Exceptional Proff 520

Lawrence R. Jacobs is Walter F. and

Joan Mondale Chair for Political Studies

and director of the Center for the Study

of Politics and Governance in the Hubert

H. Humphrey School and Department

of Political Science at the University of

Minnesota. He has coauthored or coedited

14 books and numerous articles for

scholarly and popular outlets on health

policy, public opinion and elections, the

U.S. presidency, and American political

development.

E-mail: [email protected]

480 Public Administration Review • July | August 2014

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 74, Iss. 4, pp. 480–494. © 2014 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.12170.

Lawrence R. Jacobs University of Minnesota

Th e emerging fi eld of public values helpfully focuses on the norms and government policies that serve the public interest, but its analysis neglects the barriers to actually creating public value in contemporary America. Chief among these barriers are contending strains of public beliefs and opinions, the disproportionate infl uence of affl uent individuals and business and professional associations, as well as governing structures predisposed toward inaction and drift. Th is article contrasts the expectations of the public values fi eld with research on American politics to identify barriers to advancing the public interest under current conditions. Although public values scholars off er an analysis of American public life that is inadequate, they do raise challenging questions about how a public-regarding agenda can be “designed in” to politics and policy. Th e article concludes by suggest- ing feasible reforms to improve the conditions for pursu- ing the public interest.

The onset of World War I and the failed eff orts to end it on terms that would head off the resumption of war in Europe fed skepti- cism about the future of democracy and the making of sensible policy that would advance the enduring public interest. Walter Lippmann crystallized these doubts in the United States in a stinging critique that attributed democracy’s ills to distracted and poorly informed citizens. Inclusive processes for making policy and running a government, he argued, were doomed because they relied on a “phantom public”: the preoccupation of most individuals with their private lives seduced them into becoming “deaf spectator[s] in the back row [of public aff airs]” who were “necessarily ignorant, usually irrelevant, and often meddlesome” (Lippmann 1925, 13, 52–53). Instead, Lippmann pinned the hopes of eff ective gov- ernment on technocratic elites—the small number of “individuals directly concerned” with the substance of policy issues who are equipped to take “executive action” to “initiate, … administer, [and] … settle” remedies and who are “subject[ed] to the least pos- sible interference from ignorant and meddlesome outsiders” (198–99).

John Dewey, in Th e Public and Its Problems (1927), rebutted Lippmann by shifting the onus for eff ec- tive democratic governance from citizens to elites and to the circumstances and conditions of public life. Dewey partly accepted Lippmann’s critique that citizens, at times, displayed uneven knowledge and awareness of public aff airs, but Dewey attributed these limits in citizen performance to the systems of poli- tics, communications, and information dissemination created by elites. What citizens knew and did was, in Dewey’s account, “a function of association and com- munication” (158). Th e problem facing democratic governance lay with the “the triviality and ‘sensational’ quality of so much of what passes as news [in the form of ] … crime, accident, family rows, personal clashes and confl icts … [that] supply the element of shock” (180). Dewey also indicted antiquated political institutions: American government and politics, he argued, invite a “schizophrenia between actual practice and [its] traditional machinery”; leave individuals feeling “apathy, neglect, and contempt,” “even if they cannot make their feeling articulate”; and expose Americans to orchestrated publicity that eff ectively enlists the “emotional partisanship of the masses” (31, 111, 134–35, 169). While Lippmann sought salvation in technocratic governing that diminished democratic practices, Dewey promoted reforms of public life to create “conditions” that would foster informed and engaged citizens, including “associated or joint activ- ity,” public education in which citizenship is “inter- woven,” and newly responsive political institutions (146, 149).

Dewey’s energetic challenge to Lippmann heralded an inclusive notion of public value as encompassing both an informed citizenry’s values and public policy and government operations that engage citizens and generate the conditions for vibrant communities. Recent scholarship about the “public value” generated by government and the “public values” of an inclu- sive and participatory community revive Dewey’s thinking but nonetheless lack Dewey’s sensitivities to the conditions of public beliefs and opinion and the

Th e Contested Politics of Public Value

The Contested Politics of Public Value 481

the entrepreneurship of government managers who “orchestrate the processes of public policy development often in partnership with other actors and stakeholders” (Moore 1995, 71; Moore and Benington 2011). Moore scripts public managers with the respon- sibility for divining a path through the “strategic triangle” toward public value that is also administratively feasible and wins public and government approval.

Th ese distinct variants share a focus on common public goods and together highlight three dimensions of a “public-regarding” polity. Th e fi rst concerns the core “perceptions and opinions” of citizens toward government and their responsibilities, as detected through public opinion research and, when available, other forms of data. Citizen attitudes are treated by Bozeman as largely exogenous to the information system and policy process: individuals in a com- munity come to agree on a set of normative values regarding citizen responsibilities and obligations and government functions. Th e second treats public policy as socially benefi cent—an instrument for advancing the public interest. Th e third spotlights government and the offi cials running it as worker bees serving the broader com- munity by assembling the necessary administrative capacity and authority.

Th e “public-regarding” agenda that Bozeman and Moore pioneer contributes to identifying standards that challenge central features of contemporary American society and governance. Indeed, this contribution reveals its limitation—the failure to account for the persistent neglect of the public interest in American public life. Both Bozeman and Moore tend to treat the “value” that govern- ment produces and the “values” that it embodies as disconnected from the uneven distribution of resources that permit a relative few to exercise disproportionate political infl uence on public beliefs, public policy, and government operations. Public-regarding developments are conceived, in their analysis, as volitional, a func- tion of “individuals [choosing] … to pursue the good and right, and … to make oneself of use in creating public value” (Moore and Benington 2011, 274). Th is analysis, though, neglects the conditions and structures that are largely beyond the control of individuals and yet shape the context within which choice occurs to the advantage of the better organized. Even Moore’s acknowledg- ment of a “strategic triangle” is generic and formulaic, devoid of a rigorous and concrete understanding of the scope and nature of constraining structures.

