EDMG611Wk2

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdrr

The management of spontaneous volunteers: A successful model from a flood emergency in Italy☆

Claudia Paciarotti, Angela Cesaroni⁎, Maurizio Bevilacqua Dipartimento di Ingegneria Industriale e Scienze Matematiche, Università Politecnica delle Marche, via Brecce Bianche, 60131 Ancona, Italy

A R T I C L E I N F O

Keywords: Spontaneous volunteers IDEF0 Disaster Flood Case study Management

A B S T R A C T

This paper presents an analysis of the management of spontaneous volunteers, mainly led by a local non-profit organisation, during the flood emergency that occurred in Central Italy in May 2014. The purpose of the study is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the aforementioned management, in order to elaborate on a model that may be developed further through comparisons with other case studies and applications in the context of other emergencies. This case study reiterates the importance of spontaneous volunteers during emergencies, and their appropriate management is crucial in achieving an efficient and effective volunteer service, even though it may be administered by a non-official responder organisation.

In this study, the management of spontaneous volunteers was firstly investigated through a brief literature review. Thereafter, a case study was modelled by the application of the type zero method of integration defi- nition for function modelling language, and conduct of interviews and surveys. Finally, the built model was evaluated according to major guides and manuals on this topic. Consequently, the result of the study may be adopted and utilised by other organisations engaged in similar emergencies. Moreover, it can serve as a starting point for further research and development of policies and guidelines for emergency response.

1. Introduction

The interest on the role and importance of spontaneous volunteers (SVs) during emergencies is increasing among researchers and practi- tioners. However, emergency management plans that fully harness the potential of SVs remain limited [1], and research on their management are deficient [2]. Currently, spontaneous volunteerism is considered an inevitable phenomenon that occurs during disasters [3], such as earthquakes, floods, and terrorist attacks, which are unplanned and unpredictable situations that hinder their measurability and manage- ability [4]. Through the analysis of a small-scale event, such as the flood that hit the Senigallia area, East-Central Italy, in May 2014, this study is aimed at chronicling the contribution of spontaneous volun- teers who helped affected populations within the first two weeks of the emergency. A second aim is to evaluate the spontaneous volunteers’ management (SVM) organised by the Catholic humanitarian organisa- tion Caritas Senigallia in order to identify key elements of the so called “Senigallia model of SVM,” which had been appreciated by the then Italian Prime Minister.

This paper commences with a brief literature review in Section 1 in order to identify those who were typically regarded as spontaneous

volunteers and how perceptions regarding them changed through time. The review presents the development of information and communica- tion technology (ICT) in relation to the management of spontaneous volunteers. Apart from reviewing scientific papers, which examined the function of spontaneous volunteers, guides and manuals of some of the most important agencies for emergency management were analysed as well. In Section 2, the concepts of volunteer convergence and the paradox of spontaneous volunteers are presented. Section 3 discusses the methodology adopted for the analysis of the case study, specifically, SVM during the flood in Senigallia. The case study was first modelled by applying the type zero method of the integration definition for function modelling (IDEF0), which is the most appropriate tool capable of pro- viding a wide overview of the entire managing process of SVs with the use of a series of hierarchical diagrams. Furthermore, the survey that was conducted on the representation of SVM through IDEF0, involving volunteers, beneficiaries who received some type of help during the flood emergency, staff of Caritas Senigallia, official responders, and representatives of the local government are reported. In Section 4, the analysis of the case study, which contextualised the flood emergency and the function of Caritas, is presented. The model created with IDEF0 and results of the survey are reviewed and explained as well. Section 5

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.05.013 Received 15 February 2018; Received in revised form 18 May 2018; Accepted 23 May 2018

☆ This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. ⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (C. Paciarotti), [email protected], [email protected] (A. Cesaroni), [email protected] (M. Bevilacqua).

International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

Available online 29 May 2018 2212-4209/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

T

focuses on the evaluation made on the SVM implemented during the Senigallia flood emergency, based on the survey results and comparison of the model with the most prominent guides, manuals, and similar case studies found in recent literature.

2. Spontaneous volunteers

Some figures on the arrival of SVs, ready to extend assistance, in disaster sites clearly indicate that the magnitude of this phenomenon necessitates better plans and management systems. In 1995, in Japan, approximately one million volunteers rushed to the Kobe disaster area to rescue victims of a devastating earthquake that hit the sixth largest city of the country. This event was considered as “the first year of vo- luntary activities in Japan” [5]. In China, 20 years earlier, 300,000 spontaneous volunteers arrived after an earthquake in Tangshan [6], and in 1985, in Mexico City, over two million people wanted to assist the earthquake victims [7]. More recently, in the United States, the response of the population to the Loma Prieta earthquake was en- ormous: 60% of San Francisco's population and 70% of Santa Cruz's population wanted to help the victims [8]. Earthquakes are not the only emergencies that rouse people's willingness to help. In 2011, 10,000 spontaneous responders arrived on a tornado site in Alabama [7], and after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, 8000 spontaneous volun- teers registered in the first 24 h [3]. The 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City were extensively analysed by various researchers to investigate the SV phenomenon, whose figures are impressive and practically non-estimable. Reportedly, there were 40,000 spontaneous volunteers at a minimum [7], and 15,570 volunteers were processed by the Red Cross from among the 22,000 who offered assistance [9], which were numbers more than that ever seen in the history of the National Red Cross up to that time [10].

2.1. Definition

At the time, the definitions of volunteers were multiple and varied, from the strictest to the broadest, with a wide range that encompassed four principal dimensions: free choice, remuneration, structure, and intended beneficiaries. The strictest among these defined a volunteer as a person who offered services without any coercion and remuneration through an official organisation and without any link with beneficiaries of the activities of the volunteer. The broadest definition considered some form or remuneration (not only for reimbursement of expenses), coercion (volunteering activities as part of a wider program), or per- sonal relationship with beneficiaries.

Typically, in emergencies and disasters, volunteerism is broadly defined because the focus is set on the activities of volunteers and their outputs [11]. Nevertheless, numerous definitions exist. The classifica- tions are mainly based on the volunteer's type of affiliation with any official responder agency. Thus, volunteers who want to act in- dependently without having planned any such action in advance are excluded.

In literature and manuals, this latter type of emergency volunteers could be identified with different terms and definitions, such as spon- taneous, not affiliated, convergent, emergent, walk-in volunteers, un- official, unaffiliated, informal [7] or episodic [6]. Nevertheless, the definition with a wider consensus and more users describes sponta- neous volunteers as those who seek to contribute on impulse and offer as- sistance following a disaster but are not previously affiliated with recognised volunteer agencies and may or may not have relevant training, skills, or experience [12].

The United States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Emergency Management Australia distinguish spontaneous volun- teers from regular volunteers as unaffiliated with any part of the ex- isting official emergency management and individuals with no parti- cular training or experiences and willing to help [13]. The Ministry Civil Defence Emergency Management (MCDE) of New Zealand adds

another important feature by defining a spontaneous volunteer as one not responsible or accountable to any given organisation [14].

Whittaker et al. [11] well emphasises the heterogeneity of what they define as informal volunteerism: “The activities of people who work outside of formal emergency and disaster management arrangements to help others who are at risk or are affected by emergencies and disasters. Such volunteerism may take place before, during or after an event. Informal vo- lunteers may participate as individuals or as part of a group, on a short or longer-term basis, regularly or irregularly, and in situ or ex situ. Their participation may be spontaneous and unplanned, or deliberate and care- fully planned.”

Organisations responding to a disaster can be categorised as well as established, expanding, extending, and emergent organisations [15]. An Established organisation performs disaster response according to their mission (paramedic organisations, and civil protection and fire de- partments) and are part of the official emergency response system. Expanding organisations help people in need because of their mission, but not necessarily during emergencies. They can often rely on nu- merous volunteers [7]. These organisations operate regular tasks and help people in seeking assistance through new and ad hoc structures. It is similar to the case of an organisation analysed in the following paragraph. Extending organisations perform new tasks outside or beside the official emergency management and employ the same existing structures. An example of an extending organisation is a private com- pany that donates some of its products as support or relief equipment. Emergent organisations are similar to expanding organisations, but they are less structured, often not experienced and more informal. These organisations may have a crucial role because of their proximity to the disaster-hit area and victims. Indeed, they often are the first to arrive on the emergency site [7].

In addition to all the above-mentioned categories of spontaneous volunteers, recently, another type of volunteer has emerged and rapidly increased its function—the digital volunteer. Digital volunteers are spontaneous volunteers themselves but instead of physically supporting disaster victims, they provide assistance in various ways using new technologies. The information and communication technology, and social media have potentially enabled any individual located thousands of kilometres away from the disaster site to be part of the emergency and disaster response [16] and invest any amount of time in vo- lunteering [11]. The widespread use of ICT, particularly the social network, significantly increases the potential involvement of commu- nities in disasters and may even foster social resilience [17]. In fact, digital volunteering can be performed in various ways, such as social networks by web-based mapping software and creating ad hoc software to produce, share information, and support rescue operations. The case of the missing Malaysian Airlines flight demonstrated the potential of information technologies in mobilising mass, spontaneous volunteers who are willing to help during emergencies. In March 2014, 2.3 million people searched the missing flight, MH370, using the Tomnod website. Their main task was to scrutinise satellite images. Accordingly, they scanned an area covering 24,000 km2 [18]. Indeed, spontaneous digital volunteers can even be more effective than official agencies, such as during the Haiti earthquake emergency, when digital volunteers man- aged to collect more information in 48 h than the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) did during the first week [19].

