Exceptional Proff 612

Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 79, No. 1, Spring 2015, pp. 166-180

THE POLLS— TRENDS SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE AND MILITARY SPENDING

JULIANE CORMAN KIM HARRIS DAVID LEVIN* IEFFREY SCHULTE BRITTANY SHANKS

Abstract Recent political debates over solutions to the federal budget deficit and the ending of the past decade’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have likely put defense and military spending on the chopping block. Does the American public support such a policy choice? Are Americans more or less supportive of defense and military spending than they were prior to September 11, 2001? This article reviews academic, independ­ ent, and media polls to address these questions. We find that contempo­ rary levels of support for defense and military spending remain above “normal levels” between 1960 and 2000. We also find that although Americans are still opposed to cutting defense and military spending, they are more likely to support such cuts as a solution to the federal budget deficit after 2007.

It is time for a reinvestigation of the trends in Americans’ views on support­ ing defense expenditures. The last Poll Trends study on this topic, by Torres- Reyna and Shapiro (2002), covered the period from the 1980s to 2001. Since 2001, a great deal has changed in the social and political context surround­ ing Americans’ views on supporting defense expenditures. There have been no successful repeats of large-scale foreign-source terrorist events in the United States of America. The United States of America conducted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States pulled out of Iraq in December 2011 and plans to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The worldwide economy

J u l i a n e C o r m a n is an analyst at LMI, McLean, VA, USA. K i m H a r r i s is a program manager at LMI, McLean, VA, USA. D a v i d L e v i n is a senior consultant at LMI, McLean, VA, USA. J e f f r e y S c h u l t e was an intern at LMI, McLean, VA, USA. B r i t t a n y S h a n k s was an analyst at LMI, McLean, VA, USA. * Address correspondence to David Levin, LMI, 7940 Jones Branch Drive, Tysons, VA 22102; e-mail: [email protected].

doi: 10.1093/poq/nfu091 © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf o f the American Association for Public Opinion Research. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: joumals.perm issions@ oup.com

Poll Trends— Support fo r Defense and Military Spending 167

went through a massive economic recession, from which it has been slow to emerge. A Republican president left office, to be replaced with a Democratic president, and the US House of Representatives went from a Republican major­ ity to a Democratic majority before swinging back to a Republican majority. The Tea Party emerged as a political force in the 2010 congressional elections. The US Congress has been unable to approve a budget under conventional procedures since 2009.

In light of all the changes since 2001, this review of polls seeks to address two questions. First, are Americans more or less supportive of defense and military spending than they were prior to September 11, 2001? Second, does the American public support more military and defense spending in a federal policymaking context that has shifted its focus to budget/deficit reduction? In line with Wlezien’s (1995) seminal article on the thermostatic (reciprocal) relationship between government expenditures/budget allocations for a policy area and public support for future government expenditures/budget allocations for that same policy area, we expect to see a thermostatic relationship between defense budgets and public support for military and defense spending. Since this article focuses on poll trends and not military and defense expenditures, we observe merely that military and defense expenditures increased by 2 per­ cent or more of the total obligated amount for the prior year every year between 2001 and 2008, with small increases and decreases from 2009 through 2011. Not until 2012 were military and defense budgets down by more than 3 percent of the total obligated amount from the prior year (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense [Comptroller] 2013).

Support for Defense Spending

POLLS WITH CONSISTENT WORDING AND PERIODICITY

In this section, we examine results of four long-term poll series: Gallup, the General Social Survey (GSS), the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR), and the American National Election Studies (ANES). The most fine-grained long-term poll with consistent wording is Gallup’s, the trends of which appear in table 1 and feature the following question: “There is much discussion as to the amount of money the government in Washington should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this? Do you think we are spending too little, about the right amount, or too much?” The response trends show four major phases of support in defense spending— a 2002-2008 decline in support for defense spending, a 2008-2009 increase in support, a 2009-2012 decline in support, and a 2012-2013 increase in sup­ port. In the 2012-2013 period, there is also a marked increase in support for current levels of defense spending. Kindred phases are reflected in the GSS’s line of questions, which asks respondents to “tell me whether you think w e’re

