Latin American History

14

Tr-rE SrcoNo NTcnnACUAN Crvt Wnn, 1925-1927

-l-h. installation ofAdolfo Diaz as president of Nicaragua in 1912 broughr I an imposed peace to that republic, symbolized by the presencc ol'orrc

hundred marines "protecting" the American legation in Managua antl rlrc subservience of Nicaragua to American direction. Desperately short of lirrrrls, Diaz signed a canal convention with the United States-American plirrrrrr.rs had not given up on building a Nicaraguan canal-providing sornc $.| rnil lion and a guarantee of Nicaraguan independence. In return thc Urritcrl States got an option to construct a second canal across the isthmus, tlrc cession of Great and Little Corn islands where the navy contemplatccl brriltl ing a Caribbean base, and still another naval concession on the Pacific sitlc in the Gulf of Fonseca.

This treaty had been hastily negotiated by George'W'eitzel, thc Arncli can minister in Managua, in the closing days ofThft's presidency. Asstrrrrirrg command of the State Department,

'Wllliam Jennings Bryan inhcritccl tlrr.

convention and the related squabble when Nicaraguat neighbors, who lrarl strategic interests in any transisthmian canal, protested Nicaragua.s conccs- sions. Costa fuca had claims on the use of the San Juan River, which lirrnrctl a portion of the route of the proposed waterway, and El Salvador ancl I krrr- duras objected to the alienation of territory in the Gulf of Fonseca.'lir spccrl ratification, Dfaz even suggested a proviso similar to the Platt Amcnrlrrrcrri, by which Cuba had been incorporated into the American cmpirc, btrt tlrc proposal was quietly dropped when Bryan and Nicaraguan ministcr to tlrt: United States Emiliano Chamorro drew up a new treaty in l9l1l. (As prrrt ill compensation for his cooperativeness, two ycars later, wl'rcn (lhanrr)r'r() w:rs a candidatc ftrr tlrc prcsidcncy, he returnccl to Nicarirgulr :rb<llrlrl urr Arrrt.r'i can wlrslrip rtntl irt so d<ling cowcd his opponcuts irrto srrbrrrission.) (.on. crrrrcr)tly Atrrct'ir rtrt lrltrtlicts (ool< ovcr Nicrrrirgrrrrtr Iinirnc'cs, irssrrnrinll torrtrrrl

The Banana Wars176

ofZe|ayisolddebtswithEuropeansyndicatesandreorganizingtherepublick monetary system. Since l91i an American appointee

had been collecting

Nicaraguan customs.

The Senate finally sanctioned the Bryan-Chamorro teaty in 1916' the

approval delayed by Pt;;;; attacks from the former secretary of state and

now senator plifr., noot, *ho t*pttt'ed dismay that the \Tilson admin-

istration could sign a convenrion *i,h " gor.rnmenr rhar hardly represented

the interests or i* p.oiit ;;; fl;g*"tlyii"tg"dtd the rights o[ its, neigh-

bors. In the final dtbate, the Senate *a' "suted that the interests of Costa

fuca, Honduras, and Bl'i"t""ao, were nor being violared. Nicaraguat as-

sembly hastily "ppro.'.J tnt treary though Diaz wound up with only

about

20 percent of the $3 million, the othei 80 percent going to pay off the

reoublic's restless creditors' When Costa Rica' El Salvador' and.Honduras

;ta ffi;;;;;r,r;.f;;. the central American court ofJustice, the court in

twodecisionsupheldthembutaddedominouslythatithadnojurisdiction overtheUniteds."..,..r.l.i.t,ertheUnitedStatesnorNicaraguamovedto undothetrearyandtftttt""'humiliatedbytheaffront'soondisbanded'i

Nicaragua "n,"go"iJ its neighbors- by signing the canal convention

with the American g;;;;;;t"t' b"ut' unlike the old days under Zelaya' it

had at least stopped ;;[;;;; ot"htln' And its often turbulent internal

o"frJ.t, .rprn.ily,f't f*iitia"l rivalries between Granada's Conservatives

'r"J r-.a"t Liberais, had become subdued under the stern measures pre-

scribed by the republic's American overseers'

The domina", p.r1,i."i figure after 1g16 was Emiliano chamorro. Scion

of a proud Conservative frTir., he was adulated by ordinary Nicaraguans'

His father had been merciltssly mistreated by Zelaya' and inrengeance

Chamorro h*d h"lptdtit R"'t'it"tt' crush the Mena revolt of 1912' In the

election of 1920,'""Uit tt succeed himself' Chamorro was able at least to

;ti; iit ,gi.,g ,rn.lt, Do" oitgo' into-the.presidency' The ever-conspiring "General"'

"r,h. -,"t' "i*"yJt"lltd Emillno' took up the post ofNicara-

guan minister to the unit.d St"t"r, effectively controlling his country's des-

Iiny f.o.t Managua and \Tashington' Afterward the refublict poliJci""s returned to

their principal concern-

the America., pr.,t'itt' Liberal publicists periodically condem^ned the ero-

sion of natio.t"l ,out"ignty "nd tht ttot'ornit subservience of the country

to American bankers, f,t't'old Don Diego fonhrightly responded to such

accusations *i,n ,it'git'g-ft"i"' of the rJpublic's orderliness and prosperiry'

The marines..,."-"p.ii.cr*po d.lr4"rt., within sight of the National

Pahce, occasio,ally tg*

" *"^'y-"gon: tropical" was the expressiorr de-

scrilli,g tl.,i. plr.,.,,r,i.,crr.,.-<lf ti.," l.,u,r-rdr,r,.,-, r.,',r,ti,'," o[ polici,g a dusty

The Second Nicaraguan Civil War, 1925-1927 177

little city isolated from the real world that they occasionally unleashed thcir frustrations at the slightest provocation. Clashes between marines and Nica- raguan police, in which three policemen were killed and several morc wounded, occurred in l92l and again in the following year. An angry Nicr- raguan assemblyman introduced a resolution calling for withdrawal of tlrc legation guard; the resolution failed, but the United States had to apologizc once more for the violent actions of its marines in Managua and went so fhr as to pay an indemniry to the families of the victims and to relieve the entirc guard with substitutes from the brigade in Haiti. But in 1922 the legation'.s guardians performed a signal service to President Chamorro. A small band of rebels captured the fortress atop La Loma; historically, whoever took this hill commanded the ciry. The invaders surrendered meekly when the Amcri- can minister blundy warned them that any firing on the capital woulcl bc returned by the marines.2

Don Diego Chamorro died suddenly on October 19,7923, as his cncr- getic nephew sailed for the United States to negotiate a $9 million loan from New York bankers. The vice-president, Bartolomd Martinez, as politi- cally ambitious as any Chamorro, immediately succeeded to the excctrtivr' chair. But Emiliano no sooner returned to bury his uncle than he bcg,rtn conspiring to move into the National Palace. As Nicaraguan represcntiltiv(' to the Central American Conference, he had dutifully signed the 1923 trcir- ties with their stringent provisions on presidential succession, but thc ovcr- seer of the rules-the United $1x165-1v2s now showing signs it no longcr' wanted to interfere in the internal affairs of the Central American repulrlics, Secretary of State Hughes had so declared in a bracing speech commcnro- rating the centenary of the Monroe Doctrine, and an American politicrrl scientist from Princeton Universiry Dr. Harold Dodds, was busily drawing up an electoral code for Nicaragua which, it was hoped in Washington, would be dutifully followed in the 1924 election.s

Almost a year before this election the State Department had oFficirlly informed the Nicaraguan government of American intention to withclrrtw the legation guard as soon as a properly staffed constabulary (rnoclclccl on the Dominican guard) could be organized. The Liberals, out of powcr lirl rt decade, wanted the marines to remain long enough to gllaralltcc l "lirir" election, which, it was presumed, Dr. Dodds would closcly mouitor.

