Global Societal Problem, Argument and Solution

4 ENVIRONMENT WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG VOLUME 60 NUMBER 1

by Bhawani

Venkataraman

The Paradox of Water

and the Flint Crisis

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The Flint River in Flint, Michigan, the source of the contaminated water

distributed to residents of the city.

eople in the United States have grown up believing two assumptions about tap water, assumptions that appear so basic they hardly need to be stated:

(1) that there is a virtually unlimited supply of safe drinking water from the tap available to each household and (2) that the cost to deliver that tap water is small. So, what is to be made of the drinking-water crisis in Flint, Michigan, in which residents drank contami- nated water for more than a year, resulting in severe health and social impacts and a very costly cleanup that is still not complete? Unfortunately, these assumptions have been far from correct all along, and only now are the fallacies becoming evident.

For a country to ensure access to safe drinking water for all its citizens, drinking-water management practices must start from the premise that given water’s chemical properties, a source used for drinking water will have dissolved compounds and microorganisms. This translates into requiring careful and complex treatment, monitoring, and assessment at all stages from source to tap, to render the water safe. This appears not to have been

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understood by the decision makers in Flint. Instead, their decisions appear to have been driven primarily by the desire to keep water management costs down, a very risky policy, considering the in- herent chemical properties of water.

What went wrong in Flint that re- sulted in the contaminations of the city’s drinking water supply?1,2,3,4,5,6 What went wrong in the decision making that led to the Flint water crisis?7 And most im- portantly, what can be done to prevent future Flints?

The Paradox of Water: Essential to Life but Also a Potential Threat

Water is essential for life to exist on Earth. However, from a human health perspective, it is “safe” drinking water that is essential. According to the World Health Organization, the definition of safe drinking water is water that “does not represent any significant risk to health over a lifetime of consumption, including different sensitivities that may occur between life stages.”8

The paradox of water is that the very same properties that make it essential for life also make it very easily contami- nated to the point where it potentially becomes a threat to life. From a chemi- cal perspective, the formula of water, H2O, dictates its molecular structure and properties. This translates into wa- ter being a liquid on Earth’s surface and into water having the ability to dissolve almost any compound. Water is said to be the “universal solvent.” This solvent property of water is key to sustaining life. The liquid water medium allows for biologically important molecules to dis- solve, interact, and react, which are all essential to the chemical processes that sustain life. At the same time, water’s ability to dissolve compounds makes it very challenging to keep water safe. This does not mean that everything that dissolves in water is harmful, but because water is such a good solvent, chemical compounds readily dissolve in it to varying degrees. Once they are dis- solved, if these compounds happen to

be toxic, then consuming this water is a potential threat to health.

Even if a compound is not highly soluble in water, it could dissolve to an extent that exceeds its toxicity level, rendering the water harmful. Certainly, this is the case for the 80+ chemical contaminants currently included in the U.S. National Primary Drinking Wa- ter Regulations9 under the Safe Drink- ing Water Act (SDWA).10 Some of the maximum allowed concentration lev- els (or maximum contaminant levels [MCLs]) are extremely low. For ex- ample, 1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane, used as a fumigant in agriculture, has an MCL of 0.0002 mg/L (0.2 parts per billion [ppb]).11 The MCL of dioxin, emitted during the burning of waste, is 0.00000003 mg/L (or 0.03 parts per tril- lion [ppt]).10 All this is to say that pre- venting compounds from dissolving in water at levels that do not exceed their MCLs is challenging. Further, once a compound is dissolved removing it is not trivial—again because water is the universal solvent. Life thrives in water, and if the microorganisms present in water are pathogens then this is of con- cern for human consumption. In fact, a primary reason that so many people across the globe lack access to safe water is that the principal source of contami- nation is pathogens. Once water is con- taminated by chemicals or pathogens, rendering it safe requires well-designed treatments followed by careful monitor- ing that ensures that the treated water does not get recontaminated.

