspirations

Vietnamese people. It appears ro Deparonenr that above s tared U.S.

approval would materially as.sist in s trengthening hands of nationalists

as opposed co communists in Indochina

August 30, 1948 (State 3368 to Paris):

Deparonent appreciates difficulties facing any French Go\fernmem tak·

ing decisive action vis-a-vis Indochina, but can only see sreadil)• deterio·

rating situation unless [there is] more positive approval [Bay of Ha

Long) Agreement, enactment legislation or action permining change

Cochinchina status, and immediate commencement formal negotiations

envisaged that Agreement. Deparcment believes (that] nothing should be left undone which will strengthen truly nationalist groups [in] Indochina and induce present supporters [of the] Viet Minh [to) come ro [the) side

[of] that group. No such inducement possible unless that group can

show concrete evidence [chat] French [arej prepared [to] implement

promptly creation Vietnamese free state Lwhich isJ associated Lwith rhej

French Union and with all anribures free stare . . .

January 17, 1949 (State 145 to Paris):

\'Qhile Deparonenr desirous French coming to rerms with Bao Dai or any

trUI)• narjonalist group which has reasonable chance winning over pre·

ponderance of Viemamese, we cannot ar this rime irrerrevably lsicj com·

mi, U.S. to suppott of native government which by failing develop appeal

among Viemamese might become virtually puppet government., separated

from people, and exisring only by presence French military forces . . .

The Elysee Agreement rook place in March, 1949. At this juncture, the fa ll of C hina obtruded, and the U.S. began to view the "Bao Dai solution" with a greater sense of urgency:

May 10, 1949 (Srare 77 to Saigon):

Assumption ... Department desires [the] success Bao Dai experimenr

enrirel)r correct. Since (chereJ appears LtoJ be no other alternative to [esrablished j Commie pattem [in] Viemam, Depamnent considers no

efforr should be spared by France, other \Vestem powers, and non- Commie Asian nations to assure experimenr best chance succeeding.

Ar proper dme and under proper circumstances Depamnent will be pre- pared [to] do its part by extending recognition Ito the] Bao Dai Government

and by exploring [the] possibility of complying wirh any request by such a Govemmenr for U.S. arms and economic assisrance. (It) must be under- stood, however, [that) aid program this narure would require Congressional approval. Since U.S. could scarcely afford backing (a] government which

would have color [oij, and be likely [ro suffer the] fate of, [a] pupper regime, it must first be dear rhar France wiU offer all necessary concessions to make Bao Dai solution attraai\'e to nationalists.

This is [aj step of which Frenc'.h themselves must see urgency [and] neces·

siry (in ] view possibly short rime remaining before Commie successes

[in] China are felt [in] Indochina. Moreover, Bao Dai Covernmenr musr through own efforts demon.s.trate capacity [to] organize and conduct

affairs wisely so as ro ensure maximum opportunity of obtaining requi•

sire popular support, inasmuch as [an,•] government created in Indochina analogous {to the] Kuomimang would be foredoomed failure.

Assuming essential French concessions are forthcoming, besr chance [of)

success lforj Bao Dai would. appear to be in persuading Viemamese nationalists:

( 1 J their patriotic aims may be realized promptly through French- Bao Dai agreement

(2 ) Bao Dai govemment will be truly representative even 10 the extent of including outstanding non-Commie leaders now supporting Ho, and

(3) Bao Dai solution [is rhej only means (of] safeguarding Vietnam from aggressive designs (of the] Commie Chinese.

U.S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 211

Through 1949, the southward march of Mao's legions continued, and the Viet Minh were obviously preparing to establish relations with them.

2. Recognition, 1950 The Elysee Agreements were eleven months old before the U.S. consid- ered that France had taken the concrete steps toward Vietnamese auton- omy which the U.S. had set as conditions for recognizing Bao Dai. In late January, 1950, events moved swiftly. Ho Chi Minh announced that his was the "only legal government of the Vietnam people" and indicated DRY willingness to cooperate with any nation willing to recognize it on the basis of "equality and mutual respecr of national sovereignty and ter- ritory." Mao responded promptly with recognition, followed by Stalin. ln France there was an acrimonious debate in the National Assembly between leftist advocates of immediate truce with the Viet Minh and government supporters of the Elysee Agreement to proceed with the Bao Dai solution. Rene Pleven, Minister of National Defense, declared that:

It is necessary thar rhe French people know that at the present time the

only true enemy of peace in Viet Nam i~ the Communist Party. Becau.,e

members of the Communist Party know that peace in Indochina will be

established by the policy of independence thar we are following.

("Peace with Viet Nam! Peace with Viet Nam!" shouted che

(',ammunists.)

Jean Letourneau arose to assert that:

It is not at all a question of approving or disapproving a government;

we are very far beyond the transitory life of a government in an affair

of this gravity. It is necessary that, on the international leve~ the vote

that takes place ronighr reveals rruly rhe major importance rhar rhi.s

evem should have in the eyes of the enrire world.

Frederic Dupont said:

The Indochina war has always been a cesr of che French Unjon before

international Communism. But since" rhe arrival of the Chinese

Communists on the frontier of Ton kin, Indochina has become the

212 PART II : 195 3- 1954

fronrier of \Ve.stem cl\•ilization and the war in Indochina is imegraced

imo the cold war.

Premier Georges Bidault was the last speaker:

The choice is simple. Nloreover there is no choice.

The Nationa l Assembly vot e o n Janua ry 29, 1950, was 396 to 193. From the extreme left there we,e cries of " Down with the war!" a nd Paul Coste-Floret replied: "Long live peace." On February 2, 1950, France' s fo rmal ratification of the independence of Vietnam was annow1ced.

The U.S. assessment of the situation, a nd its action, is indicated in the fo llowing:

DEPARTMENT OF STAT E Washington

February 2, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U.S. Recognition of Vietnam , Laos and Cambodia

1. The French Assembly ( Lower Ho use) ratified on 29 Jan uary by a large majority (396 - 193) the hill which, in effect, established Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as a utonomous States within the French Union. The opposit ion consisted of 18 1 Communist votes with only 12 joining in from other parties. The Council of the Republic (Senate) is expected to pass the bills by the same approx- imate majority on or about February 3. President Auriol's signa- ture is expected co follow shortly thereafter.

2. The French legislative and political steps thus taken will transform areas which were formerly governed as Prmectorates or Colonies into s tates within the French Union, with considerably more free- dom than they enjoye,d under their p rior status. The French Government has indicated that it hopes to grant greater degrees of independence co the three states as the securiry position in Indochina allows, and as the newly fo rmed governments become mo re able to administer the areas follow ing w ithdrawal of the French.

U . S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 2 13

3. Within Laos and Cambodia there are no powerful movements directed against the governments which are relatively stable. However, Viemam bas been the: battleground since the end of World War 11 of conflicting political parties and military forces. Ho Chi M.inh, who under va rious aliases, has been a communist agent in various parts of the wo rld since 1925 and was able co take over the anti-French nationalist movement in 1945. After failing co reach agreement with the French regarding the establish- ment of an autonomous state of Vietnam, be withdrew his forces to the jungle and hill areas of Vietnam and bas ha rassed the French ever since. His followers who are estimated at approximately 75,000 armed men, with probably the same number unarmed. H is headqua rters are unknown.

The French counter efforts have included, on the military side, the deployment of approximately 130,000 troops, of whom the approximately 50,000 are local natives serving voluntarily, African colonials, and a ha rd core made up of French troops and Foreign Legion units. H o Chi Minh's guerrilla tactics have been a imed at denying the French control of Vietnam. On March 8, 1949 the French President signed an agreement with Bao Dai as the H ead of State, granting independence within the French Union co the Government of Vietnam. Similar agreements were signed w ith the King of Laos and the King of Cambodia.

Recent developments have incOuded Chinese Communist victo- ries bringing those troops to the Indochina border; recognition of Ho Chi Minh as the head of the legal Government of Vietnam by Communist China (18 Ja nuary) and by Sovic:t Russia (30 January).

4. Recognition hy the United States: of the three legally constituted governments of Vietnam, Laos' a nd Cambodia appears desirable and in accordance with United States foreign policy for several reasons. Among tl1em are: encouragement to nationa l aspirations under non-Communis e leadership for peoples of colonial areas in Southeast Asia; the establishment of stable non-Communist gov- ernments in areas adjacent to Communist C hina; support co a friendly country which is also a s ignatory co the North Atlantic Treaty; and as a demonstration of displeasure with Communist tactics which are obviously aimed at eventual domination of Asia, working under the guise of indigenous nationalism.

214 PART II: 1953-1954

Subject to your approval, the Department of State recommends that the United Stares of America extend recognition to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, following ratification by the French Government.

Approved (signed) Harry S. Truman February 3, 1950

3. U.S. Aid u, Indochina

(signed) DEAN ACHESON

On February 16, 1950, France requested U.S. military and economic assistance in prosecuting the Indochina War. T he Secretary of Defense in a Memorandum for the President on March 6 stated that:

The choice confronting che United States is to support the legal governments in lndochina or ro face che extension of Communism over the remainder of

the conrinent.1I area of Southeast Asia and possibly westward . ..

T he same month, the State [)epartment dispatched an aid su rvey mis- sion under R. Allen G riffin to Indochina (and to Burma, Indonesia, Tl,ailand, and Malaya ). The Griffin Mission proposed (inter alia) aid for the Bao Dai government, since: the State of Vietnam was considered:

. . . nor secure against internaJ subversion, political infiJrrarion, or

military aggression.

The objective of each program is to assist as much as possible in build·

ing strength, and in so doing . . ro assure rhe several peoples that

suppon of rheir governments and resistance ro communist subversion

will bring them direct and tangible benefits and well-founded hope for

an increase in living standards. Accordingly, the programs are of two

main rypes: (I ) technical and marerial aid to essemial services and (2)

economic rehabiJitation and developmem, focused primarily on rhe provision of rechnfral assistance and material ajd in developing agricu.1-

rural and industrial output . ... These activities are to be carried on in a way best calculated to demonstrate thar the local national govern-

U.S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 215

ments are able to bring bene6ts to their own J'<'Ople and thereby build

political support, especially among rhe rural popularion ...

The aims of economic assistance to Southeast Asia ... are to reinforce the

non-Communist national governme.ncs in. char region b)• quickly strength•

ening and expanding the economic life of che area, improve d1e conditions

under which its people live, and demonstrate c.oncrecely the genuine inter·

est of the United States in the welfare of the J)<'Ople of Southeast Asia.

In a strategic assessment of Southeast Asia in April, 1950, the JCS recommended military assistance for Indochina, provided:

. . . rhar United States military aid not be granted unconditionally;

rather rhar it be carefully controlled and that the aid program be inte- grated wich political and economic programs ... [~)

On May I, 1950, President Truman approved $10 million for urgently needed military assistance items for Indochina. The President's decision was taken in the context of the s uccessful amphibious invasion of Nationalist-defended Hainan by a Communist Chinese army under General Lin Piao-with obvious implications for Indochina, and for Taiwan. One week later, on May 8, the Secretary of State announced U.S. aid for "the A.~sociared Stares of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to purs ue their peaceful and democratic development." Sixteen days later, Bao Dai's government and France were notified on May 24 of the U.S. intention to establish an economic aid mission to the Associated Stares. [Doc. 6] As the North Korean Army moved southward on June 27, 1950, President Truman announced that he had directed "acceleration in the furnishing of military assisrance to the forces of France and the Associated Stares in Indochina ... " !Doc. 81

The crucial iss ue presented by the American decis ion to provide aid to lndochina was who should be the recipient-Bao Dai or France-and, hence, whose policies would U.S. aid Su[PpOrt?

4. Fre11ch /11trans-igen.ce While the. U.S. was deliberating over whether to provide economic and military assistance to Indochina in early 1950, negotiations opened ar

216 PART II: 1953-1954

Pau, France, among France and the Associated States to set the timing and extent of granting autonomy. Had these talks led to genuine independence for Bao Dai's regime, the subsequent U.S.-French relationship would probably have been much less complex and significantly Jess acerbic. As it was, however, the Pau accords led to little more independence than had the Ha Long Bay or Elysee Agreemenrs. Moreover, France's reluct.ance to yield politica l or economic aUJthority to Bao Dai was reinforced by its proclivity to field scrong-wiUed commanders, suspicious of the U.S., deter- mined on a military victory, and scornful of the Bao Dai solution. General Marcel Carpentier, Commander in Chief when the French applied for aid, was quoted in the Neru York Times on March 9, 1950, as fo llows:

I will never agree ro equipment being given directly to rhe Vietnamese.

lf this should be done I would resign w irhin twenry-four hours. The

Viername-se have no generals, no colonels, no military organization char

could effectively utilize the equipmenr. Ir would be wasted, and in China, rhe United States has had enough of that.

a. 19S0-19S1: De Lattre a11d "Dynamisme" Carpentier'ssuccessor, High Commissioner-Commander in Chief General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, arrived in December, 1950, fo llowing the severe setback of the a utumn. De Latcre electrified the discouraged French forces like General Ridgway later enheartened U.S. forces in Korea. De Latcre saw himself as leading an anti-communist crusade. He calculated that he could win a decisive victory within fifteen months in Vietnam, and "save it from Peking and Moscow." He deprecated the idea that the French were sti ll motivated by colonialism, and even told one U.S. newsman that France fought for the \Vest alone:

We have no more interest here . .. \Y/e have abandoned all our colonial

positions completely. There is little rubber or coal or rice we can any

longer obrain. And what dOf's it amount to compared ro the blood of

our sons we are losing and the three hundred and fifty million francs we spend a day in Indochina? The work we are doing is for the salvation of

the Vietnamese people. And the propaganda you Americans make thar

we are stiU colonialists is doing us tremendous harm, alt of us·che

Viemamese, yourselves, and us.

U . S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 217

Moreover, De Lattre was convinced that the Vietnamese had to be brought into the fight. ln a speech- "A Call ro Vietnamese Yourh "- he declared:

This war, whether you like it or not, is rile war of Viemam for Viemam.

And France will carry it on for you only if you carry it on with her ...

Certain people pretend thar Vietnam cannoc be independent because lt is part of the French Union. Not true! lo our unjverse, and especiall)r ln

our world of roday, there can be no nations absolutely lndependenr.

There are only fruitful interdependencies and harmful dependencies ....

Young men of Vietnam, ro whom I feel as close as I do ro the youth of

my native land, the moment has come for )'OU to defend your country.

Yet, General De Lattre regarded U.S. policy vis-a-vis Bao Dai with grave misgivings. Americans, he held, afflicted with "missionary zeal," were "fanning the fires of extreme nationalism ... French traditionalism is viral here. You cannot, you muSt nor destroy it. No one can simply make a new nation overnight by giving our economic aid and arms alone." As adamantly as Carpentier, De Lattre opposed direct U.S. aid for Viemamese forces, and allowed the Viemamese military little real independence.

Edmund A. Gullion, U.S. Minister Counselor in Saigon from 1950 on, faulted De Laure on his inability tO stimulate in the Viemamese National Army either the elan vira l or dynamisme he communicated to the rest of the French Expeditionary Corps:

. .. It remained d ifficulr to inculcate nationalist ardor in a native anny

whose officers and non~corns were primarily white Frenchmen . . . The

Viemamese units thar went inro action were rarely unsupporred by the

French. American contacr with them was mainly through the French,

who retained exclusive responsibiJiry for their training. \Y/e felt we

needed much more documentation than we had ro asses..~ the army's true

potential. We ne<eded battalion-by- battalion reports on the performance

of the Viemamese in rraining as well a.s in battle and a close conract

with intelligence and command echelons, and we never gor thjs. Perhaps

the most significant and saddes-r manifestation of the French failure to

create a really independent Viemamese Army that would fight in the

218 PART II: 1953-1954

way de Latt.re meant was the absence, at Dienbienphu, of any Viernamese

fighting e lemems. It was a French show.

Gullion is not a ltogether correct with respect to Dien Bien Phu; none- theless, statistics on the ethnic composition of the defending garrison do reveal the nature of the problem. The 5th Vietnamese Parachute Battalion was dropped to reinforce the. garrison so that as of May 6, 1954, the troops at Dien Bien Phu included:

GARRISON OF DIEN BIEN PHU

Officers NCO's EM's Totals V ietnamese 11 270 5,1 19 5,480

Total 393 1,666 13,026 15,105 V ier% of Total 2 .8 16.2 39.2 36.2

Thus, the Vietnamese comprised more than a third of the fighting forces (and nearly 40% of the enlisred troops); but among the leaders, they provided one-sixth of the: non-commissioned officers and less than 3 % of the officers.

The paucity of Viet officers at Dien Bien Phu reflected the general condition of the National Army: as of 1953, there were 2,600 native officers, of whom only a handful held rank above major, compared tO 7,000 French officers in a fo rce of 150,000 Vietnamese troops.

b. 19S1-1953: Leto11mea11 an.d " Dictatorship "

De Lattre's successor as High Commissioner, Jean Letourneau, was a lso rhe French Cabinet Minister for the Associated States. Letourneau was sent to Indochina to assume the same power and privilege in the "inde- pendent" State of Vietnam that any of France's Governor Generals had ever exercised from Saigon's Norodom Palace. In May, 1953, a French Par I iamentary Mission of Inquiry accused the Minister-High Commissioner of "veritable dictatorship, without limitation or control":

The anificial life of Saigon, the temprations of power withour control,

the security of a judgment which disdains realities, have isolared rhe

Minisrer and his entourage and have made rhem insensible ro rhe daily

tragedy of che war . . .

U.S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 219

It is no longer up to us to go\fern, bur to ad\fise. The big rhing was not

to draw up plans irresponsibly, but 10 carry on daily a subtle diplomacy.

In Saigon our representatives have allowed themselves ro be inveigled

into che rempting game of power and in.crigue.

Instead of seeing the most imponant things and acting on them, instead

of making on che spot investigations, of looking for inspiration in the

\fillage and in che ricefield, instead of lnforming d1emselves and winning

the confidence of the most humble people, in order to deprive rhe rebels

of their best weapon, the Norodom Palace clique has allowed itself the

luxury of administering a la Francaise and of reigning over a coumry

where revolution is smouJdering ...

The press has nor the right of criticism. To tell the truth, it has become

official, and the principal newspaper in Saigon is ar the disposition of the High Commic;sariat. Leners are censored. Propaganda seems to be issued just to defend the High Commissariat. Such a regime cannot last, unless we

are to appear as people who are detennined not to keep their promises,

The Parliamentary M;ssion described Saigon: "where gambling, depraviry, love of money and of power finish by corrupting the morale and destroying willpower ... "; and the Vietnamese go\>emmenr: ;'The Ministers [of rhe Bao Dai regime] appear in the eyes of their compatriots to be French officials ... " The report did nor hesitate ro blame the French for Vietnamese corruption:

It is grave chat afcer eight years of laisse,•aller and of anarchy, the pres-

ence in Indochina of a resident Minister has not been able co put an

end to these daily scandals in the life in regard co rhe granting of

licenses, che transfer of piastres, war damages, or commercia I transac-

tions. Even if our administration is not entirely responsible for these

abuses:, it is deplorable that one can affirm that ic either ignores them

or coleraces chem .

Commenting on this report, an influential French editor blamed the " natural tendency of the military proconsulare to perpetuate itself" and "certain French political groups who have found in the war a principal

220 PART II: 1953 - 1954

source of their revenues . .. through exchange operations, supplies to the expeditionary corps and war damages ... H e concluded that:

The generally accepred rheory is char the prolongation of the war in Indochina is a fatality imposed by e\fenrs, one of chose dramas in history which has no solution. The theory of the skeptics is tbar the impotence

or the errors of the men responsible for our policy in Indochina have

prevented us from finding a way our of this catastrophic enterprise. The

crmh is that the facts now known seem to add up to a lucid plan worked

out step by step m eliminate any possibility of negotiation in Indochina in order ro assure rhe prolongation withour limit of the hostilities and

of the military occupation.

5. Bao Da.i, Attentiste

Despite U.S. recognition of the grave imperfections of the French adm in- istration in Vietnam, the U.S. was constrained to deal with the lndochina situation through France both by the overriding importance of its European policy and by the impotence and ineptitude of the Bao Dai regime. The U.S. attempted to persuade Bao Dai to exercise more vigor- ous leadership, but tbe Emperor chose differently. For example, immedj- ately after the Pau negotiations, the Department of State sent these instructions to Edmund Gullion:

PRIORfTY AMLEGATION

SAIGON 384

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT O F STATE

OCT 18 1950

DEPT wishes to have FOL MSG delivered to Bao Dai personally by MIN lMi\llED after Chief of State's arrival in Saigon. It SHLD be delivered infonnally without submissiorn written text with sufficient emphasis to

U.S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 221

leave no doubt in Emperor's mind that it represents DEPTS studied opin- ion in matter now receiving ATTN highest auths US GOVT. Begin MSG:

Bao Dai will arrive in Saigon at moment when Vietnam is facing grave crisis outcome of which may decide whether country will be permitted develop independence status or pass in near future to one of Sino-Soviet dominated satellite, a new form of colony immeasurably worse than the old from which Vietnam has so recently separated herself.

The US GOVT is at present moment taking steps to increase the AMT of aid to FR Union and ASSOC States in their effort to defend the territo- rial integrity of IC and prevent the incorporation of the ASSOC Stares within the COMMIE-dominated bloc of slave stares but even the resources of US are strained by our present UN commitments in Korea, the need for aid in rbe defense of Western Europe and our own rearma- ment program. We sometimes find ir impossible to furnish aid as we WLD wish in a given Al\llT at a given time and in a given place.

Leadership of Vietnam GOVT during this crucial period is a factor of preponderant importance in deciding ultimate outcome. GOVT must display unusually aggressive leadership and courage before a discouraged people, disrraughr and floundering in rhe wake of years of civil war, Lesser considerations concerning the modalities of relations between the States of the FR Union and the REP of FR must, for instance, be at least temporarily laid aside in face of serious threat to very existence of Vietnam as autonomous state, within FR Unjon or otherwise.

We are aware (as in Bao Dai) that present Vietnamese GOVT is so linked with person of Chief of State th.at leadership and example pro- vided by latter takes on extraordinary importance in determining degree of efficiency in functionjng of GOVT. Tbrough circumstances of absence in FR of Bao Dai and other Vietnamese leaders for prolonged period , opportunity for progress in assumption of respons ibilities from FR and extension authority and influence of GOVT with people was neglected. Many people, including great number AMERS, have been unable under- stand reasons for Emperor's GTE prolonged holiday UNQTE on Riviera and have misinterpreted it as an indication of lack of patriotic attachment to his role of Chief of State. DEPT is at least of opinion that his absence did not enhance the authority and prestige of his GOVT at home.

The_refore, DEPT considers it imperative Bao Dai give Vietnamese people evidence his determination personally take up reins of scare and lead his country into IMMED and energetic opposition COMMIE

222 PART II : 1953 - 1954

menace. Specifically he SHLD embark upon lMMED program of visits ro all pares Vietnam making numerous speeches a nd public appearances in the process. Chief of State SHLD declare his determination plunge into job of rallying people to support of GOVT and opposition to VM lMMED upon arrival Saigon. He SHLD announce US, FR s upport for fo rmation NATL armies and his own intention assume role Commander in C hief. He SHLD take full ad vantage of FR officia l declaration of inten- tion to form NATL armies (confirmed yesterday by MIN ASSC States Letournea u) and set up precise plan for such fo rmation lMMED.

Finally, it SHLD be tactfully suggested that a ny further display pro- crastination in facing realities iin the form prolonged periods of seclusion at Da lat o r otherwise WLD confirm impressions of those not as con- vinced of Emperor's seriousness of purpose as DEPT and LEG are and raise questions of the wisdom of continuing to support a Vietnamese GOVT which proves irself incapable of exercising the autonomy acquired by it at such a high price. End of MSG.

Endeavor obtain private interview soonest possible after arrival for DEPT regards timing as of prime import.ance. Simultaneously or I.J\IIMED FOL in form Letourneau ru1d Pignon of action. Saigon advise Paris in advance to synchronize informing FONOFF

ACHESON

Whatever Bao Dai's response-probably polite and obscure-he did not act on the U.S. advice. He s ubseq uently told Dr. Phan Quang Dan, aboard ltis imperial yacht, that his successive governmenrs had been of little use, and added that it would be dangerous to expand the Vietnamese Army because it might defect en masse and go to the Viet Minh:

I could nor inspire the troops with the necessary enthusiasm and fighting

spirit, nor could Prime Minister Huu .. . Even if we had an able man, che present political conditions would make it impossible for him ro con\•ince the people and the troops rhar rhey have something worch

while ro fighr for .. .

Dr. Dan agreed that the effectiveness of the National Army was a central issue; he pointed out that there were but three Viet generals, non of whom had ever held operationa I command, and neither they nor the

U.S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 223

20 colonels or lieutenant colonels could exercise initiative of any sort. Dr. Dan held that: "The VietnameS<!' Anny is without responsible Vietnamese leaders, without ideology, without objective, without enthusi- asm, without fighting spirit, and without popular backing." But it was very clear that Bao Dai did not propose to alter the conditions of his army except by the long, slow proces.~ of "nibbling" at French mj)itary preroga- tive. On other vital issues Bao Dai was no more aggressive. For all practi- cal purposes, the Emperor, in his own fashion, like Dr. Dan and Ngo Djnh Diem, assumed the posture of the aue11tiste-a spectator as the French and Americans tested their strength agajnst each other, and against the Viet Minh.

6. T/Je A111eri.ca11 Predica11ie11t Among the American leaders who understood the vacuity of the Bao Dai solution, and recognized the pitfalls in French intransigence on genuine independence was the then Senator John F. Kennedy. Kennedy visited Vietnam in 1951 and evidently weighed Gullion's views heavily. In November, 1951, Kennedy declared tha·t:

ln Indochina we have allied ourselves to the desperate efforr of the

French regime co hang on to the remnanrs of an empire. There is no

broad general support of the native Vietnam Governmenr among the

people of that area.

In a speecb to the U.S. Senate in June, 1953, he pointed out that:

Genuine independence as we understand it is lacking in Indochina local

government is circumscribed in irs functions ... the government of

Viemam, the state which is of the greatesr imporrance in this area, lacks

popular supporr, chat the degree of milita.ry, civil, political, and economic

control maintained by the French goes well beyond what is necessary to fight a war .. . le is because we want the war co be broughc co a success~

ful conclusion char we should insist on genuine independence . . .

Regardless of our united efforr, it is a truism that the war can never be

successful unless large numbers of the people of Viemam are won O\ler

from ,heir sullen neucraliry and open hosciliry to it and fully support its successful conclusion.

224 PART II: 195 3- 1954

... I strongly believe that the French cannot succeed in Indochina with-

out giving concessions necessary to make the native am1y a relia hie and

crusading force.

l ater, Kennedy criticized the French:

Every year we are given three- sets of assurances: first, chat the indepen-

dence of the Associated States is now complete; second, that the inde-

pendence of the Associated Scates wiU soon be completed under steps "now .. being taken; and third, that military victory for the French

Union forces is assured., or is just around the corner.

Another American knowledgeable concerning the U.S.-French diffi- culties and with the Bao Dai solution was Robert Blum, who headed the econom ic aid program extended to the Bao Dai regime in 1950. General De lattre viewed U.S. economic a id as especially pernicious, and told Blum that: " Mr. Blum, you are the most dangerous man in lndochina." De Larue resented the American intrusion. "As a student of history, 1 can understand it, but as a Frenchman I don't like it. " In 1952, Blum ana- lyzed the Bao Dai-French-American triangle as follows:

The arrirude of the French is difficuk to define. On the one hand are rhe

repeated official affirmations that France has no selfish interests in

lndocbina and desires only to promote rhe independence of rhe

Associated States and be relieved of the terrible drain of France's

resources. On the other hand are the numerous examples of the deliber-

ate continuation of French controls, rhe interference ia major policy

matters, the profiteering and ·the consrant bickering and ill-feeling over

rhe uansfe.r of powers aad the is.sues of independence . . . There is

unquestionably a conuadktion in French actions berween the natural

desire to be rid of this unpopular, costl)1 and apparently fruitless war and

the determination ro see ir through with honor while satisfying French

pride and defending interests in the process. This distinction is rypified

by rhe sharp difference between the attitude toward General de Laure in lndocluna, where he is heralded as rhe political genius and military sav-

ior ... and in France, where he is suspected as a person who for personal glory is drawing off France's resources oa a perilous advenrure . ..

U.S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 225

It is difficult to measure what have been the results of almost two years

of active American participation in the affairs of Indochina. Although

we embarked upon a course of uneasy association with the "colonialist"~

tainced bur indispensable French, on the one hand, and the indigenous,

weak and divided Vietnamese, on the other hand, we have not been

able full y to reconcile these two allies in the interest of a single-mjnded

fight against Communism. Of the purposes which we hoped to serve

by our actions in Indochina, che one chat has been most successful has

been the strengthening of the French military position. On the other

hand, the Vietnamese, many of whom thought that magical solutions

to their advanrage would result from our appearance on the scene, are

chastened but disappointed at che evidence thac America is not omnip·

otent and not prepa.red to make an undiluted effort co support their

point of \•iew .. . Our direct influence on political and economic mat-

ters has not been great. We have been reluctanr to become directly

embroiled and, though the degree of our contribution has been steadily

increasing, we have been content, if not eager, ro have the French con·

tinue to have primary responsibiliry, and to give little, if any, advice.

Blum concluded that:

The situation in Indochina is nor s.atisf-actory and shows no substantial

prospecr of improving, chat no decisive military victory can be achie\•ed,

that the Bao Dai government gives linle: promise of developing compe·

tence and winning the loyalty of the population . .. and that the attain·

menr of American objectives is remote.

Shortly before his death in 1965, Blum held that a dash of French and U.S. interesrs was inevitable:

\Y/e wanred ro strengthen the ability of the French ro protect the acea

againsc Communist infiltration and inva-sion, and we wanted to capture

the nationalist movement from the Comrnunisrs by encouraging the

national aspirations of the local popuJations and increasing popular

support of their governments. \Y/e knew tthar the French were unpopular,

that the war chat had been going on since 1946 was nor only a national·

226 PART II: 1953-1954

ist revolt against them but was an example of the awakening seJf•con·

sdousness of che peoples of Asia who were trying ro b reak loose from

domination by the Western world. We recognized right away that rwo· pronged policy was beset with great difficulties. Because of the prevail-

ing anti•French feeling, we knew that any bolstering by us of the French

posit ion would be resented by the local people. And because of Jhe tra-

ditional French position~ and French sensjriviry at seeing any increase of

American influence, we know they would look with suspicion upon rhe

development of d irect Amerjcan relations with local administrations

and peoples. Nevenheless, we were derermined chat our aid program

would nor be used as a means of forcing co·ordinarion upon unwilling

governments, and we were equally determined that our emphasis would

be on types of aid that would appea I co the masses of the population

and not on aid that, while economically more sophisticate-cl, would be less readily underscood. Ours was a political program ,hat worked with

che people and it would ob\liously ba\le lost most of irs effecti\leness if

it had been reduced to a role of French-protected anonymity . .. [The

program was] grearly handicapped and irs beneficial psychological

re-sui ts were largely negated because rhe United Stares at che same rime

was pursuing a program of [military] support co the French . . . on bal·

ance, we came co be looked upon more as a supporter of colonialism

than as a friend of the ne\\t nation.

In 1965, Edmund Gullion, w h o was also very close to the Bao Dai prob- lem, rook chis retrospect:

We really should have pushed the French right after the Elysee agree·

ments of March, 1949 . We did nor consider the exchange of letters

carefully enough a t the time. Ir was understandable. We obviously fe lt

it wa.~ going to be a continuing proces..c;, and we hoped ro be able t o have some influence over it . But then we got invol\led in Korea, and since the

French were in trouble in Indochina, we pulled our punches ...

The French could have said u:nequivocally, as we did with regard ro the

Philippines, that in sucb-and--sucb a number of years Vietnam would be

ro tally free, and tbat it could thereupon jo in the French Union o r stay

out, as it desired .. . An evolu tionary solution was the obvious one, and

U.S. l11volveme111 ;,, the Fra11co-Viet Mi1th \Var 227

ir should have been confronted openly and honestly withour all the

impossible, protracted preliminary negotiations involving efforts ro

bring the three Associated Stares together, to get rhern to agree among

each other, and with France? separately and collectively. The French, ln

arguing against any kind of bilateral agreements, claimed that their

anempt at federation in Indochina was like our effort to bujJd some sort

of federated system in Europe. Bur their involvement and interest in

Indochina was obviously different, an<i they use<i the formula they

devised to avoid any real agreement on Vietnam. The problem grew

more complex as rhe military and politicaJ aspects of the siruation

became unavoidably tied together, and rhe Korean War, of course, com·

plicated it funhe.r. from the outser, the French sought to regard the war

in Korea and the war in Indochina as related parts of one big fight agains't l,0mn1unism, bur ir wasn~t that s imple. ActuaJly, what the

Korean \Xlar did do was make it more difficult for us ro urge an evolu·

tionary settlement in Vietnam. By 1951, it may have been too late for

us to do anything about chis, but we could still have tried much harder

than we did. The rrouble was rhe world by then had begun ro close in on us. The E.D.C. formula in Europe was being rejected by the French,

just as in 1965 they were rejecting the North Atlantic T reary Organii.ation

concept. Our degree of leverage was being drastically reduced.

Had Bao Dai been willing or capable of more effective leadersh.ip, the U.S. role in the war might not have fa9lea into what Edmund Gullion called the "pattern of prediction and disappointment" :

It can be timed almost to rhe month to coincide with the rainy .season

and the campaign season. Thus, in May or June, we usually gee French

estimates of success in the coming campaign season, based panly on an assessment of losses the Vietminh are supposed ro have suffered in the

preceding fal~ which are rypically claimed as rhe brighr spot in an oth·

envise gloomy fighting season. The new set of estimates soon proves

equally disappointing; by October, Fr,ench Union rroops are found

bottled up in mountain defiles far from their bases ... There are rum·

bling.< abour late or lacking American aid and lack of American under·

standing. Some time around the first of the new year, special high-level

228 PART II: 1953-1954

United States-French conferences are called. \Ve ask some questions

about the military situation but only a few about the political siruarion.

There is widespread speculation thar rhe French may pull out oi Indochina if we press chem for explanations of their political and eco-

nomic program. \Y/e promise the French more aid. The French make a

stand: they claim great casua.lties inflicced on the enemy. They give us

new estimates for the following campaign season-and the round begins

once more.

In that bleak pattern, Bao Dai played only a passive role; the "Bao Dai solution" ultimately solved nothing. The outcome rested rather on France's milita ry struggle with the Viet Minh, and its contest of leverage with the United States.

PART III

1954-1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S

SPECIAL COMMITTEE, "MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE US POSITION ON IN DOCHINA IN GENEVA"

17 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIA1- COMMITTEE, NSC

Subject: Military Implications of the U.S. Position on Indochina in Geneva

1. The attached analysis and recommendations concernjng the U.S. position in Geneva have been developed by a Subcommjuee con- sisting of representatives of rhe Department of Defense, JCS, Scare, and CIA.

2. This paper reflects the conclusions of the Department of Defense and the JCS and has been coUaborared with the State Department representatives who have reserved their position thereon.

3. In brief, this paper concludes that from the poinr of view of the U.S. strategic position in Asia, and indeed throughout the world, no solution ro the Indochina problem short of victory is accept· able. lr recommends char this be tbe basis for the U.S. negotiating position prior ro and ar the Geneva Conference.

231

232 PART Ill: 195~ • 1960

4. Ir also notes that, aside from the improvement of the present military siruation in Indochina, none of the courses of action considered pro· vide a satisfactory solution to the Indochina war.

5. The paper notes char the implications of this position are such as to merit consideration by the NSC and the President.

6. I recommend that the Special Committee note and approve this report and forward ir with the official Department of State views to the NSC.

G. B. Erskine General, USMC (Ret)

Chairman, Sub-committee President's Special Committee

MILITARY IMPLICATION OF U.S. NEGOTIATIONS ON INDOCHINA AT GENEVA

I. PROBLEM

To develop a U.S. position with reference to the Geneva Conference as it relates ro Indochina, encompassing the military implications of certain alternatives which might arise in connection with that conference.

II. MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Department of Defense and the J CS have reviewed NSC 5405 in the light of developments since that policy was approved from a military point of view and in tbe light of certain possible courses of action as they affect the Geneva Conference. These are: 1. Maintenance of the status quo in Indochina. 2. Imposition of a cease-fire in Indochina. 3. Establishment of a coalition government. 4. Partition of the country. 5. Self-determination through free elections.

B. The Department of Defense and the JCS have a lso considered the impact of the possible future status of Indochina on the remainder of Southeast Asia and Japan and have considered the eJfect which any substantial concessions ro the Communists on the part of

Mem o ra11dum fo r tbe Preside1tt ' s Special Committee 233

France and the Associated States would have with respect to Asian peoples as a whole and U.S. objectives in Europe.

C. Indochina is the area in which the Communist and non-Communist worlds confront one another actively on the field of battle. The loss of this battle by whatever means would have the most serious reper- cussions on U.S. and free world interests, nor only in Asia but in Europe and elsewhere.

D. French wididrawal or defeat in Indochina would have most serious consequences on the French positiom in the world; the free world posi- tion in Asia; and in the U.S. on the domestic attitude vis-a-vis the French. Ir would, furthermore, constitute a de facto failure on the part of France ro abide by its commitment in U.N. to repel aggression.

E. Unless the free world maintains its position in lndochina, the Communists will be in a position to exploit what will be widely regarded in Asia as a Communist victory. Should Indochina be lost to the Communists, and in the absence of immediate and effective counteraction by the free world (which would of neces- sity be on a much greater scale than that required to be decisive in Indochina), the conquest of the remainder of Southeast Asia would inevitably follow. Thereafter, longer term res ults, proba- bly forcing Japan into an accommodation with the Communist bloc, and threatening the stabiliry and securiry of Europe, could be expected ro ensue.

F. As a measure of U.S. participation in the Indochinese war it is noted that rhe U.S. has since 1950 programmed in excess of $2.4 billion dollars in support of the French-Associated States opera- tions in Indochina. France is estimated to have expended during the period 1946-1953 the equivalent of some $5.4 billion. This investment, ,n addition ro the heavy casualties sustained by the French and Vietnamese, to say mothing of the great moral and political involvement of the U.S. and French, will have been fruitless for the anti-Communist cause if control of all or a por- tion of Indochina should now be ceded to the Communists.

ID. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

A. NSC 5405, approved January 16, 1954, states U.S. policy with respect to Indochina.

234 PART Ill: 195~ • 1960

B. The French desire for peace in Indochina almost at any cost repre• senrs our greatest vulnerability in tbe Geneva talks.

IV. DISCUSSION

For the views of the JCS see Tab A.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. Loss of Indochina to rhe Commu11isrs would constitute a political and military setback of the most serious consequences and would almost certainly lead to the ultimate Communist domination of all of Southeast Asia.

B. The U.S. policy aod objectives with respect to Soutbeast Asia as reAecred in NSC 5 405 remain entirely valid in the light of develop- ments since that policy was approved.

C. Witb respect to possible alternative courses of action enumerated in paragraph TIA above, the Department of Defense has reached the following conclusions: I. Mai11te11ance of status quo in Indochi11a. It is highly improba-

ble that a Communist agreement could be obta ined to any negotiated settlement which would be consistent with basic U.S. obj~-tives in Southeast Asia in the absence of a very sub-

stantial improvement in tbe French Union military situation. This could best be accomplished by the aggressive prosecution of military operations.

2. Imposition of a cease-fire. The acceptance of a cease-fire in advance of a satisfacrory settlement would in a ll probability lead

to a political stalemate attended by a conc-urrentand irretrievable deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position.

3. Establishment of a coalition government. The acceptance of a settlement based upon this course of action would open the way for the ultimate seizure of control by the Communists under conditions which would almost certainly preclude timely and effective external assistance designed to prevent such seizure.

4. Partition of the country. The acceptance of this course of action would represent at tl,e least a partial victory for the Viet M;nh

aod would constitute a retrogressive step in the attainment of

Mem o ra11dum fo r tbe Preside1tt ' s Special Committee 23.5

U.S. policy and would compromise the achievement of chat Policy in Southeast Asia.

5. Sel(-determi11ation through free eleaions. Many factors render the holding of a truly representative plebiscite infeasible and such a course of action would, in any case, lead to the loss of the Associated States to Communist control.

VJ. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. That the U.S. and U.K. and France reach an agreement with respect to Indochina which rejecrs all o( the courses enumerated above (except No. 1 on the assumption that the status quo can be altered to result in a military victory) prior to the initiation of discussions on Indochina at Geneva. Failing trus, the U.S. should actively oppose each of these solutions, should not entertain discussion of Indochina at Geneva, or having entertained it, should ensure that no agreements are reached.

B. If, despite all U.S. efforts to the contrary, the French Government elects to accept a negotiated senlemem which fails to provide reason· ably adequate assurance of the future poLlticaJ and territorial integ· rity of lndocruna, the U.S. should decline to associate itself with such a settlement and should pursue, directly with the governments of the Associated States and with other Allies (notably the U.K.), ways and means of continuing the struggle against the Viet Minh in Jndocruna without participation of the French.

C. The SpecjaJ Committee has reviewed the find ings and recommen- dations of the Department of Defense and considers that the impli- cations of this position are such as to warrant their review at the highest levels and by the National Security Council, after which they become the basis of the U.S. position with respect to Indochina at Geneva. The Special Committee recognizes moreover that cer- tain supplementary and alternative courses of action designed to ensure a favorable resolution of the situation in Indochina merit consideration by the NSC. These, and the Special C<Jmmittee rec- o,nmendations with respect thereto, are: 1. The political steps to be take11 to ensure a11 agreed U.S. -U.K.-

Frend, position amcemi11g Indochina at Ce11eva. That the NSC review the proposed political action designed to achieve chis

236 PART Ill: 195~ • 1960

objective with particular attention ro possible pressure against the French position in North Africa, and in NATO, and to the fact that discussions concerning implementation of course 2 and 3 hereunder will be contingent upon the success or failure of this course of action.

2. Overt U.S. involvement in Indochina. That the NSC determine the eJ<tent of U.S. willingness, over and above the contingen- cies listed in NSC 5405, to commit U.S. air, naval and ulti• mately ground fo rces 10 the direct resolution of the war in Indoch ina with or without French s upport and in the event of fai lure in course I above. That in this connection the NSC rake cognizance of present domestic and international climate of opinion with respect to U.S. involvement and consider the initiation of such steps as may be necessary to ensu re world- wide recognition of the significance of such steps in Indochina as a part of the struggle against communist aggression.

3. The development of a substit11te base of operations. Thar the NSC consider whether this course of action is acceptable as a substitute for 1 and 2 above and recognizing that the hope of implementation thereof would be one of major expendi- ture and long-term potential only.

INDO CHINA: FINAL DECLARATION OF THE GENEVA

CONFERENCE ON THE PROBLEM OF RESTORING

PEACE IN INDO- CHINA July 21, 1954

Final declaration, dated the 21st July, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Inda-China, in which the repre- sentatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United Stares of America took part.

I. The Conference rakes note of the agreements ending hostihries in Cambodia, Laos and Vier-Nam and organi2ing international con- trol and the supervision of the execution of tbe provisions of these agreements.

2. The Conference expresses satisfa~-tion at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference expresses its conviction that rhe execution of the provisions set o ut in rhe present declaration and in rhe agreements on the cessation of

Source: Geneva Conference: doc. 1043/Rev. 2; reprinted in Report on Indochina: Report of Sc-nntor Mike ~tmsfidd on a Srudy Mission to Vic-rn.:mt., C'..:imbodia, Laos, Oct. 15, 1954 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee prim, 83d. Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 26•27.

237

238 PART Ill: 195~ • 1960

hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos and Vier-Nam henceforth to play their patt, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference rakes note of rhe declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia I and of Laos1 of their intention ro adopt measures permitting a ll citizens ro take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elec- tions, whjch, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamenta l freedoms.

4. The Conference rakes nore of the clauses in the agreeme.nr on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Vier-Nam of foreign troops and mjlitary personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. T he Conference a lso takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia3 and Laos4 of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, ro the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base under rhe control of a foreign State may be establjshed in rhe regrouping zones of the rwo parries, the latter having the obliga- tion to see that the zones allotted to them shall nor constitute part of any military alliance and shall nor be utilized for the reswnp· tion of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Camborua5 and Laos" ro the e.ffect that they wilJ nor join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obliga- tion to participate in a nnilirary alliance not in conformity w ith the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hos- tilities in Laos or, so long as the,ir security is nor threatened, the obligation ro establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers.

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agree• ment relating to Vier-Nam is ro settle military questions with a view ro ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is

lndochitta: Final Declaratio11 of the Geneva Co11{ere11ce 239

provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions sec out in the pres- ent declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Vier-Nam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Vier-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial inregriry, shall permit the Vier-Namese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. ln order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of tl1e [nrernational Supervisory Commission,' referred to in tbeagreementon the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the comperem representative authorities of the rwo zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.

8. The provisions of the agreemenrs on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in par6cular, allow every- one in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authori6es of the Northern and Southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the autbori6es of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the partjes during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

10. The Conference rakes note of the declara6on of the Government of the French Republic8 to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Intros and Viet-Nam, at the request of the governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreeme_nt between the rwo parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government9 to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems

240 PART Il l : 195~ • 1960

connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the French Government will proceed from the princ iple of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territoria l integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.

12 . In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each mem- ber of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sover• eignty, the independence, the unity a nd the terrirorial integrity of the above-mentioned Sttttes, and tO refrain from a ny interference in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any q uestion which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study s uch measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam a re respected.

NOTES

I. Doc. ICJ44/Rev. I; ibid., p. 27. 2. Doc. JC/45/Rev. I; ibid., p. 28. 3. Doc. JC/46/Rev. 2; ibid., p. 28.

4. Doc. JC/47/Rev. I; ibid., pp. 28-29. 5. Doc. JC/46/Rev. 2; ibid., p. 28.

6. Doc. IC/47/Rev. I; ibid., pp. 28-29. 7. The member states are Canada, India, and Poland. 8. Doc. JC/48/Re,·. I; Report on Indochina, p. 29.

9. Doc. IC/49/Rev. I; ibid., p. 29.

INDO CHINA: STATEMENT BY THE UNDER SECRETARY OF

STATE1 AT THE CONCLUDING PLENARY SESSION OF THE

GENEY A CONFERENCE July 2 1, 19542

As 1 stated on July 18, my Government is not prepared to join in a declara -

tion by the Cou.fcrence sud, as is s11bmitt.ed. However~ the United Sta-res makes this ,milaural declaration of its position in these matters:

DECLARATION

The Government of the United Scares being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the pri nciples and pur- poses of the United Nations rakes note of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954 berween (a) the Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Vier-Nam; (bl the Royal Khmer Army Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam and of paragraphs 1 ro 12 inclusive of the declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954 declares

1 Walter Bedell Smith. 1 De-parnnent of Srnte Bulletin, Aug. 2, l954, pp. 162- 163.

241

242 PART Ill: 195~ • 1960

with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat o r the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggres- sion in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

In connection with the staremenr in the declaration concerning free elections in Viet-Nam my Gov-emment wishes to make clear irs position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954,3 as follows:

ln the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall cmrinue

ro seek to achieve uniry through free elections supen•ised by the United Nations to insure that rhey are conducted fairly.

With respect to the statement made by the representative of the Stare of Viet-Nam,4 the United States reiterates its traditional pos ition that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this tradi- tional position.

We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area tO determine their own future.

l ln&a, p. 1707. " Statement m:ide Jul>• 2 1, 1954, at the dosing session of the Geneva Conference;

for an English-languagt- t'exr, set> DocumentS on American Foreign Rtbtions, 1964 (New York, J955), pp. 315- 316.

INDOCHINA: UNIFICATION OF VIET-NAM THROUGH FREE

ELECTIONS: STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

AT A NEWS CONFERENCE J une 28, 1955 1

A t his news conference on June 28, Secretary Dulles was asked the ~~irion of the United States with respect to elections in Viet-Nam. The Secretary replied:

Neither the Unired Stares Governmem nor the Governmenr of Vier-Nam

is, of course, a parl)r co rhe Geneva armistice agreements. We did nor

sign chem, and rhe Governmem of Viet-Nam did nor sign them and,

indeed, protested against rhem. On rhe- other hand, the United Stares

believes, broad))' speaking, in the unification of counuies which have a

historic unity, where the people are akin. Vile also believe chat, if there are condirions of really free elections, there is no serious risk rhar the

Communists would win.

The Communists have never yet won any free e lection. I don' t rhink

they ever will. Tht>refore, we are nor afraid a r all of electioas, provided

1 De-parnnem of Srnte Bulletin, July 11, 1955, p~ 50.

243

244 PART Il l : 195~ • 1960

the)' ar e held under conditions of genuine freedom which che Geneva

armistice agreement caJls for . lf those conditions can be provided we would be in favor of elections, because we believe that they would bring

about the unification of the country under free government auspices.

REMARKS OF SENATOR JOHN F. KENNEDY AT THE CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM LUNCHEON IN THE HOTEL

WILLARD, WASHINGTON, D.C. June 1, 1956

Tl,is i.s a redaction of this speech made for the convenience of readers and researchers. Two copies of the speech exist in the Senate Speech file of the

Jo/m F. Kennedy Pre-Presidmtia/ Papers here at the Jo/m F. Kennedy

Library. One copy is a draft u.1ith handwritten notations and the second

copy is a press release. The redaction is based on the press release. Links to

page images of tbe ttvo copies are given a-r tbe bottom of tbis page.

It is a genuine pleasure to be here roday at this vital Conference on the future of Vietnam, and America's stake in that new nation, sponsored by the American Friends of Vietnam, an organization of which I am proud to be a member. Your meeriI1g today at a time when political events concerning Vietnam a re approaching a climax, both in that coun- try and in our own Congress, is most timely. Your topic and delibera- tions, which emphasize the promise of the future more than the failures of the past, are most constructive. I can assure you that the Congress of the United States wilJ give considerable weight to your findings and rec- ommendations; and I extend to aJJ of you who have made the effort to participate in this Conference my congratulations and best wishes.

245

246 PART Ill: 195~ • 1960

Ir is an ironic and tragic facr rhar this Conference is being held ar a time when the news about Viernam has virrually disappeared from the front pages of the American press, and the American people have all bur forgotten the riny nation for which we are in large measure responsible. Tlus decline in public arrenrion is due, I believe, to three factors:

( 1) First, ir is due in part to the amazing success of President Diem in meeting firmly and with dererminarion the major political and economic crises which had heretofore continually plagued Vietnam. (I shall say more about this point later, for ir deserves more con- sideration from all Americans inreresred in the future of Asia).

(2) Secondly, iris due in part to the traditional role of American jour· nalism, including readers as well as writers, ro be more inreresred in crises than in accomplishments, ro give more space ro the threat of wars than tbe need for works, and ro write larger headlines on the sensarional omissiorns of the past than the creative missions of the future.

(3) Third and finally, our neglect of Vietnam is the result of one of the most serious weaknesses that has hampered the long-range effective· ness of American foreign policy over the past several years-and that is the over emphasis upon our role as "volunteer fire department" for the world. Whenever and wherever fire breaks our- in lndo- China, in tbe Middle East, in Guatemala, in Cyprus, in the Formosan Straits· our firemen rush in, wheeling up aU their heavy equipment, and resorting ro every known method of containing and extinguish- ing the blaze. The crowd gathers-rhe usually successful efforts of our able volunteers are heartily applauded- and then tbe firemen rush off ro the nexr conflagration, leaving rhe grateful but still srunned inhabiranrs ro clean up the rubble, pick up rhe pieces a11d rebuild their homes witb whatever resources are available.

The role, ro be sure, is a necessary one; bur it is nor tbe only role to be played, and the others cannot be ignored. A volunteer fire department halts, bur rarely prevents, fires. It repels bur rarely rebuilds; it meets tbe problems of rhe present but nor of the future. And while we are devoting our attention ro the Communist arson in Korea, there is smoldering in lndo-China; we rum our efforts to lndo-China until rhe alarm sounds in Algeria- and so ir goes.

Remarks of S e nat o r Ken11ed y a t th e C o 11 ( ere11 ce 0 11 Vi e tnam 24 7

Of course Vietnam is not completely forgotten by o ur policy-makers today- I could not in honesty make such a charge and the facts would easily refute it- but the unfortunate truth of the matter is that, in my opinion, Vietnam would in aU likelihood be receiving more attention from our Congress and Administration, and greater assistance under our aid programs, if it were in imminent danger of Communist invasion or revolution. Like those peoples of Latin America and Africa whom we have very nearly overlooked in the past decade, the Vietnamese may find that their devotion to the cause of democracy, and their success in reduc- ing the strength of local Communist groups, have bad the ironic effect of reducing American support. Yet the need for that support has in no way been reduced. (I hope it w ill not be necessary for the Diem Government- or this organization-to subsidize the growth of the South Vietnam Comm unist Party i11 order to foc us American attention on that nation's critical needs!)

No one contends that we should now rush all our firefighting equip- ment to Vietnam, ignoring the Middle East or any other part of the world. But neither should we conclude that the cessation of hostilities in lndo-China removed char area from the list of imponanr areas of Un ired Stares foreign poljcy. Let us briefly consider exactly what is " America's Stake in Vietnam":

1. First, Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike. Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the PhiLlppines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those whose security would be threat- ened if the Red Tide of Communism overflowed into Vietnam. In the past, our policy-makers have sometimes issued contradictory statements on this point- but th.e long hisrory of Chinese inva- sions of Southeast Asia being stopped by Vietnamese warriors should have removed a ll doubt om this subject.

Moreover, the independence of a Free Vietnam is crucial to the free world in fields other than the military. Her economy is essen- tial to the economy of Southeast Asia; and her political liberty is an inspiration to those seeking to obtain or maintain their liberty in a ll parts of Asia- and indeed the world. The fundamental tenets of this nation' s foreign policy, in short, depend in considerable measure upon a strong and free Vietnamese nation.

248 PART Ill: 195~ • 1960

2. Secondly, Vietnam represents a proving ground of democracy in Asia. However we may ,choose to ignore it or deprecate it, the ris- ing prestige and influence of Communist China in Asia are unchal- lengable facts. Vietnam represents the alternative to Communist dictatorship. If this democratic experiment fails, if some one mil- lion refugees have fled the totalitarianism of the North only to find neither freedom nor security in the South, then weakness, not strength, will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians. The United States is directly responsible for this experiment- it is playing an important role in the laboratory where it is being conducted. We cannot afford to permit that experiment to fail.

3. Third and in somewhat similar fashion, Vietnam represents a test of American responsibility and determination in Asia. If we are not the parents of little Vietnam, then surely we are the godpar· enrs. We presided at its birth, we gave assistance to its life, we have helped to shape its future. As French influence in the political, economjc and military spheres has declined in Vietnam, American influence has steadily grown. This is our offspring- we cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs. And if it falls victim to any of rhe perils that threaten its existence-Communism, political anarchy, poverty and the rest- then the United States, with some justification, will be held responsible; and our prestige in Asia will sink to a new low.

4. Fourth and finally, America's stake in Vietnam, in her strength and in her security, is a very selfish one-for it can be measured, in the last analysis, in terms of American lives and American dollars. It is now well known that we were at one time on tbe brink of war in lndo-china- a war which could well have been more costly, more exhausting and less conclusive rhan any war we have ever known. The threat to such war is not now altogether removed form the horizon. Military weakness, political instability or eco- nomic failure in the new state of Vietnam could change almost overnight tbe apparent security which has increasingly character• ized that area under the leadership of Premier Diem. And the key position of Vietnam i11 Southeast Asia, as already discussed, makes inevitable the involvement of tbis nation's security in any new outbreak of trouble.

Remarks o f S e nator Ke1111ed y a t th e C o 11 ( ere11c e 0 11 Vietnam 249

It is these four poinrs, in my opinion, chat represent America's stake in Vietnamese security. And before we look co the future, let us stop co rev iew w hat the Diem Government bas already accomplished by way of increasing chat security. Most striking of all, perhaps, has been the rehabi litation of more than ¾ of a mjllion refugees from the North. For these courageous people dedicated to the free way of life, approximately 45,000 houses have bee:n constructed, 2,500 we lls dug, 100 schools established and dozens of medical centers and maternity homes provided.

Equally impressive has been the increased solidarity and stability of the Government, the elimination of rebellious sects and the taking of the first vital seeps coward true democracy. \Vhere once colonialism and Communism struggled for s upremacy, a free and independent republic has been proclrumed, recognized by over 40 countries of the free world. Where once a playboy emperor ruled from a distant shore, a constituent assembly has been elected.

Social and economic reforms have likewise been remarkable. The Llving conditions of the peasants have been vastly improved, the wastelands ha"e been cultivated, and a wider ownership of the land is gradua lly being encouraged. Farm cooperatives and farmer loans have modernized an outmoded agricultural economy; and a tremendous dam in the center of the country has made possible the irrigation of a vast area previously uncultivated. Legislation for better labor relations, health protection, workillg conditions and wages has been completed under the leadership of President Diem.

Finally, the Vietnamese army- now fighting for its own homeland and not its colon ial masters- has in,creased tremendously in both quality and quantity. General O'Daniel can cell you more about these accomplishments.

But the responsibility of the United States for Vietnam does not conclude, obviously, with a review of what has been accomplished thus far with our help. Much more needs co be done; much more, in face, than we have been doing up ro now. Military a )Llances in Southeast Asia are necessary but not enough. Atomic superiority and the development of new ultimate weapons are not enough. Informational and propaganda activities, warning of the evils of Comm1unism and the blessings of the American way of life, are not enough in a country where concepts of free enterprise and capitalism are meaningless, where poverty and hunger are

250 PART Ill: 195~ • 1960

nor enemies across the 17th parallel but enemies within their midst. As Ambassador Chuong has recently said: "People cannot be expected to fight for the Free World unless they have their own freedom to defend, their freedom from fore ign domination as well ass freedom from misery, oppression, corruption."

I shall nor attempt to set forth the derails of the type of aid program this nation should offer the Vietnamese-for it is not the details of that program that are as irnportarit as the spirit with which it is offered and the objectives it seeks to accomplish. We should not attempt to buy the friendship of the Vietnamese. Nor can we win their hearts by making them dependent upon our handouts. What we must offer them is a revolution- a political, eco• nomic and social revolution far superior to anytbing the Communists can offer- far more peaceful, far more democratic and far more locally con- trolled. Such a Revolution will require much from the United States and much from Vietnam. We must s upply capital to replace that drained by the centuries of colonial exploitation; rechnicians to train those handicapped by deliberate policies of illiteracy; guidance to assist a nation raking those first feeble steps toward the complexities of a republican fo rm of government. We musr assisr the inspiring growr!i of Vietnamese democracy and economy, including the complete inregra·tion of those refugees who gave up their homes and their belongings to seek freedom. We must provide mibtary assis- tance to rebuild the new Vietnamese Army, which every day faces the growing peril of Vietminh Armies across the border.

And finally, in the councils of the world, we must never permit any diplomatic action adverse to this, one of the youngest members of the family of nations- and I include in that injunction a plea that the United States never give its approval to the early nationwide e lections called for by the Geneva Agre,ement of 1954. Neither the United States nor Free Vietnam was a parry to that agreement- and neither the United Stares nor Free Vietnam is ever going to be a party to an election obviously stacked and subverted in advance, urged upon us by those who have already broken thei.r own pledges under the Agreement they now seek to enforc.e.

All this and more we can offer Free Vietnam, as it passes through the present period of transition on its way to a new era- an era of pride and independence, and era of democratic and economic growth-an ear which, when conrrasred with the long years of colonial oppression, will truly represent a political, social and economic revolution.

Remarks of Senator Ke1111edy at the Co11(ere11ce 011 Vietnam 25 1

This is the revolution we can, we should, we must offer to the people of Vietnam- nor as charity, nor as a bus iness proposition, not as a polit- ical maneuver, nor simply ro enlist tbem as soldiers against Communism or as chattels of American foreign policy-but a revolut ion of their own mak ing, fo r their own welfare, and fo r tbe security of freedom every- w here. The Communists offer th em another k ind of revolution, g litter- ing and seductive in its s uperficial appea l. The choice between the rwo can be made only by the Vietnamese people themselves. But in these times of trial and burden, true fr iendsh ips stand out. As Premier Diem recently wrote a great fr iend of Vietnam, Senator Mansfield, " It is only in winter that you ca n tell which trees a re evergreen." And I am confident that if this nation demonstrates th at it has nor forgotte n the people of Vietnam, the people of Vietnam w ill demonstrate that they have not for- gotten us.

EISENHOWER'S VIEWS ON

THE POPULARITY OF HO CHI MINH

lam convinced that the French could not win the war because the inter-nal political situation in Vietnam, wea.k and confused, badl y weakened their military position. I have never talke-d or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs w ho did not agree that had elec- tions been held as of the time of the fig hting, possibly 80 per ceur of the population would have voted fo r the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Ch ief of State Bao Dai. Indeed, the lack of leadership and dri ve on the part of Bao Dai was a factor in the fee ling prevalent among Vietnamese that they had nothing to fight for. As one Frenchman said to me, "What Vietnam needs is another Syngman Rhee, regardless of a ll the difficulties the presence of such a personality would entail."

Source-: )),;\..-ighr D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Cha11ge, 19.53-56 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & C,,mpnay, Inc., 1963), p. 372

253

PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISEN HOWER ON

THE LIKELIHOOD THAT HO CHI MINH WOULD WIN A NATIONAL ELECTION IN

VIETNAM IN 1955

By the time I entered the Presidency the French nation had become weary of the war, and their government-at least in officia l circles, if not publicly-was promising eventual self-rule and even illdependence ro lndochina. Undoubtedly the conflict was coming to be recognized as having global s ignificance, bur whar tine French political leaders said semi-publicly about fighting agrullSt Communism and what the Army and the population in Vietnam believed about the character of tbe war were quite different.

The forces of the French Union fig hting in Vietnam comprised approximately 200,000 French and 200,000 natives from the Associated States of lndochina . Patriotic Frenchmen fighting there natura lly expected to see their sacrifices accrue to the good of France. But Frenchmen, initially told that they were fighting in lndochina fo r France and the preservation of her empire, might reacr adversely ro an announcement and a series of actions that would inevitably lead to a breakaway of the Associated States from France.

Source: Dwight 0. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953 •1 956 { Garden C ity, NY: Doubleday & C.o, Inc, 1963), pp. 337-38

255

256 PART Ill: 195~ • 1960

This was a time in history when France, along with other old colonial powers, did not necessarily want ro continue maintaining-expensively in more than a few cases-its colonies. lnitially their troops had been sent to preserve the srarus q uo, bur the cause, nor the meaning of the war, was changing.

This put the French on the horns of a djJemma. Delay or equivocation in implementing complete independence could only serve to bolster the Communist claw that this wa.s in reality a war ro preserve colonialism. To American ears the first French pronouncements, soon made to the world, were a distinct step forward, but it was almost impossible to make the average Vietnamese peasant realize that the French, under whose rule his people had lived for some eighty years, were really fighting in the cause of freedom, while the Vietminh, people of their own ethnic origins, were fighting on the side of slavery. Ir was generally conceded that had an election been held, H o Chi Nlinh would have been elected Premier. Unhappily, the situation was exacerbated by the almost roral lack of leadership displayed by the Vietnamese Chief of State, Bao Dai, who, while nominally the head of tbat nation, chose to spend the bulk of hjs time in the spas of Europe rather than in his own land leading his armies against those of Communism.

Toward the end of 1953, the effect of the termination of hostilities in Korea began to be fe lt in Indochina. Overt Red Chinese aggression was not anticipated-that govemnnent bad been adequately warned by the Un ited States- but the Chinese Communists now were able to spare greatly increased quantities of ·materiel in the form of guns and ammuni- tion (largely supplied by the Soviets) for use on the lndochinese battle front. More advisers were being sent in and the Chinese were making available to the Vietminh logistical experience they had gained in the Korean War.

To combat this, General Navarre, who had succeeded to the French military command in Indochina, proposed in 1953 an over-all scheme under which, hopefully, he would end the war successfully. Under the Navarre Plan the French were to send nine more battalions of troops and supporting units to Indochina, increasing the size of the French Expeditionary Forces in that region to 250,000. 111 add ition, the French would train enough native troops to raise the strength of the Vietnamese Army to 300,000 during the following year. Thus, the planned strength of the. French Union should be 550,000 troops by

Eise11hou,er 011 Likelihood Jl o Chi Mi,,h \Vo uld \T/i11 Election 25 7

the end of 1954. Since the estimated strength of the Vietminh was not more than 400,000, it appeared that if the French Union could then lure chem inro open battle, they might be able to knock out the regular Vietminh forces by the end of the 1955 fighting season, reducing the fighting in lndochina to mop-up operations which could be conducted for the most part by native troops. In order to make this plan possible, the United States agreed on September 30, 1953, to grant France, in addi- tion to the aid already earmarked, another $385 million to be available by the end of that calendar year; these fonds were to supply and equip additional French and native forces during the build-up phase.

In this light the military situation was not alarming, but it was, at times, confusing. In October the French Union forces launched a fairly successful offensive against the Communist forces in central Vietnam, and on November 7 the French command reported a victorious conclu- sion of the battle. On November 20, French Union forces moved west from the Red River Delta in Tonkin and occupied an area ten miles from the border of Laos. This place was later to become a household word throughout the Free World: Dien Bien Phu.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

April 27, 1955

SUMMARY OF REMARKS OF GENERAL LAWTON COLLINS

General Collins reviewed the situation in south Viet Nam. He said that after months of attempting to work with. Ngo Dinh Diem he had reached the conclusion that the Premier did not have the executive ability 10 han- dle "strong-willed men", that he concerns himself with minor matter[sl and has nor originated a single constructive idea since he came ro power. Able men in the cabinet had been alienated by Diem's habit of going over their heads, according 10 General Collins, and he paid little attention to their views, preferring instead to rely on two brothers and a number of "yes men" [.]

There was no questioning according ro Collins of Diem's honesty, anti-communism and anti-colonialism, !but he is so completely uncom- promising, acetic !ascetic] and monastic that he cam1ot deal with realities like the Binh Xuyen and the Cao Dai. Diem has incurred the undying enmity of Bay Vien for the manner in which he closed the gambling houses in Saigon.

Between [French Commissioner-General Paul] Ely and himself, General Collins believes there is a chance to rescue the situation. It requires an able Premier ...

259

MEMORANDUM OF DIS CUSSION AT THE 246TH MEETING

OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUN CIL, WASHINGTON

April 28, 1955

D irector of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles explained that last night serious street fighting had broken out in the city of Saigon. A mortar shell had landed on the Presidemial Palace, the residence of Prime Minister [Ngo Dinh] Diem, at 1: 15 p.m. After two further shells had landed in the Palace grounds, Diem had telephoned [French Commissioner-General Paul] Ely and stated that he was ordering counterfire by the Vietnamese national forces. Eleven rounds of such councerfire had been counted by three o'clock in the afternoon. While there had since been rumors that a cease-fire bad been arranged, Mr. Dulles doubted the validity of these reports, and said it seemed that Prime M inister Diem had ordered all-out action aga inst the Binh Xuyen [sect]. In other words, Diem was proposing to force a show- down. It was not easy, continued Mr. Dulles, to say which side had actually been responsible for precipitating last night's events, but the real trouble had begun on April 26, when Prime Minister Diem had ordered the removal of the Chief of Poljce of Saigon, who was a mem- ber of the Binh Xuyen gangster group.

In a showdown fight, continued Mr. Dulles, and if the Vietnamese National Army remains loyal to the Prime Minister, there was little doubt that the Army could drive the Binh Xuyen forces out of Saigon ....

261

262 PART Ill: 195~ • 1960

At this point Mr. DilJon Anderson reminded the Council of the deci- sion with respect to U.S. policy toward South Vietnam whjch the Council had made in January of this year. While he was doing so, the Executive Secretary handed out a draft record of action prepared in the Department of State, which State suggested should be adopted in lieu of the earlier Council action of January. Secretary Dulles pointed out that the chief difference was that the earlier action had pinpointed Prime Minister Diem as the individual whose government the United States should support.

Secretary [of State J ohn Fosre-rj Dulles said that he would like to comment in general on the situation in which we found ourselves respecting South Vietnam. In his view, the present difficulties had two fundamental causes. First, the limitations of Prime Minister Diem as the he,id of a govern- ment. While Diem's good qualities were well known and need not be elaborated, it was a fact that he came from the northern part of the coun· try and was not very trustful of other people, perhaps for good reason. Furthermore, he was nor very good at delegating authority. Despite these shortcomings, Diem might have proved adequate to the situation if it had not been for the second fundamenral limitation- namely, the lack of solid support from the French. While the top leaders of the French Government, such as [French Prime Minister Pierre] Mendes-France, [Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs Edgar] Faure and General Ely, have gone along with Diem reluctantly, French colonial officials on the scene in Vietnam have done their best to sabotage him. T hese rwo fundamental limitations in conjunction have brought about a situation that has finally induced General Coll,ns ro conclude that we must now look for a replacement for Diem.

As a matter of fact, continued Secretary Dulles, we have been telling the French for a considerable period that we would be prepared to con- sider an alternative to Diem if they could come up with one. They haven't yet done so ....

I.ate yesterday ahernoon, however, we in the State Department dispatched a complicated series of cables to Saigon outlining ways and means of replac- ing Diem and his government. However, in view of the developments and the outbreak of last night, we have instructed our people in Saigon to hold up action on our plan for replacing Diem. The developments of last night could either lead ro Diem's utter overthrow or to his emergence from the disorder as a major hero. Accordingly, we are pausing to await the results before

M,mora,rdum of Discussi o ,r of th , NSC Meetin g 263

trying co settle on [Pham Huy] Quat or Defense Minister [sic] Do as possible replacements. Secretary Dulles confessed that he was not much impressed with the Defense Minister. On the other band, unless something occurs in the Saigon disorders out of which Diem will emerge as the hero, we will have to have a change. This is the view both of General Collins and General Ely, and Ely has played an honest game with us in the whole affair.

LE DUAN, "DUONG LOI CACH MANG MIEN NAM,"

[THE PATH OF REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH]

Circa 1956

The situation forces bellicose states such as the U.S. and Britain to recognize that if they adventurously start a world war, they them- selves will be the first to be destroyed, and thus the movement to demand peace in those imperialist countries is also developing strongly.

