

CHAPTER FIVE

POSTWAR PERSPECTIVES

INTRODUCTION

In the period after World War II, three perspectives—structural-functionalism, conflict theories, and symbolic interactionism—were the leading types of sociological theory. The most active centres of sociological theory were still in North America, particularly in the United States, and their development reflected national cultural and political trends.

The first perspective to emerge was “structural functionalism.” Structural-functional theorists tried to take American sociology beyond the Chicago School’s fieldwork-based empirical study of communities, urban form, ethnic relations, and deviance. They returned to the work of Durkheim and Weber, but interpreted it in a conservative light, with an emphasis on social cohesion and shared values. Their reading of Durkheim connected their work with the French structuralist tradition and its roots in the conservative reaction. In the Cold War climate of hostility to anything even faintly associated with Soviet Communism, they explicitly avoided re-reading Marx.

Structural functional theory was based on four major premises:

1. Society can be understood as a system; sociology is the study of social systems, which are coherent and relatively stable over time. Sociology is not the study of individual actions and dispositions.
2. Culture and values are generally shared within a society and form part of the glue that holds societies together.
3. Institutions—as regular, recurrent patterns of social roles—contribute to social stability, and in that sense can be said to have functions.
4. Sociologists must understand stability; the social order is in a state of dynamic equilibrium most of the time in most societies. Most change is slow and involves the gradual shedding of dysfunctional institutions and the ongoing adjustment of institutions to each other. In the course of human history, societies have generally become more complex, with more differentiated kinds of institutions.

“Conflict theory” emerged as a challenge to structural functionalism. Its leading theorists, most notably C. Wright Mills, rejected the notion that society is a relatively harmonious system, a coherent whole. Although not prepared

to call themselves Marxists, conflict theorists read Marx. They also read Weber in a very different light than structural functionalists; their Weber was a conflict theorist who studied power, struggles within states and organizations, and collective action by classes and status groups. The first works in conflict theory also drew on North American political thought, especially ideals of radical democracy and left-wing populism.

Conflict theory included these basic premises:

1. Society is not a system; it is formed by groups with objectively and subjectively opposed interests, in competition and contention with one another.
2. These groups usually have unequal power in society and unequal life chances. Wealth, power, status, and opportunities are not equally distributed; these inequalities are a central feature of societies.
3. The conflicting groups do not share values. In so far as they appear to have a common culture, it is really an ideology that favours a dominant group; this ideology is imposed on subordinate groups through institutions like the media, schooling, and religion.
4. Conflicting groups are not just categories in a social structure; sooner or later, people in these categories develop awareness or consciousness of inequalities and organize to change society. Therefore an important task of sociology is to study the conditions under which people develop this awareness and begin to take purposive, collective, and politicized action.
5. The most important kinds of changes are discontinuous and arise out of collective action, purposive political struggles initiated by subordinate groups. Armed uprising and revolutions are important forms of social change.
6. Institutions do not just function in a neutral way, to sustain a social order; they function on behalf of the groups that hold power.

For example, structural functionalists would say that schools function to socialize the next generation, teaching skills, knowledge, and shared values; schools prepare young people for labour markets. Conflict theorists would say that schools inculcate ideology and impose habits of mind that support authority and inequality; schools sort and select young people, generally along lines of existing inequalities, and use grading and tracking to perpetuate social privilege. In the conflict perspective, schools do not simply have functions of social reproduction; they reproduce inequalities.

Structural functionalists would say that the criminal justice system protects society from criminals. Conflict theorists see courts and prisons as part of the coercive arm of the state, holding subordinate groups down and suppressing any type of rebellious activity. Police are not the citizen's friends, defending law and order, but an occupying force imposing an unjust social order on the community.

The third perspective is “symbolic interactionism” (and other micro-theories). It is less politically radical than conflict theory, but challenges structural functionalism in terms of the basic subject matter of sociology. Its roots are in the liberal social thought of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on the individual as the basis of society. Pragmatic philosophy and the work of Cooley and Mead are among its more recent ancestors in the United States. Symbolic interactionists also re-read Simmel, focusing on his work on interaction, sociability, and social forms while giving less attention to his examination of capitalism. The basic premises include:

1. There is no such thing as society. Society is a reified concept; symbolic interactionists deny that society exists as a thing. Look around! There is no such thing as society; there are only interacting individuals (and the material objects we have made).
2. The fundamental element of human life is language, communication, and the use of symbols; we interact with each other and think for ourselves using language. Language (and related symbolic gestures) has to be the focus of sociological study.
3. Society is really an open-ended process of interaction. It may not have any discernable historical patterns. Change goes on all the time, and we can observe it, but we should not rush into any conclusions about its large-scale direction or patterning.
4. Most individuals act in a relatively rational way, not always in economically rational terms, but in terms of their own understanding of their situation. Human action and interaction is best understood as pragmatic coping with situations.

If we look carefully at these three perspectives we can see that there is some overlap between them. Structural functionalists and conflict theories actually share functional analysis; the difference is not in the concept “function” but in the analysis of what or whom the function serves. Symbolic interactionists cleared away all the structural and systemic concepts shared by conflict theorists and structural functionalists, but they shared conflict theorists’ interest in social action, in the meaning and purpose of human activities, and in the resistance of the marginalized and oppressed. Symbolic interactionist theory was even politically radical at times, but at a micro-level; symbolic interactionists engaged with definitions of reality and the process by which these definitions are imposed on individuals. For example, they analyzed how mental patients are stigmatized and labelled. They liked to study deviant behaviour, showing how deviance is socially constructed.

In the 1950s, structural functionalism reigned supreme and was the type of theory taught from sociology textbooks and in most departments in North

America; conflict theory and symbolic interactionism were subterranean traditions among sociology graduate students and maverick young faculty. By the later 1960s, all three traditions had become part of the sociological canon in North America; they were included in most introductory sociology textbooks and were assumed to be in the repertoire of the graduating senior and the new recruit to graduate school.

No sooner were these three perspectives canonized, than they began to disintegrate and come under challenge. Each perspective followed a distinct trajectory of disintegration.

The first casualty was probably conflict theory. By the later 1960s it was increasingly replaced by new variants of Marxism; young sociologists were no longer reluctant to use that label, and it was becoming trendy to be a Marxist again, in western Europe, North America, and many of the emerging new nations. Conflict theory began to mutate into Marxism and neo-Marxism.

