Week 9 essay

GARDNER AND MORANRESPONSE TO LYNN WATERHOUSE

The Science of Multiple Intelligences Theory:

A Response to Lynn Waterhouse

Howard Gardner and Seana Moran

Graduate School of Education

Harvard University

For a scholar, a fate worse than being criticized is being ignored. Waterhouse (2006) has

done Howard Gardner the courtesy of reading much of the primary and secondary literature

on multiple intelligences (MI) theory. Although the authors disagree with several of her in-

terpretations and conclusions, we appreciate her efforts as well as the opportunity to respond.

We have 2 main criticisms: (a) Waterhouse misunderstands and oversimplifies MI theory and

(b) Waterhouse’s own line of argument undermines her claim that MI theory is not supported

by the literature. This response reorients and clarifies for the reader the usefulness and impli-

cations of MI theory with the goal of demonstrating why Waterhouse’s critique misses the

mark in a number of respects.

Gardner introduced multiple intelligences (MI) theory in

the book, Frames of Mind, published in 1983. In arriving at

his theory, Gardner combined the empirical findings of

hundreds of studies from a variety of disciplines (see the

extensive bibliography in the original book). Although he

included psychometric and experimental psychology, he did

not limit his base of support to just these disciplines.

Rather, MI theory also encompasses cognitive and develop-

mental psychology, differential psychology, neuroscience,

anthropology, and cultural studies.

Gardner’s major claim is that a description of individu-

als in terms of a small number of relatively independent

computational capacities is more useful to cognitive scien-

tists, psychologists, and educators than a description in

terms of an innumerable collection of sensory-perceptual

modules, on the one hand, or a single, all-purpose intelli-

gence, on the other. An intelligence is defined as a

biopsychological potential to process information that can

be activated in a cultural setting to solve problems or create

products that are of value in a culture.

This definition sets the stage for our first comment on Wa-

terhouse’s (2006) account of MI theory. Her view fails to en-

compass the several levels on which MI theory examines

intelligences—as composites of fine-grained neurological

subprocesses but not those subprocesses themselves, as

biopsychological information processing capacities, and as

the bases on which an individual can participate in

meaningful activities in the broader cultural milieu. Indeed,

Waterhouse misses this latter level altogether, except for her

assertion that MI theory is a questionable basis for education,

a key cultural institution.

MI THEORY TAKES A MIDDLE ROAD

Gardner has never claimed that MI theory represents

“the” definitive description of human cognitive capaci-

ties. Rather, he maintains that relatively independent yet

interacting intelligences provide a better understanding

of the variety and scope of human cognitive feats than do

competing accounts.

This debate of whether intelligence is a singular individ-

ual quality or a plethora of components (Guilford’s 1967

structure of intellect model had 120!) has waxed and waned

throughout the 20th century. Spearman (1904), Binet and Si-

mon (1909/1976), L. M. Terman (1925) and L. W. Terman

and Oden, 1947, and Wechsler (1958) paved the path for IQ,

the “first factor” from paper-and-pencil IQ tests that has been

correlated with other paper-and-pencil tests and linguistic

and logical scholastic success—but far less impressively

with real-world success (see Moran & Gardner, 2006). In-

deed, the lack of extraordinary success among the children

with high IQs in Terman’s 70+-year longitudinal study is re-

markable in showing the limits of IQ as a conceptualization

of intelligence. Yet, because IQ tests seem easy to administer

EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST, 41(4), 227–232

Copyright © 2006, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Correspondence should be addressed to Howard Gardner, Graduate

School of Education, Harvard University, Larsen Hall 201, 14 Appian Way,

Cambridge, MA 02138. E-mail: [email protected]

and score, and because they are well entrenched in the educa-

tional psyche, they remain the standard in most schools, de-

spite lack of agreement about what they actually measure and

predict (see Neisser, 1998, for a critical discussion).

At the other end of the spectrum are people who equate in-

telligence with sensory-perceptual abilities, such as verbal,

perceptual speed, number, word fluency, space/visualization,

and mechanical acumen (Thorndike, 1921; Thurstone, 1938;

Vernon, 1950). One advantage of this slant is that these abili-

ties are easy to “see” experimentally: They can be manipu-

lated by standard cognitive psychological and social psycho-

logical research intervention paradigms. As such, this

approach tends to be favored by psychologists. Both the IQ

and the sensory-perceptual abilities foci continue today. Yet,

they may be cases of the cliché of the man looking for his

dropped car keys underneath the street lamp because that is

where the light is. Intelligence as IQ or sensory-perceptual

ability is easy to test, so many educators and psychologists

understandably prefer these approaches.