A related blind spot is the confl ict among contending interests. Bozeman imagines a “consensus” on the fault lines of American politics—tax and government transfers. Moore erects a policy process driven by cognition and a transcendent embrace of “good” that is detached from the deep-seated contemporary disputes over partisanship, public philosophy, and interests. Not long after the Tea Party propelled Republicans to large election wins in 2010, Moore and a coauthor reported that “the political attack on government has abated” and claimed that the fi nancial crisis “made it abundantly clear to many that unbridled market forces are unable on their own to produce the kind of prosperity, civility, and social justice that human beings want for themselves, their communities and their children. We know that we need government” (Moore and Benington 2011, 257; emphasis added). Th e 2012 elections, along with the subsequent intense disputes in Washington over fi scal policy,

barriers to public policy and government serving the broad public interest.

Dewey’s worries about the barriers to public life have been vigor- ously researched and largely confi rmed by several generations of political scientists, who stress the pervasive and disproportion- ate infl uence of the better organized and affl uent and the confl ict over defi ning the terms of public life. In particular, these bodies of research suggest that the public values fi eld neglects three specifi c barriers to creating a public-regarding community: (1) there are multiple and competing strains of public beliefs and opinions that political leaders and organized groups attempt to activate for their own advantage; (2) organized groups representing business, profes- sional associations, and the affl uent exert outsized infl uence on pub- lic policy; and (3) the fragmented design of the U.S. government discourages coherent programmatic action to advance broad public interests. Th e competition to advance particular values and interests translates into confl ict over the very defi nition of “public value” as the better positioned seek to shape it to serve their particular inter- est; even the absence of confl ict may refl ect the uneven exercise of power to mold the “public interest” rather than authentic agreement among diverse interests.

Th is article critically engages the “public value(s)” fi eld by situating it within the context of the struggle for political power and insti- tutional position. It begins by reviewing the fi eld and identifying its contributions and limitations. Th e next section scrutinizes the claims of “public value(s)” scholars by drawing on political science research on public beliefs and opinion, policy making, and the proc- ess of governing. While the empirical foundation of the public value fi eld is tenuous, it does raise challenging questions about the condi- tions that would be necessary to create opportunities for encourag- ing public values and value-creating policies that better serve the public interest.

Researching Public Value “Public value” scholarship has been propelled by two distinct views. One is a normative perspective that specifi es the “public values” that ought to defi ne government responsibility and the rights and obligations of citizens. Th e pioneer of the normative account, Barry Bozeman, traces “society’s ‘public values’ … [to the] normative consensus about … [citizen rights and obligations and] the princi- ples on which governments and policies should be based” (2012, 7; emphasis added; see also Bozeman 2002, 2007). Th e anchor is the acceptance by “citizens [of ] agreed upon rights, duties, obliga- tions and privileges.” Bozeman turns to survey research—along with other data—to identify “perceptions and opinions” that defi ne this consensus of society values (2012, 2, 22).

A second account shifts from normative values to concrete govern- ment policies that produce “public value” to advance the public interest. Th e leader of the “public value” account, Mark Moore, presents a notion of public policy as socially benefi cent—a “value- creating enterprise that helps create the conditions for economic prosperity, civility in social relationships, and the advancement of justice” (Moore and Benington 2011, 257). Whereas Bozeman traces the origins of “public values” to societal consensus, Moore attributes the production of public value to “individuals [who choose] … to pursue the good and right” and, specifi cally, to

482 Public Administration Review • July | August 2014

“relatively effi cient system for reinforcing agreement, encouraging moderation, and maintaining social peace” (1956, 151).

By the end of the twentieth century, Dahl’s optimism about American democracy and the prospect for responsiveness to diverse publics had dimmed in light of the increasing concentration of economic resources and political infl uence among a smaller set of affl uent individuals and organized groups (Dahl 1985, 1989). Dahl detected erosion of political equality as economic inequality wid- ened; by the twenty-fi rst century, the richest one-fi fth of the country received 48 percent of family income, and the incomes of the richest 1 percent rose by 11.2 percent from 2009 to 2011, while the rest of America saw its income decline by 0.4 percent in the aftermath of the Great Recession (Saez 2013). Th e confl ict among comparably matched organized groups that Dahl fl agged as the cornerstone of a responsive democracy after World War II had transformed under the conditions of rising economic inequality to equip the most affl uent with the disproportionate capacity to impact public attitudes, public policy, and government operations to advance their self-interest.

Dahl’s critical analysis of American politics has been extended by substantial bodies of research in political science, which challenge three core claims by Bozeman and Moore. One fi eld of research fi nds that public beliefs rarely, if ever, form one coherent body of shared values (as Bozeman suggests) but rather consist of multiple and competing strains that, under certain conditions, are suscep- tible to framing by well-organized and funded groups and to the media’s coverage of their maneuvering. A second body of research demonstrates that organized groups disproportionately infl uence public policy to serve narrow rather than broad collective interests. Th e third fi eld fi nds that the tripartite structure of the national government and its competitive sharing of power with state and local governments fragments and dissipates public authority in ways that favor the already organized and often hamstrings even the most public-spirited civil servant. We consider each of these bodies of research and their relevance to public value(s) research.

The Fight for Public Discourse and Attitudes Survey research and political psychology demonstrate that pub- lic beliefs and attitudes are endogenous to the process of making policy and governing and to the existing information system, which encompasses traditional and new media (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). By contrast, Bozeman treats public beliefs as emerging exogenously from society, while Moore suggests that individuals reach independ- ent judgments that are, in eff ect, detached from the political and policy processes.