Recently, in the U.S Presidential election, the present Republican administration, in order to buy the people's esteem, put forward the slogan " Peace and Prosperiry," which showed that even the people of an imperialist warlike country like the U.S. want peace.

The general situation shows us that the forces of peace and democ- raC)' in the world have tipped the balance toward the camp of peace and democracy. Therefore we can conclude that the world at present can maintain long-term peace.

On the other hand, however, we can also conclude that as long as the capitalist economy survives, it will a lways scheme to provoke war, and there will still remain the danger of war.

Based on the above the world situation, the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union produced rwo important judgments:

1. All conflicts in the world at present can be resolved by means of peaceful negotiations.

265

266 PART Ill: 195~ • 1960

2. The revolutionary mo,,ement in many countries at present can develop peacefully. Naturally in the countries in which the ruling class has a powerful military-police apparatus and is using fascist policies to repress the movement, the revolutionary parties m those countries must look clearly at their concrete situation to have tbe appropriate methods of struggle.

Based on the general situation and that judgment, we conclude that, if all conflicts can be resolved by means of peaceful negotiations, peace can be achieved.

Because the interest and aspiration of peaceful reunification of our country are the common interest and aspiration of all the people of the Northern and Southern zones, the people of the rwo zones did not have any reason to provoke wa r, nor to prolong the division of the country. On the contrary the people of the two zones are more and more deter• mined to oppose the U.S.-Diem scheme of division and war provocation in order to create favorable conditions for negotiations between the two zones for peaceful unification of the country.

The pre~cnc situation of division is created solely by the arbitrary U.S.-Diem regime, so the fundamental problem is how to smash the U.S.-Diem scheme of division and war-provocation.

As observed above, if they want to oppose the U.S-Diem regime, there is no other path for the people of the South but the parh of revolution. What, then, is the line and struggle method of rhe revolutionary move- ment in the South? lf the world situation can maintain peace due to a change in the relationship of forces in the world in favor of the camp of peace and democracy, the revolutionary movement can develop follow- ing a peaceful line, and the revolutionary movement in the South can a lso develop fo llowing a peaceful liine.

First of all, we must determine what it means for a revo lutionary movement to struggle accord ing to a peaceful line. A revolutionary movement struggling according to a peaceful li11e takes the political forces of the people as the base rather than using people's armed forces to struggle with the existing government to achieve their revolutionary objective. A revolutionary movement struggling according to a peaceful line is also diffe_rent from a reformist movement in that a reformist move- ment relies fundamentally on the law and constitution to struggle, while a revolutionary movement re0ies on the revolutionary political forces

The Palh of Revol,1.1io11 ; ,, the South 267

of the masses as the base. And another difference is that a revolutionary movement struggles for revolutionary objectives, while a reformist move- ment struggles fo r reformiSt goals.

With a n imperialist, feudalist, dictatoria l, fascist government like the U.S.-Diem, is it possible for a peaceful political struggle line to achieve its objectives?

We must recognize that a ll accomplishments in every co untry are due to the people. That is a definite law: it cannot be otherw ise. Therefore the line of the re,•olucionary movement must be in accord with the inclina- tions and aspirations of the people. Only in that way can a revolutionary movement be mobilized and succeed .

The ardent aspiration of the Southern people is to maintain peace and achieve national unification. We muSt dearly recognize this longing for peace: the revolutionary movement in the South can mobilize and advance co s uccess on the basis of grasping the flag of peace, in harmony with popular fee lings. On the contrary, U.S.-Diem is using fascist vio- lence to provoke war, contrary to the w ill of the people and therefore must cerrainly be defeated.

C'.an the U,S.-Diem regime, by using a clumsy policy of fascist violence, create a strong force to oppose and destroy the revolutionary movement? Definitely not, because the U.5.-Diem regime has no political strength in the country worth mentioning co rely o n. O n the contrary, nearly a ll strata of the people oppose chem. Therefore the U.S.-Diem government is not a strong government it is only a vil.e and bruta l government. Its vile and brutal character means th at it not only has no mass base in the coun- try but is o n the way to being isolated internationally. Its cruelty defi- nitely cannot shake the revolutionary movement, and it cannot survive for long.

The proof is that in the past two years, everywhere in the country- side, the sound of the gunfire of U.S.-Diem repression never ceased; nor a day went by when they did not kill patriots, but the revolutionary spirit is sti ll firm, a nd the revolutionary base of the people still has not been shaken.

O nce the entire people have become determined to protect the revolu- tion, there is no cruel fo rce. that can shake it. But why has the revolution- ary movement not yet developed strongly? This is a lso due co certain objective and subjective factors. Objectively, we see that, after nine years of waging strong a rmed Struggle, the people's movement generally speaking

268 PART Ill: 195~ • 1960

now has a temporarily peaceful character that is a factor in the change of the movement for violent fo rms of struggle to peaceful fo rms. It has the correct character of rebuilding to advance later.

With the cruel repression and exploitation of the. U.S.-Diem, the people's revolutionary movement definitely will rise up. The people of the South have known the blood and 6re of njne yea rs of resistance war, but the cruelty of the U.S.-Diem cannot extinguish the struggle spirit of the people.

On the ocher hand, subjectively, we must admit that a large number of cadres, those have responsibility for guiding the revolutionary move- ment, because of the change in the method of struggle and the work situ· ation from public to secret, have not yet firmly grasped the political line of the parry, have not yet firmly grasped the method of politica l struggle, and have not yet followed correctly the mass line, and therefore have greatly reduced the movement's possibilities for development.

At present, therefore, the political struggle movement has not yet developed equa lly among the people, and a primary reason is that a aum· ber of cadres and masses are not yet aware that the strength of political forces of the people can defeat the cruel!)', oppre,55ion and exploitation of the U.S.-Diem, and therefore they have a half-way attitude and don't believe in the sttength of their political forces.

We must admit that any revolutionary movement has times when it fal ls and times when it rises; amy revolutionary movement has times that are favorab le for development and times that are unfavorable. The basic thing is that the cadres must see clearly the character of the movement's development to lead tbe mass struggle co the correct degree, and find a way for the vase determined masses to participate in the movement. If they are determined co sttuggle from the bottom to the top, no force can resist the determination of the great masses.

In the past two years, the political struggle movement in the country· side and in the cities, either by one form or another, has shown that the masses have much capacity for political sttuggle with the U.S.-Diem. In those struggles, if we grasp more firmly the struggle line and method, the movement can develop further, to the advantage of the revolution. The cruel policy of U.S.-Diem clearly cannot break the movement, or the people's will 10 struggle.

There are those who think that the U.S.-Diem's use of violence is now aimed fundamenta lly at killing the leaders of the revolutionary

The Palh of Revol,1.1io11 ; ,, the South 269

movement to destroy the Communist Party, and that if the Communist Party is worn away to the point that it doesn't have the capacity to lead the revolution, the political stmggle movement of the masses cannot develop.

This judgment is incorrect. Those wlho lead the revolutionary move- ment are determined to mingle with the masses, to protect and serve the interest of the masses and to pursue correctly the mass line. Between the masses and communists there is no distinction any more. So how can the U.S.-Diem destroy the leaders of the revolutionary movement, since the)' cannot destroy the masses? Therefore they cannot annihilate the cadres leading the mass movement.

MANIFESTO OF THE EIGHTEEN , SAIGON

April 1960

THE PRESIDENT O F THE REPUBUC OF VIET-NAM

Saigon

Mr. President:

We the undersigned, representing a group of eminent citizens and person- a lities, intellectuals of a ll tendencies, and men of good will, recognize in the face of the gravity of the present political s ituation that we can no longer remain indifferent to the realities of life in our country.

Therefore, we officially address to you today an appeal with the aim of exposing to you the whole truth in the hope that the government w ilJ accord it all the attention necessary so as tO urgently modify its policies, so as to remedy the present situation and lead the people o ut of danger.

Let us look roward the past, at the time when you were abroad. For eight or nine years, the Vietnamese people suffered many trials due to the war: They passed from French domination to J apanese occupa- tion, from revolution to resistance, &om the nationalist imposture behind which hid communism to a pseudo-independence covering up for colo- nialism; from terror to terror, from sacrifice to sacrifice-in short, from promise to promise, until finally hope ended in bitter disillusion.

Thus, when you were on the point of returning to the country, the people as a whole entertained the hope that it would find aga in under your guidance the peace that is necessary to give meaning t0 existence, to reconstruct the destroyed homes, put to the plow again the abandoned

27 1

272 PART Ill: 195~ • 1960

lands. The people hoped no longer robe compelled ro pay homage ro one regime in the morning and to another at night, nor ro be the prey of the cruelties and oppression of once faction; no longer to be treated as coolies; no longer ro be at the mercy of the monopolies; no longer to have ro endure the depredations of corrupt and despotic civil servants. In one word, the people hoped to live in security at last, under a regime which would give them a little bit of justice and liberty. The whole people thought that you would be the man of the situation and that you would implement its hopes.

Thar is the way it was when you returned. The Geneva Accords of 1954 put an end ro combat and ro the devastations of war. The French Expeditionary Corps was progressively withdrawn, and total indepen- dence of South Vier Nam had become a reality. Furthermore, the country had benefited from moral encouragement and a substantial increase of foreign aid from the free world. With so many favorable political factors, in addition to the blessed geographic conditions of a fertile and rich soil yielding agricultural, forestry, and fishing surpluses, South Viet Nam should have been able to begir, a definitive victory in the historical com- petition with the Norrh, so as to carry out the will of the people and to lead the country on the way to hope, liberty, and happiness. Today, six years later, having benefited from so many undeniable advantages, what has the government been able to do? Where has it led South Viet Nam? What parts of the popular aspirations have been implemented?

Let us try ro draw an objective balance of the situation, without flattery or false accusations, strictly following a constructive line which you yourself have so often indicated, in the hope that the government shall modi£)' its policies so as to extricate itself from a situation that is extremely dangerous to die very existence of the nation.

POLJCIES

In spire of the fact that the bastard regime created and protected by colo- nialism has been overthrown and that many of the feudal organizations of factions and parries which oppress the population were destroyed, the people do not know a better life or more freedom under the republican regime which you have create-cl. A consrirurion has been established in forrn only; a National Assembly exists whose deliberations always fa LI into line with the government; antidemocratic elections- all those are methods

Ma11i { es/ o o f the Eightee11. Saigon 2 7 3

and "comedies" copied from the. dictawrial Communist regimes, which obviously cannot serve as terms of comparison with North Vier Nam.

Continuous arrests fill the jails and [Prisons to the rafters, as at this precise moment; public opinion and the press are reduced to silence. The same applies to tbe popular will as translated in certain open elections, in which it is insulted and trampled (as was the case, for example, during the recent elections for the Second Legislature). All these have provoked the d iscouragement and resentment of the people.

Political parties and reLlgious sects have been eliminated. "Groups" or "movements" have replaced them. But this substitution has only brought about new oppressions against the population without protecting it for that matter against Communist enterprises. Here is one example: the fiefs of religious seers, which hitherto were dea.dly for the Communisrs, now nor only provide no security whatever but have become favored highways for Vier Minh guerrillas, as is, by the way, the case of the rest of the country.

This is proof that the religious seers, though futile, nevertheless consti• cure effective anti-Communist elements. Their elimination has opened the wai• to the Viet Cong and unintentionally has prepared the way for the enemy, whereas a more realistic and more flexible policy could have amal- gamated them all with a view to reinforcing the anti-Communist front.

Today the people want freedom. You should, Mr. President, liberalize the regime, promote democracy, guarantee minimum civil rights, recognize the opposition so as to permit the citizens to express themselves without fear, thus removing grievances and resentments, opposition to which now constitutes for the people their sole reason for existence. When this occurs, the people of South Viet Nam, in comparing their position with char of the North, will appreciate the value of true liberty and of authentic democracy. It is only at that rime that th.e people will make all the neces- sary efforts and sacrifices to defend that liberty and democracy.

ADMINISTRATION

The size of the territory bas shrunk, but the number of civil servants has increased, and still the work doesn't get done. This is because the govern- ment, like the Communists, lets the political parties control the popula- tion, separate the elite from the lower echelons, and sow distrust between those individuals who are "af6Jiated with the movement" and those who are " outside the group." Effective power, no longer in the hand~ of those

274 PART Il l : 195~ • 1960

who a re us ua lly responsible, is concentrated in fact in the hands of an irrespons ible member of the ;'family," from w hom emanates a ll orders; this slows down the adminjstrative machinery, paralyzes all initiative, discourages good will. Ar rhe same time, nor a month goes by w ithout the press being full of stories about graft impossible ro hide; this becomes an endless parade of illega l transactions involving millions of piastres.

The adm inistrative machiner y, a lready slowed down, is about ro become completely para lyzed. It is in urgent need of reorganization. Competent people should be p ut back in the proper jobs; discip line must be re-establis hed from the top ro rbe bottom of rhe h iera rchy; authority must go hand in band with responsibilfry; efficiency, initiative, honesty, and rhe economy should be rhe criteria for promotion; p rofessional qualifications should be respected. Favoritism based on fami ly or parry connections should be banishe-d; the selling of influence, corruption and abuse of power must be punished.

Thus, everything still can be saved, human dignity can be reestab- lished; faith in an honest a nd just government can be restored.

ARMY

The French Expeditionary Cor ps has left the country, a nd a republican army has been constituted, thanks to American aid, which has equipped it with modern materiel. Nevertheless, even in a group of the proud elite of the youth such as the Vietnamese Army-where rhe sense of honor shou ld be c ultivated, whose b lood and a rms should be devoted ro the defense of the country, where there should be no place for clannish ness and factions -the spirit of the "national revolutionary movement" o r of the "persona list body" d ivides the men of one and the same unit, sows distru st between frie nds of rhe same rank, and uses as a criterion for promotion fide lity coward rhe parry in blind submission to its leaders. Th is creates extremely dangerous situations, such as the recent incident of Tay-Ninh.•

The purpose of the army, pi.liar of the defense of the country, is to srop fore ign invasions a nd to e limi:nate rebel movements. Ir is ar the service of rhe country only and s ltould nor lend itself to the exploitation of any factio n or parry. !rs coral reorganization is necessary. Clannishness and

• Thjs referS to the penetration of the compound of the 32d AR VN Regiment in January, l 960, when communist forces killed 23 .soldjer.;; and captured hundreds of weapons.

Ma11i { es/ o o f the Eightee11. Saigon 2 7 .5

party obedience should be eliminated; its moral base strengthened; a noble tradition of national pride created; and fighting spirit, professional conscience, and bravery should become criteria for promotion. The troops should be encouraged to respect their officers, and the officers should be encouraged to love their men. Distrust, jealousy, rancor among colleagues of the same rank should be eliminated.

Then in case of danger, the nation will have at its disposal a va liant army animated by a single spirit and a single aspiration: ro defend the most precious possession-our country, Viet Nam.

ECONOMIC ANO SOCIAL AFFAIRS.

A rich and fertile country enjoying food surpluses; a budget which does not have to face military expenditures:, •• important war reparations; substantial profits from Treasury bonds; a colossal foreign-aid program; a developing marker capable of receiving foreign capital investments- those are the many favorable conditions which could make Viet Nam a productive and prosperous nation. H owever, at the present time many people are out of work, have no roof over their heads, and no money, Rice is abundant bur does nor sell; sbop windows are well-stocked bur the goods do nor move. Sources of revenue are in the hands of specula- tors-who use the [government] parry and group to mask monopolies operating for certain private interests. At the same time, thousands of persons are mobilized for exhausting work, compelled to leave their own jobs, homes and families, ro participate in the construction of magnifi- cent bur useless "agrovilles " which weary them and provoke their disaffection, thus aggravating popular r,esentmenr and creating an ideal terra in for enemy propaganda.

The economy is the very foundation of society, and public opinion ensures the survival of the regime. The government must destroy all the obstacles standing in the way of economic development; must abolish a ll forms of monopoly and speculation; must create a favorable environment for investments coming from foreign friends as well as from our own citi- zens; must encourage commercial enterprises, develop industry, and create jobs to reduce unemployment. Ar the same time, it should put an end ro all forms of human exploitation in the work camps of the agrovilles.

• • Tue militnr)' expenditures o f the Viet.name-se- budget are paid out of U.S. economic and mjli1ar)' aid.

276 PART Ill: 195~ • 1960

Then only the economy will flourish again; the citizen will find again a peaceful life and wi ll enjoy bis condition; society will be reconstructed in an atmosphere of freedom and democracy.

Mr. President, this is perhaps the first time that you have heard such severe and disagreeable criticism-so contrary to your own desires. Nevertheless, sir, these words are strictly the truth, a truth that is bitter and bard , that you have never been able to know because, whether this is intended or nor, a void has !been created around you, and by the very fact of your high position, no one permjrs you co perceive the critical point at which truth shall burst forth in irresistible waves of hatred on the part of a people subjected for a long time to terrible suffering and a people who shall rise to break the bonds which hold it down. It shall sweep away the ignominy and all the injustices which surround and oppress it.

As we do not w ish, in all sincerity, that our Fatherland should have to live through these perilous days, we-without raking into consideration the consequences which our attitude may bring upon us- are ringing today the a larm bell, in view of the imminent danger whid1 threatens the governmenr,

Until now, we have kept sLlenr and preferred to let the Executive act as it wished. Bur now tune is of the essence; we feel that it is our duty-and in the case of a nation in turmoil even the most humble people have their share of responsibility-to speak the truth, to awaken public opiruon, to alert the people, and to urufy the opposition so as to point the way. We beseech the government to urgently modify its policies so as to remedy the situation, 10 defend the republican regime, and to safeguard the exis- tence of the nation. We hold firm hope that the Viemamese people shall know a brilliant future in which it will enjoy peace and prosperity in freedom and progress.

Yours respectfully,

1. TRAN VAN VAN, Diploma of Higher Commercial Studies, former Minister of Economy and Planning 2. PHAN KHAC SUU, Agricultural Engineer, forrner Minister of Agriculture, former Minister of Labor 3. TRAN VAN HUONG, Professor of Secondary Education, former Prefect of Saigon-Cholon

Ma11i { es/ o o f the Eightee11. Saigon 2 77

4. NGUYEN, LUU VIEN, M.D., former Professor at the Medical School , former High Commissioner of Refugees 5. HUYNH-KIM HUU, M.D., fo rmer Minister of Public Health 6 . PHAN HUY QUA T, M.D., forme r Minister of National Education , former Minister of Defense 7. TRAN VAN LY, former Governor of Central Viet-Nam 8. NGUYEN TIEN HY, M.D. 9. TRAN VAN DO, M.D., forme r Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chairman of Vietnamese Delegation to the 1954 Geneva Confere nce 10. LE NGOC CHAN, Attorney at Law, fo rmer Secreta ry of State for National Defense 1 I. LE QUANG LUAT, Attorney at Law, fo rmer Government Delegate for North Viet-Nam, fo rmer Minister of Informatio n and Propaganda 12. LUONG TR ONG TUONG, Public Works Engineer, forme r Secretar y of State fo r Nationa l Economy 13. NGUYEN TANG NGUYEN, M.D. , former Minister of Labor a nd Yo uth 14. PHAM H UU CHUONG, M.D., fo rmer Minister of Public Health and Social Action 15. TRAN VAN TUYEN, Attorney at Law, former Secretary of Stare fo r Information and Propaganda 16. T A CHUONG PHUNG, former Provincial Governor for Binh-Dirth 17. TRAN LE CHAT, Laureate of the Triennial Mandarin Competition ofl903 18. H O VAN VUI, Reverend, former Parish Priest of Saigon, at present Parish Priest of T ha-l a, Province of Tai•-Ninh

P A RT IV

1961-1963

LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S DEPUTY

ASSIST ANT FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS (LANSDALE ) TO

PRESIDENT DIEM 30 January 1961

Dear Friend: Your thoughtful kindness made the trip to Vietnam a most interesting and memorable one for me. I was happy to see you looking so well, despite the many problems you face every day, and it was a real pleasure to have had visits with you. So, thank you for aU your help, for letting Nguyen Dinh Thuan go along o n the 5th Military Region trip, and for the sandwiches you sent along! I know that Joe Redick would want to join me in expressing appreciar'lon, too.

On the way home, I stopped in H awaii for a vis it at CINCPAC. I had good talks with Admiral Felt and his staff. I called attention to the grave dangers of the current Viet Cong threat and the need for some extra attention by the U.S. He was extremely interested and, although under- standably engaged with urgent duties concerni11g Laos, put some of his staff to work promptly on your problems. I understand that he sent General Thiemer out for a visit.

In Washington, Secretary Gares and Deputy Secretary Douglas of Defense were most receptive to my report. Douglas in particular called it to the attention of our top people at the White House and State

281

Department. When the new Administration rook office, Douglas went co considerable lengths to make our new leaders aware of the situation. He is a very staunch friend. Allen Dulles, also, has been most helpful. General Lemnitur and Admiral Burke had been instrumental in getting me out on the trip and have taken great interest in what I reported.

T he new Defense leaders (Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, and Paul Nitze the new Assistant Secretary for JSA) all had me in for talks with them about your problems. Then, lase Saturday, President Kerrnedy had me in. for a long talk on the subject. He was warmly interested and asked many questions. I am sure that you can count upon him as an understanding friend and that you will be hearing further about this. Ir would have "warmed your heart" co have heard this conversation. So, you see, you do have some sincere friends in Washington..

However, there will be some here who will point out that much of the danger of your present situation comes about from your own actions. They say that you try co do coo many things yourself, rhar you refuse to give real responsibility to ochers and keep interfering with what they do, that you fee l you are infallible personally, and that too many of your organizations like the Republican Youth Corps and the Can Lao Party are actually formed by coercio n-that is, people join because they are afraid not to-rather than being genuine organizations rooted in the hearts of the Vietnamese people. I believe there will be many of these c riticisms voiced in private talks here as word gets around about favo r- able reactions to my report.

T he best answer to these criticisms would be actions by you in Vietnam. The critics would then have to close their mouths in the face of your actions. One action would be for you to announce your reorganiza- tion of the government very soon. Also, you could make your Security Council become alive a nd dynamic. Please remember my suggestion: call the military commanders and province chiefs in from rhe lSt and 5th Military Regions- co meet with the Security Council. You could make a talk to chis group, and broadcast it all over Vietnam to all of the people of Vietnam. Your country needs you ro rouse spirits right now, the way Winston Churchill did for Britain at a dark hour. Your countrymen need to be cold chat Vietnam is in grave danger from the Communists, that the help of every citizen is welcomed by the government, and chat Vietnam must and will be kept free and independent.

Letter Fr o m Lansdale to Diem 283

After your ta lk co this group, it wolllld be smart to turn the meeting over co Vice President Tho or Secretary Thuan. The meeting should be a secret one. I believe that each province chief, each responsible military commander, and the regional delegues, should report openly and frankly on the problems they have in their own areas. You did this once before, in February 1955, and it was a very wise and healthy action. You wi ll hear many things, not only bad problems but a lso good ideas. So wil l a ll of those at such a rneecing.

It would help you very much if y·ou could include some of the Americans w ho are crying to help you- let them attend this meeting and cake notes. You can invite those you believe co be sincere. They, too, would learn a Joe and would become more realistic in their work in Vietnam. I would include McGarr and Colby.

Now, the political opposition to you worries me greatly. I have thought about it for many hours and days s ince leaving Vietnam. There is much ugly ralk and bad feeling among many people in Saigon. Ir is so ugly and bad that I am afraid it will prompt some thoughtless persons to attempt another coup. You are one of the great leaders of the Free World and a friend for whom I ha1•e deep affocrion, So, please take my words in the friendship with which they are offered.

Simply suppressing this political feeling of opposition by arresting people or closing down newspapers will only turn the talk into deep emo- tions of hatred and generate the formation of more clandestine organiza- tions and plots co oppose you. This is so far from your real nature and your gifted talents of leadership that I know )'Ou are seeking a better solution.

An idea suggests itself for your consideration of this problem of the political opposition. If you cou ld get most of the oppositionists working on a program of specific ideas to save t he nation, and to work on this program freely among themselves outside of the government, you would turn the major share of their political energies into constructive work. They would argue among themselves over their ideas, trying co get each other to accept these ideas, rather than spend their political energies attacking you.

How do you do this? Perhaps you yourself cannot. Bue, you are the on ly person who can set the proper political climate for such an action. It needs you ro rell the people, including the oppositioniscs, that Vietnam is in grave danger. It needs you co remove the lurking fear of secret a rrest at night as punishment for political activ icy; whether such fears are based

on fact or false hood , the point is that ma ny people believe that special police under Dr. Tuyen make politica l arrests at night, with the knowl- edge of your brother Nhu.

Perhaps the wisest move would be to call in the younger people among the opposition. Ir would be best if you talked to them personally. You might teU them that Vietnam stands to lose its freedom, that all Vietnamese must go ro work now to save that freedom, that you know the oppositionisrs have not agreed with all your programs bur that run- ning a goverrunenr w hich is under savage Communist arrack is not as simple as critics apparently think. You wanr people not to merely criticize their government. If they believe they have good ideas, they should write these down and agree to a program they believe would save the country. Nor a Communist program, bur a program by Free Vietnamese. If they go to work ro w rite and agree upon such a program, you can assure them that you won't stand in their way-even if it means the formation of a strong, s ingle opposition parry.

You might ta lk 10 them, too, the way you did to me in 1955 and 1956- tha r your dream for Vietnam was to have two strong political parries, You might point out th at you ca lled the younger people in from the opposition g ro ups because they are the ones w ho have to build the future. They will live in it. Too many of the older politicians are living in the past or are selfishly looking for power for themselves.

Well, this became a very long letter. My suggestions were prompted by the fact that many people in Washington, just like many people in Asia, are watching you right now to see what you will do next. I am s ure that whatever you do, you will do it resolutely and w ith wisdom. I w ill help to the extent that an American official can.

With warmesr and best personal wishes, as always.

Sincerely

Edward G. Lansdale

Brigadier General, USAF

THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PRO GRAM

1961- 1963

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

A specific strategy by which the U.S. and GVN would attempt to end the insurgency in South Vietnam had never been agreed upon at the time tha t the U.S. decided, late in 1961, to increase materially its assistance to CVN and to expand its advisory efforr into one which would implement a " lim- ited parmersbip." By early 1962, however, there was apparent consensu~ among the principal parricipams that the Strategic Hamlet Program, as it came to be called, represented the unifying concept for a strategy designed to pacify rural Vietnam (the Viet Cong's chosen battleground ) and to develop support among the peasants for the central government.

The Strategic Hamlet Program was much broader than the construc- tion of strategic hamlets per se. It envisioned sequentia l phases which, beginning with clearing the insurgents from an area and protecting the rural populace, progressed through the establishment of GVN infrastruc- ture and thence to the provision of serv ices which would lead the peas- ants to identify with their government. The strategic hamlet program was, in short, a n attempt to translate the newly ar ticulated theory of counter-insurgency into operational rea lity. The objective was political though the means to its realization were a mjxture of military, socia l, psychological, economic and political measures.

The effect of these sequentia l steps to pacification was to make it very difficult to make intermediate assessments of progress. One could not really be sure how one was doing until one was done. Physical security by

285

itself (the so-called " clear and hold" initial step) was a necessary condition for pacification, not a sufficient one. The establishment of goverrunenral functions was not, by itself, necessarily conducive ro a successful effort; the quality of those functions and their respons iveness to locall y felt needs was critical. This inherent difficulry in assessing progress did not simply mean that it was difficult to identify problems and ro make improvements as one went along- which it was. Jr a lso meant that it was q uite possible to conclude char the program as a whole was progressing well (or badly) according to evidence relating only to a s ingle phase or a part of a phase.

A related problem arose from the uniqueness of this program in American experience-pacification by proxy. The theory of sequential phases could be variously interpreted. T his is nor the problem of the three blind men describing the elephant; it is the problem of men with different perspectives each moulding his own conception of a proper body to the same skeleton. If the final product were to have some sem- blance of coherence and mutual satisfaction it was necessary that the shapers came ro agreement on substance and operational procedure, not just that they agree on the proper skeleton upon w hich to work.

The problem with the apparem consensus which emerged early in 1962 was that the principal participants did view it with different per- spectives and expectations. On the U.S. side, mifoary advisors had a set of preferences w hich affected their approach to the Strategic H amlet Program. T hey wanted to make RVNAF more mobile, more aggressive, and better organized to take the offensive against the Viet Cong. They were, consequently, extremely leery of proposals which might lead it to be tied down in Strategic defenses ("holding" aher " clearing" bad been completed) o r diverted too much to military civic action undertakings.

T he American political lead ership, insofar as a generalization may be attempted, may be said to have been most concerned with the later phases of the program- those in which GVN services were provided, loca l governments established, and the economy bolstered. Mlitary clearing operations were, to them, a distasteful, expensive, but necessary precondition to the really critical and important phases of the effort.

Both of these U.S. g ro ups had perspectives different from those of the Diem administration. In the U.S. view the insurgents were only one of Diem's enemies; he himself was the other. In this view the process of pacification could proceed successfully only if Diem reformed his own government. It was precisely to ach iel'e these goals simultaneously that

The Strategic /tam/et Program 287

the U.S. agreed ro enter a "limited partnership" with GVN in the counter-insurgent effort. The Strategic Hamler Program became the operational symbol of this effort.

President Diem-unsurprisingly-had a very different view. His need, as he saw it, was 10 get the U.S. committed to South Vietnam (and 10 his administration) without surrendering his independence. He knew that his nation would fall without U.S. support; he feared that his government would fall if he either appeared to toady m U.S. wishes or allowed any single group 100 much potential power-particularly coercive power. The Strategic Hamlet Program offered a vehicle by which he could direct the counterin- surgenr effort as he thought it should be dire<.'ted and without giving up either his prerogatives to the U.S. or his mantle 10 his restless generals.

The program, in the form of a plan for pacification of the Delta, was formally proposed 10 Diem in November 1961 by R. G. K. Thompson, head of the newly arrived British Advisory Mission. U.S. military advisors favored at that time an ARVN penetration of the VC redoubt in War Zone D prior 10 any operations aimed specifically at pacification_ But U.S. political desires to srart some local operation which could achieve concrete gains combined with Diem's preference for a pacification effort in an area of strategic imporrance led tO the initial effort in March 1962, "Operation SUNRlSE," in Binh Duong Province north of Saigon_ This was a heavily VC-influlrrared area rather than one of mi:ni-mat penetration, as Thompson had urged. But planning- as distinct from operations-continued on the Delta plan and strategic hamlets were conscructed in a variegated, uncoordinated pattern throughout the spring and early summer. The U.S. had little or no influence over these actiivities; the primary impetus was traceable directly co the President's brother and political counsellor, Ngo Dinh Nhu.

In August 1962, GVN produced its long awaited national pacification plan with four priority areas and specified priorities within each area. At the same time, however, it indicated that over 2,500 strategic hamlets had already been completed and that work was already underway on more than 2,500 more. Although it was not until October 1962, that GVN explicitly announced the Strategic Hamler Program to be the unify- ing concept of its pacification and counrerinsurgenr effort ir was clear earlier that the program had assumed this central position.

Three imporranr implications of this early progress (or, more precisely, reported progress) are also clear in retrospect. These implications seem

nor to have impressed themselves acutely upon U.S. observers at the time. First, the program was truly one of GVN initiative rather than one embodying priorities and time phasing recommended by tbe U.S. Diem was running with his own ball in programmatic terms, no matter who articulated tbe theory of the approach. The geographic dispersion of hamlets already reported to be completed indicated that there was, in fact, a conscious effort to implement this phase almost simultaneously throughout the entire nation rather tban to build slowly as Diem's for- eign advisors (both U.S. and British) recommended.

Finally, the physical aspects of Diem's program were similar if not identical to earlier population resettlement and control efforts practiced by the French and by Diem. The long history of these efforts was marked by consistency in re-suits as well as in techniques: all failed dismally because they ran into resentment if not active resistance on the part of the peasants at whose control and safety, then loyalty, they were aimed. U.S. desires to begin an effective process of pacification had fastened onto security as a necessary precondition and slighted the historic record of rural resistance to resettlement. President Diem and his brother, for their part, had decided to emphasize control of the rural population as the precondition to winning loyalty. The record is inconclusive with respect to their weighing tbe record of the past but it appears that they, too, paid it scant attention. Thus the early operational efforts indicated a danger of peasant resistance,. on one hand, and of divergent approach- es between, in the initial steps, the U.S. (focused on security measures) and Diem (concerned more with control measures). Since the physical actions to achieve security and those to impose control are in many respects the same, there was generated yet another area in which assess- ments of progress would be inconclusive and difficult to make.

U.S. attention, once an apparent consensus had been forged concen- trated on program management efforts in two categories: to convince GVN to proceed at a more measured, coherent pace with a qualitative improvement in tbe physical construction of strategic hamlets; and to schedule material assistance (fortification materials, etc.) and training for local defense forces to match the rare of desired hamlet construction.

U.S. asses.sments, at the same time, concentrated on the physical aspects of the program and on VC activity in areas where strategic ham- lets had been constructed. Assessments tended to be favorable from a security (or control) viewpoint and uneven with respect 10 political

The Strategic /tam/et Program 289

development. The general concl usion was a lmost always one of cautious optimism when security (control ) was emphasized, one of hopeful pes- simism w hen politica l fo llow-up was stressed. The impression in Washington was typically slanted toward the more optimistic appraisals if fo r no other reason than that hamlet construction and security arrangements were the 6.rst chronological steps in the long process to pacification. Was it nor, after all, " progress" to have moved from doing nothing to doing something even though the something was being done imperfect) y?

These U.S. assessments changed only marginally througho ut the life of the program. By the time, in 1963, that the hopeful pessimist voices were clearer, it was also much clearer that the Ngo brothers had made the Strategic Hamler Program into one closely identi6.ed with their regime and with Diem's rather esoterically phrased " personalisr revolution." Fears grew that Diem was attempting to impose loyalty from the top through control rather than to bui ld it from the bottom by deeds. These fears were nor limited to the Strategic Hamlet Program, however; they extended 10 urban as weB as rural phases of South Vietnamese li fe and were subsumed, as the Buddhist que,stio111 moYed co the fore, hi• the gen- enl issue of the viability of Diem's regime.

President Diem grew increasingly unwilling to meet U.S. demands fo r reform. He believed that to do so wouHd cause his government to fai l. U.S. observers held that failure 10 do so would cause the nation, nor just the governrnenr to fall. ln the event the government fell and the nation's counrerinsurgenr program rook a definjre rum for the worse, bur the nation did not fa ll. The Strategic Hamlet Program did. Closely identified with the Ngo brothers, it was almost bound to suHer their fortunes; when they rued it died, too. The new government of generals, presumably rea lizing the extent of peasant displeasure with resettlement and control measures, did nothing to save it.

A number of contributory reasons can be cited for the fa ilure of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Over-expansion of construction and poor quality of defenses forms one category. This reason concentrates only on the initial phase of the program, howeYer. While valid, it does little to explain w hy the entire program collapse,d rather than only some hamlets within it. Rural a ntagonisms which identified the program with its spon- sors in the central government are more suggestive of the basis for the complete collapse as Diem and Nhu departed the scene. The reasons why

they departed are traceable in part to the different expectations which combined in the apparent consensus at the program's beginning: to Diem 's insistence on material assistance and independence, ro U.S. will- ingness to provide assistance only if its advice was heeded, and ro the failure ro resolve this question either by persuasion or leverage.

Having said this, it does nor automatically follow that the program would have succeeded even if Diem had met U.S. demands for change. To point to the causes of failure is one thjng; ro assume that changes of style would have led to success is quite another. It may well he that the program was doomed from the outset because of peasant resistance to measures whjch changed the pattern of rural life-whether aimed at security or control. Ir might have been possible, on the ocher hand, for a well-executed program eventually ro have achieved some measure of suc- cess. The early demise of the program does nor pennit a conclusive evaluation. The weight of evidence suggests that the Strategic Hamlet Program was fatally flawed in its conception by the unintended conse- quence of alienating many of those whose loyalty it aimed ro win.

This inconclusive finding, in turn, suggests that the sequential phases embodied in the doctrine of counterinsurgency may slight some very important problem areas. The evidence is nor sufficient for an indict- ment; still less is one able ro validate the counrerinsurgent doctrine with reference to a program that faiiled. The only verdict that may be given at this rime with respect to the validity of the doctrine is that used by Scots courrs- "case not proved."

KENNEDY AND MCNAMARA PREPARE FOR WAR

As the Vietnam situation heats up, the National Security Council disc.t,sws how to fig/Jr a 1tlar iu thar country. It discusses diplomatic matters (contaas ruith rl,c Co -Chairmen of the Geneva Co,rfere,,ce and with Khrushcbev). It

also examines militAry co11sideratiot1s-so.me as specific as the pcrfomtance of American assault rifles.

Note that Kennedy mggem • a group specially trained for guerrilla warfare. ··

MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESI DENT [KENNEDY] TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE [RUSK) AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE [MCNAMARA]

Top Secret

Washington, 11- 14- 61 [NOTE: The source cexc bears the following handwritten notation by Bundy: " used by President as talking paper 11- 14 before NSC. MGB"J

I chink we should gee our ducks in a row for tomorrow morning's meet• ing. I believe we should make more precise our requests for action. In cbe papers wh ich I have seen our requests have been of a general nature.

1. I would like co have you consider the proposals made by Governor Harriman. 1 I am wondering if he should recum, perhaps on Friday 111- 17] to discuss the maccer further with Pushkin.

1 Apparentl>' a reference to Harriman's draft memo which he transmitted to the Presjde.nt under CO\'er of a letter of I l- 12~ 239 fiJe.

291

2. In the. meantime what action should be taken toward South Vietnam pending the ar,ival of Ha rriman.

3. I would like a letter tO be written to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference to call a meeting of the conference to consider immediately South Viet Nam as a breach of the accord. As we will be breaching the Geneva accords ourselves it is important that we lay the groundwork. The Jorden report will do some of this. Has anyone examined the political implications in their efforrs.

4. Should I address a statement today 10 Khrushchev concerning South Viet Nam stating how dangerous we thought the situation was.

5. If we are going to send a nulitary ma.n as a Commanding Officer at the 4 -star level for South Viet Nam, perhaps we could name a younger general and give him a sta r or do you know someone who already has the stars who can handle the situation.

6. I gather you felt that we should have a general military command set up. We want to make sure that someone like George McGhee heads it, in fact, it might be well to send McGhee.

7. I would like to have someone look into what we did in Greece. How much money and men were involved. How much money was used for guerilla warfare? Should we have not done it at the company level rather than at the battalion level? It is proposed by the military that we should operate from the battalion level or even before this.

Are we prepared tO send in hundreds and hundreds of men and dozens and dozens of ships? If we would just show up with 4 or 5 ships this will not do much good. Or am I misinformed?

I think there s hould be a group specially trained for guerrilla warfare. I understand that the guns that have been used have been too heavy. Would carbines be better> Wonder if someone could make sure we a.re moving ahead 10 improve this.2

l In a memo of 12· 1◄ to Lemnitter. the \'Qhite House Defense Liaison Office, Major Genera] CV Clifton, wrore that he b:rieied the President reg;irding the Arnulite rifle using a briefing paper prepared by the Dept of the Army's Deputy Chief o f Staff for Logistics dated 12~5, which was attac.hed. Clifton also reported thal the President wanted to be informed of the Joint Chjefs' decision in response to ClNCPACs recommend:ition that addjtional Arm.nJjte rifles be sent ro Yietn:.un. Clifton informed Leinnit""a-r:

.. , also h:td the Anny bring an M4 1 nfie, an M4 l4 c:trbinc, an Annalite I and a ctrbinc to the President. In response to his (fllcstion. the Ann>• 1s uymg m find out how man y of chc 1,.327~ 10 unscrvicc:tble carhi:ocs can be nu.de scrvkcable. Also the President ~l)tt:Sscd the opinion rhar Wt' should be scndmg as m:tn>' carbines to South Viern:im as chc)' can use because this sccms ro b,e :l good we:tpon. -

Ke1111edy A11d McNamara Pre/1arc for \Var 293

Perhaps we should issue some sort of a statement on what we propose 10 do. Our actions shou Id be positive rather than nega- tive. As I said on Saturday concerning Laos- we took actions which made no difference at all. Our actions should be s ubstantial otherwise we will give the wrong impression.

8. \Yle should watch Laos very carefully for any fighting that might break out again even though we decide nor to intervene.

TALKING PAPER FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JCS, FOR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON CURRENT

US MILITARY ACTIONS IN SOUTH VIETN AM

9 January 1962

SUBJECT: CURRENT US MILITARY ACTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Background- Today Communist China and North Vietnam are suffering from the effecrs of failure of their communes to produce adequate amounts of food to feed their peoples. Recently, large quantities of wheat were purchased by Red China from Canada and Australia to overcome this failure. Southeast Asia, primarily South Vietnam and Thailand, is a food surplus area in normal times. Because of this and the standard Marxist-Leninist concept of peripheral aggression and pressure, the main communist threat in the Western Pacific appears to be directed at Southeast Asia. Of principal concern for the purpose of this briefing is the situation in South Vien1am, the US aational objectives there and the military actions that have been implemented since October in support of our objectives.

295

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Viet Cong have heavily iinlilrn11ed, organized and now effectively control the colored a reas on this chart.

To achieve their purposes the Viet Cong have divided the country into two major geographical areas, lntersector V with headq uarters in the high plateau region north and west of Kontum, and the Namb-0 sector in the south with headquarters northeast of Saigon. Each major area is sub- divided into inrerprovincial commands-four in lntersector V and three in Nambo, with a special zone fo r Sa igon. Each interprovincial area is fur- ther organized into provinces which are further subdivided into districts, villages, and hamlets.

METHODS OF VC OPERAT ION

The 16,500-man Viet Cong nnihtary establishment is divided into two operational groups- regular and regional-local forces. Regular batta l- ions and companies, nwnbering about 8,500 personnel, constitute the offensive element of the "Liberation Army" and operate throughout thei r respective interprovincial zone.

The 8,000 regional and loca l fo rces, which correspond funct ionally to the Self Defense Forces of SYN, a re essentially security troops recruited and organized on district levels fo r limited operations and to provide security for command headq uarters, conferences, and political rallies. Regional units are also used to provide semi-trained personnel as replace- ments in regular battalions and as fillers for newly activated units. Under regional unit control guerril la platoons made up of daytime farmers sabotage, terrorize, assassinate, kidnap, disseminate propaganda, and attempt to subvert their neighbors.

Availability of weapons appears to be a continuing problem for Viet Cong forces, particularly in regional unfrs in which less than half of the men are armed. The primary source of arms for a ll VC forces appears to be those captured from South Vietnamese security forces.

Most officers and key NCOs, as well as political and propaganda specialists, are former South Vietnamese who went north with the Communists in 1955, or who have since been recruited and senr to North Vietnam. These southerners are given specia l training and are then infi l- trated back into South Vietnam through Laos (or by junks) to cadre regular and regional forces.

US Military Actions in Sottth Vietnam 297

Training of regional troops and the activation of new regular battalions have been stepped up since the first of ·the year. In recent anti-guerrilla operations South Vietnamese troops uncovered several major Viet Cong training areas, one of which had barracks space for more than a battalion , 200 dummy rifles and tons of food.

In Communist-controlled areas, the Vier Cong have ordered villagers to dig trenches and prepare combat villages. The Viet Cong are collecting money from the peasants and plantation owners to finance the war against the government, and have imp!emenred a rice tax to build up supplies for future operations. Pitched battles are avoided wherever pos-

sible, unless they are essential co a given plan, or the military advantages are at least four co one. The campaign to assassinate all who cry to imple- ment the Government of Vietnam's policies in the countrys ide is being intensified.

All indications point to the Viet Cong maintairung the current high level of guerrilla action in the south, and increas ing activity in the high plateau area in efforts to build the decreed semi-permanent bases.

ROUTES OF INFILTRATION AND SUPPLY

Prisoner of war interrogation r ecently conducted by the South Vietnamese lntelligence Service has shed additional 0ighc on the means employed by Communise North Vietnam to assist the Viet Cong in the latter's military and psychologica l campaigns against the: Government of South Vietnam.

North Vietnam maintains a training camp for Special Troops in the vicinity of Vinh, where pro-Vier Cong South Vietnamese receive an I 8-month military course interspersed with intensive Communist politi- cal indoctrination. Two 6OO-man battalions already have completed training, and another two battaLlons began training in May 1961. Personnel are assigned to units within the battalion according to their respective regions of origin in South Vietnam.

Upon completion of training, Viet Cong volunteers reenter South Vietnam by taking a circuitous route through territory in neighboring Laos controlled by Communist Pathet Lao forces.

ln addition to land infiltration, some Viet Cong guerrillas and cadres are infiltrated by sea us ing junks and small craft to land at va rious points on the long South Vietnam coastline. It is esrimated that no more than 20% of the total infiltrees use the sea route.

RELATIVE STRENGTHS

The current strength of the Viet Cong is 16,500 with the possible infiltra- tion of 1,000 per month. The increase in strength by infiltration is offset by the estimated Viet Cong casualties which average over 1,000 a month according to South Vietnam official figures . A recent refinement in intel- ligence reporting- indicates that the official estimate of Viet Cong s trength may he raised to about 20,000 in the near future.

The current actual strength of the South Vietnamese forces are as fo llows:

Army: 163,696 Navy: 4,207 fur Force: 5,31 4 Marines: 3,135

In addition paramilitary forces total 65,000 in the Civi l Guard and 45,000 Self Defense Corps.

T he regular Army forces are o rganized and assigned to three corps areas with major command headquarters and units located as shown on the chart.

CURRENT US MILITARY ACTIONS

The President on 22 November 1961 authorized the Secretary of State to instruct the US Ambassador to Vietnam to inform Pres ident Diem that the US Government was prepared to join the GVN in a sharply increased effort to avoid a further deterioration of the s ituation in SVN. On its part the US would immediately

a. Provide increased airlift to the GVN in the fo rm of helicopters, light aviation and transport aircraft.

b. Provide required equipment and US personnel for aerial recon- naissance, instruction in and execution of air-ground s upport and special intelligence.

c. Augment the Vietnamese Navy operationally with small craft. d. Provide expedited trruning and equipping of the Civil G uard and

Self-Defense Corps.

US Military Actions in Sottth Vietnam 299

e. Provide necessary equipment and personnel ro improve the military-political intelligence system.

f. Provide such new terms of reference, reorganization, and addi- tional personnel for US military forces as are required fo r increased US military assistance.

Disc11ssio11- As a result of the decision to accelerate US support of the GVN, the following US military unirs a re in place or enroute as shown on this cha rt: (Overlay No. I)

a. Two Army Light Helicopter Companies are operating in s upport of the RVNAF from Tan Son Nh ut a nd Qui Nhon. The third com- pany is enroute to Da Nang with an ETA of 15 J anuary and an operational readiness date of I February. This will provide one company of 20 H-21 and rwo H-13 in s upport of each of three RVNAF Corps areas.

b. The US Army bas a lerted the 18th Fixed Wing Aircraft Company equipped w ith 16 UIA (Otter) air.craft to be ready fo r deployment by 15 January.

c. The 346th USAF Troop Carrier Squadron w ith 16 C-123 aircraft has fo ur aircraft a t Clark and four operating from Tan Son N hut. The remaining eight aircraft are i,1 the Pacific Theatre enroute to C lark with an ETA of 10 January. This unit w ill rorate aircraft into SVN from C lark to support RVNAF operatio ns as required.

d. Four RP-IOI aircraft and a small photo processing element oper- ated by the USAF are in place at Den Mua ng Airfield, Thailand, fulfilling aerial photo requirement s in SVN.

e. The USAF JUNGLE JIM unit at Bien Hoa with eight T-23, four RB-26 and fo ur SC-47 aircraft, is instructing the Vietnamese Air Force in combat air support tactics and techniques. The Pacific Air Force is deploying personnel a nd equipment to SVN to establish a joint US/GVN Tactical Air Control System (TACS). This system wi ll permit positive control of a ll air operations and rapid response ro requesrs for a ir-ground support.

f. The 3rd Radio Reconnaissance Unit at Tan Son Nbut is being augmented. The additional 279 personnel will be on board by 14 January.

g. Six C-i 23 spray equipped aircraft for support of defoliant opera- tions have received diplomatic clearance to enter SVN.

h. US Navy Mine Division 73 with a tender and five mine sweepers is operating from To1Urane Harbor in conjunction with the Vietnamese Navy conducting maritime surveiUance patrols south of the 17th parallel.

i. Air surveillance flights 30 miles seaward from the SYN coast (17th parallel) to 50 miles beyond the Paracel Islands are conducted every other day by Seventh Fleet patrol aircraft.

In addition to deployment of organized US military units to SYN and increased personnel strength for the MAAG, accelerated delivery of MAP equipment has already begun. Nine additional L-20 light observation aircraft are en-route to SVN for use by the Vietnamese Air Force. Also, 15 T-28C aircraft have been delivered to augment the Vietnamese air- ground support capability. These were provided on an interim, loan basis until 30 T-28B (NOMAD) with a greater ordnance delivery capability could complete modification and be delivered to SYN, early in March. Depam11ent of the Army is also pro1•iding an additional 12 H-34 helicop- ters from active Army units to the USAF on a reimbursable basis for accelerated MAP delivery to the RYNAF early in March.

I words missing]

Advisory Group in Vietnam was 841, present strength is 1204 and projected strength as of 30 June 1962 is 2394. The total personnel strength of US units and elements, other than the MAAG, was 1442 as of 2 January 1962 and projected strength as of 30 June 1962 is 3182. The total US personnel in South Vietnam is now 2646 and projected strength as of 30 June 1962 is 5576.

The MAAG is extending its advisory reams to battalion level within the RVNAF MA Military establishment and beginning to participate more directly in advising Vietnamese unit commanders in the planning and l'xecution of military operations plans. Since delivery of lvlAP equipment has been accelerated and RVNAF military operations are increasing, the MAAG training activities have been expanded. This training includes operations, planning, logistics, intelligence, communications and electron- ics as they apply to each service within the R VNAF. They are also acceler- ating the traini11g of the Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps.

US Militar y Actions in Sottth Vi e tnam 301

Shown on the chart are the approved and funded construction proj- ects in South Vietnam. These include:

a. Improvement of the Pleiku Airfield. b. Improvements at Tan Son Nhut Airfield which included installa-

tions of: ( I ) Pierced steel planking parking apron. (2) POL hydrant system. (3) POL pipeline ro Nha Be. (4) Ammunition storage facility (5) Concrete parking apron

[line missing]

d. Improvement of the Bien Hoa Ai,field. -Communications and electronics irnprovemenrs include the following: a. An improved intelligence communications network. Net con-

trol station to be located in Saigon and to extend down to bat- talion and provincial level.

b. An improved Gare Way Station communications facilities at Saigon.

c. Three mobile navigational aid packages in the Pacific Theatre are approved for deployment to SYN as directed by CINCPAC.

THE FUTURE OUTLOOK

The foremost national objective today of the Diem government in South Vietnam is survival against the incursions of Communist forces; cadred, supplied, and directed from North Vietnam. Secondary, but nonetheless extremely important objectives include: (1) improvement of the national economy with emphasis on agrarian reform; (2) enhancement of South Vietnam's economic, cultural, and prestige position among Southeast Asian nations; (3) the creation of an armed force capable of defending the country from potential invaders; (4 ) and the preservation of a pro- Western orientation.

Policies directed toward the achievement of these objectives suffer from the. concentration of power in the hands of the Pres ident, Ngo Dinh Diem, and a small clique headed by his extremely influential and powerful

brother. Ngo Dinh N hu. Continued receipt of US military, economic and rechrucal aid, application of Catholic philosophies, and the repulsion of the Viet Cong guerrillas are additional major policy consideratio ns.

Planned courses of action include: (1) the building up of the armed forces with US a id and assistance; (2) defoat of the Viet Cong forces; and (3) the implementation of a series of reforms and measures ro correct imbalances in the power h ier- [words illegible]

Certainly some of the projects we are implementing are outright R&D efforts such as the defoliation project and bear al l the ea rmarks of gim- micks that cannot and will not win the war in South Vietnam. However, the commitment of US units to support the RVNAF and additional per- sonnel to train, equip and advise them in conjunction with u1creased economic and administrative aid, should make it obvious to the Vietnamese and the rest of the world that the United States is committed ro preventing Communist domination of South Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

All of the recent actions we have taken may still nor be sufficient to stiffen the will of the government and the people of SYN s ufficiently to resist Commun ist p ressure and win the war without the US committing combat forces. Whether we will have co rake this dcrision within the coming year depends to a great [conclusion m issing).

JCS MEMORANDUM ON THE "STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHEAST MAINLAND"

27 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have asked that the attached memorandum, Stat· ing their views concc_ming the strategic importance may be required if the situation continues ro dereriorare, be brought ro your attention. The memorandum requires no action by you at this time. I am nor prepared ro endorse the experience with our present program in South Vietnam.

Robert S. McNamara

cc: Sec. Rusk

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington 25, D.C. JCSM-33-62 13 Jan 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: The Strategic Importance of the Southeast Asia Mainland

1. The United Stares has clearly stated and demonstrated that one of its unalterable objectives is the prevention of South Vietnam

303

fa lling ro communist aggression and the s ubsequent loss of rhe remainder of the South east Asian mainland. The military objec- tive, therefore, must be to cake expeditiously a ll actions necessary to defeat communist aggression in South Vietnam. The immediate strategic importance of Southeast Asia lies in the political value that can accrue to the Free World through a successfu l stand in that area. Of equal importance is the psychologica l impact thar a firm position by the United States will have on the countries of the world-both free and communist. On the negative side, a United Stares political a nd/or military withdrawal from the Southeast Asian area would have an adverse psychological impact of even greater proportion, and one from which recovery would be both diffic ult and costly.

2. It muse be recognized that the fall of South Vietnam co communise control would mean the eventua l communist domination of all of the Southeast Asian ma inland. There is little doubt chat the next major target would be Thailand. Cadres are now being established in that country and " land reform" o r "capitalist dictatorship " pioys may prove fertile exploiration fields for the communists. Thailand is bordered by a ''pink" Burma and a vacillating Cambodia, either of which will easily fall under communise pres- sure. T ha iland would almost certainly then seek closer accommo- dation with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. SEA TO would probably cease to exist. The only determined opposition to a communist drive would then be Malaya and Singapore. Whi le the people of Malaya have the will to fight and might have the backing of the United Kingdom, the country itself would be isolated and hard pressed. The com- munise element in Singapore is strong. Short of direct military intervention by the United Scates, it is questionable whether Ma laya and Singapore could be prevented from eventually coming under communist domination or control.

3. Military Considerations. (The Appendix contains a more detailed appraisal of these military considerations.) a. Early Eventualities- Loss of the Southeast Asian Mainland would

have an adverse impact on our military Strategy and would mark- edly reduce our ability in limited war by denying us air, land and sea bases, by forcing greater intelligence effort with lesser results, by complicating military lines of communication and hy the introduc-

Strategic lmporta11ce of tbe Southeast Mainland 305

tion of more form idable enemy forces in the area. Air access and access to 5300 miles of mainland coastline would be lost to us, our Allies and neutral India would be outflanked, the last s ignifi- cant Unired Kingdom military strength in Asia would be elimi- nated with the loss of Singapore and Malaya and US military inlluence in that area, short of war, would be difficult to exert.

b. Possible Eventualities- Of equa l importance to the immediate losses are the eventualities wh;ch could fo llow the loss of the Southeast Asian ma inland. All of the Indonesian archipelago could come under the domination and control nf the USSR and would become a communist base posing a threat against Australia a nd New Zealand. The Sino -Soviet Bloc would have control of the eastern access to tl,e lndian Ocean. The Philippines and J apan co uld be pressured to assume at best, a neutralist role, thus eliminating two of our major bases of defense in the Western Pacific. Our lines of defense then would be pulled north ro Ko rea, Okinawa and Taiwan resulting in the subsequent overtaxing of our lines of communicatio ns in a limited war. India's ability to remain neutra l would be jeopardized and, as the Bloc meets success, its concu rrent stepped-up activities to move into and control Africa can be expected.

4. Political Co,uideratio11s. The Jo int Chiefs of Staff wish 10 reaffirm their position that the United States must prevent the loss of South Vietnam to either communist insurgency or aggressio n> must pre- vent the communist control or domination of the Southeast Asia mainland and must extend its inlluence in that a rea in such a man- ner as to negate the possibility of any future communist encroach- ment. It is recognized tha t the military and political effort of Communist China in South Vietnam and the political and psycho- logical thrust by the USSR into the lndonesian archipelago are not brushfire tactics nor merely a campaign fo r control of the mainland a rea. More important, it is part of a major campaign to extend communist control beyond the per iphery of the SinoSoviet Bloc a nd overseas ro both island and continental areas in the Free World, through a most natural and comparatively soft o utlet, the Southeast Asian Peninsula. It is, in fact, a planned phase in the communist timetable for world domination. Whereas, control of C uba has opened fo r the Sino-Soviet Bloc more ready access 10 countries of

South and Central America, control of Southeast Asia will open access to the remainder of Asia and to Africa and Australia.

5. In consideration of the formidable threat to the Free World which is represented in the current actions in South Vietnam, the need for US and GVN success in that area cannot be overemphasized. ln this connection, reference is made 10 the staff level document entitled "Summary of Suggested Courses of Action" prepared for General Taylor for reference in his mission co South Vietnam. On 21 October 1961 , chis document circulated comments and recom- mendations on 20 courses of action chat could be taken in South Vietnam short of the direct utilization of US combat forces . The Joint Chiefs of Staff note chat, in keeping with the President's deci- sion chat we muse advise and support South Vietnam but not at this time engage unilaterally in combat, all of the courses of action recommended with few exceptions have either been implemented or authorized for implementation. In chis connection, it is noted that the Vietnamese Government has specifically requested further assistance from the Unired States.

6, Reference is also mad.e co the agreement made between the Government of Vietnam and the United States on 4 December 1961 wherein the Government of Vietnam agreed to take several major steps to increase its efficiency.

7. ln response to President Diem 's request for assistance and the agreement between the governments, men, money, materials and advice are being provided co South Vietnam. Unfortuoacely, our contributions are not being properly employed by the South Vietnamese Government and major portions of the agreement have either not been carried out or are being de.layed by Diem.

8. For a combined US/Viemam effort co be successful, there must be combined participation in the decision making process. To date efforts made on both the military and diplomatic level have failed to motivate Diem co agree to act forthrightly on our advice and prop- erly utilize the resources placed at his disposal. He has been slow to accept the plans and proposals of Admiral Felt and Genera I McGarr and he. has in many instances dis regarded the advice of Ambassador Nolting. The reason for Diem's negative reaction co proposals to save South Vielllam while he maintains a positive position that it must be saved may be found im ONCPACs •PPraisaJ of his character-an

Strategic lmp o rta11ce o f tbe Southeast Mainland 30 7

uncompromising inflexibility and his doubts concerning the judg- ment, ability and individual loyalty of his military leaders. Recent intelligence reports of coup d'etat plotting involving senior Vietnamese military officers and the possibility that high Vietnamese officers have approached US officials tend to confinn Diem' s doubts concerning the loyalty of some of h is military leaders.

9. In this regard, should a successful coup overturn Diem, we might discover that many of Diem's difficult characteristics are national rather than personal. The Vietnamese are tough, tenacious, agile, proud, and extraordinarily self confident. Their recent political tradition is one of the multiplicity of parties and groups inclining toward conspiratorial and violent methods. The disappearance of a strong leader who can dampen and control these tendencies could well mean reversion to a condition of political chaos exploit- able by the strongly led and well disciplined communists. If Diem goes, we can be sure of losing his strengths but we cannot be s ure of remedying his weaknesses. Achievement of US objectives could be more difficult without Diem than with him. Therefore, it must be made dea r to Diem that the United States is prepared and will- ing to bolster his regime and discourage ,nrernal factions which may seek co overthrow him.

10. ln consideration of the foregoing, the J oint Chiefs of Staff believe that there is an irrunediate requirement for making a strong approach to Diem on a Government-to-Government level. If we are to effectively assist South Vietnam, we must convince Diem that (a) there is no alternative to the establishment of a sound basis upon w hich both he and the United States Government can work and (b) he has an urgent requirement for advice, as well as assistance, in military, political and economic matters.

11. Accordingly, it is recommended that you propose to the President and to the Secretary of State that: a. Upon his return to Saigon, Ambassador Nolting meet with

President Diem and advise him that, since the United States con- siders it essential and fundamental that South Vietnam not fall to communist forces: (1) The United States is prepared and willing 10 bolster his

regime and discourage internal factions which may seek to overthrow him.

(2) Suitable military plans have been developed and jointly approved. Diem musr permit his military commanders to implement these approved plans to defeat the Viet Cong.

(3) There musr be established an adequate. basis for the recep- tion and utilization of US ad,~ce and assistance by all appro- priate echelons of the GVN.

(4 ) There must be no further procrastination. (5) Should it be found impossible to establish such a satisfactory

basis for cooperation, the United States foresees failure of our joint efforts to save Vietnam from communist conquest.

12. Vigorous prosecution of the campaign with present and planned assets could reverse the current trend. If, with Diem's full [words missing] forces, the Vie-t Cong is not brought under control, the Joint Chiefs of Staff see no alternative ro the introduction of US military combat forces along with those of the free Asian nations that can be persuaded to participate.

13. Three salient factors are: of the greatest importance if the eventual introduction of US forces is required. a. Any war in rhc Sourhe,asr Asian Mainland wiU be a peninsula and

island-type of campaign-a mode of warfare in which all elements of the Armed Forces of the United States have gained a wealth of experience and in whrch we have excelled both in World War n and Korea.

b. Study of the problem clearly indicates thar the communists are limited in the forces they can sustain in war in that area because of natural logistic and transportation problems.

c. Our present world military posture is such that we now have effective forces capable of implementing existing contingency plans for Southeast Asia without affecting to an unacceptable degree our capability to conduct planned operations in Europe relating to Berlin or otherwise.

14. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend thar in any consideration of further action which may be required because of possible unac- ceptable results obtained despite Diem's full cooperation and the effective employment of South Vietnam armed forces, you again consider the recommendation provided you by JCSM320-61, dared 10 May 1961, that a decis ion be made to deploy US forces to South Vietnam sufficient to accomplish the following:

Strategic lmporta11ce of tbe Southeast Mainland 309

a. Provide a visible deterrent to potential North Vietnam and/or Chinese Communist action;

b. Release Vietnamese fo rces from advanced and static defense posi- tions to permit their future commitment to counterinsurgency actions;

c . Assist in training the Vietnamese forces; d. Provide a nucleus fo r the support of any additional US o r SEATO

military operations in Southeast Asia; and e. Indicate the firmness of our intent to all Asian nations.

We are of the opinion that fail ure to do so under such circumstances w ill merely extend the date when s uch action must be taken and w ill make our ultimate task proportionately more difficult.

FO R THE JOl1\'T CHIEFS OF STAFF: L. L. Lemnitzer

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

RESPON SE TO A QUESTION ON AMERICAN INVOLVEMEN T

IN SOUTH VIETNAM, PRESIDENT KEN NEDY'S

NEWS CONFERENCE February 14, 1962

Q. Mr. President, the Republican National Committee publication has said that you have been less than candid with the American people as to how deeply we are involved in Vietnam. Could you throw a"ny more light on tbat?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, as you know, tlhe United States for more than a decade has been assisting tbe government, the people of Vietnam, to maintain their independence. Way back on Dec. 23, l 950, we signed a military assistance agreement with France and with hido-China which at that time included Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. We also signed in December of 1951 an agreement directly with Vietnam.

Now, in 1954, tbe Geneva agreements were signed, and while we did not sign those agreements, nevertheless Under Secretary Bedell Smith stated tbat he would view any renewal of aggression in Vietnam in viola- tion of tbe aforesaid agreements witb grave concern, and as seriously threatening international peace and security. At the time that the SEATO Pact was signed in 1954, Sept. 8, Vietnam was not a s ignatory, it was a protocol state, and, therefore, tbis pacr which was approved by tbe Senate with only, I think, two against it, under Article 4, stated that tbe

311

United Scares recognized that aggression by means of armed arrack against Vietnam would threaten our own peace and security. So s ince that time the United States has been assisting the government of Vietnam to maintain its independence. Ir has had a military training mission there and extensive economic assistance.

As you know, in the last rwo years the war has increased. The Vice Pres ident visited rhere lasr spring. The war became more intense every month; in fact, every week. The arrack on the government by the Communist forces wirh assisca nee from the north became of greater and greater concern ro the government of Vietnam and rhe Government of the United States.

We sent-I sent General Taylor there to make a review of the situa- tion. The President of Vietnam asked us for additional assistance. We issued, as you remember, a whire paper which derailed the support which the Vier Minh in rhe north were giving ro this Communist ins urgent movement and we have increased our assistance there. And we are sup- plying logistic assistance, transportation assistance, training, and we have a number of Americans who are raking part in rhar effort.

We have discussed this matter- we discussed it with the leadership of rhe Republicans and Democrats when we mer in early January a11d informed them of what we were doing in Vietnam. We- Mr. Rusk has discussed ir with the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. Mr. McNamara bas discussed ut with the Armed Services Committee. The leadership on both sides, Republicans and Democrats- we have explained ro them out concern about what is happening there, and they have been responsive, I trunk, to evidence their concern. So thar there is a long his- tory of out efforts ro prevent Vietnam from falling under control of the Communisrs. That is what we are now arrempting to do. And as the wat has increased in scope, out assistance bas increased as a result of the request of the governmenr. So that I think we should-s ir is a matter of grear importance, a marrer of grear sensitivity- my view has always been that the headquarters of both of out parties should really attempt to leave these matters ro be discussed by respon.~ible leaders on borh sides. In my opinion, we have had a very strong bi-partisan consensus up to now, and I am hope- ful thar it will continue in regard to the action thar we are raking.

Q. Mr. Pres ident, do you feel that you have told the American people as much as can be told, because of the sensitivity of the subject? Is that righr?

Preside11t Ke1111edy's News Co11{ere11ce 313

THE PRESIDENT: I think I have just indicated what o ur role is. We have increased our assistance to the government, its logistics, and we have not sent combat troops there, although the training missions that we have there have been instructed that if they are fired upon they are, of course, to fire back, to protect themselves, bur we have nor sent com- bat troops, in the generally understoot! sense of the word. We have increa➔'ied our training mission, and we have increased our logistics sup- port, and we are attempting to prevent a Communist take-over of Vietnam, which is in accordance with a policy which our Government has followed for the last-certainly since 1954, and even before then as I have indicated. We are attempting to make all of the information avail- able that we can, consistent with our security needs in the area. So I fed that we are being as frank as we can be, and I think what I have said to you is a description of our activity there.

• • •

MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY FROM AMBASSADOR

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH ON VIETNAM

4 April 1962

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

The Honorable Robert S. McNamara Secretary of Defense Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

April 7, 1962

The President has asked me to transmit to you for your comments the enclosed memorandum on the subject of Viet-Nam 10 the President from Ambassador J. K. Gaibraith dated April 4, 1962.

Encl: Memo to Pres. from Amb. Gaibraith

Sincerely Michael V. Forrestal

315

April 4, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Viet-Nam

The following considerations influence our thinking on Viet-Nam:

1. We have a growing military commitment. T his could expand step by step into a major, long-drawn out indecisive military involvement.

2. We are backing a weak and, on the record, ineffectual government and a leader who as a politician may be beyond the point of no return.

3. There is consequent danger we shall replace the French as the colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did.

4. The political effecrs of some of the measures which pacification requires or is believed co require, including the concentration of population, relocation of villages, and the burning of o ld villages, may be damaging to those and especially ro Westerners associated with it.

5. We fear that at some point in the involvement there will be a major political outburst about the new Korea and the new war into which the Democrats as so often before have precipitated us .

6. It seems at least possible: that the Soviets are nor particularly desir- ous of trouble in this part of the world and that our military reac- tion with the need to fall back on Chinese protection may be causing concern in Hanoi.

In the light of the foregoing we urge the following:

1. That it be our policy to keep open the door for political solution. We should welcome as a solution any broadly based non-Communist government that is free &om external interference. It should have the requisites for internal law and order. We should not require that it be militarily identified with the United States.

2. We shall find it useful in acrueving this result if we seize any good opportunity tO involve other countries and world opinion in settle- ment and its guarantee. This is a useful exposure and pressure on the Communist bloc countries and a useful antidote for the argument that this is a private American military adventure.

Memora1tdum to President K e 1111ed y 3 17

3. We s ho uld measurably reduce our commitment to the particular pr1:sent leadership of the government of South Viet-Nam.

To accomplish the foregoing, we recommend the fo llowing specific steps:

1. In the next fortnight or so the ICC will present a report which we are confidentially advised will accuse North Viet-Nam of subver- sion and the Government of Viet-Nam in conj unction w ith the United States of not notifying the introduction of men and mate- riel as prescribed by the Geneva accords. We should respond by asking the co-chairmen to initiate steps to re-establish compliance with the Geneva accords. Pending specific recommendations, which might at some stage include a conference of signatories, we should demand a suspension of V iet Cong activity and agree to a standstill on an introduction of men and materiel.

2. Add itiona lly, Governor Harriman should be instructed to approach the Russians to express our concem about the increasingly danger- ous situation that the Vier Cong is forcing in Southeast Asia, They should be told of our determination not to let the Viet Cong over- throw the present government while at the sanie time to look with- out relish on the dangers that thi.s military build-up is causing in the area. The Soviets should be asked to ascertain whether Hanoi can and will call off the Viet Cong activity in return fo r phased American withdrawal, liberalization in the trade relations between the two parts of the country and general and non-specific agree- ment to talk about re,rnificatioa after some period of tranquillity.

3. Alternatively, the Indians should be asked to make such an approach to Hanoi under the same terms of reference.

4. It must be recognized that our long-run position cannot involve an unconditional commitment to Diem. O ur support is to non- Communist and progressively democratic government not to indi- vid ua ls. We cannot ourselves replace Diem. But we should be clear in ou r mind that almost any non-Communist change wou ld probably be beneficial and this should he the guiding rule for our diplomatic representation in the area.

In the meantime policy should continue to be guided by the following:

1. We should resist all steps which comnut American troops co com- bat action and impress u pon a ll concerned the. importance of keep- ing American forces out of actual combat commitment.