But at the very moment that Marxism was on the verge of replacing conflict theory, new kinds of conflict theory appeared—especially feminist theory and conflict-multiculturalism (theories that put an emphasis on contending cultural/ethnic groups and traditions in a society). All these theories of societal disunity, inequality, and struggle continued to be lumped together as conflict theories, but they became increasingly strange bedfellows. Some concepts continued to appear across the variants of conflict theory (inequality, hegemony and ideology, domination, collective action and conflict, resistance and opposition, etc.), but in many other ways, Marxism, feminism, and conflict-multiculturalism were incompatible. In the real world of political action in the 1970s, Marxists, feminists, and movements of ethnic/cultural nationalism were having difficulties forming viable coalitions. In the realm of theory, conflict theory as a unified tradition no longer held together. This reflection of reality into theory is not surprising; many young radicals were also students, especially in the social sciences, and they brought their movement experiences into their theoretical work.

Structural functionalism also lost its cohesion and popularity. By the 1970s, under the onslaught of conflict theories and interactionism, hardly anyone wanted to admit to being a structural functionalist, so that the conventional centre of sociology began to fragment into many smaller sub-fields of increasingly specialized knowledge and middle range theory (of health, law and society, the sociology of gender, deviance and criminology, and literally scores of areas). Most of these, in fact, loosely held to some basic premises of structural functionalism, but often mixed in with conflict perspectives and interactionist analysis. Concepts like role, structure, and institution continued to be in common use. Mainstream sociologists did not share conflict theorists' belief that society was irrevocably divided into groups with incompatible interests.

Symbolic-interactionist theory also split and proliferated, giving rise to a bewildering multiplicity of overlapping micro approaches. Most of them still centred on individual action, interaction, and meaning, but used different terminology and expressed subtle differences of focus and method. They included ethnomethodology, rational choice theory, and frame analysis. Micro theories such as rational choice theory emphasized pragmatic decision-making; others such as ethnomethodology emphasized the invisible rules of communication.

Meanwhile, by the later 1970s, a new hybrid appeared in theories of social construction, which united some elements of conflict theory with symbolic interactionist premises. Social constructionists argued that the categories of social inequality—especially race and gender—are socially constructed. They are not natural, nor are they fixed. They emerge in a process of social definition. Social constructionists believe a key step towards greater social equality is the deconstruction of those categories of thought and language that define and create difference. For example, if we can show how “men and women” are created in language and interaction that creates difference, we are taking a radical and necessary step towards reducing the very real, everyday consequences of that difference. Social constructionists showed how “white” and “black” people were created in racist ideology through a number of processes that included the transformation of European ethnic and cultural groups into “whites.”

The bell tolled for the canon, but its trinitarian structure remained enshrined in introductory textbooks well into the 1990s. Indeed, the conceptual differences outlined here still make quite a lot of sense for distinguishing different ways of doing sociology and looking at social processes. However, sociologists now see them as no longer a satisfactory statement about innovative directions at the frontier of social theory.

STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM: TALCOTT PARSONS (1902-1979)

A long economic boom took place after World War II in most economically developed regions. In North America, high employment and low inflation created a sense of prosperity within a few years of the end of the war in 1945. The boom came later in war-ravaged western Europe and Japan. The socialist economies of the Soviet bloc also enjoyed high growth rates.

Government played an active role in this boom. The specifics of government activism varied a bit from country to country. In the United States, for example, the federal government guaranteed home mortgages and provided college scholarships for veterans; it also engaged in huge road-building efforts, ostensibly as part of national defense, that subsidized suburban development. The defense industries of the "garrison state" and the "military industrial complex" had a multiplier effect, putting money in the pockets of working people as well as defense contractors. In western Europe, governments with a leftwing or labour orientation went further, developing health care systems and physical infrastructure. These forms of government activism amplified the effects of the long economic boom and spread them to a large proportion of the population; the result was a general sense of prosperity. In the words of scholars and journalists of the period, poverty was now confined to pockets of the unfortunate, mainly African Americans in the United States, the elderly poor, and a few disadvantaged rural areas and backward regions. The patterns varied from country to country, but the same sense of prosperity and the ideal of life in the nuclear family appeared in most industrialized capitalist nations.

Prosperity and family formation in the postwar years created a sense that industrial capitalist societies were finally settling into a long-term phase of stability, not only in their economies, but also in their family structure and social institutions. The shape of the 1950s appeared to be the shape of the future: the growth of a middle class that included both production workers and white collar employees; stable nuclear families; a strong gender division of labour with dads as breadwinners and moms as homemakers; limited and manageable social problems like crime and poverty that could be handled within existing institutions; and stable political institutions in which individuals' political choices were predictably influenced by institutions such as unions and professional associations.

Structural-functional sociology mirrored these real-life developments. It emphasized societal stability and the match between institutions like the economy, the family, the political system, and the value system. Functional analy-

sis had been present in social theory from its inception at the end of the eighteenth century. After all, most societies do last a fairly long time, there is stability in the social order, and institutions do mesh with each other. Revolutions and other forms of social collapse are rare events. This stability had been celebrated by conservative thinkers, as we read in the opening chapter; but even radical intellectuals with a commitment to social transformation had to acknowledge and explain stability as a reality.

Structural-functional theory not only drew on concepts pioneered by conservative reactionaries, Burke, and Comte. It also offered a conservative reading of Durkheim and Weber. Structural-functional theorists interpreted these two classical theorists in a way that supported structural-functional analysis. For example, the evolutionary side of Durkheim—his hope for a future society that transcended the existing state of affairs—was downplayed. Weber was presented as diametrically opposed to Marx, emphasizing ideas and values in contrast to material conditions as the engine of social change. Weber's interest in social conflict and his insistence on historical analysis were not highlighted; neither was the gloomy feeling tone of his ideas about the future of modern society, the iron cages of bureaucracies, and the chilling formal rationality of the state and the market.

The 1950s was the period in which structural-functional theory enjoyed its heyday. Theory focused on how social systems achieve a dynamic stability, how institutions function together and how roles held by individuals mesh with institutional tasks. Even though structural-functional theory sometimes had a celebratory ring—endorsing as well as explaining social order—it nevertheless offered a powerful set of concepts for understanding the relative stability of most societies.