Organized groups and political leaders have developed sophisticated strategies to infl u- ence public opinion, often making it diffi cult for citizens to reach independent judgments by eff ectively withdrawing into a kind of cloistered jury room to form attitudes and beliefs. Research in political psychology iden- tifi es a potent mechanism called “framing,” in which political elites carefully design the wording or phrasing of their public pres- entations in order to infl uence individuals. Whether individuals are susceptible to these

health reform, and government fi nance (including the government shutdown and the raising of the debt ceiling), are but the latest confi rmations of the three-decade widening of partisan polarization (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Moore and Benington’s claim that “we know we need government” misunderstands the deep divide in America over what constitutes the “public” sphere and its relationship with private life. It also illustrates the trap set by Moore’s volitional and ahistorical notion of a “strategic triangle”: public offi cials are scripted either to serve as guardians of the public good by divining an imagined path to reconciliation amid deep- seated divisions or to accede to political division and deadlock and, at times, designed administrative feebleness.

While Bozeman and Moore treat “the public interest” as self-evident and embraced by people of goodwill, the reality is that it is a target of confl ict—dueling groups seek to shape its defi nition to legitimize their particular interests (Sanders 1997; Stone 2012). A serious investigation of “public-regarding” values and activities requires attention to confl ict and the asymmetrical exercise of power. Th e next section scrutinizes Bozeman’s and Moore’s portrayals of public beliefs, public policy, and government operations in light of existing political science research on American politics.

The Politics of the Organized Research by Robert Dahl, a seminal fi gure in the study of American politics since World War II, traces the increasingly concentrated political infl uence of a small number of affl uent individuals and organized groups. In the 1950s and 1960s, Dahl’s analysis cham- pioned the open, responsive, and pluralistic nature of American politics. Th ere was, according to Dahl, a “high probability that any active and legitimate group will make itself heard eff ectively at some stage in the process of decision” (1956, 151). Even this optimistic view, though, challenged the public-regarding accounts: it prima- rily traced government operations and decisions to confl ict among interested groups as opposed to the normative values and the search for benefi cent policies suggested by Bozeman and Moore. Th e splin- tering of America by economic, regional, and religious diff erences produced, according to Dahl, “government by minorities” because of the “size, number, and variety of minorities whose preferences must be taken into account by leaders” (1956, 132). Although economic and other resources advantaged some, Dahl detected a balancing eff ect from the confl ict and insisted that the advantages were “dis- persed”—the rich enjoyed greater income, but other interests such as labor enjoyed an edge in using its large membership to organize voters, while still other groups (such as religious and community groups) were better able to disseminate information to build public awareness or lobby in government. “[A]n individual or group at a disadvantage with respect to one resource,” Dahl observed, “may compensate for his handicap by exploiting his [or her] superior access to a diff erent resource” (1961, 83). With resources multiple and dispersed, policy resulted from the counter- vailing competition among organized groups and government served as a kind of neutral cash register tallying the continual bargaining and negotiations. An idealized “public inter- est” was not attainable, but America’s postwar pluralistic society and policy process was a

Organized groups and political leaders have developed sophis- ticated strategies to infl uence public opinion, often making it diffi cult for citizens to reach

independent judgments by eff ectively withdrawing into a kind of cloistered jury room to

form attitudes and beliefs.

The Contested Politics of Public Value 483

Bozeman evokes; they do not constitute a “consensus,” but they are widely embraced.

Broadly shared agreement over specifi c government programs that provide opportunity and social protection extends to the more contentious issue of accepting the need for taxation (and even increased taxation to pay for the programs). Figure 1 shows that six out of 10 or more Republicans and the affl uent join with Americans as a whole to support both spending to create “really good public schools” and devoting their taxes to make college aff ordable and pay for early childhood education. Th ere is nearly as much support for paying “more taxes” for funding of kindergarten and nursery school.

Broad, consistent, and strong public agreement is especially evident for education but extends beyond it to health care. Figure 2 reveals large and widespread support for government programs to cover children and for creating a government responsibility to establish universal health insurance coverage—upwards of three-quarters of Republicans and the affl uent favor these steps. As striking is the majority support among these groups for using “your tax dollars” to achieve these results; there is even plurality support for increas- ing taxes to establish universal coverage. Of course, the contentious debate over the Patient Protection and Aff ordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 ate into this broad and strong support—illustrating the pervasive negative impact of framing on views of particular propos- als, as we discuss later.

crafted communications depends on the “persuasive strength” of the frames to saturate the information system, the presence of coun- terframes from competing sets of political elites and well-resourced groups, and media coverage of the negative messages (Druckman 2004; Jacobs and Mettler 2011). We explore two long-standing components of American beliefs and attitudes about the rights and obligations of citizens and the government—operational liberalism and philosophical conservatism—and their susceptibility to dueling frames.

Operational liberalism. Research dating back more than half a century has identifi ed strong, broad, and stable public support for specifi c government programs that create opportunities and mitigate tangible threats to the normal operations of our everyday lives (Free and Cantril 1967). In Class War? What Americans Really Think about Economic Inequality (2009), Benjamin Page and I found large majorities of Americans favoring—often for a number of years across presidential administrations—tangible government initiatives to expand opportunities for education and job training and to protect individuals against the threat of illness and poverty, a pattern that we described as “operational liberalism.” What was particularly striking is that these core beliefs and opinions were shared not only by the expected sources of support (Democrats and those most likely to benefi t in middle- and lower-income groups) but also by Republicans and the more affl uent. The operational liberal strand of public attitudes closely resembles the public-regarding attitudes that

Source: Page and Jacobs (2009). Inequality Survey, July 2007.

Figure 1 Broad Public Agreement to Support Education

Spending tax money to provide a college education for those who can't afford it is a good idea.

Favor own tax dollars being used to help pay for… early childhood education in Kindergarten and

nursery school.

Willing to pay more taxes for early childhood education in kindergarten and nursery school.

Government should spend whatever is necessary to ensure that all children have really good public

schools they can go to.

High-income Americans Republicans All Americans

64%

59%

57%

57%

70%

81%

87%

74%

80%

69%

82%

83%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

484 Public Administration Review • July | August 2014

that address tangible barriers to opportunity and economic security as opposed to cutting government spending and taxation, even when they are directly paired with proposals to cut spending and taxes. Polls during the fi rst dozen years of the twenty-fi rst century show a general—though not uniform—pattern of greater public support for spending more on education, health care, and infrastructure at

the cost of higher taxes on business and the affl uent than for cutting taxes and reducing government spending every year.

