

The Mind and Politics

Contemporary American politics is about worldview. Conservatives simply see the world differently than do liberals, and both often have a difficult time understanding accurately what the other's worldview is. As a student of the mind and of language, I think we can make much better sense than has been made of the worldviews and forms of discourse of conservatives and liberals.

I work in a discipline that studies how people conceptualize the world. It is called cognitive science, which is the interdisciplinary study of the mind. It is a broad discipline, covering everything from vision, memory, and attention to everyday reasoning and language. The subfield most concerned with issues of worldview, that is, with everyday conceptualization, reasoning, and language, is cognitive linguistics. I have been a cognitive linguist virtually from the birth of the field, and it is my profession to study how we conceptualize our everyday lives and how we think and talk about them. The study of political concepts and political discourse falls under the job description of those in my field, though until now research in the area has been relatively sparse.

Common Sense and Unconscious Thought

A few words about my profession might be useful at the outset. One of the things most studied in cognitive science is common sense. Common sense cannot be taken for granted as a given. Whenever a cognitive scientist hears the words "It's just common sense," his ears perk up and he knows there's something to be studied in detail and depth—something that needs to be understood. Nothing is "just" common sense. Common sense has a conceptual structure that is usually unconscious. That's what makes it "common sense." It is the commonsensical quality of political discourse that makes it imperative that we study it. I hope that you will see by the end of this book just how deep, complex, sophisticated, and subtle common sense is, especially in the domains of morality and politics.

One of the most fundamental results in cognitive science, one that comes from the study of commonsense reasoning, is that most of our thought is unconscious—not unconscious in the Freudian sense of being repressed, but unconscious simply in that we are not aware of it. We think and talk at too fast a rate and at too deep a level to have conscious awareness and control over everything we think and say. We are even less conscious of the components of thoughts—concepts. When we think, we use an elaborate system of concepts, but we are not usually aware of just what those concepts are like and how they fit together into a system.

That is what I study: what, exactly, our unconscious system of concepts is and how we think and talk using that system of concepts. In recent years, my work has centered on two components of conceptual systems: conceptual metaphors and categories, especially radial categories and prototypes. A conceptual metaphor is a conventional way of conceptualizing one domain of experience in terms of another, often unconsciously. For example, many people may not be

aware that we commonly conceptualize morality in terms of financial transactions and accounting. If you do me a big favor, I will be *indebted* to you, I will *owe* you one, and I will be concerned about *repaying* the favor. We not only talk about morality in terms of paying debts, but we also think about morality that way. Concepts like retribution, restitution, revenge, and justice are typically understood in such financial terms. As we shall see, examples like these are the tip of the iceberg. Much of moral reasoning is metaphorical reasoning, as will become apparent below.

It should also become apparent, if this example does not already make it clear, that metaphorical thought need not be poetic or especially rhetorical. It is normal, everyday thought. Not every common concept is metaphorical, but a surprising number are (see References, sec. A1).

Metaphorical Common Sense

Much of what we read on the daily op-ed pages of our finest newspapers is metaphorical commonsense reasoning. Let us consider a very simple example, taken from a column by *Washington Post* columnist William Raspberry (as it appeared in the *Houston Chronicle*, section A, p. 30, February 4, 1995). The column begins straightforwardly enough.

The government of the District of Columbia is reeling from a newly discovered budget shortfall of at least \$722 million and there is growing talk of a congressional takeover of the city.

After an example of spending he considers questionable, Raspberry says,

What is about to do us in . . . is the poor but compassionate mother with a credit card.

To put it another way, a huge amount of the city's

stupendous debt is the result of the local government's effort to do good things it can't afford.

He then gives a list of examples of good things the city government wants to do and which he thinks it can't afford, and finishes the column as follows:

But a good chunk of the underlying problem is the compassionate mom attitude that says: If it's good for the kid to have, then I ought to buy it—and worry later about where the money will come from.