The concept of system is central to the theory. The roots of this concept lie in the organic metaphor of eighteenth-century social thought, but by the 1950s the system concept had become far more sophisticated and was increasingly based on contemporary biological and engineering models. How do we know that a society or a configuration of roles and actions constitutes a system? Because it has a degree of continuity and stability—and it is this continuity and stability that we want to understand in more detail.

Systems have parts—subsystems or elements that are necessary to the continuity of the whole. In societies, these parts are not individuals but institutions. As long as they function—carry out tasks that are necessary for system stability—the larger system can continue. When many institutions break down, or when a few key institutions fall apart, the system as a whole becomes weak.

The institutions (or other system components) not only have to function as separate components, they have to be articulated with one another in a coherent way. This articulation is not usually planned by people; it develops over

time by trial and error. For example, family structure and the economy have to correspond to each other. If the economy is a market system in which it is assumed that people will change jobs and investments, shifting rather rapidly and flexibly from one region or industry to another, families have to be small, geographically mobile, and geared to producing individuals who are prepared to enter and flourish in the rapidly changing world of the market. Large extended families, local loyalties, and devotion to tradition may get in the way of the market; to put it differently, the experience of the market encourages families to shrink, move around, and raise their children to be flexible and innovative. (As you remember from reading the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx observed this process too and felt ambivalent about it.) There are conscious choices at the individual level in this process, but from a systemic view, much of it develops over time, as dysfunctional institutions, roles, and behaviours are gradually extinguished. In some societies, the articulation of structures may fail to work itself out, leading to weaker systems. Structural-functionalist theory does not guarantee functional systems!

The "atoms" of social systems in structural-functional theory are social roles. Individuals fill these roles, but the individual is not the basic unit of the system. Institutions have manifest functions that correspond to group and individual purposes, but also latent functions that are not intended or understood by social actors.

Social systems differ in complexity. While all human beings are equal, the social systems in which they participate are not structured identically. We cannot speak of "primitive people," but we can assert that a modern industrial society has a more complex organization than a small hunting and gathering society. Modern industrial societies are complex in terms of the number and differentiation of institutions, the number and differentiation of roles, and the articulation of multiple institutions with each other. In a hunting and gathering band-level society, most roles are kinship roles; functions are embedded in the institution of kinship. Modern, complex societies have differentiated institutions (family, economy, religion, media, political system, military, civic associations, and so on). These differentiated institutions are articulated with each other in complicated ways.

Structural functionalists are sometimes caricatured as celebrating a completely static social order. This portrayal is unfair; they were keenly interested in how societies remain in dynamic equilibrium. They realized that not all institutions or roles are functional, so they wanted to understand how dysfunctional ones disappear or change and how institutions that may be out of sync with each other change in such a way that the system returns to a new level of stability. Yet many critics of structural-functional theory believe that the perspective carries with it a subtle endorsement of existing institutional arrangements.

especially family structures, gender roles, and social inequalities. If an institution or form of behaviour exists—especially if it exists over a long period—it is probably serving a function, according to structural functionalists. Thus the theory flirts with the notion that “what is real is rational” and that it could not be otherwise.

Some inequalities may be functional; others may be dysfunctional or irrelevant to system functioning. Structural-functional theory does not provide enough analysis of which is which; it gives little insight into either the historical causes of inequalities or their long-term effects.

Yet, despite these criticisms, structural-functional theory is a powerful way of understanding social reality. It forces us to think about stability and to recognize that most societies and institutions change only slowly. Like the work of Comte, it makes us think about a social system that operates apart from the motivations (and happiness) of individuals. It emphasizes overall, systemic, structural characteristics, especially the interconnection of institutions.

Talcott Parsons was a leading structural functionalist. His work exemplifies many of the strengths and weaknesses of the theory. Its strengths lie in the effort to create a general conceptualization of the social system, a framework of concepts that could be used in the analysis of many different kinds of societies and institutions. The problems are the flip side of the strengths: the terminology and analysis are often so abstract as to be disconnected from any observations of actual societies, social actions or behaviours, specific cultures, and historical transformations. The abstraction of the language makes Parsons's work difficult to read.

In the following reading, Parsons identifies the functional imperatives of the social system and the subsystems with which each imperative is associated. In other words, these are the tasks that must be fulfilled if a society or subsystem is to survive. His functional imperatives are often referred to by the letters *AGIL*. *A* stands for adaptation, the extraction and organization of the resources needed for survival, at whatever is deemed an appropriate level. *G* stands for goal attainment; it is the system function of decision-making, guiding or managing the system and assigning priorities to activities and purposes. *I* is the function of integration, of holding the subsystems together, of articulating the various subsystems with each other. Finally, *L* is latency, here referred to as pattern maintenance, which means reproducing the system over time. In addition, systems are characterized by distinct boundaries and by “boundary maintaining devices.” The systems could be whole societies, institutions within societies, organizations (with their divisions or departments forming subsystems), or even individual human beings.

Brought down from the high level of abstraction at which Parsons wrote, these four functions can be loosely identified with distinct institutions in mod-

em societies. Adaptation is the function of the economy, goal attainment is the function of government, and integration is carried out primarily by the legal system. Latency/pattern maintenance is the function of the family, above all; it motivates individuals—i.e., molds personality systems—to assume roles and prepares a new generation to fulfil social roles. Latency and integration are also functions of the media and religious institutions that generate and diffuse ideologies and take care of the cultural system. Notice that the functions do not correspond perfectly or in a simple one-to-one way to the institutions that we usually talk about in everyday discourse—government, the media, the family, religious institutions, the economy. A single institution may be involved in carrying out more than one of the imperatives, and each imperative may be sustained by more than one institution.

The advantage of the extremely high level of abstraction is that functions can be discussed separately from actual institutions in any given society. This allows us to compare societies that have completely different structures and institutional forms.

In simple or primitive social systems, these functions are carried out largely within and by the kinship system. In modern, complex societies they are carried out by differentiated and specialized institutions. The task of articulating and integrating the institutions is very complex. Motivating individuals is also a more difficult task in modern, large, and diverse societies than in small, community-like, band-level societies.

Readings

Alexander, Jeffrey. *Neofunctionalism*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985.



