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Article

The rise of anti-Muslim prejudice: Media and Islamophobia in Europe and the United States

Christine Ogan Indiana University, USA

Lars Willnat Indiana University, USA

Rosemary Pennington Indiana University, USA

Manaf Bashir Kuwait University, Kuwait

Abstract The goal of this study is to determine the possible factors leading to increased anti-Muslim sentiment or Islamophobia in a comparative examination of public opinion in the United States and Europe. Secondary analyses of data from the 2008 Pew Global Attitude Project and the 2010 Pew News Interest Index, allow us to assess the role of religious practice, news interest and political affiliation in the attitudes toward Muslim minorities in several countries. Predictors of anti-Muslim attitudes include being politi- cally more conservative and being older in all countries, and paying close attention to news coverage of the Park51 Islamic Community Center in the United States (which was proposed to be built near Ground Zero in New York). In France, but not in the other countries of the study, the importance of the respondents’ religion was positively related to anti-Muslim attitudes.

Corresponding author:

Christine Ogan, Indiana University, 4317 E. Morningside Drive, Bloomington, IN 47408, USA.

Email: [email protected]

the International Communication Gazette 2014, Vol. 76(1) 27–46 ª The Author(s) 2013

Reprints and permission: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/1748048513504048 gaz.sagepub.com

Keywords Islamophobia, public opinion polls, anti-Muslim attitudes, anti-immigration attitudes, media coverage, secondary comparative analysis

Prejudice against Muslims in Western countries preceded the 9/11 attacks in the United States,

but those events and other acts of violence by terrorists since that time have created a climate

for increasing anti-Muslim attitudes in many countries (Amnesty International, 2012).

These anti-Muslim attitudes persist despite the low numbers of home-grown Islamic

terrorists in Western countries (see Schanzer et al., 2010). Charles Kurzman’s analysis of

acts of terrorism committed by Muslims finds that fewer than one percent of Muslims

around the world have been involved in any militant movement in the last 25 years

(2011). Yet at least two research reports document discriminatory attitudes (such as

those targeting cultural or religious practices) and behaviors (for example, ones that limit

employment or education) focused on Muslims in several European countries in recent

years (Amnesty International, 2012; Zick et al., 2011). In surveys conducted by Gallup in

the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany from 2008 to 2011 significant

percentages of respondents (from 30% in France to 52% in the United States) have reported that Western societies do not respect Muslims (Gallup World, 2013).

A growing number of scholars have summarized this climate of anti-Muslim feelings in

the United States and Europe under the label of Islamophobia (Mastnak, 2010; Rana, 2007).

Historically, Islamophobia, or the fear or hatred of Muslims and Islam, has been used to

describe the anti-Muslim feelings of a mostly Christian population in Europe since

immigrants from Muslim countries began arriving there in the early 14th century. Current

anti-Muslim attitudes in Europe have been revealed in the speeches of recently popular polit-

ical parties that call for action against Muslim minorities in their countries, through policies

that restrict the dress and activities of Muslims, by the building of what are perceived to be

overly large mosques, and in public opinion polls across Europe (Zick et al., 2011).

A recent poll conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Germany, for example,

found that between 27% and 61% of people in eight European countries believe there are too many Muslims in their countries. The same survey found that more than half

of the people in these nations (except in Portugal) think that Muslims are too demanding,

while a similar percentage say that Islam is a religion of intolerance (Zick et al., 2011:

61). The alleged intolerance of Islam is taken as a justification for Islamophobic attitudes

that are a part of the European mainstream, according to Hockenos (2011). In 2010, the

Council of Europe viewed the issue to be of such importance that its Parliamentary

Assembly developed a series of recommendations to combat religious intolerance in its

member states (Recommendation 27, 23 June 2010), but little change has so far been

detected in public opinion.

Though the United States has relatively few Muslims—an estimated 6 million or .6% of respondents in a national survey (Pew, no date)—Islamophobia is as serious an issue

there as in Europe. Public opinion polls that have tracked American attitudes toward

Muslims since 2001 show that Americans’ favorable ratings of Islam have dropped from

47% in 2001 to 37% in 2010 (ABC News/Washington Post, 2010). Although many

28 the International Communication Gazette 76(1)

attribute the rise of anti-Islamic attitudes in the United States to the wars in Iraq and

Afghanistan, others blame the U.S. media, which tend to employ Samuel Huntington’s

Clash of Civilizations understanding of Islam when reporting stories about Muslims or

their religion (Seib, 2004). Huntington’s controversial view of post cold war global

conflict was that culture—largely based on religion, rather than ideology or geogra-

phy—would be the cause.

Focus of study

Our study examines the factors that lead to the holding of Islamophobic attitudes in

several European countries (France, Germany, Spain, and Great Britain) with large

Muslim populations and the United States. As Muslim communities continue to grow in

non-Muslim majority countries, and issues of identity and belonging only become more

salient, it is imperative to understand more fully the intersection of demographics, media,

and attitudes toward Muslims and Islam. Since media coverage of Muslims and Islam is

likely to shape the opinions of those who have limited or no contact with this religion and

its people, it is important to analyze the potential associations these media portrayals might

have with people’s attitudes toward Islam in general and Muslims in particular.