2. We should disassociate ourselves from action, however necessary, which seems to be directed at the villagers, such as the new con- centration program. If the action is one that is peculia.rly identified with Americans, such as defoliation, it should not be undertaken in the absence of most compelling reasons. Americans in their various roles should be as invis ible as the situation permits.

MEMORANDUM TO SECRETARY OF DEFEN SE MCNAMARA FROM

L.L. LEMNITZER, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ON AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH'S

MEMORANDUM 13 April 1962

JSCM-282-62 13 APR 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: US Policy Toward Vietnam

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 10 April 1962, requesting comments on a memorandum 10 the President by the Honorable J. K. Galbraith, US Ambassador to lndia, wherein he proposes changes 10 the present US policy toward Vietnam and the government of President Diem.

2. The burden of Mr. Galbraith's proposals appears to be that pres- ent US policy toward Vietnam sb.ould be revised in order 10 seek a political solution 10 the problem of communise penetration in the area. The effect of these proposals is 10 put the United States in a position of initiating negotiations w ith the communists to seek

319

disengagement from what is by now a well-known commitment to take a forthright stand against Communism in Southeast Asia.

3. The President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense both have recently and publicly affirmed the. intention of the US Government to support the government of President Diem and the people of South Vietnam to whatever extent may be necessary to eliminate the Viet Cong threat. In his letter of 14 December 1961 to President Diem, President Kennedy said:

Your (President Diem's) letter underlines what our own informa-

tion has convincingl)r shown-that the campaign of force and rer-

ror now being waged against your people and your Government

is supported and directed from the outside by rhe authorities ar Hanoi. They have thus violated the provisions of rhe Geneva

Acc:ords designed ro ensure peace in Viemam and to which chey bound themselves in 1954.

Ac that rime, rhe United Srares, although nor a pany to the

Accords, declared chat ic would view any renewal of che aggression in violation of the agreemencs with grave concern and as seriously

threarening international peace and security. \Y/e continue to main·

ta.in that view.

In accordance with that declaration, and in response to your

request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Viemam to prorect

its people and ro preserve its independence.

4. The various measures approved for implementation by the United States in support of o ur objectives in South Vietnam have not yet been underway long enough to demonstrate their full effective- ness. Ai1y reversal of US policy could have disastrous effects, not only upon our relationship with South Vietnam, but with the rest of our Asian and other a llies as well.

5. The problems raised by Mr. Gaibraith with regard to o ur present policy have been considered in the coordinated development of that policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware of the deficiencies of the present government of South Vietnam. However, the

Memorandum to Secretar y of De fe nse McNamara 321

President's policy of supporting the Diem regime while applying pr1:ssure for reform appears ro be the only practicable alternative at this time. In thjs regard, the views of tbe Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in JCSM-33-62 are reaffirmed.

6. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the present US policy toward South Viemam, as announced by the Pres ident, should be pursued vigorously to a successful conclusion.

FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: L. L. Lemnitzer

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S NEWS CON FEREN CE, RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT CRITICISMS

BY SENATOR MANSFIELD ON US SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLICY

June 14, 1962

Q: Mc. President, Senator Mansfield a few days ago suggested a review of Far Eastern policies because he said they seem to him either marking time, or at least on a collision course.

Do you think such a review is necessary?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have been r,eviewing. As you know, we have been attempting in the case of Laos to work out a policy which would prevent either one of those situations, whether we shall be successful or not, only time will tell.

I know that we have put large sums of money, and the situation there is still hazardous, what is true there of course i.s true aU around the world. This is a period of great tension and change. But if the United States had not played a part in Southeast Asia for many years, I think the whole map of Southeast Asia would be different.

I am delighted, as you know, I have the highest regard for Senator Mansfield, and I think that we should constantly review, and I think that he suggested we should make judgments between what is essential to our interest and what is marginal. We have been attempting with great diffi- culty to carry our a policy with Laos which would permit a neutral and

323

independent government there, and in Senator Mansfield's s peech he used the examples of Burma and Cambodia. Those were the examples that were also used at the Vienna meeting by Chairman Khrushchev and myself in which we stated the kind of government that we both said we hoped would emerge in Laos. That is the commitment that was made by the Soviet Union, and by the United States.

Now we have moved to a different plateau, and we are going 10 see whether that commitment can be maintained. But on the other hand, I am sure and I know Senator Mansfield would not think we should with- draw, because withdrawal in the case of Vietnam and in the case of Thailand might mean a collapse of the entire a"rea.

MICHAEL V. FORREST AL, MEMORANDUM FOR THE

PRESIDEN T, "A REPORT ON SOUTH VIETNAM"

February 1963

The war in South Vietnam is clearly going better than it was a year ago. T he government claims ro have built more than 4 ,000 Strategic Hamlets, and although many of these a re nothing more than a bamboo fence, a certain proportion have enough weapons ro keep our at least smaU Vier Cong patrols and the rudiments of the kind of social and political program needed co enlist the villagers' support.

The program ro arm and train the Montagnards, which should go fa r toward choking off the infiltration routes, has a lso made progress. There are 29 U.S. Special Forces reams training Montagnards (as well as certain minority groups in the Delta), with elewn more teams on the way. By mid-autumn training camps had been set up in aU the provinces border- ing Laos, and a system of regular patro lling started th at hopefully w ill one day cover the entire network of trails in the mountain regions. Under this program over 35,000 Montagnards have been trained, armed, and assisted in setting up their village defenses, the eventual goal being one hundred thousand.

In both the mountain regions and the heavily populated lowlands, the areas through which one can travel without escort have been enlarged. ln contested areas, the government is beginning to probe our, gradually repa iring the roads and bridges cut by the Vier Cong as they go. In some of the moderately populated areas fringing the Delta and the coastal

325

plain, as for example Binh Duong province, isolated villages have been bodily moved co positions along the roads where they can be more easily defended.

As of December 1, the Vietnamese government controlled 951 villages containing about 51 % of the rural population- a gain of 92 villages and 500,000 people in six months. The Viet Cong control 445 villages with 8% of the rura l population- a loss of 9 villages and 231,000 people in six months.

The impact of previously a uthorized U.S. aid programs is also beginning to be felt. On the m.ilirary side, U.S. advisors, helicopters, air support, and arms have given the Vietnamese military new confidence which they are showing by increased aggressiveness. For the first time since the war began in 1959, for example, the government forces began in September to capture more weapons than they lost. From January ro August, government forces captured 2,728 weapons bur lost 3,661. But in September and October, they captured 908 weapons and lost only 765.

On the Strategic H amler and civilian programs, U.S. aid is just coming in, Strategic Hamlet "kitll" are: now arriving, a U.S. military advisor has been stationed with each provi11ce chief, and twenty of the forty -one provinces will soon have a U.S. Rural Development advisor as well. Finally, there is considerably more optimism among Vietnamese officials than there was a year ago, a lmough it is probably based more on the visible flow of U.S. aid than on an objective analysis of actual progress.

The Vier Cong, in sum, are being hurt- they have somewhat less free- dom of movement than they had a year ago, they apparently suffer acutely from lack of medicines, and in some very isolated areas they seem to be having trouble getting food.

QUALIFICATIONS

Even so, the negative side of t!ie ledger is still awesome. The Vier Cong continue ro be aggressive and! are extremely effective. In the last few weeks, for example, they fought stubbornly and with telling results at Ap Bae, near My Tho. They completely escaped an elaborate trap in Tay Ninh province. They fought their way inside the perimeter of a U.S. Special Forces training camp at Plei Mrong, killing 39 of the trainee defenders and capturing 114 weapons. And they completely overran a

A Report on South Vietnam 327

strategic hamlet in Phu Yen province that was defended by a civil guard company in addition to the village militia, killing 24 of the defenders and capturing 35 weapons.

Probably even more significant are the figures on Viet Cong strength. lnrelligence estimates credit the Viet Cong with actually increasing their regular forces from 18,000 to 23,000 over this past year in spite of hav- ing suffered what the government claims were losses of 20,000 killed in action and 4,000 wounded. Part of this increase may result from nothing more than better inteHigence, but even so it is ominous that in the face of greatly increased government pressure and U.S. support the Viet Cong can still field 23,000 regular forces and 100,000 militia, supported by unknown thousands of sympathizers.

What these figures suggest is that the Viet Cong are still able to obtain an adequate supply of recruits and the large quantities of food and other supplies they need from the villagers of South Vietnam itself. Infiltration by sea has been effectively blocked s ince early in 1962. As for infiltration by land, captured documents, POW interrogation, evidence gathered by patrolling, and other intelligence indicates that 3,000 to 4,000 Viet Cong at the most have come over the so-called Ho Chi Minh trails since January, 1962. As to supplies, there seems to be no doubt that the trails have so far been used only for specialized equipment, such as radios; for medicines; and perhaps for a few automatic weapons, although no weap- ons have yet been captured which could be proved 10 have been brought in after 1954. Thus the conclusion seems inescapable that the Viet Cong could continue the war effort at the present level, or perhaps increase it, even if the infiltration ro utes were completely closed.

VILLAGERS' ATTITUDES

The question that this conclus ion raises-and the basic question of the whole war-is again the attitude of the villagers. It is difficult, if not impos- sible, 10 assess bow the villagers really feel and the only s traws in the wind point in different directions. The village defenders in many of the strategic hamlers that have been attacked have resisted bravely. But in an unknown, but probably large number of strategic hamlers, the villagers have merely let the Viet Cong in or supplied what they wanted without reporting the incident to the authorities. There is apparently some resent- ment against the Vier Cong about the " taxes" they collect and suspicion

based on che stories the villagers hear about what is going on in the North. Bue there may be jusr as much resentment and suspicion directed cowards the government. No one really knows, for example, how many of the 20,000 "Vier Cong" killed lase year were only innocent, or ar lease persuadable villagers, w hether the Strategic Hamlet program is providing enough government services 1-0 counteract the sacrifices it requires, or how the mute mass of the villagers react co the charges against Diem of dictatorship and nepotism. At the very least, the figures on Vier Cong strength imply a continuing flow of recruits and supplies from these same villages and indicate char a SU1bstancial proportion of the population is srill cooperating with the enemy, although it is unpossible ro cell how much of chis cooperation seems from fea r and how much from convic- tion. Thus on the viral question of villagers' attitudes, the nee impression is one of some encouragement at the progress in building strategic han1- lers and the number rhac resist w hen arcacked, but encouragement over- laid by a shadow of uneasiness.

CONCLUSION

O ur overall judgment, in sum, is chat we are probably winni11g, bur cer- tainly more slowly than we had hoped. Ac the race ir is now going the war will lase longer than we would like, cost more in terms of both lives and money than we anticipated, and prolong the period in wb ich a sud- den and dramatic event could upset the gains already made.

The question is w here improvements can be made- whether in our basic approach ro fighting a guerrilla war, or in the implementation of that approach.

THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

We fee l chat che basis strategic concept developed lase year is still valid. As mentioned above, the Viet Cong have gotten trained cadre and spe- c ia lized equipment from che North, but the vase bulk of both recruirs and supplies come from inside Sout h Vietnam itself. Thus the strategic objec- tives of the war in South Vietnam, as in most guerrilla wars, are basically policical-noc simply co kill Viet Cong, but co win the people. Although the strategic concept has never been spelled o ut in any one document, the consensus seems co be that it consisrs of the following objectives: ( 1) co

A Report on South Vietnam 329

create rhe incentive. for resistance in the basic population by providing for a flow upward of information on villagers' needs and a flow downward of government services, and by knitting them into the fabric of commu- nity decision-making; (2) ro provide. rhe basic population with the means and training for resistance; and (3) ro cut the guerrillas' access to the vil- lagers, their true line of communications, by essentially police-type mea- sures for controlling the movement of goods and people. ln this context, the military objectives are also threefold: (1) ro protect installations viral to the economy and government; (2) ro provide rapid reinforcement for villages under heavy attacks; and (3) to keep the regular guerrilla units off balance and prevent them from concentrating by aggressive but high- ly discriminating and selective offensive military operations.

This combination of civilian and military measures is designed to reduce the guerrillas to their die-hard nucleus a.nd isolate them in areas remote from the basic population. Only when this is done does the task finally become one of killing Viet Cong, of simple elimination.

As we say, this concept seems sound. For, even though it is difficult ro assess the attitudes of the villager, two assumptions seem reasonable. The first is rhar the villagers will be prudently cooperative with the Vier Cong if they are not given physical security, both i11 the military sense of secu- rity from attacks on their village and in the police sense of security from individual acts of terror and retaliation. The second is that if the villagers are in fact politically apathetic, as they seem to be, they are likely to remain so or even become pro-Communist if the government does not show concern for their welfare in the way it conducts the war and in the dfort it makes to provide ar least simple government services. Ir may be that these measures will nor be enough to create popular support for the government and the incentive ro resist, but it seems obvious that support could neither be created nor long mainrru11ed without them.

IMPLEMENTING THE CONCEPT

Thus it is in the implementation of the strategic concept that there seems to be the greatest room for improvement. Success requires, first, full under- stallCling of the strategy at all levels of the government and armed forces, and, second, the skills and organization for effective coordination of mili- tary activities with civilian acriviries. Some pans of the Vietnamese govern- ment do understand the strategy, bur in other parts the understanding

is imperfect ar best. The same is true of the necessary skills and organiza- tion. Specific areas in particular need of improvement are listed in rhe paragraphs below, which discuss both programs and continuing issues and conclude. with a proposal as to how the United Stares might increase its leverage o n the Vietnamese government so as ro bring the improve- ments about.

LACK OF AN OVERALL PLAN

The most serious lack in South Vietnam is th at of an overall plan, keyed ro the strategic concept described above, through w hich priorities can be set and the coordination of military and civilian activities accomplished. In spire of U.S. urgings there is srill no single country-wide plan worthy of the name bur o nly a variety of regional and provincial plans, some good and some nor so good. There are, for example, a number of special plans- the Delta Plan, Operation Sunrise, Operation Sea Swallow, Waves of Love-; several plans developed by the commanders of rhe Corps and Divisional areas; and an unknown number of plans developed by each of the fo rty-one province chiefs, Regional and provincial plans are, of course, necessa ry, but they sho uld be elements of a country-wide plan rather than a substitute fo r ir. As it is, the impression is strong rhar many of these plans are both inconsistent and competitive.

STRATEGIC HAMLETS

One result of rhe lack of an overall plan is the proliferation of strategic hamlets rhar are inadequately equipped and defended, or rhar are built prematurely in exposed areas.

GAPS: THE POLICE PROGRAM

The second result is that essential aspects of the strategy are neglected. The police program is an example. An effective police system is vital ro guard against Communisrs remaining inside srraregic hamlets, and ro man rhe check points and pa·trols that are essential in controlling the movements of goods and people. The present police system is dearly inadeq uate, and although rhe Public Safety Division of U.S. AID has put forward a proposal for expansion, no action has yer been taken.

A Report on South Vietnam 331

MULTIPLE ARMIES

A third result is what appears to be an extremely uneconomic use of manpower. There is in South Vietnam a confusing multiplicity of sepa· rare armies. In addition co the regular forces (the ARYN), there are under arms the Civil Guard, the Self Defense Corps, the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG ), the Ham let Militia, the Montagna rd Commandoes, the Force Populaire, the Republican Y ouch, the Catholic Youth, several independent groups under parish priests, s uch as Father Hoa's Sea Swallows, and even one small army trained, armed, and com- manded by a private businessman co protect his properties in Cap St. Jaques. All these forces add up co a.lmost half a million men under arms, a number which if so organized would come to the astounding total of 51 divisions.

This multiplicity of separate armies results nor only in ail uneconomic use of manpower, but also difficulties in coordination and confusion as co function. One also suspecrs that ir is a misallocation of manpower as well, with coo much emphasis on military activities and nor enough on civilian, such as government services to the villages and police work. So many armed men with different loyaltie.~ will also create problems in rhe transition co a peace-time economy if victory is in fact won, as well as the obvious danger that one or another chief will use the forces under his command for political purposes . South Vietnam does nor need any more armed men, but it does need ro reorganize what it has.

COORDINATION OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES

StiII another result of the lack of an overaII plan are rhe difficulties in coordinating military and civilian activities. One example is the propor- tion of "dear and hold" as opposed co "hit and withdraw" operations. There are no statistics available, bur a number of American military advi- sors feel chat the proportion of "dear and hold" operations, in which troops clear an area and then remain co protect the civic action teams and villagers while they build strategic hamlets, is coo low in proportion co the "hit and withdraw" operations designed co destroy regular Viet Cong units. The latter rype of operation is essential co keep the Viet Cong off balance and co prevent their concentrating for large-scale attacks, but it should be subordinate to the systematic expansion of secure areas.

AMNESTY PROGRAM

A final result of the lack of an overall pla n, or perhaps of imperfect under- scanding of an effective counter-guerrilla strategy, is the Vietnamese reluc- tance to emba rk on a meaningful amnesty program. After much U.S. urging, the Vietnamese have finally developed a plan, but it is far from satisfactor y. The basic trouble is revealed by the Vietnamese insistence that what they want is not an "amnesty" policy but a "surrender" policy.

CNIL PROGRAMS

The inadequacies in the pouce program, the tendency to build strategic hamlets in exposed places with inadequate a rms and equipment, and the reluctance to develop a meaningful amnesty program have already been discussed. Other inadequacies in civilian programs are discussed below.

One continuing problem is the fa ilure of the Vietnamese government to organize its economy on an emergency basis. A re.~iscance to deficit spending and stricter controls has permitted too large a part o( the coun- try's internal and external resources to go to non-essentia l purposes, especia lly in the Saigon area.

There should be more planning for what the Vietnamese economy will be like after the shooting has ended. There is almost none of this lond of planning now, a nd some of the things being done today might make sen- sible planning in the future vecy difficult. An obvious example is the rise of consumption levels, especially in nonessential imports wh ich Vietnam could not buy without U.S. aid. At some point, and probably soon, the U.S. should undertake a long-range economic study of the country's future development.

MILITARY OPERATIONS \VITH POLITICAL ASPECTS

The opinion of some America n military advisors that the proportion of "clear and hold" offensive operations is too low in relation to "hit and withdraw" operations designe-d to keep the Viet Cong off balance has already been mentioned. Another aspect of military operations that may have political consequences is the tactics used in the offensive operations needed to keep the Viet Cong off balance. Some American military advi- sors fee l that the Vietnamese have a bias toward elaborate, set-piece operations. These large-scale operations provide insurance against defeat,

A R epor t on South Vietnam 333

but they are expensive, cumbersome, and difficult to keep secret. From the political point of view they have the additional disadvantages fo r the Vietnamese of maximizing the chances ,of killing civilians and from the American point of view of requiring a very heavy use of heLlcoprers.

An alternative, a nd apparently effective way of keeping the regular Vier Cong off balance is long-range patrolling by small units, such as Ranger companies. In this tactic, the patrols, resuppLled by air, stay our in the field for extended periods of time, never sleeping two nights in the same place, ambushing, and in genera l using guerrilla tactics ro fight the guerrilla. T he remaining forces a re kept in reserve for rapid reinforcement and sealing off a n area when the patrol encounters resistance. Although American military advisors in South Vietnam have worked hard to overcome Vietnamese reluctance to operate for extended periods in the field and at night, which would pennir greater use of this tactic, they have had only partial success. (Paradoxically, President Diem spent a substantia l part of his four and a half hour lecture to us pcaising a province chief who has used the long-range patrol tactic ro very good effect recently in Zone D.)

USE OF AIR POWER

On use of a ir power, and the danger of adverse political effects, our impression is that the controls over air strikes and the procedures for checking intelligence against all possible sources are excellent. In spite of this, however, it is difficult to be sure that air power is being used in a way that minimizes the adverse political effecrs. U.S. Air Force advisors tell us that the demand fo r air strikes frorn the South Vietnamese has gone up enormously. There are now 1,000 srr.ikes per month, and there would be considerably more if the air power were available. During November, thirty-two per cent of these 1,000 strikes were so-called " inrerdiction "- thar is, attacks on installations located in, air photos and identified as Viet Cong by intelligence. Fifry-rhree per cent of the air strikes during November were in direct support-that is, bombi11g and strafing in advance of an arrack o n a location intelligence indicated as being occupied by Viet Cong or in response to a request by a ground unit in contact with the enemy. Fifteen percent were or her kinds of mission, s uch as reconnais- sance. There is no doubt that the Viet Cong fear air attacks and that some interdiction is necessary and useful. On the other hru1d, it is impossible to assess how much resentment among persuadable villagers is engendered

by the inevitable accidents. In general, the final judgment probably lies in the answer to the questions raised above about the relative emphasis on "clear and bold" and long-range patrolling versus "hit and withdraw" of rhe more elaborate type. If the proportion is correct between extending control and the necessary offensive operations to keep the Vier Cong off balance, then the killing of civilians is probably at an unavoidable mini- mum. If the proportion of "hit and withdraw" is coo hjgb in relation co "clear and hold," on the ocher hand, then air power, too, is probably being o,•erused in ways that have adverse polfrical consequences.

REINFORCEMENT OF STRATEGIC HAMLETS

One final point on the political aspects of miJjrary operations concerns quicker reinforcement for strategic hamlets under attack . Some American military advisors feel chat more attention should be paid to ways of provid- ing quicker reinforcement for the hamlets, including air support, although in the case of au support there are formidab le problems of communica- tions and in providing airfields dose enough to threatened villages.

FOREIGN POLICY

In its complete concentration on the civil war and on the means and ide- ology for winning it, the government of South Vietnam has a naivete in fo reign affairs which is dangerous for both Vietnam and for the U.S. There has been massive resistance to U.S. suggestions on policies for cooperation in ocher problems in the area, i.e. Laos and Cambodia. To some extent this is unavoidable in view of Diem's rather simple view of the Communist threat. But U.S. interests are so heavily involved in the country that our voice should carry more weight.

VIETNAMESE DOMESTIC POLITICS

The Diem government is freq uently criticized for being a dictatorship. This is true, but we doubt chat the lack of parliamentary democracy bothers the villagers of Vietnam or much affects their attitudes coward the war. The real question is whether the concentration of power in the hands of Diem and his family, especia lly Brother Nhu and his wife, and Diem's reluctance to delegate is alienating the middle and higher level

A Report on South Vietnam 33.5

officials on whom the government must depend to carry our its policies. Our judgment is that the United Stares does nor really have as much information on this subject as it should. All that can be said at the moment is that it is the feeling of Americans in contact with these offi- cials that they a re encouraged by U.S. aid a nd appa rently getting on with the job. Both the American and British missions, fo r example, fee l that Brother N hu's energetic support for the Strategic Hamler program has given it an important push. The only evidence ro contradict these judg- ments that we found was in a conversation w ith Buu, the head of the Vietnamese labor movement and, paradoxically, one of the co-founders with Diem and Nhu of Diem's political party.

DIEM'S PRESS RELATIONS

The American press in South Vietnam now has good relations with the Embassy and MACV and generally are grateful for the help that they have received. Bur their attitude toward Diem and the government of South Vietnam is the complete opposite, and with much justice. Diem wants only adulation and is completely insensitive to the de.sire.s of the foreign press for fact ua l information. He is equally insensitive to his own image, the political conseq uences of the activities of Madame N hu and the other members of his family, and his own tendencies of arbitrariness, failure to delegate, and general pettiness. After much effort, Ambassador Nolting persuaded Diem to let the Defense Ministry give regular military briefings. True ro form, however, the content of the briefings is deplorable. One of these briefings, for example, the transcript of which we examined, con- tained lier.le more than a saccharine eulogy of President Diem.

lr would be nice if we could say that Diem's image in the foreign press was only his affair, but it seriously affects the U.S. and its ability ro help South Vietnam. The American press representatives are bitter a nd will seize on anything that goes wrong and blow it up as much as possible. The My Tho operation, fo r example, contained some mistakes, bur it was nor nearly the botched up disaster that the press made it appear to be.

ACTION FOR THE UNITED STATES

By way of summary, then, we feel chat the United States should push the Diem government ha rder on the need for an overa ll plan, on a reduction

in che num ber of different military organizations, on foreign policy ques- tions in w hich the United Scates has an interest, on an effective police program, for a greater emphasis on military operations in extending and securing government control as opposed to large-scale offensives and air interdiction, on a meaningful amnesry program, on planning for the post- war economy, and on a realistic effort to get a more favorab le press.

On many of these issues, of course, che United Stares has a lready been pressing. Thus in one sense the question is how co increase our leverage in the face of Diem's biases and general resistance to advice.

Actually, the Un ited Stares .is in a much better position to see chat its advice is taken than it was a year ago. At chat time Diem and officials at the national level were practica lly the only point of contact the U.S. had with either civi l or military programs. Today, however, the U.S. has mil i- tar)' advisors not only at the lower levels of the Army but with each province ch ief and steps are being taken to put U.S. AID advisors in at lease 20 of the 41 provinces. It therefore is becoming possible co accom- plish much of what we want a t the local level without going through the vastly inefficient national bureaucracy. An example is the work of the specia l forces reams. They work at the village level, and at a number of places have done wonders not only in trai11ing and supervising the erec- tion of village defenses but also in medical aid, school construction, and even in agricu lture and marketing.

Ill general, it is our judgment that an effort should be made LO increase chis influence at the local level even more by putting additional U.S. AID people with province chiefs and, where it is indicated, even at selected places further down in the civiJian ltierarchy.

In addition, having gotten past the first year of increased U.S. support and demonstrated our sinceriry, the time has probably come when we can press our views on Diem more vigorously and occasionally even publicly.

One final recommendation fo r U.S. action concerns our dealings with the press here in Washington. In our judgment a systematic campaign co get more of the faces into the press and T.V. should be mounted. Although our report, for example, is not rosily optimistic, it certainly contains the factual basis (e.g., the first few paragraphs) for a much more hopeful view than the pessimistic (and factually inaccurate) picture conveyed in the press.

Michael V. Forrestal

US, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN CY, NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 53-63, "PROSPECTS IN SOUTH

VIETNAM" 17 April 1963

THE PROBLEM

To assess the situation and prospects in South Vietnam, with special emphasis upon the military and political factors most likely to affect the counterinsurgency effort.

CONCLUSIONS

A. We believe chat Communist progress has been blunted and that the situation is improving. Strengthened South Vietnamese capa- bilities and effectiveness, and particularly US involvement, are causing the Viet Cong increased difficulty, a lthough there are as yet no persuasive indications that the Communises have been grievously hurt. (Paras. 27- 28)

B. We believe the Communises w ill continue 10 wage a war of attri- tion, hoping for some break in rbe situation which will lead co victor y. T hey evidently hope chat a combination of military pres- sure and political deterioration will in time create favorab le cir- cumstances either for delivering a coup de grace or for a political

33 7

settlement which will enable chem to continue the struggle on more favorable terms. We believe it unlikely, especially in view of the open US commitment, that the North Vietnamese regime will either resort to overt military attack or introduce acknowledged North Vietnamese military unics into the south in an e.ffort to win a quick victory. (Paras. 29- 31)

C. Assuming no great increase in external support to the Viet Cong, changes and improvements which have occurred during the past year now indicate that the Viet Cong can be contained militarily and that further progress can be made in expanding the area of government control and in creating greater security in the country- side. However, we do not believe that it is possible at this time to project the future course of the war with any confidence. Decisive camprugns have yet to be fought and no quick and easy end to the war is in sight. Despite South Vietnamese progress, the situation remains fragile. (Para. 32 )

D. Developments during the last year or two also show some promise of resolving the political weaknesses, particularly that of insecu- rity in the countryside, upon which the insurgency has fed. However, the government's capacity to embark upon the broader measures required to translate miljtary success into lasting politi- cal stability is questionable. (Paras. 33- JS)

THE OVERTHROW OF NGO DINHD,JEM

May-November, 1963

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

The Diem coup was one of those critical events in the history of U.S. policy that could have altered our commitment. The choices were there: (1) continue co plod along in a limited fashion with Diem-despite his and Nhu's growing unpopularity; (2) encourage or tacitly support the overthrow of Diem, taking the risk that the GVN might crumble and/or acornmodate to the VC; and (3 ) grasp the opportunity- with the obvious risks--0f the political instability in South Vietnam to disengage. The first option was rejected because of the belief that we could not win with Diem-Nhu. The third was very seriously considered a policy alternative because of the assumption that an independent, non-communist SYN was coo important a strategic interest co abandon-and because the situa- tion was not sufficiently drastic to call into question so basic an assump- tion. The second course was chosen mainly for the reasons the first was rejected-Vietnam was thought too important; we wanted to w in; and the rebellious generals seemed to offer that prospect.

In making the choice to do nothing to prevent the coup and to tacitly support it, the U.S. inadvertently deepened its involvement. The inadver- tence is the key factor. It was a situation without good alternatives. While Diem's government offered some semblance of stability and authority, its repressive actions against the Buddhists had permanently al ientated popular support, with a high probability of victory for the Viet Cong. As efficient as the military coup leaders appeared, they were without a manageable base of political support. When they came to power and

339

when the lid was taken off the Diem-Nhu reporting system, the GVN position was revealed as weak and deteriorating. And, by virtue of its interference in internal Vietnamese affairs, the U.S. had assumed a sig- nificant responsibility for the new regime, a responsibility whjch height- ened our commitment and deepened our involvement.

The catalytic event that precipitated the protracted crisis which ended in the downfall of the Diem regime was a badly handled Buddhist reli- gious protest in Hue on lvlay 8, 1963. In and of itself the incident was hardly something tO shake the :foundations of power of most modern rul- ers, but the manner in which Diem responded t0 it, and the subsequent protests which it generated, was precisely the one most likely to aggra- vate not alleviate the situation .. At stake, of course, was far more than a religious issue. The Buddhist protest had a profoundly political character from the beginning. It sprang and fed upon the feelings of political frus- tration and repression Diem's autocratic rule had engendered.

The beginning of the end for Diem can, then, be traced through events t0 the regime's violent suppression of a Buddhist protest demonstration in Hue on Buddha's birthday, May 8, in whjch nine people were killed and another fourteen injured, Although Buddhists had theretofore been wholly qujesce.nt politically, in subsequent weeks, a fu!J -blown Buddhist "struggle" movement demonst rated a sophisticated command of public protest techniques by a cohesive and disciplined organization, somewhat belying the notion that the movement was an outraged, spontaneous response to religious repression and discrimination. Nonetheless, b)' June it was clear that the regime was confronted not with a djssident religious minority, but with a grave crisis of public confidence. The Buddhist pro- test had become a vehicle for mobiJjzing the widespread popular resent- ment of an arbitrary and often oppressive rule. It had become the focal point of political opposition to Diem. Under strong U.S. pressure and in the face of an outraged world opinion, the regime reached ostensible agreement with the Buddhists on June 16. But the agreement merely papered over the crisis, without any serious concessions by Diem. This intransigence was reinforced by Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and his wife, who bitterly attacked the Buddhists throughout the summer. By mid-August the crisis was reaching a breaking point.

The Buddhists' demonstrations and protest created a crisis for American policy as well. The U.S. policy of support for South Vietnam's struggle against the Hanoi-supported Viet Cong insurgency was founded

The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem 341

on unequivocal support of Diem, whom the U.S. had long regarded as the only national leader capable of urufying his people for their internal war. When the Buddhist protest revealed widespread public disaffection, the U.S. made repeated attempts to persuade Diem to redress the Buddhist grievances, to repair his public image, and to win back public support. But the Ngos were unwilling to bend. Diem, in true mandarin style, was preoccupied with questions of face and survival-not popular support. H e

did not understand the profound changes his country had experienced under stress, nor did he understand the requirement for popular support that the new sense of nationalism had created. The U.S. Ambassador, Frederick Nolting, had conducted a low-key diplomacy toward Diem, designed to bring him to the American wa)• of thinking through reason and persuasion. He approached the regime during the first weeks of the Buddhist crisis in the same manner, but got no results. When he left on vacation at the end of May, his DCM, William Truehart, abandoned the soft sell for a tough line. He took U.S. views to Diem not as expressions of opinion, but as demands for action. Diem, however, remained as obdurate and evasive as ever. Not even the U.S. threat to dissociate itself from GVN actions in the Buddhist crisis brought movement,

In late June, with Nolting stiU on leave, President Kennedy announced the appointment of Henry Cabot Lodge as Ambassador to Vietnam to replace Nolting in September. ln the policy deliberations then tahng place in Washington, consideration was being given for the first time to whar effect a coup against Diem would have. But Nolting returned, first to Washington and then to Saigon, to argue that the only alternative to Diem was chaos. The U.S. military too, convinced that the war effort was going weU, felt that nothing should be done to upset the apple cart. So Nolting was given another chance to talk Diem into conciliating the Buddhists. T he Ambassador worked assiduously at the rask through July and the first part of August, but Diem would agree only to gestures and half-measures thar could not stop the grave deterioration of the political situation. Nolting left Vietnam permanently in mid-August with vague assurances from Diem that he would seek to improve the climate of relations with the Buddhists. Less than a week later, Nolting was betrayed by Nhu's dramatic August 21 midnight raids on Buddhist pagodas throughout Vietnam.

One of the importru1t lessons of the American involvement in South Vietnam in support of Diem was that a policy of unreserved commitment to a particular leadership placed us in a weak and manipulable position

on important internal issues. The view that there were "no a lternatives" ro Diem greatly limited the ex:renr of our influence over rhe regime and ruled our over the years a number of kinds of leverage that we might usefu lly have employed or threatened ro employ . Furthermore, it placed the U.S. in the unforrunate role of suitor ro a fick le lover. Aware of o ur fundamental commitment ro him, Diem could with relative impunity ignore o ur wishes. Jr reversed the real power relationship between the rwo countries. Coupled with Diem's persistent and ruthless elimination of all potential political opposition, it left us with rather stark a lterna- tives indeed w hen a crisis on w hich we could nor allow delay and equiv- ocation fina lly occurred. For better or worse, the August 12 pagoda raids decided rhe issue for us.

The raids, themselves, were carefully timed by Nhu ro be carried out when the U.S. was without an Ambassador, and only after a decree plac- ing the country under militar}• martia l law had been issued. They were conducted by combat police and special forces units raking orders direct- ly from Nhu, not through the Army chain of command. The sweeping attacks resulted in rhe wounding of about 30 monks, the arrest of over 1,400 Buddhists and the closing of the pagodas (after they had been dam- aged and looted in rhe raids). In their bruta lity and their blunt repudia- tion of Diem's solemn word ro Nol ring, they were a direct, impudent slap in the face for the U.S. N hu expected rhac in crushing the Buddhists he could confront the new U.S. Ambassador with a fair accompli in which the U.S. would complainingly acquiesce, as we had in so many of the regime's actions which we opposed. Moreover, he attempted to fix blame fo r the raids on rhe senior Army genera ls. Getting word of the attacks in H onolulu, where he was conferring w ith Nolting and Hilsman, Lodge flew directly ro Saigon. H e immediately lee it be known that the U.S. complerdy dissociated itself from the raids and cou ld nor tolerate such behavior. In Washington the morning after, while much confusion reigned about who was responsible for the raids, a statement repudiating them was promptly released. Only afrer several days did the U.S. finally estab- lish Nhu's culpability in the attacks and publicly exonerate the Army.

On August 23, rhe firs t contact with a U.S. representative was made by generals w ho had begun ro plan a coup against Diem. The generals wanted a clear indication of where the U.S. stood. State in its subse- quently controversia l reply, drafted and cleared on a weekend when several ofrhe principal Presidential advisors were absent from Washington,

Th e Ove rthr o w of Ngo Dinh Di e m 343

affirmed that Nhu's continuation in a power position within the regime was intolerable (words missing) and did not, " then, we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved." This message was to be communicated to the generals, and Diem was to be warned that Nhu must go. Lodge agreed with the approach to the generals, but felt it was futile to present Diem with an ultimatum he would only ignore and one that might tip off the palace to the coup plans. Lodge proceeded to inform only the generals. They were told that the U.S. could no longer support a regime which included Nhu, bur that keeping Diem was entirely up to them. This was communicated ro the generals on August 27. The President and some of his advisors, however, had begun ro have second thoughts aboughr switching horses so suddenly, and with so little infor- mation on whether the coup could succeed, and if it did , what kind of government it would bring to power. As it turned out, Washington's anxiety was for naught, the plot was premature, and after several uncer- tain days, its demise was finally recognized on August 31.

Thus by the end of August, we found ourselves without a leadership to support and without a policy to follow in our relations with the GVN. ln this context a month-long policy review took place in Washington and in Vietnam. It was fundamentally a search for alternatives. ln both places the issue was joined between those who saw no realistic alterna- tives ro Diem and felt that his policies were having only a marginal effecr on the war effort, which they wanted to get on with by renewing our support and communication with Diem; and those who felt that the war against the VC would nor possibly be won with Diem in power and pre- ferred therefore to push for a coup of some kind. The first view was primarily supported by the military and rbe CIA both in Saigon and in Washington, while the latter was held by the U.S. Mission , the Stare Department and members of the White House staff. In the end, a third alternative was selected, namely to use pressure on Diem to get him to remove Nhu from the scene and to end his repressive policies. Through September, however, the debate continued with growing intensity. Tactical considerations, such as another Lodge approach to Diem about removing the Nhus and the effect of Senator Church's resolution calling for an aid suspension, focused the discussion at times, but the issue of whether to renew our support for Diem remained. The decision hinged on the assessment of how seriously the political deterioration was affect- ing the war effort.

In the course of these policy debates, several participants pursued the logical but painful conclusion that if the war could not be won with Diem, and if his removal would lead co political chaos and a lso jeopardize the war effort, then the war was probably unwinnable. If chat were the case, tbe argument went, tben the U.S. should really be facing a more basic deci- sion on either an order!)' disengagement from an irretrievable situation, or a major escalation of the U.S. involvement, including the use of U.S. com- bat troops. T hese prophetic nninoricy voices were, however, raising an unpleasant prospect that the Administration was unprepared to face at that time. In hindsight, however, it ,s clear chat chis was one of the times in the hisrory of our Vietnam involvement when we were making fundamental choices. The option co disengage honorably at that time now appears an attractively low-cost one. But for the Kermcdy Administration then, the coses no doubt appeared much higher. In any event, it proved to be unwiU- ing co accept the implications of predictions for a bleak future. The Administration hewed to the belief that if the U.S. be but willing to exercise its power, it could ultimately a]ways have its way in world affairs.

Nonetheless, in view of the widely divergent views of the principa ls in Saigon, the Administration sought independent judgments with rwo suc- cessive face-finding missions. The first of these whirlwind inspections, by General Victor Krulak, JCS SACSA, and a State Department Vietnam expert, Josepb Mendenhall, from September 7-10, resulted in diametri- cally opposing reports to the President on the conditions and s ituation and was, as a result, futile. The Krulak-Mendenhall divergence was sig- nificant because it typifies the deficient analysis of both the U.S. civilian and military missions in Vietnam with respect to the overal I political situation in tbe country. The U.S. civilian observers, for their part, fai led to fully appreciate the impact Diem had had in preventing the emergence of any ocher political forces. The Buddhists, while a cohesive and effec- tive minority protest movement, lacked a program or tbe means co achieve power. The labor unions were entirely urban-based and appealed to only a sma ll segment of the population. T he clandestine political par- ties were small, urban, and usually elitist. The religious sects had a nar- row appeal and were based on ethnic minorities. Only the Viet Cong had any real s upport and influence on a broad base in tbe countryside. The only real alternative source of political power was the Army s ince it had a large, disciplined organization sparllling the country, with an independent communications and cransponration system and a strong superiority co

The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem 345

any o ther group in coercive power. In its reports on the Army, however, General Harkins and the U.S. military had failed co appreciate the deeply corrosive effect on internal allegiance and discipline in the Army that Diem's loyalty based promotion and assignment policies had had. They did not foresee that in tbe wake of a coup senior officers would lack the cohesiveness co hang together and that t he temptations of power would promote a devisive internal competition among ambitious men at the expense of the war against the Viet Cong.

Two weeks after the fr uitless Krulak-Mendenhall mission, with the Washington discussions still stalemated, it was the tum of Secretary McNamara a nd Genera l Taylor, the Chairman of tbe JCS, co assess the problem. They left for Vietnam on Sep-rcmber 23 with the Presidential instruction to appra ise the condition of rhe war effort and the impact on it of the Buddhist political turmoil and to recommend a course of action for the GVN and the U.S. They returned to Washington on October 2. Their report was a somewhat contradicto ry compromise between the views of the civilian and military staffs. It affirmed that the war was being won, a nd that it wou ld be success.fully concluded in the first three corps areas by the end of 1964, and in the Delta by 1965, thereby permit- ting the withdrawal of American advisors, a lthough it noted char the political tensions were starting to have a n adverse effect on it. Bur, more importantly, it recommended a series of measures to coerce Diem into compliance w ith American w ishes that included a selective s uspension of U.S. economic aid, an end co a id fo r the special forces units used in the August 21 raids unless they were subord.inared to the Joint Genera l Staff, and the continuation of Lodge's cool official aloofness from the regime. It recommended the public announcement of the U.S. intention to with- draw 1,000 troops by the end of the year, but suggested that the aid suspensions not be announced in order to give Diem a chance to respond without a public loss of face. It concluded by recommending against active U.S. encouragement of a coup, in spite of the fact char an a id sus- pension was the o ne step the generals had asked for in August as a s ign of U.S. condemnation of Diem and s upport for a change of government. The report was q uickly adopted by Kennedy in the NSC and a brief, and subsequently much rued, statement was released to the press on October 2, a nnouncing the planned withdrawal of 1,000 troops by year's end.

The McNamara-Taylor mission, like the Krulak-Mendenhall m.ission before and the Honolulu Conference in November after the coup, points

up the great difficulty encountered by high level fact-finding missions and conferences in getting at the "facts" of a complex policy problem like Vietnam in a short time. It is hard to believe that basry visirs by harried high level officials with overloaded itineraries really add much in the way of additional data or lucid insight. And because they become a focal point of worldwide press coverage, they often raise public expectations or anxieties that may only create additional problems for the President. There were many such high level conferences over Vietnam.

Of the recommendations of the McNamara-Taylor miss ion, the pro- posal for selective suspension of economic aid, in particular the suspen- sion of the commercial import program, was the most significant both in terms of its effect, as an example of the adroit use or denial of American assistance to achieve foreign policy objectives. In this instance economic sanctions, in the form selected aid suspensions in those programs to which the regime would be most sensitive but that would have no imme- diate adverse effect on the war effort, were used constructively to influ- ence events rather than negatively to punish those who had violated our wishes, our usua l reaction to coups in Latin America. The proposal itself had been under consideration since the abortive coup plot of August. Ar that time, Lodge had been authorized to suspend aid if he thought it would enhance the likelihood of the success of a coup. Later in September he was again given specific control over the delay or suspension of any of the pending aid programs. On both occasions, however, he had expressed doubt about the utility of such a step. In fact, renewal of the commercial import program had been pending since early in September, so that the adoption of the M.cNamara-Taylor proposal merely formal- ized the existing situation into policy. As might have been expected (although the record leaves ambiguous whether this was a conscious aim of the Administration), the Vietnamese generals interpreted the suspen- sion as a green light to proceed with a coup.

While this policy was bein:g applied in October, Lodge shunned all contact with the regime that did not come at Diem's initiative. He want- ed it clearly w1derstood that they must come to him prepared to adopt our advice before he would re.commend to Washington a change in U.S. policy. Lodge performed with great skill, but inevitably frictions devel- oped within the Mission as different viewpoints and proposals came forward. In particular, Lodge's disagreements and disputes with General Harkins during October when the coup plot was maturing and later were

The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem 347

to be of considerable embarrassment to \'i'ashingron when they leaked to the press. Lodge had carefully cultivated! the press, and when the stories of fr iction appeared, it was invariably H arkins or Richardson or some- one else w ho was the villian.

No sooner had the McNamara-Tayloe mission returned to Washington and reported its recommendations than the generals reopened contact with the Mission indicating that once again they were preparing to strike against the regime. Washington's immediate reaction o n October 5 was to reiterate the decision of the NSC on the McNamara-Taylor report, i.e., no U.S. encouragement of a coup. Lodge was instructed, howe1•er, to maintain contact with the generals and to monitor their plans as they emerged. These periodic contacts continued and by October 25, Lodge had come to believe that Diem was unlikely to respond to our pressure and that we should therefore nor thwairt the coup forces. Harkins dis- agreed, believing that we still had not g iven Diem a real chance to rid himself of Nhu and that we should present him with such a n ultimatum and test his response before going ahead with a coup. He, furthermore, had reservations about the strength of the coup fo rces when compared with those likely to remain loyal to the regime. All chis left Washington anxious and doubtful. Lodge was cautio11ed to seek fuller information on the coup plot, including a line-up of fo rces and the proposed plan of action. The U.S. co uld not base its policy on support for a coup attempt that did not offer a strong prospect of s uccess. Lodge was counseled to consider ways of delaying o r preventing the coup if he doubted its pros- pects for success. By this juncture, however, Lodge fe lt committed a nd, furthermore, felt the matter was no longer in our hands. The generals were taking the action on their own initiative and we cou ld only prevent it now by denouncing them to Diem. While this debate was still going on, the generals struck.

Shortly after Ambassador Lodge and Admiral Felt had ca lled on Diem on November I, the generals made their move, c ulminating a s um- mer and fall of complex intrigue. The coup was led by General Minh, the most respected of the senior genera ls, together with Generals Don, Kim and Khiem. They convoked a meeting of a ll but a few sen ior officers at JGS headquarters a t noon on the. day of tbe coup, announced their plans and got the suppo rt of their compatriots. The coup itself was executed with skill and swiftness. They had devoted special attention to ensuring that the major potentia lly loyal fo rces were isolated and their

leaders neutralized at the outset of the. operation. By the late afternoon of November 1, only the pa lace guard remained to defend the rwo brothers. At 4:30 p.m. , Diem called Lodge ro ask where the U.S. stood. Lodge was noncommiral and confined himself to concern for Diem's physica l safety. The conversation ended inconclusively. The generals made repeated calls ro the palace offexing the brothers safe conduct out of the country if they surrendered, bur the rwo held out hope until the ve ry end. Sometime that evening they secretly slipped o ur of the palace thro ugh an underground escape passage and went to a bide-away in Cholon. There they were captured the fo llowing morning after their whereabouts was learned when the palace fe ll. Shortly the two brothers were murdered in the back of a n armored personnel carrier en route to JGS headquarters.

Having successfully carried off their coup, the generals began to make arrangements fo r a c ivi lian government. Vice President Tho was named to head a largely civilian cabinet, but General Minh became President and Chairman of the shadow Military Revolutionary Council. After hav- ing delayed an appropriate period, the U.S. recognized the new govern- ment on November 8. As rhe euphoria of the first days of liberation from the heavy hand of the Diem regime wore off, however, the real gravity of the economic situation and the lack of expertise in the new government became apparent ro both Vietnamese and American officia ls. The dete- rioration of the milita ry s ituation and the strategic hamlet program a lso came more and more dearly into perspective.

These topics dominated the discussions at the Honolulu Conference on November 20 when Lodge and the country ream mer with Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, Bell, and Bundy. Bur the meeting ended inconclu- sively. After Lodge had conferred with the President a few days later in Washington, the White House tried to pull together some conclusions and offer some guidance for Olllr continuing and now deeper involvement in Vietnam. The instructions contained in NSAM 273, however, did not reflect the truly dire situation as it was to come to light in succeeding weeks. The reappraisals forced by the new information wou ld swiftly make it irrelevant as it was "overtaken by events. "

For the military coup d 'etat against Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S. must accept its ful l share of responsibility. Beginning in August of 1963 we variously authorized, sanctioned and encouraged the coup efforts of the Vietnamese generals and offered full support for a successor government.

The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem 349

In October we cut off aid to Diem in a direct rebuff, giv ing a green light to the genera ls. We ma,nra ined clandest ine co ntact w ith them through• o ut the p lanning and execution of the coup and sought to review their operational plans and proposed new government. T hus, as the nine-year rule of Diem came to a bloody end, our com plicity in his overthrow heightened our responsibilities and o ur commitment in an essentially leaderless Vietnam.

CABLE FROM US DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO AMBASSADOR

LODGE SUPPORTIN G A COUP IN SOUTH VIETN AM

29 August 1963

STATE 2 72

STATE TO LODGE AND HARKINS

1. Highest level meeting noon today reviewed your .375 and reaf- firmed basic course. Specific decis ions fo llow:

2. In response 10 your recommendation, General Harkins is hereby a uth orized co repeat 10 such Generals as you in dicate the messages previously transmitted by CAS officers. He should srress that the USG supports the movement 10 eliminate the N hus from the gov- ernment, but that before arriving at specific understandings with the Generals, General Harkins muse know who are involved, resources available co them and overall plan fo r coup. The USG will support a coup which has good chance of succeeding but plans no direct involvement of U.S. armed forces . Harkins should scare tha t he is prepared co establish liaison with the coup p lanners and co review plans, but will not engage direcdy in joint coup planning.

3 . Q uestion of lase approach co Diem remains undecided and sepa- rate pecsonal message from Secretary co you develops o ur concern and asks your comment.

35 1

4. On movement of U.S. forces, we do not expect to make any annoUJ1ce- ment or leak at present and believe that any later decision to publicize such movements should be closely connected tO developing events on your side. \Y/e cannot of course prevent unauthorized disclosures or speculation, but we "~ll in any event knock down any reports of evacuation.

5. You are hereby authorized to announce suspension of aid through Diem government at a time and under conditions of your choice. In deciding upon the use of this authority, you should consider importance of timing and managing announcement so as to mini- mize appearance of collusion with Generals and also to minimize danger of unpredictable and disruptive reaction by existing govern- ment. We also assume that you will not in fact use this authority unless you think it essential, and we see it as possible that Harkins' approach and increas ing process of cooperation may provide assurance Generals desire. Our own view is that it will be best to hold this authority for use in close conjunction with coup, and not for present encouragement of Generals, but decision is yours.

LODGE CABLE TO SECRETARY RUSK ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD A COUP

29 August 1963

We are launched on a course fronn which there is no respectable turning back: the overthrow of th.e Diem government. There is no turning back in part because U.S. prestige is already publicly committed to this end in large measure and will become more so as the facts leak o ut. ln a more fundamenta l sense, there is no turning back because there is no possibility, in my view, that the war can be won under a Diem administra- tion, still less that Diem or any member of the family can govern the country in a way to gain the support of the people w ho count, i.e., the educated class in and out of government service, civil and military-not to mention the American people. 1n the last few months (and especially days) they have in fact positively a Llenated these people to an incalculable degree. So that I am personally in full agreement w ith the poLlcy which I was instructed 10 carry o ut by last Sunday' s telegram.

2. The chance of bringing off a Generals' coup depends on them to some extent; but it depends at least as much on us.

3. We should proceed to make all-owt effort to get Generals to move promptly. To do so we should have authority to do fo llowing: (a) That Gen. Harkins repeat 10 Generals personally message pre-

viously transmitted by CAS officers. This should estabLlsh their authenticity. Gen. Harkins should have order on this.

(b) If nevertheless Generals insist on public statement that all U.S. aid to VN through Diem regime has been stopped, we would agree, on express understanding that Generals w ill have started

353

ar same time. (We would seek persuade. Generals thar it would be better ro hold thjs card for use in event of stalemate. We bope it w ill not be necessa ry to do this at all.)

(c) VNese Generals doubt rhat we have the w ill power, courage, and determination to see this thing through. They are haunted by the idea that we will run o ut on them even though we have told them pu rsuant ro instructions, that the game had starred.

5. We must press on fo r many reasons. Some of these are: (a) Explosiveness of tbe present s ituation which may well lead to

riots and violence if issue of discontent w ith regime is nor met. Out of this could come a pro-Communist or at best a neutra l- ist set of politicians.

(b) The fact that war cannot be won with the present regime. (c) Our own reputation for steadfastness and our unwillingness to

stultify ourselves. (d) If proposed action is suspended, I believe a body blow wi ll be

dealt to respect for us by VNese Generals. Also, all those who expect U.S. to straighten out this s ituation will feel let down. Our help to the regime in past years inescapably gives a respon- sibility which we cannot avoid_

6. I reilize th at this course involves a very substantia l risk of losing VN. It also involves some additiona l risk ro America n lives. I would never propose ir if I felt there was a reasonable chance of holding VN with Diem.

[Point 7 unavailable.]

8 .... Gen. Harkins thinks thar I s ho uld ask Diem to get rid of the Nhus before starting the Generals' action . But I beLleve that such a step has no chance of getting the desired result and would have the very serious effect of being regarded by the Generals as a s ign of American indecision and delay. I beLleve ilis is a risk which we should nor run. The Generals distrust us too much already. Another point is that Diem would certainly ask for time ro consider such a far-reaching request. This wou ld give the ball to Nhu.

9. With the exception of par. 8 above Gen. Harkins concurs in ilis telegram.

SUBJECT:

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

August 29, 1963

Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS: White House Defense Department Secretary McNamara Mr. Gilpatric

COPIES TO:

The Pres ident McGeorge Bundy Mr. Forresral

State Department The Secretary Governor Harriman Mr. Hilsman Amb. Nolting The Vice President

Gen. Maxwell Taylor Maj. Gen. Krulak

CIA Gen. Carter Mr. HeJms Secretary of Treas ury Dillon USIA-Mr. Edward Murrow

The Secretary of State said that we have now had the replies from Lodge and Harkins. Both are agreed that the war cannot be won with a Diem-Nhu regime. The only point of disagreement was that Harkins thought we should make one last effort with Diem to get rid of Nhu and that Lodge felt that going to Diem would be useless and dangers for the Generals.

Ambas.sador Nolting expressed himself as in favor of one last try with Diem.

355

Mr. Hilsman expressed his opinion that going to Diem would be fruitless and cited Kattenburg 's conversation with Diem as supporting evidence.

The President asked that the group focus on the principal questions. The first was the desire of the g.enerals for reassurances that the US would support them.

Mr. Helms said that we have in effect already done this to a certain extent citing the cable reporting Rufus Phillips' conversation w ith General Kim.

Mr. Helms a lso pointed out that a meeting was scheduled for 8:15 Washington time tonight. If there was any doubt of our going ahead this meeting should be stopped immediately.

The Secretary said that although we had a need to know the adequacy of the plan, we should not get directly into planning.

Mr. Hilsman asked if the Secretary was making a distiJ1ction between participating in coup planning and further reassurances to the Genera ls. The Secretary said that this was precisely the distinction he was making.

Ambassador Nolting intervened and asked if we intended to get so deep into engineering a coup against Diem as to, for example, use American helicopters ro ttansporr rhe forces of the coup Generals to Saigon.

The President said that he wanted to get back to the basic q uestion. In the light of the cables from Lodge and Harkins, was there anyone in the EXCOM who wished to withdraw from the operation? And, sec- ondly, what was the feeli11g of the EXCOM about the issue of an approach to Diem?

The Secretary of Defense said that on the 6rst question be thought we should proceed witb the operation. On the seeond question he agreed with Harkins that one last approach should be made to Diem. However, he thought that the approach should not be made until everything was ready for a coup attempt. Otherwise Diem might react violently and we would have no alte_rnative. \Y/e were severa l days before that point.

Mr. Gi lpatric agreed with the Secretary of Defense. He fe lt that Harkins ought to accompany Lodge in the last approach to Diem. He agreed that the attempt sh ould be made at the very last moment.

The Secretary of Defense s.a id that he favored one lase approach to Diem because he doubted whether anyone. other than Diem could run this country.

The President asked who ru.ns it now; that it seemed to him that it was not being run very well.

.Memora11dum of C o nversation 357

Ambassador Nolting said that Diem runs the country; that Nhu is Diem's idea man; and that Thuan is a big help as chief of staff; but that Diem runs the country.

The Secretary of State said that Diem was facing a desperate situation- the end of his regime, possibly the end of his life and the end of his family. Diem might do something completely irrational and desperate if he was presented with an ultimatum. He might, for example, appeal to conunu- nist North Vietnam to intervene with their divisions ro help expel the Americans. If it seemed wise to make a last attempt with Diem be felt the Generals themselves might be a better vehicle, with the timing just before the coup attempt. He doubted that Lodge would succeed and an attempt by Lodge might set in train grave actions against the US and Americans.

The Secretary of Defense said the question was whether we should try ro save Diem. He felt we should. The question was one of Tactics.

The Secretary of State said it was hard ro separate them and cited the Kattenburg cable. In any case, an attempt should not be made until the coup was ready.

McGeorge Bundy said that the US posture would be better if the Generals made this attempt.

Ambassador Nolting said that the sanction is US support and that we were under a moral obligation to teU the Chief of State this.

The President asked whether we wo .. td really pull out of South Viet- Nam in any event.

The Secretary of State said that we must have an alternative when we present that ultimatum.

General Taylor said that we should have a good coup plan first; that he would welcome the opportunity for H arkins to ger into the planning process; that we needed to know the people and their objectives.

The Secretary of State said that getting into the planning depended on how it was done. We do need to know how much they expect form us but we ought not to be too involved in the derailed planning.

The President asked about signals to the Generals and fence-sitters. Mr. Hilsman felt that it was important that Harkins and his col-

leagues give the Generals the reassurances they desired since it was the military advisers who had the highest prestige. In addition, he felt that Lodge and Harkins ought ro consider whether Harkins should not make even more discreet hints to the fence-sitters as to the American views on the siruation.

The next subject for discussion was Lodge' s request for permission to announce a cur-off of aid. The Secretary of State fe lt there was some merit in making such an annowncement only after the Genera ls announced the formation of a new government. There was a discussion of the vari- ous aspects of the question with no clear-cur decision.

General Taylor reported on Seventh Fleer strength and s teps being taken to provide necessary forces to protect Americans in Vier-Nam should they be needed.

The CIA reported on "possible jamming of Diem's radio and the pro- vision to the Generals of rad io fac ilities. •

The President decided that we should a uthorize Harkins' approach to the Generals; that we should authorize Lodge to make a decision about a cut-off of aid with certa in qua lifications; that there should be no de)jb- erate leak on the Seventh Fleet movements; that there should be no hint 10 the fence-sitting Generals om Seventh Fleet movements at this time.

The Secretary of State said that the President shou ld understand that we could nor assure him of a peaceful operation; that some Americans may have 10 do some shooting, if only in self-defense; and that some Americans would probably be killed in the proce.ss.

The President again raised the question of the approach 10 Diem. The Secretary of Stare proposed a separate message to Lodge from the

Secreta ry of State to discuss the question more thoroughly. The President thought that without a sanction it would be just more

frustratio n, more words and more opportunity for Diem to delay. Ambassador Nolting said that there had been no real s ubstantive talk

with Diem; that there shou ld be a cards-on-the-table approach to him. He felt that before we went any further on a coup d'etat we should level with Diem- after a ll, we have made commitments to him. These have been altered by GVN actions, but we ought to say that GVN actions have altered the situation and say that we wanted a new deal. This action would risk the lives of the Generals; but it was the Generals who approached us not the other way around. He felt we must talk to Diem fo r dou1g so was the only way of getting the best government available.

Mr. Bundy expressed himself as being against this approach. Mr. H ilsman said that we had talked 10 Diem- as witness both

Lodge's and Kattenburg's talks- and that prospects we_re nor hopeful.

.Memora11dum of Conversation 359

Mr. Bundy and Mr. Hilsrnan agreed, however, char the discussions that had so far taken place were a ratheI thin discourse.

Ambassador Nolting said that we should tell Diem that we would nor support the alienation of the people and the military.

The Secretary of Stare said that this was all right provided it was done one hour before somebody moved. Otherwise Diem might take violent and unpredictable action against Americans and the Vietnamese people.

Ambassador Nolting said that he wa.s forced to grant chis possibility to the Secretary of State, but pointed out that Harkins feels suc.h an approach should be made.

The President asked what effect this would have on the Generals; would they nor regard it as a doublec.ross? He felt that the views of the Generals should be considered. Do they want ro keep Diem and remove only Nhu?

Ambassador Nolthingsaid that the evidence was unclear. The Generals may well want ro retain Diem .

. Mr. Hilsman recalled that our approach co the Generals specified that the decision on whether or nor Diem should be retained was up to them.

The Secretary of State said that he felt that the Nhus were the main target, bur that the decision on an approach to Diem was further down the track and this could be a subject of further discourse with the field.

Ar that the meeting broke up with rvoro cables No. lli and 7.22 being sent as a resulr.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE ON

DEALING WITH DIEM REGIME REPRESSION

August 31, 1963

American policy ;,, Vietnam bad to face 1101 only tbe challenge of a Communist in.surgency directed and controlled from North Vietnam_, but of

a government in the S011-1/, that was repre-ssive~ app01'entl)' unpopular, and

apparently 1111able to properly prosecute tile war against the Com,mmists. The following telegram, written by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and

read and approved by President Kennedy,. instructs American Aml,assador Henry Cabot Lodge on ho,u to bring pressure to bear on President Diem.

Repressive actions 011 the part of the South Vietnamese government ruould have provided a perfect cover for U.S. withdrawal, had Kennedy ,uanted to

tuithdrmv. Instead be pressured Diem to reform, and noted 11,ar the U.S.

"rvill support Vietnamese effort co change government."'

All this i.s consistent with the statement that "our primary obiective remains winning the war. "

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON Emergency 294 CNFO: ONCPAC POLAD-Exclusive for Admiral Felt

EYES ONLY FO R AMBASSADOR LODGE

Re your 391, agree your concl usion favo ring direct effort on GVN. US cannot abandon Viet-nam and while it will support Vietnamese effort to

36 1

change government that has good prospects success US should nor and would nor mount and operate o ne. To use your metaphor, when the spa- ghetti was pushed, it curled; now we must try pulling.

In the meantime, our primary objective remains w inning the war and we concur your suggestion that we should now reopen commw1icarions with Diem. Decision on exact course awaits your recommendations and consideration by highest authority. What fo llows is thinking of interde- partmental meeting chaired by Seererary today.

As ro general posture, it seems desirable to maintain both publically and in our private ta lks w ith GVN the leverage of US discontent with repression which has eroded war effort within Viet-nam as well as sup- port of Congress, US public, and world. Impression s hou ld be, both privately and publically, that US is engaged in candid and critical discus- sion to improve government nor overthrow it. Decision on changing government is Vietnamese.

In your talk w ith Diem, o ur thought is you should first stress common interest in defeating Viet Cong. Then in frank but tough line point out that daily juxtaposition of continuing American casualties and massive US aid with repressive measures contrary deepest American convictions will make it difficult for Executive and Congress to continue support. But rime is rather short. President Kennedy may well be obliged at next press conference to express US disapproval of repressive measures. Should we find it impossible to reach an agreement with GVN on a program to undo the damage caused by recent GVN actions, then suspension of aid might soon be forced upon us.

Specific policies and actions should be designed to develop political support within Viet-nam necessary co win the war and also to restore damaged image abroad. Our Ceeling is that your list of specifics should begin with blunt warning, if required, nor to arrest Generals who are so badly needed in war effort, and with strong demand Madame Nhu leave country on extended holiday. (Question of future role of Nhu could be left ro later discussions.)

In the intermediate discussion the most imporrant is relations with the Buddhists. Our feeling is that you should frankly say that negotiations with puppet bonzes w ill not accomplish purpose. We recognize that the other side of this coin is that we must assure Diem that we will make every effort to persuade the Buddhist leaders ro throw themselves fully into the common effort for the independence and security of Vier-nam.

D,a/i,ig With Di , m R eg im, R , pressio,i 363

Other po ints might be:

1. Repea l of Decree 10 by immediate executi ve action o r by specia l session of the Nationa l Assembly.

2. Restoration of damaged pagodas. 3. Release of students and reopening of closed universities. 4. Removal of press censorship.

At some stage, you w ill wish ro talk about future relationships between American advisers et al and free scope ro them in helping to carry on the war effort ar a ll appropriate governmental levels. (In this respect we fully agree with Harkin's decision to refrain from giving assur- ances in light of statements made to him. He and a ll military advisers should now concentrate on reestablishing normal relationships at a ll levels GVN to ger on with the war.)

Also would you think it useful if we tried to get Vatican to summon Archbishop Thuc to Rome fo r lengthy co nsultations?

If initial discussions go well, at some stage you may want to urge some for m of reorgan ization of the government introducing che Generals and perhaps other cjvilian leaders into ministerial posrs.

Ir may be important a r a fa irly early stage to raise the subject of the GVN improving its relations with its neighbors and especially to avoid interfering with Cambodjan traffic on the Mekong.

Tbe above is not an instruction but intended only fo r your comments. We will appreciate your views on it a,1d on any additional actions we

should require of the GVN in order ro get on w ith the task. Pres ident has reviewed this message and approves it in genera l. H e

suggests you should also plan your response to probable Diem claim that all this trouble comes from irresponsible press. He thinks you should say we hold no brief for press but Diem has been playing into their hands. Fact is that actions of GVN have now created a situation which is very difficult indeed fo r USG. For example, large cur in aid program in Ho use largely due to sense of disillusionment in w hole effort in Vier-nam. There are reports that still further cuts may be pressed on same ground, and in such a case USG simply would not have resources to sustain massive present level of support. So we need very quick and subsrantial response to your demarche. You should add that President will be commenting on situation in SYN in TV interview ro be taped Monday a.n. at Hyannis

and broadcast Monday evening. W hile in this interview he will be as restrained as possible, if asked fr will be impossible to avoid some expres- sion of concern. Thjs expression, however, will be mild in compa rison to what may have to be said soon unless there is major improvement.

GP- 1

End

RUSK

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ROBERT MCNAMARA,

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT, "VIETNAM

SITUATION" 21 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam Situation

ln accordance with your request this morning, this is a summary of my conclusions afrer my visit to Vietnam on December 19- 20.

1. Summary. The s ituation is very djsrurbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state.

2. The new govemmerit is the greatest source of concern. It is inde- cisive and drifting. Although Minh states that he, rather than the Committee of Generals, is making; decisions, it is not clear that this is actually so. ln any event, neither he nor the Committee are expe- rienced in political administration and so far they show little talent for it. There is no clear concept on how to re-shape or conduct the strategic hamlet program; the Province Chiefs, most of whom are new and inexperienced, are receiving Llttle or no direction; military operations, roo, are not being effectivdy directed because the generals are so preoccupied with essentially political affairs.

365

A specific example of the present situation is that General Dinh is spending little or no time commanding ill Corps, which is in the vital zone a round Saigon and needs full -rime direction. I made these points as strongly as possible to Minh, Don, Kim, and Tho.

3. The Country Team is the second major weakness. Ir lacks leader- ship, has been poorly informed, and is not working to a common plan. A recent example of confusion has been conllicting USOM and military recommendations both to the Government of Vietnam and to Washington on the size of the military budget. Above all, Lodge has virtually no officia l contact with H arkins. Lodge sends in reports with major military implications without showing them to Harkins, a nd does nor show Harkins important incoming traffic. My impression is that Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. This has of course been Stressed to him both by Dean Rusk and myself (and also by J ohn McCone), and I do not think he is consciously rejecting our ad vice; he has just operated as a loner a LI his life and cannot readily change now.

Lodge's newly-designated deputy, Davis Nes, was with us and seems a highly competent team player, I have stated the situation frankly to him and he has said be would do all he could to consti- tute what would in effect be an executive committee operating below the level of the Ambassador.

As to the grave reporting weakness, both Defense and CIA must take major steps to improve this. J ohn McCone and I have discussed it and are acri ng vigorously in our respective spheres.

4. Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation bas in fact been deterio - rating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of o ur undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Vier Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particula rly those d irectly south and west of Saigon. The Strategic H amler Program was seriously over-extended in these provinces, and the Vier Cong has been able to destroy many hamlets, while others have been abandoned or in some cases betrayed or pillaged by the government's own Self Defense Corps. ln these key provinces, the Vier Cong have destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at wilL

McNamara Memora:,1di,m 0 11 "Vietnam Situation .. 367

As remedial measures, we. must get the government to re-allo- cate its military forces so char its effective strength in these prov- inces is essential])' doubled. We also need to have major inereases in both militar)' and USOM staffs, to sizes that will give us a reli- able, independent U.S. appraisa l of the status of operations. Thirdly, realistic pacification plans must be prepared, allocating adequate time to secure the remainjng government-controlled a reas and work out from there.

Th is g loomy picture prevails predominantly in the provinces around the capital and in the Delta. Action to accomplish each of these objectives was started while we were in Saigon. The situation in the northern and central areas is considerably better, and does not seem to have deteriorated substantia lly in recent months. General Harkins still hopes these a.reas may be made reasonably secure by the latter half of next year.

In the g loomy southern picture, an exception to the trend of Viet Cong success may be provided by the possible adherence to the government of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao seers, which total three million people and control key areas along the Cambodian border. The Hoa Hao have already made some sort of agreement, and the Cao Daj are expected co do so at the end of this month. However, it is not clear that their influence wi ll be more than neu- tralized by these agreements, or that they will in fact really pitch in on tbe government's side.

5. Infiltration of men and equipment from North Viemam continues using (a) land corridors through Laos and Cambodia; (b) the Mekong River waterways from Cambodia; (c) some possible entry from the sea and the tip of the Delta. The best guess is that 1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entered South Vi.emam from Laos in the first nine months of 1963. The Mekong route (and a lso the possible sea entryl is apparently used for heavier weapons and ammunition and raw materials which have been turning up in inereasing numbers in the south and of whieh we have captu,ed a few shipments.

To counter this infiltration, we reviewed in Saigon various plans providing for cross-border operations into Laos. On the scale proposed, I am quite clear that these would nor be politi- cally acceptable or even militarily effective. O ur first need would

be immediate U-2 mapping of the whole Laos and Cambodian border, and trus we are preparing on an urgent basis.

One ocher seep we can take is to expand the existing limited but remarkably effective. operations on the Laos side, the so-called Operation HARDNOSE, so that it at least provides reasonable intelligence on movements all the way a lo ng the Laos corridor; plans to expand this wi0 I be prepared and presented for approval in about two weeks.

As to the waterways, the mjlitary plans presented in Saigon were unsatisfactory, and a special nava l team is being sent at once from H onolulu to determine what more can be done. The whole waterway system is so vast, however, that effective policing may be impossible.

In general, the infiltration problem, w hile serious and annoy- ing, is a lower priority than the key problems discussed earlier. H owever, we should do- what we can to reduce it.