In short, even in an era marked by viru- lent hostility toward taxes and government programs, majorities of Americans from across the partisan and income spectrums support tangible government programs that are framed as addressing concrete and specifi c challenges. While these public attitudes reveal authentic preferences, they are only a starting point in understanding the Americans’ beliefs

and their evaluations of specifi c proposals during contentious debates.

Philosophical conservatism. While Bozeman and Moore tend to present somewhat monolithic portrayals of public perceptions and

Th e phrasing of survey questions can infl uence results in certain situations. For instance, the public is more supportive of provid- ing “assistance to the poor” than “welfare,” which, after decades of harsh criticism, is associated with dependency and program inef- fectiveness (Page and Shapiro 1992; Shapiro, Weaver, and Jacobs 1996). While the word “welfare” is stigmatized, the public supports concrete eff orts to aid the poor. In addition, the public’s enduring beliefs and attitudes tend to be stable over time, including those on aid to the poor (Page and Shapiro 1992). Th e earlier fi nding of public support for government intervention to establish univer- sal health insurance, even when it requires increased taxes, is not uncommon and has been consistently found with regard to Social Security and education. For instance, 61 percent indicated in an August 2011 NBC/ Wall Street Journal poll that they personally would be “very” or “somewhat” willing to pay higher federal taxes to improve the country’s public schools. In a tougher test of the robustness of this pattern, survey questions that explicitly off er the choice of a conservative fi scal alternative continue to fi nd Americans tilting toward operational liberalism—support for specifi c government programs such as education and health care

Willing to pay more taxes in order to provide health coverage to everyone.

Favor expanding [a government program that provides health insurance for some children] to

include all uninsured children.

It is the responsibility of the federal government to make sure that all Americans have health care

coverage.

Favor your tax dollars being used to help pay for providing health coverage for everyone.

High-income Americans Republicans All Americans

58%

44%

55%

54%

49%

55%

82%

73%

70%

75%

78%

65%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

Source: Page and Jacobs (2009). Inequality Survey, July 2007.

Figure 2 Broad Public Willingness to Pay More Taxes

Even in an era marked by virulent hostility toward taxes

and government programs, majorities of Americans from

across the partisan and income spectrums support tangible

government programs that are framed as addressing concrete

and specifi c challenges.

The Contested Politics of Public Value 485

depends on free enterprise and government protections of private property.

When considering their abstract philosophical orientations, Americans continued to tilt conservative, even as the Great Recession struck and Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama instituted government interventions to rescue the fi nancial system and stabilize employment from spiraling into Depression- like depths. When not presented with specifi c programs, Americans favored smaller government with fewer services instead of larger government with more services during the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century. Figure 4 shows that this conservative orienta- tion reached its widest margin as the fi nancial crisis struck.

By more consistently larger margins, Americans reported prefer- ring—according to fi gure 5—to reduce government services rather

opinions, decades of survey research reveal multiple and competing patterns of attitudes. The public’s embrace of concrete government initiatives to widen opportunity and social protection sits uneasily alongside philosophical discomfort with government—a pattern of entrenched beliefs on which conservatives capitalize to counter- frame policy proposals to expand government and infl ame opposition.

Strong and broad support for core conservative precepts of limited government and free markets extends beyond expected sources (Republicans and the affl uent) to perhaps surpris- ing clusters of Americans—Democrats as well as middle- and lower-income people. My research with Benjamin Page, which is presented in fi gure 3, found that six out of 10 or more Democrats and people with low or middle income harbor distrust of gov- ernment for wasting taxpayer money and believe that freedom

78%

63%

76%

70%

75%

65%

74%

59%

65%

75%

64%

72%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

The people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes.

The government must always protect private property.

Our freedom depends on the free enterprise system.

All Americans Democrats

Low-Income Americans Middle-income Americans

Source: Page and Jacobs (2009). Inequality Survey, July 2007.

Figure 3 Broad Public Support for Conservative Principle

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

1/1/01 1/1/02 1/1/03 1/1/04 1/1/05 1/1/06 1/1/07 1/1/08 1/1/09 1/1/10

Smaller Larger

Source: ABC/Washington Post Poll, January 2010. N = 1,083 adults. “Generally speaking, would you say you favor smaller government with fewer services, or larger government with more services?” Options rotated.

Figure 4 Public Prefers Smaller Government and Fewer Services as a General Proposition

0%

11 /1

/2 01

0

1/ 1/

20 11

3/ 1/

20 11

5/ 1/

20 11

7/ 1/

20 11

9/ 1/

20 11

11 /1

/2 01

1

1/ 1/

20 12

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Increasing Taxes Cutting Services

Source: Associated Press-GfK Poll, November 2010, March 2011, August 2011, October 2011, December 2011, February 2012. N = 1,000 adults. “In order to balance the federal budget, which should be the main focus of lawmakers: increasing taxes or cutting govern- ment services?”

Figure 5 Public Support for General Proposition of Cutting Government

486 Public Administration Review • July | August 2014

advocates) who were intensely committed to conservative economic and social goals in the Republican Party and to their liberal alterna- tives in the Democratic Party. Th is split between the parties was reinforced by civil rights legislation that turned much of the South into a GOP stronghold and by the country’s growing racial and ethnic diversity. For candidates running in elections, the rules of the transformed political system are clear: follow the policy goals of party activists and groups, even if that means departing from what national public opinion prefers, or face the near certain prospect of a potent challenge for the party nomination and a drop-off in cam- paign contributions (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Th e result is shown in fi gure 6: the distance between the Democratic and Republican parties in Congress has reached historic levels on par with, or even surpassing, the divide following the Civil War (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).