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Poll Trends— Support fo r Defense and Military Spending 169

spending too much money on [the military, armaments, and defense/national defense], too little money, or about the right amount.” The GSS shows a 2002-2008 decline in support for military, armaments, and defense spending, a 2008-2010 increase in support, and a 2010-2012 increase in support for cur­ rent levels of defense spending (tables 2 and 3). A similar pattern emerges from the CCFR data: a decline in support for defense spending between 2002 and 2008, and a 2008-2010 increase in support for current levels of defense spend­ ing (table 4). The ANES, which lacks 2010 data, shows a 2002-2012 decrease in support for increasing defense spending, with a 2008-2012 increase in sup­ port for current levels of defense spending (table 5). Table 5 collapses the seven-point response sets in 2004-2012 to be comparable to the three-point response set for 2002. Overall, the data indicate that there is a consistent pat­ tern of decline in support for increased or stable levels of military and defense spending between 2002 and 2008. This is followed by a clear pattern of ever- larger proportions of Americans demanding a continuation of current levels of military and defense spending.

Table 2. Military, Armaments, and Defense GSS: “We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think w e’re spending too much money on it [the military, armaments, and defense], too little money, or about the right amount.”

2-6/02 8-12/04 3-8/06 4-9/08 3-8/10 3-9/12 % % % % % %

Too little 32 35 25 24 27 25 About right 46 39 33 33 38 43 Too much 22 26 41 43 35 32

N 1,324 1,367 1,442 965 986 965

Table 3. National Defense GSS: “We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think w e’re spending too much money on it [national defense], too little money, or about the right amount.”

2-6/02 8-12/04 3-8/06 4-9/08 3-8/10 3-9/12 % % % % % %

Too little 36 33 28 27 25 26 About right 44 39 34 37 41 43 Too much 20 28 38 37 35 31

N 1,348 1,371 1,445 980 981 934

170 Corman et al.

Table 4. Defense Spending CCFR: “Below is a list of present federal government programs. For each, please select whether you feel it [defense spending] should be expanded, cut back, or kept about the same.”

6/02ac 7/04a 7/04b 7/08b 6/10b % % % % %

Expand 44 37 29 31 30 Cut back 15 13 25 28 27 Keep same 38 46 44 40 43 Not sure 3 4 1 1 1

N 1,084 1,195 1,195 1,006 1,290

“Telephone Internet c“Now I am going to read a list of present federal government programs. For each, I would

like you to tell me whether you feel it [defense spending] should be expanded, cut back, or kept about the same.”

In a longer historical context, the pattern fits Wlezien’s (1995) thermostatic policy dynamic, in which waves of support for military and defense spending are associated with a Republican president coming to office, and a decline in support throughout the president’s term. Conversely, a Democratic presi­ dent is typically elected at the bottom of a cycle of support for military and defense spending. Torres-Reyna and Shapiro (2002) document that support for increasing military and defense spending reached twenty-year highs in 2000 and 2001 of around 40 percent, according to Gallup. They also show that the GSS reports a rise in support for military and defense spending prior to 2002. In the two GSS series, support for increasing military and defense spending nearly doubled between 1998 and 2002, rising to over 30 percent of respond­ ents. What is different from an ideal version of the Wlezien thermostatic model during the 2002-2013 period is that the reelection of a Democratic president is associated this time with a further decrease in support of military and defense spending.

This may be accountable to the withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011 and respondents’ hopes for a “peace dividend.” Nevertheless, even with the recent decline in support for military and defense spending, the overall support for military and defense spending remains at a higher level now than it has been during most of the period between the 1960s and late 1990s (Torres-Reyna and Shapiro 2002).