Well, Mom not only has reached her credit limit: she's in so much trouble that scrimping and saving now won't solve the problem. She'll need a bailout from Congress.

But then, she has to learn to say no—not just to junk food but to quality cuts of meat she can't afford.

None of Raspberry's readers have any problem understanding this column. He writes it as if it were just common sense. Yet, it is an elaborate conceptual metaphor, and he is reasoning in terms of this metaphor.

In the metaphor, the government is an overindulgent, impractical mother and the citizens are her children. She has no self-discipline; she is indulging her children irresponsibly, using money she doesn't have. This is not merely politics, it is a story with a moral. The moral is that Mom will have to learn self-discipline ("to say no") and self-denial ("to quality cuts of meat she can't afford"). Only then will she be a good mother.

We all understand this column, and to many readers it will seem like common sense. But why? Is the metaphor that government is a parent and the citizens are children newly made up? Or is it familiar, a metaphor we already know? And why should readers be willing to reason about a government in this way? Why don't they just reject the metaphor

as ridiculous? Why don't readers—all readers—say in response, "What's all this nonsense about indulgent moms? Let's get real and talk about the details of economics and policy." But readers don't. The column is "just common sense." And moreover, it is conservative common sense.

The logical structure of the column is determined by metaphor, not by facts. One could have taken the same budget shortfall and framed it in a different way. One could have observed that Washington, D.C., must have city services beyond its population to serve the large number of relatively well-off civil service workers, lobbyists, and others who live in the wealthy suburbs but work in town. One could also have mentioned that it is the *responsibility* of Congress to see that the city is maintained properly and that it lives by a humane standard, indeed that it should set a standard for the country. One could then apply the metaphor of the government as parent to Congress, seeing Congress as a deadbeat dad, refusing to pay for the support of his children, the citizens of Washington, D.C. One could then have drawn the moral that deadbeat dad Congress must meet his responsibilities and pay, no matter how tough it is for him. This is just common sense—a different kind of common sense.

What, exactly, is conservative common sense? How does it differ from liberal common sense? And what role, exactly, does metaphorical thought play in the everyday common-sense reasoning of conservatives and liberals? As we shall see, the metaphor used in this column, that of the government as parent, has a great deal to do with conservative common sense in general, as well as with what conservatism is as a political and moral philosophy.

RADIAL CATEGORIES

Radial categories are the most common of human conceptual categories. They are not definable in terms of some list of

properties shared by every member of the category. Instead, they are characterized by variations on a central model. Take the category *mother*. The central model is characterized by four submodels. (1) The birth model: the mother is one who gives birth. (2) The genetic model: the mother is the female from whom you get half your genetic traits. (3) The nurture model: your mother is the person who raises and nurtures you. And (4) The marriage model: your mother is the wife of your father. In the most basic case, all conditions hold. But modern life is complex, and the category extends to cases where only some of these conditions are met. Hence, there are special terms like birth mother, genetic mother, foster mother, stepmother, surrogate mother, adoptive mother, and so on.

Another example of a radial category is forms of harm. The central case is physical harm. But the category also includes kinds of harm that are metaphorically understood in terms of physical harm, e.g., financial harm, political harm, social harm, and psychological harm. Our courts recognize that these are all forms of harm, yet they also recognize the centrality of physical harm, for which the most severe penalties are usually reserved.

Radial categories, with central cases and variations on them, are normal in the human mind. And, as we shall see, the categories of conservative and liberal are also radial categories. This is important to realize because conservative and liberal are very complex categories, with a great many variations. The theory of radial categories allows us to account for both the central tendencies and the variations. For an introduction to radial categories, see Lakoff (1987) and References, sec. A2.

TYPES OF PROTOTYPES

The central members of radial categories are one subtype of a general phenomenon called "prototypes" (see References,

sec. A2). There are many types of prototypes and it is important to discuss them at the outset since they will play a major role throughout the book. A prototype is an element of a category (either a subcategory or an individual member) that is used to represent the category as a whole in some sort of reasoning. *All prototypes are cognitive constructions used to perform a certain kind of reasoning; they are not objective features of the world.*

Here are some of the basic types of prototypes that play a role in American politics and that will recur throughout this book:

1. The *central subcategory* of a radial category: This provides the basis for extending the category in new ways and for defining variations.