Despite its recognised and demonstrated potential, digital volunteerism and the use of ICT by citizens are still at an early stage [19]. Furthermore, the technology utilised is rarely integrated into the official response systems [16]. For instance, existing innovative software allowing citizens to report or map remains extremely underused in emergency management because of a mismatch between the real needs of professional responders and ICT community that created those software [20]. Accordingly, the social media used during emergencies has to be supported and better developed in order to find ways of using them that could match the expectations of citizens and requirements of emergency services [17].

C. Paciarotti et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

261

Digital volunteerism requires further development and regulation. Indeed, three main barriers persist: lack of personnel time, lack of po- licies and guidelines for social media's use in those contexts, and the problem of trustworthiness of collected data through those means [19]. In some cases, an under regulated use of social network may even hinder official responders on the field, generating false appeals and alarmism or requests not actually needed. At this time, digital vo- lunteerism is a phenomenon expected to expand in the near future, and a key to connect the traditional relief system to new forms of vo- lunteerism, as acknowledged by UN OCHA [21].

2.2. Convergence

The SV figures cited at the beginning of Section 2 exhibit char- acteristics of the phenomenon of spontaneous volunteers: it is not a recent occurrence, and it is transnational, inevitable, and occurs re- gardless of the size and nature of the disaster. This mass movement or attempted movement towards a disaster site was also defined as “con- vergence” [8]. Fritz and Mathewson in 1957 [22] also included the mass movement of messages and supplies towards the disaster-stricken area in the concept of convergence. Approximately 10 years later, in 1969, Barton [23] attempted to estimate the size of the convergence, claiming that an average of 60–90% of disaster survivors want to vo- lunteer in some way, causing what he defines as a mass assault [24]. Nowadays, the convergence phenomenon has even increased and changed because of the modern means of mass communications [25]. Consequently, even a small disaster can easily reach international re- sonance in a few minutes, attracting persons and organisations willing to be part of the rescue and relief operations. Despite of convergence being recognised as practically a universal aspect of disasters and emergencies, a number of planners are apparently unaware of it, [26] and consequently, unprepared to manage the mass assault that thus might become a real hindrance to official responses. A number of recent research and analysis are focused on identifying the main character- istics of convergence [7] in order to enable the management system to deal with the occurrence of an unpredictable phenomenon. This per- sistent weakness of several emergency management systems, con- sidered as fact by many experts, is supported by recent research. This directly leads to another discussed problem, the so-called paradox of the spontaneous volunteer.

2.3. The paradox of the spontaneous volunteer

The meaning of this paradox is clear since the time the first scholars who theorised the concept of convergence and analysed the emergency management system as Quarantelli did. In 1986 it was claimed that “volunteers can be far more than a help if careful and detailed pre- parations have not been made and coordinated with all relevant par- ties” [27]. Frequently, professional emergency managers refer to the convergence of volunteers as a “disaster within a disaster”, because the mass of people willing to help requires the management and co- ordination by experienced human resources [7]. The requirement of a structured and dedicated management system aims to involve both of them, but not to impede effective response [11]. In 1975, Fritz and Mathewson listed a number of cases where the convergence of people in different emergencies caused more problems than support to official responders, particularly in terms of traffic jams or phone line conges- tions [22]. These case studies support those who refer to the con- vergence of volunteers as an overabundance of something not required, if not well-managed [28].

The involvement/exclusion paradox of spontaneous volunteers manifests itself every time people converge to a disaster site in order to volunteer, where they may be both a help and hindrance [29], thus, creating the paradox: the people's willingness to volunteer versus the system capacity of the official responder to utilise them effectively [30]. On the one hand, SVs can offer various skills to rescue teams as they

represent generous human resources especially in performing simple activities and sharing their knowledge on local situations and essentials with professionals. A well-managed engagement of SVs increases em- pathy with victims and enhances the resilience of the local community, because ordinary people have a sense of further accountability in re- sponding to risks in the best possible way [16]. On the other hand, they may entail additional costs, in terms of human resources to manage them. In Addition to insurance cost, they may need equipment, ac- commodation, and food supplies that would be preferably be given to victims [31]. If SVs improperly perform support and assistance, they can ruin the reputation of the organisation that involved them in the operations [4]. Moreover, as previously mentioned, they can constitute a physical obstacle to official responders. Whittaker et al. [11] in their literature review listed some incidents where SVs, in their attempt to help during emergencies, became a hindrance to official rescue teams, even resulting to casualties and severe injuries among SVs for their lack of skill, experience, and information.

As for convergence, the paradox of involvement/exclusion can also be extended to the problem associated with donated items for disaster relief, particularly when unsolicited donations are inappropriate and unnecessary or exceeding the need. Consequently, this requires addi- tional costs for their management, distribution or even disposal [32], which are problems specifically addressed by humanitarian logistic experts and researchers.

Volunteers entail cost for those who have to manage and organise them. Nevertheless, their value is gradually being recognised and demonstrated by researchers. An interesting research from the Czech Republic aims at estimating the economic value of volunteers, showing that the entire National Integrated Rescue System could not efficiently respond without volunteer support, especially in this country, where large scale floods are the most frequent and devas- tating natural disasters [33]. Albeit recognizing the costs for managing SVs, FEMA sees their successful integration into the official emergency system as a key step to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of a disaster [30]. This is becoming an imperative because of the limited resources available at the public level, not only in the United States.

This brief literature review once again demonstrates how the per- ception of spontaneous volunteers had changed through the years, from a mass assault to a huge resource for emergency victims and a valid support for the work of official responders. Moreover, it shows the complexity and inevitability of this phenomenon, at the same time emphasizing the heterogeneity that people willing to provide support to disaster victims may have. The literature on this topic progressively refers to SVs as valid resources. However, researchers and professionals who support the involvement of SVs emphasise the necessity of a dedicated and planned management for them, as demonstrated by the growing number of manuals and guides on this subject. With the aforementioned in mind, our work, aimed at presenting an SVM model built from a case study and evaluated by harnessing existing literature, could have particular relevance.

3. Methodology

First, an in-depth analysis of SVM has been conducted, starting with the consideration of the entire process as a set of interacting functions, with the aim of identifying each action, internal and external resources, and conditions. The entire process of SVM has been so represented by applying the type zero method of integrated definition language.

The type zero method of integrated definition language is a mod- elling language used to provide a structured representation of the functions performed by an organisation in order to conduct analysis required at the lowest level. Among the several modelling languages, IDEF0 was considered the most suitable for this research because it enables a systemic and transparent perspective of design activities and their interactions, while allowing the decomposition of a complex

C. Paciarotti et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

262

system into sub-functions, by treating each function as a separate en- tity.

In the case of operations management, IDEF0 allows the con- sideration of different types of design constraints and resources, while providing an appropriate level of description of the single task [34]. While keeping track on the goals of the project, IDEF0 offers a wide overview of involved people, used resources, external conditions, and constraints. Furthermore, IDEFO, as a flexible, scalable, and adaptable modelling language, is the most appropriate tool for strategic planning and strategic management [35].

The primary application of IDEF0 is for the analysis of complex in- dustrial plants. Nevertheless, it has been applied to several areas and for different purposes, such as in the agriculture and healthcare sectors [36]. For instance, in literature, the IDEF0 language finds application in strategy modelling, strategic planning, development and implementation [35] Pia- tyszek and Karagiannis emphasised the advantages of IDEF0 in emergency planning by applying this process modelling approach to identify critical points and failures of the local emergency operations plan [37] Bevilacqua et al. [38] applied IDEF0 to the emergency management of an industrial establishment where dangerous materials are stocked, in order to get an overview of the communication system between emergency actors and a structured base for the re-engineering process.

In this research, IDEF0 was employed to model and systematically analyse the whole SVM, in order to have a complete overview of the entire process implemented by different organisations and actors, while analysing each function as a single entity and keeping track of requisite resources, and external and internal factors. This model was considered the most appropriate for the purpose of our research to provide a comprehensive description of the set of tasks to be performed in SVM, describing interactions between all tasks, necessary resources, and management factors that influence the performance of tasks.

The type zero method of integrated definition language consists of hierarchical diagrams composed of graphics, texts, and a glossary. It models the actions, functions, and activities of a company, process or systems. It is well standardised syntactically and semantically. Moreover, it is based on the structured analysis and design technique, developed in 1972 by Douglas T. Ross and SofTech, Inc. [39]. Conse- quently, IDEF0 was adopted as a standard of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers [40].

As shown in Fig. 1 below, IDEF0 activities, processes, and trans- formations are enclosed by a rectangle describing their functions, whereas arrows represent data and objects related to functions.