Functional Imperatives

TALCOTT PARSONS

The most strategic starting point for explaining this basic set of classifications is the category of functions, the link between the structural and the dynamic aspects of the system. I have suggested that it is possible to reduce the essential functional imperatives of any system of action, and hence of any social sys-

tem, to four, which I have called pattern-maintenance, integration, goal-attainment, and adaptation. These are listed in order of significance from the point of view of cybernetic control of action processes in the system type under consideration

The Function of Pattern Maintenance. The function of pattern-maintenance refers to the imperative of maintaining the stability of the patterns of institutionalized culture defining the structure of the system. There are two distinct aspects of this functional imperative. The first concerns the character of the normative pattern itself; the second concerns its state of "institutionalization." From the point of view of the individual participant in a social system, this may be called his motivational *commitment* to act in accordance with certain normative patterns; this, as we shall see, involves their "internalization" in the structure of his personality.

Accordingly, the focus of pattern-maintenance lies in the structural category of *values*, which will be discussed presently. In this connection, the essential function is maintenance, at the cultural level, of the stability of institutionalized values through the processes which articulate values with the belief system, namely, religious beliefs, ideology, and the like. Values, of course, are subject to change, but whether the empirical tendency be toward stability or not, the potentialities of disruption from this source are very great, and it is essential to look for mechanisms that tend to protect such order—even if it is orderliness in the process of change.

The second aspect of this control function concerns the motivational commitment of the individual—elsewhere called "tension-management." A very central problem is that of the mechanisms of socialization of the individual, i.e., of the processes by which the values of the society are internalized in his personality. But even when values have become internalized, the commitments involved are subject to different kinds of strain. Much insight has recently been gained about the ways in which such mechanisms as ritual, various types of expressive symbolism, the arts, and indeed recreation, operate in this connection. Durkheim's analysis of the functions of religious ritual may be said to constitute the main point of departure here.

Pattern-maintenance in this sense plays a part in the theory of social systems, as of other systems of action, comparable to that of the concept of inertia in mechanics. It serves as the most fundamental reference point to which the analysis of other, more variable factors can be related. Properly conceived and used, it does not imply the empirical predominance of stability over change. However, when we say that, because of this set of functional exigencies, social systems show a *tendency* to maintain their structural patterns, we say essentially two things. First, we provide a reference point for the orderly analysis of a whole range of problems of variation which can be treated as arising from

sources *other* than processes of structural change in the system, including, in the latter concept, its dissolution. Second, we make it clear that when we do analyze structural change we are dealing with a different kind of theoretical problem than that involved in equilibration. Hence, there is a direct relation between the function of pattern-maintenance—as distinguished from the other three functional imperatives—and the distinction between problems of equilibrium analysis, on the one hand, and the analysis of structural change on the other. The distinction between these two types of problems comes to focus at this point in the paradigm.

The Function of Goal-Attainment. For purposes of exposition it seems best to abandon the order of control set forth above and to concentrate next upon the function of goal-attainment and its relation to adaptation. In contrast to the constancy of institutionalized cultural patterns, we have emphasized the variability of a system's relation to its situation. The functions of goal-attainment and adaptation concern the structures, mechanisms, and processes involved in this relation.

We have compared pattern-maintenance with inertia as used in the theory of mechanics. Goal-attainment then becomes a "problem" in so far as there arises some discrepancy between the inertial tendencies of the system and its "needs" resulting from interchange with the situation. Such needs necessarily arise because the internal system and the environing ones cannot be expected to follow immediately the changing patterns of process.¹ A goal is therefore defined in terms of equilibrium. It is a directional change that tends to reduce the discrepancy between the needs of the system, with respect to input-output interchange, and the conditions in the environing systems that bear upon the "fulfilment" of such needs. Goal-attainment or goal-orientation is thus, by contrast with pattern-maintenance, essentially tied to a specific situation.

A social system with only one goal, defined in relation to a generically crucial situational problem, is conceivable. Most often, however, the situation is complex, with many goals and problems. In such a case two further considerations must be taken into account. First, to protect the integrity of the system, the several goals must be arranged in some scale of relative urgency, a scale sufficiently flexible to allow for variations in the situation. For any complex system, therefore, it is necessary to speak of a system of goals rather than of a single unitary goal, a system, however, which must have some balance between integration as a system and flexible adjustment to changing pressures.

For the social system as such, the focus of its goal-orientation lies in its relation as a system to the personalities of the participating individuals. It concerns, therefore, not commitment to the values of the society, but motivation to contribute what is necessary for the functioning of the system; these "contributions" vary according to particular exigencies. For example, considering

American society, one may suggest that, given the main system of values, there has been in the cold-war period a major problem of motivating large sectors of the population to the level of national effort required to sustain a position of world leadership in a very unstable and rapidly changing situation. I would interpret much of the sense of frustration expressed in isolationism and McCarthyism as manifestations of the strains resulting from this problem.²

The Function of Adaptation. The second consequence of plurality of goals, however, concerns the difference between the functions of goal-attainment and adaptation. When there is only one goal, the problem of evaluating the usefulness of facilities is narrowed down to their relevance to attaining this particular goal. With plurality of goals, however, the problem of "cost" arises. That is, the same scarce facilities will have *alternative* uses within the system of goals, and hence their use for one purchase means sacrificing the gains that would have been derived from their use for another. It is on this basis that an analytical distinction must be made between the function of effective goal-attainment and that of providing disposable facilities independent of their relevance to any particular goal. The adaptive function is defined as the provision of such facilities.

Just as there is a pluralism of lower-order, more concrete goals, there is also a pluralism of relatively concrete facilities. Hence there is a parallel problem of the organization of such facilities in a system. The primary criterion is the provision of flexibility, so far as this is compatible with effectiveness; for the system, this means a maximum of generalized disposability in the processes of allocation between alternative uses. Within the complex type of social system, this disposability of facilities crystallizes about the institutionalization of money and markets. More generally, at the macroscopic social-system level, the function of goal-attainment is the focus of the political organization of societies, while that of adaptation is the focus of economic organization.³

The most important kinds of facilities involve control of physical objects, access to the services of human agents and certain cultural elements. For their mechanisms of control to be at all highly generalized, particular units of such resources must be "alienable," i.e., not bound to specific uses through ascription. The market system is thus a primary focus of the society's organization for adaptation. Comparable features operate in less differentiated societies, and in more differentiated subsystems where markets do not penetrate, such as the family.⁴

Within a given system, goal-attainment is a more important control than adaptation. Facilities subserve the attainment of goals, not vice versa—though of course the provision or "production" of facilities may itself be a goal, with a place within the more general system of goals. There are, however, complications in the implication of this statement.