Political examples will include central types of liberals and conservatives.

2. A *typical case* prototype: This characterizes typical cases and is used to draw inferences about category members as a whole, unless it is made clear that we are operating with a nontypical case.

For example, what we consider to be typical birds fly, sing, are not predators, and are about the size of a robin or sparrow. If I say "There's a bird on the porch," you will draw the conclusion that it is a typical case prototype, unless I indicate otherwise. If I speak of a typical American, what comes to mind for many is an adult white male Protestant, who is native-born, speaks English natively, and so on.

3. An *ideal case* prototype: This defines a standard against which other subcategories are measured.

We will be discussing what conservatives and liberals think of as an ideal parent, an ideal citizen, and an ideal person.

4. An *anti-ideal* prototype: This subcategory exemplifies the worst kind of subcategory, a "demon" subcategory. It defines a negative standard.

Liberals and conservatives have very different kinds of demons, and we will discuss the types and how they are used in reasoning.

5. A social *stereotype*: This is a model, widespread in a culture, for making snap judgments—judgments without reflective thought—about an entire category, by virtue of suggesting that the stereotype is the typical case.

Social stereotypes are commonly used in unreflective or biased discourse. Examples include the Drunken Irishman (used to suggest that the Irish typically drink to excess), the Industrious Japanese (used to suggest that the Japanese are typically industrious), and so on. Ethnic and gender stereotypes constantly enter into political discourse, as do political stereotypes. Stereotypes can either be based on myth or on individual well-known examples.

6. A *salient exemplar*: A single memorable example that is commonly used in making probability judgments or in drawing conclusions about what is typical of category members.

It is commonplace in political discourse to use a salient exemplar as if it were a typical case; for example, popularizing the case of a single welfare cheater to suggest that everyone on welfare cheats.

7. An *essential* prototype: This is a hypothesized collection of properties that, according to a commonplace folk theory, characterizes what makes a thing the kind of thing it is, or what makes a person the kind of person he is.

Essential properties of birds are, among others, that they have feathers, wings, and beaks, and lay eggs. Rational thought is seen as an essential property of human beings. In moral discourse, the notion of *character* is seen as defined by an essential prototype. Your character is what makes you what you are and determines how you will behave.

None of these should be strange or unfamiliar. All of these are normal products of the human mind, and they are used in normal everyday discourse. There is nothing surprising about their use in politics, but we do need to be aware of how they are used. It is important, as we shall see, not to confuse a salient exemplar with a typical case, or a typical case (say, the typical politician) with an ideal case (like the ideal politician).

The Present Book

In my previous writings I have been concerned with the details of conceptual analysis and their consequences for such fields as cognitive science, philosophy, and linguistics. The present book came out of such routine research. Around the time of the conservatives' victory in the 1994 elections, I happened to be working on the details of our moral conceptual system, especially our system of metaphors for morality. During the election campaign, it became clear to me that liberals and conservatives have very different moral systems, and that much of the political discourse of conservatives and liberals derives from their moral systems. I found that, using analytic techniques from cognitive linguistics, I could describe the moral systems of both conservatives and liberals in considerable detail, and could list the metaphors for morality that conservatives and liberals seemed to prefer. What was particularly interesting was that they seemed to use virtu-

ally the same metaphors for morality but with different—almost opposite—priorities. This seemed to explain why liberals and conservatives could seem to be talking about the same thing and yet reach opposite conclusions—and why they could seem to be talking past each other with little understanding much of the time.