There are many recent examples of the ease with which water gets con- taminated. After Flint, there has been

increasing awareness of the number of communities that have unsafe levels of lead in the water they consume. A re- cent report by the Natural Resources Defense Council indicates that in 2015, water delivered by 1,110 water systems in the United States, serving about 3.9 million people, had lead levels that ex- ceeded the action level of 15 ppb.6

In January 2014, a chemical spill from a storage tank contaminated the Elk River in West Virginia, which is used as a source for drinking water for residents in the Charleston, West Vir- ginia, area. The chemical methylcyclo- hexane methanol entered the drinking- water system and caused residents to experience stomach and skin infec- tions.12 While a recent study suggests no known long-term health risks,13 the immediate health impacts—nausea, ir- ritations—required residents to rely on bottled water for several days. This spill resulted in an estimated $60 million cost to the local economy, which does not in- clude cleanup costs.14

In the fall of 2014, an analysis of drinking-water samples from the town of Hoosick Falls, New York, revealed the presence of perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA).15,16 The PFOA contamination was a result of its use in a local plastics plant. It was not until late 2015 that the New York State Department of Envi- ronmental Conservation (DEC) acted to address the presence of PFOA in the drinking water. The DEC installed a fil- tration system in the water treatment plant to address the dissolved PFOA and in March 2016 announced that the drinking water was safe for consump- tion.17 There have also been concerns that chemicals used in firefighting foams have been detected in the drink- ing water in some military bases.18 These compounds include PFOA and other perfluoroalkyl compounds (PFAs). The Pentagon is looking into possible contamination by these chemi- cals in the drinking water in almost 400 military bases.19 In September 2017 the organization Environmental Working Group released a report on the presence of a solvent 1,4-dioxane (not to be con- fused with dioxin, mentioned earlier)

The paradox of water is that the very same properties that make it essential for life also make it very

easily contaminated to the point where it potentially becomes

a threat to life.

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in drinking-water systems in 27 U.S. states that serve 7 million people.20 All of these compounds, PFOA, PFA, and 1,4-dioxane, are considered to be likely carcinogens but currently none are reg- ulated contaminants under the National Drinking Water Standards.18,21 All three, along with many other compounds, are under consideration by the U.S. Envi- ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) for possible inclusion in the list of regulated drinking-water contaminants.22

Given the fundamental chemistry of water that allows it to be easily contami- nated, the preceding examples just serve to emphasize that drinking-water treat- ment and management must be care- fully scrutinized through this chemical lens. A precautionary principle should be employed, in which water manage- ment decisions start with the assump- tion that the source water is contami- nated and will require careful treatment and monitoring to ensure that the

treated water meets standards. Further, even after treatment, there must be care- ful monitoring to ensure that the water is not compromised between the treat- ment plant and the consumer. The cost of such an approach may seem on the face of it to be high. However, the Flint water crisis is a tragic example of why this up-front investment is always worth it, as the social and economic costs to address the impact of unsafe water are always substantially higher.

The Flint Water Treatment Plant, Flint, Michigan, which personnel warned was not up to the task of adequately treating the water from the Flint River.

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What Happened in Flint, Michigan?*

Prior to 1967, the city of Flint re- ceived treated water from the Flint Wa- ter Service Center (FWSC), which used the Flint River as its source.7,23,24 In 1967, as a result of rising population and the inability of the FWSC to deliver suf- ficient water to the residents, the city of Flint switched to receiving treated drinking water from the Detroit Water and Sewage Department (DWSD),7,23,24 which uses the Great Lakes Water Sys- tem (Lake Huron and the Detroit River

systems) as the water source.25 While the switch to the DWSD was triggered by capacity, it was clear even at that time that the quality of the water in the Flint River was being compromised due to discharges from industries and the municipality and runoff from streets.23 Between 1967 and 2014, the residents of Flint received treated water from the DWSD. Over the years, the FWSC served as a backup to the DWSD.7,23,24

With the decline of the U.S. auto- mobile industry toward the end of the 20th century, the population of Flint de- creased from a peak of almost 200,000

residents in 1960 to just below 100,000. Along with this population decline came a shrinking tax base and severe budget problems. By 2011, things be- came so bad financially that the gov- ernor of Michigan appointed an emer- gency manager to take over the Flint budget and look for ways to bring the deficit under control.23 The emergency manager had decision-making author- ity over Flint city officials.