Martinez went along with the delay on rcmoval of thc guarcl attrl cottt- plicd with the suggestion for a constabulary, but hc was noticcably t'cluctrrttt to allow Doclcls anc{ his assistants to supcrvisc thc clcction bccrrusc hc hrrtl cvcry intcntion ol'chcating. I)isstraclccl by a politc tlcurrrrral li'orrr thc.St;rtc l)cprrrtrrrcttt to lris rlrrcly rrlxlrtt ltis owtt crtrttlitlrtcy, Mrrltfitcz. rt'solvt'tl lo

174 The Banana Wars

keep Emiliano chamorro from becoming presidenr. He craftily fashioned a

symbiotic coalition of anti-Chamorro Conservatives and disaffected Liber-

als into a union called the Conservative-Republicans, who nominated Carlos

Sol6rzano, an amiable old capitalist with a penchant for spending his own

money to get ahead in politics, for president' and Dr. Juan B. Sacasa, a prominent physician and Liberal, as his running mate.

Martinez controlled the election, and Sol6rzano won a stupendous vic-

tory. But in triumph he suppressed an inner fear that the popular Cha- morro, who knew the election was fraudulent ("irregular" would have been

more apt), would try to annul the results by proclaiming a revolution. The

State Department was genuinely befuddled: It questioned the fairness of the

election but could hardly encourage Chamorro to undo matters. Sensing the American predicament (central American politicians had already ac-

quired a sixth sense in divining American quandaries), Sol6rzano inundated 'Washington with pledges for reforms-electoral reforms, economic reforms,

and military reforms. The enfeebled Nicaraguan government even managed

to muster enough resources to purchase the national bank from American

creditors, and in June 1925 it hired Maj. Calvin Carter of Elgin' Texas, as head of the proposed constabulary.

On August 3 the marines of Managua boarded a train for Corinto. A jubilant crowd bade them farewell at the railroad station, their departure captured by a newsreel crew intently focusing the camera on the windows of waving leathernecks. As the train chugged on, President Sol6rzano jumped

in front of the camera and began waving an enormous Nicaraguan banner.4 "Peace reigned in Nicaragua," wrote Harold Denny in his spirited ac-

count of American rule in the republic, "for three weeks, four days, and thirteen hours after the marines departed."s

Stung by his defeat, Emiliano Chamorro retired to his plantation to raise corn and plan his revenge in what Calvin Carter later called the "Ken-

tucky feud" in Nicaragua. On August 28, 1925, a band of Conservatives invaded the International Club, disrupting an exquisite dinner parry for the

capitalt most prominent families, President and Mrs' Sol6rzano, various members of the president's cabinet, and a goodly number of guests from the

American colony, including the American minister, Charles C. Eberhardt,

and Roscoe R. Hill, Nicaraguan high commissioner. At the height of the merriment, as champagne glasses were hoisted in toasts, a prominent Con-

servative outfitted in breeches, boots, and spurs, obviously drunk, strode into the grand ballroom firing a pistol. tailing behind were less gaudily attirec{ youl-lg ruffians, somc wcaring straw hats and all armecl. \7omen faintcd

The Second Nicaraguan Civil War, 1925-1g27 77<)

and scuffies erupted. A few of the less combative guests scurried for covcr underneath the billiard tables in the game room.

The invaders had come to liberate the president from the clutches of his Liberal allies, their leader proclaimed. Fortunately, the sol6rzanos had dc- p_arted early, but the invading mob began arresring prominent guesrs, in_ cluding one Liberal who grabbed Minister Eberhardt by the coattails, beseeching protecrion. Gen. Josd Marfa Moncrda,

" futu.e president, was

f1d away with a pistol nuzzled against his head as he cursed his captor. Thc

liberators took their prisoners to La Loma and defied the president ro mccr their demands. At one point Major carter urged the h"rri.d sol6rzano to take a detachment of troops and srorm the citadel and even promised to shoot the conservarive dandy who had invaded the Internation"l club, but solSrzano demurred, saying, "Het my brother-in-law." In the end the presi- dent dismissed the Liberals in the cabinet, and the parry crasher

".quir".l ,

bribe of $5,000, a house, and a membership card forih. Int"rnatio.,ai ctut .n Sol6rzano was so agitated that he began pestering Eberhardt to call lirr

an American warship to bolster his resolve. .il/hen chamorro, presumably the instigaror of these shenanigans, appeared in Managua, c".t., gavc hirrr a stern_lecture about political agitation. But the marines *"." go.r.] nncl rlrc genelal believed they would not be returning to Nicaragua. Hi, foll.r*",., seized La Loma,

"ni ch"-orro demanded a coalition cabinet with hi'rscll'

as general of the army. The next move called for a convenient resig,ati', from thc assembly, so that chamorro might join that body. cleicrly hc maneuvered a bill of impeachment against sacasa through a complia.t :rs- sembly, whose members saw fit to inflict more pain on thi vice-proid"nt lry attaching to it a decree of banishment from th. .o,rrrtry for two yc:rrs. rrr March 1926, afrcr an orchesrrated campaign that may righdy be icscribccl as psychologically torturous, chamorro compelled rhe piesident to rcsign, beginning with an offer to make sol6rzano minister to the Unitecl St^tcs and, when he refused, threatening to have the president declared i,sa.c. As first designate of the assembly, chamorro b.tame president-all acc.rrr- plished in a manner vaguely conforming to Nicaragua's rorruous rulcs ,. presidential succession. Two years of conspiracy had appar"ntly paicl .ll' handsomely.

Both Sol6rzano and sacasa fled rhe counrry. Sol6rzano hacl rcsigrrctl under duress, but he had resigned,. Sacasa had been ruclcly antl, his l.ibcrll followers assertcd, unco,stiturionally prever"rtcd fru,.,,,,,.."..1i,g thc lirr- rlcr prcsidcnr. A loyal supporrcr, Gcn. Josi Marfl Monc,r.ll, lrr,x.lairrrc.l ,r tnovcnlcnt t() t(.sl()rc .Srtca,sa to powcr.

180 The Banana Wars

The revolt against Chamorro' like the one that began more than fifteen

years before against Z,et^y^'won its first successes on the isolated eastern

coast. A makeshift Li;;lif";;t ""ulttd Bluefields' home of the coastal

American colony, "'-ta '-t*JS160'000 from the national bank' The fight-

ing prompted ,f" tot"i i-trican naval commander to land a detachment

of marines from the ;;';;i"i"'to protect American lives and interests"'

and to d.eclare the ciry a neutral zone'

American irr".t"tit"Ji" Nit'*gUs internal affairs deepened when

Eberhardt suddenly left the country' turning things over to his chargd

d,affaires, Lawrence ;;; a moody fig*r. *"ho in Jr. n.*t decade would

become an intellectu"l;;;;;tt of f""i"i' Dennis plunsfd into the Nicara-

guan politicar rn"trtt"i' tfilild"* to thewarring?"ctiont andbluntly

tellingChamorrotoresign'TheConservativereactionwas'predictably'to unite in calls for ,.r,ffi, ;;Ls.;;-[ otti.a even more

strongly behind

Sacasa in his claims on th! presidency'7 ^ Throughout 'f" '**t'it'

tht *" of nerves between Dennis and Cha-

morro continued un;;J;t ;L'iJtt't btlitving that the Americans would

not return-even as thttt -;;ts policed Bluefields-to enforce rhe 1923

treaties and that, i" ;i;;'^il;;;t'ld "tti"t American diplomatic recogni-

tion. He was more successful in prosecuting the war against his rival Sacasa'