SPORADIC POLLS

In this section, we examine the results of two sporadic poll series— those administered by the Pew Research Center and by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA). Pew tracked public opinion on military spending in

Poll Trends— Support fo r Defense and Military Spending 171

Table 5. Increase or Decrease in Defense Spending ANES: “Next I am going to read you a list of federal programs. For each one, I would like you to tell me whether you would like to see spending Increased or Decreased. [What about] defense? [Should federal spending on defense be Increased, Decreased, or Kept about the Sam el]”

1 1 -1 2 /0 2 %

9 - 1 1 /0 4 “ %

9 - 1 1 /0 8 “ %

9 - 1 1 /1 2 “ %

01. G o v e rn m e n t sh o u ld d e c re a s e d e fe n se sp e n d in g 4 8 6

02. 6 8 9 03. 9 13 16 D e c re a se d 15 (c o llap sed ) 8 19 29 30 04. K e p t a b o u t th e sam e" 32 27 28 32 In c re a se d 11 (c o llap sed ) 60 54 43 38 05. 28 22 20 06. 15 13 11 07. G o v e rn m e n t sh o u ld

in c re a s e d e fe n se sp e n d in g 11 9 7

N 6 5 4 1,061 963 5 ,1 9 4

““Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, o f course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?”

"To compare to 2002, we collapsed responses 1-3 in 2004, 2008, and 2012. T o compare to 2002, we treated a response of 4 as equivalent to “kept about the same” for

2004, 2008, and 2012. dTo compare to 2002, we collapsed responses 5 -7 in 2004, 2008, and 2012.

2002, and then discontinued tracking until 2009. The 2002 data show higher levels of support for military spending than any of the previously discussed polls (at 60 percent support), while the 2009-2013 data show support at simi­ lar levels to the other studies for increased spending (table 6).

PIPA has two sets of trends for sporadic polls that are rather unusual. The first trend shows low levels of support for increasing defense spending dur­ ing the early part of 2004. Specifically, PIPA registers the level of support for increasing national defense spending at 16 percent, while most other series show levels of support for increasing military and defense spending at around 40 percent (table 7). However, this may be an artifact of the question for­ mat PIPA employed. When PIPA changed its question format in September 2004, the level of support detected for increasing defense spending was meas­ ured as 40 percent. PIPA also looked at budget allocation vignettes at three points between 2005 and 2012, and found that the proportion of Americans who chose to increase the budget allocation for defense or national defense

172 Corman et al.

Table 6. Federal Budget and Military Spending Pew: “If you were making up the budget for the federal government this year, would you increase spending, decrease spending, or keep spending the same for [Insert first item, randomize, observe form splits]1 What about for military spending? [Repeat as necessary, at least every third item: Would you increase spending, decrease spending, or keep spending the same for military spending?]”

2/02“ 6/09“ 2/11“ 2/13 % % % %

Increase spending 60 40 31 32 Decrease spending 5 18 30 24 Keep spending the same 31 37 36 41 DK/ref (vol.) 4 5 3 3

N 906 500 697 764

““If you were making up the budget for the federal government this year, would you increase spending for...military defense, decrease spending for...military defense, or keep spending the same for this?”

T able 7. N a tio n a l D efen se S p e n d in g

PIPA: “Please select whether you think defense spending should be:”

3/04“ 9/04b 12/04 12/06c % % % %

Expanded 16 41 34 22 Cut back 41 13 21 30 Kept about the same 41 43 42 44 (No answer) 2 3 3 5

N 1,311 959 801 1,004

““There is much discussion as to the amount of money the government in Washington should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this? Do you think we are spending: too much, about the right amount, or too little?"

b“Thinking about defense spending, would you want your congressional representative to vote to: increase it, decrease it, or keep it about the same as this year?”