During 2012–2013, the emergency manager decided to shift the drinking water supply for Flint from DWSD to the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA). This was a “cost-saving” measure, since the KWA offered water rates lower than those of the DWSD.1–6,23 The KWA is in the process of building a water pipeline to bring water from Lake Huron with a target completion date of 2017. Need- ing an interim solution, the emergency manager opted to turn to the Flint River as the source for municipal water and to use the water treatment plant that had not been in consistent use since the 1960s. 1–6,23 Since the FWSC was not fully operational, the city of Flint hired an engineering firm to provide plans for upgrades to the FWSC to treat the Flint River water.26 This same engineering firm was also hired for the construction of the upgrades.26

On April 25, 2014, the water from the Flint River treated by the FWSC began flowing through the pipes of the city de- livering water to the residents.1–6 There is evidence suggesting that personnel in the FWSC warned against opening the plant at this time, as there were concerns that the facility was not ready to treat

*Table 1 lists acronyms and Table 2 lists names and role of key players referenced in this article.

Table 1. List of Acronyms Referenced in the Article Acronym Agency

CSMR chloride to sulfate mass ratio DEC Department of Environmental Conservation DWSD Detroit Water and Sewage Department FWSC Flint Water Service Center KWA Karegnondi Water Authority MCHM methylcyclohexane methanol MCL maximum contaminant level MDEQ Michigan Department of Environmental Quality MDGs UN Millennium Development Goals MDHHS Michigan Department of Health and Human Services PFA perfluoroalkyl PFOA perfluorooctanoic acid SDWA Safe Drinking Water Act THMs trihalomethanes TTHMs total trihalomethanes

Table 2. Names and Roles of Key People Referenced in the Article Name Role

Lee Anne Walters Flint resident/activist Miguel Del Toral EPA employee Marc Edwards Professor of civil and environmental engineering, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA Mona Hanna-Attisha Pediatrician, Hurley Medical Center, Flint, MI Governor Snyder Governor of Michigan

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and monitor the water that was leaving the facility.7,27

By May 2014, problems with the wa- ter being delivered to the residents of Flint were evident. The water was often brown and had a foul odor, and some residents complained of skin rashes and hair loss when they bathed.1–6 The city officials assured the community that the water was safe.1–6 In August, the city is- sued an Escherichia coli alert and a call to residents to boil the tap water before drinking it.1–7 These “boil alerts” contin- ued until September 9, 2014.

The next alert came on January 2, 2015, when residents were informed by city officials that the drinking water leav- ing the water treatment plant violated the SDWA due to high levels of a class

of compounds called trihalomethanes (THMs).28,29 These compounds are regu- lated under the SDWA as total trihalo- methanes (TTHMs) because they are known carcinogens, with potential health impacts over long-term exposure.30

After January 2015, the problems escalated. As early as January 9, 2015, some water samples from the Univer- sity of Michigan–Flint campus revealed unsafe levels of lead.1 In February 2015, a resident of Flint, Lee Anne Walters, concerned about her children’s reac- tion to the tap water, insisted that the city test for lead in the water in her home.1–6 Analysis of water samples from Walters’s home revealed levels of lead of 104 ppb.1–6 The Lead and Copper Rule under the National Drinking Wa-

ter Standards defines the “action level” for lead as 15 ppb.31,32 This rule requires water treatment systems to monitor lev- els of lead and copper at the customers’ taps. If more than 10% of these water samples have levels of lead that exceed the 15-ppb action level, the system must implement lead treatment protocols.31,32 In spite of the results of the lead levels in water samples collected at the Uni- versity of Michigan–Flint and Walters’s home, the city did not take these results as an indication of a possible systemic issue with the drinking water treated at the FWSC. In February, the federal EPA asked the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) about the procedures used for the treatment of the water from Flint River. The reply

This photograph, taken in a hospital in Flint, Michigan, on October 16, 2015, shows the brown discoloration of tap water treated by the FWSC.