At the end of May tttt irtttdt rtl"d triumpt'ed "long tf,t ea:: Tlu they

had

taken Bluefield', R-;;;' c'*t p"ttto.b"bt"'' *d tht Bluff, controlling

the entrance i,"o gt"t?ttd' f'"'U"t' \Tithin three months Chamorro's expe-

ditionary force had iil;; tht* to the Costa Rican border and into the

wild Nicarag,,"tt i"tttii'' But as Chamorro won victories over Sacasa' Adm'

rurianLatime,..*;;;;;;;'ji::ii::tll.T:ff ?::l'J.'J.t:ffi1 ii, fo..., ashore, sending more marlnes ln1 tember, regularly ai"tU""'ki"g marinesfro

m the Denuer at Corinto'

By the f"ll of 19;;;;Ni"?ogo"" affair had become more than a bitter

internal f.,rd p"tipiti;il 'h""-orro's

coup' for Sacasa had made a tri-

umphant visi, to rurttiill"'ia ttiat"tt of Mt*itan involvement had shown

up in captur.d *t"po'"'and ammunition bearing the stamp of a Mexican

munitions fi,*. Th|ilit;;;;; t";stabulary h"Jt"t' taken Mexican pris-

oners who confessed. they hid been given offi.irl leave to ioin Sacasa's rebel-

lion. chamor.o a.i.'rri..J rt. ,r.aaring in words familiar to Americans

who had been chastising the Mexican go"tt'ttttt for its expropriation of

American prop.*y' It' i926 Sttttt'ry of State Frank Kellogg condemned

thc"bolsheviLt"t.'"t""'-'extdoor'andPresiclentCalvinCoolidgeclcclarcd tlrrrt "Mcxic<, *,' t"]l''tti-l"ft"t thc worlcl'" l3ut'

incx;rlictbly' thc corrrrlrorl

The Second Nicaraguan Civil War, 1925 1927 181

hostiliry toward the Mexicans of Chamorro and Kellogg did not make the Nicaraguan leader a kindred spirit; he was not absolved of guilt for violating the 1923 treaties.8

Searching for an acceptable course in the Nicaraguan maze, J.H. Sta- bler, a longtime functionary of the Latin American division of the State Department, resurrected a solution often used byAmerican negotiators when dealing with feuding Central Americans-a conference. Sumner'Welles had corralled a gaggle of warring Hondurans aboard an American warship in 7924 and thrashed out a compromise. Now, in neighboring Nicaragua, the State Department decided on a reprise of that performance. The site for the conference was the port of Corinto, the neutrality of which could be as- sured by the menacing presence of Admiral Latimer's light cruisers.

Corinto, wrote an American ensign who saw it some four years later, was a "typical Central American place with mud-flats to the rear and vul- tures croaking in the trees." Three volcanoes, the middle one belching "thin smoke," loomed in the background.e The talks began on October 6 aboard rhe Denuer, with Dennis, the thirty-two-year-old chargd, presiding. Naively, Dennis believed he could now play the role he had failed at in his persistent meddling in Nicaraguan affairs: Under his direction the Liberals and Con- servatives would thrash out the issues and divide the spoils in the American tradition. \Tithin a few days he realized that the civil war was not a contest between men with differing political philosophies but an intensely fought feud between antagonistic families with irreconcilable ambitions. At one point the Liberal delegates suggested American arbitration of Nicaraguat quarrel, which brought the predictable response that the republic's troubles were an "internal" concern. Eager to be fair, the American government even arranged an interview with Sacasa, who had sought refuge in Guatemala Ciry but the man on whose behalf the rebellion was waged emphatically denied any collaboration with the Liberal cause.r0

Chamorro, however, came away from the Corinto conference with an- other of his labyrinthine political schemes. Lacking American recognition, he knew it was hopeless to continue as president, but before resigning he secured pledges from Conservative assemblymen supporting him in the 1928 clection. The agreement was signed in Dennis's presence in the American legation. An interim executive followed, and under Dennis's prodding the asscmbly on November I 1 namedAdolfo Diaz president. D(az immediately got C)hirmorro or"rt of the country by naming him general minister to Great llritain, Iilrrrcc, Spain, and Italy. f'hc Statc Department'.s harried Latin AIrrct'ic:rtr spc:cillists wcrc clcliglttcd, having alrcacly cablccl to Mtnagua tl.rcir

ta2 The Banana Wars The Second Nicaraguan Civil War, 1925-1927 tB3

can high commissioner at the American legation. Though virtually desti- tute, the Nicaraguan representatives declared, Diaz's government intended to carry on the struggle for "national honor" even though it meant forced loans, levies, and, possibly, "suspension of the foreign debt." Alarmed, the Americans replied that such a course would be disastrous, but their Nica- raguan counterparts were resolute, saying that if the Americans did not in- tervene the Mexicans would continue their support of Sacasa. The alternative to surrender was a "fight to the finish."l4 Given the condition of Diazt government, that was a fight the United States could ill afford to wage by prory-and D(az knew it.

The preservation of order without undue interference in the republic's internal affairs, Coolidge declared in a special message to Congress on Janu- ary 10, 1927, guided American policy in Nicaragua. The United States, he said, had a "special responsibiliry' in the Caribbean. Two days later Secre- tary of State Kellogg followed with a reproachful assessment of the Bolshe- vist menace symbolized by the leftist course of the Mexican governmer"rt and its unwarranted involvement in Nicaragua.

Adolfo Dlazhad correctly interpreted the American mood: The Unitcd States, frustrated in its efforts to retrench from Caribbean empire, could not repudiate the interventionist doctrines of Roosevelt and W'ilson because t<r do so would mean losing face to Mexico and its inspired leftist course in Central American affairs. The putative reasons for plunging ever deeper into Nicaraguan troubles-preservation of the Monroe Doctrine, protection ol: the canal route, and security forAmerican lives and interests-sounded plati- tudinous to such sarcastic critics as'William E. Borah, the Senate's most persistent foe ofAmerican policy toward Mexico and Nicaragua. Borah callccl the president's recitation of Americat mission in the tropics a "mahogauy and oil policy," an unsubtle reference to accusations that the administration was fundamentally more concerned about American business interests in those two countries than with its professed commitments to political stabil- iry. Testifring before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, a studcnt ol' inter-American affairs questioned the presidentt use of the Monroc Doc- trine to protect'Wall Streett investments.l5

But in the establishment of neutral zones along the cast corlst, lt Bluefields, Prinzapolca, and Puerto Cabezas, the U.S. Navy provic{ccl sanc- tuary to Americans or any other foreign resident wanting to cscrlpc thc fighting. Admiral Latimer was only vagucly conccrnccl atrout \Wall Strcct'.s stal<c irr Nicarrrgtra. IIis bluejackets and marincs protcctcd Arncricrrns li'orrr thc lrrvlrlics ol'r'ivil w:rr llccrrusc it was tladitiorrlrl nrrvrrl l)rrrcticc in tlrc trrrllrr- lcnt (llrriltlrt'iul t() (l() so.'l'lrc tttltt'ittcs irt lllrre[lckls, ltt l,crin, tlrt'r'itltrlcl ol'

view that while the United States hesitated to interfere in Nicaragua's poli-

tics it nonetheless thoughtDiaz 'would be a wise choice" because he was

lfro.r.r, and capable" "rid

po"t"ed "firmness of character"'ll

it. relationship b.t*..r, Diaz andAmerican officials in these trying

monthsforAmericanpolicyinCentralAmericaofferedanearlyexampleof ,i.'."if wagging,h. iog,'i a phrase former Secretary of State-Dean Rusk

has often ,rrli.o d.scribl a *o" "ttt" alliance between the United States

andanothersmallcountrymiredincivilconflict.Reluctantlydrawnmore deeply into the Nicaragurn morass, the United States

looked to Diaz ("our

Nii.'rg"r"') to unify i,. .ot"tt'y "nd protect American interests' Schooled

in the Central American political art of manipulating lWashington

' Diaz

determined on serving a iull te'm, which meant that the Americans not

only would have to riaintait' their military Presence t" '*, rePurblic but

wouldhavetoaugmentit,ThestateDepartment,alerttoDiaz,sthinking, hesitated in sustaining him beyond diplomatic recognition'

but D(az then

,"ir.d "n.* the charies of Mlxican meddling in Nicaraguan affairs'