The Function of Integration. The last of the four functional imperatives of a system of action—in our case, a social system—is that of integration. In the control hierarchy, this stands between the functions of pattern-maintenance and goal-attainment. Our recognition of the significance of integration implies that all systems, except for a limiting case, are differentiated and segmented into relatively independent units, i.e., must be treated as boundary maintaining systems within an environment of other systems, which in this case are other subsystems of the same, more inclusive system. The functional problem of integration concerns the mutual adjustments of these “units” or subsystems from the point of view of their “contributions,” to the effective functioning of the system as a whole. This, in turn, concerns their relation to the pattern-maintenance problem, as well as to the external situation through processes of goal-attainment and adaptation.

In a highly differentiated society, the primary focus of the integrative function is found in its system of legal norms and the agencies associated with its management, notably the courts and the legal profession. Legal norms at this level, rather than that of a supreme constitution, govern the *allocation* of rights and obligations, of facilities and rewards, between different units of the complex system; such norms facilitate internal adjustments compatible with the stability of the value system or its orderly change, as well as with adaptation to the shifting demands of the external situation. The institutionalization of money and power are primarily integrative phenomena, like other mechanisms of social control in the narrower sense. These problems will be further discussed in later sections of this essay.

For any given type of system—here, the social—the integrative function is the focus of its most distinctive properties and processes. We contend, therefore, that the problems focusing about the integrative functions of social systems constitute the central core of the concerns of sociological theory. This point of view will guide our analyses in subsequent introductory discussions and will receive strong emphasis in selections presented at various points in the Reader. Until a broad structural outline of the social system has been presented, it seems best to defer further discussion of the ways in which the integrative function meshes more specifically with the others.

Notes

1. When we speak of the *pattern* of the system tending to remain constant, we mean this in an analytical sense. The outputs to enviroing systems need not remain constant in the same sense, and their variations may disturb the relationship to the enviroing system. Thus scientific investigation may be stably institutionalized in a structural sense but result in a continuing output of new knowledge, which is a dynamic factor in the system's interchanges with its situation.

2. Cf. The paper, Parsons, "McCarthyism and American Social Tension," *Yale Review*, Winter 1955. Reprinted as Chap. 7, "Structure and Process" in *Modern Societies*.
3. It should be noted that the above formulation of the function of adaptation carefully avoids any implication that "passive" adjustment is the keynote of adaptation. Adaptation is relative to the values and goals of the system. "Good adaptation" may consist either in passive acceptance of conditions with a minimization of risk or in active mastery of conditions. The inclusion of active mastery in the concept of adaptation is one of the most important tendencies of recent developments in biological theory. An important relation between the two functional categories of goal-attainment and adaptation and the old categories of ends and means should be noted. The basic discrimination of ends and means may be said to be the special case, for the personality system, of the more general discrimination of the functions of goal-attainment and adaptation. In attempting to squeeze analysis of social behavior into this framework, utilitarian theory was guilty both of narrowing it to the personality case (above all, denying the independent analytical significance of social systems) and of overlooking the independent significance of the functions of pattern-maintenance and of integration of social systems themselves.
4. The importance of adaptive flexibility for the functioning of families as systems is well illustrated in the study of Robert Angell, *The Family Encounters the Depression* (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1936).

CONFLICT THEORY: C. WRIGHT MILLS (1916-1962)

The work of C. Wright Mills represents the emergence of conflict theories in postwar North American sociology. Of Texan origin, which contributed to his image as a maverick and radical from the heartland, he was a professor of sociology at Columbia University during the most intense period of the Cold War. The 1950s was a period of political timidity and enforced conformity when many intellectuals avoided expressing ideas and opinions for which they could have been labeled as reds or subversives. Mills courageously opposed this political timidity in his writing and teaching.

He took a critical view of trends in sociology and in society. Within the field of sociology he questioned “grand theory” and “abstracted empiricism.” By using these terms he attacked the tendency of sociologists—especially structural functionalists—to develop concepts that were drained of political meaning. Concepts like “functional imperatives” and “system integration” were so broad and abstract as to be completely detached from public issues, political concerns, historical change, and people’s everyday lives; Mills thought that these concepts and theories expressed tautologies and platitudes.

Mills was also critical of the direction in which sociologists were taking empirical research in the 1950s—the trend toward quantification, statistical analysis, survey research, and a positivist outlook. He believed that increasingly sophisticated statistical analysis and survey methodologies obscured rather than clarified the issues of the times; fragmented data based on isolated individual questionnaire responses were displacing a broad historical and political understanding of society.

In his own writing Mills offered a vigorous alternative to abstracted empiricism. He analyzed political and social institutions in the United States. In *The Power Elite* he identified the three-fold elite that he believed ruled the United States: the executives of the largest corporations, the upper-level leadership of the executive branch of the federal government, and the decision-makers in the military-industrial complex (the department of defense, top military officers, and major defense contractors). The presidency and the executive branch of the federal government represented these interests; they were gaining power, while Congress was increasingly relegated to the role of offering more local and limited special interests a sphere of action. The main loser in this process was the public at large, composed of ordinary citizens who had no political contacts and no forum in which to voice concerns.

In *White Collar*, Mills described the transformation of the old entrepreneurial middle class into a new stratum of employees of large organizations, mostly corporations and government agencies. The new middle class was composed of a huge sales force, technical intellectuals with narrowly defined areas of expertise, clerical workers, and low-level managers and supervisors. It had lost the independent spirit and autonomous political organization of the middle classes of the past.

Mills was concerned that the media were transforming the United States from a society of political discussion and public debate into a mass society in which the media disseminated opinions and the masses could no longer talk back. More and more people were becoming receivers of opinions via the new channels of communication. The town meeting and even the small town newspaper had permitted an exchange of political ideas; the new corporate media allowed only a one-way flow of opinions and images. Universities were also becoming part of a corporate system, producing knowledge for specific ends defined by elites and abandoning the critical spirit of the liberal arts and sciences.