We already know that media play a big role in framing the public discourse about

Muslims and Islam in Europe and the United States. For example, a meta-analysis of

research of European media content related to immigrants by Bennett et al. (2011), found

that although variation in tone and balance occurred in the media of member states, Mus-

lims were generally portrayed in stereotypical terms, and Islam was seen as a threat to

security. In the United States, research by sociologist Christopher Bail (2012) finds that

U.S. media coverage of the 9/11 events was dominated by messages of fear and anger

originating in the press releases from anti-Muslim fringe organizations rather than more

moderate messages emanating from mainstream civil society groups. He goes so far as to

charge that such messages changed the mainstream discourse itself. However, instead of

relying on an analysis of media coverage of Muslims and Islam in Europe and the United

States, our study tries to determine the actual weight that media coverage might have in

guiding public opinion relative to other possible influences, like political affiliation and

religious beliefs or practices.

Another goal of this study is to determine whether the underlying predictors of

Islamophobia are the same in Europe and the United States. Anti-Islamic attitudes and

behaviors have eroded the tenets of democracy on both sides of the Atlantic, and it is

important to check whether these trends have been fueled by the same basic factors such

as political ideology or lack of education. According to Werbner (2005), democracy

requires a ‘‘shared ethical convictions about the validity of cultural differences’’ and

such ethical commonalities are difficult to maintain while the ‘‘globalized images of the

Muslim religious fanatic’’ exist (9).

This study is based on a secondary analysis of representative public opinion polls con-

ducted in the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Italy in 2008 and

2010. We begin by examining first whether anti-Muslim attitudes have increased in the

United States and in Europe in recent years and by checking the demographic predictors

of Islamophobia. Special emphasis is placed on the interaction of political ideology and

Ogan et al. 29

religiosity. We then analyze the potential relationship between exposure to negative

news about Muslim-related issues and attitudes toward Muslims in the United States

by analyzing public opinion data that have been collected during the intense public

controversy that surrounded the planned building of an Islamic Community Center in

New York City in late 2010.

Anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe

During the past four decades, the Muslim population in Europe has increased dramati-

cally through migration and family reunification, creating tensions that, perhaps, should

not be all that surprising. In Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of

Anger, Appadurai (2006) suggests that these tensions between majority and minority

groups in Europe are not a result of what Samuel Huntington (1993) called a ‘‘clash

of civilizations,’’ but instead the outcome of what is a globalized civilization of clashes.

. . . there is a growing tendency to see global moral enemies as being morally

indistinguishable from local or internal enemies. This double logic—globalizing internal

moral opponents and localizing faraway moral enemies—is the key to the logic of

ideocide and civicide (118).

This clash between the local and the global is clearly being felt in Europe today.

Across Western Europe, there are more than 17 million Muslims, located in 17 countries

with the largest numbers living in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and

Spain (Pew, 2010c). In all of these nations, there has been an increase in Islamophobic

discourse, perhaps most notably in the Netherlands where Geert Wilders, Dutch MP and

leader of the nationalistic Freedom Party, has called for a complete halt to immigration to

the Netherlands from all Muslim countries.

This shift in public discourse on immigration has also led to recent changes in public

policy related to Muslim practices. Earlier in 2010, the Belgian parliament voted to ban

niqabs (face-covering veils in Islam) in public places. However, the government fell

before the Senate could vote it into law. In a similar move, the French legislature out-

lawed niqabs from being worn publicly. The law took effect in spring 2011 with a fine

of 150 Euros for wearing a niqab in public. French Justice Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie

explained the need for this law in terms of French integration and societal values, saying

that to live with an open face ‘‘is a question of dignity and equality’’ (Davies, 2010).

There are other signs that more and more Europeans fear the growing number of

Muslim immigrants. Bleich (2009), who compared responses to public opinion polls

conducted between 1988 and 2008 to determine whether Islamic hatred had increased

in Britain and France over a 20-year period, found that anti-Muslim attitudes in the two

countries are higher today than in the late 1980s. In Switzerland, where a referendum was

held in 2009 to determine whether mosques could attach minarets to their buildings, a

Gallup poll found that about 4 in 10 citizens see an irresolvable contradiction between

the values of liberal democracy and Islam (Manchin, 2009).

A trend toward stronger anti-immigration attitudes can also be observed in Germany.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently said that multicultural approach has failed in

30 the International Communication Gazette 76(1)

Germany, noting that immigrants are not willing to adapt to German society (Siebold,

2010). The debate over foreigners in Germany also has gained much publicity since

former central banker Thilo Sarrazin (2010) published Deutschland schafft sich ab

(Germany Does Away With Itself), a book in which he accused Muslim immigrants

of lowering the intelligence of German society.

Media content analyses document the rise of anti-Muslim stories in some European

countries as well as a shift in the focus of these stories. In a study that examined nearly

1000 newspaper stories across Great Britain from 2000 to 2008 alongside an analysis of

two years of visual images in articles, Moore et al. (2008) found that the bulk of coverage

of British Muslims—around two-thirds—focuses on Muslims as a threat (in relation to

terrorism), a problem (in terms of differences in values), or both (Muslim extremism in

general). The number of such stories increased steadily from 2002 on. However, while

terrorism was a consistent topic of these stories, the authors also found an increasing

coverage of religious and cultural issues, alongside a very small number of stories

related to immigration and asylum.

Islamophobia in the United States

Some researchers point to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 as the starting point for

Islamophobia in the United States. Gottschalk and Greenwald (2008), however, find

Islamophobia present in the United States far earlier and argue that Americans were using

the fear of Islam as a unifying concept in defining America. Similarly, Rana (2007) links

America’s Islam connection to the transatlantic slave trade and ties American anti-Muslim

sentiment with racism—noting that Islam figured as an important aspect of the early

formation of U.S. racism. According to the author, this construction of an African-

American Muslim ‘‘other’’ has been perpetuated by the media through its coverage of the

arrests of African-American Muslims suspected of terrorist crimes (2007: 159).