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from MDEQ was that the water was be- ing treated according to regulations and that the FWSC was using an “optimized corrosion plan.”1,7

With growing concerns, Walters contacted Miguel Del Toral, an EPA employee. Del Toral put Walters in touch with Marc Edwards, a professor of civil and environmental engineering at Virginia Tech. Edwards is an expert on drinking-water systems and was the person who investigated the cause of lead in the drinking water in Washing- ton, D.C.33,34 On hearing from Walters, Edwards launched a systematic analysis of the lead levels in homes in Flint and worked with the community to establish credible, scientific evidence of the scale of the water contamination. Along with his research group, Edwards established a website with data and information on what was unfolding in Flint.35 At the same time, Mona Hanna-Attisha, a pe-

diatrician at the Hurley Medical Center in Flint, published a paper that demon- strated an increase in blood lead levels in children in Flint compared to chil- dren in neighboring areas that did not receive water from the FWSC.36 Further, the increase in blood lead levels was co- incident with the switch to water from FWSC. After hearing about lead levels in the drinking water, Del Toral identi- fied a grave concern—the Flint system was not using anticorrosion agents, contradicting earlier statements by the MDEQ.37 The Lead and Copper Rule states that for systems serving more than 50,000 residents, a corrosion treat- ment plan is required.31,32 Further, since Flint has lead service lines, a corrosion treatment plan is crucial.

In addition to the unsafe levels of lead present in the drinking water, other evidence also pointed to concerns about the water quality delivered by the FWSC.

As early as October 2014 the General Motors plant in Flint had opted out of the FWSC system because the water was corroding metal parts.38 There was also an increase in the number of legionel- losis cases coincident with the switch to the FWSC.1–7,39

When the results of Edwards’s studies were released, the MDEQ initially dis- puted them.1 The MDEQ did conduct lead assessments in homes as mandated by the SDWA, but it appears that these analyses may have been incorrectly car- ried out.40,41 The lead reports released by the MDEQ on July 28, 2015, and August 20, 2015, reveal that insufficient samples were collected.40 Further, the August report states that two samples were removed from the analysis, as the collections of these samples did not fol- low protocols.41 As a result, the MDEQ reported that the levels of lead in the samples collected did meet the require-

Systematic analysis of water samples collected from residences in Flint. This analysis was conducted by Marc Edwards and his research group at Virginia Tech.

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ments of the National Drinking Water Standards.

In October 2015, after state gov- ernment epidemiologists confirmed Hanna-Attisha’s measurements indi- cating increased blood lead levels in children who drank water from the FWSC, Governor Snyder of Michigan responded.1–6 On October 16, 2015, the city of Flint was reconnected to the DWSC.1–6 More than a year had passed since the switch—a switch that was in- tended to save money resulted in the residents of Flint paying dearly and, due to the lead poisoning of the children, potentially intergenerationally.36

On October 21, 2015, Governor Snyder appointed an independent task force to investigate the Flint water cri- sis. The Flint Water Advisory Task Force released its findings in March 2016.42 Among the conclusions were:

(i) recognition of the severe misman- agement of the switch of water sys- tems by the Flint Public Works and the FWSC;

(ii) the dangers of reliance on deci- sions made purely on financial is- sues and by people without neces- sary expertise;

(iii) failure of the government in partic- ular the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) and the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MD- HHS);

(iv) the Governor’s office as being the ultimate office of accountability and undue reliance on informa- tion from the MDEQ and MDHHS when the residents’ complaints and concerns should have suggested otherwise;

(v) the failure of the U.S. EPA for not being more aggressive in exercis- ing its authority in intervening to ensure the safety and health of the residents of Flint; and

(vi) “The Flint water crisis is a clear case of environmental injustice.”