6. Pla11s for Covert Actio11 into North Vietnam were prepared as we had requested and were an excellent job. They present a wide variety of sabotage and psychologica l operations against North Vietnam from wh ich I believe we should aim to select those that provide maximum pressure with mjnjmum risk. ln accordance with your direction at the meeting, General Krulak of the J CS is cha iring a group that will lay out a program in the ne>."t ten days fo r your consideration.

7. Possible 11eutralizatio11 of Vietnam is strongly opposed by Minh, and our attitude is somewhat suspect because of edfrorials by the New York Times and mention by Wa lter Lippmann and others. We reassured them as strongly as possible on this-and in some- what more general terms on the neutralization of Cambodia. I recommend that you convey to Minh a Presidential message for the New Year that would repeat o ur position in the strongest pos- s ible terms and would also be a vehicle to stress the necessity of strong central direction by the government a nd specifically by Minh himself.

8. U.S. resources and perso1111el cannot usefully be substantially increased. I have directed a modest arti llery supplement, and a lso the provision of uniforms fo r the Self Defense Corps, which is the most exposed fo rce and s uffers from low morale. Of greater

McNamara Memorandum 011 .. Vie t11am Situatio11 "n 369

potential significance, I have directed the Military Departments to review urgently the quality of the people we are sending to Vietnam. It seems to have fallen off considerably from the high standards applied in the original selections in I 962, and the J CS fully agree with me that we must have our best men there.

Conclusion. My appraisal may be overly pessimistic. Lodge, Harkins, and Minh would probably agree with me on specific points, but fee l that J anuary should see significant improvement. We should watch t he situation very carefully, running scared, hoping foe the best, but preparing for more forceful moves if the situation does not show early signs of improvement.

Robert S. McNamara

WAS KENN EDY PLANNING TO PULL OUT OF VIETNAM?

April 30, 1964

Robert Ke,111-edy was not merely John Kennedy's brother, he was his closest

political ally and closest confidant. So what Bobl,y said about John's view of tbe rvar in Vietnam is not merely spectilation or opi11ion.

The following i.s a pas.sage from an oral history interview done rvith Bobby in April, 1964 l,y the john F. Kennedy Li/,rary.

THIRD ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT F. KENNEDY

April 30, I 964 New York, New York

By John Bartlow Marrin For the John F. Kennedy Library

[BEGIN T APE V, REEL I]

[snipping earlier portion of interview]

Martin: All right. Now, Vietnam began in the first-on the 3rd of January started appearing rather prominently in the papers and, of course, still is, and was all through '63. Do you want to talk about it now? Do you want to wait till we come and pick up the coup later? In, on, in January, the Vietnamese killed three Americans and shot down five helicopters.

371

Kennedy: Viet Cong, you mean.

Martin: That's right. That' s what I mean, I'm sorry, Viet Cong. A little later Mansfield said that we we.re, this thing was turning into a n American war and wasn' t justified by our nationa l interest; we hadn't any business going in so deep, but we kept going in deeper. T he president sent Maxwell Taylor and McNamara o ut there. And then, and Lodge, he appointed Lodge as the ambassador- a nd you remember the hassle between the CIA and Lodge. The president brought the CIA fellow back, and, in the end, there was the coup against the Diem brothers. Do you want to discuss the whole thing now? You must have been in on a good deal of this.

Kennedy: Yes. Well, yeah, what do you want to start with?

Martin: All right. At the begin:ning we seemed to have our lines crossed. I mean, the majority leader in t he Senate, Mansfield, was saying this was not an American war, and he didn't think it was- that o ur- it should be- not, not- should not be an American war. He didn' t think our heavy commitment there was justified. H ow'd you fee l about it; how'd the president feel about it; and at w hat point did we get our lines straight- ened our?

Kennedy: Well, I don't think tlhat ...

Martin: Did I make myself clear?

Kennedy: No, I don' t think that fact, Senator Mansfield or somebody in the Senate takes a position, necessarily means . . .

Marrin: Well, he was majority leader.

Kennedy: Yeah, but, you know, he's frequently taken that, those, that line or that position on some of these matters. I don' t think that the fact he has an independent view from the executive branch of the government, particularly in Southeast Asia, indicates that the lines aren' t straight. I, no, I just, I chink every .... I, the president felt that the .... He had a strong, over whelming reason for being in Viemam and that we should win the war in Viemam.

Marrin: What was the overwhelming reason?

Kennedy: J ust the loss of all of Southeast Asia if you lost Vietnam. I think everybody was quite dear that the rest of Southeast Asia would fa ll.

Marrin: What if it did?

\Vas Ke1111edy Pla1111i11g to Pull Out o f Vietnam? 3 7 3

Kennedy: Just have profound effects as far as our position throughout the world, and our position in a rather vita l part of the world. Also, it would affect what happened in India, of course, which in turn has an effect on the Middle East. Just, it would have, everybody felt, a very adverse effect. It would have an effect on Indonesia, hundred million population. All of these countries wou ld be affected by the fall of Vietnam to the Communist.~, particula rly as we had made such a fuss in the Un ited States both under President Eisenhower and President Kennedy about the preservation of the integrity of Vietnam.

Martin: There was never any consideration given to pulling o ut?

Kennedy: No.

Martin: But the same time, no disposition to go in all ...

Kennedy: No ...

Martin: ... in an all out way as we went into Ko rea. We were trying to avoid a Korea, is that correct?

Kennedy: Yes, because I, everybody incl uding General MacArthur fe lt that land conOict between o ur troops, white troops and Asian, would only lead to, end in disaster. So it was .... We went in as advisers, but to try to get the Vietnamese to fight themselves, because we couldn't win the wa r for them. They had to win the war for themselves.

Martin: It' s generally true a ll over the world, w hether it's in a shooting wa r or a different kind of a war. But the president was convinced that we had to keep, had 10 stay in there ...

Kennedy: Yes.

Martin: ... and couldn' t lose it.

Kennedy: Yes.

Martin: And if Vietnamese were about to lose it, would he propose to go in on land if he had to?

Kennedy: Well, we'd face that when we came to it.

Martin: Mm hm. O r go with air strikes, o r-direct from carriers, I mean, something like that?

Kennedy: But w ithout .... It didn' t have to be faced at that time. In the first place, we were w inning the war in 1962 and 1963, up until

May or so of 1963. The siruarion was getting progressively better. And then I ...

Martin: Bur then it got progre- starred going downbjlJ, djdn'r it?

Kennedy: Yes, and then we had all the problems with the Buddhists and the ...

Martin: Yeah.

Kennedy: And, uh ...

Martin: Why did they go down , why did they get bad, Bob?

Kennedy: Well, 1 just thjnk be was just, Diem wouldn' t make even the slightest concessions. He was difficult to reason with , well, with the .... And then it was built up tremendously in an adverse fash ion here in the United Stares and that was played back in Vietnam, and .... And 1 think just the people themselves became concerned about it. And so, it began to, the situation began to deteriorate in the spring of 1962, uh, spring of 1963. I think David Halberstam, from the New York Times' articles, had a strong effect on molding public opinion: the fact that the situation was unsatisfactory. O ur problem was that thinking of Halberstam sort of as the Ma- what Matthews !unidentified] d id in Cuba, that Batista [Fulgencio R. Batista] was nor very satisfactory, but the important thing was to try to get somebody who could replace him and somebody who could keep, continue the war and keep the country united, and that was far more rufficulr. So that was what was of great concern ro all of us dur- ing this period of time. Nobody liked Diem particula rly, but how to get rid of him and get somebody that would continue the war, not split the country in two, and therefore lose not only the war but the country. Thar was the great problem.

So would Kennedy have fal len ;mo the Vietnam quagn,jre just as Johnson did? No one can be sure, and Kennedy supporters can certainly believe that he would have avoided J ohnson' s massive comn,jnmenr-even though he had the same advisors as J ohnson and the same desire to pre- vent a Communist takeover.

However, the Oliver Stone version of the Kennedy assassination, as expressed in the movie JFK, holds that Kenned)' had already decided to pull our of Vietnam, and was killed fo r that reason. That's just nor so.

PART V

1964-1965

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON

AND SEN ATOR RICHARD RUSSELL

May 27, 1964, 10:55 p.m.

Senator Russell: Prerry Good. How are you Mr. Pres ident?

President Johnson: Oh, I've gor lors of trouble. I want ro see what you ...

Russell: Well, we all have rhose.

Johnson: Whar do you think about this Vietnam thing? I'd like to hear you talk a little bir.

Russell: Well, frankly, Mr. President, if you were ro tell me that I was authorized to settle as I saw fit, I would respectfully decline to undertake it. Ir's the damn worse mess that I ever saw, and I don't like to brag and I never have been right many times in nny life, but I knew that we were gone to get into this sort of mess when we went in there. And I don't see how we' re ever going to get out of it without fighting a major war with the Chinese and all of them down there i.n those rice paddies and jungles. I just don't see it. I just don't know what to do.

Johnson: Well, that's the way I have been feeling for six months.

Russell: Our position i.s deteriorating and it looks like the more we try to do for them, the less they are willing to do for themselves. It's just a sad situation. There is no sense of responsibiliry there on the part of any of

377

their leaders apparently. Ir is all just through generations or even centuries that they have just thought about the individual and glorified the individ- ual. That' s the only utilization of power, just ro glorify the individual and not to save the state or help other people. And they just can't shed them- selves of that complex. It's a hell of a situation. It is a mess, and it's going ro get worse, and I don't know how or what ro do. I don' t think the American people are quite ready for us to send our troops in there to do the fighting. lf it came down to an option of just sending the Americans in there to do the fighting, which will, of course, eventually end in a ground war and a conventional war with China, and we do them a favor every time we kill a coolie, whereas when one of our people got killed it would be a loss to us, and if it got down ro that-of just pulling out- fd get out. But then I don't know. There is undoubtedly some middle ground some- where. If I was going to get out, I'd get the same crowd that got rid of old Diem to get rid of these people and to get some fellow in there that said we wish to hell we would get out. That would give us a good excuse for gettiJ1g out. I see no terminal dare, boy oh boy, any part of that in there.

Johnson: How important is it to us?

Russell: It isn' t importru1t a damn bit for all this new missile stuff.

Johnson: I guess it is important.

Russell: From a psychological standpoint.

Johnson: I mean, yes, and from the standpoint that we are a parry ro a treaty. And if we don' t pay any attention to this treaty I don't guess that they think paying attention to any of them.

Russell: Yeah, but we are the only ones paying attention ro it.

Johnson: Yeah, I think that is .right.

Russell: You see the other people are just as bound to that treaty as we are.

Johnson: Yes, that' s right.

Russell: I think there are some twelve or fourteen other countries.

Johnson: That' s right. Yeah, there are fourteen of them.

Russell: I don't know much about the foreign policy but it seems to me that there were several of them that were parties to it. And other than the question of our word and saving face, that's the reason that 1 said that

Teleph o 11 e Co nv e rsation B e ttue e 11 Jo h11s a 11 a,id Russell 3 7 9

I don' t think char anybody would expe,cr us to sray in there. Some old freebooter down in there, I've forgotten his name, I haven' t heard about him lately, but he is still there, sort of a hellraiser and be don't know exactly what he wants, but I think be is the. most dangerous thing to the present regime. I think that if he were r-0 rake over, he would ask us ro ger our. And, of course, if he did, with our theory of standing by self- determination of people, I don't think how we could say we not going to go if he is in charge of the government. Ir' s going to be a headache ro anybody that tries ro fool with it. You've got all the brains in the country, Mr. President, you better get a hold of them. I don' t know what to do about this. I saw it all coming on, but that don't do any good now, that's water over the dam and under the bridge. And we are there.

Johnson: Well, you 've got ...

Russell: Well, you got McNamara over there. He was up here yesterday testifying before the committee. I didn't want to have him up here, but Howard Cannon and some of them wanted to have him up here. So I set up the hearing for 8:30 before I started the Appropriations hearings. He's gor, well, rather kicked around so I'm not sure he is objective as he ought to be in surveying the conditions out there. He feels like it is sort of up to him personally to see rhat the thing goes through, and he's a can-do-fellow, but I'm nor too sure that he understands the history and background of those people out there as :fully as he should. But even from his picture, the damn thing a in' t getting any better, it is just gerting worse, putting more and more in there and it's taking more and more away from the people we're trying to help, that we give them. I don' t know, you better get some. brains from somewhere to apply to this thing up. Beeause I don' t know what to do with it.

Johnson: Well, I spend all my days with Rusk and McNamara and Bundy and Harriman and Vance, and all those folks that are dealing with it and I would say that it pretty well adds up to them now that we have got show some power and some force and that they do nor- they are kind of like MacArthur in Korea- they don' t believe chat the Chinese Communists will come into this thing. But they don' t know, and nobody can really be sure, but their feel ing is that they won' t, and in any event, we haven' t got much choice. That we are treary bound, that we are there, this will be a domino that will kick off a whole list of others, and that we

have just got ro prepare. for the: worst. Now I have avoided that for a few days. I don't think the American people are fo r it. I don't agree with Morse and all that he says, but ...

Russell: Neither do I, but he is voicing the sentiment of a hell of a lot of people.

Johnson: I'm afraid that's right. I' m afraid that's right. I don't think the people of this country know m uch about Vietnam, and I don't think that they care a hell of a lot less.

Russell: Yeah , I know, but you go sending a whole lot of o ur boys out there they'll care something abour it.

Johnson: Yeah, that's exactly right. That's what I'm talking about. You get a few killed. We had 35 killed. H ell, we got enough of them lciJJed- over 35 this year.

Russell: There is more than that been killed in Atlanta, Georgia, in a uto - mobile accidencs.

Johnson: Yeah, that's right, and 83 went down in one crash on a 707 in one day, but that doesn't make any difference.

Russell: That's the way these folks under stand it, they don't understand that thing over there now.

Johnson: The Republicans going to make a political issue out of it, every one of them, even Dirksen .

Russell: It's the only issue they've got.

Johnson: I talked to Dirksen the other day, Friday, and he suggested that I have three of Armed Services, three from Appropriations, and all of them from Foreign Relations d own. So I told him all right and invited them. And yesterday before they came he gave o ut a big statement that we had to get us a program and go after them. AI1d Hickenlooper said that they just had to stand and show our force and put our men in there and let come what may come, and nobod)• disagreed with him. Now Mansfield, he just wants to pull up and get out, and Morse wants to get out, and Gruening wants to g,et o ut. And that's about where it stops. I don't know.

Russell: And there's others here that want to get o ut, but they haven't said much about it, but Frank Church told me two or three times that he

Telepho11e Conversation Bettuee11 Joh11sa11 a,id Russell 38 1

doesn't wanr to make a speech on ir, bU1t he just wished to God thar we could ger our of there. I don't know whether he has told you that or nor?

J ohnson: No, I haven't talked ro him.

Russell: Bur I just use that as an illustration cause he has mentioned it ro me more than once.

J ohnson: Who are the best people that we have, that you know of, to talk about this thing? I don't want to do an ything on the basis of just the information rhar I have gor now.

Russell: I don 't know who, Mr. President. Ah.

J ohnson: I ta lked to Eisenhower a little bit.

Russell: I think that the people that you have named have a ll formed a hard opinion on it, I rbink.

J ohnson: Rusk has tried to pull back, he has tried to bold back on every- thing, but he has about come to the conclusion now that Laos is crum- bling and Vietnam is wobbly.

Russell: Laos, Laos, hell, it ain't worth a damn! They've been miking about all these battles down there, and I tried tO get the best information I could from the CIA and from Defense both about a ll this fierce fighting on the Plain of Jars and all, and the highest estimate ro the casualties is 150. That Laotian thing is absolutely impossible, it's a whole lot worse than Vietnam. There are some of these Vietnamese. after they beat them over the head they will go in there and fight, but Laos is an impossible situation. That's just a rathole there. I don't know, but before I rook any drastic action, I think I would get somebody like o ld Omar Bradley and one or rwo, perhaps senior people who had had government experience, nor necessarily the military. lf he wasn't scared to death of McNamara, this fellow Adams who is the head of Strike (Strike Command] would be a top flight man to send out there with them. Let them go our there, fool around for a few days and smell the air and get the atmosphere, and then come back in a few days and tell you whar they think, cause they are new in ir and would not have a great many preconceived idea:s in approaching it.

J ohnson: One of o ur big problems there, Dick, the biggest, between us and I don't want this repeated ro anybody, is Lodge.

Russell: I know it.

Johnson: He ain't worth a damn.

Russell: Why, of course.

Johnson: And he can't work with anybody. He won't let anybody else work. We get the beSt USIA man to put all on all the radios and try to get them to be loyal to the government and to be fighting and quit deserting.

Russell: He thinks he's the emperor out there.

Johnson: And he calls in USIA and says: "I handle the newspapers and the magazines and radio myse lf, so hell with you." So that knocks that guy out. So then we send out the best CIA man we've got and he says, " I handle intelligence, to hell with you." Then be wants a new Deputy Chief of M;ssion and we get him rn give us some names, and we pick one, the best one we've got, send him out there to rllll the damn war, and he gets where he (Lodge] won't speak to the Deputy Chief of Mission. Then we get General Harkins out there, we thought he was a pretty good man, and he gets where he can't work with him. So we send Westmoreland out there. It's just a hell of a mess:. You can't do anything with Lodge, and that is where McNamara gets so frustrated. They go out and get agree- ments and issue orders, and sends his stufi in there, and then Lodge takes charge of it himself, and he is not a take-charge man. And he just gets stacked up.

Russell: He never has followed anything through to a conclusion since I've known him, and I've known h:im for 20 odd years. He never has. I went out with him around the world in ' 43, the only committee that went out during the war, we went everywhere. And Lodge was on there, he's a bright fellow, intelligent fellow, but he i.s not a man that persists. And he thinks he is dealing with barbarian tribes our there, and that he's the emperor, and he is going to tell ·them what ro do. And there isn't any doubt in my mind that he had old Diem killed out there, himself, so he could.

Johnson: That was a tragic mistake.

Russell: Oh, it was horrible, awful.

Johnson: And we've lost ever since.

Russell: You have to go get someone that's more pliant than Lodge, that would do exactly as he said right quick. He's living up on cloud nine, it's a bad mistake. I don't know but the best thing you could do is ask Lodge if he don't think it's about time rhat he coming home?

Telepho11e Conversation Bettuee11 Joh11sa11 a,id Russell 383

J ohnson: Well, he'd be home campaignrng against us on this issue every day.

Russell: Well, God Almighty, he's goin' to come back anyway, when time comes. I'd give him a reason for doing it. He is going to come back. If you bring him back now, everybody going to say, " hell, he's coming back cause Johnson removed him from o ur there." MacArthur with a ll his power couldn't hurt Truman because everybody would said, well, hell, he just mad cause he got removed, though millions sympathized w ith him in it. And you needn't worry. Lodge will be in here, in my judgment, he'll be on that ticket some way. I don't think they'll nominate him for President, but they may put him o n there for Vice President. But whether they do or don't, he'll be back here campaigning before that campaign's over. I don't know, I best rake that back. This thing is so hopeless for the Republicans. He has certainly got enough critica l sense ro know that and not get his head chopped off. It would be foolish.

J ohnson: Has C lay got any judgment on a thing like this?

Russell: Yeah, he has, even though he inclined ...

J onnson: He's off in another part of the world, mostly, isn't he.

Russell: I think Clay knows. I'd rake his judgment on most anything if he separates himself from his predilections. And he don' t have any out there in that part of the world . I think that people generally have a good dea l of respect for Clay's judgment too. And there's a great deal of affection and respect for o ld man Bradley, he's not in !his dotage yet by a hell of a lot. I had him up here the other day getting some advice on some matters and I found him very alert. H e's so humble, I don't know, he could rend to be a doormat for Lodge our there. But he's an intelligent man. Now Clay wouldn't. Clay would stand up to anybody if he felt he had support from high up places. I just don' t know, it's a ·tragic s ituation, it's one of those places were you just can't win. Anythin& you do is wrong.

J ohnson: Well, think about it and call me.

Russell: All right, sir. I have thought about it and worried about it and prayed about it.

Johnson: I don't believe that we can do anything thar-

Russell: I have religiously because it's something that fr ightens me cause it's my country that is involved over there and if we get in there on any

considerable scale, there is no doubt in my mind that what the Chinese will be in there and we will be fightin' a dang conventional war against our secondary potential threat. And it'll be Korea on a much bigger scale. And on a worse scale because- of the peculiar physical configuration of Korea made extensive guerrilla lighting virtually impossible, but that's not true over in there. You go from Laos and Cambodia, into Vietnam, and bring North Vietnam into it too, it's the damnedest mess on earth. The French lost 250,000 men and spent a couple billion of their money and rwo billion of ou,s down in tbere. Just got the bell whipped out of them. And they got the best t~oops they had. ln fact, they had a crack division of Gennan troopers who were serving and the French Foreign Legion went down there.

Johnson: You don't have any doubt but if we go in there and get them up against the wall, the Chinese Communists is goi11g to come in?

Russell: No doubt at a ll.

Johnson: That's my judgment, and my people don't think so.

Russell: There's no doubt in my mind about it. You'll find O,inese volunteers

in there as soon as, very shortly, after we have active combat unirs engaged.

Johnson: Now Mike writes me a memo and all he says is that we con- tinue to support the Vietnamese, and that's number one, and "end to the reflex of pique and face saving of every essay of DeGaulle's." Well, we're not piqued, we just asked DeGaulle to give us a blueprint, and he don't have it, he just says neutralization. But there ain't nobody wants to agree to neutralization. We ask him who would agree to go with old Ben Milam, 1 we're ready, but he just sai•s, well, we have to continue to mrun- tain our strength ru1d get in a position. But he's got no blueprint. "Th,ee, realis6c facing of the fact that we are in this situation without reliable military allies." Well, bell, I know that. "Four, an exploration of the pos- sibility of the United Nations or some other arrangement." Well.

Russell: Who is this?

JohJ1Son: This is Mike Mansfield. They [the United Nations] won't do a damn thing even on the Cambodian border, and hell, we can't get a majority vote in the Security Council. "Our willingness to entertain any

1 Ben J\'1Ham was a hero or the war of Texas independenct.

Telepho11e Conversation Bettuee11 Joh11sa11 a,id Russell 385

reasonable proposals for international conferences." Well, we are ready to confer with anybody, a nytime, but, that conferences ain't going to do a damn bit of good. They a in' t going to rnke back and behave. We tell them every week, we tell Khrushchev, send China, Hanoi, and all of them word that we would get out of there and stay o ut of there if they just q uit raiding their neighbors, and thei• just say, serew you.

Russell: That's right.

J ohnson: So the conferences won't do it. Now tbe whole question as I see it, do we, is it more dangerous for us to let things go as they are going now, deteriorating every day?

Russell: I don't think we can let it go, Mr. President, indefinitely.

J ohnson: Than it wou ld be for us to move in?

Russell: Well, either we move in or mov-e o ut.

J ohnson: That's about what it is.

Russell: You can make a tremendous case for moving out, but a good for moving in?

J ohnson: Well, now Nixon and Rockefeller.

Russell: But it would be more consistent with their attitude of the American people and their general reactions to go in. They could under- stand it. But getting out, even after we go in, getting bogged down with the war with China, and it's going to be a hell of a mess, it be worse than the one now to some extent, and that's what makes it so difficult. And don't fo rget that old Ben Milam was the onl)' man that got killed. Old Ben was a hell of a hero, but he got killed.

J ohnson: That's right.

Russell: And o ld Ben was killed. And so if they start off with Ben Milam, wh ich they ain't going to do with any inside degree, they'll get o ut and Ben w ill be killed. It's just a hell of a come on. I don't know, I don't know how much Russia- they want to cause us all the trouble as they ca n. But, ah, if there is any truth in the theory that they are really at odds with C hina, and really is a cleavage there?

Jonnson: They are, but they would go with them as soon as the fighting started. They wouldn't fo rsake that China, that Communist bloc.

Russell: I was talking about that. We might get them to take an active pact in getting the thing straightened o ut.

Johnson: We are doing all that we can on that, but s he doesn't sh ow any signs of contributing.

Russell: Well, they'd be foolish to one e.xtenc because we just continue to pour money in there a nd get notlung back o ut of it. We don't even get good will back o ut of that. I d on't know, I don't know where to go fo r advice, I just don't know where to go fo r it. McNamara is the smartest fellow a ny of us know, but he is opinionated as hell and he's made up his mind on this. I don't think it ...

Johnson: Well, I'll tell you, Dick, what he has done. I think he is a pretty flexible fe llow. H e has gone out there and got Khanh to agree that we cannot launch a counter offensive o r hit the North until he gets more stabilized a nd better set in the South. And thought he was buying us time and we could get by muil November. But these politicians got to raising hell, and Scripps H oward writ;ng these stories, and all the Senators, and Nixon, and Rockefeller, and Goldwater a ll saying let's move, let's go in the North.

Russell: That was a devastatir1g piece that Lucas had in that lfrtle old paper.

Johnson: Tha t's right.

Russell: That paper don't cover much of the country, but if it got out everywhere, that would raise a lot of hell.

Johnson: That's right, and they can a lways get an isolated example of bad things McNamara says, but that's not generally true that they had too many damn people being killed every day. And that they are flying the sorties a nd they even get some result and they' re killing thousands of their people, but we're losing more, I mean we're losing ground. And he was hoping that we could avoid moving into the North, and thereby provoking the Ch inese, for a few months.

Russell: Hell, you know we tried that from an infiltration guerrilla wac standpoint with disastrous results.

Johnson: Lodge, Nixon, Rockefeller, Goldwater all say move. Eisenhower-

Telepho11e Conversation Bettuee11 Joh11sa11 a,id Russell 387

Russell: Well, and bomb the North, get a whole mess of women and children killed and infuriate everybody?

J ohnson: No, no, they say pick our an o;I plant or pick out a refinery, or something like that, take selected targets, watch this trail they're coming down, and try to bomb them our when ·they're coming in.

Russell: Oh, hell, it ain't worth it a hoot . That's just impossible.

J ohnson: McNamara said yeSterday that in Korea LeMay and a ll of them were going ro stop a ll of those tanks, and there were 90 of them coming through, and they turned the Air Force loose on them and they got one. Eighty-nine came on through.

Russell: We tried it in Korea. We even got our a lot of old B-29s ro increase the bombing load, and sent them over there and just dropped mjllions and millions of pounds of bombs day and night. And in the morning, we'd knock o ur the road at night, in the morning the damn people be back traveling over it. Thar's true on that rai lroad over there on the north coast. We used the Navy wurh these 14 inch riAes [guns] and knocked a mountain down on it, shelled it, and knocked down this mountain and covered up the railroad tracks. And everybody srud, "by God, we've got them now." And in the ne.xt morning, the trains were running like the devil right over that track. We shot up severa l million dollars worth of shells thjnking we had dosed it. We never could actu· ally interdict all their lines of communication in Korea even though we had absolute control of the seas and the air. And we never did stop them. And you run't going to stop these people either.

J ohnson: Well, they'd impeach a president, though, that would run o ur, wou ldn't they?

Russell: I don't think they would.

J onnson: I just don't believe that outside of Morse, everybody that I've talked to says that you got ro go in, incllllding H ickenlooper, including all the Republicans, nobody disagreed with him yesterday when he made the statement that we had ro stand. And I don't know bow in hell you' re going to get out, unless they tell you to get out.

Russell: If we had a man over there running the government, that we told ro get out, we could should do it.

J ohnson: That's right, bur you can't do ithat.

Russell: I don't know if we could gee somebody else. I don'r remember thar fellow's name, some sorr of a maverick, that's gor a bir of a following in below Saigon and rhen all our people hate him because he's always against the government. And he's nor fighting them and all, bur he's a very powerful man in Vietnam, and everybody who rakes over the gov- ernment gives him as an excu:se for their repressions and suppressions. And if he were ro get and say, "now you damn Yankees ger o ut of here, l'm running the government now."

Johnson: Wouldn't that pretty well fix us in the eyes of the world and make us look mighry bad?

Russell: Well, I don't know, we don't look roo good right now. And course, you'd look prerry good, I guess, going in there with all the troops, sending them all in there, but I'll rell you ir'll be the mosr expensive adventure this country ever went into.

Johnson: I've gor a lirrle old sergeant that works for me over at the house and he's got six chi ldren. And I jusr pur him up as the Unired States Army and Air Force and Navy every time I think about making rhis decision. I think about sending that father of those six kids in there, and what the hell are we going ro gee our of bis doing in? It just makes the chills run up my back.

Russell: Ir does me.

Johnson: I haven't the nerve ro do it, bur I don'r see any ocher wai• our of ir.

Russell: It doesn't make. much sense co do ir. Ir's one of these things, heads I win, rails you lose.

Johnson: Well, think abour ir, and I'll talk co you again. I hare ro borher you.

Russell: I feel for you, God knows I do. Ir's a terrific quandary rhar we' re in over rhere. We' re in the quicksands up ro our very neck, and I jusr don'r know whar rhe hell rhe besr way ro do about ir.

Johnson: I love you, and I' ll be calling you.

Russell: I'll see you, sir.

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL

ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (BUNDY)

Washington, M ay 27, 1964, 11:24 a .m.

Here follows disc"ssio11 of the Seaborn mission to Hanoi and pf ans for Ambassador Stevenson to meet with the Pre:o.ident.

Johnson: I will rel! you the more, I just srayed awake last nighr thinking of this thing, and rhe more that I think of ir I don't know what in the hcll, it looks like ro me that we're getting into another Korea. It jusr worries the hell our of me. I don'r see wbar we can ever hope to get our of there with once we're commirred. I beJieve the Chinese Communists are com- ing into it. I don't think rhar we can fight them 10,000 miles away from home and ever get anywhere in rhar area .. I don'r think it's worrh fighting for and I don't think we can ger our. And it's just the biggest damn mess that I ever saw.

Bundy: It is an awful mess.

J ohnson: And we jusr gor ro think abou r it. I'm looking ar this Sergeant of mine this morning and he's gor 6 J;rtle old kids over there, and he's gerring out my things, and bringing me in my night reading, and all that

389

kind of stuff, and I just thought about ordering all those kids in there. And what in the hell am I ordering them out there for? What in the hell is Vietnam worth to me? What is Laos worth to me? What is it worth to this country? We've got a treary but hell, everybody else has got a treaty out there, and they're not doing a thing about it.

Bundy: Yeah, yeah.

Johnson: Of course, if you start running from the Communists, they may just chase you right into your own kitchen.

Bundy: Yeah, that's the trouble. And that is what the rest of that half of the world is going to think if this thing comes apart on us. That's the dilemma, that's exactly the dilemma.

Johnson: But everybody that I talk to that's got any sense now the)' just says Ob, my God, please give us thought. Of course I was reading Mansfield's stuff this morning, and it is just Milquetoast as it can be. He's got no spine at all.

Bundy: Yeah.

Johnson: But this is a terrible thing that we're getting ready to do.

Bundy: lvlr. President, I just think it figure it is really the only big decision in one sense, this is the one that we have to either reach up and get it, or we let it go by. And I'm not telling you today what I'd do in your pos i- tion. I just trunk that the most that we have to do with it is pray with it for another while.

Johnson: Anybody else that we got that can advise with, that might have any judgement on this question, that might be fresh, that might have some new approach. Would Bradley be any good? Would Clay be any good?

Bundy: No, Bradley would be no good. I do not think Clay would add. I think you're constantly searching, if I understand you correctly, for some means of stiffening this thing that does not have this escalating aspect to it, and I've been up and down this with Bob McNamara, and I have up and down it again wi.th Mike Forrestal. And I think that there are some ma rgi11al things th.at we can do, . . . but I think, also, lvlr. President, you can do, what I think Kennedy did at least once which is to make the threat without having made your own internal decision that you would actually carry it through. Now I think that the risk in

Teleph o 11e C o 11versa1i o 11 Betw ee n /0l111s011 a11d Bu,id y 39 1

chat is that we have, at least, it seemed to do it about once or twice before. And there's another dilemma in here, which is the difficulty your own people have in. I'm not talking about Dean Rusk or Bob McNamara or me, but people who are at second removed, w ho just find it very ha rd to be firm, if they're not absolutely clear what your decision is. And yet you must safeguard that decision a nd keep your ...

Johnson: What does Bill think that we o ught to do?

Bundy: He's in favor of touching things u p, but you ought to talk to him about it. I've got an extremely good memorandum from Forrestal I that I'm just getting ready fo r you that shows what he thinks about it.

Johnson: What does he think?

Bundy: He thinks that we ought to be ready to move a little bit, a little bit. And mainly the Vietnamese. On the other band, a readiness to do more. He believes really that's the best way of galvanizing the South, that if they feel that we are prepared to take a little action against the center of this infection, that that's the best way ...

Johnson: What action do we take, though?

Bundy: Well, I chink that we really do need to do some target fodde r work, Mr. President, chat shows precisely what we do and don't mean here. The main object is to kill as few people as possible, wh ile creating an environment in which the incentive to react is as low as possible. But I can' t say to you chat this is a small matter. There's one other thing tha t I've thought about, I've on ly just thought overnight, a nd it's on this same matter of saying to a guy, you go to Korea, or you go to Vietnam, and you fight in the rice paddies . I would love to know what happened if we were to say in chis same speech, a nd from now on, nobody goes o n this task who doesn' t volunteer. I think that we might turn around the atmo• sphere of our own people o ut there, if it were a volunteer enterprise. I suspect that the Joints Chiefs won't agree to that, but I'd like to know what would happen. If we really dramatized this as Americans against terror and Americans keeping their commitment, and Americans who have on ly peace as their object, a nd only Americans who want to go have to go, you might change the temper of it some.

1 Apparent reference to 3 memorandum from Fonestnl to Bundy, M:t )' 26, printed in Foreign Relations, 1964- 1968, \1 01. l, Document l 78.

Johnson: Well, you wouldn't have a Corporals' Guard would you?

Bundy: I just don't know, I just don't know. If that's true, then I'm not sure that we're the country to do this job.

Johnson: I don't think that it's just Morse and Russell, and Gruening, J think it's ...

Bundy: I know it isn't. I know it Mr. President, it is 90% of the people that don't want any part of it.

Johnson: Did you see the poll this morning? 65% of them don' t know anything about it, and of chose that do, the majority think that we're mishandling it. Bue they don't know what to do, that Gallup.

Bundy: Yeah, yeah.

Johnson: It's damn easy to get into a war, but if it's going to be awful hard to ever extricate yourself if you get in.

Bundy: Very easy. I'm very sensitive co the fact that the people who are having trouble with the intransigent problem find it very easy to come and say co the President of the United States, go ai1d be cough.

Johnson: What does Lippmann think that you ought to do?

Bundy: Well, I'm going to talk with him ac greater length, but what he really thinks is chat you sholllld provide a diplomatic structure within which the thing can go under the control of Hanoi, and walk away from it. I don't think that's an unfaiir scatemenc, but I wiU ask him.

Johnson: You mean that he chinks that Hanoi ought co take South Vietnam?

Bundy: Yes sir, diplomatically.

Johnson: Uh, huh.

Bundy: Maybe by calling it a neutralization and removing American force and letting it slip away the way that Laos did, would if we didn't do anything, and will if we don' t do anything. We would guarantee the neutrality in some sort of a treaty that we would write. I think, I'm sorry, I'm not sure chat I'm the best person to describe l ippmarm' s views, because I don' t agree with them.

Johnson: Who, who, who, who has he been talking to besides you? Has he talked to Rusk on any of this? Has he talked to McNamara?

Telepho11e Co11versa1io11 Between /0l1 11 s0 11 a11d Bu,idy 393

Bundy: H e's talked ro George Ball. And he's talked to, I don't think rhar he's talked to Rusk, and I don't fhjnk he's talked to McNamara.

Johnson: Wouldn't it be good for be and McNamara to sit down'

Bundy: I think that it would be very good, but I don 't think, I think, I had planned co have lunch with Walter on Monday, because I couldn't find a workable time before fo r that, bur I can do it sooner, if you'd like me to.

Johnson: I wish you would.

Bundy: I wiU.

J ohnson: I'd try to get his ideas a little more concrete before I leave here. And I' d like to have him talk to McNamara. I might, I might just have the three of you in this afternoon somet;me.

Bundy: All right.

Johnson: Walter, McNamara and him [Ball?]. f'd like to hear Walter and McNamara debate.

Bundy: Debate it?Z

J ohnson: Yeah.

2 According to the President's Dail>• Diar)', the Pr~sident met with McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Ball, and Lippmann from 4:30 p.m. to approximately 5 p.rn. Oohnson Library) Ball wrote Rusk a n acco unt o f the meeting, noting that Lippmann "made his usual a rgument for neutralization." Ball re ported that whe-n he pressed, Lippmann admitted that be assumed Southeast Asia was "'destined inevitably to become a zo ne of C hinese Communist control" and the best U.S. oourS-e was to slow thal expan~ionism and "'nuke it less brutal." BaU did not think the Preside nt "'bough t Lippmann's thesis," but Johnson was impressed with Lippmann's \'iew that the United States was losing the battle of lntemarional public relations. After t he President left, the group debated Southeast Asia an d Viftnam for another hour. (Letter from Ba ll to Rusk, May 31; Oepa rrme111 o f Stat<, Ball Files: Loi 74 0 272, Vietnam (&U's Memos))

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

August 5, 1964

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in internationa l waters, and therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now bee11 carried our with substantial damage to the boats and faci lities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.

After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and dctermjnation of the United States i11 supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given' a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in char area are well known to the Congress . They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense T reacy approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This treaty with its accompanying protocol obljgaces the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol States.

395

Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on J une 2 in fo ur simple propositions:

1. America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitmenrs.

2. The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

3. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territo rial ambitions in the area.

4 . This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom 011 every front of human activit)'· Our m ilitary and economic assistance to South Vietnam a nd Laos in particular bas the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

The threat to the three nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of sub- version, wh ich includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese terri- tory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintajned mi)jtary fo rces, used Laotian territory fo r infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations- all in dfrect violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threaten ing. ln May, fo llowing new acts of Communist aggressio n in Laos, the United States undertook reconnais- sance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territor)' where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnis hing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our nava l vessels are not the :first direct attack on armed forces of the United States.

As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress on its part, to join in affirming the national determination

President 's Message t o Co11gress 397

chat all such attack swill be met, and chat the United States will continue in its basic poLlcj' of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no ras h• ness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect co South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

I recommend a resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces and to assist nations covered by the SEA TO T reary. At the same time, I assure the Congress chat we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution chat will effectively guarantee the remova l of Communist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of tbe area.

The resolution could well be based upon s imilar resolutions enacted by the Congress in the past-to meet the threat to Formosa in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle East in 1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and s upport of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against our Armed Forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the Unjced States under the Southeast Asia Treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such a resolution promptly and thus to give convincing evidence ro the aggressive Communist nations, and co the world as a whole, that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward-and chat the peace and security of the area will be preserved.

The events of this week would in an)' event have made the passage of a congressional resolution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on 3 months of political cam· paigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period rhe United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us.

TEXT OF JOINT RESOLUTION (THE TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION),

AUGUST 7, DEPARTMENT OF STA TE BULLETIN

24 August 1964

'"ro promote the maintenance of international peace and security in .l Southeast Asia.

Whereas naval units of the communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of interna- tional law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United Stares naval vessels lawfuUy present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic cam- paign of aggression that the communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United Stares is assisting the peoples of Southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambi- tions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinjes in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, ro rake all necessary measures to repel any armed attack agaimr rhe forces of the United States and ro prevent further aggression.

399

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of internarional peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obliga- tions under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all nec- essary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by interna- tional conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

W.P. BUNDY, SECOND DRAFT OF "NEXT COURSES OF ACTION

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA"

SECOND DRAFT W. P. Bundy Augusr 11, 1964

11 August 1964

NEXT COURSES OF ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

I. INTRODUCTION

This memorandum examines the courses of acrion the US mighr pursue, commencing in abour two weeks, assuming thar the Communist side does not react further to the events of last week.

We have agreed that the intervening period will be in effect a short holding phase, in which we would avoid actions thar would in any way rake the onus off the Communist s ide foe escalation. We will nor send the DESOTO patrol back; will hold up on new 34A operations (continuing only essential re-supply of airdropped missions, plus relatively safe lealler drops); continue intens ive reconnaissance of the DRV and the Panhandle (PDJ if necessary) but hold up on U-2s oves Communist China at least until we can use Chinar polors and unless we have evidence suggesting major military moves. Within Laos, the attempt ro secure Phou Kout would continue, as would consolidation of the Triangle gains, bur noth- ing further would be done or indicated.

401

We are not yet s ure what the Communise s ide may do in this period. They have introduced a ircraft into North Vietnam, and may well send in at least token ground forces. VC activity should step up markedly at any moment. Although the volume of Chicom propaganda and demonstra- tions is ominous, it does not ye-t clearly suggest any further moves; if they were made, we would ace accordingly. T his memorandum assumes the Communise side does not go beyond the ahove.

D. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION

A. South Vietnam is not going well. The Mission's monthly report (Saigon 877) expresses the hope that there can be significant gains by the end of the year. But it also says Khan h's chances of staying in power are only 50-50, that the leadership (though not so much the people or the army) has symptoms of defeatism and hates the prospect of slugging it out within the country, chat there will be mounting pressures for w ider action which, cf resisted, will create frictions a nd irritations which cou ld lead local politicians to seri- ous consideration of a negotiated solution or local soldiers co a milita ry adventure without US "consent. " In other words, even if the situation in our own view does go a bit better, we have a major problem of maintaining morale. Our actions of last week li fred that morale temporarily, but it could easily sag back agajn if the VC have some successes and we do nothing further.

B. Laos, on the other hand has righted itself remarkably-so much so that a Communise retaliatory move is a real possibility. lf Phou Kout can be secured, tbe present military areas of control a re if anything better for Sou vanna than the line of last April. T-28 operations have been a major factor, and really hurt PL morale. Souvanna's imernal position is also stronger, though the right- wing generals could malke foo ls of themselves aga in at any time.

C. Laos negotiations may well start to move in the near future what- ever we do. Souvanna has agreed tO a tripartite meeting in Paris, and has suggested August 24th. With his gains in hand, he has already inclicated he is likely not to insist on his previous precondj- rion of Commurust withdrawal from the PDJ before agreeing to a 14-nation conference. The USSR, Inclia, and France-and the UK and Canada only slightly less so-are pressing fo r a conference or

Next Courses of Action in Southeast Asia 403

at least clear morion toward one. While it is nor yet clear that Souphanouvang will accept the tripartite as proposed by Souvanna, we must recognize that if he does it will be a real step toward an eventual conference. We can and will urge Souvanna to go s low, but our control will be limited.

D. As of now, Hanoi and Peiping are certainly nor persuaded that they must abandon their efforts in South Vietnam and Laos. The US response to the Vietnamese naval attacks has undoubtedly convinced the Communjst s ide char we will act strong!)' where US force units are directly involved-as they have previously seen in our handling of Laos reconnaissance. Bur in other respects the Communist side may nor be so persuaded that we are prepared 10 rake Stronger actions, either in response to infiltration into South Vietnam or VC activity. The Communists probably believe that we nught counter a ir action in Laos quite firml)', but that we would not wish to be drawn into ground action there.

III. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF US POLICY

A. Soi,th Vietnam is still the main theater. Morale and momentum there must be maintained. This means: I. We must devise means of action that get maximum results for

minimum risks. 2. We must continue co oppose any Viet-Nam conference and must

play the prospect of a Laos conference very carefully. We must particularly avoid any impression of ruslting to a Laos confer- ence, and must show a posrure of general firmness into which an eventual Laos conference would fit without serious loss.

3. We particularly need to keep our hands free fo r at lea_~t limited measures against the Laos infiltration areas.

B. Laos. It is our interest to stabiliz.e the Laos situation as between the Government forces and the PLJVM, and tO reduce the chances of a Communist escalating move on this front. (If such a move comes, we must meet it firml y, of course. We s hould a lso be step- ping up Thai support tO deter and prevent any Communist nibbles.) However, Souvanna should not give up his strong cards, particularly T-28 operations, without getting a full price for them

in terms of acceptance of his position and a really satisfactory military status. Moreover, we musr seek to reduce as much as pos- sible the inhibiting effect of any Laos talks on actions against the Panhandle.

C. Solution. Basically, a solution in both South Vier-Nam and Laos will require a combination of military pressure and some form of communication under which Hanoi (and Peiping) eventually accept the idea of gett;ng our." Negotiation without continued pressure, indeed without continued military action, will nor achieve our objectives in the foreseeable future. But military pressure could be accomparued by attempts to commurucate with Hanoi and per- haps Peiping-through third-country channels, through side conver- sations around a Laos .conference of any sort- provided always that we make it dear both to the Communists and to South Viet- Nam that the pressure will continue until we have achieved our objectives. After, but 011/y after, we have established a clear pattern of pressure, we could accept a conference broadened to include the Viet-Nam issue. (The UN now looks to be out as a communication forum, though this could conceivably change.)

TIMING AND SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS

A. PHASE ONE-"Military Silence'' (through August) [see Sec. I/ PHASE nVO-Limited Pressures (September through December)

There are a number of limited actions we could take that would rend to maintain the initiative and the morale of the GVN and Khanh, but that would not involve major risks of escalation. Such actions could be such as to foreshadow stronger measures to come, though they would nor in themselves go far to cha"nge Hanoi's basic actions. l. 34A operations could be overtly acknowledged and justified by

the GVN. Marine operations could be strongly defended on the basis of continued DIRV sea infiltration, and successes could be publicized. Leaflet operations could also be admitted and

,. \Y/e ha\'e never defined precise!>' what we mean b)' • getting ouc"- what actions, what proofs., :1nd what future guar3nt~ we would accept. A small group should work on this over the- next months.

Next Courses of Action in Southeast Asia 405

defended, again on the grounds of meeting DRV efforts in the South, and their impunity (we hope) would tend to have its own morale value in both Vietnams. Air-drop operations are more doubtful; their justification is good but less clear than the other operations, and their successes have been few. With the others admfrted, they could be left ro speak for themselves-and of course security would forbid any mention of specific operations before they succeeded.

2. Joint planning• between the US and the GVN already covers possible actions against the DRV and also againstthe Panhandle. Ir can be tL~ed in itself to maintain morale of the GVN leader- ship as weU as to control and inhibit any unilateral GVN moves. With 34A surfaced, it could be put right into the same frame- work. We would not ourselves publicize chis planning, but it could be leaked (as it probably would anyway) with desirable effects in Hanoi and elsewhere_

3. Stepped-up training of Vietname$e 011 ;et aircraft should now be undertaken in any event in light of the presence of MJG's in North Vietnam, The JCS are preparing a plan, and the existence of training could be publicized both for irs morale effect in the GVN and as a signal to Hanoi of possible future action.

4. Cross-border operations into the Panhandle could be conducted on a limited scale. To be successful, ground operations would have to be so large in sca le as co be beyond what the GVN can spare, and we s hould not at this time consider major US or Thai ground action from the Thai s ide. But on the air side, there are at least a few worthwhile targets in the infiltration areas, and these could be hit by US and/or GVN air. Probably we should use both; probably we s hould avoid publicity so as not to embarrass Souvanna; the Communise s ide might squawk, but in the past they have been silent o n this area. The strikes should probably be timed and plotted on the map co bring them to the borders of North Vietnam at the end of December.

5. DESOTO patrols could be reintroduced at some point. Both for present purposes and to maintain the credibility of our account of the events of last week, they 11111st be clearly dissociated from

• This is in Phase One also.

34A operations both in fact and in physical appearance. In terms of course patterns, we should probably avoid penetra- tions of 11 miles or so and stay at least 30 miles off; whatever the importance of asserting our view of territoria l waters, it is less than t he international drawbacks of appearing to provoke attack unduly.

6. Speci(iG tit-for-tat aGtions could be undertaken for any VC or DRY activity suited to the treatment. These would be "actions of opportunity." As Saigon 877 points o ur, t he VC have " unused dirt)' tricks " such as mining (or attacks) in the Saigon River, sabotage of major POL stocks, and terro r ist attacks on US dependents. The first two, at least, would land themselves to prompt and precise reprisal, e.g., by mining the Haiphong chan- nel and attack ing t he Haiphong POL storage. Terrorism against US dependents wou ld be harder to fu1d the right reprisal target, and reprisa l has some disadvantages in that it could be asked why this was djfferent from the regular pattern of terrorism.

C. PHASE THREE-More Serio11S Pressures aa11uary 1965 t111d (ol/0111i11g).

AU the above actions would be foreshadowing systematic mili- tary action against the DRY, and we might at some point conclude that such action was required either because of incidents arising from the above actions or because of deterioration in the situation in South Vietnam, particularly if there were to be clear evidence of greatly increased infiltration from the north. However, in the absence of such major new developments, we should probably be thinking of a contingency dare, as suggested by Ambassador Taylor, of 1 January 1965. Possible categor ies of action beginning at about that rime, are: l. AGtion against i11/ilt.ration routes and facilities is probably the

best opening gambit. It would fo llow logica lly the actions in the Sepr.-Dec. Phase Two. It could be strongly justified by evidence that infiltration was continuing and, in a ll probability, increas- ing. The fam ily of infiltration-related targets starts with dear militar y installations near the borders. It can be extended almost at will no rthward, to inJlict progressive damage that would have a meaningful cumulative effect, and would always be keyed to one rationale.

Next Courses of Action in Southeast Asia 407

2. Aaio11 in the DRV against selected military-related targets would appear to be the next upward move. POL installations and the mining of Haiphong Harbor (to prevent POL import as its rationale) would be s pectacular actions, as would action against key bridges and railroads. All of these could probably be designed so as 10 avoid major civilian casualties.

3. Beyond these points it is probably nor useful to think at rhe present time.

D. Ha11dli11g of Laos Negotiations. I. We would wish to slow down any progress toward a conference

and to hold Souvanna 10 the firmest possible position. Unger's suggestion of tripartite admini.srration for the PD J is one pos- sibility that would be both advantageous and a useful delaying gambit. Insistence on full recognition of Souvanna's position is another point on which he should insist, and there would also be play in the hand on the question of free ICC operations. As ro a cease-fire, we would certainly not want this 10 be agreed 10 at the tripartite stage, since it would remove Souvanna's power- ful T -28 lever. But since Souvanna has always made a cease-lire one of his preconditions, we must reckon that the other side might insist on it before a conference were convened- which we would hope would not be until January in any case.

2. lf, despite our best efforts, Souvanna on his own, or in response ro third-country pressures, started 10 move rapidly toward a conference, we would have a very difficult problem. If the tim- ing of the Laos conference, in relation to the degree of pressures we had then set in motion against the ORV, was s uch that our a ttending or accepting the conference would have major morale drawbacks in South Viet-Nam, we might well have 10 refuse 10 attend ourselves and ro accept the disadvantages of having no direct participation. In the lase analysis, GVN morale would have 10 be the deciding factor.

SNIE 53-2-64, THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1 October 1964

THE PROBLEM

To examine the situation as it has developed since early September, and to assess itS implications for the US.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Since our estimate of 8 September 19641 the situation in South Vietnam has continued to deteriorate. A coup by disgruntled South Vietnam military figures could occur at any time. ln any case, we believe that the conditions favor a further decay of GVN will and effectiveness. The likely pattern of this decay will be increas ing defeatism, paralysis of leadership, Ericrion w ith Americans, exploration of possible lines of political accommoda - tion with the other s ide, and a general petering o ur of the war effort. It is possible that the civilian government promised for the end of October could improve GVN esprit and effectiveness, bur on the basis of present indications, this is unlikely.

B. We do not believe that the Viet Cong will make any early effort to seize power by force of arms; indeed, we doubt tl1at they have the capability for s uch a takeover. They will continue to exploit and encourage the trend toward anarchy, looking for the emergence of a neurralisr coalition government which they can dominate.

1 SNIE 53~64, .. Chances fo r a Stable Govemmenr in South Vietnam,,. dated 8 September 1964, Se<re-t. [footnote in the source text. SNII.E 53~64 is printed as Document 341.)

409

DISCUSSION

The GVN

1. Continued Political Deterioration. Political conditions in South Vietnam have continued! 10 deteriorate since our estimate of early September. Despite efforts by Prime Minister Nguyen Khanh to stabilize the situation, he has been faced with an attempted coup, rioting and demonstrations in the northern provinces, a massive labor strike in Saigon, and an armed revolt by Montagnard ele- ments among the Specia] Forces. Khanh's authority, already weak- ened by the Buddhist-student crisis in August, has been further diminished, and the degree of his support within the military estab- lislunent is increasingly in question. Most of the non-Communist power elements appear to be marking time, pending their assess- ment of the civilian government which Khanh has promised will be formed by the end of October.

2. The Picture in Saigon. South Vietnam is almost leaderless at the present time. General Khanh has retained his position by making concessions to various ime.resr groups-political, religious, stu- dents, military, and labor- which have pressed thcir demands upon him. In turn, these groups still seem bent on pursuing self interest and factional quarrels almost to the point of anarchy. A lack of sense of purpose and an absence of direction from above have seriously affected 1111orale and created passiveness and apathy within the civil law enforcement agencies. Government ministries in Saigon are close 10 a standstill, with only the most routine operations going on. Cabinet ministers, as well as second-level bureaucrats, freely express their pessimism, and even though US and GVN officials are again meeting on pacification and other joint planni11g, these meetings are not being followed by action from the Vietnamese sidle.

3. GVN Military Morale and Effectiveness. The continuing disarray of the Saigon government, power struggles within the military leadership, and the activities of self-seeking politicians and relj- gious leaders have adversely affected morale within the military establishment. However, the existing level of effectiveness of com- bat operations does not seem to have been seriously affected as yet. Nevertheless, continuing political insrabiliry would almost

Tbe Situation in Sottth Vietnam 4.11

certainly aggravate such long-standing deficiencies in the Vietnamese military effort as inadequate motivation, initiative, and aggressiveness. A continuing lack of firm direction, and fur· ther squabbling among senior officers in particular, could depress the morale of the troops and junior officers to the critical point. Although the GVN armed forces have long had a high rate of desertion by individuals, there have been no important unit deser- tions or defections. If military morale continues to decline, however, desertion and defections within both the military and paramilitary services may occur on a larger scale, perhaps even by organized units.

4. Signs of Defeatism in GVN Leadership. High-ranking ARYN offi- cers have confessed to US officers deep discouragement at the lack of leadership and dLtection. The J-3 of the Joint General Staff has indicated that he feels little reason even to discuss further pacifica- tion planning; various high-ranking field commanders have expressed similar pessimism; and General Khanh hLrnself has shown signs of being overwhelmed by his responsibilities.

5, The SitHatio11 iri the Go1mtryside, The near paralysis of goyern- ment initiative in Saigon appears to be spreading rapidly to outlying areas. Although tbe southern areas still appear relatively unaffected by the crises of the past several we.eks, governmental a uthority bas declined seriously in the northern coastal provinces where provincial and police officials are apparently receiving little guidance &om Saigon. In such urban centers as Hue, Danang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang, Vietnamese commanders have repeat- edly failed to intervene in civil djsturbances and rioting on the grounds they lacked precise orders; in some instances, actual a uthority has passed by default ro extremist "vigi lance" groups, such as the "People's Salvation (or Revolutionary) Council" (PRC). The nature of the provincial bureaucracy is such that it can rock along for considerable time, carrying out existing pro- grams despite political deterioration in Saigon. Nevertheless, continued confusion and inaction in Saigon, or another coup, could rapidly produce a critical deterioration in government in the countryside. A slippage in nnorale and in programs among provincial administrations, at least in the central provinces, has already begun.

6. The People's Revolutionary Council (PRC) . The PRC has estab- lished local councils in many coastal cities a nd may seek to fo rm a chapter in Sa igon, wbere two PRC leaders have recentl)' been named to the new 17-man H igh Nationa l Council. The aims of the PRC are not clear, but rhe local councils seem vulnerable to Viet Cong penetration, and the fact that they have assumed govern- ment powers in some provincial cities rends to underm ine Saigon's

control and to damage the morale of civil servants. 7. The Mo11tag11ard Problem. The Rhade revolt of 20 September and

the continuing possibility of further and more general uprisings by the Monragnards pose a n immediate a nd very serious problem for the GVN. The Montagnards have a violent dislike fo r and distrust of the lowland Vietnamese, and bave sought a utonomy for years. The Vietnamese on their part look down on the Montagnards; until recently, the GVN has usually acted in a manner which has widened rather then lessened the breach between the two. The problem has been further compounded by constant and rather intensive Viet Cong political and psychological agitation among the Montagnards, playing on their aspirations and their dislike of the ethnjc Vietnamese. Resentment over the killing of some 70 Vietnamese by tribesmem during their revolt will make it extremely difficult for the GVN to offer settlement terms acceptable to the Monragnards. Thus, there will probably be continuing disorders in the Highland a reas, diminish ing cooperation with the GVN, and increasing Viet Cong influence.

8. Offsetting Considerations. Although the signs of deterioration are many and clear, there are offsetting consideratio ns that reduce the likelihood of sudden col.lapse and afford some very slim hope that the trend can be arresred. The Vietnamese people have a long record of resilience in the face of adversity; the ability of the peas- ants and even of urban elements to continue normal patterns of life despite political disorder makes for some degree of basic stabil ity. The routine functions of government still work fairly normally; bus iness does go on; and the Streets are not places of consrant ter- ror. Discouragement over the absence of leadership and the prog- ress of the war has not yet led to calls for ending the fighting. Few if any of the many groups now seeking to en large their powers regard an accommodation with the Communists as consistent with

Tbe Situation in Sottth Vietnam 4.13

their interests. Finally, the military instrumentalities of pacification still exist and retain significant capabilities.

9. Tensions in US-G VN Relations. In the last month or so, there has been a disturbing increase in anti-American sentiment at various levels of Vietnamese society. Recent demonstrations in Hue, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang have bad definite anti-American over- tones. These were probably attributable in part to Viet Cong agita- tion and incitement, but in some measure they seem a lso to have reflected a genuine irritation at th.e Americans fo r various reasons having no direct connection with Viet Cong activity. For its part, the Buddhist leadership, whether anti-Communist or nor, is imbued with intense nationalism which has at times manifested itself in opposition co US policies and actions. Suspicion of US motives and concern over US involvement in internal policy is growing among the top echelons of the GVN, and, most importantly, on the part of Khanh himse If.

10. G VN Contacts ruith the Communists. The principal GVN leaders have not to our knowledge been in recent contact with the Communists, bur there has been ar least one instance of informal contact between a lesser governmental official and members of the "National Liberation Front," which is a creation of Hanoi. Moreover, there are numerous potential channels of communica- tion between the present GVN leadership and the DRY a uthori- ties, and these could very likely be used without US knowledge.

11. Coup Possibilities. Although no definite coup plans are known to be afoot at the moment, we belieYe that further coup attempts are likely, given the ambitions, discouragement, and bitterness preva- lent among certain key South Vietnamese military and civilian figures- and the comparative ease of mounting a coup attempt in the present deteriorating scene.

12. Alternatives to Present GVN Leadership. Present plans call for the establishment of a new, broadly-based, and predominantly civilian government by the end of October. Such a government might do better than the present one, but the odds a re against its having the cohesion and effectiveness necessary to arrest the current decline. No visible a lternative seems any more promising. lndeed, we can- not presently see any likely source of real leadership; no Magsaysay bas yet appeared. None of the military personalities and factions

seems capable of commanding a sufficiently broad spectrum of support. Of nonmilitary figures, the Buddhist leader Tri Quang is the strongest political personality and has demonstrated talents for leadership and organiz.ation. But he apparently desires to avoid such responsibility, and a Tri Quang government would face strong opposition from miliram Catholics, some of the military, and certain other groups. Not least, it would be a difficult govern- ment for the US to work with, and some of its major policies would almost certainly '10t be consonant with US interests.

THE VIET CONG

13. Viet Cong Policy. There are numerous signs that Viet Cong agents have played a role in helping sustain the level of civil disorder which has recently prevailed in the cities of South Vietnam; they have also affected the tone and direction taken by some recent protest dem- onstrations. Their hand was evident in the recent riots in the capital of Binh Dinh Province, and they may have already penetrated the PRC. Viet Cong propaganda throughout September bas increas- ingly called upon the people to take advantage of the go"ernmenr's confusion by pressing on all fronts. This capitalizing on unrest is an old policy; what is new is the rich opportunity presented by the col- lapsing of GVN authority. The Viet Cong have apparently decided that heightened efforts on their part will reduce the country to near anarchy and the government to impotence, bringing an early vic- tory in the form of a negotiated truce and a "neutralist" govern- ment dominated by their National Liberation Front. Although these heightened efforts may include some battalion-sized, or larger attacks, we do not believe that the Viet Cong are trying to force a military decision at this stage. Rather, they will continue stressing small-scale terrorist activity aimed at furthering the breakdown of administration and the decline of faith in the government.

14. Viet Cong Capabilities ,'11 the Cities. Viet Cong strength in the cit- ies has almost certainly increased substantially in recent months We base this conclusion on our general reading of the present situ- ation rather than on specific knowledge of current Viet Cong assets. In the. dosing days of the Diem regime, Vietnamese police

Tbe Situation in Sottth Vietnam 4.15

and security agencies had a fairly good reading on the nature and extent of the Viet Cong appararus in the capital area, and it did not constitute a serious threat at that time. Immediately following the November I 963 coup, however, Colonel Tran Ba Thanh became Deputy Director of National Police. There are strong grounds for believing tbat Tranh may be a C-0mmunist agent; in any event he released some key Viet C-Ong prisoners, destroyed Viet Cong dossiers in police archives, and placed at least one known Viet Cong agent in a key position within the police struc- ture. Although Thanh was ousted! when Khanh seized power, the Saigon police and security services have not recovered their anti- Communist capabilities. The fact that Communist agitation still remains under careful cover, however, suggests that the Viet Cong intend still to husband these assets and not risk them in a prema- ture takeover attempt.

CABLE (SAIGON 1129 ) FROM THE SIAGON EMBASSY TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON THE DETERIORATING

SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

FM: SAIGON 1129 TO: STATE REF: Embcel 1046

14 October 1964

My impressions chis week are colored by the receipt of the monthly reports from the field for September. That month and October thus far have seen little or no progress in the overall situation (except possibly in the work of the High National Council) and some deterioration, particu- larly in the northern provinces. It has been a period characterized by government instability, civil djsorders (now qujeting down), indications of increased infiltration from the north, and a high level of military activ- ity both on the pare of the Viet Cong and the Government Forces.

During the past week, our attention a:nd efforcs have been focused pri- marily on the activities of the High National Council and its efforts 10 lay the foundation of a strong provisional government. We have been crying hard 10 influence it in the right direction and 10 bring about some under- standing between the council and the military. I have been encouraged by the seriousness of purpose of the council and the evidence of having made considerable progress. We expect momentarily the announcement

41 7

of a provisional charter which will provide for a Chief of Scatt, a Prime Minister and eventually for a national assembly chosen at lease in part by elections. It remains to be seen what kind of a reception the charter will receive from the public and interested minorities.

According co our contacts w ith members of the council, General Minh is the leading candidate for Ch:ief of Seate, but there is no consensus as to the Prime Minister who, it is hoped, will be a strong civilian. The council members are worried about General Khanh's attitude toward their plans. They want him in the government bur are afraid he will not take a reduc- tion from Prime Minister co Minister of Defense or Commander-in-Chief as they would prefer. My talks with Khanh lead me to hope they are wrong in their misgivings and that both Minh and Khanh will undertake appropriate roles in the new government. There remains the unanswered questions of the selection of the civilian Prime Minister. Probably the principal obstacle now in the path of the new government.

On the military front, the Viet Cong appear to be holding down the number of attacks on military forces and concentrating on aces of sabotage and terrorism directed at impressing the civilian population. One reason for this emphasis is undoubred!)' the heavy losses they have recently been taking in engage.mencs with government forces. The cumulative effect of these losses muse be creating manpower problems for chem and probably explains the definite step-up in infiltration from North Vietnam, particu- larly in the northern provinces. of South Vietnam. A recent analysis sug- gests that if the present rate of infiltration is maintained the ann ual figure for 1964 will be of the order of 10,000. Furthermore, as has probably been called to your attention, we are finding more and more "bona fide" North Vietnamese soldiers an1ong the infilcrees. I feel sure chat we muse soon adopt new and drastic methods to reduce and eventually end such infiltration if we are ever to succeed in South Vietnam.

Pacification activities were sluggish during the week except in the Hop Tac area around Saigon where some progress is being made. In particular, the Hop Tac police are being somewhat more effective in controlling the movement of contraband intended fo r the use of the Vier Cong.

The psychological climate seems to be about the same, with some nervousness in Saigon over the outcome of the work of the H igh National Council. There are rumors Khanh may encourage demonstrations co maintain himself in office. I am inclined to doubt this but Khanh could be playing a deeper game than. we presently think.

PERSONAL NOTE FROM W.W. ROSTOW

TO ROBERT MCNAMARA ON "MILITARY DISPOSITIONS

AN D POLITICAL SIGNALS" 16 November 1964

PERSONAL TO: Secretary McNamara FROM.: W. W. Rostow SUBJ ECT: Military Dispositions and Political Signals

Following on our conversation of last njghr I am concerned that roo much thought is being g iven to the actual damage we do in the North, nor enpugh th ought to the signal we wis h to send.

Tbe signal consists of three pa rts:

a ) damage to the North is now co be inflicted beca use they are violat- ing the 1954 and 1962 Accords;

b) we are ready and able to go much further than our in itia l act of damage;

c) We are ready and able to meet any level of escalation they might mount in response; if they are so minded.

41 9

Four poinrs fo llow.

1. I am convinced that we should not go forwa rd into the nexr stage without a US ground force commitment of some kind: a. The withdrawal of those ground forces cou ld be a critically

important part of o ur diplomatic bargaining position. Ground forces can sir during a conference more easily than we can maintain a series of mounting air and naval pressures.

b. We must make clea r thar counter escalation by the Communists will run directly into US strength on the ground; and, therefore, the possibility of radically exrending their position on the ground at rhe cosr of air and naval damage a lone, is ruled our.

c. There is a marginal possibiliry that in attacking the airfield they were thinking rwo moves ahead; namely, they may be planning a pre-emptive ground force response to an expected US retalia- tion for the Bien Hoa attack.

2. The firsr critical military acrion against North Vietnam should be designed merely to install the principle thar they w ill, from the present forward, be vulnerable to reta liatory arrack in rhc north for continued violarions for rhe 1954 and 1962 Accords. In other words, we would signal. a shift from the principle in volved in the Tonkin Gu lf response. This means that the initia l use of force in the north should be as limited and as unsanguinary as possible. Ir is the installation of the principle thar we are initially interested in, nor tir for tat.

3. Bur our force dispositions to accompany an in itial retaliatory move against the north should send three further s igna ls lucidly: a . that we are putting in place a capacity subsequently to step up

direct and naval pressure on the north, if that should be required;

b. that we are prepared to face down any fo rm of escalation North Vietnam might mourut on the ground; and

c . that we are putting forces into place to exact retaliation directly against Communist Ch ina, if Peiping should join in a n escala- tory response from Hanoi. The latter could take the form of increased a ircraft on Formosa plus, perhaps, a carrier force sit- ting off C hina as distinguished from the force in the South China Sea.

Mil;tary Dispositions and Political Signals 421

4. The launching of this track, almost certainly, will require the President to explain to our own people and to the world our inten- tions and objectives. This will also be perhaps the most persuasive form of communication with Ho and Mao. In addition, I am inclined 10 think the most direct communication we can mount (perhaps via Vientiane and Warsaw) is des irable, as opposed to the use of cut-outs. They should feel they now confront an LBJ who has made up his mind. Contrary to an anxiety expressed at an earlier stage, I believe it quite possible to communicate the ljmits as well as the seriousness of our intentions without raising seri- o us ly the fear in Hanoi that we intend at our initiative to land immediately in the Red River Delta, in Chjna, or seek any other objective than the re-installation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords.

BRIEFING BY AMBASSADOR TAYLOR ON THE CURRENT

SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM 27 November 1964

SUBJECT: The Current Situation in South Vietnam-November 1964

After a year of changing and ineffective government, rhe counter- insurgency program country-wide is bogged down and will require heroic treatment ro assure revival. Even in the Saigon area, in spire of rhe planning and the special treatment accorded the Hop Tac plan, this area also is lagging. The northern provinces of South Vietnam which a year ago were considered almost free of Viet Cong are now in deep trouble. ln the Quang Ngai-Binh Dinh area, the gains of the Viet Cong have been so serious that once more we are threatened with a partition of the coun- try by a Vier-Cong salient driven tO the sea. The pressure on this area has been accompanied by continuous sabotage of the railroad and of Highway 1 which in combination rhreat,en an economic strangulation of the northern provinces.

This deterioration of the pacification program has taken place in spite of the very heavy losses inflicted almost daily on the Vier-Cong and the increase in strength and professional competence of the Armed Forces of South Vietnam. Not only have the Vietcong apparently made good their losses, but of late, have demonstrated three new or newly expanded tac- tics: The use of stand-off mortar lire against important targets, as in the attack on the Bien Hoa airfield; economic strangulation on limited areas; finally, rhe stepped-up infiltration of ORV military personnel moving from the north. These new or improved tactics employed against the

423

background of general dete,rioration offer a serious threat to the pacifica- tion program in general and to the safety of important bases and instal- lations in particular.

Perhaps more serious than the downward trend in the pacification situation, because it is the prime cause, is the continued weakness of the central go,•ernment. Although the H uong government has been installed after executing faithfully and successfully the program laid o ut by the Khanh government for its own replacement, the chances for the long life and effective performance of the new line-up appear small. lndeed, in view of the factionalism existing in Saigon and elsewhere throughout the country, it is impossible to for1:see a stable and effective government under any name in anything like the near future. Nonetheless, we do draw some encouragement from the character and seriousness of pur- pose of Prime Minister Huong and his cabinet and the apparent inten- tion of General Khanh to keep the Army out of politics, at least for the time being.

As our programs plod along or mark time, we sense the mounting feeling of war weariness and hopelessness which pervade South Vietnam, particularly in the urban areas. Although the provinces for the most pare appear steadfast, undoubtedly there is chronic discouragement there as well as in the cities. Although the military leaders have not talked recently with much conviction about tbe need for "marching North," assuredly, many of them are convinced that some new and drastic action must be taken to reverse the present trends and to offer hope of ending the insur- gency in some finite time.