In their study of the portrayal of Muslims in several U.S. newspapers in the late 1980s

and early 1990s, Sheikh et al.(1995) found that Muslims were portrayed negatively in news

reporting. However, most of the stories that mentioned Muslims were about wars or other

types of conflicts; they did not find evidence of a more generalized negative bias. After 9/

11, this negative media image of Muslims was compounded by reporting on Islam and

Muslims that relied on Huntington’s (1993) idea of a ‘‘clash of civilizations’’ for its frame-

work (Abrahamian, 2003). It was a framework, Seib (2004) writes, the American media

were all too ready to embrace after the fall of Communism in the late 1990s.

Other studies of media coverage of Muslims or Muslim countries have shown that such

coverage has been largely negative. Ali and Khalid (2008) examined coverage of three

categories of Muslim countries (U.S. allies, U.S. enemies, and neutral countries) by News-

week and Time Magazine from 1991 to 2001. Even before 9/11, their study found that

overall coverage of Muslim countries in each group was largely negative. A 2009 Pew

study of religion-related news in the U.S. press did not examine whether news during that

year was positive or negative, but instead focused on the main stories of the year. In gen-

eral, religion-related news took up a small part of the print, television or online news (1% or less in 2008 and 2009). However, the main stories for the year touched on Islam by

Ogan et al. 31

focusing on negative stories such as the ban on minarets in Switzerland and the shooting at

Fort Hood in Texas by Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan (Pew, 2010b).

Media Tenor (2010), which examined the coverage of Muslims and Islam on the U.S.

major networks from January to August, 2010, concluded that ‘‘there are virtually no

positive issues for Muslims within and outside of the US in the view of U.S. television

news. International conflicts, terrorism and domestic security remain the top issues in

2010. References to Islamic religious life were critical as well.’’

Media coverage of the Islamic community center in New York City

Anti-Muslim attitudes in the United States became highly visible in early 2010 during

the controversy that surrounded the planned building of an Islamic Community Center

a few blocks from Ground Zero in New York City (Hernandez, 2010). Those who say

that these attitudes have been triggered by the media point to conservative politicians

whose inflammatory speeches were cited in the press (for example, former Republican

congressman Newt Gingrich calling supporters of the project ‘‘apologists for radical Isla-

mist hypocrisy (see Hertzberg, 2010: 27), the blogger Pamela Geller (who insisted on

calling the center the ‘‘Ground Zero mosque’’ despite its location two blocks from the

World Trade Center site), and other commentary favoring the conservative political

views that target Muslims.

Media organizations made speculations about what to call the building—a mosque, a

cultural center or both. Many outlets could not even agree on the characteristics of a

mosque. Supporters of the project refer to it as the ‘‘Islamic Community Center,’’

‘‘Park51’’ (referencing the street address on Park Place), or simply ‘‘Islamic Cultural

Center.’’ Those who oppose Park51 called it an ‘‘Islamic citadel,’’ ‘‘the 9/11 victory

mosque,’’ or ‘‘Park51 mosque.’’

The planned Islamic Community Center rapidly became national news. Many media

outlets reported that should the plans for building the Center be canceled, many extremist

organizations would take it as the trigger for hostile actions against Americans at home

and abroad. The culmination of the discussion took place right before the 9/11 commem-

orations and was sparked by the threats made concerning the burning of the Quran by a

minister from a Gainesville, Florida church. Negative publicity placed the minister at the

center of the Park51 issue, even though both issues have nothing in common. David Ger-

gen, CNN senior political analyst, supported the extensive media coverage of the min-

ister and argued that ‘‘it was perfectly legitimate to cover him in terms of

Islamophobia. I do think he is representative of a fever we see in the country that needs

to be contained’’ (Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, 2010).

According to a Pew (2010d) study that examined the news coverage for the week of

6–12 September 2010, the second most covered topic during that week was anti-Muslim

sentiment, filling 15% of the news hole. The fourth most covered topic that week was the Park51 Community Center, with 4% of the news hole. According to the research, coverage of the two controversies also illustrates the different news agendas of radio and

television talk show hosts. While the conservative hosts dedicated slightly more cover-

age to the mosque story than their liberal counterparts, liberal talkers devoted about four

times as much attention to the Koran burning saga as the conservative hosts.

32 the International Communication Gazette 76(1)

American national and local media used multiple public opinion polls to bolster the

reporting of Park51. A Daily News poll found that 48% of New York residents opposed the Center, with more women than men in opposition. In particular, 52% of women wanted to keep it out of lower Manhattan, compared to 41% of men (McShane, 2010). A Fox News poll revealed that 64% of respondents opposed, 30% were in favor, while 6% remained undecided (Blanton, 2010). Polls also found a difference in respon- dents’ opinions depending on the distance from the proposed construction; Manhatta-

nites were more supportive of the project, while Staten Islanders are mostly against

(Hertzberg, 2010).

The conservative Fox News tended to report news about the Islamic Community

Center with public opinion polls that showed that almost 3 of 4 Americans were against

building the Center (see Fox News: 13 August 2010; 20 August 2010; 8 September 2010;

9 September 2010). Fox News also linked President Obama’s supportive statements

about the Center with a Pew poll on religion, which showed that nearly one in five Amer-

icans wrongly believed him to be a Muslim rather than a Christian (Fox News, 20 August

2010).