The directions of the arrows determine their relationship with the functions, as follows:

• Inputs, represented by arrows entering the left side of the box, are transformed or consumed by the function; Outputs, represented by arrows exiting the box from its right side, are data or objects pro- duced by the function;

• Controls are arrows entering a box from the top, and they represent necessary conditions to the function;

Fig. 1. IDEF0 representation of a function and related data and objects.

Fig. 2. IDEF0 diagrams hierarchical order.

C. Paciarotti et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

263

• The required means to execute a function (mechanisms) are re- presented by arrows entering the box from the bottom.

With a series of hierarchical diagrams and associated materials, the IDEF0 model gradually introduces further details. It starts from the A-0 context diagram, which represents the entire process as a unique function, and then progressively decomposes into sub-functions re- presented by sub-diagrams. The A-0 context diagram presents the overall target or high-level goal (Fig. 2).

During the Senigallia flood emergency of 2014, SVM was evaluated through interviews and comparative studies with major guides per- taining to this subject, in addition to toolkits and recommendations published by internationally recognised entities, such as the American FEMA, New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, Australian Government, and Australian Red Cross.

Qualitative and quantitative analyses were performed in detail through three questionnaires composed of open-ended and closed- ended questions. All questionnaires were distributed to respondents by sending them the link to online forms. For those who do not have sufficient computer literacy or internet access, the responses to the questionnaires were obtained through the phone, or hardcopies were provided to respondents. The first questionnaires were sent to volun- teers who assisted flood victims during the emergency. The online version of the questionnaire was uploaded on the SOS Alluvione Facebook page. It invited all people who volunteered in May 2014 to participate in the survey. The questionnaire link was also sent to all persons who registered themselves as volunteers at the Caritas head- quarters or by completing the SOS online form. Hardcopies were dis- tributed to Arvulutra coordinators and responsible persons. A total of 179 volunteers responded to the questions. The second questionnaire was directed to people who were affected by the flood in any way. Three hundred persons responded to the questions. The third part of the analysis involved 13 Caritas personnel engaged during the early stages of recovery activities. They were interviewed as part of a focus group, during which the IDEF0 model was also presented as a useful tool to retrace the entire process for evaluation. The last part of the survey involved official responders, such as representatives of the Civil Protection, as well as the Municipality of Senigallia. Their interviews were integrated with the analysis of official public documents and re- ports pertaining to the flood response coordinated by the Senigallia Municipality.

4. The case study

4.1. The flood emergency, first official response, and SVM—Senigallia, May 2014

On the 2nd and 3rd of May 2014, severe and unprecedented flooding caused three deaths and damage to a wide territorial section of the Diocese of Senigallia, located in the Marche Region, East-Central Italy. The City of Senigallia of approximately 44,000 inhabitants and its neighbouring smaller cities were the most affected areas and where the break down in electric and phone services, and extensive flooding of urban and residential areas occurred. A 14 million-cubic metre tidal wave hit a wide area of Senigallia and its neighbours, and swept up the embankment of the Misa river. Immediately thereafter, the Italian Government declared the highest state of emergency and the Mayor of Senigallia contacted the Municipal Operations Centre (MOC) to co- ordinate and manage all emergency operations.

Statistics on the damage and affected persons showed the severity of the event: 7727 families were affected by the flood (all reported da- mage had a total cost of €134 million), among them, 1250 completely lost their properties; 542 private businesses reported damage and other losses, which amounted to €46 million [41].

Right from the first moment, Caritas Senigallia was officially en- gaged in the rescue and recovery activities, and participated in the

Municipal Emergency Coordination table, chaired by the Mayor of Senigallia himself. Among other tasks assigned to Caritas, the Mayor requested Caritas to coordinate all SVs and to manage all donated goods. Caritas Senigallia was the only organisation officially authorised for SVM during the emergency. Apart from Caritas Senigallia, two other entities had a prominent role in managing SVs—the informal group SOS Alluvione Senigallia and the Social Centre Arvultura. Both referred to Caritas Senigallia in different ways. These are explained below fol- lowing a brief summary of the responses to the emergency activities that were performed by the official responders and public institutions.

4.1.1. The official response to the emergency In accordance with the Italian national legislation (Law 225/95),

the first response to an arising emergency starts at the local level, through the appointment of the Mayor as the foremost responsible person for the civil protection of the related municipality. If necessary, because of the size and level of the event, the Mayor takes charge in involving other institutions and actors. Following this procedure, once the highest level of emergency because of the Senigallia flood was de- clared at the national level, within the first 10 days, the official re- sponse to the emergency was coordinated and managed by the city Mayor through the MOC. Several institutions were involved, including the Prefecture, Fire Department, several Police Departments and Military Corps, neighbouring municipalities and provinces, Civil Protection Departments and civil protection voluntary associations, and the Red Cross and Regional Health Agency.

First, emergency operations were aimed at saving lives, especially within first two days. Immediately after the water receded, the official responders started to clean and pump water from streets and sub-steps, collect wastes, remove flooded vehicles, disinfect and disinfest public spaces, monitor the public water system, secure public buildings and spaces, especially schools, and beaches for seasonal tourists who were present at that time.

In addition to those performed by professional responders, 900 operations were conducted by the Fire Department. All the above- mentioned interventions were performed by affiliated volunteers of the Civil Protection Department. Official figures reported that for the 3761 affiliated volunteers who engaged in the operations, a total cost of €75,000 for their equipment, and board and lodging [41]. Different from spontaneous volunteers, such affiliated volunteers, mentioned in Section 2.1, are persons formally trained for disaster response and having relevant knowledge and understanding of disaster management procedures. During the Senigallia flood emergency, the voluntary as- sociations of civil protection, following the command and control management, provided all their affiliated volunteers essential equip- ment and assigned them precise tasks under the official mandate of the MOC.

The next section reports the entire management of SVs performed by Caritas Senigallia, Social Centre Arvultura and SOS Alluvione, as represented by the AS-IS model realised by applying the IDEF0 lan- guage (Fig. 3).

The section gives an entire overview as it describes each step, thus, providing thorough knowledge of the processes that were implemented. Diagram A0 of the IDEF0 of the Senigallia SVM identifies three main processes, as shown above:

• A1-First SOS Alluvione spontaneous volunteer management;

• A2-SOS Alluvione Senigallia and Caritas Senigallia spontaneous volunteer management;

• A3-Social Centre Arvultura spontaneous volunteer management.

All these three related main processes were decomposed and de- tailed through sub-diagrams to fully represent each element of the en- tire process.

C. Paciarotti et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

264

4.1.2. First SOS Alluvione SVM (Node A1) The informal, unofficial, and non-profit group SOS Alluvione

Senigallia decided to create a Facebook (FB) page to share information so as to more effectively cope with the emergency. Their mission was to facilitate contact among people who needed help with those willing to help for free. The group SOS Alluvione had neither collected money nor donations for its support during the emergency.

The group's first contribution to spontaneous volunteer manage- ment during the flood emergency in Senigallia was modelled by ap- plying IDEF0, as shown in Fig. 4.

On the first day of the emergency, the 3rd of May 2014, SOS Alluvione created the FB page “SOS Alluvione Senigallia,” in order to collect and share information with the populace pertaining to the rules to be followed in cases of flood, as well as to update them about the situation in flooded areas. Their first post simply focused on the rules of conduct in cases of flood, such as not using the car unless necessary, not drinking contaminated water, and avoiding dangerous areas. Moreover, they endeavoured to collect and provide information pertaining to areas that are still flooded and where power supply broke down. From the second day of the emergency, on the 4th of May, the FB page began to collate requests for aid and volunteer offers, including those received through phone calls and SMS messages to the number made available by SOS Alluvione. Meanwhile, its administrators created the first working team whose objective was to coordinate assistance requests and offers to help, and to send volunteers where they were most re- quired. On the 5th of May, SOS Alluvione Senigallia published in FB a form in Google format for volunteer registration (in which the volun- teer was asked to specify equipment owned, day and time of avail- ability, phone contact, and whether or not the volunteer owned a car). The group coordinated its first volunteer rescue teams mainly by FB messages, informing volunteers of details pertaining to the location and type of intervention required. Beneficiaries were also provided in- formation about the forthcoming support.

On the second day of the emergency, SOS Alluvione directed over 300 SVs to help the population in flooded areas. However, because of the continuous increase in the number of assistance requests, offers to

help, and updates from the field, the understaffed and overwhelmed SOS Alluvione Senigallia requested Caritas Senigallia to help them in coordinating assistance requests and offers to help. In particular, SOS Alluvione sought assistance because as an informal group uniquely composed of volunteers, it lacked structures, equipment, and legal coverage to respond to all incoming requests. Once the collaboration between those entities was established, SOS Alluvione started to re- spond to all requests through the Caritas emergency headquarters. From the 5th of May, Caritas Senigallia became a co-administrator of the FB page SOS Alluvione Senigallia.

