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African Security Review

ISSN: 1024-6029 (Print) 2154-0128 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rasr20

The fate of hostages: Nigeria's conflict theatres in comparative perspective

Samuel Oyewole

To cite this article: Samuel Oyewole (2016) The fate of hostages: Nigeria's conflict theatres in comparative perspective, African Security Review, 25:2, 193-207, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2016.1155466

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2016.1155466

Published online: 22 Apr 2016.

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ESSAY

The fate of hostages: Nigeria’s conflict theatres in comparative perspective Samuel Oyewole

ABSTRACT The violence against hostages in Nigeria’s armed conflicts is alarming. Killings, physical mutilation, sexual abuse, forced marriage, religious persecution, forced labour and conscription of hostages have all been recorded during Nigeria’s conflicts in recent times. This trend has increased the concern for the fate of hostages in the country. However, there have been a few exceptions: some have escaped from their abductors, while a few others have been released for ransom or rescued by security operatives. This study examines the fate of hostages captured in Nigeria’s conflict theatres, namely the Niger Delta region and the northern region of the country. The study seeks to understand the variations in the fates of hostages, their survival strategies, and the efficacy of Nigeria’s crisis management approaches in the aforementioned conflict theatres.

KEYWORDS Conflict; crisis management; hostage; insurgency; kidnapping; militancy; Nigeria; terrorism

Introduction

Nigeria has emerged as one of the leading countries for kidnapping and hostage-taking in the world. The proportion of global kidnappings in Africa was 22% in 2013, and Nigeria accounts for 51% of all incidents on the continent.1 In 2011, as the location of nearly one quarter of all globally recorded cases, Nigeria was named the kidnap-for-ransom capital of the world.2

Hostage-taking is a significant threat to human security in Nigeria. The country recorded an average of 1 000 incidents of kidnapping annually in the last decade.3 This criminal act is a profitable enterprise for bandits, ritualists, fraudsters (419 scams) and baby factories across the country.4 But this measure is also a tactic of conflict for the Movement for the Emancipa- tion of the Niger Delta (MEND), Boko Haram, Ansaru and other politically-motivated armed groups in the country.

The threat of kidnapping in Nigeria has attracted international attention. Foreign nationals and foreign-owned businesses in Nigeria have been one of the major targets of kidnapping in recent times. Foreign nationals kidnapped in Nigeria rose to 27% of all kidnap incidents in the country in 2013.5 Moreover, foreign-armed groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have developed significant transnational capabilities, which have been displayed in Nigeria through kidnapping. Many armed Nigerian groups have also recorded transnational kidnapping. The militant and pirate groups in the coastal regions of Nigeria have expanded their operations across the Gulf of Guinea. And the insurgent groups in the northern region of Nigeria have recorded a series of terrorist attacks and kidnappings across the Lake Chad region.

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

CONTACT Samuel Oyewole [email protected]

AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW, 2016 VOL. 25, NO. 2, 193–207 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2016.1155466

The fate of hostages in Nigeria’s conflict theatres has become a major source of concern for the Nigerian public and the international community in recent times. While the fate of hos- tages varies from one case to another – there are several records of violence against hostages but also cases where hostages have survived the violence – a certain regularity exists across time and space. This study examines the fate of hostages in Nigeria’s conflict theatres, namely the Niger Delta region and the northern region of the country. Though there are some noticeable similarities, this study focuses on the variations in the fate of hostages, the survival strategies of hostages, and the efficacy of Nigeria’s crisis-management approaches in the aforementioned conflict theatres.