“Only three-quarters of the sample was used for this question. No specific number of responses was reported.

decreased between 2005 and 2006 (table 8). In 2006, more than three-quar­ ters of respondents reduced their defense or national defense budget alloca­ tions relative to the prior year’s actual federal allocations. The proportion of respondents choosing to reduce military and defense spending in PIPA’s budget allocation vignettes is far higher than the proportion of respondents choosing to reduce military and defense spending in the more commonly found questions that directly pose an “increase or reduce” choice set.

Poll Trends— Support fo r Defense and Military Spending 173

Table 8. Budget Allocation for Defense Spending PIPA: “As you may know, the White House proposes a budget to Congress. In this survey, you will make up a budget for 17 major areas of the budget. We’re not including some big entitlement programs like Medicare or Social Security, which by law cannot simply be adjusted year to year. For these 17 areas, a budget of about $912 billion has been proposed for 2006. Please imagine that you have $1,000 of your tax money to divide among these 17 areas. For each area, you’ll see how much of your $1,000 is proposed to go to that area, and then you can indicate how many dollars you’d like to see go to that area. You’ll be able to monitor how much of the $1,000 you have left as you make decisions by scrolling down to the bottom of the page.” [Defense]

2/05 %

10/06a %

Respondents who increased 16 8 Respondents who kept the same 15 16 Respondents who reduced 65 76 (No answer)b 4 0

N 1,182 1,058

a“As you may know, every year Congress passes a budget, part of which includes spending for US foreign policy, defense, and security. We would like to know how you think this part of the budget should be distributed. For this exercise, this part o f the budget is divided into 15 areas. Please imagine that you have $900 of your tax money to divide among these 16 areas. This is about how much of the average taxpayer’s money goes to these 15 areas as a whole. For each area, you’ll see how much of your $900 goes to each of these areas in the current year’s budget. Then you can indicate how many o f your dollars you’d like to see go to that area next year. You’ll be able to monitor how much of the $900 you have left as you make decisions by scrolling down to the bottom of the page.”

bNo specific “no answer” category was reported. Flowever, the reported percentages do not add up to 100%. We interpret this to be the “no answers.” The percentages are similar to the “no answer” factions reported on most PIPA surveys for other question items.

DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE CONTEXT OF BUDGET CUTS

The CCFR data show a similar trend. Between 2010 and 2012, the percent­ age of respondents willing to cut the defense budget rose from 59 to 68 per­ cent (table 9). Pew data show an increase as well: between 2005 and 2011, the proportion of respondents willing to cut defense and military spending as a way to reduce the budget deficit rose from 35 to 49 percent. However, the percentage of respondents willing to cut defense and military spending declined in 2012 (to the low 40s) (table 10). Another parallel series conducted for CBS News /New York Times (N Y T ) shows a rise in support for cutting military spending between 2010 and 2012, in agreement with the CCFR trend (table 11). The combination of the four series indicates that the increase in sup­ port for using military and defense spending cuts as a tool to address budget

174 Corman et al.

Table 9. Defense Spending Cuts Relative to Other Government Programs CCFR: “There has been some discussion about whether, in the effort to address the federal budget deficit, the defense budget should be cut along with other programs. Do you think the defense budget:”

6/10 %

5-6/12 %

Should not be cut 41 32 Should be cut, but less than other programs 29 34 Should be cut about the same as other programs 20 23 Should be cut more than other programs 9 10 Not sure/decline 0 1

N 1,292 1,877

Table 10. Lowering Defense and Military Spending Pew: “Would you favor or oppose [Randomize]...lowering defense and military spending as a way to reduce the budget deficit?”