Each day, the cooperation between Caritas Senigallia and SOS Alluvione Senigallia in managing SVs were improved and adapted in accordance with the requisites of the affected population, feedbacks from the field, available volunteers, and MOC operational directives. From the 6th of May, on their FB page, SOS Alluvione Senigallia up- loaded a module seeking volunteer support (including address, contact number, and type of requested intervention and required related equipment).

4.1.3. SOS Alluvione and Caritas Senigallia SVM coordination (Node A2) Once the collaboration for the SVM between Caritas Senigallia and

SOS Alluvione Senigallia was fully established, both entities started to implement a sharing procedure in order to process and assign all available volunteers by responding to requests from floods victims (Fig. 5).

All requests and offers that arrived by short text messages, FB posts/ messages on SOS Alluvione Senigallia's FB page, and feedbacks from the field (from patrol groups and from SV feedbacks after their interven- tion) were filtered by SOS Alluvione by creating partial lists. At the same time, Caritas created lists by filtering requests and offers received through its mobile emergency phone, and collected by its volunteers and staff at the headquarters and local posts located on the field. All information were integrated in order to create separate lists of all as- sistance requests and all available volunteers. The Caritas staff pro- cessed the data to match the requests and offers lists, following two rules: the “first-in, first-out” rule and priority criteria. Accordingly, the

Fig. 3. IDEF0 spontaneous volunteer management (SVM), Node A0.

C. Paciarotti et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

265

first priorities were families with condemned houses and having no other place to stay; families with children, elderly, and disabled members; families with financial difficulties. A list of paired volunteers and beneficiaries was the output of such data processing, as well as the governing criteria for volunteer groupings and allocations. Once vo- lunteers from both organisations were grouped and assigned with tasks,

they received communication (via FB or short messaging service) with all necessary details (address, beneficiaries, and type of intervention). Beneficiaries were informed as well of the arriving volunteers.

4.1.4. Caritas SVM (Node A24) In order to understand the function performed by Caritas Senigallia

Fig. 4. IDEF0 SVM, Node A1. Spontaneous volunteer management, First SOS Alluvione SVM.

Fig. 5. IDEF0 SVM, Node A2 SOS Alluvione & Caritas Senigallia SVM coordination.

C. Paciarotti et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

266

during the flood emergency in Senigallia in May 2014, particularly in managing spontaneous volunteers (Fig. 6), it is necessary to introduce briefly its structure, mission, and activities in this section.

Caritas Diocesana Senigallia is a non-profit Catholic organisation of the Dioceses of Senigallia, encompassing an area of approximately 580 km2, which includes 18 municipalities. Its aim is to enhance the local community's development and to support people in need regard- less of their nationality or faith and promote universal values of soli- darity, dignity, and social justice. In order to achieve these objectives, Caritas Diocesana Senigallia created a non-profit foundation, a volun- tary association, and a non-profit social cooperative. The foundation manages all social services delivered by Caritas, performing it in close cooperation and collaboration with other NGOs and local authorities. Moreover, the association gathers all persons who volunteer in the services of Caritas, among others, ensuring them legal coverage, and providing them training programs. Finally, the social cooperative aims at increasing work inclusion for people in need and offering them temporary job opportunities through its business activities. All these entities built up a wide, positively recognised, and deeply rooted net- work within the local community, henceforth referred to as Caritas Senigallia. Despite Caritas Senigallia's mission to serve people in want, in relation to the flood emergency response, it could be considered as an expanding organisation, because it is not an accredited association of the city's Civil Protection Department. In fact, according to Dynes’ classification [15], Caritas Senigallia simply maintained its previous tasks (to support the local population) by establishing ad hoc structures, which it had exclusively operated during times of emergencies.

Caritas Senigallia established a volunteer reception centre at its emergency headquarters, where twice a day, at specific schedules, persons willing to volunteer could offer their availability. Volunteer management started with the formal enrolment of volunteers by ac- complishing a specific registration form (requiring them information pertaining to their availability and owned equipment, and signing a

privacy policy) if this was not already accomplished online by filling an SOS Alluvione form. Data collected from the SV registration were in- tegrated with the lists of help offers. Thereafter, the Caritas staff held a briefing and short training on the following: guidelines to follow in order to deliver safe and efficient help service; attention required so as not to harm themselves while providing help; basic concepts relating to the beneficiary-volunteer relationship during emergencies; precautions to be taken regarding the psychological vulnerabilities of flood victims and how to approach them; orientation on forms and modules to be distributed to flood victims for assistance and reimbursement requests; useful telephone numbers; appropriate behaviour towards floods vic- tims and other professionals engaged in emergency response activities. Volunteers were then provided with available equipment (for all vo- lunteers, at least a t-shirt and/or a sticker to be recognised as a Caritas volunteer). Based on the list of areas to be covered and tasks to be performed, matched with the SV profiles, the volunteers were divided into groups with an assignment (address of beneficiary, type of inter- vention, and required equipment). Once the intervention was com- pleted, volunteers reported their feedbacks to the Caritas staff. Moreover, if the volunteers remained available, they received new tasks and assignments.

4.1.5. Social Centre Arvultura SVM (Node A3) Simultaneously, the Social Centre Arvultura started to provide

support to persons in need, who are mainly friends and relatives of members affiliated with the Centre. In a few days, because of the in- creasing assistance requests, Arvultura began to organise its volunteers (both affiliated members and spontaneous volunteers) by coordinating its intervention with Caritas Senigallia. Thereafter, Caritas Senigallia provided the Arvultura staff with a list of areas to be covered (NODE A33, Fig. 7).

The Arvultura staff arranged for a daily meeting place and sched- uled time for those willing to help. After each meeting, SVs were

Fig. 6. IDEF0 SVM, Node A24. Caritas spontaneous volunteers management.

C. Paciarotti et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

267

divided into groups and each of them was provided with an assignment and a local referent. Each day, after completing all interventions, the Arvultura staff collected feedbacks from volunteers by phone, evening meetings, or private meetings. All feedbacks and suggestions from vo- lunteers were integrated with information from Caritas in order to ef- ficiently management the volunteers for next day.

4.2. Survey analysis

The survey involved 179 individuals who volunteered during the first two weeks of the emergency; 300 flood victims who received some form of help from volunteers; 13 Caritas workers with different func- tions who took part in SVM; two representatives from the Civil Protection department, and one from the local government of Senigallia. From the analysis of survey results, crucial elements about SVM emerged, as discussed in the following.

4.2.1. Caritas personnel questionnaires and focus group Among the 13 Caritas employees interviewed at the time of the

flood in 2014, only five had previous jobs or volunteering experiences relating to emergencies. During the emergency, all of them had to work beyond their usual functions within the organisation. They participated in emergency management by performing various tasks: welcoming and registering volunteers; filtering and matching aid requests and offers to help; briefing and training enrolled volunteers; assigning tasks and equipment to volunteers and informing beneficiaries; debriefing and collecting feedbacks from volunteers and updates from the field; managing the storehouse and aid deliveries.

Despite the fact that most of them were completely inexperienced in working during a crisis, particularly in managing spontaneous volun- teers, all professional interviewees were generally satisfied with the volunteers’ contribution and support. Only three reported some cases of inappropriate volunteer behaviour. One specified that this mis- behaviour was caused by the excessive desire of the volunteer to help. None of the interviewees reported instances of staff members who

conducted themselves superiorly. During the first days of the emergency, when the involvement of

Caritas in managing SVs was still at an early stage, the volunteer en- rolment form was changed several times, thus creating a confusion and in some cases, duplication, particularly with the online version and hard copy. Despite initial difficulties, according to interviewers who were members of the Caritas staff, the volunteer enrolment form helped in making selections and dissuading those who were unsuitable for the requested tasks (over-ambitious persons and those who are physically or mentally unfit) to some extent.

The entire affiliation procedure—enrolment, briefing, training, tasks assignment—helped in minimizing the risks for volunteers, and reduced possible damage to reputations provoked by their in- appropriate behaviours.

Another aspect that facilitated the SVM performance of the Caritas personnel was the group creation criteria. Available volunteers were assigned to groups where they were all unacquainted to the extent possible. Consequently, this generated some form of self-supervision among the volunteers themselves. In fact, not one case of looting was reported.

4.2.2. Volunteer questionnaires The analysis of responses in the volunteer questionnaire revealed a

number of interesting features and data pertaining to volunteers and their performance during the Senigallia flood emergency. In all, 179 responses were collected.

Caritas Senigallia coordinated 71.8% of all responders involved, of which 10.1%, 8.5%, and 9.6% were assigned to SOS Alluvione, Arvultura Social Centre, and others (not affiliated with any associa- tions, affiliated with Protezione Civile, or other organisations and as- sociations), respectively. Of all responders, 14% were already members or volunteers affiliated with one of the above-mentioned organisations. Among the volunteers were those previously affiliated with an organi- sation officially engaged in recovery operations because of its mission. However, it should be noted that only the Civil Protection Department

Fig. 7. IDEF0 SVM, Node A33. Coordinate spontaneous volunteers (Social Centre Arvultura).