The conclusion that this crisis was a “case of environmental injustice” has been raised by others as well43,44,45,46,47 and cer-

tainly raises the question of whether res- idents in a wealthier city with a different demographic would have encountered the relentless refusal by city and state officials to address what was clearly a failing water system, or whether people without the necessary expertise would have been employed to manage the city’s drinking-water system. In February 2017, the Michigan Civils Rights Com- mission issued a report titled “The Flint Water Crisis: Systemic Racism Through the Lens of Flint.”48 A conclusion of this commission is that “deeply embedded institutional, systemic and historical racism” was indirectly responsible for the drinking-water crisis in Flint. The report raises larger, complex questions of what led to a city like Flint to become bankrupt in the first place, which then ultimately led to the city’s “cost-saving measures” in switching the drinking- water supply.

With city and state officials ignor- ing them, residents of Flint had to take matters into their hands. After all, they and their families were being effectively “poisoned.” Residents like Walters and community organizations were persis- tent in raising awareness of what was happening. The support they received from scientists and medical profession- als like Del Toral, Hanna-Attisha, and

Edwards and his research group are exemplars of science in support of soci- ety. While the data on lead levels in the water and children’s blood were ignored by city and state officials for too long a period, the consistent citizen pressure along with the data made the news and finally could not be ignored by officials. Absent the active citizen groups and support from the scientific and medi- cal communities, it has to be asked how much longer the situation in Flint would have continued. Unfortunately, as con- cluded by the task force, even the federal agency, the EPA, failed to exercise the authority it had under the SDWA.

In January 2017, the Michigan DEQ announced that analysis of water sam- ples collected from residences in Flint revealed that the levels of lead were be- low the action level.49 While this is an improvement, it was still recommended that people not drink the tap water.

A Retrospective Analysis of the Flint Water Crisis

A retrospective analysis of the deci- sions and actions that resulted in the contamination of the drinking water delivered to the residents of Flint clearly highlights the failures of the FWSC.7 The

Collecting water samples from a residence in Flint, Michigan.

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data analyzed in the study were gathered from monthly operating reports of the FWSC, reports from the engineering company that assessed the needs for the upgrades as well as implementing them, and water quality reports for the city of Flint. An immediate conclusion of this analysis is that the plant was not ready in April 2014 when it first began the delivery of treated water to the city. Records show insufficient amounts of chemicals essential for treating water, control meters not operational, moni- tors to measure residual chlorine in the water that leaves the plant that were not operational, and delays in starting chlo- rination, which disinfects the water.

The appearance in May 2014 of the brown discoloration in the water should have been a cause of immediate con- cern. The brown color is due to iron leaching from pipes and forming iron oxide; that is, rust. This brown discolor-

ation should have been a warning to the FWSC to check the “corrosivity” of the water. Corrosivity of water is a measure of the tendency of water to dissolve met- als like iron, lead and copper. The de- gree of corrosivity is influenced by fac- tors such as the pH of the water and the presence of dissolved ions such as chlo- ride. Corrosivity is particularly danger- ous when a city has lead service lines, which is the case in Flint, and when homes have lead lines and fixtures. A re- quirement under the Lead and Copper Rule is for treatment plants to add phos- phate to the water. Phosphate serves as an “anticorrosion” agent by forming a protective film that prevents leaching of metals such as iron, lead, and copper from pipes.4,7 Treatment protocols must also include monitoring of key param- eters that influence corrosivity.

The water from DWSD was treated with phosphate; the water from the

Flint River was not. Since the switch to the Flint River was intended to be a temporary solution, the MDEQ ad- vised the FWSC to not use the anti- corrosion treatment at the start, but to “wait and watch” the water quality over two 6-month periods and then assess the necessity for this treatment pro- tocol.7 The MDEQ assumed that the protective layer formed in the service lines over the years Flint received water from DWSD would not be affected and would last over the time that the Flint River was used.4,7 This is a dangerous assumption, particularly when key wa- ter quality parameters, discussed in the following, were not monitored by the FWSC.