Contending party leaders and their organized support deploy sophisticated strategies—including poll-honed frames—to move public evaluations of policies, not by changing core beliefs but

instead by selectively activating advanta- geous strains of existing attitudes. Individuals process the competing frames using a process described by social psychologists as “motivated reasoning” rather than cognitively processing facts and relying on logic to form judgments, and the contending elite messages trigger indi- viduals to access from memory their existing set of beliefs and attitudes (Taber and Lodge 2006). Th e eff ectiveness of partisan framing has increased dramatically over the past four decades as private polling has been commis-

sioned to identify the words, arguments, and symbols that reliably connect with existing public beliefs. Th is pattern fl ips the pandering

than increase taxes as the Obama administration attempted to stimulate the economy and prevent sharper job losses and fi nancial turmoil. Exit polls during the 2012 elections found that 51 percent of voters believed that government was doing too many things better left to business and individuals; only 43 percent supported government doing more to solve problems. Th ese conservative views appear to be shared across party and income lines.

Activated unease. The operational liberal strand of public attitudes that Bozeman highlights not only exists alongside a competing set of conservative beliefs but also is challenged quite effectively by political leaders and organized groups who are intensely motivated to activate antistate views. These groups fashion counterframes in order to fuel opposition to government action—a process conveyed to the country through an increasingly fragmented information system of traditional media, cable news, and a sea of online options.

One of most signifi cant oversights by Bozeman and Moore is the origins and depth of the polarization between the political parties and their organized supporters. Prior to the 1970s, ideology trumped party on a regular basis; for instance, a bipartisan conservative coalition steadfastly supported racial segrega- tion. Th e transformation of American politics since the 1970s, however, has sorted voters and lawmakers into party blocs and prevented the formation of a “normative consensus”— even in areas of previous agreement (such as maintaining the U.S. credit rating by raising the debt ceiling). Th e power that party leaders had held over candidate nomination into the 1960s was seized by activists and organized groups (from business and faith communities to unions and public interest and consumer

Source: McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, January 2011. http://voteview.com/polarized_america.htm#POLITICALPOLARIZATION.

Figure 6 Historic Polarization of Political Parties in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives

Th e eff ectiveness of partisan framing has increased dramati- cally over the past four decades as private polling has been com- missioned to identify the words,

arguments, and symbols that reliably connect with existing

public beliefs.

The Contested Politics of Public Value 487

Th e hyperpolarization of American politics has cascading consequences for the informa- tion system, which exacerbates the tensions between Americans’ conservative orienta- tions and operationally liberal preferences. Although the press is widely criticized for its extensive coverage of confl ict, its reporting accurately refl ects genuine partisan polariza- tion and the elaborate eff orts by political lead- ers to mobilize public support (e.g., Jacobs and Shapiro 2000, chaps. 5–6; Patterson

1994). Th e pressure to attract audiences with entertaining coverage propels reporters and editors to accentuate the confl ict and political maneuvering, which, in turn, feeds public cynicism and uneasiness about the purpose of government (Cappella and Jamieson 1997).

Th e transformation of the information system has expanded opportunities for elite strategies to move public opinion. Studies of political communications fi nd that cable stations, social media, and online news-aggregating services atomize what was previously a shared public square into numerous and disconnected cubbyholes that reinforce existing perceptions and attitudes (Graber and Holyk 2011; Shapiro and Jacobs 2011). Th e media’s organizational and fi nancial motivations interact with the polarized political process: the “watchdog”-oriented press that was dominant into the 1970s has been replaced by a “partisan press” that tends to attract large audiences for news reporting and commentary that are sympathetic to liberal or conservative perspectives. Th e public-regarding values and policy that Bozeman and Moore welcome are undermined by the new political and information systems, which fan disputes over what constitutes “facts” to a degree that was less common than during the era dominated by network news (Jacobs and Shapiro 2011). During the debate over health reform in 2009 and 2010, false charges that it would create “death panels” were factually chal- lenged by some media while repeated by others. Th e reality was that the off ending provision was introduced by a conservative Georgia Republican, Senator Johnny Isakson, to create the option of receiv- ing “end-of-life” counseling; however, wide circulation of the false accusation in the new partisan press prompted lawmakers from both parties to agree to drop the option to choose end-of-life counseling from the fi nal legislation. Th e use of the concocted “death panels” charge to negatively frame the ACA led approximately four out of 10 Americans to believe the charges, according to surveys conducted by Pew, Bloomberg, and Associated Press-GfK from 2009 through 2012. Distortion that leads to misperceptions and proves impervi- ous to correction is one component of a broader challenge: convey- ing even basic facts about a decided law is another daunting hurdle. Although Obamacare has been criticized for threatening access to medical care for everyday families and imposing higher taxes on them, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Offi ce (2011) and Kaiser Family Foundation (2013b) reveal a quite diff erent reality: Obamacare’s fi nancing redistributes resources from the affl uent to a great majority of Americans (including families of four that annually earn more than $94,000) and widens coverage to a greater range of medical diagnoses and treatments for more than 30 million of Americans. Th e persistence of misperceptions, inaccurate assump- tions, and failure to grasp basic facts are common patterns in a political process geared to activating existing attitudes and biases and a communications system marked by disconnected silos in

idea on its head: instead of the public driv- ing policy outcomes (as the median voter theory predicts [Downs 1957] and charges of pandering assume), party leaders use polling to craft messages and frames to move opinion (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Th e polarization of elites who use negative framing to mobilize fellow partisans helps explain the widening divide between Democratic and Republican voters (Bafumi and Shapiro 2009).