Conceptualising the fate of hostages

Hostage-taking is a crime punishable under the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) on 17 December 1979. In Nigeria, hostage-taking is a crime punishable under the provisions of Section 364 of the Criminal Code Act (1990) and Section 11 of the Terrorism Prevention Act (2011). On these bases, hostage-taking occurs when a person intentionally seizes, detains and threatens to kill or injure another person (who is referred to as ‘the hostage’) in order to compel a third party – namely, a state, an international or non-governmental organisation, or a natural or legal person or group of persons – to undertake or abstain from undertaking an act or acts as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage.6

The fate of hostages emerged as a concern following the global attention paid to the sur- vival of victims in the 1970s and 1980s.7 The focus of concern at that time was on issues of killing, physical mutilation and the release or rescue of hostages unharmed. This understand- ing of the fate of hostages has since been advanced with several statistical models.8 While these issues remain relevant, they have become insufficient given fresh dimensions such as discrimination, sexual abuse and conscription of hostages. Hence, the frontier of this debate has been expanded with the adoption of elements of the internationally acceptable humani- tarian standards of treatment that are allocated to prisoners of war (POWs) by the detaining power.9

The internationally acceptable humanitarian standard for handling POWs is codified in the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949). This convention prohibits the killing and physical mutilation of POWs by the detaining power. POWs deserve respect as human beings, and in particular women should not be subjected to sexual abuse. POWs should not be discriminated against based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinion. They should enjoy medical attention when required and are to be evacuated from the battle or danger zone. They should also be well fed, clothed, hygienically maintained and not involved in any forced labour.10

The fate of hostages in any given case can be positive or negative, depending on whether these principles are respected or violated by the captors. The fate of a hostage can be described as positive when the victim is not killed, harmed, sexually abused, exposed to oper- ational dangers, discriminated against on racial, religious and political grounds, or denied access to medical facility when required.11 Armed groups can be assessed on this basis because all parties to conflict (state or non-state actors) are subject to international humani- tarian law.12 Moreover, communication, legitimacy, and public support are strategically essen- tial for a state actor or armed non-state group to achieve its set political objectives in armed conflict.13 In this way, acts of violence against hostages are bound to attract negative

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reporting: this can cause a miscommunication of the intent of the captors, generate public outrage and a decline in support for the organisation, all of which is to the detriment of its political objectives and the development of certain operational capabilities.14

Theatres of conflict in Nigeria

The acts of kidnapping and hostage-taking are widespread in all parts of Nigeria, but not all parts of the country qualify as theatres of conflict. A theatre of conflict is a catchment area for a series of armed campaigns between or among two or more politically-motivated actors. This is the case in the Niger Delta (south-south) region and in the northern region of Nigeria. Hostage-taking first gained prominence as a conflict tactic in Nigeria with the rise of militant movements in the Niger Delta region during the last decade. Over the last six years, the northern region of Nigeria has become another theatre of conflict with a significant number of hostage-taking incidents.

Approximately 11% of all incidents of violence in Nigeria between 1998 and 2014 were per- petrated within the Niger Delta region.15 This region has witnessed the emergence of militant groups such as the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), MEND, the Coalition of Mili- tant Action (COMA), the Niger Delta Resistance Movement (NDRM), the Liberation Movement of the Urhobo People (LIMUP), the Niger Delta Militant Force Squad (NDMFS), and the Niger Delta Liberation Front (NDLF). Few of the militant campaigns in this theatre of conflict cover the whole region; some extend into the Gulf of Guinea, while many remain limited to one or more communities or ethnic groups. Despite the diversity in the scope of campaigns among militants in the region, the universal political ends of the conflict are resource control and environmental justice.16 Against this backdrop, MEND has frequently played the role of an umbrella organisation, which harmonises the operations and strategies of several other militant movements in the region.17

More than 80% of all incidents of violence in the country between 1998 and 2014 were per- petrated within the northern region of Nigeria.18 Boko Haram’s campaign of terror, which began in 2009, was responsible for about 53% of all incidents of violence that were recorded in the region from 1998 to 2014.19 Northern Nigeria has witnessed the rise of Boko Haram, Ansaru, and a sleeper cell of the AQIM network in the Sahel. Boko Haram (the name of which roughly translates to ‘Western education is forbidden’) is officially named Jama’atu Ahlis Suna Lidda’awati Wal Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad) and Ansaru is Jama’atu Ansarul Musilimina fi Biladin Sudan (Defender of Islam in the Land of Black Africa). Although there is some disagreement on the methods and scope of these militant groups, their political objective in northern Nigeria is to spread Islam and establish a caliphate. The campaign of Boko Haram is concentrated in north- eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region.20 Ansaru’s campaign is largely based in northern Nigeria, although the group has a transnational agenda. AQIM’s campaign was established in Algeria but expanded into northern Nigeria through the Maghreb-Sahel expansion of the organisation.21 Boko Haram and Ansaru have permeable organisational structures and oper- ational networks, which are connected with AQIM.22