On

December 19 Eberhar-dt, having returned to his Managua Post'-wrote:

"\7ere

Mexico eliminated i, i. -y. . . Ipi.rion that the Liberals would immediately

be brought to treat with D(az'"12 As the war revived in the East, Diaz cleverly played

on American suspi-

cions of Mexican designs in Nicaragua' Among American residents of the

coastal towns fear of i p'olot'gtd ti"t"gglt t"" "'ottg and d-id not subside

after Diazt election ,r,j A*t't'n reafrrmation of faith in him' Two days

before Christmas 1926 Admiral Latimer, respondingto pleas for increased

protection from American interests' lat'dtJ forces from the Denuer and

Cleueland atPuerto Cabezas, known as Bragman's Bluff to Americans' and

declaredthetownneutral,givingSacasa'st'ooptuntil4:00P'M'toleave'In ,h.."pi."l an additionat ni. n.i-rar.d marinei formed a guard around

the

National Palace. On the east coast, landing ofAmerican trooPs in times

of revolutionary

disturbances *", .,o, ,r.r.o-rior and had g.r,.t"lly followed the traditional

Dattern of a vigilant naval squadron Protecting American lives and proPertF'

"B;;;; Mr;"gir" ,"a o., th. *.rt .orr., th. introduction of American forces

meant something more ominous-the United States was undertaking a

policing role that"could not be fulfilled by the government' It had done so

in 19l2,when Diaz had proved unable to quell Mena's revolt; it was doing

." "gri*

U*ause the Nic"'gu*" executive i'cked the wherewithal to crush

Sacirsa'.s rcbellion. I l

l)irrz, hilcl s:ricl its rnttch otr l)cccrnbcr 3l' whcn scvcral high-ranking

Nir'lrrltgttrttr ttllit'irrls lrt'ltl lr sct rcr crltt{i'lcttcc with li'bcrh:rltlt ;rtttl thc Arlrcri-

The Banana Wars184

Nicaraguan liberalism, and especially those.encamped at Campo de Marte

i., Mri"g,r, symbolized order in a disorderly sociery'

M".tlf.rtly, the creation of neutral zones favored the government' Sacasa

h"d tro"d ,rripo., .hto"ghot" Nicaragua' but his military strength lay in

the isolated East, far fro*?. menace oTDirr. trooPs. Forbidden to use the

coastal towns as bases, Sacasas armies in that ttgion were driven"inro the

inhospitable Nicaraguan interior' Even so' the war went poorly for Diaz'

Sustained by the ,.",,*i"g Presence of American troops in the country's

maior cities, the president .lo--".rd.d a virtually demoralized army' A Lib-

J[#;;:;;J;;i"g """"1'on chinandega' onlv ten miles from the

;;, ;ia";i,t,o, ,.r,rl,it'g it' ' f"tiot" battle for tontrol of the town' In the

fighting the ,o*rr', ..r,,,i"t" t"'pttd in flames' started' it was later charged'

by American mercenaries flying for Diaz's aviation corPs' The two aviators

had flown over the *, tpoitta the rebel advance' and flown back to

fuf"""g"r a" rouse the fo"t"-""t' Joining.in the counterattack' they heaved

bombs from their pl.""tt o" tlt'tt" of -th"bbily

clad rebels racing about

below. Diazs forces f"ta tnt town' but the human toll was high' as wit-

nessed by the ghr.tly Gt of feasting vultures among the dead' The battle

of Chinandega with ,liitt ht',,"' ani physical destruition was a portent of

the suffering to come' On February i2 "t'othtr Liberal flank-part of a

3,000-man-s,rorrg -o,t;,trny {-"'y of them women and young boys) of

General Moncada, S,t""'' "ble't ofhter-which had marched from the

Atlantic coast to Sa., Pedro del Norte' routed a Sovernment garrison at Muy

Vi"y. Att*ting the defeat, Eberhardt wtote gloomily: "It is increasingly evi-

dent that without .;;l;r. intervention tf,ere is no likely prospect of an

early restoration of order'"16

But Coolidg. ,tiitllogg, smarting from the attack on American policy

by anti-inter.'.n,io,,i.,' itt tfiZStt'"t' f,"d in mind another solution to the

ili."r"grr"r, puzzle-adramatic peace mission led by a prominent Ameri-

can who, reinforced by the m"'itt presence in the republic' could impose

;;;; il.;..n ,rt. *""'it'g Nit"t'g'-t"ns' For such a mission the president

turned to a distinguished p"ublic "'"u""' H-enry Stimson' formerly secretary

of war "nd

.apt"i., of artillery during \7orld'War I'

Stimson had picked t'p " fltttitig impression of tropical politics on an

officialvisittoHispanioladuringhistenureaSsecretaryofwarintheThft years, but he knew.,ttb""""it'gt"y titttt about Nicaragua

(which he habitu-

;6;6.""ounced "Nitarage''id') or its civil war' though he was to learn

quickly and with sufficient itpth to write a book on his experience in the

J,;;-';y. Irr.tr.r thc motncnt this irnposi'g man of sixry tttpp"d from at't

Arrrr,ricrrrr wrrrshill <lnt0 tlrc rlrlcl< at ( ilrirrttl' hc c<llrltlrrtuclccl thc llttctrtiotl-

The Second Nicaraguan Civil War, 1925-1927 1ll5

and the respect-of Conservative and Liberal alike. His rail trip to Mrttr:r gua offered a sobering education in the nature of civil war; along the wrry lrc saw the scars of battle in Chinandega and, in the countryside, scrawny f,rrutt't's bearing rifles going about their daily chores. A fertile land and rich hcritlgc, he thought, had been despoiled by the ravages of war.r7

The official announcement sent to the American legation in Managrrrr had made clear that his was not a mission of mediation. There would bc rro insistence on a mutuality of concession berween rebel and government ftlrccsi Diaz did not have to relinquish any military advantage in the war. But Stirlson would impress upon the besieged Nicaraguan president the need to olli'r' "reasonable generosiry" to the rebels (i.e., the expedience of openingi tr1, some Liberal posts in the cabinet), with the United States participating in "any permanent arrangement which may be eflected for the establishnrcnt of peace and order" (an American-trained constabulary). A few days alicl his abrupt arrival in Managua, in a conversation with Diaz's ministcr ol foreign affairs, Stimson explained "reasonable generosiry" in the vcrtrtcrrlrrt' of American politics. The solution, he told his Nicaraguan listener, lrty itr rr fair election. Told by the minister that the defeated parry in an clcttiorr resorts to revolution, Stimson replied that the defeated should acccpt tllcir' loss "in [a] spirit of sportsmanship." In a jocular mood he told thc nritristcr that Nicaraguans "ought to play more football, baseball, etc." as a tncrttts ol learning how to accept political defeats.l8