Although new media are not the focus of this research, it is important to note that

social media such as Twitter and Facebook also became important tools of supporters

and critics of the Center. In addition to the networking they provide, such sites also serve

to help shape both identity and community (Baym, 2010; Gruzd et al., 2011; Miller,

2011) and they served that purpose in connection to Park51. Specifically, a number of

Facebook groups targeting the issue of the Islamic Community Center in New York were

created: Against the Mosque at Ground Zero, Stop The Ground Zero Mosque, Yes to the

Mosque Near Ground Zero, New Yorkers Against the Mosque at Ground Zero, Cordoba

Initiative, and 1,000,000 Against The Mosque at Ground Zero. Each group was joined by

a large number of ‘‘followers’’—creating an easily accessible community of ‘‘believers’’

who worked to shape the stories the mainstream media told of the controversy.

At the same time, the blogosphere became a source of intense public debate surround-

ing the Islamic Community Center. According to the Pew Research Center’s New Media

Index (Pew, 2010a) that analyzes millions of blogs on a weekly basis, the Park51 issue

was the second most popular subject for comment during the week of 9–13 August 2010.

During that week, 18% of the news links from the blogs were about that topic and were dominated by anti-center opinions.

Increasingly, the blogosphere is impacting the types of stories told by mainstream

journalists, as well as how they are telling those stories and the sorts of experts journalists

interview (Barlow, 2008). Anti-Islam and anti-Muslim bloggers such as Pamela Geller

and Daniel Pipes have fashioned themselves into legitimate experts on Islam largely

on the strength of their blog following—both were highly visible in the mainstream news

media during the Park51 debate.

Research questions and hypotheses

As discussed in the previous sections, even before the attacks on 9/11, Muslims in the

United States were linked to acts of terrorism, leading to an overall animosity toward all

Muslims. The plan for the Islamic Community Center in New York simply served as

Ogan et al. 33

another flash point for anti-Muslim feelings. In several European countries, on the other

hand, right-wing conservative politicians who spout anti-Islamic rhetoric have gained a

foothold and increasingly feel comfortable to speak out. In addition, new laws have been

passed in various European countries such as Sweden and Denmark that constrict immi-

gration from predominantly Muslim countries. Our first research question therefore asks:

RQ1: Has the degree of Islamophobia increased both in Europe and the United States

during the past years?

To answer this question, we will analyze public opinion data collected between 2004

and 2008 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project (Pew, 2008). The surveys track the favor-

ability of Muslims among representative samples of respondents from in the United

States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Spain with an identical 4-point question

(very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, very unfavorable) that is

asked once every year. Data from the 2008 survey will be analyzed to test whether

personal demographic factors are associated with these attitudes.

There is also mounting evidence that anti-Muslim attitudes are linked to political

party affiliation. In a recent survey study of American values, for example, 66% of the members of the conservative Tea Party said that Muslim values are not compatible with

American values nor its way of life, while 63% of Republicans responded similarly (Jones et al., 2011: 10). In the same study, 68% of those who ‘‘most trust’’ the conser- vative Fox News for information about politics viewed Islamic and American values

as incompatible (Jones et al., 2011: 11). We therefore expect that politically conservative

Americans (Republicans and those affiliated with the Tea Party) will be more likely to

express anti-Islamic attitudes (Jones et al., 2011). Across Europe too, researchers have

found a relationship between right wing extremism and anti-Muslim attitudes (see

Langenbacher and Schellenberg, 2011). Our first hypothesis therefore states that:

H1: More conservative respondents will hold stronger anti-Muslim attitudes in Europe and

the United States.

In addition to the impact of political party affiliation on attitudes toward Muslims,

religious beliefs may also factor into the rise of Islamophobia—at least in the United

States. Based on an extensive analysis of public opinion data collected in the past four

decades in the United States, Putnam and Campbell (2010), for example, argue that reli-

giosity has become highly correlated with membership in the Republican Party. They

document the beginning of this trend in the 1980s, when two issues, abortion and gay

rights, became part of the political agenda. Since these two issues have been traditionally

linked to religiosity, once they became an important part of the Republican’s party plat-

form, the connection between church-going and being a Republican was forged. That

trend has increased over time to the point where there was a 22% difference in support for McCain in the 2008 presidential election by those who said they attended church at

least weekly (61%) and those who said they never go to church (39%) (Putnam and Campbell, 2010: 375). It is therefore possible that Islamophobia adds to the issues that

link religion and party affiliation in the United States. Islamophobia has been linked to

34 the International Communication Gazette 76(1)

religion in Europe as well, but in a slightly different way. Europe has been imagined as

an ‘‘exclusively Christian’’ space (European Commission and European Monitoring

Center on Racism and Xenophobia, 2003) in which Muslims, native born or immigrant,

are seen as incompatible ‘‘other’’ who do not belong in a historically Christian Europe

(Schiller, 2005). We therefore test the hypothesis that:

H2: Respondents with more frequent religious practice will hold stronger anti-Muslim atti-

tudes in the United States—but not in Europe.

In addition to political party affiliation and religiosity, there might be other important

demographic factors that correlate with more anti-Muslim attitudes in the United States

and Europe. The surveys on which this study is based include a series of questions that

probe respondents’ gender, age, education, marital status, employment status and income.

Based on previous studies of anti-Muslim attitudes, we expect that especially lower levels

of education and unemployment are associated with anti-Islamic attitudes (Jones et al.,

2011). On the other hand, women and those who are younger are expected to be more accept-

ing of Muslims (Jones et al., 2011; Saad, 2006). Our second research question therefore asks:

RQ2: What other demographic factors (other than political party affiliation and religiosity)

predict attitudes towards Muslims in Europe and the United States.

As we note above, both the traditional news media and the blogosphere paid a great deal

of attention to the Park51 story for at least two weeks in September 2010, and much of that

coverage was negative. It is therefore reasonable to assume that this negative coverage

might have had an effect on Americans who either did not know much about Muslims and

Islam or already held negative attitudes toward one or both. Empirical evidence for such a

possible interaction between media coverage and latent anti-Muslim feelings is mounting.