The south-east and south-west regions of Nigeria accounted for less than 9% of all incidents of violence in the country between 1998 and 2014.23 These regions have witnessed the rise and fall of the Oduaa Peoples’ Congress (OPC) and the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), respectively. One of the reasons for excluding these regions from consideration in this article is the absence of a consistent armed campaign in

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recent times. Moreover, kidnapping has not been a major conflict tactic in these regions. The majority of kidnapping incidents in these regions are perpetrated by economically-motivated bandits, ritualists, fraudsters and baby factories. Against this background, this study focuses on the fate of hostages and survival strategies in the Niger Delta (Case Study 1) and the northern region of Nigeria (Case Study 2).

Case Study 1: the Niger Delta

The militant campaigns in the Niger Delta region are aimed at raising the cost of oil prospect- ing in the region, so as to gain concessions for resource control. The core targets of kidnapping in the region are the personnel of oil companies, government officials and security officers. Over the years, the majority of hostages captured by the Niger Delta militants have been released unharmed in exchange for policy concessions. Security operatives have also recorded several successful rescue missions, although some hostages have been killed during these operations.

Policy concession is responsible for the release of many hostages in this theatre. This was the fate of six oil workers (two German and four Nigerian employees of the Royal Dutch Shell Company) abducted by militants in Warri on 15 June 2005. The hostages were released unharmed three days later in exchange for Shell’s commitment to grant the perpetrators’ request for social infrastructure in the region.24 Similarly, four expatriates – identified as British, Dutch, French and Pakistani nationals – were abducted by the NDPVF in June 2007. The hostages were released unharmed 21 days later, following the release of Asari Dokubo, the imprisoned leader of the NDPVF.25 It is uncertain if this was meant to be a prisoner exchange or an exchange of goodwill.

Ransom is arguably the chief determinant of hostage survival in this theatre, although it is often underreported. This was the case with 19 oil workers, identified as American, British, Bul- garian and Honduran nationals, abducted by MEND on 11 January 2006. The release of the 19 hostages was reported by the militant group as a ‘goodwill gesture to the international com- munity’ and the official story also denied that any ransom was paid. However, the government was later discovered to have paid N100 million (US$770 000) as ransom to free the hostages.26

In October 2013, MEND also released the abducted sister of President Goodluck Jonathan’s aide, Mrs Augusta Douglas-Ayam, in exchange for a N32 million (US$200 000) ransom. The victim’s family denied that any ransom was paid until this was confirmed by the militants.27

There are several other cases where hostages have been exchanged for ransom in this theatre. On 1 June 2007, three Indians working for an Indonesian petrochemical company, Indorama, and a family of five, were abducted in Port Harcourt by MEND. The hostages were released unharmed on 15 June 2007 in exchange for a N40 million (US$339 703) ransom.28 Godwin Igbodo, the monarch of Ogbogoro Community in Bayelsa was exchanged for a ransom of N12,5 million and N150 000-worth of airtime on 27 September 2011, 27 days after his abduction.29 In April 2013, the Bayelsa Police Command paid N 1 million to secure the release of Lucky Ebebi, a police corporal who had been abducted in an attack that had killed 12 other officers.30 The Delta State government also paid N500million to militants in exchange for Ebikeme Clark in April 2014, an incident described by MEND as a stage-managed kidnapping.31

Mediation is another factor that affects hostage survival in this theatre. Ransom and policy concession are often spearheaded by mediation. Notable instances include the role of commu- nity elders in the negotiation of the earlier-cited policy concession granted by Shell to the abductors of its employees in Warri in 2005. Likewise, the intervention of MEND was important

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in negotiating the US$2 million ransom that was paid by Edison Chouest Offshore LLC follow- ing the abduction of two Americans by an unknown pirate group on 23 October 2013.32

Though many variables are often underplayed/underreported, the goodwill of militants is also important to hostage survival in this theatre. On 19 June 2008, some members of MEND attacked Shell’s Bonga oilfield and abducted Jack Stone, the American captain of a supply ship. Stone was reportedly released unconditionally to his employers later the same day by MEND leadership.33 This was similar to the case of nine South Korean Daewoo employ- ees who were abducted in Yenagoa by an unknown militant group on 10 January 2007. The hostages were released unharmed three days later based on the intervention of MEND.34

Since 2009, when the government granted amnesty to the militants in this theatre, MEND’s intervention has been instrumental in securing the release of many hostages abducted by pirates and/or (ex)militants.