C. Paciarotti et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

268

was identified as an official responder. All others mentioned were considered as extending or expanding organisations. However, 86% of all responders were not previously affiliated with any organisations. Thus, they were clearly classified as spontaneous volunteers.

The main means through which people acknowledged their co- ordination with one of the above-mentioned organisation as sponta- neous volunteers was by word of mouth, followed by FB pages (22.3%) and internet web sites (7%). A small number of people obtained in- formation from the local newspaper, television, or phone calls.

A majority of the responders volunteered from one to four days (76%), whereas the rest volunteered for five days to two weeks; a few volunteered for more than 15 days. Most of the volunteers assisted populations in flooded areas through clean-up activities (e.g., pumping water out, removing debris, mucking out flooded buildings, sanitization activities, ridding of sodden furniture, and cleaning furniture and other recoverable objects). Half of the volunteers supported the Caritas staff at the headquarters or at information posts located inside the territory, sorting donated items, delivering food and other items, supporting people in filling-up forms and questionnaires, tracking needs under a fast-changing situation, and conducting a census of flooded houses. The problem on required equipment emphasised the scarcity of materials provided by SV coordinating organisations: only 36% of volunteers were provided with equipment, which were necessary but not suffi- cient, because more than 80% of volunteers interviewed owned some of the items used during their voluntary service (mainly gloves, rubber boots, water pumps, shovels, buckets, hygiene products, and sponges).

As for safety, 73% of the interviewees felt safeguarded during their volunteering operations; 79% of those interviewed performed their tasks without experiencing any problem; 94.3% reported no accidents, and the 5.7% who experienced or heard of accidents, reported that these were mainly skids, injuries because of falling debris, and other minor accidents. There were no severe injuries reported.

The result of the survey indicated that the information provided to volunteers before their intervention were incomplete and un- satisfactory. In fact only 35.5% affirmed to have received fully appro- priate information, whereas 7.6% were extremely unsatisfied with the recommendations and instructions they received.

More than 50% of interviewed volunteers received information from daily meetings; individual meetings with coordinators (35%); phone calls (23%); FB page SOS Alluvione Senigallia (17%); Caritas FB page (8.8%) and from a vademecum provided by Caritas (6.5%). Multiple choices were provided for the question.

As shown in Fig. 8, the responses of the volunteers indicated that they themselves underrated the necessity and importance of the psy- chological support for volunteers before they performed interventions.

Different results pertaining to specific psychological supports aimed at elaborating ex post the entire volunteering experience were col- lected, as shown in Fig. 9.

4.2.3. Volunteer support beneficiary questionnaires Three hundred interviewees, among whom 120 were males and 180

were females, represented 300 family units affected by the flood. During the emergency, 93% (279) were aware of the available vo-

lunteer support; 73% (219) received help from spontaneous volunteers; 19 of the 279 (6.8%) were aware of the availability of volunteers but did not require or seek their aid.

In spite of the availability of information channels regarding vo- lunteers, only approximately12% of all assisted persons received in- formation about volunteer availability and management from the social media or web sites. However, a majority of those interviewed ac- knowledged that they became aware of the availability of volunteers by word of mouth (71%) and from other volunteers already active on the field (approximately 30%). The above-mentioned responses were ob- tained because multiple answers were allowed on the questionnaire.

Regarding volunteer affiliation, 51% of respondents were helped by volunteers coordinated by Caritas Senigallia; 18% by persons affiliated with Civil Protection, and 9% by individuals coordinated by other as- sociations or organisations. However, 22% of those who were assisted could not identify or remember as to which organisation the volunteers were affiliated with.

Regarding the general satisfaction on volunteer support, the bene- ficiaries of their assistance confirmed the Caritas evaluation of volun- teer performance—91% of respondents did not report inadequate vo- lunteer behaviour. Others complained that the volunteers were not well coordinated, inexperienced, and extremely young. Nevertheless, 85% claimed that number of volunteers was adequate, 10%, extremely few, and 5%, considerably many.

4.2.3.1. Interviews with official responder representatives. The general consideration of Civil Protection representatives pertaining to SVs tends to converge to the common perspective that individuals can potentially harm themselves and others. Accordingly, they should be trained before emergencies arise. According to all interviewees, SVs who lack competencies and knowledge should remain outside of the official emergency response. In fact, during the flood emergency, not one among the official responder organisations accepted the request of some citizens to participate in helping flood victims. All SVs who sought to join the Civil Protection Department or Red Cross were rejected and required to follow the standard procedure to become affiliated volunteers through a training program to be attended when there are no emergencies.

Regarding the specific contribution of SVs managed by Caritas in May 2014, all interviewees recognised the crucial importance of sup- porting the flood victims after the most severe emergency phase. However, such SV support should be mainly on performing tasks that do not require specific skills. All official responders reported that most of the SVs managed by Caritas provided aid without having any per- sonal protective equipment; the SVs wore inappropriate clothing.

Fig. 8. Perception of the importance of a psychological support for volunteers. Comparison between volunteers’ perception at the time of the emergency while volunteering and the current one.

Fig. 9. Perception of the importance of a specific psychological support to elaborate the volunteering experience. Comparison between the perception at the time of the emergency and the current one.

C. Paciarotti et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

269

Regarding tasks and functions, nobody among the interviewees recalled any case of overlapping interventions between affiliated and non-af- filiated volunteers. Nevertheless, despite a generally positive evaluation of SV performances during the Senigallia emergency, all interviewed responders continued to assert that all persons willing to help after disaster events should become affiliated volunteers and not demand to operate without any training. Official responders, such as the Civil Protection Department and Red Cross, continued to rely on traditional models of volunteerism based on a centralised command and control style of management, which is a top-down approach supported by the local Municipality, versus a flexible coordination model, which is ex- plained in the next section.

4.2.3.2. SVM evaluation by the Municipality of Senigallia. The representatives of the Municipality of Senigallia positively recognised the role of SVs as complementary to the work of official responders. Public documents referred to SVs that were managed by Caritas as invaluable resources that allowed a faster recovery phase. In fact, because of the considerable number of SVs who supported the local population—from 700 volunteers during the first week up to 1500 at the second weekend of the emergency—public institutions and official responders focused on other operations, which hastened the entire recovery phase. As expressed by Senigallia's Mayor, the successful management of SVs during the flood emergency, in close coordination with other official responders, allowed the quick recovery of the most affected areas, by removing waste, water and mud, and by offering appropriate assistance to all victims of the flood. All interventions that were performed by SVs managed by Caritas were appropriate and well- coordinated with other actors.

The involvement of local volunteers facilitated the growth of active citizenship, raised awareness in the appropriate behaviour during emergencies, and increased the solidarity and mutual support among local communities, which allowed Senigallia to rebound from the de- vastating effects of the flood within a few weeks. Furthermore, the Municipality of Senigallia signed a memorandum of understanding with Caritas for the recovery phase, in particular, for the delivery of extra- ordinary contributions to the flood victims.

4.3. SVM evaluation

4.3.1. Caritas SVM evaluation All the major and most important existing guides and manuals

pertaining to SVM foresaw the crucial phases that required im- plementation before disasters occur and emergencies arise, such as mitigation and preparedness, which were completely absent from emergency response of Caritas Senigallia. Despite that fact, Caritas Senigallia demonstrated capacities and practical knowledge in im- plementing most of the procedures listed in the above-mentioned guides within a considerably short span of time. Indeed, Caritas Senigallia gained a long-lasting experience in managing numerous vo- lunteers to provide assistance that everyday professional support workers in social services deliver to people in need. Hence, the Caritas staff harnessed its expertise and knowledge to implement the new task of managing SVs. Furthermore, some of the steps that FEMA included in the mitigation phase were ordinary activities of Caritas Senigallia, al- though these were not specifically directed towards SVs. For instance, Caritas Senigallia mapped the social-demographic condition of the re- lated Dioceses; it established agreements with public institutions and other non-profit organisations involved with volunteers; it applied the liability and privacy policies into the affiliation process of its volun- teers.

The Volunteering Act [42], in its guide for managing SVM during emergencies, listed eight standards in responding to the key areas of volunteer involvement during emergencies or ordinary times, regard- less. The volunteer management of Caritas Senigallia during ordinary times satisfies all the standards, as explained below:

1. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT: Caritas has a dedicated man- agement system to support, involve, and manage volunteers. A re- sponsible person coordinates a dedicated staff with specific tasks.

2. COMMITMENT TO VOLUNTEER INVOLVEMENT: The commitment to volunteer involvement is one of the core values and pillars of Caritas Senigallia, regardless of its sector of activity.

3. VOLUNTEER ROLES: Volunteers are engaged in meaningful func- tions that contribute to the organisation's purpose and objectives.

4. RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION: Volunteer recruitment and se- lection strategies are planned, consistent, and satisfies the requisites of the organisation and volunteers. This crucial stage is frequently the object of updating and revising actions.

5. SUPPORT AND DEVELOPMENT: Caritas volunteers understand the function of volunteers and gain the knowledge, skills, and feedback required to perform their duties safely and effectively.