3/05 %

10/05 %

3/11 %

10/12a %

12/12a %

Favor/approve 35 36 49 40 43 Oppose/disapprove 60 58 47 56 55 DK/ref (vol.) 5 6 4 4 2

N 1,090 1,500 1,525 1,511 1,503

•“(Thinking about ways to reduce the deficit and size of the national debt, please tell me if you would approve or disapprove of each of the following.)...Reduce military defense spending... Would you approve or disapprove of this as a way to reduce the size of the national debt?”

deficits occurred after 2007— when the economy crashed and federal revenues dropped. A partial exception to this pattern comes from the ANES (table 12). The ANES shows a decrease in the proportion of respondents favoring the use of military spending as a tool to reduce federal deficits between 2008 and 2012 and a decrease in the proportion of respondents opposing, coupled with a large increase in the proportion of respondents who were undecided (from 7 to 20 percent). The CBS NewsINYT series shows a rise in those opposed to defense cuts after 2011, which may lend more credence to the ANES findings.

An enlightening perspective on the budget balancing issue is given by a series of questions Pew asked respondents prior to the economic crash: “Over the past year, the budget for military defense and homeland security has been increasing. Which one of the following do you think is the best way to pay for these increases?” Until 2007, the most popular answer was to take it out of the tax cuts enacted by the Bush Administration. In 2007, however, a plurality of respondents chose the response option of “add to the budget deficit.” In neither

Poll Trends— Support fo r Defense and Military Spending 175

Table 11. Willingness to Reduce Deficit through Military Spending “In order to reduce the federal budget deficit, would you be willing or not willing to decrease military spending?”

CBS N ew s/ NYT CBS N ew sa CBS News" CBS N ew s1 CBS N ews1 2/10 1/11 3/11 12/12 3/13

% % % % % W illing 42 52 51 42 38 N ot w illing Some, but not

52 44 45 54 58

other (vol.) 2 NA NA NA NA DK/NA 3 4 4 4 3

N 1,084 1,178 1,022 1,179 1,181

““I ’m going to read you some suggestions that have been made to reduce the size of the fed­ eral budget deficit. Please tell me whether you would be willing or not willing to do each of the following. In order to reduce the budget deficit, would you be willing or not willing to...Reduce defense spending?”

Table 12. Reduce Budget Deficit by Reducing Military Spending ANES: “Would you Favor, Oppose, or Neither Favor nor Oppose lowering the budget deficit by spending less on the military?”

11/08 11/12 % %

Favor 41 35 D o not lean either w ay/neither favor nor oppose 7 20 O ppose 53 46

N 2,078 5,463

case were respondents willing to sacrifice domestic programs to compensate for greater defense expenditures (table 13). Prior to the economic crash, many Americans wanted to have their proverbial cake and eat it too with regard to federal spending.

Cutting defense spending as a solution to budget deficits in the period after the economic crash is more popular than cuts to well-known domestic pro­ grams such as education, health care, and Social Security/Medicare (table 14).

MILITARY AND DEFENSE SPENDING AS A MEANS TO A PREVENT TERRORISM

Pew fielded a number of surveys during the 2002-2006 period to assess how the public connected terrorism with military and defense spending. Pew con­ sistently found that more than 80 percent of respondents felt that defense spending was an important way to prevent terrorism (table 15).

1 7 6 Corman et al.

Table 13. Best Way to Pay Pew: “Over the past year, the budget for military defense and homeland security has been increasing. Which one of the following do you think is the best way to pay for these increases? [Read and rotate]”

2/02“ %

2/03“-' %

2/03” %

7 -8 /0 3 %

9/03 %

9/04b %

l/0 5 b %

2/07““ %

A dd to the budget deficit 24 23 31 15 19 11 16 27 R educe spending on

dom estic program s [or] 22 21 28 23 18 19 20 26

Postpone or reduce last year’s tax cuts 42 40 23 41 41 47 42 26

N one (vol.) 2 1 5 4 7 3 2 6 M ultiple (vol.) NA 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 O ther (vol.) 1 2 3 4 3 4 4 4 D K /ref 9 12 7 12 11 15 15 10

N 1,199 629 625 2,528 1,500 994 1,503 769

“In February 2002, 2003, and 2007, the question was worded: “As you may know, President Bush has proposed large increases in the budget for military defense and homeland security. Which one of the following do you think is the best way to pay for these increases, if they are to happen?”

bWhat is the best way to pay for increased spending for military defense and homeland security?