There are exceptions to the prevalence of goodwill of the militants and the efficacy of mediation or ransom in this theatre. On 4 November 1999, four police officers were abducted in Bayelsa State by militants who demanded that the government should put an immediate end to the killing of Ijaw people in Lagos. The police officers would have been killed immedi- ately, save for the intervention of Felix Tuodolo, the Ijaw Youth Council President. Notwith- standing, the hostages were killed by their captors on 8 November 1999.35 In another instance, the former deputy governor of Anambra State, Chudi Nwike, was abducted in Edo State and killed with his driver and two messengers by members of LIMUP because his wife was adamant to pay only N5million instead of the N30 million ransom demanded by the kidnappers.36

The fate of hostages can also be determined by the response of the security forces. This was evident in the case of Professor Kamene Okonjo, the mother of the former coordinating min- ister of the economy and minister of finance, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who was abducted on 9 December 2012. In less than five days, the military and police had arrested 67 people in con- nection with the incident.37 This pressure on the abductors, who had previously demanded N1 billion in ransom, forced them to reduce the demand to N200 million. Mrs Okonjo was released by her captors after five days for a ransom of N13 million, paid by her family.38

Rescue missions are another survival strategy for hostages in this theatre. On 21 June 2007, Nigerian troops freed ten hostages barricaded inside an Italian-operated Ogbainbiri oil facility in Bayelsa, killing 12 militants in the process.39 David Ward was abducted by militants on 10 August 2007 and freed by Nigerian troops on 5 October 2007.40 In November 2010, 19 hostages (two Americans, two Indonesians, two French citizens, one Canadian and 12 Niger- ians) abducted by MEND in three different operations were rescued by the Joint Task Force (JTF) from a militant camp operated by Sotonye Kaneji Ikiba, aka Obeys, in Rivers State.41

Rescue missions have assisted many other hostages to escape from captors in this theatre. In August 2012, 28 oil workers were abducted in Cross Rivers State by a militant group ident- ified as the Lactop Marine Force. Although 27 of the hostages were rescued in a joint operation of the JTF commissioned for ‘Operation Pulo Shield’ and the (Nigeria) Eastern Naval Command, one of the hostages was reported to have escaped in the process and his fate remains unknown.42 The mother of the Speaker of the Bayelsa State House of Assembly, Betinah Okunwa Benson, who was abducted on 14 January 2013 also escaped from her captors with the help of a police rescue mission on 21 January 2013.43

Though many hostages have been successfully rescued in this theatre, others have lost their lives in the crossfire between rescue teams and the captors. On 22 November 2006, Nigerian soldiers freed seven hostages abducted by militants earlier the same day, but one hostage

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identified as a British national was killed in the process.44 On 16 May 2009, the military stormed MEND’s camp, rescuing ten hostages (six Filipinos and four Nigerians). However, unconfirmed reports from MEND claim that an eleventh hostage was killed by a stray bullet fired by a member of the rescue team during the operation.45

The maltreatment of hostages by militants has also been recorded in this theatre. Hostages are often kept in unhygienic environments, such as swamps, creeks, islands and forests, which exposes them to mosquitos and illness.46 Incidents of sexual abuse against hostages have also been recorded. In March 2009, militants abducted five women from a passenger boat in Rivers State and took them to their camp, where they were gang-raped and released thereafter.47 In January 2015, militants also raided communities in the Mbo Local Government Area of Awka Ibom State and raped some of their housewives.48

Case Study 2: the northern region of Nigeria

Hostage-taking has become significant in the military campaigns of Ansaru, AQIM and Boko Haram in the northern region of Nigeria and beyond. This theatre of conflict has produced a mixed record on the subject of hostage well-being. There are several cases where hostages have been killed by captors in response to (attempted) rescue missions. Maltreatment of hos- tages by captors is also rampant in the region. On many occasions, survivors have reported diverse forms of physical assault such as flogging and physical mutilation, as well as conscrip- tion, discrimination on religious grounds, sexual abuse and forced marriage as part of their experiences as hostages in this theatre. Nevertheless, many victims have escaped to safety, while others have been released by the insurgents or rescued by security forces.