At this point, I asked myself a question whose answer was not at first obvious: What unifies each of the lists of moral priorities? Is there some more general idea that leads conservatives to choose one set of metaphorical priorities for reasoning about morality, and liberals another? Once the question was posed, the answer came quickly. It was what conservatives were talking about nonstop: the family. Deeply embedded in conservative and liberal politics are different models of the family. Conservatism, as we shall see, is based on a Strict Father model, while liberalism is centered around a Nurturant Parent model. These two models of the family give rise to different moral systems and different discourse forms, that is, different choices of words and different modes of reasoning.

Once we notice this, a deeper question arises: Can we explain what unifies the collections of liberal and conservative political positions? Do models of the family and family-based moral systems allow one to explain why liberals and conservatives take the stands they do on particular issues? The problem is a difficult one. Consider conservatism. What does opposition to abortion have to do with opposition to environmentalism? What does either have to do with opposition to affirmative action or gun control or the minimum wage? A model of the conservative mind ought to answer these questions, just as a model of the liberal mind ought to explain why liberals tend to have the cluster of opposing political stands. The question of explanation is paramount. How, precisely, can one explain why conservatives and liberals have the clusters of policies they have?

Even the basics of conservative and liberal discourse require explanation. Conservatives argue that social safety nets are immoral because they work against self-discipline and responsibility. Liberals argue that tax cuts for the wealthy are immoral because they help people who don't need help and don't help people who do need help. What moral systems lead each of them to make these arguments and to reject the arguments of the other? Why do conservatives like to talk about discipline and toughness, while liberals like to talk about need and help? Why do liberals like to talk about social causes, while conservatives don't?

The answers, I will argue, come from differences in their models of the family and in family-based morality—from the distinction between what I will call the Strict Father and Nurturant Parent models. The link between family-based morality and politics comes from one of the most common ways we have of conceptualizing what a nation is, namely, as a family. It is the common, unconscious, and automatic metaphor of the Nation-as-Family that produces contemporary conservatism from Strict Father morality and contemporary liberalism from Nurturant Parent morality.

This is not something that is either straightforward or obvious, partly because the two moral systems are not obvious. But once we discern the moral systems, the explanation emerges. It is the only explanation there is at present for why conservatives and liberals have the policies they have and use the modes of reasoning and the language that they use.

VARIATIONS

There are, of course, far more than two forms of morality and politics, even among conservatives and liberals. But set within normal human minds, the two family systems and moral systems that I will be outlining give rise, in a system-

atic way, to a considerable number of actual moral and political positions, each of which is a variation on one of the two systems. Such variations occur systematically because human category-structure is radial. A given central model, by virtue of its structure, allows a certain range of variations, but not just any variations. The parameters of variation are defined by the structure of the model, as we shall see in detail below. As a result, two conservatives such as Robert Dole and Phil Gramm may have very different positions on a certain range of issues yet still be conservatives. One goal of this study is to provide a theory of what determines such parameters of variation. Thus, when I speak of "two models," I will be referring to two central models whose structures determine a wide range of variations. Thus, "the" model of liberalism is the central model whose structure naturally gives rise to a wide variety of liberalisms. What makes all these liberalisms a single category is the systematic relationships they bear to the central model. The details of the parameters of variation that lead to such complex radial categories will be discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 17 below.

COHERENCE

What I will call "central" conservatism and liberalism are coherent political ideologies. Moreover, each variation of conservatism and liberalism is a coherent ideology. The radial categories show how the coherent ideologies in each category fit together and what the relationships among them are.

But not all citizens have coherent ideologies. Far from it. Indeed, one of the important results of the study of conceptual systems is that they are not internally consistent. It is normal for people to operate with multiple models in various domains. Thus, one may have a number of inconsistent mod-

els of what a marriage should be like or how a computer works. Sometimes one model—one precise model—is used, sometimes another precise model is used. If one fails to look at the reasoning used in each case, it might appear that there are no models at all, that people just act randomly. But a look at forms of reasoning used on a case-by-case basis reveals that, for the most part, different models are being used in different instances.