An MI approach demands a change of minds among re-

searchers and educators: It requires an interdisciplinary per-

spective, cultural sensitivity, and an interactionist-dynamic

research methodology. The first two reasons support

Gardner’s decision to incorporate anthropological studies

and case materials from a variety of cultures in devising and

revising his theory (see Gardner, 2006a). The third reason

supports his decision to include developmental findings and

to push for assessment criteria and environments that are in-

telligence-fair, are individual-focused (rather than “average

kid”-focused), and capture the often dynamic interactions

among intelligences.

The advantage of this approach is that it better explains

the wide variety of “intelligent” performances among chil-

dren and adults depending on level of training, context, cul-

ture, and innate predisposition. An MI approach better ad-

dresses the incongruities and imbalances of intelligent

behavior not only between individuals but also within indi-

viduals. Finally, an MI approach does not overprivilege the

“average” person—rather, it makes room in the scholarly de-

bate for experts whose intelligence profiles fit perfectly with

a cultural domain; creators whose intelligence profiles are in-

congruous with a cultural domain in a fruitful, surprising

way; and savants and brain-damaged patients who exhibit a

striking disparity among abilities.

MI THEORY COMPRISES SEVERAL LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

Where should “intelligence” be situated? At the modular

level of specific neural processes, the middle level of coordi-

nated intelligences, or the social level of how intelligences

intersect with cultural domains? On the fine-grained end of

the spectrum, each intelligence makes use of psychological

subcomponents (e.g., face detection or object tracking). In

his own work, for example, Gardner (1994; Gardner,

Brownell, Wapner, & Michelow, 1983) dissected several as-

pects of linguistic intelligence, including sensitivity to syn-

tax, metaphor, and narrative. He also drew on others’ work to

understand and formulate how these subcomponents com-

prise an intelligence—in this case, linguistic intelligence. We

are pleased by the extent to which this identification of

subcomponents has been reinforced by findings in neurosci-

ence (e.g., the discovery of many specific neural systems,

mediating capacities like theory of mind, recognition of natu-

ral kinds, understanding of self, understanding of others) and

developmental studies (e.g., identification of core systems of

numerical, linguistic, and causal reasoning). For the summa-

ries of these findings, see Gardner 2006a and 2006b.

At the broader end of the spectrum, intelligences interact with

the opportunities and supports of social groups, such as profes-

sions and vocations. Gardner’s work over the last 2 decades has

focused on this interaction (Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi, &

Damon, 2001; Kornhaber, Krechevsky, & Gardner, 1990). Social

groups organize information into disciplines and domains (i.e.,

bodies of knowledge), toward which individuals can mobilize

one or more intelligences to produce proficient and/or expert be-

havior (Connell, Sheridan, & Gardner, 2004). As a result of this

work—as well as the work of Csikszentmihalyi (1988), Hutchins

(1980), Salomon (1993), and many others—we have refashioned

the concept of intelligence so that it comprises what the individual

brings and what the cultural and social environments contribute

to a particular cognitive performance.

In the middle of this spectrum are the intelligences

themselves. Based on the eight criteria outlined in chapter 4

of Frames of Mind, Gardner (1999) holds that there are

eight intelligences, each oriented to a specific type of infor-

mation: linguistic, logical-mathematical, musical, spatial,

bodily kinesthetic, naturalistic, interpersonal, and

intrapersonal. He has analyzed the potential of a ninth intel-

ligence, existential, but is not yet convinced it fulfills all of

the criteria. Note that information is not synonymous with

sensory input. Rather, information comprises a collection of

such inputs in any format that can be interpreted, under-

stood, and made use of by the person (or, more precisely,

by his or her computational capacities).