Reason and persuasion and a "fair election," then, would pronrpt llrc Liberals to stop fighting and turn in their weapons. But if persuasivc trtt r it s proved inadequate and the rebel armies pressing against the capital firrrrr tlrc

interior continued their advance, Stimson had the authoriry to call orr l,o gan Felandt two thousand marines to stop them. The Unitcd St:rtcs rrrrrsr not make the mistake of 1912, he wrote somberly, when it usccl "rr;rl<crl military intervention" but made little effort to improve political conclitions. Now the rebels had a "reasonable" choice: They could throw down tlrcir' arms and gain a fair election (with the strong likelihood that Sacasa or :rtr other Liberal would triumph), or they could continue thc war "witlt ttrr chance of recognition'if their cause triumphed militarily.r')

Stimson met with prominent Liberals of Managua, inclucling rl youtlr ful Anastasio Somoza, founder of the postwar Nicaraguar.r clynasty, wlro itu pressed the American emissary as "very frank' and "likablc." lJttt tlrc trtosl conscclr.rcntial ct.rcounter was the mceting with (lcncral M<lncrrrlrr, Srtcrts,tls hlrrcl-clrinl<ing rcllcl cornrnanclcr, unclcrncath a bllcl<th<lln trcc lry thc'l'ipitrrlr;t l{ivcr'.'l'lrt'ir r'orrvr'r's:rlion lrrstcd rlnly thirty nrinrrtcs, Morrcutlu insistinl,, tlrrrt l)(rrz's corrtirrrrrrtiorr irr powcl wrrs inrnror';rl, Slirrrsorr rcplyirrg c:rttrt'stly tlrrrt

186 The Banana Wars

the United States would stick by the president until the next election-if necessary by force of arms. The insistentAmerican departed with Moncada's verbal commitment to call upon his commanders to surrender their arms.

A few days later, Stimson and Moncada exchanged written agreements at the Hotel Tipitapa. Celebrating at lunch, the American emissary remarked

conciliatorily: "From this moment let there be a new era of peace and true friendship between Nicaraguans and Americans."20

15

THr SnNDrNo Cunsr

-!- he Tipitapa accords stopped the rebel advance, and once again in Nicara- I gua's tortured history a policing force of American marines ancl

bluejackets imposed an uneasy peace. In the towns along the rail line t<r Managua newly arriving reinforcements from American warships in Corinto harbor peering out dirry car windows must have believed Nicaraguans hacl been exhausted by the ravages of civil war. In Chinandega, wrote onc o[' Admiral Latimert bluejackets, "could be seen bodies picked clean by rhc vultures, and still other bodies with only their abdominal cavities scoopccl out by the ravaging beaks of turkey buzzards who gorge themselves ro ir nauseating stupor."l Elsewhere there were clashes berween American occtr- pying forces and Nicaraguans. In Le5n, hostiliry against patrolling marincs among Liberal partisans who felt cheated byAmerican policy and Stimson',s commitment to Adolfo Dlaz precipitated random violence. And in Chinandega a marine unit stalked a defiant rebel general to his housc anrl into his bedroom and shot him-and his equally combative mistress-dcad.

Henry Stimson had pledged General Moncada a fair election, but thc distinguished American emissary had first insisted on a general disarnra- ment. Induced by an American promise ro pay ten dollars for every sur.rcrl- dered rifle, Nicaraguans began turning over their weapons to spccial[y designated marine units. From mid-May until the first week ofJune, a vasr exchange of arms for money went on, the Conservatives surrendcring rrl- most 11,000 rifles and 300 machine guns; the Liberals,3,100 riflcs ancl 30 machine guns-a discrepancy, observed a marine vereran of thc canr- paign, an astute intelligence ofificer should have noted. Sac:rsa vainly trrg,ccl his supporters to retain their weapons, watched his movemcnt collapsc, lnrl quietly left the country.

Thc disarmametrt and the lurc of profits attr:actcc{ thc rnorc cnrcrpris- irtg Nicrrr:rguilns t().scll thcir riflcs.scvcral tiurcs ovcr trl Anrcrican prrrclrlrs. ct's. "Wt'wottltl pttt lrhc rillcsl in thc: govcrnnlcnt wilrcllorrsc," r'ccrrllctl l{olx,rr

1BB The Banana Wars

Hogaboom, detailed by General Feland to one of the three-member disar-

mament commissions, "and we found that they were being issued out the

back . . . as fast as we rvere storing them in the front." Afterward Hogaboom

and his associates began segregating the better weapons for use in the pro- posed Guardia and dumping the rest in Lake Managua.2

The difference in the number of rifles surrendered by Conservatives and Liberals was in large part due to Augusto C. Sandino's denunication of Moncada and the peace ofTipitapa. In late spring 1927 the marine occupi-

ers of Nicaragua knew little of this diminutive Nicaraguan "bandit" who was to preoccuPy them for the next five years in a savage jungle war and whose name and cause would soon be invoked throughout the hemisphere

in anti-American slogans. (Ten thousand miles across the Pacific in wartorn

China a Nationalist military unit took the name "Sandino brigade.") Ego- centric but not vainglorious, Sandino projected a becoming modesty be- neath his broad-brimmed Stetson-looking, indeed, Iike an extra in a Tom Mix cowboy film-but he excelled in writing arrogantly boastful letters to his marine pursuers and moving defenses of his cause to the outside world.

Of all the "bandits" chased by the banana warriors in the tropics, Sandino alone acquired an enthusiastic audience in the Hispanic world.

The illegitimate child of a landowner's son and a peasant girl, he had

grown up in the Zelayaera, when Liberals ran the country and life had been

relatively pleasant. The dictator's downfall, which owed much to American

harassment, and the coming of the marines in 1912 changed the family's fortunes. ln 1920, following a personal feud (Nicaraguans, among Central Americans, had a reputation for personal combativeness), he fled to Hon- duras, worked for a while on the vast Vaccaro brothers banana plantation near La Ceiba, then in 1923 moved on to tmpico, Mexico, a bustling city dominated by petroleum companies. In revolutionary Mexico, his ablest biographer, Neill Macaulay, has written, Sandino acquired a hurried educa- tion in social justice and concern for the victims of American capital in Latin America, feelings that did not abate when Sandino returned to Nica-

ragua in 1926 with five hundred dollars and a Smith & \Tesson revolver. He began working for an American mining comPany in Nueva Segovia'

a mountainous region that offered sanctuary to his forces in the coming years, but soon took up gunrunning in behalfofSacasa's cause. Sandinot ties with Sacasa and Moncada were never close, however. He first met the Liberal claimant to the presidency after a pitched battle with Chamorrot army in early November 1926, when Sandino suffered a def'eat and movccl

on to Puerto Cabezas, where Sacasa had establishcd his provision:rl govcrn-

mcnt. I;rom thcir firsr crlcourlter Sanclino clistrustcd Sacltslt antl Morrcltcla,

The Sandino Chase

considering the latter merely an opportunist. \Mhen Admiral Latimert forccs occupied the town and began confiscating arms, Sandinot men, with thc timely assistance of Puerto Cabezat prostitutes, sneaked away with thirty rifles and seven thousand cartridges. The Tipitapa accords confirnrccl Moncadat treachery in Sandinot esdmation; when they met later, Moncacla had shed his modest uniform for a Palm Beach suit and new shoes.3 Moncacla was now the traitor, but at the time, wrote marine officer \Wilburt ("Big Foot") Brown, who later joined the Sandino chase, Sandino had no plan to attack Americans. His rejection of the Tipitapa agreement made him an idol among his men, and he made a glorious entry into Jinotega.a

Feland launched a desultory campaign into Nueva Segovia to dispersc Sandinot ever-growing band, but the Nicaraguan rebel, now casually rc- ferred to by marines as a "mule thief" and "bandit," raided Telpaneca and the San Albino mine, acquiring spoils and more followers. After thc Srn Albino raid he issued a ringing denunciation ofAmerican policy and callcrl for the building of a Nicaraguan canal by hemispheric public subscriptiort. A somewhat humorous and mutually insulting exchange began bctwccrr Sandino and Capt. Gilbert Hatfield, commander of the marine-natiotrirl guard garrison at Ocotal. In provocative terms Hatfield urged Sanclino to surrender, using the example of Emilio Aguinaldo, the Filipino rebcl who had successfully defied the United States until his ignominious capturc by Frederick Funston. Aguinaldo had "become the greatest of caudillos arr.l splendid friend of the United States." Rejecting the offer a few day.s latcr', Sandino threw down the gauntlet: "I want a free country or death."