Th e 2009–10 battle to pass health reform during President Obama’s presidency is a well-studied illustration of contemporary polarization (Henderson and Hillygus 2011; Jacobs and Mettler 2011; Strickland, Taber, and Lodge 2011; Th ompson 2013). Although majorities of citizens (including Republicans) favored “health coverage for everyone” prior to the debate over “Obamacare” (as the ACA is now widely described), members of Congress from both parties tended to adopt uncompromising positions in order to retain their party’s nominations and leadership positions and then largely voted as a bloc. All Republicans in the House and Senate voted against reform, while nearly all Democrats supported it. Th is stark divide led to dueling eff orts to activate the contending strains of public opinion. Democrats targeted operational liberalism by persistently emphasiz- ing the concrete benefi ts of the ACA, such as prohibitions on insur- ers denying coverage to those with preexisting medical conditions, expanding prescription drug benefi ts for seniors, and widening access to insurance and medical coverage to 32 million nonelderly people by 2016, according to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Offi ce (2011; see also Jacobs and Skocpol 2012).

Meanwhile, critics of “Obamacare” worked to trigger Americans’ philosophical conservatism by framing reform as a “big govern- ment” “takeover” of medical care that would endanger American lives by establishing “death panels.” Th e strategic objective of these charges of liberal overreach was not to create new attitudes but rather to activate already-existing identifi cation with the Republican Party and distrust of government. Polls of Americans show that opposition among Americans who were Republicans grew after these conservative framings, producing a gap in support for reform between Democrats and Republicans that ranged from a staggering 45 percentage points to 65 percentage points (Jacobs and Mettler 2011). In other words, the dueling framings launched by Democrats and Republicans activated contending strains of operational liberal- ism and philosophical conservatism as well as enduring partisan attachments, which, in turn, polarized public attitudes toward health care reform along party lines. As rank-and-fi le Republicans learned their party’s position, they adopted those views; Democrats heard their party leaders’ dog whistle and generally followed them.

In addition to inciting Americans to return to their partisan corners, the persistent negative framing of Obamacare as extreme and unworkable fueled uncertainty. Th is propelled worries that reform would make “you and your family … worse off ,” according to the Kaiser Family Foundation’s polling (2013a). Ominous alarms about threats to personal well-being (such as warnings of “death panels” and draconian cuts in Medicare) tripled fears that reform would make health care “worse off ” for Americans and their families (from 11 percent in Kaiser polling to more than 30 percent).

Th e hyperpolarization of American politics has cascading consequences for the informa- tion system, which exacerbates

the tensions between Americans’ conservative orientations and

operationally liberal preferences.

488 Public Administration Review • July | August 2014

Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). Th is “bias” in organization translates not only into favorable new policies but also into a “pre- decision process” that obstructs threatening issues from reaching the public agenda and receiving sustained attention.

Hacker and Pierson (2010) argue that businesses and the most affl uent regularly prevail in organized combat because economic resources and political infl uence are becoming increasingly concen- trated, reversing the pattern that Dahl described after World War II. In particular, they stress that the growing concentration of income and political infl uence in the hands of the “super rich” in the top 1 percent of earners bends the “balance of organized interests” in their favor and results in outsized “political pressure for less egali- tarian policy outcomes” (4, 21). While unions and other groups might have exerted countervailing pressure in the 1950s and 1960s, the atrophying of their memberships along with enduring hurdles to forming mass-membership “encompassing organizations” has opened the door for business and the affl uent to amass a dispro- portionate edge in becoming “highly motivated, mobilized, and involved in [policy making to advance their interests]” (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 49; Olson 1982).

Generations of case studies have revealed the lopsided impact of the better organized on policies as varied as agriculture (McConnell 1966) and, more recently, fi nancial reform, where intense lobby- ing by private interests and agencies facing threats to their existing authority defeated major proposals and “watered down” many of those that remained (Carpenter 2011).

Health reform off ers a particularly compelling—and well- researched—illustration of the range of self-interested organized eff orts to shape policy. Consistent with the pluralist perspective, the strident opposition of business organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and private insurers to any meaningful reform was counteracted by unions and public interest groups, as well as associations representing doctors and hospitals and the manufacturers of pharmaceutical products and medical devices.

Even as health advocates exerted countervailing pressure to move health reform during an unusual period of Democratic control over Washington’s lawmaking branches, pressure groups represent- ing businesses and professional associations capitalized on their concentrated economic and organizational advantages to wield signifi cant infl uence while many interests—including those of the uninsured—were not organized or were only weakly evident in the policy process. Th e ACA introduced new regulations and subsi- dies, but they are largely geared to rationalizing the private system rather than restructuring it along the lines of a “single payer” approach that would supplant private insurers or a public option to establish a national government health insurance program to compete with private insurers. Even the most liberal version of health reform—the bill that passed the House of Representatives in 2009—scaled back the public option to a miniscule number of Americans; the Senate never passed the public option that liberals and some consumer activists advocated. Private insurers do face signifi cant new restrictions, but they retain—to the frustration of liberals—their primary role. In addition, medical providers and manufacturers (including the big pharmaceutical fi rms) agreed to certain concessions, but they received in return millions of new

which accuracy and thoroughness are not prime objectives, if goals at all.

Can presidential leadership resolve the confusion and foster a reason-based discussion of the national interest? Some leading schol- ars of the U.S. presidency argue that the country’s chief executive has incentives based on his national election to promote the “public interest”—an inclination that would fi t with Moore’s hopes for government offi cials. Th e problem, however, is that presidents face a familiar roster of fragmented, hostile media; an often unifi ed parti- san opposition in Congress; and the U.S. Constitution’s distribution of countervailing powers to the judicial branch and the states.

Presidential vulnerability is illustrated by President Obama’s struggles to fulfi ll the expectations of health reform advocates that he impose his “narrative” and dominate public perceptions (Westen 2011). Reformers’ hopes collided—as research on mass commu- nications anticipates—with the reality of America’s informational system. President Obama made regular and extensive public promotions of health reform starting in 2009, but the media only reported a fraction of speeches on reform, and when they did, the information conveyed to Americans tended to avoid substance in favor of political maneuvering. When Obama’s messages did reach Americans, they were eff ectively countered by those of his opponents (Jacobs 2013).