One of the things cognitive scientists do is to study as precisely as possible each of the models being used, so that one can see, on any given occasion, the kind of reasoning being employed. That is one of the goals of this book. So far as I have been able to tell, there are two major categories of moral and political models for reasoning about politics—conservative and liberal. Most voters have some version of each model—and commonly apply different models to different issues at different times. The question asked here is: What are the models being applied?

One way of understanding recent electoral history is that voters have applied one model in presidential elections and the other in congressional elections, reproducing the Strict Father and Nurturant Mother in the national family. During the cold war, we had Strict Father presidents and Nurturant Mother Congresses. With the end of the cold war and the turn to domestic issues, the country first chose a Nurturant Parent president and then turned to a Strict Father Congress. Again, voters may not be consistent in the use of their models.

A strict conservative and a strict liberal each has coherent political views; they don't go back and forth between models from time to time and issue to issue. The models described here are those of strict conservatives and strict liberals. In short, the models define coherent ideologies. What conservative and liberal political leaders and ideologues do is to try to get voters to become coherent in their views—to move to

one pole or the other, that is, to be entirely liberal or entirely conservative over the full range of issues.

Because people do not use the same models in all aspects of their lives, a political conservative could very well use the Nurturant Parent model in his family life but not in his political life, just as a political liberal could use Strict Father morality in his family life but the Nurturant Parent model in his political life. Strict fathers can be political liberals and nurturant parents can be political conservatives.

Contemporary conservative politics tries to link the family use and the political use of the models more closely; to point out that conservatives have the Strict Father model of the family and to convince others with the Strict Father model of the family that they should be political conservatives. I suspect that they are being successful at convincing people who believe in and identify with the Strict Father model of the family to vote conservative. For example, blue-collar workers who may previously have voted with liberals because of their union affiliation or economic interests may now, for cultural reasons, identify with conservatives and vote for them, even though it may not be in their economic interest to do so.

There is no logical contradiction between the use of one model as the basis of actual family life and the use of the other as the basis of one's politics. But logic is not what is at issue. There is more cognitive coherence and less cognitive dissonance if your politics is governed by the same model of the family that you use in your home life.

This book attempts to say what it means to be entirely liberal or entirely conservative. In working out the details, we will also see what it means to have a liberal or conservative view on each particular issue. In this way we will also be able to discern the forms of reasoning used on each issue by voters who go back and forth between models from time to time

and issue to issue. As a result we can get a handle on the complexity of political thought.

WHAT IS EXPLAINED

One ought to ask a very pointed question at the outset: If you are going to characterize a great many variants of two models, as well as variations in the use of the models, what is explained? Given all that variation within categories and variation in the use of categories, can't you account for just about anything?

The very question reveals a misunderstanding of the enterprise. The point is not just to categorize. Classification in itself is relatively boring. The models do many things:

First, they analyze modes of reasoning.

Second, they show how modes of reasoning about different issues fit together.

Third, they show how different forms of, say, conservative reasoning are related to each other in such a way that they are all understood to be instances of conservatism.

Fourth, the models show the links between forms of political reasoning and forms of moral reasoning.

Fifth, the models show how moral reasoning in politics is ultimately based on models of the family.

And sixth, there must be an explanation of why the models fit together as they do—and therefore, why we don't merely have random forms of political reasoning. This is a tall order.

Cognitive science is, in itself, apolitical. Those of us who study conceptual systems do so simply to find out what we can about the workings of the human mind. But the same mind that we study for scientific reasons creates moral and political systems of thought and uses them every day. For this reason, the findings of conceptual-systems research will eventually come to matter more and more in understanding moral and political life. I see this book as an early step in

the development of a cognitive social science that can allow us to comprehend our social and political lives better.

Personal Commitments

It is vital to be as clear as possible about the line between what one can discover about morality and politics using the tools of one's profession and what one's own moral and political commitments are. There are those who believe that drawing such a line is impossible, and maybe it is. But I am going to do my best anyway. In the first nineteen chapters of this book, I will be functioning as a cognitive scientist. I will be providing, to the best of my abilities, a cognitive analysis of the moral and political worldviews of conservatives and liberals in contemporary America, an analysis that I hope will be independent of any political prejudice.