MI theory also stresses that the interaction among these

intelligences is important for understanding how people’s

minds work. For example, the intelligences can be grouped

together for various purposes (e.g., those that deal with ob-

jects, with persons, with more abstract entities). One key

modification of the theory entails two overarching

intelligences profiles: searchlight and laserlike (Gardner,

2006a). Waterhouse (2006) regards these terms as additional

intelligences, but they are not. Intelligence profiles describe

the strength of intelligences relative to each other. Search-

light profiles— especially characteristic of politicians and

businessmen—involve a ready shifting among intelligences

that are often of comparable strength. Laserlike profiles—es-

pecially characteristic of artists, scientists, and schol-

228 GARDNER AND MORAN

ars—demonstrate one or two powerful intelligences used in

great depth that overshadow the other intelligences.

Deployment of the Word Intelligence

In addition to Waterhouse’s (2006) mischaracterization of

the nature and scope of MI theory, her article includes several

specific terminological and level-confusion errors. Consider,

for example, the first paragraph of the article:

1. Gardner has never combined interpersonal and

intrapersonal intelligence into a single intelligence. Interper-

sonal intelligence processes information related to other peo-

ple and interacting with them. Intrapersonal intelligence pro-

cesses information about the self. They are clearly different.

2. Naturalist intelligence does not include empathy for

natural things. Empathy is an emotional capacity not an in-

formation processing capacity. Naturalist intelligence pro-

cesses information related to distinguishing among natural

and manmade objects, which is evolutionarily derived from

the hominid capacity to recognize, group, and label distinc-

tions among natural phenomena.

3. Gardner never described the searchlight and laserlike

profiles as “additional intelligences.” As noted previously,

these conceptualizations describe the ways in which the sev-

eral intelligences interact and are deployed.

In later passages, Waterhouse (2006) confuses an intelli-

gence, which is an individual’s biopsychological informa-

tion processing capacity, with a skill, which is a cognitive

performance that includes the supports and constraints of

the environment (see Fischer, 1980). In our terms, she col-

lapses the middle intelligence level with the broad cultural

domain level. Further on, she characterizes the object and

location perceptual neural pathways as additional “place”

and “object” intelligences—confusing the levels of sensory

input and subcomponents with the middle level of

intelligences. As an additional example, she characterizes

Kahneman’s decision-making styles as still more

intelligences—the “intuitive” and the “delibera-

tive”—which confuses the individual intelligences with

profiles or means of deploying those intelligences. These

errors of detail—misusing MI theory terms and using em-

pirical findings at the inappropriate level of analysis—cast

doubt on Waterhouse’s (2006) analyses and conclusions.

MI THEORY AS AN EDUCATIONAL “PROGRAM”

Waterhouse (2006) castigates educators for building prac-

tices on an “unproved theory.” We would turn this accusation

on its head. It has taken a century and many millions of dol-

lars to bring IQ testing to its current, not especially impres-

sive (although highly reliable!) status. IQ-based education,

which Waterhouse lauds, has yielded no genuine implica-

tions for classroom instruction or the improvement of

performances, only feelings of pride or shame on the part of

test-takers or their families.

It should be stressed that Gardner himself has never put

forth an educational recipe growing out of MI theory. At

most, he has indicated some general implications—individu-

alizing education, approaching topics through multiple entry

points—that are consistent with the theory. Waterhouse’s

(2006) assertion that educational applications of MI theory

are harmful is without merit. This claim is offered without

evidence and by ignoring considerable counterevidence.

With colleagues, Kornhaber (Kornhaber, Fierros &

Veenema, 2004) studied 41 schools that had used MI-in-

spired practices for several years. She documents numerous

ways—quantitative as well as qualitative—in which these

schools and their students have benefited. In our view, it is up

to educators to decide whether ideas derived from, inferred

from, or catalyzed from MI theory are useful to them.

RIVAL VIEWS OF SCIENCE

We are puzzled when Waterhouse (2006) asserts that MI

theory is not empirical, is not based on empirical findings,

or has no support in the empirical literature. The theory

originated entirely from empirical findings. In our view,

Waterhouse embraces a naïve view of science, which con-

temporary philosophers or historians of science rarely hold.

As put forth by Diamond (2005), science is misrepresented

as “the body of knowledge acquired by performing repli-

cated experiments in the laboratory” (p. 17). Rather, as Dia-

mond goes on to point out, science is (and has been from its

origins) a much broader enterprise: the acquisition of reli-

able knowledge about the world. Many fields— population

biology, astronomy, epidemiology, geology, and paleontol-

ogy, to name a few—proceed by incorporating and

contextualizing relevant empirical findings. That is, science

progresses not only through experimentation but also by

synthesizing the experimental, observational, and theoreti-

cal work of others to build a foundation for future research.