In the early morning hours ofJuly 16, having infiltrated the villagc ol' Ocotal, Sandino attacked the garrison with about sixty regulars ancl livcr hundred partisans, including a hundred or so from the town who joinccl in the assault. Hatfield had only forry marines and a slightly larger f<rrcc ol' guardsmen, but the defenders were well protected by the thick masortry walls of the barracks. A furious fire fight raged on through the night rrnd into the next day, relieved only by Sandinot dispatch of a messenger with rt flag of truce (accompanied by the mayor, who claimed to be a prisoncr) demanding Hatfield's surrender. But the marine captain was as flamboy- antly defiant as Sandino, and the battle resumed after thc flag bcitt'ct' departed.

'fhough the Americans and their Nicaraguan guardsmcn suflcrccl orrly a fcw casualties to Sandino's hundrcd or more, thc fight lirr ()cotal wls trltin-ratcly clcciclcd by an air strikc o[fivc plancs, tl'rcrctoftrtc ctrrployc<l rrrost ly Ior ollscrvatiotr, irrtrrcd with nrachinc guns lrrd fi'ltgrncrrtrrtirln borrrbs.'l'lrc st;rurrlr,rn lrrrtl lrccn llcrtctl by two pluncs llying ovcr'()cotirl cirrlicr in thc

lB9

190 The Banana Wars

day, which had strafed the Sandinistas before returning to Managua with news of the attack. Under the command of Maj. Ross ("Rusry') Rowell, the squadron took off from a grassy strip, headed out over Lake Managua, and then climbed over the five-thousand-foot mountain chain dividing the west- ern lake region from eastern Nicaragua. Reaching Ocotal by midafternoon, the aviators began strafing and dive-bombing the scattering rebels, killing rwo hundred of the three hundred Sandino lost in the battle. At least thirry it was estimated in an official report on the battle, had perished from the explosion of one fragmentation bomb. The timely arrival of the aircraft prob- ably saved the Ocotal garrison, but the dive-bombing technique portended a frighteningly modern qualiry in the Nicaraguan war.5

Sandino and his American adversaries drew differing lessons from the battle of Ocotal. Commendng on the battle a few days later, Sandino main- tained that his force had taken control of the town and, even when com- pelled to retire by American planes, had retreated in triumph. The attack on Ocotal proved beyond doubt that his struggle was for "ideals" and constitu- tionalism and that he and his followers were not "bandits," as the American marines and Diaz's government declared. Ocotal, Sandino said, showed "we

prefer death to slavery." The person ultimately responsible for Nicaraguat agony was Calvin Coolidge, who sustained his "lackey Adolfo Diaz, whom all good Nicaraguans held in contempt." One of his pursuers, Capt. Oliver Floyd, whose seventy-five marines and 150 guardsmen had been sent into Nueva Segovia by General Feland to crush Sandino, put the issue somewhat differently. Reconnoitering in Sandino country berween San Fernando and Ocotal, Floyd reported barrios practically deserted save for women and chil- dren and "all people encountered . . . unquestionably strong for Sandino." In a somber assessment of his mission, Floyd concluded: 'I will have to wage a real blood and thunder campaign and will have casualties every day. I will become involved in a small real war."6

Yet, in the evaluation of conditions in Nueva Segovia by marine head- quarters in Managua. Sandino was still viewed as only one-albeit the most dangerous-leader of several rebel bands that had not yet been disarmed. The thrust of marine activiry General Feland stated in August, should be "a policy of denial to Sandino of places of assembly and supplies [and] of move- ment of his contraband in cattle and products and denial of opportunity for his recruiting."T

Feland left Nicaragua a few weeks after sending this report, tuming his command over to Col. Louis Gulick; in the same month Adm. Julian Latimcr, who irs commandcr of the Special Scrvicc Scluadror.r supcrvisccl Amcricirn opcnltions in Nicrragurt, rclintluisltcd his post to llcrrr Aclnr. [)rrvicl Scllcrs.

The Sandino Chase

Before departing Managua, Feland once more publicly labeled Sandino ir "bandit," though a "dangerous bandit," in keeping with State Departmcrrt poliry of minimizing the Sandino threat. Privately Feland called for morc marines to suppress the revolt. A critical press in the United States was ll- ready doubting the American government's handling of the Sandino chll- lenge to American policy in Central America. Publicly, Henry Stimson referred to Sandino as just another isthmian bandit, though Coolidge's spc- cial emissary to Nicaragua confessed years later in his autobiography that the Nicaraguan rebel was a "skillful guerrilla." But if Sandino were merely a bandit, editorialized rhe New Yorh Times in January 1928, what explaincrl his wide populariry with Nicaraguans?8

In his annual message of December 1927 President Coolidge dwclt briefly on the Nicaraguan problem-the Sandino chase had not yct bccn described as a "jungle lvx1"-nsling the threats to American lives and intcr- ests but concluding: "the population [has] returned to their peacetimc [)rrr- suits, with the exception of some small roving bands of outlaws." A [,L'w weeks later, in keeping with the presidentt well-known view about thc nrir i n function of government, the marine commander reported: "The lrusint'ss situation throughout Nicaragua continues excellent."9

Sandino was not yet captured, of course. Since his "defeats" in thc srrrrr mer, he had chosen to avoid direct confrontation with the marines ancl irr stead to follow the guerrilla tactic of hit-and-run skirmishes. In latc Aug,trst his band seemed to have been swallowed by the Nicaraguan jungle, prorrrpt ing Admiral Sellers to predict that the "critical period of pacificatiorr lr:rs passed and that the country is entering [a] period in which efficient policcirrg

[szd will be all that is required." But in September and October thcrc wcrc several ambushes of marine patrols by Sandinot men, and inforrnation dribbled in that Sandino and most of his force were encampcd atop lil Chipote, a remote mountain surrounded by virtually impenetrablc vallcys of ceiba and mahogany trees near the Honduran border-terrain iclcllly suited for guerrilla war.10

Sandino had indeed assembled an army at El Chipote, but it was unlil<t' any the American occupiers had encountered in their wearying carrrplrigns in the tropics. By virtue of his reputation and the changing cutrcnts of l;rt in American attitudes toward U.S. intervention in the Caribbcan, thc Nicrrrirg- uan rebel had become much morc than a folk hero among Niclraguans. I lt' now had flollowers from cvery Latin Amcrican natioll savc l)ctu. Scnsing irtr o1'r1'roltunity to inflict a final dcfc':rt on Sarrclino rncl ricl thcrrrsclvcs ol'this pcrsistcrrt obstaclc to Arncricrrn policy in Nicarrrgrr:r, thc rrrlrlincs lirtrrrt'lrctl lr corrrbirrt'tl glorttrtl :rir:rss:rrrlt orr lil ( )hipotc. ()rr Novt'rrrtrcr 2.), |().17, l{rrsty