Ransom and policy concession have occasionally played a role in securing the release of hostages in this theatre. On 19 February 2013, seven French tourists were abducted in Waza Park in the far northern region of Cameroon and brought to north-eastern Nigeria by Boko Haram. These hostages were released unharmed on 19 April 2013 in exchange for a ransom of US$3,15 million.49 Also in Cameroon, Boko Haram released 27 hostages (including the Kolofata chief, cleric and mayor Seini Boukar, the wife of Cameroon deputy prime minister Amadou Ali and 10 Chinese expatriates) in exchange for approximately US$600 000 as ransom and 30 Boko Haram prisoners (terrorists) in October 2014.50 Equally, some Nigerian govern- ment officials and their relatives were reportedly abducted in exchange for ransoms of between US$10 000 and US$300 000 in 2013.51

The impact of ransom and policy concession on the fate of hostages in this theatre has been undermined by the tough stance of the Nigerian government and her international partners predicated on a policy of ‘no ransom nor concession’. For example, on 5 December 2011, Ansaru abducted Briton Chris McManus and Italian Franco Lamolinara in Kebbi State. The British and Nigerian governments refused the demand of £1 million as ransom for McManus and opted for a rescue mission on 8 March 2012.52 This was similar to the case of Edgar Raupach, a German national abducted in Kano by AQIM on 26 January 2012 who was ransomed for the release of Filiz Gelowicz from a German prison.53 The German government did not respond to this demand until the Nigerian security forces opted for a rescue mission on 31 May 2012. Likewise, Boko Haram abducted 276 female students from a government sec- ondary school in Chibok, Borno State on 14 April 2014. Despite global pressure to secure the release of the girls, the government of Nigeria has rejected the demand for a prisoner swap by the insurgents.

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Beyond ransom and policy concession, the insurgent groups in this theatre are also inter- ested in Islamic propagation and the conversion of non-Muslim captives. On several occasions, Boko Haram has released abducted Christian women and girls as soon as they agreed to convert to Islam.54 Many survivors have reported that they were flogged daily by the insur- gents to renounce their religion and embrace Islam.55

Some hostages have been released based on the goodwill of their captors. This was the fate of 20-year-old Monica Sunday and her son.56 In January 2015, Boko Haram also released 192 of the 218 hostages abducted from Katarko community, Yobe State two weeks after they were taken.57 Moreover, Boko Haram has also reportedly released at least five hostages to seek better medical attention.58

Hostages in this theatre have frequently resorted to self-help to escape from their abduc- tors. The 63-year-old Frenchman Francis Collomp escaped from Ansaru in November 2013, 11 months after he was captured.59 Likewise, 53 of the Chibok schoolgirls who were abducted by Boko Haram in April 2014 have escaped. Some of them jumped out of their abductors’ vehicles while others escaped from the Sambisa Forest where over 200 others are still being kept.60 Recent testimonies of survivors have shown that virtually all the hostages held in Sambisa forest by Boko Haram planned to escape; while many executed their plan, few ever succeeded.