But I cannot hide my own moral and political views and I will not try to. In the last few chapters of the book, I will give some reasons for why I am a liberal, reasons based not on liberal ideology itself but on external considerations.

I consider this book to be anything but an idle academic exercise. Because conservatives understand the moral dimension of our politics better than liberals do, they have been able not only to gain political victories but to use politics in the service of a much larger moral and cultural agenda for America, an agenda that if carried out would, I believe, destroy much of the moral progress made in the twentieth century. Liberals have been helpless to stop them, largely, I think, because they don't understand the conservative worldview and the role of moral idealism and the family within it.

Moreover, liberals do not fully comprehend the moral unity of their own politics and the role that the family plays in it. Liberals need to understand that there is an overall, coherent liberal politics which is based on a coherent, well-

grounded, and powerful liberal morality. If liberals do not concern themselves very seriously and very quickly with the unity of their own philosophy and with morality and the family, they will not merely continue to lose elections but will as well bear responsibility for the success of conservatives in turning back the clock on progress in America.

Conservatives know that politics is not just about policy and interest groups and issue-by-issue debate. They have learned that politics is about family and morality, about myth and metaphor and emotional identification. They have, over twenty-five years, managed to forge conceptual links in the voters' minds between morality and public policy. They have done this by carefully working out their values, comprehending their myths, and designing a language to fit those values and myths so that they can evoke them with powerful slogans, repeated over and over again, that reinforce those family-morality-policy links, until the connections have come to seem natural to many Americans, including many in the media. As long as liberals ignore the moral, mythic, and emotional dimension of politics, as long as they stick to policy and interest groups and issue-by-issue debate, they will have no hope of understanding the nature of the political transformation that has overtaken this country and they will have no hope of changing it.

THE TERM "LIBERAL,"

There are many meanings for "liberal," some of which overlap with the meanings of "conservative." For the sake of clarity, I distinguish between "political liberalism," which is the subject of this book, and "theoretical liberalism," which is a topic in the field of political philosophy. I define "classical theoretical liberalism" as the view, which has a long history, that individuals are, or should be, free, autonomous rational actors, each pursuing their own self-interest.

On this account, many conservatives and libertarians are classical theoretical liberals.

Modern theoretical liberalism, on the other hand, arises primarily from the work of philosopher John Rawls (see References, sec. C3). Rawls sought to modify classic liberalism to include social issues, such as poverty, health, and education. He proposed the following social-contract theory of a just society (presented here in a much oversimplified fashion) to be added on to the classical view of the autonomous rational actor:

1. The Veil of Ignorance: The social contract must be drawn up as if no one knew where they were going to fit into society.
2. The result is that justice is seen as fairness. After all, if you don't know where you are going to fit into a society, you will want that society to be fair. If you were to wind up as low man on the totem pole, you would want that not to be so bad a position to be in.
3. An individual's choices of ends, values, and conceptions of the good are subjective expressions of preference. This makes them literal, rankable, and subject to mathematical theories of preference, utility, decision-making, etc.
4. Accepting this political view does not commit one to any particular moral view.
5. This view is universal and independent of particular cultures and subcultures.

Rawls's views have been elaborated and have been criticized on many grounds, especially on "communitarian" grounds, namely, that people are not just isolated autonomous individuals but (1) live in communities in which they have responsibilities, (2) are partly defined by those communities, (3) are partly defined by the ends they have and by conceptions of what morality is, and that (4) morality is a social phenomenon and meanings are social, not individual (see Refer-

ences, C4). All of this discussion is theoretical, rather than empirical, in nature. It is an attempt to characterize what liberalism should be, rather than what contemporary political liberalism is.