MI theory was put forth deliberately as a work of synthe-

sis: a work that organizes and integrates large bodies of em-

pirical work from a variety of disciplines. Rather than utiliz-

ing only the experimental and psychometric psychological

findings, which were the dominant approach to intelligence

at the time, Gardner cast a wide net that included neurosci-

ence, cognitive science, anthropology, and evolutionary sci-

ences. This broader view allowed Gardner to reconceptualize

intelligence(s)—that is, to understand the concept in a new

light free from the constraints of a single disciplinary lens.

Gardner continues to assess and integrate new empirical

findings from these and other various domains to refine MI

theory (e.g., Gardner, 2006a). This ongoing process of analy-

sis and synthesis has resulted in the addition of intelligences,

RESPONSE TO LYNN WATERHOUSE 229

the conceptualization of intelligence profiles, and the modest

educational guidelines described previously. In each of these

modifications, the changes have been guided by the usual

considerations of logic, clarity, and usefulness expected in

scientific theorizing and synthesizing.

At the most fundamental level, we believe that Water-

house (2006) does not acknowledge or understand the enter-

prise in which Gardner has been engaged: synthesizing the

empirical findings of others. Yet, there is a paradox: Synthe-

sis is precisely the enterprise of her own article—assembling

and making sense of a body of literature. Moreover, in her

own synthesizing efforts, she makes use of categories that are

precisely at the same level as Gardner’s intelligences—she

readily invokes emotional intelligence, musical aptitude,

spatial skill, and the like. Therefore, her own presentation un-

dermines the heart of her critique.

ON TESTING

Waterhouse (2006) berates Gardner for not testing MI theory,

and she quotes others who claim that MI theory has not been

tested. As a work of synthesis, MI theory does not lend itself

easily to testing through paper-and-pencil assessments or a

one-shot experiment. Rather, it is repeatedly assessed and re-

formulated as new empirical findings from a variety of disci-

plines are analyzed and integrated. Theories such as evolu-

tion or plate tectonics or MI develop through the continuing

accumulation of evidence, which makes the theory more or

less plausible, more or less relevant for further research, and

more or less useful to practitioners.

It is possible to develop a set of tests that purport to exam-

ine the core components of each intelligence proposed in MI

theory. Were such tests to be developed, one could then ex-

amine the correlations among the subcomponents of each in-

telligence and correlations (or lack thereof) across the tests

that purport to examine each separate intelligence. However,

in her adherence to an IQ view of intelligence, Waterhouse

(2006) claims that intercorrelations among subcomponents

refute rather than support an MI perspective. She does not

recognize that such correlations also could imply the con-

cepts of searchlight and laserlike intelligence profiles—in

other words, how the intelligences interact.

In fact, some useful tests have been developed. In the 1980s,

Feldman, Krechevsky, Chen, Gardner, and other colleagues

created “intelligence-fair” assessments of the intelligences for

preschool children. An intelligence-fair assessment means it

assesses a particular intelligence in its most natural mi-

lieu—for example, the bodily kinesthetic intelligence through

movement activities or the interpersonal intelligence through

social interaction—rather than through ersatz paper-and-pen-

cil measures. These researchers piloted the Project Spectrum

measures on select groups of young children in the Boston

area, which yielded distinctive intelligence profiles in children

as young as 3 or 4 years. These findings are described in a num-

ber of articles and in three books (Gardner, Feldman, &

Krechevsky, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). Educators in the United

States and around the world—from Scandinavia to East

Asia—continue to use these materials.

This project taught Gardner another key lesson: De-

veloping tests is an expensive and time-consuming process

whose final results may well be misused. Even as the IQ

test yields premature, all-purpose descriptions of “smart”

and “dumb,” a Spectrum assessment unthinkingly might

lead to labeling a child as “music smart” or “interpersonally

stupid.” Gardner would prefer to spend more resources

helping learners understand and develop their individual in-

telligence profiles and spend less resources testing, ranking,

and labeling them. He has made the personal decision not

to become directly involved in testing. Nevertheless, both

authors understand that assessment is a fundamental com-

ponent of the educational system; we have no objection to

others developing assessment instruments as long as they

are intelligence-fair.