One study that analyzed Fox News viewers’ anti-Muslim feelings reported, for example,

that 60% of Republicans who most trusted Fox News also believe that Muslims were attempting to establish Shariah law in the United States (Jones et al., 2011: 19). And as

we reported earlier, those trusting Fox News the most also tend to believe that Islamic val-

ues are incompatible with American values (68%). That percentage is lower for those who most trust CNN (37%) or public television new (37%) (Jones et al., 2011: 19). Given the mostly negative coverage of the Park51 issue in the American media in September 2010,

we hypothesize that:

H3: Americans who paid more attention to news stories about Park51 will hold stronger

anti-Muslim attitudes than those who paid less attention.

Methods

This study is based on a secondary analysis of two survey studies conducted in 2008 and

2010. The data of the first survey is part of the 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Project, which

conducted telephone and face-to-face interviews in 20 nations. We chose to analyze the

Ogan et al. 35

data from the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain for this particular

project. Interviews in the five selected nations were conducted by telephone with repre-

sentative samples of adults in March and April of 2008. Sample sizes ranged from 752

respondents in Spain to 1000 respondents in the United States. 1

All surveys were based

on identical questionnaires that probed (among other things) respondents’ attitudes

toward Muslims, their perception of the economy, their perceived importance of

religion, and their religious practice and demographic background.

Attitudes toward Muslims in the 2008 surveys were measured by asking respondents

how favorable or unfavorable their opinions of Muslims are (1 ¼ very unfavorable; 4 ¼ very favorable). Perceptions of the economy were measured by asking respondents how they would describe (a) the current economic situation in the United States and (b)

their personal economic situation (1 ¼ very bad; 4 ¼ very good). To assess religious atti- tudes, respondents were asked how important religion is in their life (1 ¼ not important at all; 4 ¼ very important) and how often they pray (1 ¼ never; 5 ¼ several times a day). The survey also included demographic control measures for gender, age, education, mar-

ital status, employment status, political ideology (1 ¼ left; 6 ¼ right), and income.2 The data of the second survey come from the 2010 Pew (2010a) survey that was

conducted by telephone among a representative sample of 1003 adult Americans in

August 2010. The survey included various measures of respondents’ attitudes toward

Islam and Muslims in general and a specific question that assessed respondents’ attitudes

toward the construction of the Islamic Community Center. In addition, the survey gauged

respondents’ attention to news about the planned center, their self-perceived knowledge

about Islam, and whether they personally know any Muslims.

Attitudes toward Muslims in the 2010 survey were assessed with four separate

measures. Respondents were first asked whether they generally have favorable or unfa-

vorable opinions of Islam (1 ¼ very unfavorable; 4 ¼ very favorable). Next, they were asked whether they believed that Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage

violence among its believers or not (coded as 3 ¼ support, 2 ¼ neutral, and 1 ¼ oppose). Attitudes toward the Islamic Community Center itself were measured by asking whether

they supported building the Center close to the 9/11 site and whether they believe that

Muslims should have the same rights as other religious groups to build houses of worship

in local communities (both coded as 3 ¼ support, 2 ¼ neutral, and 1 ¼ oppose). Attention to news about the controversy surrounding the Islamic Community Center

was assessed by asking respondents how closely they followed the news stories about the

Center (1 ¼ not at all closely; 4 ¼ very closely). The survey also included a measure of self-perceived knowledge about Islam, asking respondents how much they know about

the Muslim religion and its practice (1 ¼ nothing at all; 4 ¼ a great deal). In addition, the 2010 poll included demographic control measures for respondents’ sex, age, education,

employment status, income, race and political affiliation. 3

In order to evaluate the potential impact of respondent’s economic and religious atti-

tudes on perceptions of Muslims in 2008, a separate linear regression analysis was run

for each of the five nations (United States, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain)

controlling for demographic factors and political ideology. Similar regression analyses

were run with the 2010 U.S. survey data to test the potential impact of respondents’

attention to news about the Islamic Community Center, their self-perceived knowledge

36 the International Communication Gazette 76(1)

of Islam, and their personal experience with Muslims on their perceptions of Muslims

and Islam. The dependent perception measures used in these four regression analyses

represented respondents’ (a) favorable or unfavorable opinions about Islam, (b) per-

ceived rights of Muslims compared to other religious groups, (c) perceptions of Islam

as a non-violent religion, and (d) support for building the Islamic Community Center.

Because the study is based on secondary analysis of survey data from 2008 and 2010, not

all measures are completely identical or ideal to test the stated relationships. However, all

surveys were conducted by the same research company and share a set of similar questions

across nations and time. Moreover, all surveys are based on representative, national samples

and are relatively comparable. We therefore believe that our analysis makes an important

empirical contribution to the cross-national research on attitudes toward Muslims in the

United States and Europe.

Findings

In order to evaluate public opinion trends toward Muslims before 2008, we relied on data

collected in 2004 and 2008 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project (Pew, 2008). As Figure 1

shows, unfavorable opinions toward Muslims have increased in the United States

between 2004 and 2008. While in 2004 almost half (48%) of all Americans had unfavor- able opinions of Muslims, this group increased to 56% in 2008. In Europe, on the other hand, anti-Muslim opinions generally declined between 2004 and 2008. In Spain, for

example, negative opinions of Muslims declined from 46% in 2004 to 33% in 2008. Similarly, unfavorable opinions of Muslims in Great Britain decreased slightly from

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

2004 2005 2006 2008

USA Britain France Germany Spain

Figure 1. Unfavorable Opinions About Muslims in the United States 2004–2008 (in percent). Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 2004–2008. Survey Question: On a different topic, please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Muslims? (Pew, 2008). Somewhat and very unfavorable percentages were combined.