In short, the reinforcing dynamics of multiple and competing strains of public beliefs, partisan polarization, and the transforma- tion of information production creates enormous barriers to the society consensus that Bozeman seeks and the pursuit of “good” that Moore welcomes. What Bozeman and Moore are expecting of American society and government workers defi es the logic of the current political system; the nature and scope of “the public” is the focus of enduring and intensifying confl ict.

Organized Interests and Public Policy Moore presents public policy as a tool for social benefi cence—an instrument to create and widely distribute economic, civil, and social opportunities to serve the inclusive community of citizens. Th is notion of “public value” clashes with extensive research dem- onstrating that organized groups of businesses and professionals and affl uent individuals enjoy privileged access to policy makers and use their infl uence to advance their narrow interests, often at the expense of the broader public interest.

One of the pioneers of the pluralist account, Charles Lindblom, argued that the notion of a “mutual benefi t society” is undercut by the “institutional form of struggle between advantaged and disadvantaged” that routinely favors organized groups representing business, professional associations, and the affl uent (1982, 12–14, 17). Broad publics and the less established are often crippled by col- lective action problems from mounting eff orts comparable to those undertaken by businesses and the better-off who share clear, con- centrated, and intense material interests (Olson 1965). Th e result is that the population of organized groups seeking to infl uence public policy in Washington and state capitals underrepresents consumer and public interest groups compared to business and professional associations that enjoy greater access to the makers of policy and speak louder and most often to them (Hall and Wayman 1990;

The Contested Politics of Public Value 489

individual lawmakers (such as the fi libuster, which requires 60 votes in the Senate to override) (Aldrich 1995). During the health reform battle, the fi libuster did not block reform, as the Democrats had a suffi cient number of seats to overcome it, but it did empower each senator to bargain to advance his or her interests and those of sup- porters—producing in one case the “Cornhusker Kickback” to win a fi nal decisive vote from Nebraska’s Ben Nelson. It also equipped moderate Democrats to resist liberal proposals on taxation, generous subsidies to pay for private insurance, and a comprehensive national “public option.”

Th e separation of powers among the three branches of government and among the national and state and local governments disperses authority and generates incentives for confl ict as the holders of the various offi ces protect the interests of their constituents and, often, the agendas of party activists in order to prove their mettle and advance their careers by winning renomination, reelection, and leadership posts. At the national level, decades

of research have found that the dispersal of lawmaking produces “delay and deadlock,” and more so under conditions when rival

(and increasingly polarized) political parties divide control of the executive and legislative branches (Burns 1963; Mann and Ornstein 2012). A number of studies report that divided party control of government increases the number of presidential vetoes compared to periods when one party controls govern- ment (Cameron 2000; Woolley 1991).

Th e battle between levels of government is fueled by their distinct sets of authority and regional interests. For instance, states and

localities in the South have long resisted expansion of government as a threat to their regional economy based on low wages and low ben- efi ts and to their ability to attract investors and business (Kenyon and Kincaid 1991; Robertson 1989). Most Southern offi cials opposed the implementation of health reform, for instance, because of fears that their long-standing economic model would be threatened by new benefi ts, government intervention in insurance markets, and pressure to increase spending and possibly future taxes (Jacobs and Skocpol, forthcoming). State and local governments do enjoy discretion on particular policy areas—such as public safety and education—but are hemmed in by limits on their economic resources as well as by the “supremacy” of national law. Despite lingering hopes that govern- ment “closest to the people” would enjoy the greatest leeway, genera- tions of research on urban policy and politics have demonstrated the severe constraints imposed by resource limitations, the pressure of private developers and businesses, and the infl uence of market models on government operations and proposals for reform (Harvey 2008; Logan and Molotch 1987; Peterson 1981).

Research on national governing and intergovernmental relations tends to challenge Moore’s expectation of public value creation. One critique of the U.S. government suggests that the public inter- est is often lost in decentralized, uncoordinated operations that work at cross-purposes. Th e general direction of American political

patients and what are anticipated to be substantial new sources of revenue and profi ts.

Th e victors of the “organized combat” over health reform were—as Hacker and Pierson (2010) would anticipate—well-represented organizations of affl uent professions and businesses. Th e business sections of newspapers declared the verdict: “Wall Street welcomes new health prescription.” Stocks in the health care industry rose during the fi rst trading day following congressional passage of the ACA, and the industry’s profi tability and stock market valuation continued to rise into 2013 (Phelps and Yee 2010; Rothwell and Craft 2013).

Case studies highlighting the dispropor- tionate infl uence of the best organized are confi rmed by a series of empirical studies across a number of areas. One study fi nds that the votes of U.S. Senators are closely associ- ated with the preferences of higher-income individuals but are virtually unresponsive to views of the middle class and the less well-off (Bartels 2008). Another reports that government offi cials working on foreign policy and international economic issues are most infl u- enced by business leaders; the ordinary citizen exerts no signifi cant impact (Jacobs and Page 2005).

In short, the evidence off ers no consistent support for the expectations of public value scholars that policy results from a consensus of citizen beliefs and a general pattern of govern- ment offi cials transcending their context of organized combat. Policy is routinely stitched together in a process that favors the better organized. While broad publics may benefi t at times (as the expansion of insurance access demonstrates), the most consistent theme is accommodation with organized interests.

A Government of Special Interests Government institutions are neither neutral conveyor belts of societal demands nor necessarily value-creating instruments. Th e legislative process and the separation of powers design of American government generate incentives to serve narrow interests and to prefer the status quo and inaction. Decades of research have dem- onstrated that the structure of government defi nes preferences and generates confl ict; by comparison, Moore references the “strategic triangle” of government decision making but pins his hopes for the generation of public value on individual choice for “the good and right.”

Research on the legislative branch fi nds an endemic “social choice” problem: the particular interests and preferences of individual legislators obstruct eff orts to build majorities to take action that would favor the collective interests of a political party or the nation (Hall and Taylor 1996). Th e political party is one of the primary mechanisms to link together the interests of individuals, but it is susceptible to internal philosophical tensions (for instance, between moderate and liberal Democrats over a single payer or public option in health reform) and to procedures that empower

Th e evidence off ers no consist- ent support for the expectations

of public value scholars that policy results from a consensus of citizen beliefs and a general pattern of government offi cials transcending their context of

organized combat.

