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The Humanitarian Illusion Carr; , Caleb . New York Times , Late Edition (East Coast); New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]16 Sep 1993:

A.23.

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ABSTRACT (ABSTRACT) The U.N. troops, faced with a physical threat that overrode complex moral considerations, fired back, killing

perhaps 100 civilians and moving the troubled U.N. intervention in Somalia to the brink of disaster. And yesterday

Somali gunmen shot and killed two Italian soldiers.

Should the U.N. troops leave Somalia now, we can expect man-made disasters to return in full force. Retreat would

be a practical choice. But we ought to acknowledge honestly where retreat would lead. U.S. and U.N. leaders seem

unwilling to abandon Somalia to such a fate. The military seems to be increasing its efforts to disarm the gangs

and to jail leaders who, like General Aidid, obstruct the path to an effective solution to Somalia's troubles.

The U.N. leadership is not swayed by their accusations of imperialism. If the multinational force moves with

heightened vigor, Somalia could be a U.N. protectorate within the year. Freed from the fighting, U.N. officials could

see whether there are leaders who care more about Somalis than personal power. If not, the protectorate status

would have to be extended until such leaders emerged. That might take months -- or years. Are all the countries in

the U.N. force ready for such a delay and commitment? Domestic signals indicate that they may not be -- and the

conclusion of these debates, most importantly the one getting under way in Washington, will be crucial.

FULL TEXT AuthorAffiliation

Caleb Carr is author of "The Devil Soldier." This is adapted from an article that appears in the fall issue of the World

Policy Journal.

Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid again showed he would stop at nothing when he sent women and children amid his

henchmen into Mogadishu streets to attack members of the United Nations force last week.

The U.N. troops, faced with a physical threat that overrode complex moral considerations, fired back, killing

perhaps 100 civilians and moving the troubled U.N. intervention in Somalia to the brink of disaster. And yesterday

Somali gunmen shot and killed two Italian soldiers.

Only two routes offer hope of changing the deplorable status quo: increased control by the military forces or

speedy withdrawal. As always, the United States will lead the way in making this choice; its decision will have

enormous implications for U.S. policy in other parts of the world.

The U.S. and U.N. entered Somalia believing they could direct the combat troops to ignore the political situation

and pursue an extra-military -- that is, extra-political -- end: the distribution of humanitarian aid.

The U.N. forces established famine as the enemy, not the gangs of such warlords as General Aidid and Gen.

Mohammed Said Hersi, who is also known as General Morgan. The coalition was unwilling or unable to recognize

that famine in Somalia is not a natural disaster; it is a policy orchestrated by the clan leaders to preserve their

power and to destroy Somalis who will not join their sides.

Recognition of this fact came too late in the international effort, and acknowledgment of its implications is proving

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just as tardy. We now hunt General Aidid like the criminal he has always been; yet our delay in beginning that hunt,

and our willingness to seat him and the other gang leaders at an internationally sanctioned peace conference in

Addis Ababa earlier this year, have given him the time, media attention and the setting in which to portray himself

as a legitimate leader.

Seizing Generals Aidid and Morgan and other gang leaders and disarming their followers should have been the first

order of business. If our troops are to stay, we should pursue that goal more aggressively. If famine remains the

enemy, its agents must be quickly and severely stopped.

Many in the West are uncomfortable with such an approach, echoing General Aidid's inevitable claim that it

amounts to colonialism. That may be so, but it is also the only cure for Somalia's ills. Proof is evident all over the

country, notably in towns like Baardheere, where marines quickly established a weapons-free zone, neutralized the

gangs and helped the citizens rebuild their lives. This is colonialism, no doubt -- but, after all, the local leaders were

the agents of famine and disease.