191

192 The Banana Wars

Rowell finally pinpointed the location of the mountain on the crude maps

marine aviators used to reconnoiter the Nicaraguan wilds' In the days fol-

lowing, the American pilots po"{-ttlt mountain and surroundrng area

;til t";;.ntation bi*b'' 'But

El Chipote was not ocotal; the heavilv

wooded terrain p.o,idtd ftotection to S^andino's troops' invisible to their

attackers from the skies' In December the ground offensive got underwaywith

rwo marine-guard

,rrri,r-.orru".ging on ttt "illage of quilali' In separate actio.ns' Sandino am-

bushed both grouPs' ,,'if<-r"gf"t o"-.Dtttrnbt' 301t"t 1 m.il1o1t1ide Quilali

and again o. N.* y.-{ o?y i" a skirmish that took the life of Lt. Richard

Bruce,whohadjustwritten'hi'-o'ht'promisingtoholdSandino'sheadin his hands or perish "itk. ; dog.,, Bruce's ,sraila=nts stripped his

corpse of

pir..f., .ornprrr, bi.otul"t', ani a small American flag' then savagely hacked

hir body with their machetes' tking refuge in q"ii"Li, the harassed marines and guardsmen

faced an

uncertain fate as Srndito closed in on the village' The Americans turned a

grassy street it ,o " *o-t'undred-yard crude landing strip that allowed

sup-

ply planes fro* M"n"g,r, .t"t'i' From January 6 to January 8' Lt' Chris-

tian Schilt, op.r".ing'o"e of the newly acquired Vought 02U "Corsairs"'

flew ten missions i",. 'ttt Uttt"guered 'itt"gt'

bringing in 1'400 pounds of

medical supplies and evacuatinf tight"tn.*ot"dtJ' three of whom would

doubtless h".,r" perish.a fr"a ,#y b"."., trk.., out overland' For his exploit

Schilt won the Medal of Honor'

A second, -.r. at""t"ting bombardment of El Chipote commenced

in mid-Janua ty iIi2a'Thern"tltt' now had newer' more effective Corsairs

and Curtiss Falcons to take the place of the lighter- de.Havilands' and Rusry

n"*Jf't pilots subjected the ctudt shack' atop El Chipote to unremitting

aerial attack. .when,h. r.r,,.ri.rg Sandinistas ran for cover, the marine avia-

torc d.opp.d fragmentatiot' bo'ib' in their midst with deadly effectiveness'

But when ,h. g.orr,'Jlssault banalion finally reached the summit of the

mountain "ft., th... d"y'l rn"th from the base' the marines found only

hastily abandoned food supplies'r1 -. Sandinoisa"small-time'C"t"'"'saidmarinecommandantJohnLejeune

after an inspection of the Nicaraguan war' who "would rather be a big frog

in a little puddle up in Northwtti Nit""g"a than a respected but otherwise

unimportant .i.i,.* it' Managua"' But f, Sandino were little more than a

fanatic with ideals harassing Alerican trooPs in a remote corner of Nicara-

,rr, ;Vfry allthis ftrty f.tjf itt annihilation?" queried the CL'ualand Plnin

Dcalar.Though ,f," fltity of tnnfini'''g him to Nucva Scgovia tneclc sct.tsc'

r5c ,rrllcr .,r,r,i,,,,.,i, "t6c .lislratcl, .r{.I, .,u,,ri.lcrrtlllc Atrtcricltlt Arrtry rl,tl

The Sandino Chase 19:l

the sacrifice of American lives in a wild goose chase . . . seem to be without rime or reason."l2

Sandino had by now attracted numerous publicists, among them thc journalist Carleton Beals. Much to the displeasure of the marine comm:rucl, Beals sought out and interviewed the Nicaraguan rebel in his mountirin retreat and published a series of articles on Sandino in The Natioz, noted ft>r its literary anti-imperialism and its exposd of the Haitian occupation earlicr in the decade. Told frankly that his hit-and-run tactics would mean only thc sending of more marines to Nicaragua, Sandino responded:

'We are not protesting against the size of the invasion, but against inva- sion. The United States has meddled in Nicaragua for many years. tWc

cannot merely depend on her promise that she will someday get out. Ev- ery intervention is more pronounced. The United States promised to givc the Philippines their independence, but American troops still remain in the Philippines; they are still a subject people.

Denying the charge that his army was made up mosdy of mercenarics antl adventurers from other countries. Sandino boasted: "Our army is . . . cont- posed of workers and peasants who love their country."

In some respects-in the setting and the intensity of the rebel leaclcr Beals's Nicaraguan foray resembled a later and even more famous intcrvicw between an American journalist sympathetic to a cause and a Latin Anrct'i- can revolutionary, Herbert Matthews's storied encounter with Fidel (lastr'<r

in the Sierra Maestra in 1957 Cuba. The Sandinistas fought with Amcricrttt- made rifles and captured marine automatic weapons. An old man showcrl Beals a homemade bomb fashioned by wrapping rawhide tightly aroturtl dynamite, stones, nails, glass, and pieces of steel. But Sandinot clainrs oll victory (eighty of the enemy, the rebel boasted, had perished at Ocotal) were, Beals wrote, "as exaggerated as those of the marines." He did not doubt the urgency in Sandino's denunciation of the American govcl'nnrcnt'.\ tusing as pretext the need to safeguard American lives and propcrty ("1 hrrvc never touched a pin belonging to an American," was Sandino'.s rcsl'lotrsc) when its real purpose lay in sustaining the unsavory regime of Adolfir t)frrz ancl the "economic spoliation" of the country by American banking hotrst's. "\i/c arc no more bandits than was [George] 'Washington," Srtnclino rlc- clarcd. "lf thcir conscicnccs h:rd r.rot bccornc c{ullccl by thcir scrrrrrrblc lirl wc:rlth, Arncric:rns wrlr,rkl n<lt so casily f<>r'gct thc Icssott tltat, sooncr or lrttt't, ('v('ry nilti()lr, lrowt'vt'r wcltl<, uclticvcs li'cctlonr, arrtl tlrrt cvct'y ltbttsc ol powt't' Ir,rstt'rrs tll('(l('stru(tiott ol'lltt'ottt'wlro wiclrls ir."'l'lris wrls :ltl t'lotltlt'ttt

1g4 The Banana Wars

statement, made more compelling by the myth still growing about the name'

Sandino would inevitably i^ll, *io,. one Nicaraguan editor' but his image would survive as the "new \Tilliam Tell'"r3

Morosely assessing the Sandino chase in February 1928' a marine of-

ficer attributed th. reb"el's abiliry to elude his pursuers to the peculiar diffi-

culties of fighting in inhospitable terrain' Occupying the towns of.Nueva

Segovia ao J.ny ,h.,,, ,o Sandinot forces meant fewer marine contingents

foipatrolling t'he interior. And rhere was the added, though often exagger-

atei, aid Srr"dino received from the outside. Most of it came from Mexico.