'Split form with identical wording for this question. Results reported separately for each form by Pew.

Table 14. Cuts to Government Spending Programs CBS/NYT: “If you had to choose, which one of the following programs would you be willing to reduce in order to cut government spending— education, national security, health care, or Social Security and Medicare?”

1 0 /1 0 1/ 11“

% %

E ducation 9 NA N ational securityb 30 56 H ealth care 23 NA Social Security and M edicare0 11 32° DK/NA 28 11

N 1,071 1,036

““As you may know, the largest items in the federal budget are Medicare, the government health insurance program for seniors, Social Security, and the military. If you had to choose one, which of the following programs would you be willing to change in order to cut government spending—Medicare, Social Security, or the military?”

bAsked as a willingness to cut spending for the “military” in 2011. ' “Social Security” and “Medicare” were individual responses in 2011. They are collapsed here.

Poll Trends— Support fo r Defense and Military Spending 177

Table 15. Importance of Defense Spending for Military Preparedness Pew: “As I read from a list, tell me how important each of the following is a way to reduce terrorism in the future. (First,) [Insert item; randomize; observe form splits] is this very important, fairly important, not too important, or not at all important as a way to reduce terrorism in the future? (Next...[Increase defense spending to maintain our military preparedness])”

1/02 %

8/02 %

8/06 %

Very important 54 53 52 Fairly important 33 33 31 Not too important 7 7 10 Not at all important 3 3 6 DK/ref 3 4 1

N 601 501 731

Conclusion The American public’s level of support for military and defense spending appears to be undergoing a moderate rebound from its most recent low point in 2012. Nevertheless, the levels we see in 2012-2013 are not “low” from a long-term perspective. More often than not, Torres-Reyna and Shapiro (2002) found that between 1960 and 2001 the percentage of respondents saying “too little” was being spent on defense was below the 24-26 percent level Gallup and the GSS report for 2012-2013. The 2002-2006 period was one of very high support for increased military and defense spending. While there was some decline in the proportion of Americans supporting increasing military and defense spending between 2004 and 2007, large declines in the proportion occurred after 2007 and then leveled out by 2011. This appears to be in response to the economic crash. Prior to 2007, the Pew data make it clear that the American public believed it could increase military as well as domestic spending while deferring payments by raising the federal deficit. After 2007, the public appears to view military and defense spending as a policy tool to address federal budget deficits, and pluralities are willing to reduce the military and defense budget. All of this fits into a larger framework of the thermostatic policy dynamic. Americans appear to allow particular events of political or social import (e.g., September 2001) to push their preferences for military and defense spending up or down from an “equilibrium range”— a zone of support for military and defense spending that Americans tend to gravitate toward over time if left undisturbed by external events. As military and defense budgets increase over successive fiscal years, Americans’ support of continued increases declines as the shock of the trigger event (terrorist attack, foreign invasion of the United States, declaration of war, clear demonstration of military inferiority to an opponent, etc.) wears off and

178 Corman et al.

as the levels of expenditure get farther from the equilibrium range. However, equilibrium ranges can shift in response to repeated shocks and macro-trends (Eichenberg and Stoll 2003; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). This appears to be the case with military and defense spending. When military and defense budgets were actually trimmed in 2011 and 2012, support for continued reductions in military and defense budgets decreased.

What is of continued interest, both for poll watchers and for those inter­ ested in exploring the thermostatic policy dynamic, is the inequivalence of shocks. In 2011, when Osama bin Laden was killed and US forces withdrew from harm’s way in Iraq, one would have expected those events to engender more support for continued reductions in military and defense spending. If they did, it failed to overcome the normal response to reduced military and defense budgets in 2011 and 2012. The likely explanation comes from the affective intelligence and politics literature. Negative shocks have much larger and longer residual impacts in individual citizens’ decision-making processes than positive shocks (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). Thus, there may be an inherent increase built into support for military and defense spending that requires very large positive shocks (e.g., the collapse of Soviet Union) or a nationally shared perception of a finite federal budget to halt growth.