It is obvious that Boko Haram does not take the escape of its captives lightly. Faked or real sickness and running away from captors are common strategies. Because of this, several hos- tages have been denied the chance to seek medical assistance. This includes some of the Chibok girls, whose illnesses were even made known to the public.61 Boko Haram is reported to have stoned several hostages to prevent them from gaining their freedom in the wake of the military offensive of April/May 2015.62 Many runaway hostages have been killed by land- mines planted by the insurgents in the Sambisa forest. The testimonies of survivors also reveal that the camps in the Sambisa forest where they were kept are heavily fortified and guarded against any escape attempts.63

Military offensives have yielded some success in rescuing hostages in this theatre. In 2015, a military offensive rescued no fewer than 1 000 hostages held in Sambisa forest by Boko Haram. However, the Nigerian government has been criticised for not rescuing the Chibok schoolgirls. Prior to the recent offensive, many rescue missions in this theatre failed because the captors would rather kill the hostages than allow them to escape. On 8 March 2012, McManus and Lamolinara were summarily executed by their captors (Ansaru) as soon as the rescue team (a joint force of British Special Forces and Nigeria’s Department of State Service, the DSS) arrived on the scene.64 This was similar to the fate of Raupach, who was killed by his captors (AQIM) during a JTF rescue attempt.65

The killing of hostages by captors is not limited to rescue missions or escape attempts. This was the fate of seven expatriates, identified as British, Greek, Italian and Lebanese nationals, abducted in Bauchi State by Ansaru in February 2013. The hostages were killed by their captors on the basis that Britain and Nigeria were suspected to be planning a rescue mission.66 Equally, Boko Haram shot down a Nigerian Air Force (NAF) jet and captured its pilot on 11 September 2014. The pilot was beheaded by his captors and the video posted online to deter the NAF’s campaign.67

In response to the pressure from military offensives that result in the rescue of several hos- tages, the insurgents have resorted to evacuating some hostages from the danger zone in order to lessen the chances of rescue. Boko Haram evacuated some of the Chibok girls from Gwoza in the wake of a military offensive to recapture the town in March 2015.68

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Boko Haram has frustrated a series of attempts to rescue the remaining 219 Chibok girls since April 2014 by relocating them from one camp to another in Nigeria and beyond.69 Some of the survivors rescued from the Sambisa forest have reported attempts by the insurgents to relo- cate them to safe zones prior to a military invasion.70 Despite this, several hostages have escaped by exploiting the opportunity provided by military offensives against the insurgents. This was the case on 29 October 2014, when Boko Haram overran Mubi in a brutal attack that involved massacre and hostage-taking. One of the survivors recalled that they were able to escape from captivity in Mubi as a result of the bombing of their location by the NAF, which forced both captors and hostages alike to run for their lives.71 Equally, the military offen- sive from February to May 2015 assisted some hostages in escaping from the Sambisa forest, although many others lost their lives to landmines.

There are several records of hostage maltreatment in this theatre. The fate of women and young girls abducted by Boko Haram has included sexual abuse and forced marriage. Some of the Chibok girls were forced into marriage with the insurgents for a nominal bride price of US $12.72 Boko Haram is reported to have given partial freedom to some abducted Christian women and young girls under the supervision of the husband given to them by the insur- gents.73 Among the records of sexual violence is the case of the pregnant 20-year-old Susan Ishaya, one of the abducted Chibok schoolgirls who escaped from Boko Haram in September 2014.74 As of May 2015, no fewer than 200 hostages rescued from Boko Haram have been confirmed to be pregnant.75

Malnutrition and disease are common among the survivors of captivity in this theatre. The regional efforts against Boko Haram have cut the insurgents off from some supplies, including food, finance and ammunition. Consequently, several hostages kept in the forest have been without food for weeks, and have fallen sick or died. Some survivors recalled being fed with dry ground corn by the insurgents. Of the 260 women and children rescued on 2 May 2015, 10 died of starvation on their way back to safety, while 19 others were taken to hospital for special treatment because they were in a critical condition.76 On a similar note, Monica Sunday also lost her son Abraham John to starvation during the several days’ journey to escape from the forest to safety.77

Forced labour and the conscription of hostages into insurgent campaigns is a common experience in this theatre. In April 2015, Chadian troops rescued 43 children aged 12 years and over, identified as Chadian nationals, who were abducted and conscripted by Boko Haram to fight in Nigeria.78 Several other hostages have served Boko Haram as armour- bearers, transporters or porters, cameramen and traps (whereby women and young girls are used to lure security personnel and vigilantes into the insurgents’ den).79 The ascription of one form of role or another to captives exposes hostages to the inherent dangers of the cam- paign. It is also evident from the testimony of survivors that abducted women and girls are forced to cook for the insurgents, clean the camps and perform other domestic functions.80