T he causes for the present unsatisfactory situation are not bard to find. It stems from two primary causes, both a lready mentioned above, the continued ineffectiveness of the central government, the increasing strength and effectiveness of the Vietcong and their ability to replace losses.

While in view of the historical record of South Vietnam, it is nor surpris- ing to have these governmental difficulties, this chronic wealrness is a critical liability to future plans. Without an effective central government with which ro mesh the US e£fort, the latter is a spinning wheel unable to transmit impul- sion to the machinery of the GVN. While the mosr critical go"ernmenral weaknesses are, in Saigon, they are duplicated to a degree in the provinces. It is most difficult to find adequare provincial chiefs and supporting adminis- trative personnel to carry forward the complex programs which are required in the field for successful pacification. It is true that when one regards the

Current Situation in Sottth Vietnam 425

limited background of the provincial chiefs and their associates, one should perhaps be surprised by the resulrs which they have accomplished, bur unfortunately, these results are generaJJy 11101 adequate for the complex task at hand or for the time schedule which we would like to establish.

As the past history of this country shows, there seems to be a national attribute which makes for factionalism and limits the de,•elopment of a truly national spirit. Whether this tendency is innate or a development growing out of the conditions of political suppression under which s uc• cessive generations have lived is hard to determine. But it is an inescap· able fact that there is no national tendency toward team play or mutual loyalty to be found among many of the leaders and political groups within South Vietnam. Given time, many of these conditions will undoubtedly change for the better, but we are unfortunately pressed for time and unhappily perceive no short-term solution for the establishment of stable and sound government.

The ability of the Vietcong continuously to rebuild their units and 10 make good their losses is one of the mysteries of this guerrilla war. We are aware of the recruiting methods by which local boys are induced or com- pelled to join the Viet Cong ranks and have some general appreciation of the amount of infiltration of personnel from the outside. Yet taking both of these sources into account, we still find no plausible explanation of the continued strength of the Vietcong if our data on Viet Cong losses are even approximately correct. Not only do the Viet Cong uni rs have the recupera- tive powers of the phoenix, but they hav-e an amazing ability to maintain morale. Only in rare cases have we found evidences of bad morale among Viet C,0ng prisoners or recorded in captured Vier Cong documents.

Undoubtedly one cause for the growing strength of the VietCong is the increased direction and support of their campaign by the government of North Vietnam. This direction and s upport take the form of endless radioed orders and instructions, and the continuous dispatch to South Vietnam of trained cadre and military equipment, over infiltration routes by land and by water. While in the aggregate, this contribution to the guerrilla campaign over the years must represent a serious drain on the resources of the ORV, that government s hows no sign of relaxing its sup- port of the Viet Cong. In fact, the evidence points to an increased contri- bution over the last year, a plausible development, since one would expect the ORV ro press hard to exploit the obvious internal weaknesses in the south.

If, as the evidence shows, we are playing a losing game in South Vietnam, it is high time we change and find a bener way. To change the situation, it is quire dear that we need ro do three things: first, establish an adequate government in SVN; second, improve the conduct of the counter insurgency campaign; aod, finally, persuade or force the ORV to stop its aid ro the Viet Cong and rouse its directive powers ro make the Viet Cong desist from their efforts to overthrow the government of South Vietnam.

With regard to the first objective, it is hard to decide what is the minimum government which is necessary to pe_rmir reasonable hope for the success of our efforts. We would certainly like to have a government which is capable of maintaining law and order, of making and executing timely decisions, of carrying out approved programs, and generally of leading its people and gearing its efforts effectively with those of the United Stares.

As indicated above, however, it seems highly unlikely that we will see such a government of South Vietnam in the time frame available ro us to reverse the downward trend of events. It seems qufre probable that we will be obliged to settle for something considerably less.

However, it is hard to visualize our being willing to make added out- lays of resources and to run increasing political risks without an allied government which, at least, cam speak for and to its people, can maintain law and order in the principal cities, can provide local protection for the viral military bases and insrallaitions, can raise and support Armed Forces, and can gear its efforts to those of the United Stares. Anything less than this would hardly be a government at all, and under such circumstances, the United Stares Government might do better to carry forward the war on a purely unilateral basis.

The objective of an improve-cl counter insurgency program will depend for its feasibility upon the capacity of the South Vietnamese government. We cannot do much better than what we are doing at present until the government improves. However, we need to have our plans and means organized on the assumption that some improvement will occur and will permit intens ified efforts toward the pacification of the country.

In any case, we feel sure that even after establishing some reasonably satisfactory government and effecting some improvement in the counter- insurgency program, we will nor succeed in the end unless we drive the ORV our of its reinforcing role and obtain its cooperation in bringing an end to the Vier Cong insurgency.

Current Situation in Sottth Vietnam 427

To attain these three. objectives, we must consider what are the pos- sible courses of action which are open to us. To unprove the govern- ment we will, of course, continue to aid, advise and encourage it much as we are doing at the present time. We will try to restrain, insofar as we can, the minority groups bent upon its overthrow. We will indicate clearly the desire of the United States Government to see an end to the succession of weak and trans itory governments and we will throw all of our influence nn the side of stabili1.i11g programs both for organiza- tions and for personnel.

As these efforts in themselves will probably be inadequate, we should also consider ways and means to raise the morale and restore the confi- dence both of the government and of the South Vietnamese people. One way to accomplish this lift of morale would be to increase the covert operations against North Vietnam h)' sea and air and the counter-infiltra- tion attacks within the Laotian corridor. While the former would be covert in the sense of being disavowed, nonetheless the knowledge of their occurrence could be made known in such a way as to give the morale lift which is desired. Additionally, we could engage in reprisal bombings, m repay outrageous acrs of the Vietcong in South Vietnam, such as the attack on Bien Hoa.

All these actions, however, may not be sufficient to bold the present government upright. If it fails, we are going to be in deep trouble, with limited resources for subsequent actions. It is true that we could try again with another civilian government but the odds against it would be even higher than those which have confronted the Huong government. We might try in a second civilian govemment to take over operational control by US officials if indeed the GVN would! agree to this change. However, there are more objections to this form of US intervention than there are arguments in favor of it. Another alternative would be to ,nvite back a military dictatorship on the model of ithat he.1ded of late by General Khanb. However, Khanh did very poorly when he was on the spot and we have little reason to believe that a s uccessor mi~tary government could be more effective. Finally, we always have the option of withdraw- ing, leaving the internal situation to the Vietnamese, and limiting our contribution to military action directed at North Vietnam. Such action, while assuring that North Vietnam would pay a pric.e for its misdeeds in the South, would probably not save South Vietnam from eventual loss to the Viet Cong.

There is little to say about the ways and means of intensifying the in-country counterinsurgency program except to recognize again that this program depends entirely upon the government. lf we can solve the governmental problem, we can improve the in-country program.

In bringing military pressure to bear on North Vietnam, there are a number of variations which are possible. At the bottom of the ladder of escalation, we have the initiation of intensified coverr operations, anti- infiltration attacks in Laos, and reprisal bombings mentioned above as a means for stiffening South Vie-tnamese morale. From this level of opera- tions, we could begin 10 escalate progressively by attacking appropriate targets i11 North Vietnam. If we justified our action primarily upon the need to reduce infiltration, it would be natural to direct these attacks on infiltration-related targets such as staging areas, training facilities, com- munications cenrers and the like. The tempo and weight of the attacks could be varied according 10 the effects sought. ln its final forms, this kind of arrack could extend ro the. destruction of all important fixed targets in North Vietnam and to the inre rdicrion of movement on all lines of communication.

Before making a fina l decision on any of the courses of action, it will be necessary ro have a heart-to-heart talk with Prime .Minister Huong and General Khanh to find our their reaction ro the alternatives which we are considering. They will be taking on risks as great or greater than ours so that they have a right ro a serious hearing. We should make every effort ro get them ro ask our help in expanding the war. lf they decline, we shall have to rethink the whole situation. If, as is likely, they urge us with enthusiasm, we should take advanrage of the opporruniry to nail down certain important points such as:

a. The GVN undertakes {l) to maintain the strength of itS military and police forces; (2) ro replace incomperenr military commanders and province chiefs and ro leave the competent ones in place for an indefinite period; (3) to suppress disorders and demonstrations; (4 ) 10 establish effective resources control; and (5) to obtain US concurrence for all military operations outside of South Vietnam.

b. The US undertakes responsibility for the air and maritime defense of South Vietnam.

c. The GVN takes responsi biliry for the land defense of South Vietnam 10 include the protection of all US nationals and installations.

Current Situation in Sottth Vietnam 429

d. The GVN accepts rhe US statement (ro be prepared) of war aims and circumstances for negotiations.

Shortly after initiating an escalation program it will be important to communicate with the DRY and the CH1COMS to establish certain essential points in the minds of their leaders. The first is that under no circumstances w ill the United States let rhe DRY go unscathed and reap the benefits of its nefarious actions in S.Outh Vietnam without paying a heavy price. Furthermore, we w ill not accept any Statement from the DRY to the effect that it is not responsible for the Vier Cong insurgency and that it cannot control the Viet Cong actions. We know better and will act accordingly. H owever, the enemy s hould know that the United States objectives are limited. We are not seeking to unify North and South Vietnam; we are seeking no permanent military presence in Southeast Asia. But on the other hand, we do insist that the DRV let its neighbors, South Vietnam and Laos, strictly alone.

Furthermore, we are not trying to change the narure of the govern- ment in Hanoi. Uthe North Vietnamese prefer a Communist government, that is their choice to make. If the DRV remain aloof from the CHICO MS in a Tito-like stare, we would not be adverse to aiding such a government provided it conducted itself decently with its neighbors.

But with all, we are tired of standing by and seeing the unabashed eJfons of the DRV to absorb South Vietnam into the Communist orbit against its will. We know that Hanoi is responsible and that we are going to punjsh it until it desists from this behavior.

Just how and when s uch a communication should be transmitted should be a subject of careful study. !Bur, some such transmission is required to assure that the Communists in the North know exactly what is taking place and will continue ro take place.

We can be reasonably s ure that the D RV, and Vier Cong will nor rake such offensive actions on our part without a reaction. Already the Vier Cong, assisted from Hanoi, are doing many things ro hamper and harass the central and local governments of South Vietnam, ro encourage minor- ities to res ist Saigon and to foster the spirit of neutralism and defeatism everywhere. T hey are quire capable of intensifying such actions, of rais- ing the level of harassmenrs of people and officials, of mounting mortar attacks on tbe model of Bien Hoa, and of continuing to try ro effect the economic strangulation of many areas within South Vietnam.

There are several courses of action which they could adopt which are presentli• nor on their program. They can call fo r international interven- tion ro fo rce us to desist &om our pressures. They can engage in limited air and ground attacks in South Vietnam using formed units of the armies of North Vietnam and perhaps volunteers from Red China. Ir is quite likely that they will invite some CHICOM military forces into the ORV if only ro reinforce its air defense. Furthermore, they have some limited seaborne capability for raids against the South Vietnamese coast.

If their counter actions failed and our pressures became unbearable, the ORV might feign submiss ion and undertake ro lie low for a time. They would probably, howeve r, insist that they do not have the capabil- ity of compelling the Viet Cong to lay down their anus and become law- abiding citizens. Any temporary reduction of their s upport of the Vier Cong could, of course, be resumed at a ny rime after the Uruted States had been cajoled into leaving the scene of action.

In view of the foregoing considerations, we reach the point where a decision must be taken as to what course or courses of action we should undertake to change the tide which is running against us. Ir seems per- fectly clear that we must work to the maximum to make something out of the present H uong government or any successor thereto. While doing so, we must be thinking constantly of what we would do if o ur efforts are unsuccessful and the government collapses. Concurrently, we should stay on the present in-country program, intensifying it as possible in pro- portion to the current capabilities of the government. To bolster the local morale and restra in the Vier Cong duri11g this period, we should step up the 34-A operations, engage in bombing attacks and armed recce in the l aorion corridor and undertake reprisal bombing as requued. Ir will be important that United Stares forces take part in the Laotian operations in order to demonstrate to South Vietnam our willingness to share in the risks of attacking the North.

If this course of action is inadequate, and the government fa lls, then we must start over again o.r try a new approach. At this moment, it is premature ro say exactly what these new measures should be. In any case, we should be prepared for emergency military action against the North if only to shore up a collapsing s ituation.

If, on the other ha nd as we hope, the government maintains and proves itself, then we should be prepared ro embark on a methodical program of mounting air attacks in order to accomplish o ur pressure

Current Situati o n in S o ttth Vi e tnam 431

objectives vis-a-vis the DRY and at the same time do our best to improve in-country pacification program. We will leave negotiation initiatives to Hanoi. Throughout this period, our guard must be up in the Western Pacific, ready for any reaction by the DRV or of Red China. Annex I sug- gests the train of events which we might set in motion.

Whatever the course of events, we should adhere to three principles:

a. Do nor enter into negotiations until the DRY is hurting. b. Never )er the D RV gain a victory i:n South Vietnam without having

paid a disproportionate price. c. Keep rhe GVN in the forefront of the combat and rhe negotiations.

Maxwell D. Taylor

ANNEX I

SUGGESTED SCENARIO FOR CONTROLLED ESCALATION

(The following suggests a sequence of events without at this time attempt· ing to establish precise time intervals. Ir assumes that 34-A operations and corridor strikes including armed reconnaissance in Laos have been continuing for some period prior to initiating scenario. It also assumes that background briefing on infiltration has been given in both Saigon and Washington. )

1. Definitive discussions with GVN to obtain firm GVN request for joint action against ORV and to reach agreement on the frame- work of demands to be made on the DRV as well as on general negotiating procedures. (See 15 below)

2. Initiate discussions with Thai Government. 3. Initiate discussions with other selected friendly governments. 4. Quietly initiate necessary preparatory military moves that have

thus far not been taken. (Preparatory military moves should have included or include stationing of Hawk battalion and F-IOS's a t Danang, a MEB afloat off Danang and the alerting of the 173rd ABG).

5. Initiate discussions with RLG.

6. Cease travel 10 Vietnam of additional dependents, bur take no action to evacuate dependents already in Vietnam pending further developments.

7. An appropriate intermediary tells Hanoi nothing has been heard from the US; he is concerned over the situation; and does Hanoi have anything to pass on to rhe US?

8. Yru1kee Team strikes Route Seven rargers in Laos. 9. RLAF arrack on ORV side of Mua Gia Pass with US air CAP.

JO. A single VNAF air strike against an infiltration target in ORV just north of DMZ.

11. A significa.nt MAROP supported by US air cover. 12. GVN-US air strike on an infiltration target just north of DMZ. 13. Continue limited military actions in the foregoing categories sequen-

tially with not more than a few days gap between each, while being prepared promptly to make higher level responses to attacks from MIGs or V-C spectaculars in SYN.

14. Throughout the foregoing, in absence of public statements by ORV, initiate no public statement or publicity by ourselves or GVN. If ORV does make public sraremenrs, confine ourselves and GVN to statements that GVN is exercisi11g right of self-defense and we are assisting.

15. In light of developments, disclose to selected allies, and possibly USSR, US/GVN terms for cessation of arracks as follows: (Ir will be important to assure that one of these channel~ undertakes accurately and fully to commw1icate these terms to both Hanoi and Peking)

A. Demands: I. ORV return to strict observance of 1954 Accords with respect to SYN-that is, stop infiltration and bringabouta cessation of VC armed insurgency. (Query- should demand include DR Vo bser- va nee of 1962 accords with respect to Laos and how should such demand be framed so as to give ICC Laos effective role in moni- roring infiltration through Laos?)

B. In return: I. US will return to 1954 Accords with respect to military person-

nel in GVN and GVN would be willing to enter into trade talks looking toward normalization of economic relations between ORV and GVN.

Current Situation in Sottth Vietnam 433

2. Subject to faithfu l compliance lby ORV with 1954 Accords, US and GVN would give assurances that they would not use force or support the use of force by any other parry to upset the Accords with respect to the ORV.

3. Within the framework of the 1954 Accords, the GVN would permit VC desiring to do so to return to the ORV w ithout their a rms or would grant amnesty to those peacefully laying down their arms and desiring to remain in SYN.

C. If and when Hanoi indicates its acceptance of foregoing condi- tions, careful considerations must be given to immediate subse- quent procedures which wi ll avoid dangers of (a) becoming involved in a cease fire vis-a-vis the ORV and/or the VC accompa - nied by strung-out negotiations; (b) making conditions so strin- gent as to be unworkable from practical point of view. Probably best procedure would be to have the GVN and ORV meet in the DMZ under ICC a uspices with US observers to reach agreement on mechanics of carrying o ut understanding while action against the VC and ORV cont inues, at least in principle.

M CNAUGHTON'S OBSERVATIONS ABOUT

SOUTH VIETN AM 4 Ja nuary 1965

DRAFT: Ja nuary 4, 1965-Observations Re South Vietnam-JTM

1) (Sca rcely needs co be said: Pique shou ld not be allowed to make policy.) [This is a comment on Max Taylo r's attitude toward Kh anh and his dissolution of the high national council.] [Author of bracketed materia l not known_]

2) Our stakes in South Vietnam are: (a) Buffe r real esta te near Thailan d and Ma laysia a nd (b) Our reputation.

The latter is more important than the fo rmer; the latter is sensitive to how, as well as whether, the area is lost.

3) The best present estimate is that South Vietnam is being " lost." From the poinr of view of the real estate this means that a govern- ment not unfriendly to the DRV will probably emerge within two years; from the po int of view of our reputation, it will suffer least if we continue to support South Vietnam and if Khanh and com- pany continue to behave like child ren if the game is lost.

4) The situation could change fo r the: better over night, however. This happened in the Philippines. This is another reason for d - - - - - - perseverance.

5) \Vie should continue to try to do better inside South Vietnam. ("The people do not support the government; their indication is that the GVN treats prisoners badly; etc.")

435

6) Essentials of U.S. conduct: (a) continue ro take risks on behalf of South Vietnam. A reprisal should be carried o ur soon. (Dependents could be removed at that time.) (T his attitude reflected my own arguments, for better or worse.]; (b) keep s lugging away. Keep help Rowing but do not increase the number of U.S. men in South Vietnam. (Additional U.S. soldiers are as likely to be counterpro- ductive as productive.) (MACY and the J CS were pushing for a logistic command and increased logistic support troops in Vietnam; McNaughton w ithholding the line on total U.S. troops at this time.] (c) do not appear to lead in any negotiations. Chances of reversing the tide will be better and, if we don' t reverse the tide, our reputation will eme.rge in better condition; (d) if we leave, be sure it is a departure of the kind which would put everyone on our side, wondering bow we stuck it and took it so long.

7) If things slip, have, plans to sho re up Thailand and Malaysia.

Note from a McNaughton Draft in 1964:

There has been no decision taken putting on the same value sca le (a) desirability of various outcomes, ( b) undesirability of various efforts and (c) undesi rability of having tried and fai led. For example:

(1) Is a collapse at a 75,000 level worse than an inclusive situation at a 200,000-400,000+ level? Probably yes;

(2) Is a 60 percent chance of a compromise better than a 40 percent chance of winning? Probably yes if the compromise is to lerable;

(3 ) Is a 40 percent chance of compromise in 1966 better than a 40 percent chance of winning in 1967? Query.

HANS MORGENTHAU, WE ARE DELUDING OURSELVES

IN VIETNAM 18 April 1965

The address President J ohnson delivered on AprU 7, l 965 at J ohns Hopkins University is important for two reasons. On the one hand, the President has shown for the first time a way o ut of the impas.~e in which we find ourselves in Vietnam. By agreeing to negotiations without precondjtions he has opened the door to negotiations w hich those pre- conditions had made impossible from the outset.

By proposing a project for the economic development of Southeast Asia- with North Vietnam a beneficiary and the Soviet Union a supporter- he has implicitly recognized the variety of national interests in the commu- nist world and the need for varied American responses tailored to those interests. By asking "that the people of South Vietnam be aUowed to guide their own coun,try in their own way." he has left all possibilities open fo r future evolution of relations between North and South Vietnam.

On the other hand, the President reiterated the intellectual assump- tions and policy proposals which brought us to an impasse and which make it impossible to extricate ourselves. The President has linked our involvement in Vietnam w ith our war of independence and has pro- claimed the freedom of all nations as the goal of our foreign policy. H e has started from the assumption that there are rwo Vietnamese nations, one of which has attacked the other, and he sees that attack as an integral

Source: Hans Morgenthau, Ne,v York Times .Megaz.hte, April 18? 1965

437

part of unlimited C hinese agg ression. Consistent with this assumpt ion, the President is willing ro negotiate with China and North Vietnam but nor with the Viet Cong.

Yet we cannot have it both ways. We cannot ar the same rime embrace these false assumptions and pursue new sound policies. ThLL~ we are faced with a real dilemma. This dilemma is by no means of the President's making.

We are militarily engaged in Vietnam by virtue of a basic principle of OLLr foreign policy that was implicit in the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and was p ut into practice by J ohn Foster Dulies from 1954 onward. This principle is the military containment of Communism. Conta inment had its origins in Europe; Dulles applied it to the Middle East and Asia through a series of bilateral and multilateral a lliances. Yer what was an outstanding success In Europe turned out to be a disma l fa ilure else- where. T he reasons fo r that fai lure are twofold.

First, the threat that faced the nations of Western Europe in the after- math of the Second World War was primarily military. Ir was the threat of the Red Army marching westward. &hind the line of military demar- cation of 1945 which the policy of containment declared robe the west- ernmost limits of the Soviet empire there was an ancient civiLization, only temporarily weak and able to maimain itself against the threat of Communist subversion.

T he situation is different in the Middle East and Asia. T he threat there is nor primarily military bur J>Olitica l in nature. Weak governments and societies provide opportunities for Communist subversion. Military con- tainment is irrelevant ro that threat and may even be counter-productive. Thus the Baghdad Pact did nor protect Egypt from Soviet influ ence and SEATO has had no bearing on Ch inese influence in Indonesia and Pakistan.

Second and more important, even lf China were threatening her neighbors primarily by military mean.s, it would be impossib le to contain her by erecting a military wa ll at the periphery of her empire. For China is, even in her present underde,•eloped stare, the dominant power in Asia. She is this by virtue of the quality and quantity of her population, her geographic position, her civilizarion, her past power remembered and her future power anticipated. Anybody who has traveled in Asia with his eyes and ears open must have been impressed by the enormous impact which the resurgence of China has made upon a ll manner of men, regard- less of class and political conviction, from Japan ro Pakistan.

\Ve Are Deludittg Ourselves;,, Vietnam 439

The issue China poses is political and cultural predominance. The United States can no more contain Chinese influence in Asia by arming South Vietnam and Thailand than China could contain American influence in the Western Hemisphere by arming, say, N icaragua and Costa Rica.

If we are convinced that we cannot Llve w ith a China predominant on the mainland of Asia, then we must strike at the heart of Chinese power- that is, rather than cry to contain the power of China, we must try to destroy that power itself. Thus there is logic on the side of that small group of Americans who are convinced that war between the United States and China is inevitable. and that tine earlier it comes the better will be the chances for the United States to win it.

Yer, while logic is on their side, practical judgment is against them. For while China is obviously no march for the United States in overall power, Ch ina is large!)' immune ro the specific rypes of power in which the s uperiority of the United States consists- that is, nuclea r, air and naval power. Certainly, the United States has the power to destroy the nuclear installations and the major industrial and population centers of China, but thjs destruction would not defeat China; it would only set her

development hack. To be defeated, China has to be conquered. Physical conquest would require the deployment of millions of

American soldiers on the mainland of Asia. No American military leader has ever advocated a course of action so fraught with incalculable risks, so uncertain of o utcome, requiring sacrifices so out of proportion to the interests at stake and the benefits to be expected. President Eisenhower declared on February 10, 1954, that he "could conceive of no greater tragedy than for the United States to be,come involved in an a ll-out war in Indochina." General MacArthur, in the Congressional hearings con- cerning his dismissal and in personal conversation with President Kennedy, emphatically warned against sending American foot soldiers to the Asian mainland to fight China.

If we do not wane to set ourselves goa.1s which cannot be attained with the means we a re willing to employ, we must learn to accomn1odate our- selves to the predominance of Ch ina on the Asian mainland. It is instruc- tive to note that those Asian nations which have done s~uch as Burma and Cambodia- live peacefully in the shadow of the Chinese giant.

This modus vivendi, composed of legal independence and various degrees of actual dependence, has indeed been for more than a millenni- um the persisrenr pattern of C hinese predom i1iance in Southeast Asia.

The military conquest of Tibet is the sole exception ro chat pattern. The military operations at the Indian border do nor diverge from it, since their purpose was the esra blishment of a frontier disputed by both sides.

On the ocher hand, those Asian nations which have allowed them- selves ro be transformed into ourposcs of American military power-such as Laos a few years ago, South Vietnam and Thailand- have become the actua l or prospective victims of Communist aggression and subversion. Thus it appears that peripheral military containment is counterproduc- tive. Challenged at its periphery by American milita ry power at ics weakest- that is, by the proxy of client-stares- China or ics proxies respond with locally superior military and political power.

In specific terms, accommodation means fo ur things: (1) recognition of the political and cultural predominance of China on the mainland of Asia as a fact of life; (2) liquidation of the peripheral military contain- ment of China; (3) strengthening of the uncommitted nations of Asia by nonmilitary means; (4) assessment of Communist governments in Asta ln terms not of Commw1isr doctcine but of their relation co the inrerescs and power of the United States.

In the light of these principles, the alternative to our present policies in Vietnam would be this: a face -saving agreement which would allow us 10 disengage ourselves militarily in stages spaced in time; restoration of the status q uo of the Geneva Agreement of 1954. w ith special emphasis upon a ll-Vietnamese elections; cooperation with the Soviet Union in sup- port of a Tiroist all-vietnamese Government, which would be li kely to emerge from such elections.

This last point is crucial, for our present policies nor only drive H anoi into the waiting arms of Peking, but also make it very difficult for Moscow ro pursue an independent policy. Our interests In Southeast Asia are identical with those of the Soviet Union: ro prevent the expansion of the mibtary power of C hina. Bur while our present policies invite that expansion, they make it impossible for the Soviet Union to join us in preventing it. If we were ro reconcile o urselves to the es1ablishmet1t of a Titoisr government in all of Vietnam, the Soviet Union could successfully compete with C hina in claiming credit fo r it and surreptitiously cooper- ate w ith us in maintaining it.

Testing the President's proposa ls by these standards, one realizes how fa r they go in meeting them. These proposals do not preclude a return ro

We Arc Deluding Ourselves i11 Vietnam 441

the Geneva agreement and even assume the existence. of a Titoist govern- ment in North Vietnam. Nor do they preclude the establishment of a Titoist government for all of Vietnam, provided the people of South Vietnam have freely agreed to it. They also envision the active participa- tion of the Soviet Union in establishing and maintaining a new balance of power in Southeast Asia. On the ocher hand, the President has flatly rejected a withdrawal "under the cloak of meaningless agreement." The controlling word is obviously " meaningless, " and only the future can cell whether we shall consider any face-saving agreement as "meaningless" regardless of its political context.

However, we are under a psychological compulsion to continue our military presence in South Vietnam as pairt of the peripheral military con- tainment of China. We have been emboldened in this course of action by the identification of the enemy as "Communist," seeing in every Communist party and regime an extension of hostile Russian or Chinese power. This identification was justified 15 co 20 years ago when Communism still had a monolithic character. Here, as elsewhere, our modes of thought and action have been rendered obsolete by new developmenrs.

It is ironic that this simple juxtaposition of Communism and " free world" was erected by John Foster Dulles's crusading moralism imo the guirung principle of American foreign policy at a lime when the national Communism of Yugoslavia, the neutralism of the third world and the incipient split between the Soviet Union, and China were rendering that juxtaposition in valid.

Today, it is be.laboring the obvious to say that we are faced not with one monolithic Communism whose uniform hostility must be countered with equally uniform hostility, but with a number of different Communisms whose hostility, determined by rufferenc national interescs, varies . In fact, the United States encounters today less hostility from Tito, who is a Communise, than from de Gaulle, who is not.

We can today distinguish four different types of Communism in view of the kind and degree of hostility to the United States they represent: a Communism identified with the Soviet Un ion-e.g., Poland; a Communism identified with China-e.g., Albania; a Communism that straddles the fence between the Soviet Union and China-e.g., Ru mania; and indepen- dent Communism-e.g .. Yugoslavia. Each of these Communisms must be dealt with in terms of the bearing its foreign policy has upon the inter- ests of the United States in a concrete instance.

It would, of course, be absurd to suggest that the officials responsible fo r the conduct of American fore ign policy are unaware of these distinc- tions and of the demands they make for discriminating subtlety. Yet it is an obvious fact of experience that these officials are incapable of living up to these demands when they deal with Vietnam.

Thus they maneuver themselves into a position which is a nti-revolu- tionary per so and which requires military opposition to revolution wherever it is found in Asia, regardless of how it affects the interests- and how susceptible it is to the power-of the United States. There is a historic precedent for this kind of policy: Metternich's military opposi- tion to liberalism after the Napoleonic Wars, which collapsed in 1848. For better or for worse, we live again in an age of revolution. It is the task of statesmanship not to oppose what cannot be opposed without a chance of success, but to bend it to one's own interests. This is what the President is trying to do with his proposal for the economic development of Southeast Asia.

Why do we support the Saigon Government in the Civi l War against the Viet Cong? Because the Sa igon Government is "&ee" and the Viet Cong are "Communist," By containing Vietnamese Communism, we assume that we a re really contai11ing the Communism of China .

Yet this assunlption is at odds wit!, the historic experience of a millen- nium and is unsupported by contemporary evidence. China is the hered- itary enemy of Vietnam, and Ho Chi Minh will become the leader of a Chinese satell ite only if the United States forces him to become one.

Furthermore, H o Chi Mlnh, li ke Tito and unlike the Communist gov- ernments of the other states of Eastern Europe, came to power not by courtesy of another Communist nation's victorious army but at the head of a victorious army of his own. He is, then, a natural cand idate to become an Asian Tito, and the question we must answer is: H ow adversely would a Titoist Ho Chi Minh, governing all of Vietnam, affect the interests of the United States? The answer can only be: not at all. One can even maintain the proposition that, far from affecting adversely the interests of the United States, It would be in the interest of the United States if tl1e western periphery of China were ringed by a chain of inde- pendent states, though they would, of course, in their policies take due account of the predominance of their powerful neighbor.

The roots of the Vietnamese civil waJ go back to the very beginning of South Vietnam as an independent state. When President Ngo Dinh

We Arc Deluding Ourselves i11 Vietnam 443

Diem took office in 1954, he presided not over a state but over one-half of a country arbitrarily and, in the intentions of all concerned, temporar- ily severed from the other half. He was generally regarded as a caretaker who would establish the rudiments of an administration until the coun- try was uni red by nation wide elections to be held in 19 5 6 in accordance with the Geneva accords.

Diem was confronted at home with a number of private armies which were politically, religiously or criminally oriented. To the general sur- prise, he subdued one after another and created what looked like a viable government. Yet in the process of creating it, he also laid the foundations ro the present civil war. He ruthlessly s.uppressed all opposition, estab- lished concentration camps, organized a brutal secret police, closed newspapers and rigged elections. These policies inevitably led to a polar- ization of the policies of South Vietnam-on one side, Diem's family, surrounded by a Pretorian guard; on the other, the Vietnamese people, backed by the Communists, declaring themselves liberators from foreign domination and internal oppression.

Thus, the possib iliry of civil war was inherent in the very nature of the Diem regime. Ir became inevitable after Diem refused co agree to all-Vietnamese elections and, in the face of mounting popular alien- ation, accentuated the tyrannical aspects of his regime. The South Vietnamese who cherished freedom could not help but oppose him. Threatened by the secret police, they went either abroad or underground where the Communists were waiting for them.

Until the end of last February [1965J, the Government of the United States started from the assumption that ·the war in South Vietnam was a civil war, aided and abetted- but not created from abroad, and spokes- men for the Government have made time and again the point that the key to winning the war was political and not military and was to be found in South Vietnam itself. It was supposed to lie in transforming the indilfer- ence or hostiliry of the great mass of th.e South Vietnamese people into pos itive loyalty to the Government.

To that end, a new theory of warfare called "counterinsurgency" was put into practice. Strategic hamlets were established, massive propaganda campaigns were embarked upon, social and economic measures were at least sporadically taken. But all was ro no avail. The mass of the popula- tion remained indifferent, if nor hostile, and large units of the army ran away or went over to the. enemy.

The reasons for this failure are of general significance, for they stem from a deeply ingrained habit of the American mind, We like to thjnk of social problems as technically self-sufficient and susceptible of simple, dear-cut solutions. We tend to think of foreign aid as a kind of self- sufficient, economic enterprise subject to the laws of economics and divorced from politics, and of war as a similarly self-sufficient, technical enterprise, to be won as quickly, as cheaply. as thoroughly as possible and divorced from the foreign policy that preceded and is to follow it. Thus our military theoreticians and practitioners conceive of counterin- surgency as though it were just another branch of warfare, to be caught in special schools and applied with technical proficiency wherever the occasion arises.

This view derives of course from a complete misconception of the nature of civil war. People fight and die in civil wars because they have a faith which appears to them worth fighting and d)'ing for, and they can be opposed with a chance of S1Uccess only by people who have at least as strong a faith.

Magsaysay could subdue the Huk rebellion in the Philippines because his charisma, proven in action, aroused a faith superior to that of his opponents. In South Vietnam there is nothing to oppose the faith of the Viet Cong and, In consequence, the Saigon Government and we are losing the civil war.

A guerrilla war cannot be won without the active support of the indig- enous population, short of the physical extermiI1ation of that population. Gennany was at least consistent when, during the Second World War, faced with unmanageable gueririlla warfare throughout occupied Europe, she tried to master the situation through a deliberate policy of extermina- tion. The French tried "counterinsurgency" in Algeria and failed; 400,000 French troops fought the guerrillas in Indochina for nine years and failed.

The United States has recognized that it is falling in South Vietnam. But it has drawn from this recognition of failure a most astounding con- clusion.

The United Scates has decided to change the character of the war by unilateral declaration from a South Vietnamese civil war tO a war of "foreign aggression." " Aggression from the North: The Record of North Vietnam 's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam" is the title of a white paper published by the Department of State on the last day of February,

We Arc Deluding Ourselves i11 Vietnam 445

1965. While normally foreign and military policy is based upon intelli- gence-that is, the objective assessment of the facts- the process is here reversed: a new policy has been decided upon, and intelligence must provide the facts to justify it.

The United States, stymied in South Vietnam and on the verge of defeat, decided 10 carry tbe war 10 North Vietnam not so muc.h in order to retrieve tbe fortunes of war as to lay the groundwork for "negotiations from strength." In order to justify that new policy, it was necessary to prove chat North Vietnam is the real enemy. It is the white paper's purpose to present chat proof.

Let it be said rigbt away that the white paper is a dismal failure. The discrepancy between its assertions and ·the factual evidence adduced to support them borders on the grotesque. It does nothing 10 disprove, and tends even 10 confirm, what until the end of February bad been official American doctrine: chat the main body of the Viet Cong is composed of South Vietnamese and chat 80 per cent co 90 per cent of their weapons are of American o rigin.

This document is most disturbing in chat it provides a particularly glaring insrance of the tendency to conduct fore ign and military policy not on their own merits, but as exercises in public relations. The Government fashions an imaginary world that pleases it, and then comes to believe in the reality of that world and aces as though it were real.

It is for this reason chat public officials are so resentful of the reporters assigned to Vietnam and have cried to shut them off from the sources of news and even to silence them. They resent the confrontation of their policies with the faces. Yee the faces are what they are, and tbey cake terrible vengeance on chose who disregard chem.

H owever, the white paper is but the latest instance of a delusionary tendency which has led American pol;cy in Vietnam astray in other respeccs: \Ve call the American troops in Vietnam "advisers" and have assigned them by and large ro advisory functions, and we have limited the activities of the Marines who have now landed i11 Vietnam 10 guard- ing American installations. \Ve have done this for reasons of public rela- tions, in order to spa re ourselves the odium of open be.lligerency.

There is an ominous similarity between this technique and chat applied to the expedition in the Bay of Pigs, \Ve wanted to overthrow Castro, but for reasons of public relations we did not want to do it ourselves. So it

was not done at all, and our prestige was damaged far beyond what It would have suffered had we worked openly a nd single-minded ly for the goal we had set o urselves.

Our very presence in Vietnam is in a sense. dictated by considerations of public relations; we are afraid lest our prestige would suffer were we tO retreat from an untenable position.

One may ask whether we have gained prestige by being involved in a civil war on the mainland of Asia and by being unable to win it. Would we gain more by being unable to extricate o urselves from it, and by expanding it unilaterally into an international war? Is French prestige lower today than it was 11 years ago when Frru,ce was fighting in Indochina, o r five years ago when Fra nce was fighting in Algeria? Does not a great power gain prestige by mustering the wisdom and courage necessary to liq uidate a losing enterprise? ln other words, is it not the mark of greatness, in circumstances such as these, to be able to afford t0 be indifferent to one's prestige?

The periphera l military containment of China, the indiscriminate crusade against Communism, counterinsurgency as a technically self- sufficienr new branch of warfare, the conception of fo reign and military policy as a branch of public relations- they are-all misconceptions that conj ure up terri ble dangers for those who base their policies on them.

One can only hope a nd pray that the vaunted pragmatism and com- mon sense of the American mind-of which the President's new propos- als may well be a manifestation- will act as a corrective upon those misconceptions before they lead us from the blind a lley in which we find ourselves today to the rim of the abyss. Beyond the present crisis, how- ever, one must hope that the confrontation between these misconceptions and reality will teach us a long-overdue lesson- to rid ourselves of these misconceptions altogether.

CLARE M. CLIFFORD LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

The President The White H ouse

Dear Mr. President:

May 17, 1965

Clare M. Clifford 615 Connecticut Avenue Washington D. C. 20000

May 17, 1965

I am returning herewith the letter of the Director of Central Intelligence, dared May 8, 1965, together with enclosures.

I wish ro make one major point.

I believe o ur ground forces in South Vietnam should be kept ro a mini- mum, consistent with the protection of our installations and property in that country. My concern is that a substantial buildup of U. S. ground troops would be construed by the communists, and by the world, as a determination on our part ro win the war on the ground.

I do nor think the situation is comparable tO Korea. The politica l posture of the parries involved, and the physical conditions, including terrain, are entirely different.

447

This could be a quagmire. It could rum into an open end commitment on our part rhar would take more and more ground troops, witbour a real- istic hope of ultimate victory.

I continue to believe rhar the constant probing of every avenue leading to a possible settlement will ultimately be fruitful. It won't be what we want, but we can learn to live with it.

Respectful])' yours,

Clare

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM GEORGE BALL,

"A COMPROMISE SOLUTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM"

1 July 1965

A COMPROMISE SOLUTION IN SOUTH VfETNAM

(I) A Losi11g \Var: The South Viemamese are losing the warm the Vier Cong. No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms, no matter how many hundred thousand white, foreign (U.S.) troops we deploy.

No one has demons trated that a white ground force of what· ever size can win a guerrilla war- which is at the same time a civil war between Asians-in jungle terrain in the midst of a popula- tion that refuses cooperation to the white forces (and the South Vietnamese) and thus provides a great intelligence advantage to the other s ide. Three recent incidents vividly illustrate this point: (a) the sneak arrack on the Da Nang Air Base which involved penetration of a defense parame-ter guarded by 9,000 Marines. This ra id was possible only because of the cooperation of the local inhabitants; (b) the 8-52 raid that failed to hit the Viet Cong who had obviously been tipped off; (cl the sea rch and destroy mission of the 173rd Air Borne Brigade whjch spent three days looking for the Viet Cong, suffered 23 casualties, and never made contact with the enemy who had obviously gotten advance word of their assignment.

449

(2) The Question to Decide: Should we limit o ur liabilities in South Vietnam and tr)' ro find a way our with minima l long-rerm costs?

The alternative- no matter what we may w ish it to be-is almost certainly a prorracred war involving an open-ended com- mitment of U.S. fo rces, mounting U.S. casualties, no assurance of a satisfactory solution, and a serious danger of escalation at the end of the road.

(3) Need for a Decision Now: So long as our forces are restricted to advising and assisting the South Vietnamese, the struggle will remain a civil war berween Asian peoples. Once we deploy sub- stantial numbers of troops in combat it will become a war between the U.S. and a large part of the population of South Vietnam, organized and directed from North Vietnam and backed by the resources of both MoscQw and Peiping.

The decision you face now, therefore, is crucial. Once large numbers of U.S. troops arc committed ro direct combat, they will begin to rake heavy casualties in a wa r they are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative if nor downright hostile countryside.

Once we suffer large,casualrics, we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot-without nationa I humiliation-stop short of achieving our complete objectives. 0/the rwo possibilities I think humiliation would be more likely than the achievement of our objectives-even after we have paid terrible costs.

(4 ) Compromise Solution: Should we commit U.S. manpower and prestige to a terrain so l!lilfavorable as to give a very large advan- rage to the enemy-or should we seek a compromise settlement which achieves less than our stated objectives and thus cur our losses while we still have the freedom of maneuver to do so.

(5) Costs of a Compromise Solution: The answer involves a judgment as to the cost to the U.S. of such a compromise settlement in terms of our relations with the countries in the a rea of South Vietnam, the credibility of our commitments, and our prestige around the world. ln my judgment, if we act before we commit a substantial U.S. truce to combat in South Vietnam we can, by accepting some short-term coses, avoid what may well be a long-term carasrrophe. I believe we attended gr-ossly to exaggerate the costs involved in a compromise settlement. An appreciation of probable costs is con- rained in the arrached memorandum.

A C o mpromise Soluti o n in Sottth Vietnam 451

(6) With these considerations in mind, I strongly urge the following program: (a ) Military Program

(1) Complete all deployments already announced- 15 battal- ions- but decide not co go beyond a total of 72,000 men represented by chis figure.

(2) Restrict the combat role of tlhe American forces co the June 19 announcement, making it dear co General Westmoreland that this announcement is co be strictly construed.

(3) Continue bombing in the North but avoid the Hanoi- Haiphong area and any targets nearer co the Chinese border than those already struck.

(b) Political Program (1) In any political approaches so far, we have been the prison-

ers of whatever South Vietnamese government that was momentarily in power. If we are ever co move toward a sectlemenc, it will probably be because the South Vietnamese government pulls the rug out from under us and makes its own deal or because we go forward quietly without ad1•ance prearrangement with Saigon.

(2) So far we have not given cbe other side a reason co believe there is any flexibiliry in our negotiating approach. And the other s ide has been unwilling co accept what in their terms is complete capitulation.

(3) Now is the time co start some serious diplomatic feelers looking towards a solution based on some application of a self-determination principle.

(4 ) I would recommend approaching H anoi rather'than any of the other probable parties, the N LF, or Peiping. H ano i is the only one that has given any signs of interest in discussion. Peiping has been rigidly opposed. Moscow has recommended that we negotiate with Hanoi. The NLF has been silent.

(5) There are several channels to the North Vietnamese, but I think the best one is through their representative in Paris, Mai van Bo. Initial feelers of Bo should be directed toward a discussion both of the four points we have put forward and

the four points put forward by H anoi as a basis for negotia- tion. We can accept all but one of Hanoi' s four points, and hopefully we should be able to agree on some gro und rules for serious negotiations- including no preconditions.

(6) lf the initial feelers. lead to further secret, exploratory talks, we can inject the concept of self-determination that would permit the Vier Cong some hope of achieving some of their political objectives through, local elections or some other device.

(7) The contact on o ur s ide should be handled through a non- governmenta I cutout (possibly a reliable newspaper man w ho can be repudiated).

(8) lf progress can be made at this level a basis can be laid for a multinational conference. At some point, obviously, the government of South Vietnam wiU have to be brought on board, but I would postpone chis step until after a substan- tial feeling our of Hanoi.

(7) Before moving to a ny formal conference we should be prepared to agree once the conference is starred: (a) The U.S. will srand down its bombing of the North (b) The South Vietnamese will initia te no offensive operations in

the South, and (c) The ORV w ill stop terrorism and other aggressive action

against the South. (SJ The negotiations a t the conference s ho uld aim at incorporating

our understanding with H anoi in the form of a multinational agreement guar anteed by the U.S., the Soviet Union and possibly other parries, and providing fo r an internationa l mechanism to supervise irs execution.

PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE CUTTING 0/ O UR LOSSES IN SOUTH VfETNAl\.1

We have tended co exaggerate the losses involved in a compromise settle- ment in South Vietnam. There are three aspects to the problem char should be considered. First, the local eJfecc of our action on nations in or near Southeast Asia. Second, rlhe effect of our action on the eredibilicy of our commicn1encs around the world. Third, the effect on our position of world leadership.

A C o mpromise Soluti o n in Sottth Vietnam 453

A. Free Asian reactions to a compromise settlement in South Vietnam would be highly parochial,

With each country interpreting the event primarily in terms of (a) its own immediate interest, (b) its sense of vulnerability to Communist invasion or insurgeney, and (c) its confidence in the integrity of our commitment tO itS own security based on evidence other than that provided by our actions in South Vietnam.

Within this framework the following groupings emerge: (1) The Republic of China and Thailand staunch allies whose

preference for extreme U.S. actions including a risk of war with Communist China sets them apart from all other Asian nations;

(2) The Republic of Korea and the Philippines equally staunch allies whose support for strong U.S. action short of a war with Communjst China would ma.ke post-settlement reassurance a pressing U.S. need;

(3) Japan;- it would prefer wisdom to valor in an area remote from its own interests where escalation could involve its Chinese or Eurasian neighbors or both;

(4) Laos- A friendly neutral dependent on a strong Thai-U.S. guarantee of support in the faee of increased Vietnamese-and Laos pressures.

(5) Burma and Cambodia, suspicious neutrals whose fear of antagonjzing Communist China would increase their leaning toward Peiping in a conviction that the U.S. presence is not long for Southeast Asia; and

(6) lndonesia whose opportunistic marriage of convenience of both Hanoi and Peiping wo·uld carry it further in its overt aggression agrunst Malaysia, convinced that foreign imperial- ism is a fast fading entity in the region.

JAPAN

Government cooperation was the essential m making the following points to the Japanese people:

(1) U.S. support was given in full measure as shown by our casualties, our expenditures and our risk taking;

(2) The U.S. record in Korea shows the credibility or our commitment so far as Japan is concerned.

The government as such supports our strong posture in Vietnam but scops s hort of the idea of a wa.r between the U.S. and China.

THAILAND

Thai commitments to the scmggle within Laos and South Vietnam are based upon a careful evaluation of the regional threat to Thailand's secu- rity. The Thais a reconJident they can contain a ny threats from lndochina alone. They know, however, they cannot withstand the massive power of Communist C hina without foreign assistance. Unfortunately, the Thai view of the war has seriously erred in fundamental respects. They bel ieve American power can do anything, both militarily and in terms of show- ing up the Saigon regime. They now assume that we really could rake over in Saigon and win the war if we fe lt we had ro. 11 we should fail co do so, the Thais would initia lly see it as a fai lure of U.S. will. Yet time is on our side providing we employ it effectively. Thailand is an indepen- dent nation with a long national history, and unlike South Vietnam, an acute national consciousness. lt has few domestic Communists and none of the instability that plague its neighbors, Burma and Malaysia. Its one danger area in the northeast is well in hand so far as preventive measures against insurgency are concerned. Securing the Mekong Valley will be critical in any long-run solution, whether by the partition of Laos with Thai-U.S. fo rces occupying the western half or by some cover arrange- ment. Providing we are willing to make the effort, Thailand can be a fo undation of rock and not a bed or sand in which to base our political/ military commitment to Southeast Asia.

- With the exception of the nations in Southeast Asia, a compromise settlement in South Vietnam should not have a major impact on the cred- ibility of our commitments around the world .... C hancellor Erhard has m id us privately that the people of BerLln would be concerned by a com- promise settlement of South Vietnam. But this was hardly an original thought, and I suspect he was telling us what he beLleved we would like co hear. After a ll, the confidence of the West Berliners will depend more on what they see on the spot than on news or events halfway a round the world. In my observation, the principal anxiety of our NA TO Allies is chat we have become too preoccupied with an area which seems to them an

A Compromise Solution in Sottth Vietnam 455

irrelevance and may be tempted in neglecr to o ur NATO responsibilities. Moreover, they have a vested interest and easier relationship between Washington and Moscow. By and large, rtherdore, they will be inclined to regard a compromise solution in South Vietnam more as new evidence in American maturity and judgment and of American loss of face .... On balance, I believe we would more seriously undermine the effectiveness of our world leadership by continuing the war and deepening our involve- ment than by pursuing a carefully plotted course toward a compromise solution. In spite of the number of powers that have-in response to our pleading-siven verbal s upport from feel ings of loyalty and dependence, we cannot ignore the fact that the war is vastly unpopular and that our role in it is perceptively eroding the respect and confidenc-e with which other nations regard us. \Y/e have not persuaded either our friends or a lLles that our further involvement is essential to the defense of freedom in the cold war. Moreover, the more men we deploy in the jungles of South Vietnam, the more we contribute to a growing world anxiety a nd mistrust.

In the short run, of course, we could expect some catcalls from the sidelines and some vindictive pleasure on the part of Europeans jealous of American power, But tha1 would, in my view, be a transient phenom- enon with which we could live without sustained anguish. Elsewhere around the world I would see few m1happy implications for the credibil- ity of our commitments. No doubt the Communists will try to gain pro- paganda value in Africa, but I cannot seriously believe that the Africans care too much about what happens in Southeast Asia. Australia and New Zealand are, of course, special cases s ince they fee l lonely in the far reaches of the Pacific. Yet even their concern is far greater with Malaysia than with South Vietnam, and the degree of their anxiety would be con- ditioned largely by expressions of our support for Malaysia.

Earlie,r-Qu ire possibly, President de Gaulle will make propaganda about perfidious Washington, yet even he will be inhibited by his much- heralded disapproval of our activities in South Vietnam.

South Korea- As for the rest of the Far East the only serious point of concern might be South Korean. But if we stop pressing the Koreans for more troops to Vietnam (the Vietnamese show no desire for additional Asian forces since it affronts their sense of pride) we may be able to cushion Korean reactions to a compromise in South Vietnam by the pro- vision of greater military and economic assistance. In this regard, Japan can play a pivotal role now that it has achieved normal relations with South Korea.

N ATION: THE DEBATE Friday, Jul. 02, 1965

The crayoned sign on the door of Georgetown University's glass-and-concrete Hall of Nations in Washingcon announced a coming event: SOCIAL MIXER- BEER, PEOPLE, DANCING. But what went on inside the hall one night last week was hardly a mixer. It was rhe televised debate between Special Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy and crit- ics of the Administration's firm Viet Nam pnlicies, originally scheduled for May but posrpnncd when the Pres ident ordered Bundy to the Dominican Republic. Risks & Cosrs. Supporting Bundy were Polis h- born Zbigniew K. Br,ezinski, di.rector of Columbia's Research Institute on Communist Affairs, and the Rand Corp.'s expert on Asia, Guy J. Pauker. On the critics' side were rhe University of Chicago's German- born Political Sciencisr Hans J. Morgenrhau; ex-Foreign Service Office Edmund 0. Clubb, chairman of Columbia's Seminar on Modern Asia; and Michigan Seate University Anthropologist John D. Donoghue, who recently s pent rwo years in South Vier Nani's villages.

Moderator Eric Sevareid started the hour-long debate by saying: "The cosr and risk of fighting this war have to be measured agaimt the risks and costs of not fighting ir." As five TV cameras rolled, the Government's critics explained why they thought the risks were too grave and the costs roo high. The war, sa id Clubb, cannot be won "without virtually annih.i- lacing the Vietnamese people," and besides, it is "alienating both Asian and ocher world sympathies." Morgenrau could not think of a single jusri!ication for it. " I am opposed to ou.r present policies in Viet Nam," he said, "on moral, military, political and general inte llectual grounds."

Source: T;me Magazi11e, JuJr 2, 1965. 457

Said Donoghue: " I view chis as a civil war, w ith most peasants against the government that we support."

Bundy & Co. rook heated exception. "The policy which the United States is now following is the. best policy in a difficult and dangerous situ- ation," said Bundy. "We have a commitment matured through time, made for good reasons and susta ined for the same reasons." One of rhe reasons, offered Brzezinski, is to keep Red China from gaining supremacy in Asia. "A great many Asian nations,~ he said, "see a major interest for them- selves in an American continued presence in Viet Nam asa bulwark. " As for the notion that the Viet Nam war is a civil war, Pauker said: "This is aggression from North Viet Nam, bur carefully staged so as to make Communist revolution a ry way appear as a spontaneous grassroots revolt. " When Morgenthau argued that the U.S. attempt 10 contain Communism was "eminently successful in Europe against the Soviet Union," but "is bound to fai0 in Asia against China," Brze-,inski said ca ustically: " I would like to suggest, respectfully, that Professor Morgenthau is wrong. " Were the U.S. to pull out of Asia, Brzezinski added, " the Chinese wiU have been proven right, and this would be a highly destabilizing condition for world peace."

Later, when Morgenrhau began to cite fore ign magazine articles (from France's L' Express and Britain's Economist) and figures on South Vietnamese desertion rates, Bundy, his voice edged with sarcasm, cut him short. " I'll simply have to break in, if I may, Mr. Sevareid, and say that I think Professor Morgenrha u i.s wrong on his facts as to the desertion rates, wrong in his summary of the Express articles, wrong in his view of what the Economist says, and, I'm sorry to say, g iving vent to his con- genital pessimism." As an example of th is pessimism, Bundy quoted a 1961 article in wh ich Morgenthau wrote chat " the Communist domina- tion of Laos is virtually a fo regone conclusion" and that "the Administration has reconciled itself to the loss of Laos. " Said Bundy flatl y, "Neither of th ose things is true."

Morgenthau smiled weakly. " I might ha ve been dead w rong on Laos, bur that doesn't prove that I'm dead wrong on Viet Nam," he sa id .

Apocalyptic Predictions. What alternatives, Sevareid asked, does the U.S. have ro its present policy? Brzezinski noted that one alternative is to cross the 17th parallel, but immediately rejected it. "We're nor trying to overthrow the North Vietnamese government," he said. " There is no effort here to roll back the Communis.t world. "What the U.S. must do, he added,

Nation: The Debate 459

is ''ro make ir very clear that the we ourselves are nor going to be thrown out of South Vier Nam. And I believe we can do this in spire of the apoca- lyptic predictions by some people that this will lead to a world war with China or with the Soviet Union or to a homogenous Communist World."

Bundy a lso noted- and rejected- the alternative of carrying the war "ever further northward without regards to cities o r population or boundaries or what country you are choosing to attack." That, he said, "is not the policy of the Administration." Its position, he went on, "is that we should stay there, that we sholilld do our part as may become necessary, do only what is necessary, and seek constantly, as we have for months and months and months, ro find a way to get this dangerous and difficult business to the conference room."

Morgenthau, admitting that his position "must come as a surprise to some listeners here, " did not call for an immediate U.S. pullout. instead he suggested that the U.S. try to hold a few coastal enclaves to show the Viet Cong that they cannot win a complete mi litary victory. " I think our a im must be to get o ut of Vier Nam," he said, "but to get out of it w ith honour."

As soon as the debate went off the air, students and teachers swarmed around Bundy, trying to keep the argument going. "What about the napalm?" American University Government Professor Daniel Berman kept demanding. "I've answered you now three times, politely," said Bundy. "Oh, you have, have you?" snapped Berman. "Yes," said Bundy wa rily, "I have. "

REPORT BY M CNAMARA AFTER VISIT TO VIETNAM

30 November 1965

30 NOVEMBER 1965: (AFTER VISIT TO VN, 28-29 NOV 65)

.... the Ky "government of generals" is surviving, bur nor acquiring w ide s upport or generating actions; pacification is thoroughly sta lled, with no guarantee that security anywhere is permanent and no indica- tions that able and w im11g leadership will emerge in the absence of that perm:inenr security. (Prime Minister Ky estimates that his government controls only 25% of the population today and reports that his pacifica- tion chief hopes to increase that ro 50% two yeais from now.)

The dJamaric recent changes in the situation are on the military side. They are the increased infiltration from the North and the increased will- ingness of the Communist forces ro stand and fight, even in large-scale engagements. The la Drang River Campaign of early November is an example. The Communists appear ro have decided ro increase their forces in SVN both by heavy recruitment in the South (especia lly in the Delta) and by infiltration of regular NVN forces from the North .... the enemy can be expected ro enlarge his present strength of 110 batta lion equivalents ro more than 150 battalion equivalents by the end of ca len- dar 1966, w hen hopefully bis losses can be made ro equal his input.

As for the Communist ability to supply this force, it is estimated that, even raking account of interdiction of routes by air and sea, more than 200 rons of supplies a day can be infiltrated- more than enough, a llow- ing for the extent ro whieh the enemy lives off the land, ro s upport the likely PA VNNC force at the li kely level of operations.

461

To meet this possible-and in my view likely- Communist buildup, the presently contemplated Phase I forces will nor be enough (approx 220,000 Americans, almost a ll in place by end of 1965). Bearing in mind the nature of the war, the expected weighted combat force ratio of less than 2-ro-i will not be good enough. Nor will the o riginally contem- plated Phase II addition of 2.8 more US battalions (112,000 men) be enough; the combat force ratio, even with 32 new SVNese battalions, would stil l be little better than 2-ro-i at the end of 1966. The initiative which we have held since August would pass ro the enemy; we would fall far short of what we expected to achieve in terms of population control and disruption of enemy bases and lines of communications. Indeed, it is estimated that w ith the contemplated Phase II addfrion of 28 US battal- ions, we would be able only to hold o ur present geographical positions.

2. We have but rwo options, it seems to me. One is to go now fo r a compromise so lution (someth ing substantially less than the "favorable outcome" I described in my memo of Nov 3) and bold further deployments to a minimum. The other is to stick with our stated objectives and wjcb che war, and provide what it rakes in men and materiel. lf it is decided not to move now toward a com- prom ise, I recommend that the US both send a s ubstantial number of additional troops and very gradually intensify the bombing of NVN. Amb. Lodge, Wheeler, Sharp and Westmoreland concur in this prolonged course of action, a lthough Wheeler and Sharp would intensify the bombing of the North more quickly.

(recommend up to 74 battalions by end-66: total to approx 400,000 by end-66. And it should be understood that further deploy- ments (perhaps exceeding 200,000) may be needed in 1967.)

3. Bombing of NVN .... over a period of the next six months we gradually enlarge the target system in the northeast (Hanoi- Haiphong) quadrant until, at the end of the period, it incl udes "controlled" reconnaissance of lines of communication through- out the area, bombing of petroleum storage fac ilities and power plants, and mining of the harbors. (Left unstruck would be popu- lation targets, industrial plants, locks and dams).

4. Pause in bombing NVN. It is my belief that there should be a three- or four-week pause in the program of bombing the North before we either greatly increase our troop deployments to VN or

Mc,ramara After Visit to \fi,t.,am 463

intensify our strikes against the North. (My recommendation for a "pausen is not concurred in by Lodge, Wheeler, or Sharp.) The reasons for this belief are, first, tlhat we must lay a foundation in the mind of the American public and in world opinion for such an enlarged phase of the war and, second, we should give NVN a face-saving chance to stop the aggression. I am not seriously con- cerned about the risk of alienating the SVNese, misleading Hanoi , or being "trappedn in a pause; if we take reasonable precautions, we can avoid these pitfalls. I am seriously concerned about embarking on a markedly higher level of war in VN without hav- ing tried, through a pause, to end the war or at least having made it dear to our people that we did our best to end it.

5. Evaluation. We should be aware that deployments of the kind I have recommended will not guarantee success. US killed-in-action can be expected to reach 1000 a month, and the odds are even that we will be faced in early 1967 with a " no-decision" at an even higher level. My overall evaluation, nevertheless, is that the best chance of achieving our stated objectives lies in a pause followed, if it fails, by the deployments mentioned above.

NOTES FOR MEMORANDUM FROM MCNAMARA TO

LYNDON JOHNSON, "RECOMMENDATIONS OF

ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENTS TO VIETNAM "

20 July 1965

RECOMMENDATIONS OF ADDITTONAL DEPLOYMENTS TO VN

1. Our object in VN is to create conditions for a favorable outcome by demonstrating to the VC/DRV that the odds are against their winning. We want to create these conditions, if possible, without causing the war to expand into one with China or the Soviet Union and in a way which preserves support of the American people and, hopefully, of our allies and fr iends.

2. In my view a " favorable outcomeM has nine fundamental elements: a. VC stop attacks and drastically reduce incidents of tenor and

sabotage. b. ORV reduces infiltration to a trickle, with some reasonably reli-

able method of our obtaining confirmation of this fact. c. US/GVN stop bombing of NVN. d. GVN stays independent (hopefully pro-US, but possibly genu-

inely neutral).

465

e. GYN exercises governmental functions over substantially all of SYN.

f. Communists remain quiescent in Laos and Thailand. g. DRY withdraws PA VN forces and other NVNese infiltrators

(not regroupees) from SYN. h. YC/NLF transform from a military to a purely political

organization. ,. US combat forces (not advisors or AID) w ithdraw .

. . . . more likely to evolve without an express agreement th an w ith one.

3. Estimate: The s ituation in SYN is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few months of stale- mate, the tempo of the war has quickened .... The central high- lands could well be losr to the NLF during th is monsoon season. Since June 1, the GVN has been forced to abandon six district capita ls; only one has been retaken. US combat troop deployments and US/VNAF strikes against the North have put to rest most SYNese fears that the US wiU fo rsake them, and USNNAF air strikes in-country have probably shaken YC mora le somewhat. Yet the government is able to provide security to fewer and fewer people in less and less territory as terrorism increases .

. . . . The odds are less than even that the Ky government will last out the year. Ky is "executive agent" fo r a directorate of generals .

. . . . The Govt-to-YC ratio overall is now only a little better than 3-to-l , and in combat battaJ;ons little better than 1.5-to- l

.... Nor have our air attacks in NYN produced tangible evi- dence of w illingness on the part of Hanoi to come to the confer- ence table in a reasona.ble mood. The DR YNC seem to believe that SYN is on the run and near collapse; they show no signs of settling for less than complete takeover.

4. Options open to us: a. Cut our losses and withdraw under the best conditions that can

be arranged-almost certainly conditions humiliating the US and very damaging to o ur future effectiveness on the world scene.

b. Continue at about the present level, with the US forces limited to say 75,000, holding on and playing fo r the breaks-a course of action which, because our position would grow weaker, almost certainly would confront us later with a choice between

Recomme11dations of Additi o 11al Deplo y me11ts t o Vietnam 46 7

withdrawal and an emergency expansion of forces, perhaps coo lace ro do any good.

c. Expand promptly and substantia lly the US military pressure against the VC in the South and maintain the military pressure against the NVNese in the North while launching a vigorous effort o n the political side ro lay the g ro undwork for a favor· able o utcome by cla rifying our objectives and establishing channels of commun ication. (Amb. Lodge states "an y furt her in itiative by us now- before we are strong- would s imply harden the Communist resolve not co stop fighting. " Ambs. Tay lor and Johnson would maintain discreet contacts with the Soviets, but otherwise agree with Amb. Lodge.) This a lternative would stave off defeat in the sh ort run a nd offer a good cha nce of producing a favorab le settlement in the longer run; at the same time, it would imply a commitment to see a fighting war clear through at considerable cost in casualties and materiel and would make any later decision ro withdraw even more difficult a nd even more costly than would be the case today.

M y recommendations in par. 5 below a re based on the choice of the third alternative as the course of action involving the best odds of the best outcome with the most acceptable cost ro the US.

5. There are now 15 US (and 1 Australian) combat battalions in VN; they together with other combat and non-combat personnel, bring the total US personnel in VN co approx. 15,000. a. lncrease by October to 34 mane uver battalions; p lus other rein•

forceme nts, u p to approx. 175,000 .... It should be understood chat the deployment of more men (perhaps 100,000) may be necessary in early 1966, and that the deployment of additional forces therefore is possible but will depend o n developments. (Ask Congress to authorize call up of 235,000 men in Reserve and National Guard; increase regular forces by 375,000 men. By mid-66 US would have 600,000 additional men as protec- t ion against contingencies.)

((VNese have asked for forces: fo r 53 bns. )) .... The ORV, on the other hand, may well send up to sev-

eral divis ions of regular forces im SVN to assist the VC if they see

the tide turning and victory, once so near, being snatched away. Thjs possible ORV action is the most ominous one, since it would lead to increased pressures on us to "counter-invade" NVN and to extend a ir strikes 10 population targets in the North; acced ing to these pressures cou.ld bring the Sovs and the Chinese in .

. . . . T he success of the program from the military point of view turns on whether the VNese ho ld their own in rerms of numbers and fighting spirit, and o n w hether the US forces can be effective in a q uick-reaction reserve ro le, a role in which they are only now being tested. T he number of US troops is too sma U 10 make a significant difference in the traditiona l 10-ro- l government-guerrilla formula, bur ir is not roo small to make a s ignificant difference in rhe kind of war which seems 10 be evolving in Vietnam- a "Third Stage" or conventionaJ war in which ir is easier to identify, loca te and arrack the enemy .

. . . . The SVNese under one government or another will probably see the thing through (Amb Lodge points ou t that we may face a neutralist government a t some time in the fu ture and that in those circumstances the US should be prepared to carry on alone) and the US public will support the course of action because it is a sensible and courageous milirary-polirical pro - gram designed a nd likely 10 bring about a success in Vietnam.

Ir shou.ld be recognized, however, that success aga inst the larger, more conventional, VOPA VN forces could merely drive rhe VC back into the trees and back to their l 960-64 pattern- a pattern aga inst whicb US troops a nd a ircraft would be of limited value but wieh w hich rhe GVN, with o ur help, could cope. The q uestions here would be whether the VC could main- rain mora le afte r such a setback, and whether the SVNese would have the w iU to hang on th rough a nother cyde. It should be recognized also that even in "success" it is not obvious how we wi ll be able to d isengage our forces fro m Vietnam. It is unlikely that a fo rma.l agreement good enough for the purpose could possibly be negotiated- because the arrangement can reflect little more than the power situation. A fair ly large num- ber of US (or pe_rhaps international) forces may be required to stay in Vietnam.

Recomme11dations of Additio11al Deployme11ts to Vietnam 469

The overall evaluation is that the course of action recom- mended in tltis memo ... stands a good chance of achieving an acceptable outcome within a reasonable time in Vietnam.

THE ADVISORY BUILD-UP 1961-1967

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

The United States decided, s hortly after the Geneva Accords and during the period of French withdrawal from l111do-China, to give military assis- tance and advice to the newly proclaimed Republic of Vietnam. It might as easily have decided nor to undertake this effort to prevent South Vietnam from falling ro communism.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were pessimistic. The creation of a Vietnamese Anny, they said, might nor even lead ro internal political stability, much less assure the capability to protect South Vietnam from external aggression. The JCS also believed that the limitations imposed by the Geneva agree- ments on the number of U.S. military personnel would make it impractical to attempt to train a new Anny-particularly given the paucity of experienced leaders which was the legacy of French colonialism. T he President's military advisors did not wish 10 assume the resporL~ibiliry for failure ,vithout the resources and influence which would offer a better chance for success.

THE AMERICAN GAMBLE

The available record does nor indicate any rebuttal of the JCS's appraisal of the s ituation. What it does indicate is that the U.S. decided tO gamble with very limited resources because tlhe potential gains seemed well worth a limited risk. " I cannot guarantee that Vietnam will remain free, even with our rud," Genera l J. Lawron Collins reported to the National Security Council, "But I know that without our aid Vietnam will surely be lost ro Communism."

471

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was instrumental in deciding for political reasons 10 undertake a modest program of military advice aimed at producing political scability. Once launched, however, the program of advice and assistance came 10 be dominated by conventional military conceptions. [nsuring internal stability is a "lesser included capability" of armed fo rce, the reasoning went; the principal purpose of such a force is to protect the territorial integrity of the nation .

It was such a conventional force that the small USMAAG attempted tO prod uce from 1955 until about 1960. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was made to "mirror image" the U.S. Anny to the extent permitted by differences in equipment and locale. The number of U.S. advisors (approximately doubled by "The Equipment Recovery Mission "-• thinly veiled device 10 increase the number of Americans in Vietnam) remained stable throughout this period. ARVN developed into a multi-divisional force oriented primarily toward conventional defense. The later transition to a force designed for counterins urgent warfare was thereby made more difficult.

It seemed for a while that the gamble against long odds had succeed- ed, The Viet Minh were quiescent; the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) were markedly better a rmed and trained than they were when the U.S. effort began (at which time they were unarmed and untrained), and President Ngo Dinh Diem showed a remarkable ability to put down factions threatening GVN stability and to maintain himself in office.

This period of apparent stabiLl ty disappeared, however, in the events of 1959/61 as the Viet Minh (relabelled Viet Cong- a contraction for Vietnamese Communist) stepped up terrorism, saborage, and military action by increasingly large units. By mid-1 961, the prospect for South Vietnam's independence was at least as dark as it had been six years earLler.

But the U.S. military advisors in Vietnam had learned-or at least th ought tney bad learned- during this period of gradual disintegration the true nature of the battle in which they were engaged by proxy. This was an unconventional, internal war of counterinsurgency rather than a conventional struggle against an external foe . It was a battle fo r the "hearts and minds " of the indigenous (and especia lly the rural) popula- tion rather than a comest to w in and hold key terrain features. It was an intermeshed political-economic-military war rather than one in which political and economic issues were settled by military victory.

The Advisory Build-Up 473

U.S. advisors in Vietnam-and U.S. military and civilian theorists in other places, as weU- formulated during this period a rudimentary doc- trine of counterinsurgent warfare. ln response 10 Premier Khrushchev's endorsement of "wars of national Llberation " they proposed 10 help free world nations save themselves from communism by a series of sequential actions that dealt with the symptoms of social revolution (the insurgencyl as well as its causes (the frustration of expectations for social justice).

Thus, at almost the same time that the U.S. began its advisory buildup in South Vietnam in late I 961, military and civilian practitioners found themselves in possession of a simple, apparently logical, outline sketch of a method by which to counter the communist-captured insurgency. Physical security from the acts of the insurgents was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for success. ln addition to security the Vietnamese government had to establish the services which would link it in classic terms of legitimacy to its subjects. We would fight fire with fire and we would fight it with water, too.

THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

The decisions made by the Kennedy Administration from mid-1961 onward, culminating in the expansion of the U.S. advisory effort follow- ing General Maxwell D. Taylor's mission 10 Saigon in October, did nor simply set out tO explain this newly-articulated counterinsurgency theory and doctrine to the GVN. They attempted to induce the GVN to reform itself so that identification with its populace would be possible. Beyond this, they chose tO attempt to help the Vietnamese, i11 Taylor's words, ;,as friends and partners- not as arms-length advisors- land] show them how the job might be done-not tell them or do it them."

The "limited partnership " which General Taylor proposed- and which President Kennedy accepted- was designed to place U.S. advisors at many levels within the RVNAF and GVN structure rather than merely at the top. An earlier proposal, to concentrate on advisors at the top with wide discretionary authority and to count on influence as the product of the demonstrated commitment of a carefully selected handful of men, was rejected in favor of many advisors at many levels, each serving nor- mally only for a twelve month period, and with the advisory manpower furnished through normal personnel selection and assignment processes within the military services.

The expectation among U.S. policymakers- recorded in NSAM 111- was that tbe GVN and U.S. would murually agree upon necessary steps tO end the insurgency. The U.S., for its part, would underwrite an increase in RVNAF and provide advisors throughout the military structure down to battalion level and in each provincial capital. The GVN would ratio- nalize its lines of authority and begin reform measures to bring it closer to the Vietnamese people. This was, of course, a U.S. expectation, not an agreed quid pro quo. Diem was unwilling to permit the U.S. to share in his formulation of plans. He was e,•en afraid to discuss tbe U.S. expecta- tions candidly with his own cabinet ministers. It is a matter of record that he did not reform his government. ("He will not reform because he can- not, " J. Kenneth Gaibraith cabled President Kennedy.) What remains in issue is whether he could have done so. If he could not, the U.S. plan to end the insurgency was foredoomed from its inception, for it depended on Vietnamese initiatives to solve a Vietnamese problem.

COMMITMENT AND EXPECTATION

Thus the U.S. overall plan to end the insurgency was on shaki• ground on the GVN side. Diem needed the U.S. and the U.S. needed a reformed Diem. As U.S. advisors began deploying to Vietnam for service with tac- tical units in the field, the gamble of the mid-50's was transferred into a broad commitment. President Kennedy and his advisors were determined to save Vietnam from communism by helping the Vietnamese t0 save themselves. One side of the dual U.S. thrust (GVN reform) was already in trouble. What of tbe "friends and partners" wbo were t0 share the dangers and tasks of RVNAF in the field? What was expected of them? What advantages would accrue from their presence in Vietnam?

The available record is almost totally devoid of any explication (much less any debate) on these questions. General Taylor's report of bis mission to Saigon implies an unambiguous convergence of interests between the advisors and the advised. All that was needed was greater competence. More U.S. advisors at more places working on problems of Vietnamese training and operations could not but have an overall beneficial effect.

It is necessary tO surmise tbe expectations i11 the policymakers minds of just how this would come about. First, they seem t0 have expected the increased U.S. advisory presence to lead directly to increased R VNAF competence in technical and tactical areas. Basic military skills-how to

The Advis o r y Build-Up 4 7 .5

move, shoot, and communicare-could be improved and the improve- ments sustained by a continuing U.S. presence at many operarionaJ levels. Second, the U.S. policymakers could receive reports &om an omnipresent U.S. "network" which would permit them to become better informed about what was really taking place in Vietnam, not only with respect to VC activity but with reference to ARYN plans, opemrions, and problems as well. Finally, the U.S. expected to realize increased influence within RYNAF from the presence of advisors. (and it expected, as NSAM 111 made clear, to realize increased influence with GYN in exchange for increasing its visible commitment to South Vietnamese independence.)

Increased influence can, of course, be gained in many ways. U.S. advisors could, by example, promote more aggressive Vietnamese leadership and improved standards of conduct. A weU-coordinated advisory network could exert persuasive pressure throughout RVNAF to adopt certain poli- cies or practices.

And the U.S. providers of the material resources could, if they wished, keep a tight hand on the spigot and comtrol the flow. They could exert influence negatively. The U.S. was anxious to avoid rhis last mentioned approach co increased influence. "Leverage," as it is now commonly known, was a subject rarely discussed, inuch less practiced. The "limited partnership" finessed the whole issue of sanctions by assuming (or hop- ing or pretending, one cannot know which) that no problem existed.

PACIFICATION AND STRATEGIC HAMLETS

The process of countering insurgency, most commonly called pacifica- tion, received a great amount of attention and publicity at the same time the U.S. was increasing its field advisors with ARYN from a hru1dful to over 3,000. Earlier, in 1960, the USMAAG had pressed upon the GYN a national Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam (CCP) which was really an organizational blueprint for reordering the G\IN-RYNAF lines of com- mand to permit effective action. The nub of the problem was that the political leaders in rural areas (Province and Disrrict Chief-s-almost all military officers) were responsible to Sa;gon directly while RYNAF had a separate chai11 of command. In 1961, the MAAG presented its comple- mentary Geographically Phased Plan which specified the relative priority for clearing our the VC, holding, then building GYN at the "rice roots." The object, as the U.S. advisors saw it, was to have a workable national plan upon which to base the entire US-GYN effort.

T he Strategic H amler Program soon became the unify ing vehicle ro express the pacification process. The theory was that of physical security first, then government programs ro develop popular allegiance. T he fact was over-expansion, counter-productive coercion in some areas, wide- spread mismanagement, and dishonesty. U.S. policymakers were nor, however, aware of bow badly things were going until they became much worse. Optimism dominated official thinking. No need was perceived for new departures. Throughout the period ofrhe Strategic Hamlet Program- that is, until Diem's regime was toppled in late 1963- the numbe_r of U.S. advisors remained relatively stable at its new (1962) plateau.

T he expectation that more ll.J.S. advisors wou ld mean better informa- tion for U.S. policymakers was not realized. One cannot judge accu- rately the reasons why U.S. leaders in Vietnam and Washington thought the counterinsurgenc effort was making headway, but the fact that it was not is crystal clear in retrospect. The expectation that GVN and U.S. interests were sufficiently parallel to permit greater U.S. influence solely as a result of a larger U.S. presence foundered on the personalities and the felt necessities of the Ngo brothers. The extent to which R VNAF technical-tactical competence was increased during this period remains a subject of disagreement but it was not increased sufficiently to "turn the tide" of the war. That much is indisputable.

ANOTHER ROUND OF INCREASES

After Diem's fall there was a brief period of optimism based on the expectation that the new military regime in Saigon would be more recep- tive to U.S. advice than its predecessor had been. By the summer of 1964, when the decision was made to expand the advisory effort again, this optimistic hope had fo undered on the fact of continued VC victories and instability w itbin the GVN.

NSAM 288 bad, in March 1964, stated U.S. objectives in Vietnam in the most unambiguous and sweeping terms. lf there had been doubt that the limited risk gamble w1dextaken by Eisenhower had be_en transformed into an unlimited commitment under Kennedy, that doubt s hou ld have been d ispelled internally by NSAM 288's statement of objectives:

We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. We do nor

require rhar it serve as a \Vestem base or as a member of a Western

The Advisory Build-Up 477

Alliance. South Vie.roam must be free, however, co accept outside assis·

tance as required ro malncain its security. This assistance should be able

to take the form not only of economjc and social measures but also

police and milita.ry help ro roor out and control insurgent elements.

If we cannot save South Vietnam, rhe NSAM continued in a classic sraremenr of the "domino theory," all of Southeast Asia will probably fa]J and all of the Western Pacific and South Asian nations will come under increased pressure.

There were ac this time severa l seeps which the U.S. could have taken to increase its assistance to the GVN. Ca rrying the war co H anoi was one; introducing U.S. combat fo rces was another. Neither appealed much, however, in terms of helping the South Vietnamese co win their wa r. Both were anathema in the midst of Presidential election year poli- tics. Bombing was discussed and plans laid , bur no action taken. Troop commitments were not even discussed- at least in the w ritten record of proposals and decisions. Ra ther, a number of palliative measures co help the GVN economy and R VNAF were adopted and the advisory effort was expanded.

The 1964 expansion of the advisory effort consisted of the beefing-up of the batta lion advisory reams and the establishment of district (sub- sector) teams. Thus, a new climension of American presence was added and the density of U.S. advisors in operational uni cs was increased. There is nothing in che available record to suggest either a challenge to the o ld , unseated assumption that more U.S. advisors would lead to increased performance or any change in the assumed expectations of U.S. policy- makers had changed. The determination remained to advise rather than co command, to develop Vietnamese leadership rather than co supplant it, and to induce the GVN ro cake the seeps necessary co pacify its own dissident elements.

ADVISORS TEMPORARILY FORGOTTEN

The expansion co district level placed U.S. military advisors thro ughout almost the entire RVNAF hierarchy (from JGS co battalion, w ith enough men at the lower level ro advise compa:nies on a "when needed" basisl and the po litical h.ierarchy as well (sector/province and sub-sector/dis- trict). U.S. advisors were nor present in large numbers with the old Civi l

Guard and Self-Defense Corps- now relabelled the Regional Forces and Popula r Forces under province and district control respectively-but they advised the military men in political positions who controlled these para- military forces.

Still the situation continued ro deteriorate. Po litical instability w itbin the GVN had by 1965 become a perennial rather than a transitory problem. T he U.S. had initiated a continuing series of military air war measures to dissuade North Vietnam &om support of the war in the South. The results were obvi- ously inadequate; they may even have been opposite co those expected. Then ARVN suffered a series of disastrous defeats lace in the spring of 1965 which led knowledgeable observers to fear an imminent GVN collapse. U.S. com- bat units- a few of which were already in-country with restrictive missions- began co be deployed co South Vietnam in earnest.

When the build-up of U.S. ,combat fo rces got underway the build-up of U.S. advisors had a lready be:en essentially completed. Being an advisor in the fie ld had been the most challenging assignment a U.S. soldier could seek; being with a U.S. unit in combat now became the aim of most. The advisory effort san k into relative obscurity as the attention of policymak- ers (and of the press and public) focused on the U.S. fo rce deployments, on builcfu1g the base complexes from which U.S. military might could project itself into the countryside, and in explo ring the new relationships and new opportunities occas.ioned by the commitment of U.S. land fo rces to the Asian mainland.

A number of measures whic h would have changed materially the U.S. advisors relationship to their Vietnamese counterparts were examined briefly in mid-1965. Each was dropped. The encadremenc of U.S. and ARVN units was favo red by President J ohnson. General Westmoreland opposed it-apparently because of language problems and the difficult logistic support problem it would create-and the issue quickly d ied, except for the experimenta l Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) fo rmed by the Marines. The s ubject of a combined U.S.-RVNAF command was brought up. Secretary McNamara was more favorab ly disposed coward achieving "unity of command " than were his senior military advisors and the U.S. Mission representatives in Saigon. They were keenly aware of GVN sensitivity co any measures which would explicitly finger the increasing Americanization of the war effort. So combined command was shelved, coo. The GVN even opposed a joint US-JGS staff to coordi- nate the war effort. T he staff was never fo rmed .

Th e Ad v is o r y Build- U p 4 7 9

PACIFICATION REEMPHASIZED

As the build-up of U.S. combat forces reached a level permitting offensive fora ys against the VC (and North Vietnamese Army) forces, there gradually evolved a division of responsibilities berween U.S. and Vietnamese forces in which the former were to concentrate on defeating the majn forces of the VC/NV A and the latter were to give primary emphasis to the pacification program. Half of AR VN was to operate in support of pacification.

This division of effort threw most U.S. advisors into pacification- with ARYN units as well a s in the province and clistrict advisory teams. It a lso threw the U.S. military advisors into closer contact- and competi- tion and conflict- with the growing number of advisors on civil ftrnc - tions (many of whom were U.S. military men on " loan") representing the CIA, AID, and USIA. The question was raised of the optimal internal U.S. organization to support the Vietnamese pacification program.

The result of a drawn-out, occasionally acrimonious debate on this question was an intermixed civil-milita ry organization embracing the entire pacification effort, headed by a 6vilian of ambassadorial rank under COMUSMACV' s clirecrion. Called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), it replaced a bilinear system in which military advisors were controlled through a military chain of command and all civilian advisors were controlled (at least in theory) through an Office of Civil Operations (OCO). The creation of CORDS was hailed as a victory fo r the "single manager" concept even though some very sub- stantial U.S. programs were defined as o utside the pacification program and, hence, beyond CORDS' competence.

RF/PF ADVISORS

The creation of CORDS affected only the organizationa l context of U.S. advice to the South Vietnamese. It djd nothing to change the relationship berween advisor and advised. U.S. expectations continued in the well- worn fur rows in which they had travelled from the beginning: better information, more U.S. influence over Vietnamese plans and actions, and improved GVN (including RVNAF) performance were the hoped fo r products of the advisory effort.

This pattern was repeated in 1967 when an increase of over 2,000 military advisors was proposed by MACY to assist the Regional and Popular Forces- whose security missions were almost exclusively devoted

to support of the pacification program. The RF and PF were, at that time, the only RVNAF components without a sizeable U.S. advisory comple- ment. When the question of improving their effectiveness was addressed the old assumption that more U.S. advisors would equate to improved effectiveness again went unchallenged.

The question debated was whether this new dimension of the U.S. advisory effort should be structured to give continuing advice to RF com- panies and PF platoons or should be constituted on a mobile training basis. The decision was to form mobile teams for both tactical and logis- tical support training. Advisors were detached &om their parent U.S. combat units and detailed to th.ese duties pending the manpower account- ing change which would transfer these individuals to MACY advisory control and replace them in U_S. units with newly deployed fiUers.

AVOIDED ISSUES

This was the situation when the VCJNVA launched a massive series of attacks against urban population centers and surrounding pacification program forces during the 1968 lunar new year (Tee) offensive. In the confused aftermath of this radical change in VCJNV A strategy the U.S. announced in Washington its imtention to give renewed attention to mod- ernizing R VNAF so that a larger share of the war effort could be turned back to the Viemamese. This policy decision, following as it did an unprecedented six -year period of U.S. attempts to wage counterinsurgent war by proxy, constituted an adequate reason to reexamine the experi- ence of the past and to explore more ful ly some difficult q uestions which have been consistently avoided in the desire to assist South Viemam.

The mosr basic of these questions is whether the U.S. can in any way serve as a makeweight sufficient to change the continuing unfavorable trend of the war in South Vietnam? Can it, that is, overcome the appar- ent fact that the Viet Cong ha.ve "captured" the Viemamese nationalist movement while the GVN bas become the refuge of Viemamese who were allied with the Frem:h in the battle against the independenc.e of their nation? Attempts to answer this question are complicated, of course, by the difficult issue of Viet Cong allegiance to and control by Communist China. But this is the nature of the situation. The issue of whether the U.S. can energize the GVN has been too long submerged by repeated assertions that it must do so.

The Advisory Build-Up 481

A part of any tentative answer to this fundamental question will turn on the issue of how the U.S. might better promote a more adequate pace of GVN reform and improved RVNAF effectiveness to cope with the VC/ NV A threat. (A related question, of course, is whether reform and increased effectiveness can proceed simulltaneously.) Asking this question would open for examination rwo aspects of the advisory program that have come to be treated by reflexive res ponse: where are advisors needed and what should be the relationship of the advisor to the advised?

The continuing U.S. unstated assumption has been that more advisors somehow equate to better performance. This can be traced in the succes- sive expansions of the military advisory effort-first to the provinces and down to battalion level within ARYN, then to the districtS, and most recently to the paramilitary forces withjjn RVNAF. It may be that large numbers of advisors are, in fact, the best way to influence events but one cannot reach such a conclusion validly without first asking the q uestion.

The relationship of advisor to advised has gone through recurrent changes relative to judging an advisor's performance according to the performance of his counterpart. It has a lmost never deviated, however, from the belief that the conscious and continuing use of le1•erage at many levels would undercut Vietnamese sovereignty and srultify the develop- ment of Vietnamese leadership. Given the results of this policy over a number of years it is fair to ask whether the stick o ught not to be more routinely used in combination w ith the carrot. Again, the answer is not obvious but it is obvious that there can be no sound answer in the absence of inquiry.

Finally, and closely related to any examination of the leverage issue, there is the question of the adequacy of counterinsurgent theory and doctrine. The progression from physica.l security through the establish- ment of socially oriented programs (political and economic) to the objec- tive of earning and winning popular allegiance seems both simple and logical. It may a lso be simplistic, for its transformation into operational reality bumps bead-on into some very difficult questions. Is security a precondition 10 loyalty, for instance, or must some degree of loyalty be realized as a precondition to intelligence information adequate to make security feasible? This chicken-and-egg argument has been debated for years without leading to any noticeable consensus on guides to opera- tional action_

Seeking answers to any of these q uestions is a difficult, frustrating business. There exists no "control" by which laboratory comparisons of alternative courses can be made. There is almost surely no bard choice which will not carry with it very real liabilities a long with its advantages. But if the lives and effort expemded in the U.S. military advisory effort in South Vietnam in the 1960's are co be justi6ed, a substantial portion of that justification will consist of a closer examination of past assumptions in order better to guide future policy.

P A RT VI

1966-1971

TELEGRAM FROM THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC

(SHARP) TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Honolulu, January 12, 1966, 0205Z.

JCS 46895. THE RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST NVN TO THE OVERALL STRATEGY OF THE WAR IN SVN (U) .

1. One of the key elements of the strategy ,n Vietnam has been rhe application of steadily increasing military pressure against North Vietnam to fo rce cessation of support to the VC, and to bring NVN to the negotiating table. Surely a negotiated solution ro the problem of peace and security for SVN is infinitely preferable to a long, bitter and costly war. We recognize that rhe effectiveness of military pressure depends partly on a s ignificant combination of moves toward negotiation which dearly indicates co the ORV our continuing readiness ro negotiate. T he current pause is such a move, and it is to he hoped that it will be quickly successful.

2. Based on reactions so far, however, H anoi has shown no inclina- tion to negotiate and may continue to spurn all our efforts unless forced to rake some other course. We should plan now ro resume effective operations agrunst NVN, as mdeed we must if negotia- tions do not bring an early cease lire.

3. It is essential, therefore, char the viral relationship of military operations agrunst NVN to a coherent overall strategy for Vietnam

485

486 PART V J: t966 - t9 7 1

be recognized. This overall strategy is based o n three undertakings. These are: A. To deny to the Communists in SYN the effective direction and

assistance from NVN so vital to their war making capability. B. To assist the R VN in providing protection of the South

Viemamese people from Communise subversio n and oppres- sion, to liberate areas dominated by the VC, and 10 assist in the establishment of a stable economy and the continuation of a n independent no n-Communjst government.

C. To defeat the VC a nd PAYN fo rces and destroy their base areas in the RVN.

Germane to the interdependent nature of these three elements of strat- egy is the necessity that success be achieved in each and that each of the three undertakings be subject to a simultaneous application of appropri- ate miljcary force.

4. When we resume ope~acions against NVN, the air campaign should be conducted in the most effective manner ro accomplish sub para 3.A. above. This will require operations quite different from the pre-cease fire pattern. The vita l external assistance co NVN required ta sustain effective internal milita ry operations and external aggression must be denied. Resources already in NVN masc needed to s upport aggression should be destroyed in depth. All known military material and facifaies should be destroyed and milita ry activities and movements sho uld be continuously harassed and disrupted.

5 . It appears tbat the very fo undation of the enemy's morale and resultant tenacity stands squarely on the belief chat our patience will run out before bis. Hanoi has publicly stated tbac the enor- mous costs of long lines of communications and the casualties they intend to inflict on U.S. forces w ill cause us to negotiate o n their terms. We should cons ider the consequences of NVN secure from arrack, supported by both Russia and Chjna, infiltrating inro SYN troops equipped with tbe latest weapons, fully trained, and con- tinuously supplied. Of even greater importance would be the free- dom of Hanoi to exerci.se unhampered direction of operations in SYN a nd the concomitant beneficial morale effects upon the

Telegram From lhe Commander in Chi ef 48 7

PA VNNC forces. Vietnam Communist history and doctrine and current experience lead on ly to the conclusion that they are willing to expend lives at a rate which we would consider unacceptable to achieve their objectives. Therefore, we must accept as reality that an exorbitant expenditure of lives by the enemy in SYN over a long period of time would be endured as long as success appea red possible. The implications of this fact are enormous. Viewed in this context then, H anoi may not have been idly boasting when thei• claimed that Operation Starlite, 1 near Chu Lai, and the battle of la Drang2 were actually victor;es for their side. Unfortunately, this could be true in a strategic sense unless our strategy makes fu ]J use of our superio r air power to reduce casualties and fo reshorten the time required 10 achieve our I imited objectives.

6. Again, as they d id in one phase of the war against the French when faced with superior regular milit.ary forces, the Communists are currently avoiding costly engagements at o ur initiative in SYN and are concentrating on terro rism a nd destructive attacks on smalJ o utposts and garrisons. This technique can be used any time suc- cess seems to elude chem temporarily. A PA VNNC force using chis strategy and s upported as visualized ca n extend the time period before we gain any real military s uccesses or reconstruction prog- ress. A long stand-down in air attacks against NVN while NVN continues to support PA VNNC intensive operations in SYN would vitiate U.S. strategy for bringing the war in Vietnam to an acceptable condusion. For political, economic and psychological reasons of great importance in both the U.S. and SYN there is an urgent need to make rapid progress toward security for the SYN people and the destruction of PA YNNC forces and base areas. The adverse consequences, both in the U.S. and SYN of very s low progress in the war, cou ld be incalculable.

7. The Communists have a total disregard for the human va lues held by the Western world. By our standards, they w ill endure stagger- ing losses of human lives to achieve their objectives . They are

1 ln Operation Starlfre, August J 965, U.S. Mari.t)es trapped a major portion of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment on a peninsula near Chu l.:tj

1 100 kjlometcrS southeast of Da Nang.

l The Battle of 13 Orang took place i.t1 Novembe-r 1965 in the la Orang Valley of South Vietnam's Central Highlands.

488 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

keenly aware of our attitudes and have announced that U.S. troop casualties, rather than ,·ictory in battle, wiU govern their strategy in SVN. At the same time, they know that we would choose to exploit full use of a ir power as a technological alternative to human loss. To prevent this, they have staged a remarkable world-wide political and propaganda campa ign. They anticipate that the VC, fully supported by NVN, can inflict suffic ient casua l- ties to generate internal U.S. pressures to end the war far short of the objectives we seek. They have correctly determined that a crucia l battle of the war is the political battle. They are not fight- ing to attain a permanent stand-down. We must not permit them to w in it.

8. With these thoughts in mind, a review of the changed situation since RT operations be:gan is in o rder. We began RT with very limited objectives, at a time when PA VN infiltration was of less significance than it is now. Our build up in SVN was visualized as a moderate and sustainable assist to the ARVN in maintaining effective mobile reserve forces and in gaining and maintaining security for reconstruction. Ir was visualized that such assistance was politically and econom ically supportable for an indefinite period while the GVN made the required progress.

9. When RT began, there was considerable hope of causing Hanoi to cease aggression through an increasing pressure brought to bear through carefully timed destruction of selected resources, accom- panied by threat of greater losses. Presumably this would cause Hanoi to decide to cease support of the VC. But in Feb of last year CINCPAC stated a view substantially as follows: We must face the fact that punitive attacks and the threat of destruction of the capi- tal resources in NVN probably will not bring Hanoi to the confer- ence table. Ho Chi Min h has never doubted ultimate victory. We said that from his point of view the prospect of eventual defeat in SVN would be the unacceptable threat to his long term objectives. Therefore, in order to win in SVN, the immediate objective of RT should be to make it as difficult and as costly as possible for NVN to continue effective support of the VC and Pathet Lao, thereby contributing directly to our ultimate objective of winning in SVN.

10. However, Rolling Thunder has been conducted with the primary objective of increasing pressure to cause Hanoi to "decide" to

Telegram From lhe Commander in Chi ef 489

cease support of the VC and Parhet Lao and the objective of mak- ing ir difficult ro export aggression has been pursued in a very bmited manner. On the credjt side, there has been significant dis- ruption upon which we can c:apiralize. when operations are resumed. NVN has had to expend great effort to repair roads and bridges and to prepare defense of urban areas for possible attack. Necessary internal operations have been severely disrupted and military support ro the VC and Pathet Lao has been somewhat slowed but not slowed enough. Reconstruction of communication links has been designated as a number one strategic problem and large numbers of people have been organized into repair gangs. The Arm)' has been given supervision of reconstruction in Zone IV, no doubt detracting from their military duties. And as a reflec- tion of the pressure the Vietnam news agency in Hanoi has been increasing the tempo of propaganda relating to U.S. air attacks. These facts and orhers indicate that Hanoi has felt the pressure and rhat we were presenting the government with growing inter- nal problems. In light of the limited objectives of the air campaign, RT has done quice well.

11. On the other hand, RT operations have not been conducted in such a manner as ro increase the pressure on Hanoi in recent months. Targets vital to effective military o·perarions have not been struck in significant numbers; military and civiljan activities have accommo- dated to the limited operations; a11d, in fact, the psychological pres- sure has decreased. Bur regardless of how RT has been conducted, the important fact now is that the nature of the war has changed since the air campaign began. RT has not forced Hanoi to the deci- sion which we sought. There is now every indication thar Ho Chi Minh intends to continue support of the VC until he is denied rhe capability to do so. He has the unstinting support of the ChiComs which has increased his obligation to that regime. This, together with the pressure from that direction to continue support probably leaves him little alternative. This resolve has caused a significant change in the complexion of NVN support to the VC, wrule U.S. commitntenrs have dramatically increased. In the lighr of these greatly increased commitmenrs and the factors already discussed, and with due regard to political realjties and current resources, we must do all that we can to make ir as difficult and costly as possible

490 PART V J: t966 - t9 7 1

for Hanoi to continue direction and support of aggression. In good conscience, we should not long delay resumption of an RT program designed to meet the changed nature of the war.

12. In consonance w ith the. overall concept, military operations against NVN should: A. Deny to NVN assistance from external sources. B. Destroy in depth those resources a lready in NVN that contrib-

ute most to the support of aggressio n; destroy or deny use of a ll known permanem military facilities; and harass and dis- rupt dispersed military operations.

C. Ha rass, disrupt, a nd impede movement of men and materials thcough Southern ORV into Laos and SYN. Denial of external assistance requires interdiction of land LOC's from China and closing of the pores. Occasional attacks against bridges on the LOC's in the northeast quadrant has had o nly limited s uccess in disrupting the flow. This area must be opened up for armed recce with a uthority to attack LOC tar- gets as necessary. Ln initiating action to dose the ports, particu- larly Haiphong, Hon Gay and Cam Pba, it is recognized that political considerations are involved. Highly selective strikes and political action on the international scene to indicate our intentions to continue to deny use of the pores should be under- taken. Reaction of C hiComs wh ile the program gets underway s hould provide indications of their actual intentions. Nevertheless, if we are to realize our aims, we musr take these sreps, bold as they may seem. Destruction of resources within NVN s hould begin with POL. Every known PO L facility and discriburion activity should be destroyed and harassed until the war is concluded. Denial of electric power faci lities should begin at an early date and continue until a ll planes are o ur of action. Complete destruction is nor required. All large military facilities sho uld be destroyed in Northern NVN as they have been in the Southern area.

13. We should mount an intensified armed reconnaissance program witho ut sortie restriction, to ha rass, disrupt and attric the dis- persed a nd hidden military fac ilities a nd activities south of 20 deg

Telegram From lhe Commander in Chie f 491

which have been identified and are continuing to be identified as a result of detailed intelligence analysis. We should concentrate on LOC centers, attacking trans-shi[Pment points, vehicle/boat con- centrations, and LOC exits into Laos on a nire and day basis. The irutial effort should be followed by sustained armed recce surveil- lance and attack against known atld predicted traffic flow areas in order to maintain the harassment and disruption desired.

14. Paralleling an increased tempo of RT operations CINCPAC will maintain intensified photo reconnaissance with all available assets. Previous RT operations have forced the enemy to hide, disperse, and camouflage his military supp-Ort base, and to ta.ke maximum advantage of darkness to move personnel, supplies and equipment over the infiltration routes. All available exploitation resources will be applied to detailed readout and analysis of the frequent coverage that must be obtained, but more may be required. When RT operations are reswned, security of our forces should be given the attention required. We must neither accept losses that could be prevented nor interference with operational flexibility. Plans have been drawn up for constant surveillance of the airfields and their destruction when required. Soon they should be authorized for attack. It will be far too costly to an intensive air campaign to permit the enemy to maintain a SAM capability. Operational com- manders will require a uthority to deal with this threat wherever it jeopardizes operations.

15. In summary, we strongly believe that air operations against NVN should be resumed as one of the r.hree main elements of our strat- egy in Vietnam. \Vie should use all available force, with due regard to the President's intention at this time not to destroy tbe NVN people and nation, to eliminate Hanoi's capability to support the VC. The complementary course in SYN is tO employ the combined in-country military force to better protect the South Vietnamese people, liberate areas domi11ated by the Viet Cong, institute and maintain a pacification rural construction program, destroy enemy base a reas, and defeat regular enemy military forces. Success in all three elements of this strategy promises the most rapid progress toward ach ieving our objectives. Viewing this prospect from both

492 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

sides, and in consideration of factors discussed, these three tasks well done will bring the enemy to the conference table or cause the insurgency ro wither from lack of supporr.3 The alternative appears to be a long and costly counterinsurgency-costly in U.S. and SYN lives and material resources.4

3 ln a I 2 •page paper, .. Viet Natn Prospect.s," also dated Januar>' 12. Goldberg sought to convince the President th.1t the .. limited though cons-idernble escalation now contem- pl:ited" would .. probabl)' achieve no significant results except to eSC'alate casualties, destruction, costS, and political liabilities." (Washington Nation:il Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: fEtC 77-0075, Vietnam~ 1966)

" William Bundy responded to Admiral Sharp on January I◄, concurring "'on the impor• tance of combining political moves 11:oward negotiation with n1ilirary presswes" but not- ing that -the key question which always fuces us is that of timing." As for denying a.ssistnnce from the North to the enemy in the South. Bundy felt that the problem was "'to find exactly the rig.ht combination of militaT)' measures and political initiati\'es to a<..""COmplish this result ... (Department of Stnte, Bun<l)' Files: Lot 85 D 240, \Xi'PB Chron)

SELECTED PRESS REACTIONS TO THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE

February 1966

EDITORIAL: The New York Herald Tribune, Februa ry 8:

The meeting presents the prospect of our resuming the war in more favor- able circumstances. The meeting of the heads of the American and South Vietnamese governments is a fresh and stronger demonstration of mutual confidence. On this basis they can now proceed to mount measures for deal- ing with the equally imporranr military and civilian aspeas of the war.

The two are intimately related ... the loyalty and support of the peas- ants in the interior are essential. President J ohnson is bidding for them by offering some of the benefits of his Great Society program to the South Vietnamese. It will not be easy, in time of war, ... but ... they must be pursued with the same vigor as we press the war on the battlefield.

EDITORIAL: The Washington Evening Star, February 7:

It is particularly significant that the American delegation included HEW Secretary Gardner and Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture. Their presence certainly means that a greater " pacification" effort will be made as the fighting goes on ... "

COLUMNIST: Marquis C hilds, February 9 ( from Honolulu)

This conference called by President J ohnson is a large blue chip put on the surv ival val ue of the wiry, exuberant Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, and the generals who rule with him . It is expected that Ky will not only s urvive bur that w ith massive econom ic help from the U.S. the national leadership comm ittee w ill eventually win the support of

493

494 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

rhe peasant in the countryside ... Any sensible bookmaker would quote long odds against the bet paying off. Bur after so many false sta rts this seems ro be the rigl-ir direction-a determined drive to raise rhe level of living in the courutr)•side and close. the gap of indifference and hostility berween the peasant and the sophisticated city dweller ... Over and over we have been told that only by winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people will we achieve a victory that has meaning beyond the grim choice of pulverization of American occupa- tion into the indefinite future

This is the reason teams of American specialists in agriculture, health, and education are going to Vietnam ....

EDITORIAL: The New York Herald Tribune, February 9:

Perhaps the most constructive part of the H onolulu conference was the emphasis it placed on this hitherto badly neglected aspect of the Vier Nam war [Pacification]. It is unfortunate that Chief of Stare Thieu diverted attention from it by heaping more fuel on the controversy over whether the Viet Cong should or should not sit at a peace conference table ....

EDITORIAL: The New York Times, February 9 and 13:

The Honolulu conference has followed the classic pattern of Summit meetings that are hastily called without thorough preparation in advance; it has left confusion in its wake, with more questions raised than answered ..... The one important area of agreement at Honolulu, apart from continuation of the milita.ry efforts, was on an expanded program of " rural construction. " The prospective doubling of American economic aid, however, will be futile unless it is accompanied by a veritable social revolution, including vigorous land reform. Premier Ky cast some doubt in his emphasis on moving slowly. His Minister of Rural Pacification envis- ages action in only 1,900 of South Vietnam's 15,000 hamlets this year.

Vice President Humphrey evidently has his work cur our for him in hjs fo llow-up visit to Saigon. Unless some way can be found ro give more momentum ro this effort, the new economic aid program may go down the same drain as all previous programs of this kind.

It would be a cruel deception for Americans to get the idea that social reforms carried our by the Ky government with American money are going ro make any perceptible difference in the near future ro the Vietnamese people or to the course of the war.

Selected Press Reactions to the Ho110l11/u C o 11{ere11ce 495

COLUMNIST: Ted Lewis, New York Daily News, February 10 ( from Washingt0n):

Why, a ll of a sudden, has President Johnson begun co come t0 grips with the "ocher war" in Sourh Vietnam? ... Johnson, with his typical oratorica l flourishes, has given the impression char he la unched some- thing corally new ar H onolulu .... The fact is thar for several years this problem of the "other war" has been recognized as vital by the State Department, the Pentagon and even by the White H ouse. But nobody did much about ir, except in an offhand way Johnson is a master of timing. He has definitely gained a political advantage over his Viet policy critics by stressing righr now the need of w in-fling over the peasants ..... [Senator Robert] Kennedy complained in a Senate speech jusr ten days ago chat the.re were 'many indications rhat we have not yer even begun ro develop a program .... It is absolutely urgent," the Senator said, "that we now act to institute new programs of education, land reform, public health, political participation ...... "

NEWS ANALYSIS: Richard Critchfield in The Washington Evening Star, February 9 (from Saigon):

President Jolmson's historic decision at !Honolulu backing an American- sponsored brand of social revolution as an alternative ro communism in South Vietnam was warmly hailed today by veteran political observers. The Honolulu declaration was viewed as ending postwar era of American foreign policy aimed ar stabilizing rhe srarus quo in Asia.

The key phrase, in the view of many diplomacs here, was rhe offer of full American "support co measures of social revolution, including land reform based upon the principle of building upward from the hopes and purposes of a ll the people of Vietnam."

..... J ohnson's decisions to put political remedies on a par with mili- tary action are also regarded here as a major personal triumph for Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and his top aide, Major General Edward G . Lansdale, the two main advocates of "social revolution" in South Vietnam ..... The Honolulu declaration appears to signify a major shift away from the policy of primarily military support established by President Kennedy in 1961 and closely identified with General Maxwell Taylor, Defense Secretary McNamara, and Secretary of Stare Rusk . ... The Lodge-Lansdale form ula was a striking departure in that ir saw the eventua l solution not so much in Hanoi's capitulation as in s uccessful

496 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

pacification in South Vietnam .... The Honolulu declaration amounts to almost a point by point acceptance of this formula and both its phraseol- ogy arid philosophy bear Lansdale's unmistakable imprint .....

EDITORIAL: The Baltimore Sun, February 10:

Unless there was more substance ro the H onolulu Conference than meets the eye, it could be summed up as much ado-nor much ado about nothing but simply much ado ... It was all spectacular and diverting but so far as we can see the problem of the war is where it was before the burst of activity began ... Ir is probably worthwhile ro have a reiteration of the s0<.'ial and economic measures needed in South Vietnam ... Ir is essential ro underscore the political nature of the war, along with the continuing military operations. But these matters were generally understood before the Honolulu meetings. Perhaps events to come will make the purpose of the meeting dearer.

EDITORIAL: The New York Post, February 9:

The H awaii meetings were advertised as the beginning of a vast new movement of economic and social reform in Vietnam, President J ohnson, we were told, went to Honolulu to launch the new approach with maxi- mum drama.

Instead, the session inadvertently underscored rhe lack of interest of rhe junta in Saigon in anything bur military conquest of the Viet Cong, to be carried out by stepped up U.S. armed efforts ....

NEWS STORY: AP, February JO (from H onolulu):

Vice President Humphrey left for Saigon today with South Vietnam's top leaders to spur action on programs attacking hunger, disease, and igno- rance in that war-torn country . ...

NEWS ANALYSIS: Charles Mohr, The New York Times, February I 0 (from Saigon):

In the atmosphere of Honolulu, there was much emphasis on form, so much that in some ways it may have obscured substance. The Americans appea red so delighted with Marshal Ky's "stylen- wirh his showing as a politically salable young man with the right instincts rather than as a young warlord- that there seemed to be a lmost no emphasis on rhe important differences between the Governments ... What Marshal Ky rold President Johnson was something he had often srud before: South

Selected Press Reactions to the Ho110l11/u Co11{ere11ce 497

Vietnamese society is still riddled witb social injustices and political weaknesses; there is nor one political party worthy of the name ... The South Vietnamese leaders believe that they could not s urvive a "peaceJul settlement" that left the VC political structure in place, even if the VC guerrilla units were disbanded. Therefore, the South Vietnamese feel that " rural pacification," of which much wa.s said ar Honolulu, is necessary not only to help them achieve military victory but also to prevent a political reversal of that victory ... As the Vietnamese see pacification, its core is not merely "helping the people to a better life," the aspect on which many Americru, speakers dwelled, it is rather the destruction of the clandestine VC political structure and the creation of an ironlike system of government political control over the population ....

But the two governments have never been closer than they are in the after- math of Honolulu, and the atmosphere of good feeling seems genuine ....

NEWS ANALYSIS: Roscoe Drummond, February 14 (from Washington):

..... The decisions taken at Honolulu by Pres ident Johnson and Premier Ky go to the hearr of winning. They were primarily social, economic, and political decisions. They come at a malleable and pe.rhaps decisive turn in the war ....

NEWS ANALYSIS: Tom Wicker in Th e New York Times, February 13 (from Saigon):

Vice President Humphrey ... has left Saigon re verberating with what he said was the "single message" he had come to deliver. The message was that the war in Vietnam was a war to bring social justice and eco- nomic and political progress to the Vietnamese people ... Humphrey said at a news conference here: " Social and economjc revolution does not belong to the V.C. Non-communist forces are the ones forwarding the revolution."

The emphasis on social reform could a.lso quiet critics who contend that Washington has concentrated too much on the military problem and nor enough on civic action to win the loyalty of the Vietnamese people ....

NEWS ANALYSIS: Charles Mohr, The New York Times, February 13 (from Saigon):

By giving enormous emphasis and publicity to it, an impression was left that pacification is somethjng new. In a sense, there was some truth in

498 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

this. The men running rhe program, both Vietnamese. and American, are new. And the 1966 plan itself is a new one in many respects.

Pacification is vitally important ro success in the guerrilla war in South Vietnam. Without ir, purely military success becomes empty even if all the battles are "won."

NEWS ANALYSIS: J oseph Alsop, February 14 (from Saigon):

CART BEFORE H ORSE ... All that really mattered at H onolulu was a Presidential decision to provide the forces needed to keep the pressure on the enemy here in Vietnam. Tine odds a.re heavy thar the President, who seems tO prefer doing good by stealth, actually rook this decision behind the electorate smokescreen of ralk about other matters. The question remains whether the needed forces will be provided soon enough. One must wait and see.

But at the risk of sounding captious, and for the sake of honesty and realism, ir must be noted that there was a big Madison Avenue element in a ll the talk about "pacification " during the Hawaii meeting and Vice President Humphrey' s subsequent visit to Vietnam.

This does not mean that pacification of the Vietnamese coumryside is an unimportant and/or secondary problem. On the contrary, it will even- tually be all-important and primary. But one need onl)' glance at the list of priority areas marked for pacification now, to see the adman's rouch in the present commotion.

There are: An Giang Provi nee, which belongs 10 the Hoa H ao sect and has been long since pacified by the Hoa Hao; the Hop Tac region near Saigon, where General Harkins experimented unhappily with the so-called oil spot technique; parts of Binh Dinh Province along the north- south highway; and the fr inges of rhe Marine endave ar Da Nang.

Each area differs from the others. In rhe case of the nine villages on the fringes of the Marines' Da Nang enclave, for instance, pacification is needed ro insure airfield securi-ry from mortar fire. Most of these villages have been Viet Cong strongholds for over 20 years, and they could be dangerous .

. . . . . Pacification by the Marines looks very fine ... Bur it takes far 100 many Marines to do the job.

Nonetheless, the real objections to making a big-immediate show of pacification are q uite d ifferent. The H op Tac experience tells the story. H ere a great effort was made by the Vietnamese a uthorities with the

Selected Press Reactions to the Ho110l11/u Co11{ere11ce 499

strong support of General Harkins. A good deal was initially accom- plished. Boasrs began to be heard. Whereat the enemy sailed forth from the nearest redoubt area, knocked dowm everything that had been built up, murdered all the villagers who had worked with the government, and left things much worse than they had !been before ... An attempt to make a big immediate show of pacificat ion needs to be warned against, because of the Washington pressure to do just that. A large element of the U.S. Mission was called home a mon.tb or so ago. And in effect, these men were commanded to produce a plan for making a show as soon as possible.

Fortunately, they had the courage to point out that the cart was being put before the horse once again. Fortunately, Ambassador Lodge is well aware of the dangers of putting the cant before the horse. The pressure for something showy may continue, but it is likely to be resisted.

If so, the pressure will not be altogether useless. The Vietnamese and the Americans here are getting ready for pacification on a big scale and in an imaginative way, pa rtly because of that pressure.

It is vital to have everything in readiness to do the job of pacification as soon as favorable circumstances arise, But it is also vital 10 bear in mind that really favorable circumstances cannot arise until the enemy's backbone of regular units is at last very close to the breaking point, if not actually beginning to break.

EDITORIAL: Christian Science Monitor, February 11:

lf Saigon and Washington fight South Vietnam's economic and social war as vigorously as they fight irs military war, the Communist thrust against that country will fail. Yet this is the biggest "if" of the war. Over and over lip-service has been paid 10 the inescapable need of winning over the peasantry. But time and again this has come to naught.

We are cautiously encouraged by the latest steps being taken. The strong emphasis laid in the Honolulu D eclaration on civic reforms is a commitment in the right direction. The sending of Vice-President Humphrey to srudy South Vietnamese reform programs on the spot is an even stronger earnest of American's intention not to let this program slip back into another do-nothing doldrum .....

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS ON MAY 9, 1966, "BACKGROUND OF U.S. POLICY

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA" Department of State Bulletin, May 30, 1966

I was myself in Government during the Truman administration and well recall the discussions which were held ar the highest levels of Government in the National Security Council as well as rhe strategic problems consid- ered by rhe Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If rhe committee will search its own and rhe public records on this matter during that pe_riod and since, they could surely have no doubt that ir was the judgmenr that the security of Southeast Asia was extremely important ro the security interests of the United Stares. This was because of rhe more than 200 million people in Southeast Asia, the geography of that area, the important natural resources of rhe countries involved, the relationship of Southeast Asia to the coral world siruarion, and the effect u pon the prospects of a durable peace.

" I emphasize the last point because the o,•erriding security interest of the United Stares is in organizing a stable peace. The sacrifices of World War II and the almost unimaginable losses of a world war III underline this central objective of American policy.

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There was also involved the problem of the phenomenon of aggres- sion. We had found ourselves in the catastrophe of World War Il because aggressio ns in Asia, in Africa, and in Europe had demonstrated that the. aggressor would not stop until compelled to do so. It was the determ ina tion of the United States to learn the lessons of that experi- ence by moving in the U.N. and otherwise to try to build an enduring international peace.

• • •

LEGALITY O F U.S . EFFORTS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

Very briefly, on the second question, Mr. Cha irman, the matter was raised with respect to the legal issues surrounding our efforts in South Viet-Nam. We have made ava ilable to the committee an extensive legal memorandum on these matters, and the law officers of the Government ace available to discuss t his in whatever detail the committee may wish.

In this brief sratcmenr today I s hall merely outline the essence of our view.

Military actions of the United States in s upport of South Viet-Nam, including air attacks on military targets in North Viet-Nam, are a utho- rized under international law by the well-established right of collective self-defense against armed attack.

South Viet-Nam is the victim of armed attack from the North through the infiltration of armed personnel, military equipment, and regular com- bat units. This a rmed attack preceded our strikes at military targets in North Viet-Nam. "The fact that South Viet-Nam is not a member of the United Nations, because of the Soviet Union's veto, does not affect the lawfulness of collective self-cidense of South Viet-Nam. The United Nations Charter was not designed to, and does not, limit the right of self-defense to United Nations members.

Nor does South Vier-Nam's status m1de_r the Geneva accords of 1954, as one zone of a temporarily divided state, impair the lawfulness of the defense against attack from rhe other zone.

As in Germany and Korea, rhe demarcation line is established by an international agreement, and international law requires that ir be respect- ed by each zone. Moreover, South Viet-Nam has been recognized as an

Bockgrou11d of U.S . Policy in Southeast Asia 503

independent entity by more than 60 governments around the world and admitted to membership in a number of the specialized agencies of the U.N.

Nothing in the U.N. Charter purports to restrict the exercise of the right of collective self-defense to regional organizations s uch as tbe OAS [Organization of American States].

As required by the U.N. Charter, the United States has reported to the Security Council the actions it has taken in exercising the right of collec- tive self-defense in Viet-Nam. It has indeed requested the Council to seek a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Geneva accords, but the Council has not been able to act.

There is no requirement in international law for a declaration of war before the right of individual or collecfrve self-defense can be exercised.

South Viet-Nam did not violate the Geneva accords of 19 54 by refus - ing to engage in consultations with the North Vietnamese in 1955 with a view to holding general elections in 1956, as provided for in chose accords. Even assuming that the election provisions were binding on South Viet-Nam, which did not agree co them, conditions in the North clearly made impossible the free expression of the national will contemplated by the accords. In these circumstances, at least, South Viet-Nam was justified in declining co participate in planning for a nationwide election.

The introduction of U.S. military personnel and equipment in South VietNam is not a violation of the accords. Until lace 1961 U.S. military personnel and equipment in South Viet- Nam were restricted co replace- ments for French military personnel and equipment in 1954. Such replacement was expressly permitted by the accords.

North Viet-Nam, however, had from the beginning violated the accords by leaving forces and supplies in the South and using its zone for aggression against the South. In response tO mounting armed infiltration from the North, the United States, beginning in lace 1961, s ubstantially increased its contribution to the South's defense. This was fully justified by the established principle of international law that a material breach of an agreement by one party entitles another parry at lease to withhold compliance with a related provision.

The United States has commitments to assist South Viet-Nam in defending itself against Communist aggression: In the SEA TO treaty· which I have already mentioned and which is similar in form to our

504 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

defense commitments to South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of China-and even earlier in the Geneva conference we had declared that we would regard a renewal of Communist aggression in Viet-Nam with 'grave concern.'

Since 1954 three Presidents have reaffirmed our commitments to the defense of South Viet-Nam.

Finally, the Pres ident of the United States has full authority to commit U.S. forces in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam. This authority stems from the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, with responsibilities as well for the conduct of foreign rela tions. Howeve r, it is not necessary ro rely upon the Constitution alone as the source of the Pres ident's authority. The SEATO treaty, which forms part of the law of the land, sets forth a United States commitment to defend South Viet-Nam against a,med attack, and the Congress, in a joint resolution of August 1964 and in authorization and appropriation acts in support of the military effort in Vier-Nam, has given its approval and support to the President's action.

The Constitution does not require a declaration of war for U.S. actions in Viet-Nam taken by the President and approved by the Congress. A long line of precedents, beginning with the undeclared wa, with France in 1798-1800 and including actions in Korea and Lebanon, supports the use of U.S. armed forces abroad in the absence of a congres- s ional decla,ation of war.

• • •

MOSCOW AND THE VIETNAM PEACE TALKS

The following documents confirm Western analyses of the Soviet Union's ro le in negotiations to end the Vietnam War. From J une to December 1966, Januscz Lewandowski, the Polish representative to the International Control Commission, launched a diplomatic initiative called " Marigold. " Lewandowski served as an intermediary between North Vietnam (Democratic RepublicofVietnru:n,or ORV) and U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge in an attempt to discover terms that might provide a basis fo r negotiations. Although the initiative broke down in December when the United States resumed its bombings of the North, the Poles claimed to have extracted a commitment from the ORV to bilateral negotiations with the United States. According to George C. Herring, the Soviet Union supported, and perhaps even directed, the Polish initiative. [Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1983), 227.J Colonel Fitzgerald's reported claim therefore that the USSR "is to blame for the fact that the war drags on" is overstated and inaccurate.

Tbe Soviets had refused to serve as an active mediator of negotiations on several occasions. But, as the Zorin document indicates, the Soviets played a key role in secret deliberations. Zorin, the USSR ambassador to France, summarizes a meeting he had in Paris in February 1969 with rep- resentatives of the ORV and National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSV) . His conversation confirms the Viets' commitment to their respective Four and Five Point plans for peace. What is new and exciting about Zorin's memorandum, however, is the Viet position that "the time for discussion of military questions," with the United States, "hadn't come yet." Shortly after the Tet Offensive of 1968, the negotiations in

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Paris opened w ith the DRY and NLFSV adopting the. strategy of vua danh, vua dam [fighting while negotiating]. Zorin's note tells us much about the Communist side's military strength in early 1969.

T hrough these investigations in the. Soviet archives, a complicated and ill-balanced history may be made dearer and fuller. If only to confirm the previous work of Western scholars, the Soviet documents are important. Perhaps, further research will reveal some new ins ight.~ into the Second Indochina War. Introduction by Robert K. Brigham, History Depr., University of Kentucky; translations by Mark H. Doctoroff, Harriman Institute, Columbia University.

Secret Copy No. ICC CPSU

(For the [General ) department CC CPSU )

Colonel Ch.G. Fitzgerald, the military attache at the USA Embassy in the USSR, has larely, in his ralks with the officers of the foreign Affairs depart- ment of the Ministry of Defense, been methodically and insistently main- taining the idea of the import.ant role the USSR could play in settling the Vietnam conflict, as the initiator and an active mediator of negotiations.

In this respect he considers that the USSR " is to blame" for the fact that the war drags on and on: "When rwo forces meet head on- in thjs case the U.S. and tbe Vietnamese communists- a third force is needed, which could help them come to an agreement. Only the Soviet Union could be this third power. •

In his speculations abour the ways the Vietnamese conflict could be settled, Colonel Ch. Fitzgerald made the following points:

- Peace in Vietnam can. be achieved through negotiations, between the USA, North Viemam, the Vietcong, and the government of South Vietnam. The main obstacle ro organizing the negotiations is the government of North Vietnam, though in the present situ- ation negotiations would be mosr beneficial ro North Vietnam. Ar the same time we w1dersrand thar the war in Vietnam is prof- itable for the USSR, because it artracrs the attention of the Chinese, otherwise. )'Ou would have had a lot of trouble and unpleasantries with them on frontier questions and other issues.

Mosco w a11d the Vietttam Peace Talks 507

- The main goal of the. USA in the situation as ir has developed is ro maintain its prestige-to leave Vietnam "beauti.fully" [krasivoJ. That's why the American gover nment is persistently looking fo r ways ro organize the negotiations. This was the mission of the senator Mike Mansfield when he came ro the USSR, but unfor- runatel y he fa iled to find understanding from the Soviet rep- resentatives. Not long ago the President appointed A. Harriman as his specia l assistant, with his rask being to find paths to nego- tiations. H e has been appointed to use every tiniest possibility to achieve this goal.

- The President's declaration during his press conference in Texas after his meeting with the Commander [of] American troops !Gen. W ilLlamj Westmoreland, that the American people must know that there will be no quick victory, is just an assertion of his former position. This is nor new fo r us, we are used to it.

Colonel Ch. Fitzgerald expresses his personal attitude ro rhe American aggression in Viernam evasively: "I'm a soldier and am therefore obliged to maintain the policy of my government and follow rhe directions of my command, but as a man I may sometimes be ashamed for the under- mined prestige of the USA. •

(s igned) P. lvashurin"23" August 1966

No. 46722

Source, SCCD, F. 5, Op. 58, D. 262, LI. 237-38.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE

VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST S' STRENGTHS, CAP ABILITIES, AND

WILL TO PERSIST IN THEIR PRESENT STRATEGY IN

VIETNAM~

26 August 1966

VID. ALTERNATE COMMUNIST STRATEGIC OPTIONS

39. Should the Vietnamese communists decide at this point that con- tinuation of their insurgency a long current lines would not be profitable, they would have three basic policy options. They could: ( I ) convert the struggle into a :major war by inviting massive

Chinese Communist military intervention; (2) relax Communist pressure and w ithdraw some North

Vietnamese troops, in the hope that the appearance of tranquil- ity would eventually impel the US tO disengage the better part of its forces without any formal commitments from the com- munists in return; or (3) enter into some form of negotiations.

• ·r1tis memorandum has been produced by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Lntelligenc:e Agency. h was jointl)' prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Research and Reports, the Of6ce of National Estimates, and the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affaics in the Office of tbe Dir«tor of Centrnl lmdligence.

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40. We believe Option (I) ,s the option the Vietnamese Communists would consider least i:n their long-term interests. Option (2), despite some advantages, would entail major problems for the communists. It carries no guarantee that the U.S. would in fact disengage, and puts the Communists in a position of bidding by successive increments to bring this about. It would engender seri- ous morale problems for the Communists during a protracted stand-down without s imultaneous U.S. response. It would be hard to explain as anything but acknowledgement of a serious reverse for long-range Communist objectives.

4 I. ln our view, the Vietnamese Communists would be most likely to try some variant of Option (3)- negotiation. They would hope initially to achieve a reduction of allied offensive pressure, includ- ing a suspension of bombing in the Norch: They would probably work to keep the talks going in order to prolong such a respite. During the course of the negotiations, they would probably deter- mine whether they wou Id seriously explore the possibilities of an acceptable political solution, or examine the alternative courses still open to them.

PRINCIPAL FINDING

I. So long as the U.S. air offensive remains at present levels, it is unlikely to diminish North Vietnam's continued abLiity to provide material support to the war in the south. North Vietnam is raking punishment on its own territory, but at a price it can afford and one it probably considers acceptable in light of the political objec- tives it hopes to achieve.

2. The Viet Cong have borne the brunt of Communist personnel losses in South Vietnam and have also had to compensate for losses of North Vietnamese personnel. We believe that the Viet Cong capability to recruit and train manpower is adequate to cover losses estimated for 1966 but will probably be inadequate to compensate for casualties and losses in 1967. During 1967 the North Vietnamese will have tO assume most of the burden of expanding force levels, and an increasing role in replacing losses. These manpower requirements can almost certainly be met from

• Communist l,ehavior in periods of negotia tio n is examined in Annex XlL

i\n i\ttalysis of the Vietttamese Comm1111ists' Strengths 5 11

North Vietnamese resources, bur they will impose additional strains on Nort h Vietnam's limited supply of skilled personnel and leadership cadre.

3. The Commun ists' present strategy is costly in both human and economic terms a nd is taxing Communist resources in some areas, particularly within South Vietnam itself. AJ Jjed actions are compli- cating Communjst efforts and raising the costs of t heir execution.

However, neither internal resowrce shortages nor a llied actions within present political parameters are likely to render the Vietnamese Commurusts physically incapable of persisting in their present strategy.

4. lo absolute numerical terms the Communists cannot hope ro match present and projected Allied force commitments. However, i f prewnt estimates of Allied and Communist force projections are accurate, by mid-1967 the Communists will have a slight advan- tage in maneuver battalion- i.e., tactical combat troops available

for commitment to offens ive ground operations. 5. Nevertheless, i f they are objective, the Communjsts must acknowl-

edge chat during the past year their insurgent ca mpa ign has lost momentum in both the military an d poLlrical fields. Although rhey may nor be losing the war at the present time, rhey are certainly not w inning it. The Communists are far from being defeated; but they are faced with problems greater that a ny they have had ro contend with before in this struggle. Furthermore, Communist forces have at least temporarily lost the aura of invincibility which was one of their most potent political assets.

6. Morale w ithin Commurust military forces and the political a ppa - rarus in South Vietnam has declined s ince mid-1965 but not ro a point presently sufficient to force any major revision in basic Communist strategy.

7. The Communists must be disappointed in comparing rhe present situation with that which existed in the spring of 1965. Ar least indirectly, they have acknowledged that the infusion of U.S. and Allied combat fo rces has created new problems which must be overcome. before victory can be won . Yet Communist real ism is

presently tinged more w ith defiance that pessimism; rhe Communists may be disappointed, but tbey do not yet seem to be discouraged.

512 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

8. Consideration of world popular opposition to U.S. policy would certainly enter into any eventual Vietnamese Communist decision on w hether to revise present srrategi' bur would most certainly not be a decisive facror.

9. The Vietnamese Communists pay close arrention to evidence of opposition to current U.S. policy arising within the United Stares itself. The outcome of their previous struggle with the French almosr certainly prediS[POSes them to draw invalid parallels to French domestic opposi·tion in rhe Indochina war and to look for sign of American domestic political pressures capable of forcing policy changes on Washington.

JO. The timing of any Vietnamese Communist decision on altering basic strategy- and the nature of such a decision- will be greatly affected by a variety of considerations, including those outlined in this paper. We estimate that none of the pressures upon the Communists which we can now identify is severe enough to force a major change in Communist strategy over the next eight ro nine months. The Communists would be even less inclined to airer their strategy if they should find political and milirary developments during this period running in their favor- for example, serious political deterioration in South Vietnam, a series of major Viet Cong military successes, or what they construe as a signi fie.ant rise of anti-war sentiment in the United Stares. If on the orher hand pressures on them are maintained and the course of events gives them no grounds for en.couragement, by late spring of 1967 they will probably feel compelled to rake stock and consider a change in their basic strategy.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, THE OUTLOOK IN

VIETNAM 26 February 1968

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The Outlook in Vietnam

26 February 1968

1. This Memorandum does not seek to explore all aspects of the situation in Vietnam, or its probable development over a long term. Ir is addressed only to tl1e specific question put to us, i.e., whether developments in Vietnam are apt to involve a continua- tion of combat into the indefinite future at a level comparable or higher than current levels, or whether it is more probable that either the VC or the GVN will be unable to sustain such a level beyond a few months.

2. The current phase of combat will have a critical bearing on the further course of the war and may even prove to be decisive. We cannot be sure how long this phase will lasr, but it seems likely that by early summer the immediate results and the longer term implications will be fairly clear ro Hanoi, Saigon, and Washington.

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Ar present, the key question concern: (1) rhe capabilities of rhe Communist forces ro sustain their current challenge, and whether they can continue the fighting thereafter, and (2) the capabilities of the South Vietnamese political and military establishment to cope with the tasks imposed by rhe present Commurusr offensive.

Communist Plans and Prospects

3. Hanoi's aims in the present offensive phase are: to regisrer signifi- cant military successes against US and especially ARYN forces, and to inflict such heavy losses, physical destruction and disorga- nization on the GVN as to produce a total siruation favorable to a negotiated settlement on Communist terms. The Communists are not likely ro have a rigid timetable, bur they probably hope to achieve decisive results during the course of the summer. The high importance which Hanoi now attaches to forcing the issue is evi- dent from the risks and costs of the enterprise.

4. The toll on Communist forces has been considerable, even if reported casualties are greatly inflated by inclusion of low le1•el recruits and impressed civilians. To some exrenr these losses have been offset by measure~ already taken. Heavy infiltration of both new units and replacements from the North is continuing. A strenuous, last minute recruitment effort was made prior to the Tet attacks. A significant part of the guerrilla and Main forces could still be committed. And, ar present, the Communists enjoy fuller access to the rural areas, where they are recruiting heavily. They will probably be able to recoup their recent losses, though at some sacriJice in quality.

5. ln any case, the communists probably will maintain tbeir offensive for the next several months and be prepared to accept the high losses their entails. They cannot accept such lo~es indefinitely, however, and they prolbably will not be capable soon again of launching repeated mass attacks of the magnitude and widespread scale of 30-31 January. But they are almost certainly capable of s ustaining a high level of combat, including major battles with US forces, assaults on selected cities, and rocker and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installations.

Memora11dum fo r th e Dir ec t o r, The Outl oo k i11 Vi e tnam 5 15

6. It is possible rhar the Communi sts regard the present campaign as so c ritica l to the outcome of the war that they will coilllllit their fu ll resources to a maximum effort in the near term. On balance, however, we think it likely that even if their present push fa lls short they will w ish to be able a sustain a protracted struggle. Hence they will probably not exercise their ca pabilit ies in such a profl igate manner as to deny themselves the possibil ity of continu ing the struggle shou ld rhe present phase fo il to pro- duce a decisive result.

GVN/ARVN Prospects

7. T he w ill and capabilit)' of the GVN and its armed forces remain the keys to the eventual o utcome.

8. lo the main, the ARYN has acquitted itself fairly well since 30 January, though the record is uneven. Morale has held up on the whole, and we known of no unit defections. However, the ARYN is showing signs of fat igue and in many areas it has now lapsed inco a sraric defensive posture, Security in che country-side has been sharply reduced. A long and costly effort would have to be undertaken to regain the pre-Tet position. Ir is highly unlikely that the ARYN will be inspired enough or strong enough to make such a n effort-<errain ly not in the near future.

9. T he GYN also performed adequat ely in the immediate emergency, particularly in the Sa igon area. T here now appears to be a greater recognition of the need to push fo rward with additional measures, bur the Communist challenge has not yet proved a catalyst in stimu lating a n urgent sense of nationa l unity a nd purpose.

JO. T he overall position of rhe government has been weakened. Its prestige has su ffe red from the shock of the Tet offensive; its con- trol over the countryside has been greatly reduced. Popular atti- tudes are confused and contradictory; the Viet Cong received virtually no popular support, but neither was there a rallying to the government side. Passivity is likely to continue as the domi- nant attitude in most of the po pu lation, but further military defeats could cause a sudden swing away from the government. W hile the central a uthority in Saigon is unlikely to collapse, its

516 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

ability 10 provide energetic leadership throughout the country and all levels is in serious doubt. It is possible that over the next few months certain provinces, especially in I and IV Corps, will be lost to Saigon's effective authorit)' ·

11. The psychological factor is now critical or South Vietnam's whole political-military apparatus. The widespread rumors that he US conspired with the Communists are symptomatic of popular anxieties over the future course of the war and US attitudes toward a political settlement. As yet, however, there are no s igns of a crisis of confidence within the government.

12. If major military reverses occur, the political and military appara- tus could degenerate into general ineffectualness. If, on the other hand, US and ARVN regain the initiative and inflict some con- spicuous setbacks on the Communists and the general offensive appears to he contained, then the GVN might manifest new energy and confidence and draw new support 10 itself. On balance, we judge that the chances are no better than even that the GVN/ ARYN will emerge from the present phase without being still fur- ther weakened.

Alternative Outcomes of Pre.sent Phase

13. We believe that the Communists will sustain a ltigh level of mili- tary activity for at least the next two or rltree months. It is difficult to forecast the situation which will then obtain, given the number of unknowable factors which will figure. Our best estimate is as follows: a. The least likely outcome of the present phase is that the

Communist side expend its resources to such an extent as to be incapable thereafter of preventing steady advances by the US/GVN.

b. Also unlikely, though. considerably less so, is that the GVN/ R VN will be so critically weak ened that it can play no further sig- nificant part in the military and political prosecution of the struggle.

Memora11dum fo r th e Dir ec t o r, The Outl oo k i11 Vi e tnam 51 7

c. More. likely than either of the above is that the present push will be generally contained, but with severe losses 10 both the GVN and Communist forces , and that a period will set in dur- ing which neither will be capable of registering decisive gains.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES: ABBOT SMITH

C hariman

INTELLIGEN CE MEMORAN DUM, PACIFICATION IN THE WAKE

OF THE TET OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETN AM

19 March 1968

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence

19 March 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Pacification in the Wake of the Test Offensive in South Vietnam

Although the evidence is still incomplete, the evidence that is now available indicates that the pacification program has received a serve setback in the majority of South Vietnam's 44 provinces as a result of enemy activities since the initiation of the Test Offensive on 30 January. In some areas, many of the gains made by the allies since I 965 were apparently negated.

Areas where only a slight to moderate setback occurred appear ro be those of least s ignificance from the s tandpoint of population density and strategic location. It is probable, moreover, chat as the gaps in informa- tion are filled, the extent of personnel and material losses will grow.

In the long run, the most damaging aspect of the offensive may well prove to be its adverse impact on popular attitudes toward pacification. Evidence already indicates that the enemy action has greatly increased the apathy and passivity of many rural residents coward government programs and personnel. 519

520 PART VJ: t966 -t 9 71

The Prc-Tet Situation

1. The blow to pacification caused by the Tet offensive did not come on the heels of steady, all around progress in the program. Rather, it was an additional, heavier setback in a rural security situation that had been gradually deteriorating in many areas since at least August 1967. The decline began to accelerate as the Q)mmunists' winter-spring campaign moved into high gear in October. Thus, for several months prior to Tee, che enemy has mruntained continuous pressure on many rural aireas, reducing the effectiveness of the GVN presence and improving his own political and milirary posture.

2. ln the initial phases of che Tet assaults, pacification areas and per- sonnel assets generally were not Communist targets. As a result of Viet Cong military action in che. months before che offensive and the absence of government personnel for the Tee holiday, the forces involved in pacification in most places were easily bypassed or presented no effective opposition co the enemy's military forces. Since the offensive, however, as the enemy has attempted to con- solidate his grasp on che countryside, those military units and Revolutionary Development (RD) teams chat either remained in their assigned areas or are again operating in them have in most cases been s ubjected to a considerable increase in enemy pressure.

Present Status of Personnel

3. The Status of the personnel assets of the related pacification programs- the bulk of whom, some 45,000 persons, are Revolutionary Development and ocher cadres- is still only partially known. Those provinces reporting casualties usually have only par- tial statistics available. There have, more-over, been few reports of cadre missing or desert;ng, although ic is apparent chat chis has occurred to some degree. On 1 January, 555 Vietnamese RD teams with a field strength of about 26,1 20 had reportedly been formed. The Truong Son, or montagnard, RD teams numbered 108 with a field strength of approximately 6,770. The Static Census Grievance (SCG) cadres stood at around 5,500 and the members of the Provincial Reconnaissance units (PRU) totaled some 3,780. During January, and additional 2,500 Vietnamese RD cadres finished train- ing. Q)nsidering probable attrition in January, che RD cadres prob- ably went into che Tee period numbering around 29,200.

l11tellige11ce Memora11dum Pacification 521

4. As of 12 March, US officials in Vietnam reported that 321 Vietnamese RD reams- coraling approximately 13,800 cadres- were working in assigned RD hamlets. In addition, 93 Truong Son reams w ith abour 5,900 men were in field positions. Of these, US officials have stared that about h alf were in planned 1968 loca- tions. Although these teams are accounted for in the sense that they have been reported at a givem locale, there is very lirtle infor- mation available on their activities. Their personnel strength, moreover, appears co be an approximation at best.

5. Considering the extent of Vier Cong influence reported in the countryside and the drift of the fragmentary reports on current RD activities, it seems likely that the teams which have returned to the fie ld are still largely involve-cl in defensive activities. Ir is also doubtful that in the near future most of the teams can perform an effective miss ion among the people.

6. The condition of the Static Census Grievance program in the wake of the Ter offensive varies widely from province of province. In some cases, the SCG cadres performed effectively during the attack period and have been a major source of information on enemy activities in the countryside. In others, the personnel asselS and effectiveness of the SCG have been seriously degraded or no cadre reporting has been received from the rural areas.

7. With few exceptions, however, the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) are reported to have performed admirably, both during the attacks at Tet and s ubsequently. In a few cases, the PRU provided the only effective government military deJense in urban areas and the units appea r ro have moved rapidly to the offensive as enemy troops withdrew. The effectiveness of the PRU is almost certainly the result of their disciplined military character and the fact that they a re directly under US rather than South Vietnamese Government direction. The units, however, took heavy casualties in some instances and it remains question- able whether they could sustain their punch under renewed assaults s uch as occurred at Tet.

Military Support for Pacification

8. As of 16 March, MACY reported thar 20 of the 51 RD support battalions were not in their assigned a reas. T hese battalions, for

522 PART VJ: t966 -t971

the most part, are still drawn off for security duty in and around urban centers. Most of the battalions now in place on pacification duty still appea, tO be deployed in defensive positions on are oper- ating in RD a,eas only during daylight hours.

9. The status of the military forces most relied upon for pacification support- the Regional a nd Popular Forces (RF and PF)- remains unclear. Based upon initial report.~, the 150,000 PF soldiers appea, t0 have s uffered! heavily, particularly in the wake of the urban offensive, as the Communists focused their attention on the rural areas. At least 360 militia outposts, primarily manned by the PF, have been overrun or abandoned in the delta alone. A number of tbe RF and PF units throughout the country were, like the AR VN, withdrawn in early February from the rural areas and brought to the provincial and district towns to augment defensive forces. Many of these forces have apparently not returned t0 the countryside.

The 1968 Plan

IO. Generally speaking, the government's overall 1968 pacification plan is being held in abeyance until security improves and the situation in the rural areas is fully determined. Although efforts are under way by the v;etnamese Government to assess the pres- ent status of pacification and to get the program moving again, officials seem to be working at cross-purposes to some extent. The government has formulated several new concepts and has issued several seemingl y conJljcting djrectives without agreeing on a single plan. New pacification guidelines thus far formulated by US authorities have nor been coordinated with the South Vietnamese Government. Some of the Vietnamese officials apparently believe that the US plans go beyond the government' s present capabilities.