Appendix SOURCES

The data presented in this article were collected from the American National Election Studies website (http://www.electionstudies.org/), the Chicago Council on Global Affairs website (http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/), the Gallup website (http://www.gallup.eom/poll/l 60682/americans-divided- views-defense-spending.aspx), the General Social Survey website (http:// www3.norc.org/GSS+Website), the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press website (http://www.people-press.org/), the Polling Report website (http://pollingreport.com), the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research’s iPOLL Databank (http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu), and the World Public Opinion website (http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/). Further information about these data can be obtained from the organizations enumerated below.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANES: American National Election Studies

CBS: CBS News

CBS/ATT: CBS News/New York Times

CCFR: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations/Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Poll Trends— Support fo r Defense and Military Spending 179

GALLUP: Gallup Organization

GSS: NORC at the University of Chicago/General Social Survey

PEW: Pew Center for the People and the Press

PIPA: Program on International Policy Attitudes

Response rates are as follows: American National Election Studies: National sample. Modes were face-to- face, telephone, and online. (AAPOR RR1) 2002 (55.8%; reinterview 89.1%); 2004 (66.1%; reinterview 88.0%); 2008 (not yet calculated); 2012 (face-to- face 38%/online 2%; reinterview face-to-face 94%/online 93%).

CBS News: National sample. Modes are landline and cellular telephone. (AAPOR RR1) 1/11, 10.0%; 3/11,7.9%; 12/12,9.3%; 3/13,9.1%.

CBS/ATT: National sample. Modes are landline and cellular telephone. (AAPOR RR1) 2/10, 10.5%; 10/10, 9.9%.

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations: National sample. Modes were face- to-face and telephone in 2002, Knowledge Networks Internet surveys from 2004-2012. 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 NA; (firm supplied the RR without a calculation method) 2010 (66%); (firm supplied the RR without a calculation method) 2012 (63%).

GALLUP: National sample. Modes are landline and cellular telephone. (AAPOR RR3) 2/02, 19%; 2/03, 15%; 2/04, 16%; 2/05, 18%; 2/06, 16%; 2/07, 16%; 2/08, 11%; 2/09, 13%; 2/10, 10%; 2/11, 9%; 2/12 9%; 2/13, 8%.

General Social Survey: National sample. Mode is face-to-face. (AAPOR RR5) 2002, 70.1%; 2004, 70.4%; 2006, 71.2%; 2008, 70.4%; 2010, 70.3%; 2012,71.4%.

Pew Center for the People and the Press: National sample. Modes are lan­ dline and cellular telephone. (AAPOR RR3) 1/02, 2/02, 8/02, 2/03, 3/03, NA; 7-8/03 30.7%; 9/03, NA; 9/04, 31%, 1/05, 29.4%; 8/06, 26%; 2/07, 25.4%; 6/09, 14.8% (landline), 18.1% (cellular); 2/11, 13.5% (landline), 6.6% (cel­ lular); 2/13, NA.

Program on International Policy Attitudes: National sample. 3/04, 9/04, 12/04,2/05, 10/06, 12/06,4/12, NA. Five of the seven surveys were conducted by Knowledge Networks for PIPA/World Public Opinion. Response/coopera- tion rates were not provided (http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/knpanel/ docs/KnowledgePanel(R)-Design-Summary-Description.pdf). The method for calculating the 65 percent response rate was not supplied by KN or GfK, which purchased KN. Correspondence with GfK on 11/24/2014 suggests that the material is not readily available.

180 Corman et al.

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Marcus, George, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press.

Office o f the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller). 2013. National Defense Budget Estimates fo r FY 2014. Arlington, VA: Department of Defense. Available at http://comptroller.defense. gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY14_Green_Book.pdf.

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