Observations and discussion

The fates of hostages vary from one case to another, depending on the relationship between the victims and the captors, and the responses of the state and other stakeholders. However, there is a certain consistency in hostage–captor relations and the responses of the state and other stakeholders across time and space.81 Consequently, there are noticeable similarities in both case studies under review. The tendency for hostages to be killed, mutilated, sexually abused, denied access to medical care when required, exposed to the dangers of operations,

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and discriminated against on racial, religious and political grounds are common to the two theatres. Likewise, kidnappers in the two theatres tend to preserve the lives of hostages and release them unharmed if ransom or policy concessions can be negotiated or there is mili- tant goodwill, while hostages also return either through the completion of successful rescue missions or through effecting self-devised escape plans. Despite these commonalities, there are noticeable variations between the two case studies.

The fates of hostages, their survival strategies and the efficacy of the state response in the two case studies were influenced by several factors. The conflict terrain is an important factor in this consideration. Several creeks, swamps and forests provide the militants and their cap- tives with good hideouts in Case Study 1. Although Case Study 2 is characterised by grassland, its vast landmass, the Sambisa Forest and the porous borders across the Sahel also provide the insurgents with good hideouts. This varied terrain offers different opportunities and challenges for both the rebels and the state, and informs their strategies, which in turn affect the fates of hostages. In view of this, it seems easier for hostages to escape in desert and grasslands than in riverine areas, swamp forests and creeks. This suggests that militants may have needed to increase the risks for hostages that chose to attempt to escape in Case Study 2 over what was necessary in Case Study 1. The terrain is also significant for rescue missions, favouring the role of the navy in Case Study 1 and the army in Case Study 2; air power cannot be excluded from either of the theatres.

Beyond the general geographical variations, there are some specific factors that affect the fates of hostages, related to the behavioural traits of stakeholders in each of the case studies. The immediate and long-term reasons for hostage-taking in each of the case studies cannot be overlooked. The prevailing objectives of the militants in Case Study 1 are to use hostages to generate attention and exchange victims for ransom, working towards the long-term goal of gaining more control over the region’s resources. These objectives generally constitute little or no threat to the hostages; therefore, atrocities against hostages are not ideologically significant or defendable in this theatre.

Given the importance of ransom in the fate of hostages in Case Study 1, the line between greed and grievance is not easy to define; unknown groups can and do commit acts of mili- tancy while criminals can be branded as militants. It is in these cases that hostages can become endangered. Several unknown or unnamed militant groups have been recorded as having raped and killed hostages in this theatre. For example, LIMUP is a group in transition from being a gang to a post-amnesty militant group that desires to benefit from amnesty. The killing of the former deputy governor of Anambra State and his aides by a LIMUP cell in Benin, according to some captured members of the group, was not acceptable to their leader in Port Harcourt.82 Although the hostage-handling behaviours of MEND and its associ- ated groups are below the internationally accepted humanitarian standards, they do reflect some sense of responsibility. These militants find little or no glory in the death of hostages, which they often present soberly and blame on rescue teams.

The militant groups in Case Study 2 cannot use ransom or policy concessions as their pre- vailing objectives because of the tough stance taken by Nigeria and her partners. Against this background, the demand for the constant reinforcement of Boko Haram’s human and material resources to enhance their insurgents’ capabilities and maintain their occupied territory become significant considerations. This is in line with fulfilling the long-term objective of creat- ing an Islamic state. But for Ansaru and AQIM, the fate of hostages is connected to the global jihad. In this way, Ansaru was systematic in the abduction and killing of seven expatriates, which it justified as a punishment for the ills of the Western nations afflicting the Arab

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world.83 This suggests that atrocities committed against hostages are ideologically significant and defendable in this theatre. The common justifications in this case are that hostages may be abducted for receiving Western education and being a Christian or Western citizen, con- scripted to fight in a holy war, discriminated against and flogged on a religious basis to be ‘saved’, raped as sex slaves or jizya so that they may contribute their quotas to the caliphate, or killed for some related reasons.84