6. WORKPLACE SAFETY AND WELLBEING: All volunteers affiliated with Caritas are guaranteed of legal cover.

7. VOLUNTEER RECOGNITION: The contribution of volunteers and their value is commonly understood and appreciated by the paid staff of Caritas, as well as by Caritas stakeholders and the local community, especially during events, manifestation, and celebra- tions.

8. QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT: These are achieved through trainings, education, debate, and con- stant updates.

All these standards are intrinsic and deeply rooted in Caritas Senigallia organisation at all levels, and its staff has endeavoured to maintain them during the emergency management.

A more thorough analysis of SVMs performed by Caritas Senigallia in comparison with major guides and other case studies revealed a number of strengths. Although some aspects positively contributed to the success of SVM, they can be improved further, as follows:

• Volunteer Reception Centre: FEMA recommends planning and providing a venue for receiving spontaneous volunteers. Harris et al. and Liath [4,24], in evaluating their case studies, strongly empha- sises the importance of a place for SV to converge, be processed and briefed. The Caritas volunteer centre matched the main character- istics designated by FEMA and MCDE manuals, such as accessibility and proximity to the affected area. Indeed, it was located in a safe residential area, close to the affected zones, and easily accessible by foot or bicycle by most Senigallia citizens, so as not to create traffic jams that could hinder the transit of emergency transportation. Moreover, MCDE recommends that in case of smaller events, it is more appropriate to receive volunteers at the organisation's head- quarters, as it was for Caritas Senigallia.

• Volunteer Registration Form: Another essential step in SV man- agement is to create forms and key documents, such as the disaster volunteer registration form with release from liability, as that cre- ated by Caritas Senigallia. Caritas personnel reported some diffi- culties in creating, adopting, and processing an efficient and user- friendly form that could be easily improved by drafting a form for spontaneous volunteers in advance. The form should be drafted while there is no emergency. Hence, it will be available when it is required.

• Establishment of a temporary identification system: To identify volunteers and allow their access to restricted areas, a temporary identification system should be established. In Caritas Senigallia SVM, although an identification system was adopted, it was im- provable. In fact, Caritas provided stickers and/or t-shirts to its af- filiated volunteers. These two items were necessary but not suffi- cient, as indicated by the survey of service beneficiaries, where a high percentage of interviewed beneficiaries were unable to re- member or recognise the organisation the volunteers that helped them were affiliated. Thus, rather than using a simple self-adhesive

C. Paciarotti et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

270

sticker that is easily detachable, for example, some guides re- commend the use of identification badges pinned to the clothing.

• Two types of coordination: For an effective SV management, one coordination is required in cyber-space to manage all online re- quests and offers, and another on the ground to manage all SVs physically converging and requests for help collected by patrolling. This key aspect was emphasised in the analysis of another case study, the river flooding in Tonbridge, UK [43].

• Briefing and training: Even though neither briefing nor training was planned prior to the emergency, the Caritas staff managed to provide sufficient information in order to allow volunteers to safely and efficiently perform their support for floods victims. The success of these activities benefitted from the expertise of the Caritas staff in training volunteers, as well as from their few personal experiences in managing emergencies.

• Spontaneous volunteer coordinators: Coordinators should be able to effectively deal with all types of people who want to volunteer. This skill was already shared among the Caritas staff in charge of managing volunteers in the daily activities of the organisation. However, the function of a coordinator was never assigned officially during the emergency.

• Communication messages for spontaneous volunteers: Guides and manuals recommend a communication plan containing in- formation on whether or not volunteers are required, what skills and equipment are necessary, and where and how people can volunteer. This task was initially performed by SOS Alluvione Senigallia on its FB page. Its posts prevented unnecessary and potentially harmful self-intervention and gave notice to people available for vo- lunteering to register with the Caritas volunteer management system. The cooperation between Caritas Senigallia and SOS Alluvione significantly increased the coverage of their communica- tions, both online and on the ground.

• Necessary personnel for SVM: As part of the staff, Caritas provided receptionists and screeners, who welcomed volunteers and helped them in completing all required forms; trainers, who delivered a training and briefed volunteers; dispatchers, who assigned the task to SVs and directed them on the field by appointing a local referent. Although the Caritas staff performed all these roles, sometimes the same persons held different tasks.

• Recognition of the value and specific characteristics of spon- taneous volunteers. Caritas Senigallia gave recognition to dis- tinctive contributions made by SVs rather than trying to incorporate them into the official flood response [4], because of the official as- signment given by MOC and the Mayor. Most official emergency agencies tend to integrate SV into the official response [11], but spontaneous volunteer request processes are different from those that lead towards becoming pre-affiliated volunteers [44].

• Involvement of the affected population: All interviewees affirmed that Caritas Senigallia involved flood victims in designing the aid delivery, emergency management, and SVM through specific com- munication channels and means.

Despite the success of SVM implemented by Caritas Senigallia, some weaknesses and aspects that were improvable were identified from the management analysis and comparison with manuals, guides, and other case studies.

Weaknesses:

• Lack of a volunteer coordinator: There was no specifically as- signed coordinator to handle the specific role and task of organizing the SVs.

• There is lack of listed roles to be performed by volunteers, with specific tasks, profiles, and resources. This was mainly conducted “informally,” by endeavouring to match collected information with those in the enrolment form of volunteers and requests for help. In

order to resolve this problem, the proposed model may be integrated with other research, such as the innovative approach for managing volunteers proposed by Lassiter et al. [2]. The aim of the authors was to minimise the unmet demands of disaster victims, by max- imizing the match between preferences and skills of volunteers.

• Another crucial aspect that emerged from the structured interviews of the Caritas staff is the lack of evaluation means to assess SVM immediately after the most critical emergency phase. The re- commendation of FEMA is to develop methods to evaluate the ex- perience of volunteers, both process and outcome, from organisa- tions that utilise referred volunteers, emergency management staff, and the volunteers themselves.

• From the results of the survey of volunteers, another weak point of the Caritas SVM that emerged is the scarcity of psychological support for volunteers during and after their support activities to elaborate on the event. The Italian Society Emergency Psychologists, a group of specialist volunteers, supported the Caritas staff, flood victims, and volunteers. However, volunteers complained on the scarcity of this specific type of support because the size of the event might demand a bigger number of psychologists and/or better ac- cessibility and visibility for those who require their assistance.

• Information to volunteers: The questionnaires accomplished by volunteers indicate the necessity of improving communications and information delivery to spontaneous volunteers before performing their intervention. Such improvements would provide responders details that are more precise, such as the addresses of beneficiaries, necessary equipment, and type of intervention requested.

• Debriefing: All guides strongly endorse this activity as an essential aspect of a successful SVM. A debriefing can be conducted with a group, which may foster resilience by allowing individuals to bond with their volunteering experiences. Moreover, it is focused on the interpersonal and emotional experiences, rather than the emergency management itself. It can also be conducted on an individual basis, especially for those with higher risks of trauma. Volunteer co- ordinators should foresee the necessity for specialist services, such as counselling, if necessary and appropriate. The Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management of New Zealand [14] re- commends a short debriefing after each shift ends and a longer one once the volunteer service is ended. During the Senigallia flood, some form of debriefing activities were conducted on a daily basis, through private a group meeting or phone call, but without a properly planned schedule, as shown by the responses to the ques- tionnaire for volunteers.

• Recognition and follow-up activities: Caritas gave recognition mainly by sending SMS expressing gratitude to volunteers. However, it was completely devoid of the narrative part, such as sharing stories and experiences during celebrative events. Furthermore, a brief SMS may be followed by a longer a letter or by publishing articles to reach those outside the locality. This types of activities, especially when conducted with a group, help in the emotional and psychological recovery from the tragic event, while strengthening the affiliation to an organisation, as FEMA and Australian Agencies affirm [30,45].

4.3.2. SOS Alluvione and Social Centre Arvultura's SVM evaluation By promptly creating an informative FB page dedicated to the flood

emergency, the informal group, SOS Alluvione Senigallia had a crucial role at the early stages of the emergency. Information given through the FB posts and messages helped prevent inappropriate and potentially harmful self-initiatives of citizens; facilitated the dispatch of the first spontaneous volunteers where needed; shared the rules of conduct to be followed in the event of a flood; shared official information released by public authorities. Furthermore, the FB page SOS Alluvione Senigallia was the first platform where information, requests for help and offers of assistance could converge. As the emergency escalated, SOS Alluvione Senigallia, which is an informal group uniquely composed of

C. Paciarotti et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

271

volunteers, strongly required the support of a bigger and well-struc- tured organisation, as Caritas Senigallia. As previously discussed, their cooperation, allowed volunteers to safely extend help and significantly support flood victims.

In performing its spontaneous volunteer management, the Arvultura Social Centre benefitted from its associative structure, which is based on voluntary affiliation and being deeply rooted within the local com- munity. The coordination of SVM led by the Social Centre Arvultura, albeit implemented on a smaller scale, demonstrated several strengths, as follows: a volunteer reception centre and scheduled times for their enrolment were made available; briefing and training before the in- tervention of volunteers were conducted; roles and tasks to be per- formed were assigned, and volunteers were provided with all necessary information; feedbacks were collected, and volunteers were debriefed after their performance; SVM was coordinated with other organisations that performed the same functions (mainly with Caritas Senigallia).