The Mexican government's sympathies for Sandino and his cause were widely

known, wrote Ambassador Dwight Morrow, who had arrived in Mexico the

previous year to resolve the naggittg issues in Mexican-American relations'

Lut Me*ican authorities *.r. 'T"1. ,oo pr.o..upied with internal problems" to render aid to Sandino. Pro-sandino committees, which collected funds

presumably only for medical supplies, operated not only in Mexico but in

ih. U.,ir.i St"t.r. A larger threat to American policy, observed one intelli-

g..r.. ,.por,, was rhe M-exican-based Hands off Nicaragua Society, a leftist

f,e^ispheric organization thar drew funds from organizations tan_ging all

,h. *ry fro* tf,. International League against Imperialism to the Interna- tio.rd League in Behalf of Persecuted Stragglers'14

By the"early spring of 1928 Bealst prediction to Sandino about inevita-

ble increases in marinJ sffength in Nicaragua had become a realiry. Follow-

ing Lejeune's visit, which ..irrt..d Logan Feland to command the marine

Utig"a. in the republic, 2,000 marines arrived, enlarging the Sandino pur-

suit force to 3,700 men. Five American cruisers with 1,500 bluejackets pa-

trolled the Nicaraguan coast. The republic{political system, like an addict whose body had adjusted

to daily drug ini.ciiorr, hri already begun the quadrennial campaign, for the presiden"cy i.rpit. the apparenr absurdiry of trying to elect a chief ex- ..r.r.irr. while almost fou, thousand foreign troops pursued a defiantly anti-

American rebel throughout the North. By now the Sandino chase had become

an obsession with the interventionists, a cause vital to American credibility

in the tropics, and in a Perverse way Sandino's escapades and the continuing

violence ,.*.d the biclering poliiical parties. As Admiral Sellers observed: ,.All

local disturbances ,r. r.ir.d upon by both political parties as militating

against our guarantees of free "rrd

f,it election and agreement to tranquilize

the country."l5 A "fair election"-that had been srimson's pledge to Moncad:r and his

rctrciliotrs l-ibcrals. 'l'hc followcrs of Chamorro, rcmovccl by thc Powcr o[

Attrcric:ttt irttt'lttrsigctrcc in 1926, tlltrtrltlly klol<ctl ()tl thc Stittrs<ltr accot'rl

The Sandino Chase

and the American military presence as an election the Liberals were guaran- teed to win. In the fall of 1927, when Nicaraguas politicians began mane u- vering for the 1928 election, Don Emiliano dutifully went to \Tashington beseeching American support. At his elegant Long Island home, Coloncl Stimson told the general that he was not considered 'presidential" anymorc, Moncada followed and was enthusiastically received; the former rebcl had quickly learned the old Central American art of accommodating thc Yankees.

Early in 1928 there arrived a special commission at Corinto, headed by Army Brig. Gen. Frank McCoy, accompanied by a young officer destined for bigger things, Matthew Ridgway, "a master of Spanish grammar," a skill he would soon put to good use. The McCoy commission drew up an elec- toral code, reminiscent of the one another army officer, Enoch Crowder, had laboriously put together for the Cubans and which they had so cleverly learned to circumvent. Ridgway diligently checked the translation. His work completed, he took Nicaraguan "R and R" by hunting alligators.

Electoral reform posed a greater threat to the Conservatives than to thc Liberals, Chamorro quickly recognized. \When his minions blocked pas- sage of the enabling legislation in the National Assembly in March, Diaz. dutifully proclaimed the code by executive decree. Shortly thereaftcr McCoy became supervisor of the board of elections and with that post virtual master of the upcoming election.16 Driven from Nueva Segovia by the marine occupation of the province's towns and the frantic clearing of' airstrips for their aerial force, Sandino shifted his campaign into the eastern lowlands. His war was now directed almost exclusively against the Ameri- can invaders and their properry, and he began a campaign of destruction of American mines. Having reduced one American mine belonging to Adolfo Diazt old employer, the La Luzand Los Angeles Mining Company, he left an explanation:

Dear Sir: I have the honor to inform you that on this date your mine has been reduced to ashes, by disposition of this command, to make more tangible our protest against the warlike invasion that your government has made in our territory, without any more right than that of brute force. . . . The losses which you have sustained in the aforementioned mine you may collect from the Government of the United States.rT

But thc att:rcks in the East and the harsh trcatrncnt allcgcdly mctccl orrt by Srrndirr<is trool)s to civililns, (lcncral Fclaud wr()tc in rnicl-May, nlcrlnt tlr:rt S;rnrlirrr) wll.s now "tlcspcrlrtc." \Whcn tlrc rlritls llrccipitirtcd lcrrcwcrl

195

196 The Banana Wars

violence in Masaya in the'West, as Sandino had expected, the disturbance was quickly dealt with, followed by Felandt reassuring statement: "The oc- currence is of small importance." \7ith Admiral Sellers he undertook a per- sonal inspection of the eastern theater (which required sailing through the Panama Canal and up the eastern coast of the isthmus). Returning to the west coast, Sellers reported confidently: "The military situation has improved steadily and is now in a very satisfactory condition despite the fact that Sandino is still at large." Under Diazt amnesry decree in April, 538 "self- confessed bandits" 5u11snds1sd-the number rose above a thousand during 6hs 5urnrnsl-though, inexplicably, only twenry-two turned in any weap- ons. But the surrenders meant that "neither Sandino nor his followers will be able to have any appreciable efitct on the outcome of the election."l8

For the policing of the election, McCoy had acquired an impressive staff of twenry-five army, twenry-nine navy, and four marine officers and ten civilians. There at their behest were 432 marines and bluejackets, one at each of the polling places scattered throughout the republic. The army had not played a major role in Caribbean occupation since the days when Frederick Funston had ruled Veracruz, but McCoy was making the most of his role. His electoral commission, he believed, would rejuvenate-even revolutionize-Nicaraguan politics, and his enthusiastic descent on Mana- gua aroused marine resentment. The marines, after all, had been doing the grubby work of pursuing Sandino, policing the dense forests and boggy wastes of northern and eastern Nicaragua in what was turning out to be, from the perspective in'Washington, a futile chase. They (and their navy comrades) were predictably annoyed at Coolidge's abrupt decision to turn to a rival service for inspiration about American policy in Nicaragua and management of the election. McCoy had arrived not only for the purpose of drafting an electoral code and guaranteeing an honest count but also to assess the war and report on marine operations. "People cannot understand why the job [of disarming Sandino] cannot be done," Secretary of State Kellogg had lamely confessed to McCoy before he left for Nicaragua, "and frankly I do not understand myself,"le

In reviewing the dreary record of fraudulent voting in Latin American politics, American supervision of the 1928 (and 1932) Nicaraguan election stands out as premier example of the honest election. President-elect Her- bert Hoover, in his preinaugural goodwill tour of the hemisphere, stopped briefly at Corinto and observed that intervention had inherent limitations. Privately he noted that New York City politics might bcncfit from applica- tion oIthe Amcrican clectoral code used in Nicaragua. At polling placcs thc srrpcrvisors rcrlrrircrl crrclr votcr t() dil) tw<l lingcrs in intlclilllc Mcrctrro-

The Sandino Chase lttT

chrome. Even President Diaz was photographed complying with thc rc- quirement in order ro convince wary peasants, who had been told by tlrc sandinistas that the chemical substance in the bowl was poisonous, r. participate.2o

Yet the conduct of the campaign and the American presence virtually dictated a Liberal victory. The Nicaraguan Liberals, like the cuban Liberal.s of 1905, probably deserved ro win, but they took no chances. They clevcrly spread among Mccoy's supervisors stories about conservarive ,,ro.,g-"rn., tactics in previous elections and even circulated the credible story that thc united states favored their cause. General Moncada, the Liberal candidarc, ostentatiously traveled with General Mccoy on one of his preelectiorr inspections.2l

_The voting went off without much trouble, though one marine officcr.

in charge in ]inotega, where Sandino had threatened ,o dir.,rp. the elccti.rr, obtained secrer permission to alter the rules to fir the situation. And dcspitc the use of Mercurochrome there was multiple voting. \when ir was ovcr, Moncada won a stupendous victory. Thus was fulfilled Stimsont plcclgc rrt Tipitapa. A few weeks Iater Admiral Sellers implored Sandino to

".."1.,i r 1,"

result and surrender. Leaflets pledging amnesry were dropped from rnrrrinr. planes flying over Sandinista country. Sandino himself seni his old chicl'rrrr accommodating letter urging their alliance againsr the yankee invadcr.s..l.r

Moncada, however, had already made his bargain.