The retrospective analysis revealed that parameters used to measure corro- sivity—the chloride to sulfate mass ratio (CSMR) and the Larson–Skold index— indicated that the water from the Flint

Even as early as the 1960s it was clear that the quality of the water in the Flint River was being compromised by discharges from industries and the municipality and runoff from streets.

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River is very corrosive and hence will leach metals from pipes. Quoting from this study:

The high values of the CSMR and Larson–Skold indexes of water en- tering the Flint distribution system should have raised serious concerns about the possibility of corrosion, especially given prior experience by water utilities. For example, in Co- lumbus, Ohio, the 90th percentile lead levels in the water increased by almost 360% after a change in coagulant from alum to ferric chlo- ride, which resulted in an increase in the CSMR by up to 170%.7

The Flint water treatment plan in fact did use ferric chloride as a coagulant (which is used in treatment of drink- ing water to precipitate suspended par- ticles, such as soil). According to the retrospective analysis, the values of the CSMR and Larson–Skold indices for the Flint River were in the “serious concern” category. Further, the paper concludes:

Journalistic reports of the Flint disaster have often stated that the failure to add phosphate was the primary cause of the lead corro- sion problem. However, it should be recognized that the CSMR of the treated Flint River water was so high that, even with the addi- tion of phosphate, the water may have been so corrosive that lead levels in the system might have still exceeded the action level. The fail- ure to recognize the corrosivity of the water and to add a corrosion inhibitor had devastating effects.7

The presence of THMs was also a re- sult of improper monitoring of key parameters. As early as May 2014, the FWSC recorded levels of TTHMs that exceeded the maximum level permitted by the SDWA. THMs are “disinfection by-products” that form when chlorina- tion is used to disinfect the water. THMs form when the chemicals used for chlo- rination react with dissolved organic compounds—through side reactions of disinfection.30 While disinfection is an essential step in treatment of drinking

water, if chlorination is the method, then levels of dissolved organic matter must be monitored. If dissolved organic com- pounds are present, a filtration method that removes these compounds must be used before the chlorination step. Once the FWSC recognized that the levels of TTHMs were above permitted levels, filters were retroactively added to the water treatment system to lower the lev- els of dissolved organic compounds and prevent the production of THMs. It was only in August 2015 that this retrofit- ting was finally successful in lowering TTHMs levels below the regulated level.

Two key conclusions of the retro- spective analysis are:7

Without any treatability studies on which to determine chemical dosages until late August 2015, it appears that plant personnel were left to attempt to address the pleth- ora of complex water quality issues and complaints by trial and error. Significant changes were made to chemical dosages, and the reasons for these changes were often not apparent.

Since the Flint plant had not been fully operational in almost 50 years, was understaffed, and some of the staff were undertrained, it is not surprising that it was difficult to achieve effective treatment.

This retrospective study emphasizes the importance of understanding the scien- tific and technical complexities inher- ent in drinking-water treatments and in implementing and enforcing effective procedures in ensuring that the water that leaves the plant is safe. This study highlights that water management is not easy nor should it be taken for granted, and a key reason for this is the funda- mental chemistry of water.

The Role of Safe Drinking Water in Social and Economic Development

The National Academy of Engineer- ing ranked Water Supply and Distri-

bution as fourth on a list of the top 20 engineering feats of the 20th century (electrification, the automobile, and the airplane were numbers 1, 2, and 3, re- spectively).50,51 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also heralds drinking water treatment as one of the 10 greatest achievements in the 20th century, as indicated in the follow- ing quote:52

In 1900, the occurrence of typhoid fever in the United States was ap- proximately 100 cases per 100,000 people. By 1920, it had decreased to 33.8 cases per 100,000 people. In 2006, it had decreased to 0.1 cases per 100,000 people (only 353 cases) with approximately 75% occurring among international travelers. Ty- phoid fever decreased rapidly in cities from Baltimore to Chicago as water disinfection and treatment was instituted. This decrease in ill- ness is credited to the implementa- tion of drinking water disinfection and treatment, improving the qual- ity of source water, and improve- ments in sanitation and hygiene.