4.4. Discussion

The analysis and evaluation of SVMs performed by Caritas Senigallia, SOS Alluvione Senigallia, and Social Centre Arvultura during the flood of 2014 identified crucial problems in managing spontaneous volunteers during emergencies. First, because the three entities engaged in SVM are not official emergency responders, none of them had prior plans for SVs before the emergency. Albeit in different ways, Caritas Senigallia, SOS Alluvione Senigallia, and Arvultura Social Centre performed successful volunteer management whose key points are summarised, as follows:

• Information management: The provision of information, such as on “what to do and not to do” to recover from a flood event, and a place and time for volunteers to converge are important. Initially, SOS Alluvione Senigallia performed it. Thereafter, Caritas Senigallia implemented it, and Arvultura Social Centre conducted it in parallel on a smaller scale. All entities managed to promptly provide suffi- cient information both online and on the ground.

• SV enrolment and management: These include opening a volunteer reception centre, drafting a volunteer registration form, briefing and training of volunteers, assigning tasks to volunteers and equipping them, providing identification items; collecting volunteer feedbacks.

• Coordination and cooperation among organisations managing spontaneous volunteers, with official responders and public autho- rities: Caritas Senigallia was in charge of coordinating with public authorities and MOC (vertical coordination aimed at upstream and downstream activities), while synchronising its activities with SOS Alluvione and Social Centre Arvultura (horizontal coordination among organisations at the same level of the chain). These well- structured forms of coordination, albeit perfectible, were allowed to prevent duplication of efforts, and improve performances and re- sponse time [46]. Such an integrated cooperation may be defined an alliance, as Oloruntoba did [47] in describing the triangulation of governmental units with NGOs and private sectors during the Cy- clone Larry emergency in Australia. Furthermore, as Balcik et al. stated [48], it is recognised that local actors have a better knowl- edge of the needs of local communities and could facilitate needs assessment and the so-called “last mile” distribution, i.e., the de- livery of relief supplies to affected areas [2].

• Culture of volunteering and expertise in managing volunteers during ordinary times: Caritas Senigallia and Social Centre Arvultura har- nessed their long-lasting experience in the field of volunteerism by applying the rules of conduct and management principles to a new emergency context.

• Knowledge of the local community and needs—engagement of the organisations into social issues: These two key elements performed an important function in SVM in terms of reliability of the organi- sations, liability of volunteers, effectiveness, and efficacy of per- formed tasks.

Another crucial element emerged from the survey analysis: The perceptions of SVs between official responders and the Municipality of Senigallia differ. On the one hand, professional emergency responders neither accepted SVs nor foresaw them as performing a potential function in the emergency management system; on the other hand, local governors authorised and recognised the full engagement of vo- lunteers with the disaster emergency response.

5. Conclusion

The value of spontaneous volunteers in emergency response was clearly demonstrated, even during a small-scale disaster, such as the flood in Senigallia, in 2014, whereas research on volunteer manage- ment remains limited [2], and even more, lacking on SVM. At the same time, this case study emphasised the necessity of a well-administered SVM and highlighted some of the crucial aspects that could determine the success or failure of the involvement of volunteers, particularly when these turn into the so-called “mass assault.” Based on an in-depth analysis, the Senigallia SVM was evaluated, which led to the identifi- cation of its strengths, weaknesses, and improvable aspects in ac- cordance with international guides and manuals on SVM.

One aspect that required consideration in the design of SVMs was the common attitude towards SVs that persisted among official responders. Although the positive contribution of SVs was recognised, as demonstrated by the specific case study presented herein, official responders practically denied the existence of SV convergence and did not see any positive po- tential in this form of emergent volunteerism; rather, an added danger. On the other hand, the local government implemented an innovative approach to emergency management and recognised the function of spontaneous volunteers as part of the emergency response system. Accordingly, they authorised the management of SVs by a local non-profit organisation. In disaster and emergency contexts, this reflected the generally increasing shift towards resilience-based strategies that implied decentralised authority and shared responsibility among different subjects, including third-sector orga- nisations [25].

In Senigallia, the importance given to the local community's in- volvement in the emergency response remained active four years after the last flood event. Indeed, the Municipality had included Caritas Senigallia in the newly conceived Municipal Committee of the Civil Protection Voluntary Associations, whose aim is to coordinate all civil protection organisations in emergency preparedness and response, in accordance with the Italian Law 225/92. This law recognises Civil Protection volunteerism as an operational structure of the National Service of Civil Protection. This Committee, the first within Italian territory, gathers all local organisations accredited as civil protection associations. Caritas, the only member not accredited as a civil pro- tection association, was invited as an official member of this Committee as well. During the 2014 floods, the support that Caritas provided, as well as the level of expertise it demonstrated, had allowed it to achieve a special function within an institutional public body engaged in pre- paredness, response, and recovery phases [49,50].

The applicability of our findings, although seemingly limited and questionable, could be twofold: first, our research may help in im- proving the practical operation of SVM; second, it proposes to autho- rities and official responders an innovative model of the emergency response system, which is an approach more inclined towards a bigger citizen involvement through spontaneous volunteerism. Thus, the case study analysis reported herein, proposes a predictive model of a re- sponse system, which foresees a sharing of responsibilities for a wider civic engagement that may lead to both positive and negative poten- tials. On the one hand, it may increase community resilience, emotional support, self-help [10], reduce public spending [33]. On the other hand, it may lead to unrealistic government expectations of the potential of unaffiliated volunteers and increase bureaucracy and regulations. All these aspects of informal volunteerism remain scarcely studied, both during ordinary times and emergencies [25].

C. Paciarotti et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

272

The results of our analysis can be applied to analogous social and legal contexts, and similar disaster situations, especially within Italy, where the flood frequency continues to increase because of anthro- pogenic activities and widespread impermeability of the territory [51]. Only recently, in 2017, two massive floods hit the southern and central regions of the country, and caused nine deaths and enormous damage. Locally, since 1955, 10 widespread floods hit the territory of the Marche Region [52,53].

Two other main variables affect the applicability of our findings: the official disaster response system and the culture of volunteering. Both these aspects strongly influence the way that people volunteer, the phenomenon itself, and perception of spontaneous volunteers [4,14,54]. Caritas SVM benefited from the deeply rooted volunteering culture and long-lasting relationship of trust with the local government and population. Those two aspects may influence the replicability of the model, or, at least, they have to be considered when key elements are applied.

After comparing our research with other case studies, it is evident that our study could support the drafting of SVM guidelines and policies that can be applied to situations with similar contexts.

Declaration of interests

None.

References

[1] J.K.A. Word, R.S. Brower, Volunteers, nonprofits, and community capacity: a case study in preparing for disaster response and recovery, J. Nonprofit Manag. (2012) 65–83.

[2] K. Lassiter, A. Khademi, K.M. Taafle, A robust optimization approach to volunteer management in humanitarian crises, Int. J. Prod. Econ. 163 (2015) 97–111.

[3] Commonwealth of Australia, Spontaneous Volunteer Management. Resource Kit. Helping to Manage Spontaneous Volunteers in Emergencies. Australian Government, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2010.

[4] M. Harris, D. Shaw, J. Scully, C.M. Smith, G. Hieke, The involvement/exclusion paradox of spontaneous volunteering: new lessons and theory from winter flood episodes in England, Nonprofit Volunt. Sect. Q. 46 (2016) 352–371.

[5] E. Yamamura, Natural disaster and participation in volunteer activities: a case study of great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, Ann. Public Coop. Econ. 84 (2013) 103–117.

[6] L. Heng, Disaster Recovery and Volunteers: Literature Review of Best Practice, HSRV301 University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 2012.

[7] E.J. Lodree Jr., L.B. Davis, Empirical analysis of volunteer convergence following the 2011 tornado disaster in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, Nat. Hazards 84 (2016) 1109–1135.

[8] L.S. Fernandez, J.A. Barbera, J.R. Van Dorp, Strategies for managing volunteers during incident response: a systems approach, Homel. Secur. Aff. 2 (2006) (Article 9).

[9] S. Lowe, A. Fothergill, A Need to Help: Emergent Volunteer Behaviour after September 11th. Beyond September 11th: An Account of Post-Disaster Research, Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado, Boulder, USA, 2003, pp. 293–314.

[10] S.L. Steffen, A. Fothergill, 9/11 Volunteerism: a pathway to personal healing and community engagement, Soc. Sci. J. 46 (2009) 29–46.

[11] J. Whittaker, B. McLennan, J. Handmer, A review of informal volunteerism in emergencies and disasters: definition, opportunities and challenges, Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct. 13 (2015) 358–368.

[12] T.E. Drabek, D.A. McEntire, Emergent phenomena and the sociology of disaster: lessons, trends and opportunities from the research literature, Disaster Prev. Manag.: Int. J. 12 (2003) 97–112.

[13] A. Cottrell, Research Report. A Survey of Spontaneous Volunteers. Centre for Disaster Studies James Cook University. Australian Red Cross, 2010.