I l. It will be several weeks, at least, before the US Mission and the GVN have an agreed concept, and it may be the middle of May before the revised provincial pacification plans are approved, re-funded, and acted upon by a majority of the provinces. This assumes that the GVN will be capable of resuming an offensive stance in the. counuyside.

l11tellige11c e M e m o ra11dum Pa c ification 523

Prospects

12. It does not yet appear that most provincia l governments are capable, on the one hand, of providing continuing security and handling the plethora of greatly compounded socioeconomic prob- lems and, on the other, of restoring and mainta ining the momen- tum of pacification activities. Government movement back to the countryside from the cities and towns has so fa r been very s low. This has been due in part to continued harassment of the urban a reas by the Viet Cong and to the need for extensive diversion of personnel resources to reconstruction tasks in the cities.

13. It also appears, however, that the delay in the government's return to the countryside is due in part to the pervasive fear of enemy reprisal a nd to uncertainly about the political future of the. govern- ment among provincial and district civil and military officia ls. T he psychological impact of the recent fighting on this echelon of the government leadership and on many of the individuals directly involved in executing the specific pacification programs is bound to be significant and may be far-reaching. The loss of life among district and provincial officials, as well as the destruction of pacifi- cation facilities and records, was severe in a number of provinces.

14. Since pacification stands or falls on the confidence and enthusiasm of these individuals- and on the reuptiveness of the rural populace-- the extent of future support and participation in pacification by local Viemamese remains in q uestion. The past commitment of many of these officia ls to pacification has often been less than adequate, and in the aftermath of recent events, considerable foot-dragging can be anticipated. In the final analysis, however, the most significant effect of the enemy offensive may have been its revelation of the over-all vulnerability and relative shallowness of the pacification gains made during past years, despite the heavy cost and effort applied to achieve them.

15. Summaries of the situation by Corps are contained in the attached annex, along w ith derailed assessments of each province.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION , MEETING OF

PRESIDEN T-ELECT NIXON WITH HENRY CABOT LODGE,

STATLER HILTON HOTEL, WASHINGTON , DC January 19, 1969, 5:30 p .m.

President-elect Nixon said that Lodge could assure the South Vietnamese of his strong s upport but that they should understand that American public opinion was in a highly critical condition.

They discussed the question of a <:ease-fire and the difficulty of expla ining the dangers of a cease-fire to the public. Lodge suggested that it might be expedient for the US to preempt the field with a proposal whereby a cease-fire wou ld be tied ,n w ith a withdrawal. Kissinger seemed ro thmk this idea had merit.

Mr. N ixon said for Lodge nor to be concerned about adverse press in the immecliare future. He said he was willing ro tolerate an adverse press rather than g ive up a matter of importance in the negotiations.

Mr. Nixon bel ieved that some of the o utgoing administration's state- ments with regard to the Vietnamese were unduly harsh, and in view of the high regard w ith which the South Vietnamese hold him, he wanted Lodge to make it clear ro them on a personal basis that Mr. Nixon has

525

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great sympathy with them and will nor ler them down. Mr. Lodge should explain ro them that public opinion in rhe United Stareswith respect ro the South Vietnamese was at a low point and that they should nor be concerned.

CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AN D THE

VIETNAMESE, 1969

FROM THE DAYBOOK OF ZORIN, V.A. Secret, Copy # 2 "28n February 1969

lnitial #203 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION with the head of the DRY delegation Comrade Xuan Thuy and the head of the NLFSV delegation Comrade Tran Buu Kiem at the Paris negotiations

21 February 1969

Today I visited the residence of the DRY delegation, where a talk with Comrades Xuan Thuy and Tran Buu Kiem took place.

1. I briefly informed the Vietnamese comrades about the latest state- ments of the American representative, C. Vance, during the con- versation with the Advisor-En,•oy of the Embassy Comrade Oberemko, V.I. on February 15 of this year and about French perceptions, expressed by the acting head of the Asia department of the French Foreign Ministry, Delai•er (sic) (without direct refer- ence to him) during a talk with Comrade Utkin, the counselor at the Embassy, on February 18 of this year, about questions related 10 a settlement in Vietnam. The Vietnamese comrades thanked me for this information, which they received with great interest.

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2. Referring to the fact that within the next few days I plan to pay a return visit to C. Lodge, the head of the USA delegation at the Paris negotiations, I tried to find out if my interlocutors thought we should, before President Nixon's arrival to Paris, ask C. Lodge some questions which would be interesting to the Vietnamese comrades, in order to push the U.S. toward a political settlement. I also asked if the Vietnamese comrades had any questions for the French, taking into consideration that De Gaulle is likely to dis- cuss the Vietnamese question with R. Nixon.

In response to this, my interlocutor made the following observations:

a) Having remarked that the U.S. does nor now want to consider serious issues ar the negotiations, Comrade Tran Buu Kiem said that Richard Nixon is trying to strengthen the Saigon regime and its army and only then to work toward the resolution of essential questions. But the situation in South Vietnam will change and the U.S. will not realize its goals. Now the USA is taking measures to provide security in the cities, The Americans have to face new difficulties now, caused by the growth of the movement of various strata of the urban population. This move- ment has not only a nationalist character, but appears to be broader, with its main a im being the restoration of peace in the country, the dismissal of Nguyen van Thieu, Nguyen Cao Ky, and Tran van Huong from power, and the creation ofa "Cabinet of Peace."

The delegations of the NLFSV and the ORV, he went on, have already put forward the: proposals which are necessary ro discuss in order to come to a political resolution of the problems, and had clearly expressed their positions on political and military issues, but the USA is trying first of all to solve military questions, to improve its position in South Vietnam in order to conduct the negotiations from a position of strength.

b) Comrade Xuan Thuy, having agreed with the ideas expressed by Comrade Tran Buu Kie:m, stressed that R. Nixon, like Johnson, wants ro solve the Vietnamese problem from a position of strength, and that the U.S. is continuing to strengthen the puppet regime, intending to stay in Vietnam even after its troops are

Co11vers a 1i o 11s between the S o viets a11d the Viet11amese. 1 9 69 529

withdrawn in order to carry ou.t its neo-colonia l policy, using the puppets.

The Americans don't yet have a concrete plan for settling the Vietnamese problem. The concrete suggestions which they put forward during the first meetings (I mean C. Lodge's proposal to start djscussing problems connected with the demifaarized zone, withdrawal of foreign troops and exchange of prisoners of warl are aimed at talking, not ar actually solving the problem, at put- ting off its decision. The Americans understand that if the ques- tions which they have put forward are nor resolved, rhey will have a chance to strengthen the Saigon regime. The USA is forc ing con- sideration of military questions in order to put pressure on the ORV and NLFSV.

As for the position of France on the Vietnam question; the French, according to Comrade Xuan Thuy, want t he USA to leave South Vietnam and France to return there, bur nor in the same role which it played before. Obviously the French, during their negotiations with R. Nixon, will somehow push him in th is direction.

Then Comrade Xuan Thuy said that the following could be srud in the talk with C. Lodge: - The ORV and NLFSV want to solve the Vietnam problem on

the basis of the ach ievement of rrue independence, nor on the basis on which the U.S. wants to solve ir.

- Should the U.S. continue ro act &om a position of strength, the Vietnamese people will nor agree with this, and will go on struggling against U.S. aggression.

- If the U.S. wants to solve the Vietnam problem, it has to start talking with the N LFSV. If it doesn' t happen the Vietnam prob- lem will nor be solved. So far the USA and Saigon speak on ly with the ORV at the negotiations, and don't wru1t to talk with NLFSV.

- If the USA doesn' t agree ro a complete and unconditional with- drawal of its troops from South Vietnam and continues the war, ir will suffer even greater military losses. As for concrete questions and approaches to their decision, in the

opinion of Comrades Xuan Thuy and Tran Buu Kiem the proper time to discuss them with the Americans still hasn' t arrived.

530 PART VJ: t966 -t971

3. During an exchange of opinions on certain aspecrs of the Vietnam problem, some quescion.s were raised on our initiative (to find out the position of the Vietnamese comrades). These included " the Peace Cabinet," the gradual withdrawal of American troops, the elimination of American bases and the cessation of military operations.

In this respect the Vietnamese comrades expressed the following ideas:

a) Comrade Tran Buu Kiem explained that participants in the oppo- si6on movement to the Saigon regime treat the Thieu-Ky-Huong government as a war government, capable only of serving the war. This movement and its demands confirm the NLFSV idea about the creation of the "Ca bin et of Peace;" therefore the NLFSV s up- ports chi~ movement. The NLFSV also s upports people whom chis movement puts forward as candidates co be included in the "Cabinet of Peace. " These candidates are wortby people and among them there are some who formerly were connected with the Americans, but who now maintain progressive positions.

b) C,0mrade Xuan Thuy added that the present-day Saigon govern- ment doesn't wane peace and continues the policy of support for the aggressive American wac. That's why the population of Saigon and other cities, and districts occupied by the Americans, dema11d the overthrow of Thieu, Ky, and Huong. This is not the demand of the ORV and NLFSV but a demand of the people, a demand coming from below, and tbe ORV and the NLFSV support it.

The ORV a nd NLFSV do not have concrete proposals regard- ing the creation of the "Cabinet of Peace," he went on, but we will welcome all people who will join a new government and who express the desire 10 conduct negotiations with the NLFSV. le would be very good if the population of South Vietoam demru1ds tbat the government include NLFSV members. But if the readiness to conduct negotiations with the NLFSV is expressed, rather that a wish for the NLFSV to be represented in the "Cabinet of Peace, " the ORV and NLFSV will accept it. The main task is for a national union of different strata of the population to be created in this "Cabinet of Peace," for it ro include representatives of the " Union of Na6onal, Democratic and Peace-loving forces. " Later, when a

Co11versa1i o 11s between the S o viets a11d the Viet11amese. 1 9 69 531

"Cabinet of Peace" like that has a lready been created, a tempo- rary government may be created o n the basis of the NLFSV political program.

c) In connection with my remark, that in order to solve milita ry questions it might be reasonable for the ORV and NLFSV to put forward some concrete proposals- for example, on tbe limitation of the scale of military operations in some districts, or on the gradua l withdrawal of American troops and liquidation of American bases within definite periods of time, Comrade Xuan Thuy said that the time for discussion of military questions hadn't come yet. The Americans want to conduct negotiations from a position of strength and want to use this strength. The ORV and NLFSV demand a quick, and complete-not gradual- and uncon- ditional withdrawal of American troops. The Americans think that the power of the NLFSV and DRV has trickled away, and that they are incapable of effective actions. That' s why, if the ORV and NLFSV would put forward some concrete proposals now- fo r example on the limitation of military actions- the Americans wi ll interpret it as a re1•elation of ORV and NLFSV weakness.

In this connection Comrade T ,an Buu Kiem added that " we' ll fight the Americans eagerly and we believe in our strength. "

H aving said that this question shouldn' t be mentioned in talks with Americans, Comrade Xuan Thuy said that the ORV and NLFSV delegations will discuss it and then have an exchange of opinions with the Embassy.

d) In the course of the discussion I suggested to the Vietnamese com- rades that, co make the Americans talk with the NLFSV, the NLFSV delegation to the Paris negotiations could propose a con- crete program- which could be s upported by the ORV- based on the four and five points.

The Vietnamese comrades treated this idea with interest, and Comrade Xuan Thuy said that this suggestion will be considered by the delegations.

ORV delegation members Comrades Ha van Lau, Mai Van Bo; a member of NLFSV delegation Nguyen van Tien; Comrade Nguyen Ngoc Thuong, a colleague of the NLFSV delegation; Embassy Counselor Comrade Zdencsov, V.A.; the Second Secretary of the Embassy Goritskii, V.A. were present at the talk.

532 PART VJ: t966 -t971

The talk was translated by Counselor Comrade Zelentsov, V.A.; the talk was recorded by the second secretary Goritskii, V.A.

The USSR Ambassador in France

(signed) V. Zorin

6 copies sent to:1- Com,ade Kozyrev, S.P. 2-General department of CC CPSU 3- 1 EO 4- 0UVA 5- UOMP 6- To the file No. 256, February 24, 1969

MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENTIAL ASSIST ANT

KISSINGER AND AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN February 21, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION (USSR)'

I mer one-on--0ne with Henry Kissinger over luneh ar our Embassy on February 21.

He said that Pres ident Nixon had carefuUy studied the views expressed to him by the Soviet Ambassador on instruc:tions from the Soviet Government and in that connection he, Kissinger, was authorized to present some of President Nixon's views in response.

(He then took out of his pocket an English translation of the text of our views and presented the President's v iews, checking from time to time against our text, in the margins of which he had notes for the conversa- tion with me.)

The Middle East. )(jss inger said that the President regards a bilateral exchange of views with the Soviet Government on the issue of the M_iddle

East as important and he is prepared for such an exchange. I rold Kissinger that, as far as I know, there has not been much prog-

ress made as yet in New York with respect to the exchange of views on

1 Source: AVI' RF,(. 0119, op. 53, p. 399, d. 5, I. 75-86. Secret. From Dobrynin's Journal. No American record of the conversation has been found.

533

534 PART VJ: t966 -t971

the substance of a Middle East settlement, and that the U.S. pos,r,on there, unfortunately, boils down to introducing a brief declaration by the four powers concernj1,g the Middle East. To be frank, such a declaration is of little use, and Ambassador Yost for some reason is obviously unpre- pared to discuss specific issues relating to the settlement. In that connec- tion, referring to what JGssinger had just said, I asked if the U.S. Government was prepared for bilateral exchanges of views with the Soviet side, apart from the current rype of "consultations" in New York.

Kissinger said that, yes, they are prepared for confidential bilateral exchanges of views with us on the s ubstance of the issues, they regard that as important, a nd in this connection they would like to know the Soviet side's opinion on where they could best be held- in Moscow, Washington, or New York.

He added that this question of theirs also stems in part from the fact that I, the Soviet Ambassador, had mentioned Moscow as one of the pos- sibilities, in a conversation with Secretary of State Rogers. Therefore, they would like to clarify the opinion of the Soviet Government on dus matter.

I said that the main thing is ro begin a serious exchange of views on the s ubstance of the settlement, provided that the United Stares is genu- inely prepared to do that. As for the venue, it is unlikely that there will be any difficulties in that regard.

Repeating that they are prepared to exchange views with us, Kissinger requested that, if possible, we give him an answer immediately upon his return to Washington after his trip with the President to Western Europe, i.e., in a week (apparently Nixon hopes to define bis position in more spe- cific terms by that time, after conversations with de Gaulle and \V.lson).2

In that connection, Kissinger said that, on instructions from Nixon, he would in fact like to make a request- if that is acceptable to the Soviet side- in regard to the meGhanism for the exd,ange of opinio11s between the two governments: name.ly, char the most fundamental issues requiring a high degree of confidentia lity ("which the Stare Department cannot always ensure"), as well as issues pertaining to the initiation of an exchange berween the Soviet Government and the new Nixon

1 President Nixon left Washingrnn on February 22 :ind rerumed o n March 2 During hi..,; eight~day tour of Westem Europe~ Nixon met wlth leaders in the United Kingdom, \Vest Gennan)', \Vest Berlin, Ital)', france, and Vatican Cit}'·

Meeting Between Presidential Assista11t Kissinger 53.5

Administration on various political problems (i.e., the initial determina· tion of the basic objectives, venue, and level of the talks), be addressed by the Governments of the United States and the USSR through the con• lidenrial Kissinger/Soviet Ambassador channel.

Then, after aU those issues bave been agreed upon in principle, the problem would be transferred to the official, diplomatic level for a derailed working review- whether through the Stare Department in Washington, or in Moscow with the USSR MFA, or in some appropri• are international body. Then, as djfficulties arise, or when the most difficult and delicate points are being discussed, we could again activate the confidential Kissinger/Soviet Ambassador channel from time to time.

This " mechanism for approachjng" the review of various complex international problems between the Government of the USSR and the Nixon Administration would, according to Kissinger, best suit the U.S. President, allowing him co personally exercise more direct leadership and observe the exchange of opiruons on the aforementioned problems.

European Problems. Kissinger stared that President Nixon agrees with the Soviet Government char the foundations of the postwar order in Europe should nor be changed, si11ce this might res ult in major upheavals and the danger of a needless confrontation between the great powers.

He, the Pres ident, would like ro assure the Soviet Government char, for example, he does not have the slightest intention of intervening in the affairs of Eastern Europe. " You will not hear any statements from us about the need co ' liberate' EaStem Europe from the Soviet Union, and we, in all likelihood, will stop using even such expressions as 'bwlcling bridges,' since we understand the actual situation."

We, continued Kissinger, expect that the Soviet Union, for its part, will also rake into account the relations the United Stares has developed with the countries of Western Europe. \Y/e have no intention of fomenting war hysteria in Western Europe against the So,•ier Union, nor do we intend co incite hostile feelings among Western Europeans against you.

Bur we, of course, will pursue the policy of strengthening our ties with Western Europe, nor in order to pit one part of Europe against another, bur raking into account the historically established relations of various parts of Europe with the United Stares a:s well as with the Soviet Union.

Speaking of the need to presen•e the Status quo in Europe, IGssinger in fact intimated- although he did nor say so outright- that they favor

536 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

maintaining the postwar borders in Europe. Ar one point he remarked that, on the whole, it was his understanding that we, i.e., the United Stares and the USSR, have an identical approach 10 the question of what cons tirures the status quo or respect for the foundations of the postwar order in Europe; apparently the only exception, Kiss inger srud, is differ- ences on the issue of Wesr Berllin.

W ith respect ro Wesr Berlin, Kissinger remarked, we, the Unired States, understand maintaining the status quo, taking into account certain ties that have developed during the postwar period between West Berlin and the FRG. Our position remains the same: we are not prepared to accept your formula of a "free city of West Berlin," bur neirher do we inrend ro undertake o r support anything new in the relationship between West Berlin and the FRG beyond what has actually developed and exists.

I rold Kiss inger that I was pleased by President Nixon's agreement with the Soviet Government's views on the need for our rwo countries co base their practical policies on respect for the foundations of the postwar

order in Europe, which came abour as a resulr of the Second World War, postwar developments, and agreements between allies.

At the sa me time, I reaffirmed the Soviet Union's position regarding West Berlin and gave appropriate explanations.

Kissinger agrun nored rhar apparently Wesr Berlin is the only issue over wh ich there is an appreciable difference of opinion berween us ar this rime. Kissinger went on 10 say that the Pres ident and he himself were somewhat intrigued by the reference, made in the Sovier Government's views presented to Nixon by rh.e Soviet Ambassador, to the effect that "at one time, specifically in 1959-1963, when the Governments of the USSR and the United Stares were diiscussing the range of German issues, we were not very far apart on sonne important quesrions."

In thar connection, Kissinger requested that, ii possible, when he returns from rhe trip to Wesrern Europe, Moscow provide him on an unofficial basis with a somewhat more derailed explanation of whar, specifically, the Sovier side has in mind now, because a rather w ide range of issues was being considered during the period we had indicated.

The U.S. s ide, Kissinger said, is prepared ro give careful consideration 10 these views.

Kissinger indicated, as Nixon had ear)jer in his conversation with me,

rhar our governments must maintain the utrnosr composure in order ro prevent any confrontation between us ar rhis juncture over West Berlin.

Meeting Between Presidential Assista11t Kissinger 537

According to Kissinger, N ixon, for his part, had asked him to convey again that he does nor intend ro do or say a nything that might look like a provocative act on his part during his trip 10 West Berlin, or that could be interpreted by us in that way. Kissinger added that Nixon will a lso be circumspect in his public statements, altho ugh he will reaffirm the U.S. position in regard ro maintaining the existing, de facto ties that have developed between rhe FRG and West Berlin over decades.

H e then sa id that he would like to discuss a certain confidential mat- ter that "affects the President personally." According to him (Kissinger], one of the staff members at our Embassy a lleged ly told a Stare Department employee that the Soviet side de facto accepts that Nixon is to fly ro West Berlin, but "categorically objects and warns the Pres ident" not to rake West German representatives 10 West Berlin aboard his personal a ircraft.

That warning by a Soviet staff member (Kissinger was in fact unable ro tell me exactly who said that, o r w hen, or where) caused great uneas- iness in the U.S. Government, Kissinger said, because the security of the U.S. President was involved. He went on to say that in this connection , the military had suggested to the Pre.sidenr that, fo r the sa ke of protec- tion, his plane be escorted by a s trong .contingent of U.S. fighte rs, etc., during his flight to West Berlin. And in genera l, an unnecessary, albeit unpublicized, hu llabaloo about a ll this has begun among the Americans who a re going to accompany N ixon on this trip.

Kiss inger then said that this was a thorny issue for another reason as well: a lthough they do not intend to take any large group of government officials from the FRG aboard the aircraft, Chancellor Kiesinger and Brandt will most likely fly to West Berlin with President Nixon, in keep- ing with the past practice of other U.S. presidents.

I confined myself to remarking to Kissinger that I was unaware of any such statement by any of the Soviet pea-sonnel and had not a uthorized anyone to discuss such things.

(The possibility cannot be r uled our that this whole story was slipped 10 Nixon by the West Germans to "play on the nerves of" the new President and, if possible, induce him to make some " hard-line" statements during his stay in Bonn and West Berlin.)

Then, couching on Nixon's trip to Western Europe, Kis.~inger said that its main purpose is to hear what the Allies have to say ("the times are such that the great powers need to show some s igns of attention to their

538 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

smaller allie~"). T he trip is intended nor for making any major decisions (chere was no rime to prepare chem) but for enhancing ties, strengthening the mechanism for consultations, and establishing personal, businesslike relations between Nixon himself and the Western European leaders.

The most "difficult place" will be Paris, Kissinger remarked, although de Gaulle is much more favorably disposed to Nixon chan to his prede- cessor; at lease chat is che impression one has from the exchange of letters char has already taken place between the two pres idents.

Vietnam. This issue was raised by Kissinger, who said char che Pres ident attaches great importance to settlement of the Viemam conflict. The pres- ent impasse in the Paris negotiations, Kissinger continued, cannot go on forever, and in a few months the President will evidently face the need co make an appropriate decision regarding the subsequent course of U.S. actions in Vietnam.

I said char a solution to che Vietnam conJlict muse be sought chrough peaceful means-through recognition of and respect for the legitimate rights of the Vietnamese people themselves. T here is no other way. Ac che same time, I remarked, the views of those who would like co continue talking in terms of ultimatums and who would like to re-escalate the war in Vietnam in the vain hope of a "milita ry victory" still enjoy currency in Washington. What such views have led to is well kllown from the experi- ence of the prev ious administration. I would like to express the hope, I remarked co Kissinger, char the new administration would nor pay much heed to the advice of such people, but would seek a genuine peace settle- ment based on sober consideration of the actual siruation in Vietnam.

Kissinger said char chey themselves, of course, are by no means pre- senting any ultimatums, that they favor a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, but rhe meaning of his words boiled down ro the following: progress still muse be made at the Paris talks and, for domestic political reasons, Nixon "simply cannot wait a year for Hanoi to decide to cake some new seep and take a more flexible position."

In connection with che situation at che Paris talks, 1 said that in order tO make progress, it is necessary chat the U.S. side itself take a more flex- ible, realistic position, and, in particular, that it give up its attempt.~ co divide che talks into two pares: discussion of military issues berween che U.S. and the ORV, and, secondly, resolution of political issues by placing them, for all practical purposes, entirely in the hands of Saigon, which does not wane co resolve them and is unable to do so, since it is unable co soberly assess the situation and che alignment of forces in South Vietnam.

Meeting Between Presidential Assista11t Kissinger 539

Kissinger remarked on a personal has is that, to a large extent, rhe U.S. side's current position in Paris reflects " unavoidable propaganda ele- ments," but that it does not define President Nixon's actual practical policy and that he will be "fairly flexible" on how co conduct the Paris talks .

In that connection, Kissinger then recalled that in the views I had pre- sented on instructions from Moscow duriing my conversation with Nixon, there was one point where I said char the Soviet side would support the Paris talks in e,•ery poss ible way if they go in the right direction, and, cit- ing Nixon's instructions, he said that the Pres ident would very much like to maintain dose, confidential contacts with the Soviet Goverrunenc on matters relating ro settlement of the Vietnam conflict and that he is seri- ously seeking a "settlement that is honorable for all sides.•

At this time, Kissinger continued, th.e Pres ident does not have yet a detailed program worked out in regard to all the points of such a settle- ment, but after returning from Europe he will carefully study the U.S. position at the Paris talks and define his own program more precisely in all its main derails.

However, knowing the President's O\'erall approach to this problem , he, )(jssinger, can say right now chat the new U.S. Government is pre- pared co resolve the Vietnam issue on the basis of rwo main principles, which, if correctly understood, would make it possible co work out all the s ubsequent concrete details: - First, the U.S. carmoc accept a settlement chat would look co Americans

and to the rest of the world like an outright military defeat for the United States. The Pres ident is in face prepared to withdraw U.S. troops from South Vietnam, but there must he some sort of linkage here with tl1e withdrawal of DRY troops.

- Second, the Nixon Administration cannot accept a settlement that would be followed immediately (Kissinger stressed the word ;'imme- diately") by a replacement of the South Vietnamese Government and a drastic change in the entire policy of South Vietnam, for that would be regarded in the United Scares and rthroughour the world as an out- right defeat of the United States or as a backroom deal by Nixon- the United Stares "handing over" the Saigon Government to rhe render mercies of its enemy. However, the United Stares would have no objections if, aher an

agreement is reached, events in Vietnam were ro take their own "purely

540 PART VJ: t966 -t 9 71

Vietnamese" course and develop "in keeping with the historical tradi- tions and experience of the Vietnamese people."

Ir, general, one could conclude from Kissinger's remarks that Nixon is primarily concerned about his own political reputation and how the settlement in Vietnam might affect his political future. In all likelihood, that will be the main yardstick he will use in his approach to matters of war and peace in Vietnam.

China. Touching upon the recent failed attempt at talks between the United States and the People's Republic of China in Warsaw, Kissinger said that they believe the refusal of the Chinese to hold talks, on the pre- text that the U.S. had been in volved in the case of a Chinese diplomat who had defected, is actually due to the fact that Mao and his colleagues are not prepared at the present time-for one reason or another-to enter into a dialogue with the Nixon Administration. Evidently we shall have ro wait.

For our pare, Kissinger co:ncinued, we are prepared to conduct an exchange of views with Peking for the purpose of promoting U.S.- Chinese relations at lease to some extent, and in this regard the new U.S. Government is more objective and unbiased in its approach than were previous administrations. On the question of Taiwan, however, we can- not accommodate the position on which the PRC has insisted all these years. As for the rest, the United States is "keeping the doors open. "

On his own initiative, Kissinger emphasized that the Nixon Administration's China policy "i.s not based on any unfriendly designs" against the Soviet Union but is dictated by a "natural desire" to improve its relations with the PRC as a nation that plays a major role in Asia, where the United States bas considerable interests.

However, a comment that Kissinger made during the conversation is worth noting: namely, that in his personal opinion, "from the purely geopolfrical viewpoint" the USSR, as China's next-door neighbor, has more reason to fear her than docs the United States, and that 750 million Chinese, who " need space," may be more easily enticed by the prospects of expansion toward the Soviet Far East.

Kissinger was rold in response that s uch "geopolitical theories" had currency back before the Second World War and that it is common knowledge now what they had in face led to. It would only be sensible for the new U.S. Administration to build its policy (including its Asia policy) on a more realistic basis.

Meeting Between Presidential Assista11t Kissinger 541

Kissinger immediately replied that he would ask that his remark be regarded as the "remark of a professor, not of an assistant ro the President," and chat be had basically not dealt at aU with Chinese matters yet.

The Treaty on the Nonproliferat.ion of Nuclear Weapons. Kissinger said chat the U.S. Government agrees co continue consultations with the Soviet side to develop coordinated measures to ensure that the treaty is signed by the broadest possible number of states and that it enters into force as soon as possible.

Concerning individual countries, he said that cooperation in chis area would be required primarily with regard co India. It would evidently be necessary 10 return to chis issue somewhat later.

Kissinger then said that Nixon firmly intends to tell Israel in no uncer- tain terms that Tel Aviv must sign the t reaty and that this is in its own interesrs, otherwise the Arabs will also refuse to comply with the pro,~sions of the treaty, and all this will further complicate a Middle East settlement.

Bue the main question now, as we understand ir, is the attitude of the FRG roward the treaty, Kissinger emphasized. During bis trip, the President intends co use, in Bonn, all his influence to prevail upon the FRG Government to s ign the treary.

However, the Pres ident's message, Kissinger continued, would have greater success if the Soviet Governrnen t were to consider it possible to provide, in the near future, an explanation chat would eliminate in some way the contentious issue of the possibility of applying to the FRG the provisions stipulated in articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter.

!Gssinger was told in response (citing our arguments on the subStance of the matter) char chis is an artificial f,aming of the question, deliber- ately concocted by chose in Bonn who do nor want ro s ign the treaty. The Soviet Foreign Minister had already spoken about this matter with Brandt in New York during the lase session of the UN General Assembly. In addition, the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn, on instructions from the Soviet Government, had once more made an exhaustive statement as recent! y as February 6, which Brandt received favorably.

Kiss inger remarked half-jokingly that the Germans are telling them something totaUy different, bur added at once that Nixon himself does nor intend to raise the issue of those UN Charter articles in Bonn on his own initiative.

I said that it is time for Washington to take a sufficiently clear and firm position toward Bonn on the issue of the treary.

542 PART VJ: t966 -t971

Curbing theStrategicAnns R,ue. During the conversation I called Kissinger's attention to the recently observed inconsistency in the sratements of U.S. Govemmem officials (Rogers and L'lird) with respect to the time frame fo r beginning talks between the USSR and the United Srates on limiting the strate- gic arms rat-c. I asked what President Nixon's own position is on this issue.

Kissinger replied that, frankly speaking, there are certain disagree- ments within the government regarding that issue at the present time. Everyone, from the President on down, bel ieves in principle that such talks with the Soviet Union are necessary. There are no arguments on that score. The arguments revolve around the connection between the begin- ning of the talks and the deployment of the U.S. Sentinel ABM system.

Rogers and certain others, for purely political reasons, believe that it is necessary to begin the talks without complicating them by hasti ly making far-reachil1g decis ions on relevant military matters, which, moreover, need to be studied thoroughly from the standpoint of their practical feasibility.

Laird and the military think that a decision on practical deployment of a limited Sentinel system should not be made contingent upon the talks, the outcome of wh;ch is still far from clear and which will

inevitably lase a long time. President Nixon himself, according to Kissinger, has nor yet taken a

definite position in this whole controversy. Apparently his decision will be made in March or April. In principle, however- and he, Kiss inger, can repeat this with full responsibility- Nixon favors strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union and will pursue precisely that goal.

It seems 10 Kissinger that official Soviet-U.S. talks at the level of spe- c ially designated representatives will begin within 5-6 months, "speaking realistically and given the s ituation." Before that time they hope there will be a basically private exchange of views between the sides on issues related to beginning s uch talks.

Bilateral Soviet-U.S. Relations. Kissinger said that the President had instructed him to convey, in connection with the views expressed to him by the Soviet Ambassador on instructions from Moscow, rbat he is prepared to look specifically at the opportunities that are presently available for further development of bilateral relations, including in the areas mentioned by the Soviet side.

The President has now instructed that appropriate U.S. proposals be prepared. Aherwards, this entire matter can be examined on a more practical plane. They would like to make one additional request in this

Meeting Between Presidential Assista11t Kissinger 543

regard. Cooperation in certain areas of science, technology, or medicine could be carried o ut not only on a bila.teral, but a lso on a multilateral basis with the participation of ocher countries, so as 10 a void accusations that the two great powers want to deal only w ith each ocher and do not wish to sha re with others their successes in science, technology, econom• ics, and ocher areas.

During the conversation, Kissinger seated, on his own initiative, that President Nixon would like co reiterate that in bis foreign policy plans he is proceeding on the assumption that a meeting w ith the Sov iet leadership is useful and appropriate, although he ch.inks some prepara tory work will be needed so that such a meeting will be sufficiently successful and live up co the hopes that will m1doub1edly be placed in it.

Since the subject of a smnmic meeting in the above-mentioned form had already been raised with me by President Nixon himself, and then by Kissinger in our previous meetings, I, in order not to emphasize any specia l interest of ours in chis matter, limited myself to a remark that the question of s uch a meeting will, naturally, have to be resolved by the two sides on the basis of the specific situation.

Kissinger proposed 1hat I mee1 with him OYer lunch in his office at the Wh.ite House on March 3, immediately upon his return from the trip with Nixon co Western Europe, for a further exchange of views.

I agreed.3

A. Dobrynin

1 During o telephone call at 2:45 p.m. on February 22, Kjssinger told Dobrrnin that Ni.xon thought "HAK and Dobr>'llin had a good conversation yesterday." Dobrynin dictated the text of a Soviet note, which suggested that., if the United States :isked., West Cem1any would "gladly" reverSe its decision to hold the Bun<lesversa.mmlung in West Berlin. Although he promised to relay the nott t-0 th~ President, Kissjnger thought that there was "'not a great deal" that the United States could do "at this time." Kissjnger also warned Dobrynln thu .. if the situation in Vietnam should turn into :i general offensive or attack on major population centerS, we would have to respond very strong!)'· \Vie would consider it very unfortunate." {National Archives, Nixon Presidenti3l Materials, Henry Kissjnger Telephone ConverSntion Transcripts, Box I, Chronological file; and A VP Rf, f. 0129, op. 53, p. 399, d. 5, I. 87-89)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION (USSR)

Washington, May 14, 1969

A t Kissinger's invitation, I visited him in his office at the White House on the morning of May 1. Kissinger sa id that, as I was aware, President Nixon was to deliver a

televised address to the nation on Vietnam at 10 p.m. tonight. Nixon had expressed the wish that the text of his speech be prO\'ided to the Soviet Ambassador in advance so that it could then be transmitted to Moscow for the Soviet Government.

Noting that the speech was being printed even as we spoke and would be ready in a few minutes, Kissinger began commenting on the main sub- stance of the speech and the thoughts that bad guided the President in preparing it. Kissinger's comments were interrupted by a call from Nixon, who suggested chat Kissinger bring me in to see him, the President.

First. Pres ident Nixon received me upstairs in a s mall office in his apartment, rather than in bis regular, official office. Nixon explained that he " locks himself in this small room when he needs to think and work in private, without interference." H e was holding pages &om his speech, which he was correcting while sitting by the burning firep lace.

Nixon began the conversation by remarking that he greatly appreciates the confidential contacts which have been established with the Soviet lead- ership through the private Soviet Ambassador/ Kissinger channel, and that he intends to continue utilizing this "channel, which is operating success- fully and has proven its effectiveness," to exchange views with the Soviet Government on issues requiring particular secrecy and confidentiality.

Source': A VPRF, (. 0 129, op. 53, p. 399, d. 6, I. 44-50. Secret. From Oobrynin'sjoumnl. No Ameriom record of Dobrynin's con\tersation with either Kissinga or Nixon has been found.

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Nixon emphasized again, as he had during our first meeting, the significance he attaches ro Soviet-U.S. relations, which, he is convinced, are of decisive importance for the entire international situation, for the fate of war and peace. Despite different approaches ro various problems, he, the President, is confident that the two governments are united in their desire ro search for solutions to complex and contentious issues not through confrontation but through negotiation, by seeking peaceful set- tlement of these issues . That was the main thing.

Nixon went on to say that he hopes to begin strategic a,ms limitation talks with the Soviet Union soon. The fact that there had been some delay in beginning the talks, he added, was not due to an unwillingness 10 hold such talks, but ro a des ire ro ·thoroughly prepare for them, taking inro account the range of issues involved, which is important for the security of both countries.

He, the President, intends to continue the bilateral exchange of views with the Soviet Government on Middle East issues, with a view to search- ing for ways to reach a settlement, even though, he had to admit, this was very difficult, considering the profound differences between the parties in the region that have a direct interes t in this,

At present he is also thinking about iss ues related 10 expanding trade berween the United States and the Soviet Union. In all likelihood, he, the President, will send a message to Congress on this matter in the not too distant future.

The Pres ident also asked to convey to Moscow his thanks not only for the Soviet Union's assistance in sea,ching for the crew of the U.S. aircraft that was shot down by DPRK fighter planes, 1 but also for the fact that the Soviet Union had exhibited certain public restraint, because this, in turn, had helped him, the President, to withstand pressure from the "hot- heads," who are, regrettably, fairly numerous in the U.S. The relevant, confidential communication from the Government of the USSR rega,ding the U.S. fleet had met with understanding on his pa,t, and he had given the order 10 recall the fleet.

Nixon then turned ro the issue of Vietnam. After saying tha1 he under- star1ds the position of the Soviet Union as the main socialist power pro- viding assistance to the ORV and that he does not intend to ask for anything that would be incompatible with that status, Nixon emphasized

1 See Document 20.

Memorandum of Co11versatio11 ( USSR) 547

char, at the same time, he is aware. of the Soviet Government's construc- tive role, whjch is aimed at peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict.

In this connection, he had decided, even before today's address to the nation on Vietnam-and he himself regards chis as a very important speech- to personally provide advance comments on it co the Soviet Ambassador for transmission to the Soviet Government. You, he added, are the only ambassador who is being given the text of the speech in advance, not to mention the face that I will nor be receiving any other ambassadors in connection with crus (towa rds evening the State Department informed all the embassies, including ours, char Embassy representatives could gee copies of Nixon's speech in the Scace Depart- ment reception area at 9 p.m.-i.e., an hour before the speech).

Returning to his upcoming speech, Nixon asked me to convey the following co the Soviet Government:

This speech is a sincere attempt by him, the President, to get out of the current impasse with regard to a Vietnam peace settlement. This is not propaganda, it is nor a clever crick, nor is it a political or mj)itary trap. He, Nixon, has personally been examining all the details of this complex issue (Vietnam) for a long time. Today's speech represents a fairly detailed program that, given good will on both sides, can be used to find an equitable political solution.

He went on to say that the speech sets forth some basic principles chat guide the U.S. in its approach to the Vietnam problem. Ac the same rime, the U.S. Government is prepared to be flexible regarding ways and meth- ods of attaining the ultimate objectives. It is prepared, if the ORV and NLF ins ist, to participate in four-party meeti11gs that would consider not only military issues (the withdrawal of troops, the demj)itarized zone, etc.), but also political issues related to a settlement, even though he him- self remains convinced that it would be best if such issues were discussed by the South Vietnamese themselves- the NLF and Saigon.

He, Nixon, was prepared to discuss any "four," "five" or "ren » poinrs from H anoi2 and the NLF if the latter were, in rum, prepared to also discuss the U.S. proposals, rather than just dismissing chem out of hand with corresponding "abusive epithets." Lodge will have appropriate instructions for the Paris negotiations.

2 The delegation of the National Liberation Fro:nt of South Vietnam to the Paris Peace Tnlks presented a Ten.Point Peace Program on i\<lay 8. For the text, sec Docum,nls on Americ.an Foreign Relations, /968--/969, pp. 249-252.

548 PART V J: t966 - t9 7 1

Nixon stated further that they are prepared to undertake nor to seek military bases for them selves in South Vietnam and not to have any future mjlitary ties with the South Vietnamese government that wiU ulti- mately be fo rmed; the U.S. accepts South Vietnam' s neutrality " if that is what the South Vietnamese themselves want"; they (the Americans) are also prepared to accept any go,•ernment in South Vietnam that might be established there "by the will of the South Vietnamese themselves."

Nixon went on to say that his speech roday will evoke a certain amount of dissatisfaction among some influential circles in the U.S. who fee l it is necessary to take a harder line in Vietnam, seeing this as a guar- antee of ultimate success. He is seeking mutually acceptable ways to reach a peace settlement, even though he is well aware that such a pro- cess inevitably involves considerable difficulties and delays.

Ar the same time, he would like Hanoi to know that their approach is quite clear to Washington and that it w ill not bring them success. Nixon is firmly convinced that the strategy and tactics of tbe North Vietnamese leaders now basically come down to the fo llowing: not engaging in any serious negotiations in Paris, anticipating that time will work against him, i.e. against Nixon, and that he will ultimately have to give in, mainly owing to pressure from public opinion in hjs own country. These calculations are clearly based on a lack of understanding of the true state of affairs in the U.S. and the way most Americans view the world, although o utwardly the above line of reasoning may seem most correct to Hanoi. The U.S. President has the ability to convince the country of the need for "other measures and support for those measures" if the nation sees that a ll the government's attempts to reach an honorable settlement are being blocked by the other side, which is in fact seeking " total capirularion by the U.S." "Neither the President nor the people of the U.S. will accept" that. Nor can they wait forever until the other side finally decides to begin serious negotiations. The U.S. is a great power that cannot aUow itself to be tied down in Vietnam indefinitely by what amounts to a boycott of serious settlement talks. The Hanoi leadership must be clear on that.

Thar is why, Nixon continued, the U.S. Government, and he person- ally, would hope that both Hanoi and the N LF w ill pay dose attention ro what will be sa id today and subsequently proposed for discussion in Paris. They (the U.S.) are prepared ro wait "a reasonable amount of time" to determine the reaction of the ORV and N LF leadership " to the

Memorandum of Co11versatio11 ( USSR) 549

current message of the U.S. Government, which is genuinely important and serious and which could become a turning point in the further devel- opment of events."

After listening 10 the President, I reminded him of our principled posi- tion on the Vietnam issue. I noted further the positive significance of the recent " 10 Points" that the NLF delegation had presented in Paris as a basis for resolving the Vietnam problem. J stressed that, in our view, this is an important document that merits the most careful study and discussion during further negotiations in Paris. I also expres.~ed my firm belief that, as experience has convincingly demonstrated, a solution ro the Vietnam issue cannot be sought through military means. Such a course is ine,~tably doomed ro failure. What is needed is a political solution based on consid- eration of the legitimate rights of the Vietnamese people themselves.

I concluded by saying that the views expressed by the President would be reported ro the Soviet Government.

In connection with my remarks, N ixon said that he "could assure" the Soviet Government that he is nor seeking a military solution to the Vietnam problem; rhar is precisely why he decided to present "important political proposals" today, However, he added, the U.S. "cannot wait forever for Hanoi and the N LF to finally decide ro begin real negotia- tions" and, for that eventuality, he, as President, also has to think "about alternatives.,..

I replied that if one takes a realistic approach, in resolving the Vietnam problem there can be no alternatives to a political settlement.

Nixon, dearly nor wanting the conversation ro become contentious, said that his message on Vietnam today is based precisely on the assump- tion that a politica l settlement is needed, and be asks that that be con- veyed to the Soviet Government. In conclusion, he asked [mej ro convey his personal greetings to LI. Bre-,bnev, A.N. Kosygin, and N.V. Podgomy.

I replied that that would be done. Before I left, N ixon invited my wife: and me to lunch at the White

House on July 26, when he wished to mark the tenth anniversary of his first official visit ro the Soviet Union. Then Nixon showed me his per- sonal apartments, where he lives with h;s family. He also asked whether any of the Soviet leaders live in the Kremlin.

During my conversation with Nixon, I did not yet have the text of his speech, and therefore, I was unable ro comment in any way on its

550 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

substance. Kissinger handed me the text right before I left the White House, when the meeting was over.

Second. Kissinger's remarks during his conversation with me before we went in to see Nixon were basically a repetition of what the President said. One might note only his comment that Nixon's speech today is not, in fact, a response to the NLF's "IO Points," since it was prepared long before that, and, in this sense, the NLF's initiative bad put them "some- what at a disadvantage."

To a question as to how, in fact, they envision the transitional, interim political si•stem in South Vietnam, in light of the most recent NLF pro- posals, and how this issue is treated in Nixon's upcoming speech, Kiss inger thought for a moment and then said that this is a complex question, and it is difficult to provide an immediate answer. He added that the speech makes no attempt to answer all the questions; to some extent that is deliberate, in order to maintain flexibility. Some of the most sensitive issues will have to "be clarified" during further negotiations or contacts in Paris. In this connection, he repeated their latest confidential proposal to the effect that they are also prepared to meet with representa- tives of rhe other side in a different location, for confidential talks.

To a question as to what he, Kissinger, sees as the difference between the position of the current administration and the position of the Johnson Administration on the Vietnam issue, he asserted that there is indeed a definite difference.

He stated that prior to March- April 196S Johnson had, in general, believed only in a military solution; therefore, he bad made virtually no effort to think about the substance of the political problems. However, after he stopped the bombing of the DRY, he had rather naively hoped for a fairly quick settlement- as the other side's response. ln the face of unyielding tactics by the Vietnamese at the negotiations, he was some- what at a loss, and until the end of his presidency he essentially had no clear political views as to what more to do and how to deal with the ocher side.

Nixon, on the other hand, takes a realistic approach, according to Kiss inger. He recognizes de facto Hanoi's interest in the further develop- ment of events in South Vietnam. He recognizes the NLF as a reality that exists and operates i11 South Vietnam. He is prepared to accept South Vietnam 's neutrality. He is prepared to accept whatever the South Vietnamese themselves agree on. In the final analysis, be is even prepared

Memorandum of Co11versatio11 ( USSR ) 551

to accept any political system in South Vietnam, "provided there is a fairly reasonable interval between conclus ion of an agreement and [the establishment of] such a system."

At this point my conversation with Kissinger was interrupted, since we were invited to join Ni.xon upstairs.

On the whole, it was evident from the conversations with President Nixon and his assistant Kis.~inger that they are under the distinct impres- sion that the NLF's recent proposals, which met with certain interest in the U.S., are the res ult of Nixon's latest message to the So,•iet Government (my conversation with Kissinger on April 14 of this yea r). Nixon's view that Moscow is playing a constructive role in this whole matter has been noticeably reinforced.

A. Dobry11i11

RON RIDENHOUR LETTER March 29, 1969

Gentlemen: It was lare in April, 1968 that I first heard of " PinkviUe" and what

allegedly happened there. I received that 6rsr report with some skepti- cism, but in the following months I was to hear similar stories &om such a wide variety of people that it became impossible for me to disbelieve that something rather dark and bloody did indeed occur sometime in March, 1968 in a village caUed " Pinkville" in the Republic of Viet Na m.

The circumstances that led to my h.avins access to the reports I'm about to relate need explanation. I was inducted in March, 1967 into the U. S. Army. After receiving various tra;,ung I was assigned to the 70th lnfantry Detachment (LRP), 11th Light Infantry Brigade at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, in early October, 1967. That unit, the 70th Infantry Detachennt (LRP), was disbanded a week before the 11th Brigade sh ipped out for Viet Nam on the 5th of December, 1967. All of the man from whom I later heard reports of the " Pinkville" incident were reassigned to "C" Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Light Infantry Brigade. I was reassigned to the aviation section of Headquarters Headquarters Company 11th LIB. After we had been in Viet Nam for 3 to 4 months many of the men from the 70th Inf. Der. (LRP) began to transfer into the same unit, "E" Company, 51st Infantry ( LRPJ.

In late April, I 968 I was awaiting orders for a transfer from HHC, 11th Brigade to Company "E," 51st Inf, (LRP), when I happened to run into Pfc " Butch" Gruver, whom I had known in Hawaii. Gruver told me he had been assigned to "C" Company 1st of the 20th until April 1st when he transferred to the w1it that I was headed for. During the course of our conversation he told me the 6rst of many reports I was to hear of "Pinkville."

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"Charlie" Company 1/20 had been assigned to Task Force Barker in lace February, 1968 co help conduct "sea rch and destroy" operations on the Bacangan Penins ula, Barker's area of operation. The cask force was operating out of L. F. Dottie, located five or six miles north of Quang Nhai city on Viet Namese National Highway I. Gruver said that Charlie Company had sustained casualties; primarily from mines and booby traps, almost everyday from the first day they arrived on the peninsula. One village area was particularly troublesome and seemed to be infested with booby traps and enemy soldiers. It was located about six miles northeast of Quang Nh,ai city at approximate coordinates B.S. 728795. Ir was a notorious area and the men of T ask Force Barker had a special name I for it: they called it "Pinkville." One morning in the latter part of March, Task Force Barker moved out from its firebase headed for " Pink ville." Its mission: destroy the trouble spot and all of its inhabitants.

When "Butch" cold me this I didn't quite believe that what he was celling me was true, but he assured me that it was and went on to describe what had happened. The other two companies that made up the task force cordoned off the village so that "Charlie" Company could move through to de,srroy the structures and kill the inhabitants. Any villagers who ran from Charlie Company were stopped by the encircling compa- nies. I asked "Burch" several times if all the people were killed. He said that he thought they were men, women and children. He recalled seeing a small boy, about three or four years old, standing by the trail with a gunshot wound in one arm. The boy was clutching his wounded arm with his other hand, while blood trickled between his fingers. He was staring around himself in shock and disbelief at what be saw. " He just stood there with big eyes staring around like he didn' t understand; he didn't believe what was happening. Then the captain' s RTO (radio operator) put a burst of 16 (M-16 rifle) fire imo him." It was so bad, Gruver said, that one of the men in his squad shot himself in the foot in order to be medivaced out of the area so chat he would not have to par- ticipate in the slaughter. Although he had not seen it, Gruver had been cold by people he considered trnscworthy that one of the company's offi- cers, 2nd Lieutenant Kally (this spelling ,nay be incorrect) had rounded up several groups of villagers (each group consisting of a minimum of 20 persons of both sexes and all ages). According to the story, Kally then machine-gunned each group. Gruver estimated that the population of the village had been 300 co 400 people and that very few, if any, escaped.

Ron Ride11ho1,r Letter 555

After hearing this account I couldn't quite accept it. Somehow I just co uldn't believe that not only had so many young American men par- ticipated in such an act of barbarism, but that their officers had o rdered it. There were other men in the unit I was soon to be assigned to, "E" Company, 51st Infantry (LRP), w ho had been in C ha.die Company at the time that Gruver alleged the incident at "PinkviUe" had occurred. I became determined to ask them about "Pinkville" so that I might compare, their accounts wirh Pfc Gruver's.

When I arrived at "Echo" Company, 51st Infantry (LRP) the nest men I looked fo r were Pfcs Michael Terry, and William Doherty. Both were veterans of "Charlie" Company, 1/20 and " Pink ville." Instead of contra · dieting "Butch" Gruver's story they corroborated it, adding some ta_~ry tidbits of information of their own. Terry and Doherty bad been in the same, squad and their platoon was the third platoon of "C" Company to pass through the village. Most of the people they Came to were a lready dead. Those that weren't were sought out and shot. The platoon left nothing alive neither livestock nor people. Around noon the rwo sol• djers' squad stoppe.d to eat. "Billy and I started to get o ut o ur chow" Terr)' sa id, "but close to us was a bunch of Vietnamese in a heap, and some of them were moaning. Kally (2:nd Lt. Kally) bad been through before us and a ll of them had been shot, bur many weren't dead. It was obvious that they weren' t going to get any medical attention so Billy and I got up and went over to where they were. I guess we sort of finished them off." Terry went on to say that be a nd Doherty then returned to where their packs were and ate lunch. H e estima ted the size o if the vii• !age to be 200 to 300 people. Doherty thought that the population of Pinkville bad been 400 people.

lf Terry, Doherty and Gruver could be believed, then not only had "Charlie" Company received orders to s laughter all the inhabitants of the 1•illage, but those orders had come from the commanding officer of Task Force Barker, or possibly even high.er in the chain of command. Pfc Terry stated that when Captain Medina (Charlie Company' s command· ing officer Captain Ernest Medjna) issued the order for the destruction of "Pinkville" he had been hesitant, as if it were somethjng he didn't want to do but had to. Others I spoke to concurred with Terry on this.

It was June before I spoke to anyone who had something of signifi • cance to add to what I had alreadybeen told of the "PinkviUe" incident. It was the end of June, 1968 when I ran into Sargent La rry La Croix a t

556 PART VJ: t966 -t 9 71

the USO in Chu Lai. La Croix had been in 2nd Lt. Kally's platoon on the day Task Force Barker swept through "Pinkville." What be told me veri- fied the stories of the ochers, but be also had something new to add. He had been a witness to Kally's gunning down at least truce separate groups of villagers. " It was terrible. They were slaughtering villagers like so many sheep." Kally's men were dragging people out of bunkers and hootches and putting them together in a group. The people in the group were men, women and childre.n of aU ages. As soon as he felt that the group was big enough, Kally ordered a M-60 (machine gun) set up and the people killed. La Croix sa id that he bore witness to this procedure at least three times. The three groups were of different sizes, one of about twenty people, one of about thirty people and one of about 40 people. When the first group was put together Kally ordered Pfc. Torres to man the machine-gun and open fire on the villagers that had been grouped together. This Torres did, but before everyone in the group was sown he ceased fire and refused to fire again. After ordering Torres to recommence firing several times, Lieutenant Kally cook over the M-60 and finished shooting the remaining villagers in that first group himself. Sargent La Croix rold me rhar Kally didln'r bother to order anyone to rake the machine-gun when the other two groups of villagers were formed. He simply manned it himself and shot down all villagers in both groups.

This account of Sargent La Croix's confirmed the rumors that Gruver, Terry and Doherty had previously told me about Lieutenant Kally. It also convinced me that there was a very s ubstantial aniount of truth co the stories that all of these men had told. If I needed more convincing, I was about to receive it.

It was in the middle of November, 1968 just a few weeks before I was to return to the United States for separation from the army that I talked to Pfc Michael Bernhardt. Be;nhardt had served his entire year in Viet Nam in "Charlie" Company 1/20 and he too was a bout to go home. " Bernie" s ubstantiated the tales cold by the other men I had talked to in vivid, bloody detail and added this. ;'Bernie" had absolutely refused to take part in the massacre of the villagers of "PinkviUe" that morning and he thought that it was rather st1ar1ge that the officers of the company had not made an issue of it. But that evening "Medina (Captain Ernest Medina) came up to me (';Bern.ie") and told me not to do anything stupid like write my congressman" about what had happened that day. Bernhardt assured Captain Medina that he had no such thing in mind.

R o n Ride11ho1,r L e tt e r 55 7

He had nine months left in Viet Nam and felt that it was dangerous enough just fighting the acknowledged enemy.

Exactly what did, in fact, occur in the village of "Pinkville" in March, 1968 I do not know for certain, but I am convinced that it was some- thing very black indeed. I remain irrevocably persuaded that cf you and I do truly beljeve in the principles, of justice and the equality of every man, however humble, before the law, tliat form the very backbone that this country is founded on, then we must press forward a widespread and public investigation of this matter with all our combined efforrs. I think that it was Winston Churchill who, once said "A country without a con- science is a countr)' without a soul, and a country without a soul is a country that cannot survive." I feel that I must take some positive action on this matter. I hope that you will launch an investigation immediately and keep me informed of your progress. If you cannot, then I don't know what other course of action to take.

I have considered sending this to newspapers, magazines and broad- casting companies, but I somehow feel ·that investigation and action by the Congress of the United States is the appropriate procedure, and as a conscientious citizen I have no de.sire co further besmirch the image of the American serviceman in the eyes of the world. I feel that this action, while probably it would promote attent ion, would not bring about the constructive actions that the direct actions of the Congress of the United States would.

Sincerely,

Isl Ron Ridenhour

PEERS REPORT DIRECTIVE FOR INVESTIGATION FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

26 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR UEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM R. PEERS

SUBJECT: Directive for Investigation

Confirming oral instructions given you -0n 24 November 1969, you are directed to explore the nature and the scope of the original U.S. Army investigations of the alleged My Lai ( 4) incident which occurred 16 March 1968 in Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam. Your inves- tigation will include a determination of the adequacy of the investigation(sl or inqujries on this subject, their subseq uent reviews and reports within the chain of command, and possible suppression or withholding of infor- mation by persons involved in the incident.

Your investigation will be concerned with the time period beginning March 1968 until Mr. Ronald L. Ridenhour sent his letter, dared 29 March 1969, to the Secretary of Defense and others. The scope of your investigation does nor include, nor will it interfere with, ongoing criminal investigations in progress.

The procedures contained in AR 15-6 are authorized for such use as may be required.

You are authorized to select and use on a full-time basis officer and civilian members of the Army whom you deem necessary for the conduct of the investigation. Your deputy is designated as Mr. Bland West, Assistant

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General Counsel, Department of the Army. Should you require ocher assistance, please let us know.

You wiJI inform us at an early dare of the expected completion dare of your report.

W.C. WESTMORELAND General, U. S. Army Chief of Staff

Stanley R. Resor Secretary of the Army

PEERS REPORT SUMMARY

A. THE SON MY VILLAGE INCIDENT

During the period 16-19 March 1968, a tactical operation was conducted inro Son My Village, Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam, by Task Force (TF) Backer, a battalion-size unit of the Americal Division.

TF Barker was an interim organization of the 11th Brigade, created co fill a tactical void resulting from the withdrawal of a Republic of Korea Marine Brigade from the Quang Ngai area. The Task Force was com- posed of a rifle company from each of rhe 11th Brigade's three organic in fantry battalions - A/3-1 Inf, B/4-3 Inf, 01 -20 Inf. The commander was l TC Frank A. Barker (now deceased).

The plans for the operation were never reduced to writing but it was reportedly a imed at destroying the 48th VC local Force (LF) Battalion, thought to be located in Son MY Village, which also served as a VC stag- ing and logistical support base. On two previous operations in the area, units of TF Barker had received casualties from enemy fire, mines, and boobyrraps, been able to close effectively with the enemy and had nor.

On 15 March 1968, the new 11th Brigade commander, COL Oran K. Henderson, visited the TF Barker command post at landing Zone (LZ) Dottie and talked to the assembled staff and commanders. H e urged them to press forward aggressively and eliminate the 48th LF Battlion. Following these remarks, l TC Barker and his staff gave an intelligence briefing and issued an operations order. The company com- manders were told that most of the Population of Son My were "VC or VC sympacluzersn and were advised char most of the civi lian u1habirants would be away from Son My and on their way to market by 0700 hours. The operation was to commence at 0725 hours on 16 March 1968 with a short artillery preparation, following which C/1-20 Inf was to combat

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assault into an LZ immediately west or My Lai (4) and rhen sweep east through the subharnlet. Following C Company's landing, B/4-3 Inf was co reinforce C/1 -20 Inf, or to conduct a second combat assault co the east of My Lai (4) into an LZ south or the subhamlet or My Lai (1 ) or "Pinkville. » A/3-1 l nf was to move from its field location to blocking positions north of Son My.

During or subsequent to the briefing, L TC Barker ordered the com- manders or C/1 -20 W, and possibly B/4-3 Inf, co bum the houses, kill the Ii vescock, destroy foodstuffs and perhaps co close the wells. No instructions were issued as to the safeguarding or noncombatants fo und there.

During a subsequent briefing by CPT Medina to his men, L TC Barker' s orders were embellished, a revenge element was added, and the men or 01 -20 lnf, were given 10 understand that only the enemy would be present in My Lai (4) on 16 March and that the enemy was to be destroyed. In CPT Michles' briefing co his platoon leaders, mention was also apparently made of tbe burning of dwellings.

On the morning or 16 Mar-ch 1968, the operation began as planned. Af3-l inf was reported in blocking positions at 0725 hours, At about that same time the artillery preparation and fires of the supporting heli- copter gunship were placed on the 01-20 Inf LZ and a part of My La i (4). L TC Barker controlled the arti llery preparation and combat assault from his helicopter. COL H enderson and ltis command group also arrived overhead at approximately this time.

By 0750 hours all elements of 0 1-20 Inf were on rhe ground. Before entering My La i ( 4 ), they killed several Vietnamese fleeing the area in the rice paddies around the subhamlet and along Route 52 1 to the south of the subhamler. No resistance was encountered at this time or later in the day.

The infantry assault on My Lai ( 4) began a few minutes before 0800 hours. During the 1st Placoon's movement through the southern half of the subhamler, its members were involved in widespread killing of Vietnamese inhabitants (comprised a lmost exclusively of o ld men, women, and children) and a lso in property destruction. Most of rhe inhabitants who were nor killed immediately were rounded up into two gro ups. The first group, consisting of about 70-80 Vietnamese, was taken to a large ditch east of My Lai (4 ) and later shot. A second group, consisting of 20-50 Vietnamese, was taken south of the hamlet and shot there on a trail. Similar killings of smalle r groups took place within the subhamler.

P,us R,part S11mmary 563

Members of the 2d Platoon killed at least 60-70 Vietnamese ment women, and children, as they swept through the northern half of My Lai (4) and through Binh Tay, a sma ll s ubhamJet about 400 meters north of My Lai (4). They also committed several rapes.

The 3d Platoon, having secured the LZ , fo Uowed behind the 1st a nd 2d and burned a nd destroyed what remained of the houses in My Lai (41 and killed most of the rema ining livestock. It.~ members also rounded up and killed a group of 7-1 2 women and children.

There was considerable testimony that orders to stop the killing were issued rwo or three times d ur ing the morning. The 2d Platoon received such an order around 0920 hours and promptly complied. The 1st Platoon continued the killings until perhaps 1030 hours, when the order was repeated. By this time the I st Platoon had completed its sweep through the subhamlet.

By the time C/1-20 Inf departed My Lai (4) in the early afternoon, moving to the northeast for link-up with 8/4-3 Inf, its members had killed at least 175-200 Vietnamese men, women, a nd children. 1 The evidence indicates that only 3 or 4 were confirmed as Viet Cong a lthough there were undoubtedly several unarmed VC (men, women, and children) among them a nd many more active supporters and sympathizers. One man from the company was reported as wounded from the accidenta l discharge of his weapon.

Since C Company had encountered no enemy Opposition, B/4-3 Inf was a ir landed in its LZ between 0815 and 0830 hours, fo llowing a short artil- lery preparation. Little if any resistance was encountered, alth ough the 2nd Platoon suffered 1 KIA and 7 \VlA from mi11es a11d/or boobytraps. The 1st Platoon moved eastward separately from the rest of B Company to cross and secure a bridge over the Song My Khe (My Khe River). After crossing the bridge and approaching the o utskirts of the s ubhamlet Of My Khe (4), elements of the platoon opened fire on the subhamler with an M-60 madunegun and M-16 rifles. The fire continued for approximately 5 minutes, during which time some inhiabirants of My Khe (4), mostly women and children, were killed. The lead elements of the platoon then entered the subhamlet, firing into the houses and throwing demolitions into shelters. Many noncombat3l1ts apparent] y were killed in the process.

1 Casualty figures cited for My Laj (4) were devello~ by this lnquiry solely on the basi,; of statements and restimony of US personneU. Separate estimates by the Criminal Lnve:stig.1tion Division (ClD) agency t0gether with other evidence, indic:ue the number of Vietnamese killed in the o,,ernll area of Son My Village may have exceeded 400.

564 PART VJ: t966 -t971

It is believed that only ten men in B/4-3 Inf directly participated in the killings and destruction in My Ly (4 ); rwo of these aie dead and the remaining eight have either refused to testify or claim no recollection of rhe event. As a result, it has nor been possible to reconstruct the events with certainty. It appears, however, that the number of noncombatants killed by B/4-3 Inf on 16 March 1968 may have been as high as 90. The company reported a total of 38 VC KIA on 16 March, but it is likely that few if any were Vier Cong.

On the evening of 16 Maich 1968, after C/1-20 Inf and B/4-3 Inf had linked up in a night defensive position, a Viet Cong suspect was appar- ently tortured and maimed by a US officer. He was s ubsequently killed along with some additional suspects by Vietnamese National Police in the presence of US personnel.

During rhe period 17-19 March 1968 both C/1-20 Inf and B/4-3 Inf were invo lved in additional burning and destruction of dwellings, and in the mistreatment of Vietnamese detainees.

B. REPORTS OF THE INCIDENT

1. Reports of Civilian Casualt;cs

Commencing early in the operation, commanders began receiving reports of civilian casualties in My Lai (4). Ar about 0930 hours, MG Koster was advised by COL Henderson that he had observed 6 to 8 s uch casual- ties. The figure was increased when L TC Barker reported to Henderson during rhe afternoon that the total was 12 to 14, and was further increased to 20 in a report Barker made char evening. This last report was relayed to MG Koster at about 1900 hours. None of these reports was entered in unit journals or reported outside the America! Division.

2. Observations and Complaints by Aviation Personnel

One element which provided combat s upport 10 TF Baiker on 16 March was an aero-scout ream from Company B, 123d Aviation Battalion. A pilot of this ream, W0l (now lL T ) Hugh Thompson, had been flying at a low a ltitude over My Lai (4) during the morning hours and had observed the actions of C/1-20 Inf. He becaine greatly concerned over the "needless and unnecessary killings" he had witnessed. He landed his helicopter sev- eral times co aid the inhabitants and in an attempt to stop the killing.

Peers Report SJtmmary 565

Shortly before noon, W0l T hompson returned ro LZ Dottie and reported his observations ro his company commander, MAJ Frederic Watke. The complaints of WOl Thompson were confirmed by other pilots and crewmen who had also been over My Lai (4). T he complaints were expressed in most serious terms; those who were present heard the terms "killing" and "murder" used freely with estimates of the dead in My Lai (4) running over 100. Upon receipt of this report, MAJ Wacke went co the commander of TF Barker and advised him of the allegations. Watke stated that Barker then left for his heLlcopter, presumably to visit 01-20 Inf. Watke considered the matter was "in the hands of the man who could do something about it" and took no further action at that time. Later chat day, he again encountered Barker who advised him that he could find nothing to substantiate Thompson's allegations while Watke testified that he was convinced ar the time that L T C Barker was lying, be cook no further action until 2200 hours that night when he reported to his battalion commander, LTC Holladay, and related fo r the second time the substance of what is hereafter referred to as the " Thompson Report."

3. The Order to Return to My Lai (4)

At about 1530 hours on 16 March, after receiving a second report of civil ian casualties, COL Henderson scared he became suspicio us and directed TF Barker to send a company back through My Lai (4) ro ascertain rhe exact number of casualties and the cause of death. As rhe order was being transmitted to 01-20 Inf by T F Barker, it was moni- tored by MG Koster, the commander of the America! Division, who inquired concerning the reasons. After a brief explanation by the CO of 01-20 Inf, during which time MG Koster was advised that 20-28 noncombatants had been killed, MG Koster countermanded the order and directed chat COL Henderson be notified. There were no further eJforts to make an on-site determination of the cause o r extent of the civilian casualties.

4. The Thompson Report Reaches Division Headquarters

Because of the lace hour at which L TC Holladay received the report from MAJ Wacke, they waited until the following morning before reporting co

566 PART VJ: t966 -t 9 71

BG Young, an Assistant Division Connander. Watke repeated his story, which both he and LTC Holladay agree contained the allegations that there had been "lots of unnecessary kil(jng ... mostly women, children and old men" and that a confrontation had taken place between person- nel of aviation and ground units; however, there is conflict as to the number of casualties mentioned. L TC Holladay and MAJ Watke also agree that BG Young was advised that the complaints made by Thompson had been confirmed by other aviation unit personnel.

At about noon on the 17th, BG Young reported to MG Koster the information he had received from MAJ Watke and LTC Holladay. There is substantive disagreement in testimony between what BG Young testi- fied he received from Watke amd Holladay and what the latter rwo stare they reported. BG Young stated he was nor apprised of any charge of indiscriminate or unnecessary killing of noncombatants. He further stared that ir was his impression the matter of majorconcern was rhar there had been a confrontation between the ground forces aviation unit, resulting from an incident in which noncombatants had been caught in a cross fire between US and enemy forces.

BG Young contends that it was this lesser charge he brought to MG Koster, who rurected BG Young to instruct COL Henderson to conduct a thorough investigation of the incident. MG Koster has confirmed parts of BG Young's account of this conversation but in a previous statement before the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), MG Koster stated that he bad been advised of some indiscriminate shooting of civilians.

The Inquiry has concluded that the two general officers received a muted version of the Thompson Report from Watke and Holladay, but one that included the allegation that noncombatants had been indiscriminately killed. Upon receipt of the report, it seems most likely that they related it to the information MG Koster had received from TF Barker the previous day, that 20-28 noncombatants had been inadvertently killed. The information concerning noncombatant casualties had not been forwarded outside of the Division , although D4ACV and LIi MAF regulations required such action, or were the new allegations reported to higher headquarters. Adopting a "close hold" attitude concerning all information relating to this matter, MG Kos ter directed BG Young to have COL Henderson investigate the incident.

Peers Report SJtmmary 567

C. INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT AND REVIEW

1. COL Henderson's '·Investigation "

BG Young made arrangements for a meeting which was held on 18 March at 0900 hours at LZ Dottie. The meeting was attended by five officers: BG Young, COL Henderson, LTC Barker, LTC Holladay, and MAJ Wacke. BG Young told the grou!P of the Division Commander's instructions concerning the investigation and MAJ Wacke repeated his account of the complaints. When the mee-ting terminated, COL Henderson commenced his "investigation" with an interview of W0J Thompson and two other aviation unit personnel. (While H enderson states he talked only with Thompson and fo r only a few minutes, the testimony of others indicates that he talked individually with three persons for almost an hour.) These interviews, together w ith the information already possessed by Henderson from personal observation and conversations with TF Barker personnel, sh ould have provided a full awareness of the nature and extent of the incident at My Lai (4). From at least this point for - wa rd, Henderson's actions appear to have been little more than a pre- tense of an investigation and had as their goal the suppression of the true facts concerning rhe events of 16 March.

Following his interview with aviation personnel, H enderson ques- tioned CPT Medina, whose explanation concerning civilian casualties left him ''suspicious.• The remajnder of Henderson's "investigation" was without substance; his "interview with a substantial number of C Company personnel " consisted of a discussion on the afternoon of 18 March with a group which, COL Henderson clauns, numbered from 30 to 40 personnel. After complimenting them on their performance in the operation, he asked them collectively if they had witnessed any atrocities. Henderson stated that the response he received was negative. While COL Henderson claims he spoke with other individuals and responsible commanders, available evidence indicates that his so-called investigative actions ended after a brief flight which he stated he made over the area of operation on 18 March.

Commencing on 19 March, COL Henderson is sa id to have made a series of oral reports to BG Young and MG Koster in which he was pur- ported to have related to them the results of his "investigation." It seems clear that in his reports Henderson deliberately misrepresented both the scope of his investigation and the ion he had obtained. He reported that

568 PART VJ: t966 -t971

while 20 civilians had been kililed by arti llery and/or gunships, there was no basis in fact to the allegations made by W0J Thompson. H enderson' s final oral report was accepted by MG Koster as adequately responding to the charges made by W0J Thompson. The matter appears to have reseed there until about mid-April 1968, when information was received at Division H eadquarters from Vietnamese sources.