Ogan et al. 37

67% in 2004 to 62% in 2008. Anti-Muslim sentiments in France and Germany, however, remained fairly stable at around 62% and 40%, respectively. Thus, while opinions of Muslims deteriorated significantly in the United States between 2004 and 2008, this

trend was not observed in Europe.

Fairly strong support was found for Hypothesis 1, which predicts that more conserva-

tive respondents in Europe and the United States will hold stronger anti-Muslim attitudes.

Conservative respondents (measured in terms of political ideology) in the 2008 survey held

more unfavorable opinions of Muslims in the United States (b ¼� .19, p < .001), France (b ¼�15, p < .001) and Germany (b ¼�.11, p < .01). Similarly, in 2010, Republicans were more likely than Democrats and Independents to (a) hold more unfavorable opinions

of Islam (b ¼ � .18, p < .001), (b) believe that Islam encourages violence (b ¼ � .12, p < .001), (c) believe that Muslims do not have the same rights as other religious groups

to build houses of worship in local communities (b ¼� .20, p < .001), and (d) oppose the construction of the Islamic Community Center (b¼ .24, p < .001). Overall, it seems fair to conclude that more conservative respondents in the United States, France and Germany

were more likely to hold negative attitudes toward Muslims and Islam.

However, no support was found for our second hypothesis that religiosity is associ-

ated with stronger anti-Muslim attitudes in the United States in 2008. In fact, both the

Table 1. Predictors of attitudes toward Muslims in 2008 by country (Pew Global Attitudes Project).a

USA France Germany Great Britain Spain

Demographics Female (1 ¼ yes) .13 (.07)b .01 (.06) �.01 (.06) .11 (.07)b �.03 (.07) Age �.22 (.01)c �.16 (.01)b �.19 (.01)c �.03 (.01) �.10 (.01)d Education .14 (.02)c .11 (.02)b .12 (.02)b .12 (.02)b .17 (.03)c

Married (1 ¼ yes) �.03 (.08) .01 (.06) .05 (.06) .05 (.08) .07 (.08) Unemployed (1 ¼ yes) .06 (.08) �.06 (.09) .06 (.09) �.07 (.11) �.07 (.13) Ideology (left-right) �.19 (.04)c �.15 (.03)c �.11 (.03)b �.07 (.03) .01 (.03) Income .08 (.02) �.04 (.02) �.03 (.02) �.01 (.03) �.01 (.03)

Other predictors Perceived economic situation of country

�.02 (.04) .09 (.05)d .14 (.05)c .03 (.05) .14 (.05)b

Perceived economic situation of respondent

�.01 (.05) .02 (.05) .03 (.05) .06 (.05) .03 (.06)

Personal importance of religion .10 (.05) .11 (.04)d .02 (.04) .04 (.05) �.03 (.05) Frequency of church attendance

�.05 (.03) �.02 (.03) .06 (.03) .07 (.04) .04 (.04)

Adj. R-square .11 .08 .07 .05 .06 N 690 721 617 506 512

a Question used for dependent variable: On a different topic, please tell me if you have a very favorable, some-

what favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Muslims? Reverse coded. Cell entries are standardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. bp < 0.01. cp < 0.001 (two-tailed). dp < 0.05.

38 the International Communication Gazette 76(1)

importance of religion and religious practice were unrelated to attitudes toward Muslims

in all nations except in France, where respondents who considered religion more impor-

tant actually had slightly more positive perceptions of Muslims (b ¼ .11, p < .05). In the next step, the analysis focuses on which other demographic factors might

explain attitudes toward Muslims in Europe and the United States. To analyze the simul-

taneous effects of respondents’ demographic characteristics in each of the five nations,

sex, age, education, marital status, employment status, political ideology and income

were regressed on attitudes toward Muslims in 2008. As Table 1 shows, age, education,

and political ideology were the strongest and most consistent predictors of attitudes

toward Muslims in most nations. While older respondents were more likely to hold more

unfavorable opinions of Muslims in the United States, France, Germany and Spain, the

same was true for conservative respondents in the United States, France and Germany.

Respondents with more education, on the other hand, were more likely to hold more

positive attitudes toward Muslims in all five nations.

Table 1 also shows that German, French and Spanish respondents who judged the

economic situation of their country more optimistically also were more likely to have

more positive opinions of Muslims. The respondents’ personal economic situation, on

Table 2. Predictors of attitudes toward Islam, Muslims, and the Islamic community center in 2010.a

Favorable opinion of

Islam

Muslims should have same rights as other

religious groups

Islam does not encour- age violence

Center should be allowed to

be built

Demographics Female (1 ¼ yes) .02 (.05) .04 (.06) .14 (.06)b .02 (.06) Age �.11 (.01)b �.10 (.01)b �.12 (.01)b �.19 (.01)b Education .20 (.02)b .13 (.02)b .08 (.02)c .10 (.02)d

Unemployment (1 ¼ yes) �.05 (.08) .02 (.08) �.02 (.09) �.01 (.08) Income .03 (.01) .05 (.01) .03 (.01) �.04 (.01) Minority (1 ¼ yes) �.01 (.07) .01 (.07) .01 (.08) .06 (.07) Republican (1 ¼ yes) �.18 (.06)b �.20 (.06)b �.12 (.07)b �.24 (.07)b Incr. R-square (%) 9.6

b 7.8

b 5.4

b 12.2

b

Media exposure Attention to news about Islamic Community Center

�.04 (.02) �.07 (.02)c �.12 (.03)b �.16 (.03)b

Incr. R-square (%) .10 .50 c

1.3 b

2.2 b

Experience with Islam Knowledge about Islam .02 (.03) .06 (.03) �.05 (.04) .10 (.04)d Know Muslim (1 ¼ yes) .13 (.06)b .06 (.06) .17 (.07)b .09 (.06)d Incr. R-square (%) 1.6

b .70

c 2.3

b 1.7

b

Total R-square (%) 11.3 9.0 9.0 16.1 N 981 981 981 981

aCell entries are standardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. bp < 0.001 (two-tailed). cp < 0.05. d p < 0.01.