Mills and other conflict theorists were deeply influenced by Marx and Marxist thought; Mills edited *The Marxists*, an anthology aimed at bringing back this intellectual legacy to the United States after McCarthyism. Mills however did not label himself a Marxist, and indeed there are major differences between his theories of society and Marxism. Mills did not see all inequality as emerging from the mode of production; like Weber, he identified several distinct dimensions of inequality and treated power as a variable that can be independent from economic class. The concept of power elite, rather than ruling class, signals this difference between Mills and Marxists. He did not insist on the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as the antagonistic classes of a polarized structure, nor did he share Marxist ideas about the unfolding of a historical process. In many ways, his version of conflict theory was much closer to Weber than to Marx, and his concerns about the direction of society overlapped and updated Weber's critique of bureaucracy and formal rationality.

Mills also differed from many Marxists in his commitment to North American traditions of social criticism and radical democracy. His solution to the economic inequalities and power differences in corporate America was not a vanguard party and a proletarian revolution, but a re-opening of political debate, public discussion, and citizen participation in politics.

Mills had an enormous influence on a younger generation of sociologists, the graduate students of the 1960s. They continued his inquiries, probing the social organization of the media, the universities, the corporations, and the state. His work was read not only by sociologists but by student radicals in the protest movements of the 1960s, especially during the civil rights movement

and the formation of Students for a Democratic Society. Later in the decade some activists fell in love with unrealistic dreams of Third World revolution and Marxist-Leninist models; they lost sight of Mills's vision of radical democracy rooted in North American values and informed by North American traditions of pragmatism, progressive politics, and critical social thought.

The selection is from the opening pages of *The Sociological Imagination*. Mills is calling for a practice of sociology that connects it to public issues. The sociologist must be a public intellectual; critical skills must be linked to political engagement. The sociologist is first and foremost a citizen of a society.

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The Sociological Imagination C. WRIGHT MILLS

Nowadays men often feel that their private lives are a series of traps. They sense that within their everyday worlds, they cannot overcome their troubles, and in this feeling, they are often quite correct: What ordinary men are directly aware of and what they try to do are bounded by the private orbits in which they live; their visions and their powers are limited to the close-up scenes of job, family, neighborhood; in other milieux, they move vicariously and remain spectators. And the more aware they become, however vaguely, of ambitions and of threats which transcend their immediate locales, the more trapped they seem to feel.

Underlying this sense of being trapped are seemingly impersonal changes in the very structure of continent-wide societies. The facts of contemporary his-

tory are also facts about the success and the failure of individual men and women. When a society is industrialized, a peasant becomes a worker; a feudal lord is liquidated or becomes a businessman. When classes rise or fall, a man is employed or unemployed; when the rate of investment goes up or down, a man takes new heart or goes broke. When wars happen, an insurance salesman becomes a rocket launcher; a store clerk, a radar man; a wife lives alone; a child grows up without a father. Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society can be understood without understanding both.

Yet men do not usually define the troubles they endure in terms of historical change and institutional contradiction. The well-being they enjoy, they do not usually impute to the big ups and downs of the societies in which they live. Seldom aware of the intricate connection between the patterns of their own lives and the course of world history, ordinary men do not usually know what this connection means for the kinds of men they are becoming and for the kinds of history-making in which they might take part. They do not possess the quality of mind essential to grasp the interplay of man and society, of biography and history, of self and world. They cannot cope with their personal troubles in such ways as to control the structural transformations that usually lie behind them.

Surely it is no wonder. In what period have so many men been so totally exposed at so fast a pace to such earthquakes of change? That Americans have not known such catastrophic changes as have the men and women of other societies is due to historical facts that are now quickly becoming "merely history." The history that now affects every man is world history. Within this scene and this period, in the course of a single generation, one sixth of mankind is transformed from all that is feudal and backward into all that is modern, advanced, and fearful. Political colonies are freed; new and less visible forms of imperialism installed. Revolutions occur; men feel the intimate grip of new kinds of authority. Totalitarian societies rise, and are smashed to bits—or succeed fabulously. After two centuries of ascendancy, capitalism is shown up as only one way to make society into an industrial apparatus. After two centuries of hope, even formal democracy is restricted to a quite small portion of mankind. Everywhere in the underdeveloped world, ancient ways of life are broken up and vague expectations become urgent demands. Everywhere in the overdeveloped world, the means of authority and of violence become total in scope and bureaucratic in form. Humanity itself now lies before us, the super-nation at either pole concentrating its most co-ordinated and massive efforts upon the preparation of World War Three.

The very shaping of history now outpaces the ability of men to orient themselves in accordance with cherished values. And which values? Even when they do not panic, men often sense that older ways of feeling and thinking have collapsed and that newer beginnings are ambiguous to the point of moral stasis. Is

it any wonder that ordinary men feel they cannot cope with the larger worlds with which they are so suddenly confronted? That they cannot understand the meaning of their epoch for their own lives? That—in defense of selfhood—they become morally insensible, trying to remain altogether private men? Is it any wonder that they come to be possessed by a sense of the trap?

It is not only information that they need—in this Age of Fact, information often dominates their attention and overwhelms their capacities to assimilate it. It is not only the skills of reason that they need—although their struggles to acquire these often exhaust their limited moral energy.

What they need, and what they feel they need, is a quality of mind that will help them to use information and to develop reason in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be happening within themselves. It is this quality, I am going to contend, that journalists and scholars artists and publics, scientists and editors are coming to expect of what may be called the sociological imagination.

1 The sociological imagination enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals. It enables him to take into account how individuals, in the welter of their daily experience, often become falsely conscious of their social positions. Within that welter, the framework of modern society is sought, and within that framework the psychologies of a variety of men and women are formulated. By such means the personal uneasiness of individuals is focused upon explicit troubles and the indifference of publics is transformed into involvement with public issues.

The first fruit of this imagination—and the first lesson of the social science that embodies it—is the idea that the individual can understand his own experience and gauge his own fate only by locating himself within his period, that he can know his own chances in life only by becoming aware of those of all individuals in his circumstances. In many ways it is a terrible lesson; in many ways a magnificent one. We do not know the limits of man's capacities for supreme effort or willing degradation, for agony or glee, for pleasurable brutality or the sweetness of reason. But in our time we have come to know that the limits of "human nature" are frighteningly broad. We have come to know that every individual lives, from one generation to the next, in some society; that he lives out a biography, and that he lives it out within some historical sequence. By the fact of his living he contributes, however minutely, to the shaping of this society and to the course of its history, even as he is made by society and by its historical push and shove.

The sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography

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and the relations between the two within society. That is its task and its promise. To recognize this task and this promise is the mark of the classic social analyst. It is characteristic of Herbert Spencer—turgid, polysyllabic, comprehensive; of E.A. Ross—grateful, muckraking, upright; of Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim; of the intricate and subtle Karl Mannheim. It is the quality of all that is intellectually excellent in Karl Marx; it is the clue to Thorsten Veblen's brilliant and ironic insight, to Joseph Schumpeter's many-sided constructions of reality; it is the basis of the psychological sweep of W. E. H. Lecky no less than of the profundity and clarity of Max Weber. And it is the signal of what is best in contemporary studies of man and society.

No social study that does not come back to the problems of biography, of history and of their intersections within a society has completed its intellectual journey. Whatever the specific problems of the classic social analysis, however limited or however broad the features of social reality they have examined, those who have been imaginatively aware of the promise of their work have consistently asked three sorts of questions:

- (1) What is the structure of this particular society as a whole? What are its essential components and how are they related to one another? How does it differ from other varieties of social order? Within it, what is the meaning of any particular feature for its continuance and for its change?
- (2) Where does this society stand in human history? What are the mechanics by which it is changing? What is its place within and its meaning for the development of humanity as a whole? How does any particular feature we are examining affect, and how is it affected by, the historical period in which it moves? And this period—what are its essential features? How does it differ from other periods? What are its characteristic ways of history-making?
- (3) What varieties of men and women now prevail in this society and in this period? And what varieties are coming to prevail? In what ways are they selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive and blunted? What kinds of "human nature" are revealed in the conduct and character we observe in this society in this period? And what is the meaning for "human nature" of each and every feature of the society we are examining?

Whether the point of interest is a great power state or a minor literary mood, a family, a prison, a creed—these are the kinds of questions the best social analysts have asked. They are the intellectual pivots of classic studies of man in society—and they are the questions inevitably raised by any mind possessing the sociological imagination. For that imagination is the capacity to shift from one perspective to another—from the political to the psychological; from examination of a single family to comparative assessment of the national budgets of the world; from the theological school to the military establishment;

from considerations of an oil industry to studies of contemporary poetry. It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self—and to see the relations between the two. Back of its use there is always the urge to know the social and historical meaning of the individual in the society and in the period in which he has his quality and his being.

That, in brief, is why it is by means of the sociological imagination that men now hope to grasp what is going on in the world, and to understand what is happening in themselves as minute points of the intersections of biography and history within society. In large part, contemporary man's self-conscious view of himself as at least an outsider, if not a permanent stranger, rests upon an absorbed realization of social relativity and of the transformative power of history. The sociological imagination is the most fruitful form of this self-consciousness. By its use men whose mentalities have swept only a series of limited orbits often come to feel as if suddenly awakened in a house with which they had only supposed themselves to be familiar. Correctly or incorrectly, they often come to feel that they can now provide themselves with adequate summations, cohesive assessments, comprehensive orientations. Older decisions that once appeared sound now seem to them products of a mind unaccountably dense. Their capacity for astonishment is made lively again. They acquire a new way of thinking, they experience a transvaluation of values; in a word, by their reflection and by their sensibility, they realize the cultural meaning of the social sciences.

2

Perhaps the most fruitful distinction with which the sociological imagination works is between "the personal troubles of milieu" and the "public issues of social structure." This distinction is an essential tool of the sociological imagination and a feature of all classic work in social science.

Troubles occur within the character of the individual and within the range of his immediate relations with others; they have to do with his self and with those limited areas of social life of which he is directly and personally aware. Accordingly, the statement and the resolution of troubles properly lie within the individual as a biographical entity and within the scope of his immediate milieu—the social setting that is directly open to his personal experience and to some extent his willful activity. A trouble is a private matter: values cherished by an individual are felt by him to be threatened.

Issues have to do with matters that transcend these local environments of the individual and the range of his inner life. They have to do with the organization of many such milieux into the institutions of a historical society as a whole, with the ways in which various milieux overlap and interpenetrate to

form the larger structure of social and historical life. An issue is a public matter: some value cherished by publics is felt to be threatened. Often there is a debate about what that value really is and about what it is that really threatens it. This debate is often without focus if only because it is the very nature of an issue, unlike even widespread trouble, that it cannot very well be defined in terms of the immediate and everyday environments of ordinary men. An issue, in fact, often involves a crisis in institutional arrangements, and often too it involves what Marxists call "contradictions" or "antagonisms."

In these terms, consider unemployment. When, in a city of 100,000, only one man is unemployed, that is his personal trouble, and for its relief we properly look to the character of the man, his skills, and his immediate opportunities. But when in a nation of 50 million employees, 15 million men are unemployed, that is an issue, and we may not hope to find its solution within the range of opportunities open to any one individual. The very structure of opportunities has collapsed. Both the correct statement of the problem and the range of possible solutions require us to consider the economic and political institutions of the society, and not merely the personal situation and character of a scatter of individuals.

Consider war. The personal problem of war, when it occurs, may be how to survive it or how to die in it with honor; how to make money out of it; how to climb into the higher safety of the military apparatus; or how to contribute to the war's termination. In short, according to one's values, to find a set of milieux and within it to survive the war or make one's death in it meaningful. But the structural issues of war have to do with its cause; with what types of men it throws up into command; with its effects upon economic and political, family and religious institutions, with the unorganized irresponsibility of a world of nation-states.

Consider marriage. Inside a marriage a man and a woman may experience personal trouble, but when the divorce rate during the first four years of marriage is 250 out of every 1,000 attempts, this is an indication of a structural issue having to do with the institutions of marriage and the family and other institutions that bear upon them.

Or consider the metropolis—the horrible, beautiful, ugly, magnificent sprawl of the great city. For many upper-class people, the personal solution to "the problem of the city" is to have an apartment with private garage under it in the heart of the city, and forty miles out, a house by Henry Hill, garden by Garrett Eckbo, on a hundred acres of private land. In these two controlled environments—with a small staff at each end and a private helicopter connection—most people could solve many of the problems of personal milieux caused by the facts of the city. But all this, however splendid, does not solve the public issues that the structural fact of the city poses. What should be done with this

wonderful monstrosity? Break it all up into scattered units, combining residence and work? Refurbish it as it stands? Or, after evacuation, dynamite it and build new cities according to new plans in new places? What should those plans be? And who is to decide and to accomplish whatever choice is made? These are structural issues; to confront them and to solve them requires us to consider political and economic issues that affect innumerable milieux.