2. Re.action to Information from Vietnamese Sources

The initial repom from Vietnamese sources conceming the incjdenc were apparently received by the US Advisory teams in Son Tinh District and Quang Ngai Province.

T he Son My Village Chief s ubmitted a report to the Son Tinh District Chief containing a llegations of mass killings by US Forces in Son My Village. The District Chief in turn forwarded rwo reports of the incident to the Quang Ngai Province C hief based on the information fumished co him by the Village Chief. The first of these reports, dated 2 8 March 1968, contained little of s ubstance and remained within Vietnamese channels. The second was dated l! April 1968, and copies of it were provided to both the Provinceand District Advisory reams. ln addition, a copy of the District C hief's 11 April letter went to COL Toan, the Commanding Officer of the 2d AR VN Division.

In his 11 April letter, the District Chief referred to an incident of 16 March in which it was alleged that a US Army unit had assembled and killed more than 400 civilian r esidents of Tu C ung Hamlet2 of Son My Village and had killed an additional 90 people at Co Luy H amlec.3 He stated that, if true he cons idered chis an act of insane violence.

Also in the first half of April, VC propaganda a lleging that US forces had killed 500 people in Son My Village in the middle of March came into the hands of COL Toan and LTC Khien, the Province C hief of Q uang Ngai Province and, possibly somewhat later, into US hands. Both COL Henderson and MG Koster appear to have d iscussed the District chief's re port and the VC propaganda with COL Toan and LTC Khien, and apparendy w ith L TC G uinn, the US Deputy Province Advisor.

2 Includes the subhamlet of M y Lai (4). 3 Includes the <ubhamlct of M y Khe /4).

Peers Report SJtmmary 569

MG Koster indicated that the receipt in mid-April 1968 of the VC propaganda and the information from the District Chief reopened the subject of civilian casualties in the 16 M.arch operation. However, it did not stimulate any fresh inquiry. COL Henderson had already completed his ;'investigation" and had given an oral report to MG Koster. T he receipt of the allegations from Vietnamese sources resulted only in MG Koster's directing COL Henderson to commit his oral report to writing.

In response to this direction, COL Henderson prepared and submined a so-called "Report of lnvestigation" dated 24 April 1968 to MG Koster. The report consisted of two typewritten pages and rwo inclosures. The first enclosure was a typed copy of a statement dated 14 April 1968 with the signature block removed, which this Lnquiry determined was prepared by the Deputy Senior Advisor, Son Tinh District, at the request of the Province Advisory Team. This statement indicate.-<! that the report of the Son My Village Chief alleging mass-kiJljngs was n.ot given much importance by the Son Tin.h District Chief. The second enclosure was a translation of the VC propaganda message regarding the incident. COL Henderson's report briefly summarized the operation, listed person.nel purportedly interviewed (but made no reference to WO! Thompson or to any other members of the aero scout unit), and summarized what purported to be the District ChiePs attitude toward the allegation. The concOusion stated by COL Henderson in the report was that 20 noncombatants were inadvertently killed by artil- lery and by crossfire between the US and VC Forces, that no civilians were gathered and shot by US Forces, and that the allegation that US Forces had shot and killed 450-500 civilians was obviously VC propaganda.

MG Koster testified that when he received the 24 April report he found it unacceptable and directed the conduct of a formal investigation through either BG Young or COL Parson, the Division Chief of Staff. Both Yom1g and Parson denied having received or passed on any such instructions. MG Koster and COL H enderson agreed that such an inves- tigation was conducted, and a report submined, by L TC Barker. Both described in detail the form and substance of this report, but the evidence appears conclusive that no such report was ever prepared.

D . SUPPRESSION AND WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION

Within the Americal Division, at every command level from company to division, actions were taken or omitted which together effectively concealed

570 PART VJ: t966 -t 9 71

the Son My incident. Outside the division, advisory teams at Province, District and possibly the 2d AR VN Division also contributed to this end. Some of the acrs and omissions that resulted in concealment of the incident were inadvertent while others constituted deliberate suppression or with- holding of information.

Efforts initiated in I 968 deliberately ro withhold information con- tinue to this day. Six officers who occupied key positions at the time of the incident exercised their right to remain silent before this Inquiry, oth- ers gave false or misleading testimony or withheld information, and key documents relating ro the incident have not been found in US files.

1. At Company Level

No reports of the crimes committed by C/1-20 Wand B/4 - 3 lnf during the operation were made by members of the units, although there were many men in both companies who had not participated in any criminal acts. The comander of C/1-20 Inf assembled bis men after the operation and advised them not to discuss the incident because an investigation was being conducted , and he adYised one individual nor to wrire ro his Congressman about the incident. H e also made a false report that only 20-28 noncombatants had been killed and attributed the cause of death to artillery and gunships.

The commander of B/4-3 Inf s ubmitted false reports (possibly witbout knowing they were false) that 38 VC had been killed by his 1st Platoon and that none of them were women and children.

2. At Task Force and Brigade Levels

Significant information concerning irregularities in the operation and the commission of war crimes by CJl-20 lnf was known to the commanders and staff officers of both TF Barker and the 11th Brigade on 16 March but was never transmitted to the Americal Division. Reports of VC killed by C/1 -20 Inf on 16 M.arch terminated at 0840 hours when the total reached 90, although the killing continued. In addition to with- holding information, the 11th Brigade headquarters submitted false and misleading reports to Division. One instance concerned a C/1-20 lnf VC body count report of 69, which was changed to attribute the cause of death to artillery and to move the location at which the purported VC

Peers Report SJtmmary 571

were killed from inside the hamlet of My Lai (4) to a sire 600 meters away. A second false report involved am interrogation report from C/1- 20 Inf that 30-40 VC had departed the hamlet immediately prior 10 the

combat assault. The record of this interrogation report as received at the America! Division on 16 March stated that there were many VC in the C/1-20 Inf area of operation.

A reporter and photographer attached to the 11th Brigade informa- tion office accompanied TF Barker on 16 March and observed many war crimes committed by C/1-20 Inf. Both individuals failed to report what thei• had seen, the reporter wrote a false and misleading account of the operation, and the photographer withheld and suppressed from proper authorities the photographic evidence of atrocities he had obtained.

In response to a routine division requirement, l TC Barker submitted a Combat Action Report, dated 28 March 1968, concerning his unit's operations on 16 March. The report significantly omitted any reference to noncombatant casualties and other irregularities, falsely depicted a hotly-contested combat action, and appears to have been an outright effort to s uppress and mislead.

Perhaps the most significant action taken co suppress the true facts of the Son M y operation was the deception employed by COL Henderson to mislead his commander as to the scope and findings of his investiga- tion of the Thompson allegations. His later submission- the so-called Report of Investigation, dared 24 April 1968, which dismissed the allega- tions from Viemamese sources as baseless propaganda and restated the fiction that 20 noncombatants had been inadvertently killed, continued the original deception practiced upon his commander.

3. At Divirion level

a. Withi11- Aviatlco11 U11it.s There is no evidence to suggest that there were deliberate attempts within the division aviation unit to conceal information concerning the Son My incident. However, there were acrs and omissions by the commanders of the 123d Aviation Battalion, and Company B of that unit, which contrib- uted to concealment of the facts. One of the principal reasons why the fu)J import of the Thompson Report was probably nor appreciated at the division command level can be attributed to these rwo commanders and their failure to verify or document the serious charges made by WO!

572 PART V J: t966 - t9 7 1

Thompson and others. Neither took action to obtain aocumentary sub- stantiation, to conduct a low-level aerial reconnaissance or otherwise to verify the a llegations, or ro confirm in writing what they reported orally to BG Young. The initial delay in reporting the matter through command channels needlessly prevented the report &om reaching the America! Division, command group until approximately 24 hoUis after the incident had occurred.

A second serious charge against both of these two commanders is that they fru led to take any action when they became convinced that the inves- tigation of the incident was a "cover-up. " An admonition was issued by the B Company Commander to his unit to halt further discussion of the incident while it was being investigated. This action was not taken co conceal information, but it probably had the unfortunate, a lthough unin- tended, result of aiding in the s uppression of the fa cts.

b. Within Headquarters, Am.erical Division

Americal Division Headquarters was the recipient of much information concerning the Son Ply operation from both US and GVN sources. Except for routine operational data forwarded on 16 March, none of the reporrs or allegations concerning irregularities at Son My were transmitted to higher headquarters, although directives from Ill MAF and 14ACV clearly required such action. As previously indi<.'ated, the Inquiry has concluded that on 17 March, when they received a muted version of the Thompson Report, MG Koster and BG Young may have viewed the report in relation to information previously received that 20-28 noncombatant casualties had been caused by artillery and gunships. While COL Henderson's later reports were false, a11d the general officers were negligent in having accepted them, they probably believed they were withholding information concerning a much less serious incident than the one that had actually occurred.

Additional information from Vietnamese sources reaching the America! Division sometime in April implied that a far more serio us event had taken place at Son My. The command response to this information was so inadequate to the situation and so inconsistent with what would ordi- narily be expected of officers of the ability and experience of MG Koster and BG Young that it can only be explained as a refusal or an inability ro give credence to information or reports which were not consistent with their origina l, and erronoous, conclusions.

Peers Report SJtmmary 573

In summary form, the following are the significant acts done or omit- ted at the America I Division headquarters which contributed to the concealment of the true facts concerning Son My:

(1) There was a failure 10 report information concerning noncomba- tant casualties and allegations of war crimes known 10 be to of particular interest to COMUSMACV and required to be reported

by directives of both ill 14AF and MACY; (2) Having decided to withhold from h igher headquarters informa-

tion concerning civilian casualties, MG Koster directed that the matter be investigated by COL Henderson. However, he did nor insure that a thorough investigation was conducted nor did he subject COL H enderson's reports to adequate review, thereby nul-

lifying his efforts to determine t he true facts; (3) The Division command group ac-red 10 control closely all information

regarding t he Son My incident. Information regarding the incident was not included in daily briefings or provided the General or Special Staff, and the investigative resources of the staff were not employed.

4. By Persons Outside the America) Division

Among the Vietnamese officials who came in contact with information concerning possible war crimes in Son My during the period 16-19 March, there was a natural reluctance 10 confront their American coun- terparts with such serious allegations and to insist upon inquiry imo the matter. Such information as did reach US advisor y personnel was not forwarded through advisory channels, but referred only to the America! Division and its 11th Brigade. In addition, there is evidence that at the Quang Ngai Province and Son Tinh District levels and probably at the 2d ARYN Division, the senior US military advisors a ided in suppressing in formation concerning the incident.

E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

It is concluded that:

1. During the period of 16-19 March 1968, troops of Task Force Barker massacred a la rge numbe, of Vietnamese nationals in the

village of Son My.

574 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

2. Knowledge as to the extent of the incident existed at Company level, at least among the key staff officers and comander at the Task Force Barker level, and at the I Ith Brigade command level.

3. Efforts at the America! Division command level to conceal infor- mation concerning whar was probably believed to be the killing of 20-28 civilians actually resulted in the suppression of a war crime of far greater magnitude.

4. The commander of the I Ith Brigade, upon learning that a war crime had probably bee:n committed, deliberately set out to con- ceal the fact from proper authority and to deceive his commander concerning the matter.

5. investigations concerning the incident conducted widtin the America! Division were superficial and misleading and not s ub- jected to substantive rc\riew.

6. Efforts were made at every level of command from company co division to withhold and suppress information concerning the incident at Son M y.

7. Failure of America! Di vision headquarters personnel to act on information received from GVN/ARVN officials served to sup- press eJiectively information concerning the Son M y incident.

8. Efforrs of the America! Division to suppress and withhold infor- mation were assisted by US officers serving in advisory positions with Vietnamese agencies.

ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON THE SITUATION IN

SOUTHEAST ASIA FROM PRESIDENT RICH ARD M. NIXON

April 30, 1970

G ood evening my fellow Americans:

Ten days ago, in my report to the Nation on Vietnam, I announced a decision to withdraw an additional 150,000 Americans from Vietnam over the next year. I sa id then that I was making that decision despite our concern over increased enemy activity in Laos, in Cambodia, and in South Vietnam.

At that time, I warned that if I concluded that increased enemy activity in any of these areas endangered the lives of Americans remaining in Vietnam, I would not hesitate to rake strong and effective measures ro deal with that situation.

Despite that warning, North Vietnam has increased its military aggression in all these areas, and particula rly in Cambodia.

Afrer full consultation with the National Security Council, Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams, and my other advisers, I have concluded that the actions of the enemy in the last 10 days dearly endanger the lives of Americans who are in Vietnam now and would constitute an unacceptable risk to those who will be there after withdrawal of another 150,000.

To protect our men who are in Vietnam and to guarantee the contin- ued success of our withdrawal and Vietnami2ation programs, I have concluded that the time has come fo r action.

575

576 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

Tonight, I shall describe the actions of the enemy, the actions I have ordered to deal witb that sicua.tion, and the reasons for my decision.

Cambodia, a small country of 7 million people, has been a neutral nation since the Geneva agreement of 1954-an agreement, incidentally, which was signed by the Government of North Vietnam.

American policy since then has been to scrupulously respect the neu- trality of the Cambodian people. We have maintained a skeleton diplo- matic mission of fewer than 15 in Cambodia's capital, and that only s ince la.~t August. For the previous 4 years, from 1965 to 1969, we did not have any diplomatic mission whatever in Cambodia. And for the past 5 yea,s, we have provided no military assistance whatever and no eco- nomic assistance to Cambodia.

North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutrality. For the past 5 yea,s-as indicated on this map that you see here-

North Vietnam has occupied military sanccua,ies aU along the Cambodian frontier with South Vietnam. Some of these extend up to 20 miles into Cambodia. The sanctuaries are in red and, as you aore, they are on both sides of the border. They are used for hit and run attacks on American and South Vietnamese forces i111 South Vietnam.

These Communist occupied territories contain major base camps, training s ites, logistics facilities, weapons and ammunition factories, air- strips, and prisoner-of-war compounds.

For 5 years, neither the United States nor South Vietnam has moved against these enemy sanctua,ies because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation. Even after the Vietnamese Communists began to expand these sanctuaries 4 weeks ago, we counseled patience to our South Vietnamese allies and imposed restraints on our own commanders.

In contrast to our policy, the enemy in the past 2 weeks has stepped up his guerrilla actions and be is concentrati11g bis main forces in these sanctuaries that you see on this map where they are building up to launch massive attacks on our forces and chose of South Vietnam.

North Vietnam in the last 2 weeks bas stripped away all pretense of respecting the sovereignty or the neutrality of Cambodia. Thousands of their soldiers are invading the country from the sanctuaries; they are encir- cling the capital of Phnom Penh. Coming from these sanctuaries, as you see here, they have moved into Cambodia and are encircling the capital.

Cambodia, as a result of this, has sent out a call to the United States, to a number of other nations, for ass,srance. Because if this enemy effort succeeds,

Address to the Natio11 ott the Situation in Southeast Asia 577

Cambodia would become a vast enemy staging area and a springboard for attacks on Sou di Vietnam along 600 miles ,of frontier- a refuge where enemy troops could return from combat without fear of retaliation.

North Vietnamese. men and supplies could then be poured into that country, jeopardizing not only the lives of our own men but the people of South Vietnam as well.

Now confronted with this situation, we have three options. First, we can do nothing. Well, the ultimate result of that course of

action is clear. Unless we indulge in wishful thinking, the ljves of Americans remaining in Vietnam after our next withdrawal of 150,000 would be gravely threatened.

Let us go to the map again. Here is South Vietnam. Here is North Vietnam. North Vietnam already occupies this part of Laos. If North Vietnam also occupied this whole band un Cambodia, or the entire coun- try, it would mean that South Vietnam was completely outflanked and the forces of Americans in this area, as well as the South Vietnamese, would be in an untenable miJjrary position.

Our second choice is to provide massive military assistance to Cambodia itself, Now unfortunately, while we deeply sympathize with the plight of 7 million Cambodians whose country is being invaded, mas- sive amounts of military assistance could not be rapidly and effectively utilized by the small Cambodian Army against the immediate threat. With other nations, we shall do our best to provide the small arms and other equipment which the Cambodian Army of 40,000 needs and can use for its defense. But the aid we will provide will be limited to the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its neutrality and not for the purpose of making it an active belligerent on one s ide or the other.

Our third choice is to go to the heart of the trouble. That means clean- ing out major North Vietnamese and Vietcong occupied territories- these sanctuaries which serve as bases for attacks on both Cambodia and American and South Vietnamese forces i:n South Vietnam. Some of these, incidenta lly, are as close to Saigon as Baltimore is to Washington. This one, for example [indicating], is called the Parrot's Beak. It is on ly 33 miles from Saigon.

Now faced with these three options, this is the decision I have made. ln cooperation with the armed forces of South Vietnam, attacks are

being launched this week to clean out major enemy sancruaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam border.

578 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

A major responsibility for the ground operations is being assumed by South Vietnamese forces. For example, the attacks in several areas, including the Parrot's Beak that I referred to a moment ago, are exclu- sively South Vietnamese ground operations under South Vietnamese command with the United Stares providing air and logistical support.

There is one area, however, immediately above Parrot's Beak, where I have concluded that a combined American and South Vietnamese opera- tion is necessary.

Tonight, American and So.,th Vietnamese units will attack the head- quarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam. Tlus ke>• control center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong for 5 years in blatant violation of Cambodia's neutrality.

This is not an invasion of Cambodia. The areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces. Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctua ries and once their military s upplies are destroyed, we will withdraw.

These actions are in no way djrected to the security interests of any nation, Any government that chooses co use these actions as a pretext for harming relations with the United States will be doing so on its own responsibility, and on its own initiative, and we will draw the appropriate conclusions.

Now let me give you the reasons for my decision. A majority of the American people, a majority of you listening to me,

are for the withdrawal of our forces from Vietnam. The action I have taken tonight is indispensable for the continuing success of that with- drawal program.

A majority of the American people want ro end this war rather than to have it drag on interminably. The action I have taken tonight will serve that purpose.

A majority of the American people want to keep the casualties of our brave men in Vietnam at an absolute minimum. The action I take tonight is essential if we are tO accomplish that goal.

We take this action not fo:r the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose. of ending the war in Vietnam and winning the just peace we all desire. We have made- we will continue to make every possible effort ro end this war through negotiation at the confer- ence table rather than through more fighting on the battlefield.

Address to the Natio11 ott the Situation in Southeast Asia 579

Let us look again at the record. We. have stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. We have cur air operations by over 20 percent. We have announced withdrawal of over 250,000 of our men. We have offered ro withdraw all of our men if they will withdraw theirs. We have offered ro negotiate all issues with only one condition - and that is that the future of South Vietnam he determined nor by North Vietnam, and nor by the United Stares, but by the people of South Vietnam themselves.

The answer of the enemy has been intransigence at the conference table, belligerence in Hanoi, massive military aggression in Laos and Cambodia, and stepped-up attacks io South Vietnam, designed 10 increase American casualties.

This attitude has become intolerable. We will not react to this threat to American lives merely by plaintive diplomatic protests. If we did, the credibilfry of the United Stares would be destroyed in every area of the world where only the power of the United States deters aggression.

Tonight, I again warn the North Vietnamese that if they continue to esca- late the fighting when the United States is withdrawing its forces, I shall meet my responsibility as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces to take the action I consider necessary to defend the security of our American men.

The action that I have announced to night puts the leaders of North Vietnam on notice that we will he patient in working for peace; we will be conciliatory at the conference table, but we will not be humiliated. We will not be defeated. We will not allow American men by the thousands to be killed by an enemy from privileged sanctua ries.

The time came long ago to end this war through peaceful negotia - tions. We stand ready for those nego·tiations. We have made major efforts, many of whjch must remain secret. I say tonight: All the offers and approaches made previously remain on the conference table when- ever Hanoi is ready to negotiate seriously.

But if the enemy response to our most conciliatory offers for peaceful negotiation continues to be to increase its attacks and humiliate and defeat us, we sha ll react accordingly.

M y fellow Americans, we live in an age of anarchy, both abroad and at home. We see mindless attacks on all che great inStitutions which have been created by free civilizations in the last 500 years. Even here in the United States, great universities are being systematically destroyed. Small nations all over the world find themselves under attack from within and from without.

580 PART VJ: t966 - t9 7 1

If, when the chips arc down, the world's most powerful nation, the United States of America, acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of tOtalitarianism and anarchy will thieaten free nations and free institu- tions throughout the world.

It is not our power but our will and character that is being rested tonight. The question all Americans must ask and answer t0nigh1 is this: Does the richest and strongest nation in the history of the world have the character 10 meet a direct challenge by a group which rejects every effort to win a just peace, ignores our warning, tramples on solemn agreements, violates the neutrality of an unarmed people, and uses our prisoners as hostages?

If we fail to meet this challenge, all other nations will be on notice that despite its overwhelming power the United States, when a real crisis comes, will be found wanting.

During my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to bring Americans home from Vietnam. They are coming home.

I promised ro end this war. I sha ll keep that promise. I promised t0 win a just peace. I shall keep that promise. We shall avoid a wider war. But we are also determined to put an end

to this war, In this room, Woodrow Wi0son made the great decisions which led to

victory in World War I. Franklin Roosevelt made the decisions which led to our victory in World War fl. Dwight D. Eisenhower made decisions which ended the war in Korea and avoided war in the M;ddle East. John F. Kennedy, in his finest hour, made the great decision which removed Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba and the Western Hemisphere.

I have noted that there has been a great deal of discussion with regard to this decision that I have made and I should po int out that I do not contend that it is in the same magnitude as these decis ions that I have just mentioned. But between those decisions and this decision there is a dif- ference that is very fundamental. In those decisions, the American peo ple were not assailed by counsels of doubt and defeat from some of the most widely known opinion leaders of rhe Nation.

I have noted, for example, that a Republican Senator has said that this acton I have taken means thar my parry has lost all chance of winning the November elections. And others are saying today that this move against enemy sanctuaries will make me a one-term President.

No one is more aware than I am of the political consequences of the action I have taken. It is tempting to take the easy political path: t0 blame

Address to the Natio11 ott the Situation in Southeast Asia 581

chis war on previous administrations and to bring all of our men home immediately, regardless of the consequences, even though that would mean defeat for the United States; to desert 18 million South Vietnamese people, who have put their trust in us and to expose. them to the same slaughter and savagery which the leaders of North Vietnam inJ!icred on hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese who chose freedom when the Communists took over North Vietn.am in 1954; to get peace at any price now, even though I know that a peace of humiliation for the United States would lead to a bigger war or surrender later.

I have rejected all political considerations in making this decision. Whether my parry gains in November is nothing compared to the li ves

of 400,000 brave Americans fighting for our country and for the cause of peace and freedom in Vietnam. Whether I may be a one-term President is insignificant compared to whether by our failure 10 act in this crisis the United States proves itself to be unworthy to lead the forces of freedom in this critical period in world history. I would rather be a one-term President and do what I believe is right than to be a two-term Pres ident at the cost of seeing America become a second-rate power and to see chis Nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history,

I reabze that in this war there are honest a nd deep differences in this country about whether we should have become involved, that there are differences as to how the war should have been conducted. But the deci- sion I announce tonight transcends those differences.

For tbe lives of American men are involved. The opportunity for 150,000 Americans to come home in the next 12 months is involved. The future of 18 million people in South Vietnam and 7 million people in Cambodia is involved. The possibility of winning a just peace in Vietnam and in the Pacific is at stake.

It is customary to conclude a speech from the White House by asking support for the President of the United Stares. Tonight, I depart from that precedent. What I ask is far more important. I ask for your s upport for our brave men fighting tonight halfway around the world - not for terri- tory - not for glory - bur so that their younger brothers and their sons and your sons can have a chance to gr-ow up in a world of peace and freedom and justice.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: Th e President spoke at 9 p.m. i11 his office at the White House. His address was broadcast live on radio and television.

PART VII

1972-1975

MEETING BETWEEN

PRESIDENTIAL ASSIST AN T KISSINGER AN D

AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN APRIL 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION (USSR)

Ar Kiss inger's urgent invitation, I went ro see him at the White Ho use on the evening of April 3. 1

1. Citing the Pres ident's instructions, Kissinger asked me to convey the fo llowing ro rhe Soviet leaders in co nnection with the events of rhe past few days in Vietnam.

Source: A VP RF,(. 0129, op. 56, p. 4 IS~ d. 5, I. 153-159. Top Secret. From Dobrynin's Joum31. According to his Record of Schedule, Kis.singer met Dobryni n in the M.:1p Room on April 3 from 5:37 to 6:15 p.m. (library of Congf('SS, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 4.38, M.isccllan )' , 1968- 76) No Ameri<..-nn r«ord of the convers:nion has bttn found.

1 Dobrynin called Kissinger at 12: 15 p.m. on April 3 to d iscuss lodging arrangements for the summit. When Kissinger asked about the '"other thing., he memioned on March JO-presumably refr-rring to a Soviet proposal on SALT-Dobrynin replied: .. Tbis I receive yesl'e.rda)'· I don't want to call yo u because it was a Sunday. I wiJJ call you by tomorrow e,,ening." .. l wanted to see yo u on anothe r matter, .. Kissinger inte.r• jec.-ted . .. Could you come ove-r 3 t 5:30?" Dobrynin agreed to meet at the .. usual place.,.. (National Arc.hi\'eS, Nixon Presidential M:aterials, Henry Kissinger Telephone ConverSation Transcripts, Box 13, ChronologicaJ file)

585

586 PART V II : 197s-t975

As you know, he said, a few days ago the ORV la unched a large- scale military offensive ac,oss the demilitarized wne (DMZ).

The North Vietnamese have now invaded South Vietnamese territory and in a number of places have penerrared as far as 10- 15 miles south of th.e DMZ. The offensive across the DMZ is massive. Accord ing to U.S. intelligence, yesterday alone more than 50 North Vietnamese tanks c rossed the zone.

In short, Kissinger said, we are talking about a large-scale armed invasion of South Vietnam. Thar is the only way to charac- terize the current s ituation.

Hanoi's actions, Kissinger contin ued, flagran tly vio late the 1968 agreement that was the basis for halting large-scale U.S. bombing of ORV territory and starting the ta lks in Paris. Moreover, this agreement specifica lly stipulated that ORV rroops would not c.ross the demilita rized zone.

Kissinger went on to say that the North Vietnamese actions are all the more provoca tive, because just the day before it became known that this North Vietnamese offensive had begun, the U.S. side had secretly informed DRY representatives of its willingness to resume talks in Paris on April 11 and had reaffirmed that he, Kissinger, was prepared to meet secretly with the Vietnamese in Paris on April 24.

The ORV responded by agreeing to a ll this, and then it started the offensive.

In general, Kissinger co ntinued, the White House views these actions by H anoi not only as a n attempt to inflict a mifaary defeat on Saigon's rroops in th.at area, bur above a ll as an attempt to put President Nixon persona lly in a dif.ficult position, especially d ur- ing the U.S. election campaign.

Hanoi could have achieved almost all of its objectives if it had agreed to wait a little. T his was fa irly clearly intimated directly to Hanoi and also through some of its all ies. Bur that is nor enough for the ORV leadership; it wants to publidy humiliate the U.S. and to humiliate President Nixon. T he White H ouse will nor a llow that.

Nor is it o ut of the q uestion, he added, that these North Vietnamese actions are also directed againsr the President's trip to Moscow. Of course, they, the Americans, do not have precise information in this regard, but from an objective stand-point,

,\i e eti11g Betwee11 Kissi11ger a11d Ambassador Dobry11in 58 7

Hanoi 's actions are unquestionably aimed at complicating the situ- ation on the eve of the Sovier-U.S. summit. Thar is the only pos- sible conclusion.

Kiss i11ger went on to say that considering the complicated military situation that is developing in the area of the DMZ, and the aforementioned actions by tbe ORV Government, which are clearly politically motivated against the U.S. President, the U.S. side will very shortly be forced ro ·rake countermeasures in connec- tion with the offensive by ORV forces.

The President realizes that North Vietnam is an ally of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the President is also well aware that Moscow did not perform any planning or encourage Hanoi at this particular rime to carry our the current offensive by North Vietnamese rroops against South Vietna m; rather it is an indepen- dent action by the ORV Government irself, which is purs uing irs own military and political objectives in this regard.

In connection with all of the above, Kissinger stated, President Nixon expresses the hope that the military response he is forced ro undertake will not be viewed in Moscow as being dcliberarely directed against the intesesrs of the Soviet Union and that all this will not negatively impact Soviet-U.S. relations in other fields and in other parts of the world, such as Europe, where a certain amount of progress in Sovier-U.S. relations is being made.

Kissinger concluded that the President leaves entirely to the discre- tion of the Soviet Government which views or recommendations it could o r would convey to Hanoi in the present situation. The President recognizes that the USSR and the DRY are allies, so of course he can- not make any direct requesrs to Moscow in this regard.

I responded to all this by rdling Kissinger that the White House is undoubtedly well aware of our fundamental assessment of the overall U.S. policy in Indochina; iir remains unchanged.

Nor has there been any change in our assessment of the situa- tion in South Vietnam irself, where the Saigon puppet regime exists only thanks ro direct U.S. backing.. The evenrs of the past few days have eloquently confirmed that yet agrun. I also srressed that the only realistic solution ro the Vietnam issue is the complete, uncon- ditional wirh-drawal of U.S. troops from Indochina and an end to a ll U.S. interference in the affairs of the nations of that region.

588 PART VII: 197s-t975

I also particularly directed Kissinger's attention to the final pa,agraph of LI. Brezhnev's recent letter to President Nixon2

(regaiding the fact that the bombing of the DRV can only complj- cate the situation and, consequently, the annosphere leading up to and during the Soviet-U.S. talks in Moscow). I stressed that in the present situation the Pres ident should bear in mind, above all, this thought from the General Secretary of the CC CPSU.

Kissinger said the Pr,esident is well aware of this. That is pre- cisely the reason for his confidential message to the Soviet leader- ship today.

He went on to refer to my previous conversation with him3 and said (this time more directly) that after receiving LI. Brezhnev's letter and appropriate!)' weighing the General Secretary's words, Pres ident Nixon had be-en prepared to scale back all bombing of the DRV so that there would be no U.S. raids against North Vietnamese territory at all during the meeting in Moscow, s ince he, the President, realizes the importance of this factor for the Soviet Union.

However, Kissinger continued, the new offensive by DRV forces against South Vietnam compels the United States to proceed differently now, at least at thjs stage.

But even now the President, bearing in mind L.1. Brezhnev's words, has ordered that during the initial stage U.S. retaliatory actions should be frurly limited in scope. In the longer term, though, there can be no guarantees, because everything will spe- cifically depend on how things develop militarily.

Kissinger went on to say that the President very much regrets that now, during preparations for the Moscow meeting, when both s ides have already invested so much effort in improving Soviet-U.S. relations, once again events in another context and in another part of the world are fatalistically interfering in the important process that has begun. Apparently we will have 10 go through yet another crisis that neither of us precipitated. But we would very much like 10 hope that this crisis will not seriously affect the incipient process of visible improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations and will not get in the way of a constructive o utcome to the meeting in Moscow.

l Document 276. 3 March 30.

Meeli11g Bet1vee11 Kissi11ger a11d Ambassador Dobry11in 589

I again stared o ur fundamental view. During the discussion of the situation in Vietnam, Kissinger

a lso made the following comments of interest: - According to the U.S. command's assessment, the current offen•

sive by ORV forces across the demilitarized zone is only one important element of a general, large-scale North Vietnamese offensive. The second important element will be a major offen- sive by ORV troops in the area of the Central Plateau; accord- ing to U.S. information, it is precisely the combination of these two directions of attack that c-omprise the strategic concept of the current ORV offensive.

Ar this stage the attacking Vietnamese troops "are 90- 95% equipped with Soviet-made weapons."

- In the view of the U.S. military, the North Vietnamese com- mand is now "raking a gamble" by throwing virtually a ll of its regular troops into rhe offens;ve. According ro U.S. informa - tion, of the regula r combat units- not counting reserve units and the people's militia-only one regiment is now left in North Vietnam; a ll the remaining units have been sent to carry out the offensive in South Vietnam . "If a fa irly large assault fo rce were to la nd in North Vietnam right now," Kissinger said, "it could reach Hanoi without major difficulties."

- If the DRV's present capabilities for carrying o ur major offen- sive combat operations are eval uated based on the availability of ammunition and the number of troops that are attacking and massed for that purpose, then according to U.S. assess- ments, the ORV can carry on offensive operations at the cur- rent intensity for about a month o r a month-and-a-half.

Bur if the North Vietnamese command deems that more protracted (but in char case less intensive) military actions are politically advisable, then such. offensive operations could drag on as long as several months.

- So far the Americans have no information indicating that in launching the current offensive the ORV was infl uenced by the Chinese, a lthough, as we know, China h.as recently become more vociferous in its public statements regarding the war in Indochina.

2. During the conversation, when Kissinger expressed the hope tha t rhe events in Vietnam would nor affect other issues, he also briefly touched on Bahr's recent visit to Washington.

590 PART VII: 19 7 s - t9 7 5

According 10 him, both Strauss and Barze! have already expressed to the White House their displeasUie over the fact that Bahr had been received, and have asked that their representatives also he received at the White House in order to "balance out the impression in the FRG." However, according to Kissinger, Pres ident Nixon does not intend to grant this request.

3. Citing instructions, I informed Kissinger that in connection with Pres ident Nixon's message to us about the possibility of his visit- ing Poland after the visit to the Soviet Union, Moscow proceeds from the premise that this is an issue that should be decided by the Pres ident and the Polish leaders. Naturally, we appreciate the fact that the President consllllted the Soviet leaders about this matter.

Kissinger said he is sure the President will be pleased with the Soviet leadership's response.

4. During the meeting with Kissinger I again raised the issue of drop- ping the criminal case in the U.S. against Markelov, a Soviet employee of the UN Secretariat, and permitting him to depart for the USSR.

I stressed the idea chat delaying closure of chis whole maccer is not in the interests of either side. The decision by the U.S. court to begin its "proceedings " in early May, i.e. two weeks before the prominent meeting in lvloscow, once again under-scores the need for the White House to take appropriate measures. I concluded by expressing the hope that Kissinger would personally intervene in this matter and that, as ;n the past, a murually acceprable solution that is satisfactory to both sides would be found. In this context I also alluded in the appropriate manner to the case of the American, Kappe.I, who was arrested in the GDR.

Kissinger said he remembered our previous conversations about Markelov. He also understood the undesirability of any legal pro- ceedings right before the Pres ident's visit to Moscow. However, he, Kissinger, has a personal difficulty in that FBI Director Hoover vigorously opposes dropping Marke.lov's court case.

In response I expressed confidence that the White House, and not Hoover, still has the last word.

Kissinger thought for a moment and then promised that he would again report this matter ro President Nixon personally. He will need another two or three weeks to properly prepare the report.

Mee1i11g Be11vee11 Kissi11ger a11d Ambassador Dobry11in 59 1

H e added chat he does not know whar the President's fi nal deci- sion wiU be, bur if it is favorab le, then they ''will nor link ir in any way" co the case of the American, Kappel, because rhese two mat- ters are "completely different," aUrhough rhac does nor mean they a re not inreresred in Kappel's fate.

In reply I pointed o ur co him that there is good reason fo r him co expect chat if the President's decision is favorab le, then the Soviet side can, ar its own initia ti ve, provide assistance in obtain - ing Kappel's release.

Kissinger nodded co ind icate he understood and added that he would be prepared to come back ro an additional discussion of chis whole subject w ith me after the time&ame he had mentioned above.4

A. Dobrynin

◄ Whtn Nixon called at 6:20 p.m., Kissinger reported: .. J told him roobryn inJ what you said and he said~ 'Isn't it amazing what a little country can do to wreck ,,,.ell-laid plrui.~.• I said, •The President wantS >' OU to know we will under no c.irc-umstance-s ac-ctpt a defeat there and we will do what is necessary not to.' Ht!' said, 'What do you want us to do?' I said, 'FirSt to show restui.nt amd secondly >'Ou have to ask >'Ou rselves whether this isn't the time to b ring an tnd to the w:1.r. There is, afte r all, when I look around th<' world I see no areas where we should be in conflict.' He said he did not either-not even in Vietn3m. Then I brought up th<' BerJjn thing. I said, ' l ook, here we are. We get the ratification thing comi11g up in ~rmany, the President has been asked to write to Brandt, but he can·t under these circumstances and he want.~ you to know if we should lose in Vietnam that is the last concession we will m:1ke thjs year.' He s.aid, 'You aren't going ro lose. In our assessment you can't lose."' (N3tiona1 Archh•ts, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henr}' Kii!inger Ttlephone Conversation Transe:ripts, Box lJ, Chronologital f-lJe) During a telephone conversation at 7:10, Nixon and Kissinger discussed their strategy: ... K: I think the Russians will do some• thing. They are not going to r isk everything. P: They will [not] risk Summit, Berlin, Gennan treaty-correct. K: That's right. I told Dobrynin. \Ve can't con.-.ider sending a mess.age to Brandt under these circ.umstances. P: I won't. K: I don't think you should send it anyway-so any C'xcuse. " (Ibid.)

AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH BUNKER'S CABLE CONCERNING

CORRUPTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM July 19, 1972

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

Page 03 Saigon 10678 191 65 42

Aggressive, and effective commanders and their abilities had tO be used, however, when the military situation permitted it, officers known for cor- ruption should be re lieved. It is Evident that those commanders who a re nor only competent and effective, but also known for their integrity and honesty command the greatest loyalty and respect on the part of their forces and hence are the most effective-Men like general Truong- and there are many such in the Vietnamese armed forces. But it is not only in the military. But elsewhere that the problem of corruption needs to be attacked in an energetic and fo rthright manner. With a political contest in the offing. It is imperative that this should be done without delay.

8. Thieu agreed that the problem was important and that he intended to continue to support the vice president's actions. Once the military situation was in hand, the problem of corruption would be tackled more broadly.

Bunker

593

EXCERPTS FROM THE PARIS ACCORDS

January 27, 1973

ARTICLE 1

.... The United States and a ll ocher countries respect the independence, sovereignty, uniry, and territoria l incegriry of Viet-Nam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva As,eements o n Viet-Nam ...

ARTIC LE 2

A cease fire shall be obser ved throughout South Viet-Nam as of 2400 hours G .M.T., on Jan uary 27, 1973. At the same hour, the United Sta tes w ill stop all irs military activities aga i11st the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam by ground, air a nd naval forces, wherever they may be based, and end the mining of th e territorial waters, pore.~, har- bors, and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The United States will remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the m ines in the territoria l waters, po rts, harbors, and waterways of North Viet-Nam as soon as this Agreement goes into effect. The complete ces- sation of hostilities mentioned in this Airticle sha ll be durable and with- out limit of time ....

ART ICLE 4

The United States will no t contin ue its ,njJicary involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Viet-Nam.

595

596 PART VII: 197s-t975

ARTICLE 5

Within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement, there will be a tOtal withdrawal &om South Viet-Nam of troops, military ad,,isers, and mili- tary personnel including technical military personnel and military per- sonnel associated with the pacification program, armamentS, munitions, and war material of the United States and tbose of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a). Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all paramilitaiy organizations and the police fo rce will also be withdrawn within the same period of time.

ARTICLE 6

The dismantlement of all military bases in South Viet-Nam of the United States and of the other foreign countries mentioned i11 Article 3(a) shall be completed within sixty days of the s igning of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 7

From the enforcement of the cease-6re to the formation of the govern- ment provided for in Article 9(1b) and 14 of this Agreement, the rwo South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Vier-Nam ....

ARTICLE 8

(a) The return of captured militaiy personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out s imultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. T he parties shall exchange complete lis ts of the above- mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this Agreement.

(b) The Parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repat riation of the remains, and co take any such other measures as may be required to get information abolllt those still considered missing in action.

Exr:erp ts from the Paris Accords 597

(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel cap- tured and detained in South Viet-Nam will be resolved by the rwo South Vietnamese parties on the basis of rhe principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of H ostilities in Viet- Nam of July 20, 1954. The rwo South Vietnamese panies will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view ro ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost ro resolve th is question within ninety days after the cease- fire comes into effect ....

ARTICLE U

lmmediarely after the cease-fire, the rwo South Vietnamese parries will: -achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit a ll acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with o ne side or the other; -ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organiza- tion, freedom of political activities, freedom of beJjef, freedom of move- ment, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property owner- ship, and right to free enterprise .. . .

CHAPTER V THE REUNIFJCATIONI OF VIET-NAM AND THE R ELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM

ARTICLE 15

The reunification of Vier-Nam shall be carried our step by step through peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Viet-Nam, without coercion or annexation by either party, and without fo reign interference. The time for reunification will be agreed upon by North and South Vier-Nam. Pending reunification:

(a) The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th paralld is only provisional and not a political o r territorial bound- ary, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

598 PART Vil: 197i - 1975

(b) North and South Viet-Nam shall respect the Demilitarized Zone on either side of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(c) North and South Viet-Nam shall promptly start negotiations with a view to reestablishing normal relations in various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are the modalities of civilian move- ment across the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(d) North and South Viet-Nam shall not join any military alliance or military bloc and shall not allow foreign powers to maintain miJj- tary bases, troops, mjlirary advisers, and military personnel on their respective territories, as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam . . ..

ARTICLE 21

The Unjted States anticipates that this Agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In purs1Uance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and throughout lndocluna.

ARTICLE 22

The ending of tbe war, the restoration of peace in Viet-Nam, and the strict implementation of this Agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship berween the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam on the basis of respect of each other's independence and sovereignty, and non- interference in each other's internal affairs. At the same time this will ensure stable peace in Viet-Nam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia ....

THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS

ARTICLE 1

The parties signatory to the Agreement shall return the captured military personnel of the parties mentioned in Article 8(a) of the Agreemem as

Exr:erp ts from the Paris Accords 599

follows: -all captured military personnel of the Unired States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) of the Agreement shall be returned 10 United States authorities; -all captured Vietnamese military personnel, whether belonging to regular or irregular armed forces, shall be returned 10 the two South Vietnamese parties; they shall be returned ro that South Vietnamese party under whose command they served.

ARTICLE 2

All captured civilians who are nationals of the United States or of any other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) of the Agreement shall be returned to United States authorities. All other captured foreign civil• ians shall be returned 10 the authorities of their country of nationality by any one of the parties willing and able to do so.

ARTICLE 3

The parties shall today exchange complete lists of captured persons men• tioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this Prowcol.

ARTICLE 4

(a) The return of all captured persons mentioned in Articles I and 2 of this Protocol sha ll be completed within sixty days of the s igning of the Agreement at a rate no slower than the rate of withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of United Stares forces and those of rhe other foreign countries mentioned in Article 5 of the Agreement.

(b) Persons who are seriously ill, wounded or maimed, old persons and women shall be returned firsr. The remainder shall be returned either by returning all from one detention place after another or in order of their dares of capture, beginning with those who have been held the longest ....

WITH REGARD TO DEAD AND MISSfNG PERSONS

ARTICLE 10

(a) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall ensure joint action by the parties in implemenri:ng Article 8 (b) of the Agreement.

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When the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities, a Four-Parry J oint M;lirary team shall be maintained 10 ca,ry on this task.

(h) With regard 10 Vietnamese civilian personnel dead or missing in South Viet-Nam, the rwo South Vietnamese pa,ties shall help each other ro obtain informa·tion about missing persons, determine the location and take care of the graves of rhe dead, in a spirir of national reconciliation and concord, in keeping with the people's aspirations ....

OMINOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM March 12, 1975

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE URGENT lNFORMATION March 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KJSSINGER

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN

SUBJECT: Ominous Developments in Viemam

A number of recent significant military and political developments in Vietnam provide an ominous indicatiom of North Viemamese strategy and intentions for the months to come. The high level of military activity since March 10 reinforces this view. These now developments are:

In December of 1974 the 23rd plenum of the Lao Dong- Parry Central Committee issued Resolution 23. This may have dealt with a new policy toward the South. In late February and early March, high level Soviet and PRC del- egations visited Hanoi. Soviet Vice Mini~ter of Foreign Affairs Nikolay Firyubin led the Soviet group. The presence of the PRC delegation and Firyubin in Hanoi may be the result of a major Hanoi policy change relating to the war in South Vietnam. Communications intelligence indi.cates that as of March 10, North Vietnam is apparently deploying to the South an integral unit, the

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size and identity of which are unknown. This is in addition to the probable movement of e lements of the 341st NV A Division from Q uang Binh in North Vietnam ac_ross the DMZ into Q uang Tri and the confirmed movement of the 968th Division from Laos into the central highlands. The forwa rd element of COSVN has expanded its communica- tions a nd is now in contact with at least three divisions and a number of independent units in the Tay Ninh- Parrots Beak Alea. Th is forward element will probably be the senior tactical control unit in the expected coordinated Communist offens ive in M R 3. Its existence is more evidence of forthcom ing multi-regiment size attacks in that area. Infiltration groups are being dispatched dur ing the current dry season at a rate double that fo r the same period d ur ing the 1973- 74 dry season. If the current rate continues, this dry season's infi l- tration will rival the high level of 1968. (1975: 125, 900- 1968: 130, 300) A large scale mi litary recruitment program is bcing carried o ut in Norch Vietnam and the training period for those ind uctees has been reduced from 4 to 6 months to about 1 month. This sho rtened cycle now enables the NV A to recruit, train and djspatch infiltra- tion groups in the span of lfrtle more than a month. Troops which started training in February are a lready on their way South. The NV A is continuing to ship large amounts of cargo a nd add i- tional weapons into the NVN Panhandle, including some tanks and 130 mm guns. Destinations of these weapons is unknown, but they a re probably enroute to South Vietnam. MIGs have been returned to southern North Vietnam. 1\IUG 17' s are at Dong Hoi and M IG 2 1 ' s are believed to be at Vinh. The MlG force will be primarily reactive in nature, a lthough the MlG l 7's may be used as ground attack aircraft with 1\IUG 2 ls p roviding air cover. Communist troop indoctrination has stressed that fighting in 1975 will be very intensive. Slogans being used to exhort troops on to a high perfo rmance are: • " Repeat 1968" • "Attack as in 1972" • "Achieve a victory like Dien Bien Phu"

Omi11011s Devefopme11ts i11 Vietnam 603

When taken together, these signs indicate that the North Vietnamese spring offensive could be extremely intense and is probably designed to achieve a fundamental change in the balance of power in the South. Many intelligence sources indicate that this fighting is a prelude to a new round of negotiations designed to achiev·e an unplementation of the Paris Accords on North Vietnamese terms.

The probable NVN strategy w ill be 10 make its gains in the spring and early s ummer and then offer a cease-fire before the GVN is able to recoup many of its losses. Congressional pressure 10 accept s uch an offer would no doubt be grear-;;ince it would be seen as a chance 10 end the fighting and to reduce our military aid. As it is unlikely that the GVN wi ll be ready to accept the NVN proposals, the Comm,rnists would probably as seek to pressure us, through the Congress, into forcing T hieu to acqui- esce. We may, therefore, soon be fac ing a situation in which heavy pr1:s- sure w ill be placed on the Executive Brach to accept Hanoi's proposals. These will probably center a round establishing the Nationa l Council of Reconcilia tion and Concord with some quasis-governmental powers and providing the communists completed access to the GVN-conttolled population.

ASSESSMEN T OF GENERAL FRED C. WEYAND'S REPORT

ON VIETNAM April 5, 1975

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION April 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFr

FROM: CLINTON E. GRANGER

SUBJEC.T: Report on Vietnam

General Weyand has completed his tour of Vietnam, end his asses.~ment for the President, in draft, is attached. The final report was completed, but General Weyand declined to release it except to the President, although a copy has been delivered to S.ecretary Schlesinger - and could be available from General Wickham. Little change is anticipated from the draft to the final. The report to the President is objective, and reflects his considered judgment. I agree with his analysis, and assisted in some detajJ in the preparation of the report.

However, supplementing the formal report, General Weyand will make verbal commenrs to the President which will amplify some of the more gen- eralized points in his report. He has expressed concern over the political via- bility of President Thieu, and over capabilities of several of the senior generals in the Vietnamese Anny; he will bring these points out to the President.

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In addition, he will probably pass on some impressions similar co mine, wluch follow. The written report, as well as ocher reports being rendered by Ambassador Martin, reflect the necessity which both feel to seek a positive solution to an almost impossible. problem. In my judg- ment, both General Weyand and Ambassador Martin may feel constrained co maintain the "can-do" American attitude in the face of ad,·ersity; my comments provide a more pessimistic balance.

The principal question is whether the GVN can survive in the shore term. Without substantial assistance from the United States. I do not think the GVN will su rvive until the end of April. With a rapid replace- ment of key weapons by the United Scates, the situation could be sus- tained until mid to late May. This is, of course, under the assumption that the North Vietnamese will use their opportunities, and pursue their current military operations while they enjoy a very decided advantage. The intelligence at the time this was drafted - and it is a very fast moving situation - indicates that the NV A is rapidly shifting military assets south ro maintain the initiative.

In gross terms, the GVN had 13 divisions before the NV A offensive. They now have only 6 divisions, plus fragmenis chat have been with- drawn South from the northern provinces. The six are disposed with three in Mil ital)' Region (MR) III, on the main approaches co Saigon, and three in MR IV defending the Delta. Against this the North Vietnamese have 11 + divisions in the northern provinces and as strategic reserve, and an additional eight in the south, for a total of 19. Again in gross terms, the ratio of combat forces is about 3:1 against the South Vietnamese.

The NV A have in excess of 600 Soviet or Chinese-provided tanks: the ARVN have only a little over a hundred left in their entire inventory. The NVA maneuver battalions (armor and infantry) are supported by ade- quate artillery, and have demonstrated ability to use their forces in con- ventional warfare in a highly professional manner. They have more than adequate ammunition stocks to support continued offensive action co a final conclusion.

The NV A remain highly disciplined in their operations, in spite of the relatively short training period for some of their replacements. Their command and control is excellent, permitting them to use their forces effectively in offensive operations.

Assessment of \l1e y a11d ' s Re/1 o rt 0 11 Vi e tnam 60 7

The ARYN divisions in MR Ill and IV are intact, discipline is reason- ably sound, but morale has suffered se riously from tbe unprecedented disasters in tbe north. They have been, and remain defensive minded, and with each NV A success their stamina for sustained operations wiJI con- tinue to shrink. Morale has been deteriorating at a rapid rare in rhe last week.

The NV A are operating as military units, with their famil ies in North Vietnam. ln contrast, the ARYN are concerned about the future of their families, and when fighting in areas where the families are located may be expected to place greater emphasis on family responsibility over responsibilities to a Government which may not be able to protect those families. I believe this one factor, more than any other, explains the rout in MR I and Il. The NVA have a winner outlook, while the ARYN have a defeatist philosophy.

With this as a general background, I do not think that the ARYN will be able to sustain a defense of the remaining half of South Vietnam - unless the North Vietnamese do not press their advantage, and permit tbe GYN time to rebuild their a rmy. T he probability of this is very low, since intelligence indicates that the NV A are moving to exploit success.

Given time to reb,,ild their forces, as outlined in Genera l Weyand's report, and with equipment and supplies provided by a supplemental bill for $722 million in FY 1975, the GYN would probably be able to defend the reduced land areas, especially considering the reduced lines of com- munication and the advantages of interior lines in a conventional war. This would require doubling their assets in a relatively short period. It is highly improbable that tbe NV A will pause in their current operations long enough for this re-organization and rebuilding of ARYN to be accomplished. I is more reasonable to assume that the North Vietnamese will use their total assets apparently having suffered little damage in their conquest of MR I and MR Il-to maintain their initiative, and to seek a rapid military solution.

I have talked at some length with Lieu.tenant General T oan, the ARYN commander in MR Ill (based on having operated as a team when he was commru1ding the 2d ARYN Division in 1967. We exchanged views as old soldiers, having shared experiences in fighting a common enemy in the past). This is tbe man who will be charged witb fighting the decisive

608 PART VII: 197s-t975

battles in MR IIT, and his views would appear to be key in any judgment, and are indeed key to my opinions expressed in this paper.

In response to questions on what he envisioned as the immediate futUie, General Toan b.riefed me on his intelligence, his disposi- tions, and indicated that his plans were ro defend in place with his forces disposed as they now are. I asked if he had considered with- drawal of the 25th ARYN Division from the Tay Ninh area, or the 18th from the northeast approaches to Binh Hoa-Long Binh- Saigon, and what his plans might be. He said there were no plans for withdrawal, and reiterated his intent to light in place "to the last drop of blood and the last bullet.• I asked his views on his capability to cope with the threat developing from the north. He indicated that his forces can handle the existing enemy in MR IIT, and co·uld probably cope with an additional NV A division as well. However, he pointed out that more than one more NV A division would pose "serious problem." ln response to my question on what he considered the most serious aspect of the enemy threat, he cited the combined arms teams of armor, artillery and infantry. The enemy capability to use his artil- lery effectively has caused major problems, bur General Toan saw the prime threat as the NVA armor. He desires additional tanks to counter this threat, but we did not discuss the effectiveness of TOW anti-rank missiles mounted on MIU armored personnel carriers as an alternative. (I later determined independently that the ARYN have s ufficient TOW launchers and Ml!J carriers to use the two together as an effective military tool, and that they had developed local adaptations to mount TOW on the carrier. However, the carriers and TOW are scattered through AR VN units, and the probability of a withdrawal and refitting is low. ) He indicated that he needed additional tactical mobility, and wished for additional helicopters. However, while helicopters would be useful, the comment may well have been spurred by OUI associations in 1967, when I supplied helicopter airlift and gun- ship cover to his 2d ARVN Division. I talked about the probllems created in the northern provinces by the presence of families of military personnel near the tactical positions of the GVN forces, and asked if he had any plans to withdraw the families in the more exposed positions to Saigon. He

Assessment of \Ve ya11d' s Rep or t 011 Vietnam 609

said he had no such plans, and that there was nor really any place that they could withdraw ro - and that the families would stand on position with his soldiers. While nor very realistic, this proba- bly indicates the mental attitude wltich will evident when the pres- sure increases. In response ro questions on rhe effectiveness of the South Viernamese Air Force, General Toan had no kind words, indicating that the Air Force was ineffective, would nor press in on targers in support of the ground forces in the face of enemy air defenses; dropped their bombs from extremely high altitude, and had even bombed General Toan's own troops recently. Discussions on the political scene and higher headquarters were very limited - General Toan did nor want to discuss his views, but expressed himself in a few short profane terms.

We. then discussed rhe probable scenario for future evenrs in MR ill. Our views coincided: expecting a major effort to isolate Tay Ninh and the 25th ARYN Divis ion as a prime effort, with a large secondary attack toward rhe Bien Hoa-Long Binh-Saigon complex from the northeast.

This would probably lead to a rapidly disintegrating tactical siruation through our MR ill, and could trigger a GVN effort to shift a division north from the. Delta. However, one division would nor have the added capability ro lend real srabiliry, and the vacuum in the Delta would cause a more rapid collapse there.

Saigon will probably become a city under siege at a very early point in time possibly the last week in April.

One event which could airer the situation in all of the remaining South Viernamese forces would be the replacement of Pres ident Thieu. There is a vast bitterness against Thieu for the reverses in the northern provinces. Correctly or not, Thieu is being blamed for the military disasters in MR I and fl.

My pessimistic view is that there is 1-irtle the United Stares can do ro alter the course of future events in South Vietnam, short of reintroduc- tion of U. S. airpower in considerable quanriry - and even that probably would nor turn the ride on the ground.

Ar the same time, the U. S. has both ai moral and pragmatic interest in making a maximum effort to salvage the siruarion in Vietnam, Our cred- ibility as an ally will be measured by otnr efforts in the next weeks and, hopefully, months. While rbe probability of success may be low, it is

610 PART VII: 197s-t975

essential that the U.S. project a clear picture of determination to assist the South Vietnamese. This will insure that the GVN has some marginal chance of s urvival, and will, more importantly, protect U. S. credibility worldwide.

In a practical sense, while we may speak of plans extending over a period of several years, we can accept almost any kind of a Congressional funding accommodation which will give us a high surge now. Without rapid funding in the short term there is zero probability of a long term future, and even with a large appropriation, the probability of having a problem to be concerned about by the beginning of FY 1976 may be only academic.

Finall)', the evacuation of refugees could easily grow to a maner of millions of people. This is being addressed separately.

At Tab A is a draft of General Weyand's report.

PRESIDENT FORD·'S SPEECH ON THE FALL OF VIETNAM

24 April 1975

NE\'V ORLEANS, April 23-Fo/Joruing are excerpts from the text of a

speech by President Ford as prepared for delivery last night to the st11dent body of Tulane University:

On Jan. 8, 1815, a monumental American victory was achieved here, the Battle of New Orleans. Louisiana had been a state for less than three years. But outnumbered American innovated and used the tactics of the frontie r to defeat a veteran British fo rce trained in the strategy of the Napoleonic Wars.

We had s uffered humiliation and a measure of defeat in the War of 1812. Our national capital in Washington had been captured and burned. So the illustrious victory in tbe battle of New Orleans was a powerful restorative to national pride.

Yet the victory at New Orleans took place rwo weeks after tbe s igning of the armistice in Europe. Thousands fled although a peace had been negotiated. T he combatants had not gotten the word. Yet the epic strug· gle nevertheless res tored America's pride.

Today America can again regain the sense of pride that existed before Vietnam. But it cannot be achieved by refighring a war that is finjshed - as far as America is concerned. The rime has come to look forward to an agenda for the future, to unity, to binding up the nation's wounds and restoring it to health and optimistic self- confidence.

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In New O rleans, a great battle was fought after a war was over. In New Orleans tonight we can !begin a great national reco ncilia tion. The firs t engagement must be with the problems of today- and of the future.

I ask ton ight that we stop rdighting the battles and recriminations of the past. I ask that we look now at what is right with America, at our possibilities and o ur potentia lities fo r change, a nd g rowth, and ach ieve- ment, and sharing. I ask that we accept the responsibilities of leadership as a good neighbor to all people and the enemy of none. I ask that we strive to become, in the finest American tradition, something more tomorrow than we are today.

Instead of addressing the image of America, I p refer to consider the reality of America. It is true that we have launched o ur bicentennia l cel- ebration without having ach ieved hwnan perfection. But we have attained a remarkable self-go-,emed society that possesses the flexibility and dynamism to grow and undertake an entirely new agenda- an agenda fo r America's third century.

I ask you today to join me in writing that agenda. I am determined as President to seek nationa l rediscovery of the belief in o urselves tha t ch ar- acterized the most creative periods in o ur history. T he gre.ate.sr cha llenge of creativity lies a head.

We are saddened, indeed, by events in Indoch ina. But these events, tragic as they a re, portend neither the end of the world nor of America's leadersh.ip in the world. Some seem to feel that if we do not succeed in eveq•thing everywhere, then we have succeeded, in nothing anywhere. 1 reject such pola rized thinking_ We can and should help others to help themselves. But the fare of responsible men and women everywhere, in the final decision, rests in their own hands.

PRESIDENT MINH'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS IN SAIGON PALACE

South Vietnam, April 28, 1975

Following is a transcript of the inaugural address today of President Duong

Van Minh as translated by United Press International:

Y ou must have realized that the situation, militarily and in all respects is very critical. We have seen for a long time now that the use of force is not a good solution.

For many years, we have talked among ourselves, and we have reached rhe conclusion ro seek mutual understanding among the people. We intend no revenge on anyone, and there is no reason why we cannot have reconciliation among brothers in the same house.

All the tragic thjngs we have heard about, occurring minute by min- ute, second by second, in our country, we have been paying fo r with our blood. I am distressed by all chis.

I accept the responsibility now for myself: I feel a responsibility co seek a cease-fire, and to reopen negotiations and bring peace on the basis of the Paris agreement.

Thar is the single objective for the present. I also believe that peace for the nation must be based on mutual understanding. Thar is a basic trait of the Vietnamese.

With that spirit, with all of our will and sense of responsibility, I accept the task of being President of the Republic of Viernam.

Lawyer Nguyen Van Huyen is Vice President. He has agreed co help me in the negoriarions.

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I also want to inform you, ladies and gentlemen, that Vu Van Mau will assume the function of Premier. He has agreed to accept this role.

Now I would like tO address the nation. Fellow citizens, in the past <lays a situation so urgent and critical has

a,isen that many religious groups and generals have asked me t0 become Pres ident.

The mission assigned to me is clear: to attempt to bring peace, the sooner the better, and to negotiate a political solution for South Vietnam based on the Paris agreement; to put an end ro the war and re-establish peace.

The Administration under me will be composed of elemenrs of all par- ries, to bring unification to our country. I strongly believe I can form such an idealistic Administration and Cabinet in a short rime.

Faced with the current situation, I have only one hope. Thar is to bring a mutual understanding among the people. Such an understanding can be realized only when all elements of the political parties accept the policy.

The coming days will be very difficult. I cannot promise you much. One of the primary policies is to free all political prisoners and put an

end to discrimination against the press. The success of this Administration will depend on calm and support

among the people. 1 call upon all political parties and religious seers to forger about the hatred and swspicion they have for each other, and to unite for national strength.

1 will welcome any initiative and suggestion for peace and I am willing to cooperate with people of good will.

Fellow soldiers, I have spent most of my life in the armed forces. I know more than anyone else, 1 understand the hardships you have s uffered in the last few weeks.

Today an old page of history will be turned. You have a new dury: This is to defend the territory that is left and to defend peace. Keep your spirit high, your ranks intact, and you r positions firm t0 accomplish that duty.

When the cease-lire order is given, your mission will be rigorously to execute that order in accordance with the clauses of the Paris agreement and maintain order and security in your areas.

You will nor abandon your arms nor your ranks, and in any circum- stances, you will strictly obey your officers. All undisciplined action will be immediately punished.

Presid e nt Minh ' s Inau g ural Addr e ss 6 15

Now a few words to o ur friends of the other side, rhe Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

We sincerely want reconciliation. You know thar. Reconciliation requires rhar each element of rhe nation respect the other's right ro live. Thar is the spirit of the Paris agreement.

l et us sir together and negotiate and. work out a solution. I propose we stop all aggression against each other. I hope you will approve my suggestion.

To friendly nations, I say the Admjnistration of South Vietnam wishes to maintain good relations and will welcome any help. We sincerely ca ll on all the world's people to come to owr a id to recover peace.

Fellow citizens, in past dai•s you have wondered why so many people have quietly left the country. I want to tell you, dear citizens, that this is o ur beloved land. Please be courageous and stay here and accept the fate of God.

Please remain, and stay together. Rebuild South Vietnam. Build an independent South Vietnam, democratic and prosperous, so Vietnamese w ill live w ith Vietnamese in brotherhood.

Thank you very much.

"LESSONS OF VIETNAM" BY SECRETARY OF STATE

HENRY KISSINGER 1

ca. May 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Lessons of Vietnam

Ar your request, I have prepared some thoughts on rhe " lessons of Vietnam" for your consideration and for your background information in dealing with further press questions on the subject.

Ir is remarkable, considering how long the war lasted and how intensely it was reported and commented, that there are really not very many lessons, from our experience in Vietnam that can be usefu lly applied e lsewhere despite the obvious temptation to try. Vietnam repre- sented a unique situation, geographically, ethnically, politically, militarily and diplomatically. We should probably be grateful for that and should recognize it for what it is, instead of ·trying to apply the " lessons of Vietnam" as universally as we once tried to apply the " lessons of Munich" .

The real frustration of Vietnam, in terms of commentary and eva lua - tion, may be that the war had a lmost universal effects bur did not provide a universal catechism.

1 Dra.ft- ne\'er submjtted t0 the Pre:Sidcm.

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618 PART VII: 19 7 s - t9 7 5

A frequent temptation of many commentators has been to draw con- clusions regarding the tenacity of the American people and the ultimate failure of our will. But I question whether we can accept that conclusion. It was the longest war in American history, the most distant, the least obviously relevant to our nation's immediate concerns, and yet the American people supported our involvement and its general objectives until the very end. The people made enormous sacrifices. I am convinced that, even at the end, they would have been prepared to support a policy that would have saved South Vietnam if such an option had heen avail- able to use.

It must not be forgotten that the decisions of American administra- tions that involved this nation in the war were generally supported at the time they were taken, and thar they were supported not only among the people at large but among the political elements and among the journal- ists who later came to oppose the war. The American people generally supported and applauded President Eisenhower for a decision to partition Vietnam and to support an anti-Communist government in the South. The American people, and particularly the American media, supported President Kennedy's decision to go beyond the restrictions on American involvement that President Eisenhower had set and they also supported his decision to permit American involvement in the removal of Pres ident Diem- although the extent of that involvement was not clear at the time. Many who were later to be labeled as "doves" on Vietnam then insisted that South Vietnam had to be saved and that President Diem's removal was essential to save it. You yourself will remember the strong support that the Tonkin Gulf resolution won on the Hill and the general support for President Johnson's decision to send troops. President Nixon won an outpouring of support for the decision to withdraw American forces at a gradual pace, as well as for the Paris Peace Agreement.

If one could offer any guidelines for the future about the lessons to be drawn regarding domestic support for foreign policy, it would be that American political groups will not long remain comfortable in positions that go against their traditional attitudes. The liberal Democrats could not long s upport a war against a revolutionary movement, no matter how reactionary the domestic tactics of that movement. They had accepted the heavy commitment to Vietnam because of President Kennedy, whom they regarded as their leader, but they withdrew from it under Pres ident Johnson.

Lesso1ts o f Vietnam 619

One. clear !es.son chat can be drawn, however, is the importance of absolute honesty and objectivity in all reporting, within and from the Government as well as from the press. U. $. official reports tended for a long time to be excessively optimistic, with the result char official state- ments did nor make clear co the American people how long and how rough the conflict might rum our to be. After a while the pessimistic reports from journalists began to gain greater credence because such positive trends as did emerge came roo slowly co justify optimistic Washington assessments. In Vietnam, the situation was generally worse than some reported and better than ochers reported. But the pessimistic reports, even if they were inaccurate, began to look closer to the mark until almost any government statement could be rejected as biased, not only by the opposition but by an increasingly skeptical public.

Another lesson would be the absolute importance of focusing our own remarks and the public debate on essentials-even if those essentials are not clearly visible every night on the television screen. The Vietnam debate often turned into a fascination with issues that were, at best, peripheral. The "tiger cages" were seen as a symbol of South Vietnamese Government oppression, alchough thac Government was facing an enemy who had assassinated, tortured and jailed an infinitely greater number, the "Phoenix" program became a subject of arcack although North Vietnamese and Viet Cong tactics were infinitely more brutal. The Mylai incident tarnished the image of an American Army that had generally- through not always- been compassionate in dealing with the civilian population. Even at the end, much of the public discussion focused on President Thieus's alleged failure to gain political support, bur it was the Communists who rejected free elections and who brought in their reserve divisions because they did nor have popu,lar support. And at home, it was argued that your aid request meant American reinvolvemenr when noth- ing was further from your mind.

Of equal importance may be a dedication to consistency. When the United States entered the war during the 1960's, it did so with excesses chat not only ended the career and the life of an allied leader bur char may have done serious damage co the American economy and chat poured over half a million soldiers into a country where we never had more than 100,000 who were actually fighting. At t he end, the excesses in the other direction made it impossible to get from the Congress only about 2 or 3 percent as much money as it had earlier appropriated every year. When

620 PART Vil: 197i - 1975

we entered, many did so in the name of morality. Before the war was over, many opposed it in the name of morality. Bur nobody spoke of the morality of consistency, or of the virtue of seeing something through once its cost had been reduced to manageable proportions.

In terms of military tactics, we cannot help draw the conclusion that our armed forces are not suited ro this kind of war. Even the Special Forces who had been designed for it could nor prevail. This was partly because of the nature of the conflict. Ir was both a revolutionary war fought at knife-point during the night within the villages. Ir was also a main force war in which technology could make a genuine. difference. Both s ides had trouble devising tactics that would be suitable for each type of warfare. Bur we and the South Vietnamese had more difficulry with this than the other side. We also had trouble with excesses here: when we made it "our war" we would nor let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became "their war", we would nor help them fight it. Ironically, we prepared the South Vietnamese for main force warfare after 1954 (anticipating another Korean-type attack), and they faced a political war; they had prepared themselves for political warfare after 1973 only m be faced with a main force invasion 20 years after it had been expected.

Our diplomacy also suffered in the process, and it may take us some time to bring things back to balance. We often found that the United States could not sustain a diplomatic position for more than a few weeks or months before it came under attack from the same political elements that had often advocated that very position. We ended up negotiating with ourselves, constantly offering concession after concession while the North Vietnamese changed nothing in their diplomatic objectives and very little in their diplomatic positions. Ir was only in secret diplomacy that we could hold anything approaching a genuine dialogue, and even then the North Vietnamese could keep us under constant public pressure. Our diplomacy often degenerated into frantic efforts to find formulas that would evoke momentary support and would gloss over obvious dif- ferences between ourselves and the North Vietnamese. The legacy of this remains ro haunt us, making it difficult for us ro sustain a diplomatic position for any length of time, no matter how obdurate tbe enemy, with- out becoming s ubject to domestic arrack.

In the end, we must ask ourselves whether it was all worth it, or at least what benefits we did gain. I believe the benefits were many, though

Lesso1ts of Vietnam 62 1

they have long been ignored, and I fear that we w ill only now begin to realize how much we need to shore up our positions elsewhere once our position in Vietnam is lost. We may be compelled tO support ocher situ· arions much more strongly in order ro repair rhe damage and ro take rougher stands in o rder to make ochers believe in us again.

I have always belie,•ed, as have many observers, rhat oux decision ro save South Vietnam in 1965 prevented Indonesia from falling to Comm unism and probably preserved the American presence in Asia.

This not only means char we kept our troops. It also means chat we kept o ur economic presence as well as our political influence, and thar o ur friends- including Japan-did not fee l that they had ro provide fo r their own defense. When we consider the impact of what is now happen- ing, it is worth remembering how much greater the impact would have been ren yea rs ago when the Communist movement was still widely regaxded as a monolith destined to engulf us all. Therefore, in our public sraremenrs, I believe we can honorably avoid self-flagellation and that we should nor chaxacterize our role in the conJlicr as a disgraceful disaster. I believe our efforts, militarily, diplomatically and politically, were nor in vain, We paid a high price bur we gained ren years of rime and we changed whar then appeared to be an overwhelming momentum. I do not believe our soldiers o r oux people need to be ashamed.

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