Ogan et al. 39

the other hand, was not associated with their attitudes toward Muslims in any of the five

nations.

Our third and final hypothesis predicts that respondents who paid more attention to

news stories about the 2010 controversy surrounding the planned Islamic Community

Center would hold stronger anti-Muslim attitudes in the United States. As Table 2 indi-

cates, this hypothesis is supported in three of four cases. Respondents who paid more

attention to the Park51 news stories not only were more likely to oppose the construction

of the Center (b ¼ �.16, p < .001), but also were more likely to oppose the idea that Muslims should have the same rights as other religious groups to build houses of worship

and local communities (b ¼ �.07, p < .05). More attention to news about Park51 also correlated positively with the belief that Islam encourages violence (b ¼ �.12, p < .001). While these associations are relatively weak, they remain significant despite the

strong associations observed for control variables such as age, education and party iden-

tification. Hypothesis 3 is therefore supported.

It is also worthwhile to mention that respondents who claimed to know Muslims per-

sonally were more likely to hold positive attitudes toward Islam (b¼ .13, p < .001), think that Islam is not a violent religion (b ¼.17, p < .001), and support the construction of the Islamic Community Center (b ¼ .09, p < .01). A higher level of self-perceived knowl- edge about Islam, on the other hand, only was associated with more support for the con-

struction of the Center (b ¼.10, p < .01).

Conclusions

This paper focused on the rising Islamophobic climate in both the United States and in

Europe. We explored the potentially interactive effects of religion, political ideology,

and media attention on attitudes toward Muslims. Though ideally our data would have

been collected over time with comparative measures, this was not possible. The Pew

studies’ use in the testing of our research questions and hypotheses served as the next

best source of data, however.

Our findings indicate that negative attitudes toward Muslims and Islam are most

strongly and consistently associated with political conservatism on both sides of the

Atlantic. Politically conservatives in the United States, France, Germany and Spain

generally saw Muslims in a more negative light than liberals—an indication that percep-

tions of Muslims are connected to political views in most of the here analyzed nations.

Following Putnam and Campbell (2010), we also thought that the connection between

religiosity and political affiliation would be supported among American respondents in

this study—but that was not the case. Perhaps it is too soon for an anti-Muslim stance to

be adopted as a core issue for religious conservatives. Our findings also show that per-

ceptions of Muslims and Islam are likely independent from religious beliefs and instead

are driven much more by political viewpoints.

In all countries of the study, higher levels of education and actual contact with mem-

bers of the Islamic faith correlate with more positive attitudes toward these people, a

finding that matches results in previous studies (Ata et al., 2009; McClaren, 2003). This

might indicate that policies directed toward increased education and social contact

between majority populations and Muslim minorities could lead to holding more positive

40 the International Communication Gazette 76(1)

attitudes. We also found that older people were more likely to hold negative opinions in

all countries, so increased education among older citizens and the airing of positive

media stories about Muslims could contribute to changed attitudes toward Muslims in

this group. Because older people tend to consume more news than younger audiences,

positive media coverage might exert a positive influence especially among this group.

As predicted, our analysis found support for the hypothesis that media exposure to

Muslim-related issues might have an impact on attitudes toward Muslims and Islam in

general. Our analysis shows that U.S. respondents who paid more attention to media

coverage of the Park51 issue were less likely to support the building of an Islamic Com-

munity Center in New York City, more likely to think that Islam is a religion of violence,

and that Muslims should not have the same rights as other religious groups.

Since being Republican was also a predictor of these attitudes, we believe that respon-

dents were more likely to be exposed to conservative media where stories about the Cen-

ter were framed in a negative light. However, the fact that media coverage of the Islamic

Community Center was predominantly negative means that no matter which news stories

Americans consumed, they might come away with negative attitudes about Islam or

Muslims. While providing fair and balanced coverage remains a guiding principle of

U.S. journalism, on this issue, the U.S. media were clearly unbalanced. As a conse-

quence, the U.S. media might have contributed to more negative perceptions of Muslims

and Islam among American audiences in 2010.

While our research findings provide a detailed examination of American and

European attitudes toward Muslims, media coverage of Muslims, and the Islamic Com-

munity Center, there are several limitations. One is our inability to predict the same pat-

terns in the findings beyond the five countries we chose for this study. The choice was

based on recent events that put Islam and Muslims at the forefront of public debate in the

selected European countries and the United States, among which was the Islamic Com-

munity Center in New York City. Also, the large number of Muslims living in the United

Sates, France, Germany, Great Britain and Spain (Pew, 2010c) made these five countries

a research priority.

Another limitation stems from our use of the secondary survey data. As mentioned

earlier, not all measures are identical in the 2008 and 2010 data to test the hypothesized

relationships. However, the two surveys were conducted by the same research company

and share a set of similar questions across nations and time.