In so far as an economy is so arranged that slumps occur, the problem of unemployment becomes incapable of personal solution. In so far as war is inherent in the nation-state system and in the uneven industrialization of the world, the ordinary individual in his restricted milieu will be powerless—with or without psychiatric aid—to solve the troubles this system or lack of system imposes upon him. In so far as the family as an institution turns women into darling little slaves and men into their chief providers and unweaned dependents, the problem of a satisfactory marriage remains incapable of purely private solution. In so far as the overdeveloped megalopolis and the overdeveloped automobile are built-in features of the overdeveloped society, the issues of urban living will not be solved by personal ingenuity and private wealth.

What we experience in various and specific milieux, I have noted, is often caused by structural changes. Accordingly, to understand the changes of many personal milieux we are required to look beyond them. And the number and variety of such structural changes increase as the institutions within which we live become more embracing and more intricately connected with one another. To be aware of the idea of social structure and to use it with sensibility is to be capable of tracing such linkages among a great variety of milieux. To be able to do that is to possess the sociological imagination.

SYMBOLIC INTERACTION AND OTHER MICRO-PERSPECTIVES: HOWARD BECKER (1928-) AND ERVING GOFFMAN (1922-1982)

Symbolic-interactionist theory had multiple roots. One was the work of Cooley and Mead, the Pragmatic theorists who charted the formation of the self in interaction and role taking; they identified the reciprocal formation of self and society. Second was the Chicago School with its emphasis on observation of the flow of everyday life. And third was rebellion against structural functionalism with its large impersonal systems, absence of human agency, and abstract detachment from actual situations. Symbolic interactionists called for “grounded theory,” theory that emerged from observation.

Symbolic interactionists also challenged theories in psychology that gave no attention to what people said and quantified conclusions about behaviour using experimental designs. For symbolic interactionists, society and self were not fixed, measurable, external quantities but a constant flow of action, interaction, and self-reflection in countless situations of human life. The essence of sociology was observing and documenting these situations and writing about them in a perceptive, engaging way. There are no laws of behaviour or system imperatives, only an ongoing flux of human interaction.

Symbolic interactionists were often drawn to extreme situations in which these processes of interaction, negotiation of identities, and self-reflection were most visible. Among these situations were drug states and addictions. Symbolic interactionists did not believe that these were simply caused by the chemical properties of a drug; a “high” and an “addiction” were socially constructed conditions in which individuals came to experience themselves on the basis of the expectations and responses of others. Highs and addictions reflected the definitions of drug states that prevailed in communities of users. New users in these social contexts learned from others what to expect and how to behave; their identity as a drug user (and in the case of heroin, an addict) was learned.

In the late 1950s and 1960s Howard Becker compiled his observations of jazz musicians and marijuana users in *Outsiders*. He showed how deviance is a socially constructed category, a view we already saw in Durkheim’s work; the jazz musicians and marijuana users were not inherently deviant, only deviant in the context of then-current norms about race, drugs, and lifestyles. Even more radical was his finding that a high is not a fixed product of the chemical properties of marijuana, but a condition that is verbally defined, recognized, and learned only in interaction with more experienced users.

A number of other perspectives with a focus on interaction and symbolic processes emerged in the later 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s; one of the most influential was the work of Erving Goffman. Goffman developed a dramaturgical model to analyze interaction and self-presentation; this model suggests that interaction is much like a theatrical performance. Individuals and teams perform roles and act out scenes, sometimes tightly scripted and sometimes loosely improvised. The self is a performed self, constantly presented in an effort to manage impressions. Space is organized into backstage areas for relaxation and rehearsal and frontstage areas in which the performance is presented to the public; the teachers' lounge and the classroom are corresponding examples.

Goffman's work, like Becker's, contained a critical edge, exposing many of the pretensions of institutions and social life. This critical edge is most evident in his work on mental hospitals and other total institutions. Based on his observation in a large mental hospital, Goffman revealed the ways in which staff labeled patients, constantly discredited their self-identity, and imposed one or another medical view of mental illness on them. The patient is processed through the stages of a moral career which finally produces an apathetic and manipulative self that can play the games necessary for survival in the asylum and, perhaps, obtain eventual release. Mental hospitals are only one of many types of total institutions—prisons, schools, boot camps, sects and cults, and the military are other examples. All operate to break down a self by batch processing; labeling; isolation from external support; and regimes of physical, mental, and emotional restrictions. Goffman's critical analysis of these institutions and their use of medical, psychological, and social science jargon paralleled the work of Michel Foucault who was developing his own theories of knowledge, power, and micro-politics as he engaged in the prisoners' rights movement (see below, selection 33).

Goffman developed the concept of framing, the pattern or form in which an idea or position is stated, especially in the media. As the term implies, frames limit understandings and perceptions. They are words and images that emerge from and sustain certain types of ideological assumptions through which we comprehend reality, negotiate it, and believe we understand it. Frames involve selection of some experiences, neglect or discounting of other experiences, choices of words and symbols for expressing experiences, and systems of classifying and categorizing them. Framing occurs not only in interpersonal communication, but also in the media and social movement ideologies. Although Goffman made no direct references to Marxist theory, frame analysis is a contemporary way of addressing issues that intrigued Gramsci and other Marxists. How is thought—common sense itself—forced into certain channels that limit and constrain our understanding of social reality? How is a hegemonic consciousness perpetuated by education and media in order to preclude critical thinking?

Symbolic interactionism and Goffman's work form a body of conflict theory at the micro-level. These theorists took a negative-critical stand toward the status quo, but without mention of structural inequalities, oppressive institutions, societal elites, class domination, or any of the usual terms of conflict theories. For the micro-theorists, power is a game played at the level of interaction and communication, and inequality is an interactive and symbolic strategy. Most of the micro-theorists of the postwar period consistently took the side of the outcast, outsider, and underdog in the game of power—the deviant, the incarcerated, the mental patient, the addict. In Part III we will see how the analysis of power and inequality at the level of interaction and culture has now become a mainstream of social theory. The pioneering role of North American micro-sociologists in the period between 1955 and 1975 is unfortunately sometimes forgotten in tracing this history.

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