The substantial investments in the United States in the 20th century to support infrastructure, scientific and engineering research, and establish- ment of agencies such as the EPA has allowed its citizens access to safe drink- ing water, resulting in significant social and economic benefits. According to a study by Cutler and Miller,53 introduc- tion of filtration and chlorination in water treatment in the United States in the early 1900s accounted for a decline of total mortality rates by 43%, a decline of 62% in child mortality rates, and 74% decline in infant mortality rates. Due to the health improvements and reduction in mortality, Cutler and Miller estimate a return of investment of 23 times, dem- onstrating the significant positive im- pact of safe drinking water on human and economic development.53

Globally, significant strides have been made through the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in increas- ing access to safe water.54 As a result of the MDGs, about 90% of the world’s

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population now has access to safe water sources.55 The strides made in increas- ing the number of people with access to safe water will positively impact com- munities’ health and economic devel- opment, saving lives from waterborne diseases and saving time spent in col- lecting of water, which limits access to education and employment, particularly for women and girls, who do the bulk of the collection worldwide.

These successes, however, cannot be taken for granted.56 What residents of Flint, Hoosick Falls, Charleston, mili- tary bases, and so many others face is the reality of water being easily contam- inated. A recent report by the United Nations Joint Monitoring Program found that in 42 countries, 100% of the population has access to safe water.57 The United States was not one of the 42 countries and was number 64 on the list with 0.8% of the U.S. population lack- ing access to safe water.57 While a small percentage, this still translates to about 2.5 million people in the United States.

Who are these 2.5 million people? Residents of Flint lack access to safe wa- ter, as do the residents of Hoosick Falls, New York, and the residents on military bases. The drinking water in some com- munities in the Appalachia region is contaminated as a consequence of coal mining.58,59 Approximately 30% of Na- vajo Nation families live without access to piped water.60 On average, a family in the Navajo Nation lives on 7 gallons of water a day. In California, the aver- age is 362 gallons.61 For some in these communities, the groundwater is con- taminated by radioactive waste left dur- ing uranium mining, and E. coli con- taminates about 70% of the water used in these homes.58,61 In the Central Valley in California, the water sources in some farm communities have been contami- nated by agricultural runoff.62,63,64 These communities tend to be poor, and their problem is compounded by the neces- sity to purchase bottled water, which is many times more expensive than tap water.63 As with the residents of Flint, these communities’ hardships are also a result of environmental injustices.58 For a country to achieve universal access

to safe water, policies and actions must start with the assumption that source water will have dissolved chemical com- pounds and microorganisms and must be protected and treated.

The tragedy is that the decision to switch water sources in Flint to save money has resulted in social and eco- nomic costs that far outweigh any up- front costs that would have been neces- sary to ensure the safety of the drinking water for the residents of the city. The decision to save approximately $5 mil- lion over 2 years by switching the water source to the Flint River has resulted thus far in more than $200 million to be allocated from state and federal funds to provide bottled water, filter systems, and replacement of lead service lines and home plumbing.65,66,67 And this does not even address the social impact. Peter Muennig, a professor of public health at Columbia University, estimates that the social costs to the residents of Flint due to exposure to lead could translate to about $400 million and “1,760 quality- adjusted life-years lost.”68

Reflections and Recommendations

The 1996 Amendments of the SDWA, which strengthened the original act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1974, included the following:69

“Recognizing source water protection, operator training, funding for water system improvements, and public in- formation as important components of safe drinking water.”

“States and water suppliers must con- duct assessments of water sources to see where they may be vulnerable to contamination.”

“SDWA mandates that states have pro- grams to certify water system opera- tors and make sure that new water systems have the technical, financial, and managerial capacity to provide safe drinking water.”

These statements make it clear that the SDWA mandates monitoring and as-

sessing the water quality of the source body of water used for human con- sumption, and that the people respon- sible for delivering safe drinking water must be qualified, trained, and certified and understand what these mandates require. Further, states must ensure that drinking-water systems have the “tech- nical, financial, and managerial capac- ity” to enforce these laws. Translating these mandates into action requires that people directly involved in water man- agement are educated to understand the fundamental chemistry of water—that the source water will require careful treatment and constant assessment to ensure that the water delivered is indeed safe.