Mediation, ransom and policy concessions have played a greater role in the fates of the hos- tages in Case Study 1 than in Case Study 2. Unlike what is possible in Case Study 1, the militants in Case Study 2 have largely alienated their natural constituency (northern Muslims) and potential mediators with their extreme ideology and the level of terror directed against the civilian population in the region. For the Nigerian government and its international partners, the long-term objective of the militant groups in Case Study 2 cannot be met with negotiation. While the militants in Case Study 1 seek change in national policy on resource control and environmentalism, those in Case Study 2 want to spread their own radical understanding of Islam and create an Islamic caliphate against the territorial integrity of Nigeria and her neighbours.

The payments of ransom and policy concessions are strategically related to the demand for the control of resources in oil-producing regions. Similar policy measures in Case Study 2 may not address any grievances, but could improve the capabilities of the militants to intensify their campaigns of terror. Nevertheless, there would be more likelihood of a positive outcome for hostages in Case Study 2 given a different bargaining stance. It is also important to think of what the fates of hostages in Case Study 1 might have been if the government had implemented the ‘no ransom or concession’ policy uniformly. The common assumption is that the kidnap business would have folded when made unprofitable. However, one of the lessons that can be learned from Case Study 2 is that the perpetrators may have become more violent given such a context.

Hostages are more likely to regain their freedom unharmed in Case Study 1 than in Case Study 2. Hostages are often freed in Case Study 1 when ransom or policy concessions are agreed upon and/or granted, rescue missions are staged, or the militants are willing to release the hostage(s) unconditionally. However, the actors in Case Study 2 are largely zero- sum: the government will not agree to, or allow for, ransom or policy concessions, and the mili- tants will not easily allow any rescue attempt to prove successful. Hostages are more likely to remain in captivity in this theatre as long as there is no substantial change in the policy stance of the government, especially in terms of relatives of the captives, military offensives, self-help escapes and the goodwill of the abductors. Hostages often win militants’ goodwill by renoun- cing their (ir)religion and embracing Islam, and sometimes through contracting severe illness, in the case of Boko Haram.

Hostage rescue missions are more likely to be successful in Case Study 1 than in Case Study 2. While the militants in Case Study 1 may meet rescue teams with resistance, they are less likely to act in zero-sum ways such as executing hostages like their counterparts in Case Study 2. Virtually all the rescue missions in Case Study 2 have failed because the militants are zero-sum. As a result, the security operatives face the dilemma of attempting to rescue the hostages alive with a high chance that the insurgents will kill them at the first sign of a rescue attempt. This is the basis of the recent reluctance to stage rescue missions in Case Study 2. A comprehensive campaign is more appropriate than a special rescue mission in this case, although it makes the hostages more vulnerable to violence during the course of operations.

202 S. OYEWOLE

Conclusion

In response to the growing concern for the fate of hostages captured by insurgent groups in Nigeria, this article considers the (mal)treatment that victims experience in the country’s thea- tres of conflict, namely, the Niger Delta and the northern regions. On the one hand, this study examines the tendency for hostages to be killed, mutilated, sexually abused, denied access to medical care when required, exposed to the dangers of operations, and discriminated against on racial, religious and political grounds in the two theatres. On the other hand, it examines the circumstances under which the lives of hostages are preserved and the circumstances under which they return unharmed. This tendency is observed in terms of the prospects and chal- lenges for negotiated ransom payments and policy concessions, militant goodwill and suc- cessful rescue missions or self-devised escape.

Against this background, the degree of efficacy of Nigeria’s policy responses, together with the survival strategies of hostages in each of the theatres of conflict examined, was also con- sidered. As the analysis reveals, there are notable convergences and divergences in the form and character of the fates of hostages, the survival strategies employed and the state responses in the two empirical case studies.

Notes

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206 S. OYEWOLE

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank J. Shola Omotola, Lere Amusan, Emmanuel Durosinmi, the anonymous reviewers and the editorial team of African Security Review for their valuable advice and comments.

Notes on Contributor

Samuel Oyewole is currently studying for his Masters in Political Science at the University of Ilorin, Nigeria ([email protected])

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