For example, we find encouraging those efforts to create

milieus in which the intelligences can be observed using

meaningful materials in meaningful situations. Recently

both of us had the opportunity to learn about the Explorama

at Danfoss Universe in southwestern Denmark. The Universe

is an impressive new science park and museum complex

open to the general public. Inspired by MI theory, the

Explorama offers approximately 50 games that individuals

can play alone or in small groups. The games range from lan-

guage learning games, to games involving balancing or jug-

gling, making and dissecting tunes, or working with individ-

uals or robots to move objects around.

Of the dozens of efforts to create measures of the various

intelligences, the Explorama is by far the most effective. It is

fun to sample across the board or to delve into a particular task,

it involves measures that do not require the intrusion of pa-

per-and-pencil instrumentation, the materials are novel for the

user yet easily understood by anyone from a schooled society,

and it gives users the opportunities to predict their own intelli-

gence profile and ascertain whether they are correct. We antic-

ipate that the approach epitomized by the Explorama will

prove usable in virtual as well as real-life settings and will give

individuals all over the world the opportunity to under-

stand—in an intuitive, phenomenological way—what is

meant by multiple, relatively independent, intelligences.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Having critiqued Waterhouse (2006) on numerous accounts,

we welcome her effort to compare and reconcile MI theory

with accounts from information processing psychology, evo-

lutionary psychology, and other contemporary approaches.

However, although the tack used by Waterhouse is promising,

the results are not convincing. For example, the “what” versus

“where” dichotomy is hardly an all-purpose information pro-

230 GARDNER AND MORAN

cessing distinction; it refers primarily to the identification and

location of objects. Similarly, some of the specific modules

identified by evolutionary psychologists, contrary to Water-

house’s argument that they refute MI theory, align very well

with Gardner’s intelligences and their subcomponents. When

authorities like Carey and Spelke (1994) speak about intuitive

theories of mind, life, or causality, they might as well have used

the terminology of interpersonal intelligence, naturalist intel-

ligence, or logical-mathematical intelligence.

By limiting her synthesis to the singular disciplinary

frames of psychometrics and experimentation, Waterhouse

(2006) misses the core of MI theory. We are open to

disconfirming evidence but not to closing down an entire line

of inquiry. Maintaining our synthesizing stance, we are en-

couraged by the development of new methodologies that may

satisfy both the quantitative bent of strict psychometricians,

experimentalists, and statisticians and our insistence on

studying intelligences in an intelligence-fair, contextualized

manner. For example, configural and dynamical models

(e.g., Lykken, McGue, Tellegen, & Bouchard, 1992; Van

Geert, 2003), which allow for interactions and context, rather

than more traditional factor analytic or regression models,

which require independence of variables and large sample

sizes, hold promise for a truly integrated conceptualization of

intelligence.

CONCLUSION

MI theory will continue to be assessed in two ways. First, those

familiar with the scientific evidence, and any new evidence

that emerges from intelligence-fair testing, will weigh

whether MI theory’s synthesis of cognition speaks adequately

to the data. Second, those interested in improving the lot of stu-

dents in schools will note, formally and informally, whether

practices informed by MI theory encourage student engage-

ment and learning. We look forward to the ongoing debate.

REFERENCES

Binet, A., & Simon, T. (1909/1976). The development of intelligence in the

child. In W. Dennis & M. W. Dennis (Eds.), The intellectually gifted (pp.

13–16). New York: Grune & Stratton.

Carey, S., & Spelke, E. (1994). Domain-specific knowledge and conceptual

change. In L. A. Hirschfield & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind:

Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp. 3–35). New York: Cam-

bridge University Press.

Connell, M., Sheridan, K., & Gardner, H. (2004). Experts, generalists, and

expert generalists: On the relation between general competence and ex-

pertise in a domain. In. R. Sternberg & E. Grigorenko (Eds.), Perspectives

on the psychology of abilities, competencies, and expertise (pp. 126–155).

New York: Cambridge University Press.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1988). Society, culture, and person: A systems view

of creativity. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity (pp.

325–339). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Diamond, J. (2005). Collapse: How societies choose to fail or succeed. New

York: Penguin.

Fischer, K. (1980). A theory of cognitive development: The control and

construction of hierarchies of skills. Psychological Review, 87,

477–531.

Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences.

New York: Basic Books. (New editions 1993, 2004).

Gardner, H. (1994). The stories of the right hemisphere. In W. D. Spaulding

(Ed.), Integrative views of motivation, cognition and emotion, Vol. 41 of

The Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (pp. 57–69). Lincoln: University

of Nebraska Press.

Gardner, H. (1999). Intelligence reframed. New York: Basic Books.

Gardner, H. (2006a). Multiple intelligences: New horizons. New York: Basic

Books.

Gardner, H. (2006b). Response to critiques of multiple intelligences theory.

In J. Schaler (Ed.), Gardner under fire. Chicago, IL: Open Court Pub-

lishing.

Gardner, H., Brownell, H. H., Wapner, W., & Michelow, D. (1983). Missing

the point: The role of the right hemisphere in the processing of complex

linguistic materials. In E. Perecman (Ed.), Cognitive processing in the

right hemisphere. New York: Academic.

Gardner, H., Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Damon, W. (2001). Good work: When

excellence and ethics meet. New York: Basic Books.

Gardner, H., Feldman, D. H., & Krechevsky, M. (Gen. Eds.). (1998a). Pro-

ject Zero frameworks for early childhood education: Volume 1, Building

on children’s strengths: The experience of project spectrum. New York:

Teachers College Press.

Gardner, H., Feldman, D. H., & Krechevsky, M. (Gen. Eds.). (1998b).

Project Zero frameworks for early childhood education: Volume 2, Pro-

ject spectrum early learning activities. New York: Teachers College

Press.

Gardner, H., Feldman, D. H., & Krechevsky, M. (Gen. Eds.). (1998c). Pro-

ject Zero frameworks for early childhood education: Volume 3, Project

Spectrum preschool assessment handbook. New York: Teachers College

Press.

Guilford, J. P. (1967). The nature of human intelligence. New York:

McGraw-Hill.

Hutchins, E. (1980). Culture and inference: A Trobriand case study. Cam-

bridge: Harvard University Press.

Kornhaber, M., Fierros, E., & Veenema, S. (2004). Multiple intelligences:

Best ideas from research and practice. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Kornhaber, M., Krechevsky, M., & Gardner, H. (1990). Engaging intelli-

gence. Educational Psychologist, 25, 177–199.

Lykken, D. T., McGue, M., Tellegen, A., & Bouchard, T. J., Jr. (1992).

Emergenesis: Genetic traits that may not run in families. American Psy-

chologist, 47, 1565–1577.

Moran, S., & Gardner, H. (2006). Extraordinary cognitive achievements: A

developmental and systems analysis. In W. Damon (Series Ed.) & D.

Kuhn & R. S. Siegler (Vol. Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 2

Cognition, perception, and language (6th ed., pp. 905–949). New York:

Wiley.

Neisser, U. (Ed.). (1998). The rising curve. Washington, DC: American

Psychological Association.

Salomon, G. (Ed.). (1993). Distributed cognitions. New York: Cambridge

University Press.

Spearman, C. (1904). ‘General intelligence,’ objectively determined and

measured. American Journal of Psychology, 15, 201–293.

Terman, L. M. (Ed.). (1925). Genetic studies of genius (Vol. 1). Stanford,

CA: Stanford University Press.

Terman, L. W., & Oden, M. H. (1947). The gifted child grows up. In L. M.

Terman (Ed.), Genetic studies of genius (Vol. 3). Stanford, CA: Stanford

University Press.

Thorndike, E. L. (1921). Intelligence and its measurement. Journal of Edu-

cational Psychology, 12, 124–127.

Thurstone, L. L. (1938). Primary mental abilities. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press.

RESPONSE TO LYNN WATERHOUSE 231

Van Geert, P. (2003). Measuring intelligence in a dynamic systems and

contextualist framework. In R. J. Sternberg, R. J. Lautrey, & T. I. Lubart

(Eds.), Models of intelligence: International perspectives (pp. 195–211).

Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Vernon, P. E. (1950). The structure of human abilities. New York: Wiley.

Waterhouse, L. (2006). Multiple intelligences, the Mozart effect, and emo-

tional intelligence: A critical review. Educational Psychologist, 41,

207–225.

Wechsler, D. (1958). The measurement and appraisal of adult intelligence.

Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins.

232 GARDNER AND MORAN