At the same time, there are real con- cerns that drinking-water treatment plants, particularly those that are small, do not have the technical and financial resources necessary to ensure the safety of the water.70,71 A way to address this is for municipalities to engage with ex- perts from academia and industry. A key conclusion from the retrospective analysis is that the Flint River water may be too corrosive to be used as a source of drinking water.7,32 The researchers who conducted the retrospective analysis are at Michigan State University—the same state as Flint. If only these experts had been consulted during the decision- making process, perhaps this crisis in Flint could have been prevented. This partnership between experts and the community played a crucial role in un- covering the causes of the catastrophe in Flint. Given the complexities of wa- ter and drinking-water management, should not partnerships between wa- ter treatment managers and experts in water management be a requirement in decision making, particularly in mu- nicipalities that are small and may not have the necessary financial resources to have “in-house” expertise? Such part- nerships will go far in ensuring the qual- ity of drinking water being delivered and safeguarding human health.

In the current political atmosphere in which our political representatives are moving away from scientifically in- formed policies and actions, it has be-

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2018 WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG ENVIRONMENT 15

come even more important for citizens to be aware of the complexities of water management. How many of us truly un- derstand the complex scientific, techni- cal, economic, and policy infrastructure necessary to ensure that all residents have access to safe water, or the costs when this is not the case? The more we understand these complexities, the more we can demand that our political repre- sentatives not shirk from environmental regulations and instead strengthen them to ensure the continued access to safe water that many of us take from granted.

The Flint water crisis happened un- der an administration well aware of the importance of enforcing and strength- ening environmental regulations to safe- guard human health. Under the Obama administration, the EPA launched its EJ 2014 Plan, which requires environ- mental justice to be the centerpiece of its work and regulations.72,73 While rec- ognizing that it takes time for federal

policies such as EJ 2014 to have real influence on actions and policies at the state and city level, the real danger we now face is the complete about-face of the current administration’s approach to environmental regulation. The current EPA administration has fired scientific members of its science advisory board while increasing representation from industry,74 and has proposed a budget that will cut EPA funds by 30%, includ- ing a 50% reduction of funds for EPA’s Office of Science and Technology.75

In an opinion piece published in the New York Times, former EPA Adminis- trator Christine Todd Whitman raised concerns about the current EPA’s “ac- tions that pose real and lasting threats to the nation’s land, air, water and public health.”76 Her article raises the crucial importance of science in informing en- vironmental policy: “Policy should al- ways be rooted in unbiased science. Peo- ple’s lives and our country’s resources

are at stake. Mr. Pruitt should respect his duty to the agency’s mission … call on his agency’s scientists to educate him. No doubt they’re willing and eager to impart the knowledge they’ve dedicated their lives to understanding.”73

The people of Flint, Hoosick Falls, Appalachia, the tribal nations, service people on military bases, and farm com- munities in the Central Valley have paid the price of unsafe water. There will be more situations like these unless citi- zens require that our political represen- tatives understand the complexities of water management and the crucial role of science in informing environmental policy and management. We can learn from the people of El Salvador, whose government took the bold step of priz- ing clean water over mining and banned mining of metals to maintain water quality.77 As El Salvador recognized, the economic value of mining does not ex- ceed the economic value of clean, safe

In March 2016 the Flint Water Advisory Task Force concluded that the Flint water crisis is a “clear case of environmental injustice.”

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16 ENVIRONMENT WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG VOLUME 60 NUMBER 1

water. It would be a huge leap forward if the United States were able to follow this example and value safe drinking water as essential for social and economic de- velopment.

Bhawani Venkataraman is Associate Professor of Chem- istry in the Natural Sciences and Mathematics Depart- ment, Eugene Lang College of Liberal Arts, The New School, New York, NY.

NOTES

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