What I call "political liberalism," on the other hand, characterizes the cluster of political positions supported by people called "liberals" in our everyday political discourse: support for social programs; environmentalism; public education; equal rights for women, gays, and ethnic minorities; affirmative action; the pro-choice position on abortion; and so on. When I speak of "liberalism" in this book, I will be speaking of political liberalism, not theoretical liberalism.

But having made the distinction, I should ask the obvious question: Does modern theoretical liberalism in any form provide an accurate account of what political liberalism is? I think not, and the reasons should be clear by the end of the book. Political liberalism is a creature of a very different kind, and the worldview that characterizes it looks very different from any proposed form of theoretical liberalism.

Because this book studies empirical, not purely theoretical, issues, it should not be surprising that it comes up with a very different conception of "liberalism" than one finds in political philosophy. What is interesting is that what emerges has a few Rawls-like qualities and many qualities of the communitarian critiques. The rational actor shows up in the metaphor of Moral Self-Interest. Rawls's "veil of ignorance" has functional similarities to the metaphor of morality as empathy, which gives rise to the metaphor of morality as fairness (Chapter 6). Many of the communitarian views of liberalism emerge from Nurturant Parent morality, which stresses social responsibility, both social and individual ends, morality as being fundamentally social, and politics as fundamentally moral; other aspects of Nurturant Parent morality stress individual rights and freedoms.

I am not a political philosopher and did not begin with

any philosophical presuppositions about what I would find. Nor did I use either the intellectual tools or forms of reasoning of political philosophers. These results emerged from empirical study using the tools of a cognitive scientist to study political worldviews. As empirical findings, they have a very different status than theoretical speculations, and so should not be confused with political philosophy—for which, incidentally, I have great respect.

An Outline of the Book

Chapter 2 raises questions to be answered, questions about conservative and liberal ideologies. It asks why liberals and conservatives have the clusters of positions that they have and what forms of reason shape their forms of discourse. It also brings up a collection of puzzles: questions that each side has about the other.

Part II describes the family-based moral systems on which conservatism and liberalism are based and shows the enormous role played by metaphor in those moral systems. Chapter 3 lays out the basis for all metaphors for morality. Within Part II, Chapter 4 describes our most basic metaphor for morality. Chapters 5 and 6 describe the Strict Father and Nurturant Parent models of the family and the family-based moral systems they give rise to. At this point the groundwork has been laid for the application of these family-based systems of morality to politics.

Part III provides the link between the moral analysis and the political analysis. Chapter 7 explains why such an analysis is needed and why previous analyses have failed. Chapter 8 characterizes the explanatory nature of the model. And Chapter 9 describes the moral categories induced by the two family-based moralities.

Part IV is where the political explanation is carried out. Chapters 10 through 16 discuss a broad range of issues, from

social programs and crime to abortion, showing the logic of the liberal and conservative stands on these issues and how each stand derives ultimately from a version of one of the two family-based moral systems.

Part V sums up the explanation. Chapter 17 surveys variations within the ranks of conservatives and liberals. Chapter 18 describes varieties of conservatism and liberalism that are “pathological” relative to the central models of the categories and discusses the issue of stereotyping. Chapter 19 argues that there cannot be a politics in America without the kinds of family-based moral systems described in the previous chapters.

Up until this point, the book provides a neutral description of conservative and liberal conceptual systems. In Part VI, I ask if there are any reasons *not* grounded in one of the ideologies for choosing between these moral and political systems. Chapters 21 through 23 provide three such reasons—reasons for being a liberal. Many other reasons might be adduced—and have been—but I bring up three that come from my field of research and adjacent fields: research on child development, the nature of mind, and the internal structure of moral conceptual systems. Finally, in the Epilogue, I discuss problems for public discourse and the media that are revealed by this study.

Overall, the book has a linear structure: First, the questions to be answered. Second, the first step in answering them, namely, the family-based moral systems. Third, the link between the moral systems and politics. Fourth, the politics and the answers to the questions. Fifth, nonideological reasons for choosing between the political worldviews. Sixth, implications for public discourse.