[14] Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management (MCDE), Community Engagement in CDEM Context. Best Practice Guideline for Civil Defence Emergency Management Sector [BPG3/06], Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, Wellington, New Zealand, 2010.

[15] R. Dynes, Organized Behavior in Disaster, Heath-Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, 1970.

[16] D. Bruce, Sustainable volunteering – how can we do it differently? Fire Aust. Mag. Spring 2014 (2014) 30–32.

[17] C. Reuter, T. Spielhofer, Towards social resilience: a quantitative and qualitative survey on citizens' perception of social media in emergencies in Europe, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 121 (2017) 168–180.

[18] C. Fishwick, Tomnod – The Online Search Party Looking for Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370. The Guardian, 2014 ⟨https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ mar/14/tomnod-online-search-malaysian-airlines-flight-mh370⟩ (Accessed January 2017).

[19] B.E. Munkvold, M. Flaten, R.P. Nguyen, Volunteers’ perceptions of the use of social media in emergency management, in: Palen, Büscher, Comes, Hughes (Eds.) Proceedings of the ISCRAM 2015 Conference Short Paper – Practitioner Cases and Practitioner-Centered Research, Kristiansand, 24–27 May 2015.

[20] J. Rogstadius, C. Teixera, E. Karapanos, V. Kostakos, An introduction for system developers to volunteer roles in crisis response and recovery, in: T. Comes, F. Fiedrich, S. Fortier, J. Geldermann, T. Müller (Eds.) Proceedings of the 10th International ISCRAM Conference – Baden-Baden, Germany, May 2013.

[21] A.F. Van Gorp, Integration of volunteer and technical communities into the hu- manitarian aid sector: barriers to collaboration, in: S.R. Hiltz, M.S. Pfaff, L. Plotnick, P.C. Shih (Eds.) Proceedings of the 11th International ISCRAM Conference – University Park, Pennsylvania, USA, May 2014.

[22] C.E. Fritz, J.H. Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters; A Problem in Social Control, National Academy of Sciences-National Research Councel, Washington, 1957, pp. 93–100.

[23] A. Barton, Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations, Doubleday, New York, 1969.

[24] S. Liath, Averting a Disaster within a Disaster: The Management of Spontaneous Volunteers Following the 11 September 2001 Attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. Volunt. Action. 6, 2004.

[25] B. McLennan, J. Whittaker, J. Handmer, The changing landscape of disaster vo- lunteering: opportunities, responses and gaps in Australia, Nat. Hazards 84 (2016) 2031–2048.

[26] E. Auf der Heide, Convergence behaviour in disasters, Ann. Emerg. Med. 41 (2003) 463–466.

[27] E. Quarantelli, Research Findings in Organizational Behaviour in Disaster and Their Applicability in Developing Countries, Disaster Research Center University of Delaware, Newark, USA, 1986, p. 107.

[28] E. Quarantelli, Ten criteria for evaluating the management of community disasters. Disaster Research Center, Disasters 21 (1997) 39–56.

[29] L.E. Barsky, J.E. Trainor, M.R. Torres, B.E. Aguirre, Managing volunteers: FEMA's urban search and rescue programme and interactions with unaffiliated responders in disaster response, Disasters 31 (2007) 495–507.

[30] Federal Emergency Management Agency Emergency Management Institute (FEMA), Management of Spontaneous Volunteers in Times of Disasters: The Synergy of Structure and Good Intentions. Points of Light Foundation, NVOAD, and UPS Foundation, 2005.

[31] J.D. Rivera, Z.D. Wood, Disaster relief volunteerism: evaluating cities’ planning for the usage and management of spontaneous volunteers, J. Emerg. Manag. 14 (2) (2016) 127–138.

[32] J. Holguín-Veras, M. Jaller, L.N. Van Wassenhove, N. Perez, T. Wachtendord, On the unique features of post-disaster humanitarian logistics, J. Oper. Manag. 30 (2012) 494–506.

[33] J. Dostal, L. Balarinova, Volunteers in Emergency Management – An Investment in the Future? Disaster Management and Human Health Risk III: Reducing Risk, Improving Outcomes, Wessex Institute of Technology, UK, Southampton: C.A. Brebbia, 2013, pp. 381–391.

[34] G., R. Waissi, M. Demira, J., E. Humblea, B. Lev, Automation of strategy using IDEF0 – a proof of concept, Oper. Res. Perspect. 2 (2015) 106–113.

[35] G., R. Waissi, M. Demira, J., E. Humblea, B. Lev, Automation of strategy using IDEF0 – a proof of concept, Oper. Res. Perspect. 2 (2015) 106–113.

[36] P.J. Papajorgji, P.M. Pardalos, Advances in Modeling Agricultural Systems vol. 25, Springer Optimization and its Applications. X, Boston, USA, 2009, p. 172.

[37] E. Piatyszek, G.M. Karagiannis, A model-based approach for systematic risk analysis of local flood emergency operation plans: a first step toward decision support system, Nat. Hazards 61 (2012) 1443–1462.

[38] M. Bevilacqua, F.E. Ciarapica, C. Paciarotti, Business process reengineering of emergency management procedures: a case study, Saf. Sci. 50 (2012) 1368–1376.

[39] D.A. Marca, C.L. McGowan, SADT: Structured Analysis and Design Technique, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, NY, 1988.

[40] KBSI, IEEE Standard for Functional Modelling Language – Syntax and Semantics for IDEF0. IEEE Std 1320.1, 1998.

[41] E. Monachesi, Relazione del Presidente della Commissione Speciale – Alluvione 3 maggio 2014. Delibera del Consiglio Comunale, no. CC/2015/2 del 29 gennaio, 2015. ⟨https://senigallia.openmunicipio.it/⟩ (Accessed April 2018).

[42] Volunteering ACT, Be Prepared: Managing Volunteers in Emergencies. A Practical Guide. ⟨https://www.volunteeringact.org.au/⟩ Government and the Commonwealth Under the Natural Disaster Resilience Program, 2015.

[43] D. Shaw, C.M. Smith, G. Heike, M. Harris, J. Scully, Spontaneous Volunteers: Involving Citizens in the Response and Recovery to Flood Emergencies, Final Report FD 2666. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Flood Risk Management Division, London, 2015.

[44] Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, (MCDE), Spontaneous Volunteer Management: A Guide for CDEM Practitioners. Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, Wellington, New Zealand, 2006.

[45] Australia-New Zealand Emergency Management Committee (ANZEMC), Spontaneous Volunteer Strategy. Coordination of Volunteer Effort in the Immediate Post Disaster Stage. Canberra: Australia-New Zealand Emergency Management Committee (Community Engagement Sub-Committee), 2015.

[46] C. Thevenaz, S.L. Resodihardjo, All the best laid plans…conditions impeding proper emergency response, Int. J. Prod. Econ. 126 (2010) 7–21.

[47] R. Oloruntoba, An analysis of Cyclone Larry emergency relief chain: some key success factors, Int. J. Prod. Econ. 126 (2010) 85–101.

[48] B. Balcik, B.M. Beamon, C.C. Krejci, K.M. Muramatsu, M. Ramirez, Coordination in humanitarian relief chains: practices, challenges and opportunities, Int. J. Prod. Econ. 126 (2010) 22–34.

C. Paciarotti et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

273

[49] Comune di Senigallia, Approvazione protocollo di intesa tra il Comune di Senigallia e la Fondazione Caritas per la gestione della seconda fase di emergenza alluvione del 3 maggio 2014_Concessione di contributi straordinari ed urgenti a sostengo delle famiglie colpite per il ripristino delle condizioni di fruibilità delle abitazioni e/ o il reperimento di alloggi alternativi. Deliberazione della Giunta Municipale n. 76, 2014 ⟨https://senigallia.openmunicipio.it/⟩ (Accessed April 2018).

[50] Comune di Senigallia, Approvazione regolamento istitutivo del Comitato Comunale delle Associazioni di Protezione Civile. Deliberazione del Consiglio Comunale n. 97, 2017. ⟨https://senigallia.openmunicipio.it/⟩ (Accessed April 2018).

[51] Protezione Civile Italiana, floods. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Dipartimento della protezione civile. ⟨http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/

en/rovesci_di_pioggia_e_gran.wp;jsessionid= 87DD7C9BC62A3480A82E4E6086A2A4D4⟩ (Accessed September 2017) .

[52] Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche Istituto di Ricerca per la Protezione Idrogeologica, Rapporto Periodico sul Rischio posto alla Popolazione italiana da Frane e Inondazioni. Anno 2013, 2014.

[53] Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche Istituto di Ricerca per la Protezione Idrogeologica, Rapporto Periodico sul Rischio posto alla Popolazione italiana da Frane e Inondazioni. Anno 2014, 2015.

[54] K. Smith, H. Hamerton, S. Hunt, R.J. Sargisson, Local volunteers respond to the Rena oil spill in Maketū, New Zealand, Kōtuitui: New Zealand, J. Soc. Sci. Online 11 (2016) 1–10.

C. Paciarotti et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 260–274

274