Also, we have failed to mention the role of gender in this study so far. Though being

female was not an across-the-board predictor of positive attitudes toward Muslims, in the

2008 study, that was the case in 2008 in the United States (b ¼.13, p < .01) and Great Britain (b ¼.11, p <.01). And in 2010, being female was a predictor of the attitude that Islam does not encourage violence in its religious teachings (b ¼.14, p < .001). This is in line with past research that’s shown women tend to hold less prejudiced attitudes toward

minorities than men (Bierly 1985; Dustmann and Preston 2001). Thus, exploring the role

of gender in perceptions of Muslims could prove to be a fruitful line of inquiry in future

studies.

According to Putnam and Campbell (2010), the key to reducing hatred against

Muslims may come through more inter-religious contact. Their study of religion and pol-

itics in the United States showed that the most negatively perceived religious groups, of

Ogan et al. 41

which Muslims were one, are concentrated in particular geographic areas and this limits

contact with people from other religions. ‘‘We would expect their image problem to

disappear even more rapidly as more and more Americans count a Buddhist, a Muslim,

or a Mormon among their friends and family,’’ the authors conclude (p. 534).

We believe that is also true of Europeans, and that Islamophobia only will decline

when people choose to challenge their assumptions about the nature of Muslims and the

Islamic religion. It appears from some scholars’ analysis of the problem, however, that

Muslims have been racialized (Meer and Modood, 2010; Yilmaz, 2011). Though this

may not be a new way to view the problem (Said, 1995), it does make it more difficult

to address when Muslims are ascribed with not only a religious, but also a racial iden-

tity—the ‘‘other’’ in terms of their religious and cultural views and practices—but also

in terms of a racial category. Since such views are not openly admitted in the media or

elsewhere, deconstructing and then exposing the roots of Islamophobic ideas will not be

easy.

Notes

1. United States: 1000 respondents, conducted April 9–17, 2008; Britain: 753 respondents,

conducted 17 March–6 April 2008; France: 754 respondents, conducted 31 March–8 April

2008; Germany: 750 respondents, conducted 25 March–9 April 2008; Spain: 752 respondents,

conducted 17 March–17 April 2008. All five surveys are based on national, representative sam-

ples interviewed by telephone. Muslim respondents were excluded from the analysis (France

23, Great Britain 15, Germany N ¼ 18, Spain N ¼ 1, USA N ¼ 2). 2. Perception of economy (overall and personal): ‘‘Now thinking about our economic situation,

how would you describe the current economic situation in (survey country)?’’ Coded as:

1 ¼ very bad, 2 ¼ somewhat bad, 3 ¼ somewhat good, 4 ¼ very good; ‘‘Now thinking about your personal economic situation, how would you describe it? Coded as: 1 ¼ very bad, 2 ¼ somewhat bad, 3 ¼ somewhat good, 4 ¼ very good); Intensity of religious practice: ‘‘Outside of attending religious services, do you pray several times a day, once a day, a few times a week,

once a week or less, or never?’’ Coded as: 1 ¼ never, 2 ¼ once a week, 3 ¼ a few times a week, 4 ¼ once a day, 5 ¼ several times a day; ‘‘How important is religion in your life? Coded as; 1 ¼ not important at all, 2 ¼ not too important, 3 ¼ somewhat important, 4 ¼ very important; Education: ‘‘What is the highest level of education that you have completed?’’ Employment

status: ‘‘What is your current employment situation?’’ Income: ‘‘Here is a list of incomes.

Which of these does your household fall into counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other

incomes that come in?’’ Political ideology: ‘‘Some people talk about politics in terms of left,

center and right. On a six-point left-right scale, with 1 indicating extreme left and 6 indicating

extreme right, where would you place yourself?’’

3. News attention: ‘‘Please tell me if you happened to follow each news story very closely, fairly

closely, not too closely, or not at all closely – The planned building of an Islamic cultural center

and mosque in downtown New York City.’’ Coded as: 1 ¼ not closely at all, 2 ¼ not too closely, 3 ¼ fairly closely, 4 ¼ very closely’ Knowledge about Islam: ‘‘How much would you say you know about the Muslim religion and its practices?’’ Coded as: 1 ¼ nothing at all, 2 ¼ not very much, 3 ¼ some, 4 ¼ a great deal; Opinions about Muslims: ‘‘Would you say you have a gen- erally favorable or unfavorable opinion of Islam?’’ Coded as: 1 ¼ unfavorable, 2 ¼ don’t know, 3 ¼ favorable; Know Muslims: ‘‘Do you, yourself happen to know anyone who is Muslim?’’

42 the International Communication Gazette 76(1)

Coded as 1 ¼ yes, 0 ¼ no; Attitudes toward Islam: ‘‘Which statement is closer to your views even if neither is exactly right? The Islamic religion is more likely than others to encourage

violence among its believers [or] the Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than

others, neither.’’ Coded as: 1 ¼ Islamic religion is encouraging violence, 2 ¼ don’t know, 3 ¼ Islamic religion does not encourage violence; Attitudes toward Park51: ‘‘As you may know, there is a proposal to build an Islamic cultural center and mosque in downtown New

York City . . . from what you’ve read and heard, do you agree more with: those who object

to the building of the Center [or] those who think the Center should be allowed to be built?’’

Coded as: 1 ¼ agree with those who object, 2 ¼ don’t know, 3 ¼ those who think it should be allowed to be built; ‘‘Which comes closer to your view, even if neither is exactly right? Local

communities should be able to prohibit the construction of mosques in the area if they don’t

want them [or] Muslims should have the same rights as other religious groups to build houses

of worship in local communities?’’ Coded as: 1 ¼ local communities should be able to prohibit, 2 ¼ don’t know, 3 ¼ Muslims should have the same rights.

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