Th e separation of powers among the three branches of govern- ment and among the national

and state and local governments disperses authority and gener-

ates incentives for confl ict.

490 Public Administration Review • July | August 2014

normative beliefs and the advantages of the organized, how can civil discourse and government operations be designed to generate public values and public value? Even with eff ective of barriers to change, there remains an indeterminate space between volitional agency to pursue change and the straitjacket of structural constraints. Finding those vulnerabilities of the existing order and tailoring strategies to exploit those potential openings require precise analysis and an appreciation for processes of change and the temporal development of institutions. In particular, research on historical institutional- ism demonstrates that public-regarding change can occur when the erosion or, in rare cases, rupture of existing economic and politi- cal structures unsettles entrenched stakeholders and received ideas about public life; previously marginalized social groups organize politically to challenge the status quo; and developmental paths are inaugurated that generate new and broader constituencies (Skocpol and Jacobs 2011). With due awareness of the barriers to change, three shifts in political incentives, policy design, and public discourse may open opportunities—perhaps of limited scope—to foster public-regarding dynamics.

Rebalancing Political Incentives One of the most daunting hurdles for value-creating policy is entrenched partisan polarization. Rebalancing or, more modestly, tilting against the current political system’s incentives that favor political activists may create opportunities for more lawmakers to

work for common-good outcomes that cross today’s party lines.

Surveys of national and state political party conventions persistently reveal that they fail to represent the country as a whole. Democratic conventions are more liberal than the party’s rank-and-fi le members and far more liberal than the country as a whole. Republican conventions pull even more dis- proportionately from conservatives. Because the fi rst step to serving in elected offi ce is winning the nomination from these highly

partisan deciders, most government offi cials feel intense pressure to respond to their partisan bases, even if that requires shirking their fi delity to the general public (Mann and Ornstein 2012; Wood 2009).

Weakening—let alone replacing—these partisan incentives is a daunting task. A practical starting place is to alter the nominations process. Among promising eff orts are state reforms of the process of drawing legislative boundaries: where redistricting processes in the past have often been controlled by legislators to pervert competi- tive elections by drawing safe districts, Arizona, California, and other states have enacted nonpartisan and independent redistrict- ing commissions to foster competition. Another promising reform is California’s recent nonpartisan or open primary: the common practice of each party running its own nomination processes is replaced with one primary for all political parties, and the top two vote-getters advance to the general election. While additional analysis is necessary, the early indications from certain of California’s 2012 state elections are that the open primary created incentives for candidates to abandon narrow party appeals (especially when they hailed from the same party). Democratic candidates reached for

development is marked by the breakdowns and dysfunction of a “hapless giant” rather than the coherent programmatic action that Moore seeks (Skowronek 1982). In recent years, the government’s failure to adequately regulate the fi nancial industry (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011), control national health care expendi- tures (Jacobs and Skocpol 2012), and conduct an organizationally integrated national security system (9/11 Commission 2004) are not aberrations but variations on a long-standing theme. A leading scholar of the national government process warns that “the general, long-term welfare of the United States is no more than an incidental by-product of the system” (Fiorina 1977).

Critical studies of organized groups fi nd that the fragmented nature of the U.S. government creates opportunities to advantage narrow rather than broad public interests. Ill-informed and inattentive pub- lics rarely engage with what can seem like byzantine legislative and executive offi ces and lack well-resourced lobbyists to work on their behalf, while groups representing business, professional associations, and the affl uent skillfully exploit the byways of Washington. Th ese pressure groups have been found to establish enduring relationships with their nominal regulators (Lowi 1969), engage in “subterranean politics” to develop special deals below the public radar (Hacker 2002), and exploit multiple veto points to deliberately produce deadlock in order to create inoff ensive “drift” as an alternative to government action that would redistribute their resources (Hacker 2004).

While the general pattern is marked by accommodation of the best organized, con- sequential government action for the general public does occur on occasion. Th e ACA is reworking—though not without continuing intense resistance—the fi nancing and deliver- ing of health care, and the Dodd-Frank law is bringing new regulations to fi nance. Th ese are exceptions, though, that required an unu- sual confl uence of unifi ed government and the opportunity created by economic crisis (Skocpol and Jacobs 2011). While individual government offi cials are often concerned about serving the public, their behavior is often channeled by existing structures and incentives toward advancing the interests of stakeholders and the careers of government offi cials.

Public Value and Renewed Politics Generations of research on American politics challenge the analysis off ered by the public values fi eld. Organized groups and government fragmentation favor narrow interests and discourage the socially benefi cent actions of government individuals that Moore expects. Multiple and competing opinions and beliefs disrupt the societal consensus around public values that Bozeman projects. In the context of deep and growing inequalities in resources and political infl uence, Bozeman’s focus on fi nding a consensus may, paradoxi- cally, encourage orchestrated debates by well-equipped organizations intent on erecting a façade of agreement even though the interests of Middle America along with those of the poor and unorganized are neglected (Sanders 1997).

While the public values fi eld is inadequate as a framework of analy- sis, it does pose an intriguing question: given the contested nature of

Rebalancing or, more modestly, tilting against the current politi- cal system’s incentives that favor

political activists may create opportunities for more lawmak- ers to work for common-good

outcomes that cross today’s party lines.

The Contested Politics of Public Value 491

the short term and prospects of benefi ts from future developmental patterns that further expand public value at the expense of today’s stakeholders.

Another challenge is to elevate the visibility of the public value that is being created. For instance, most Americans receive their health insurance coverage through their employer. In a “hidden” subsidy to this employment-based system, the federal government’s third- largest expenditure on health care is tax subsidies for employer payments for employees’ premiums. Tax exemptions for the interest on home mortgages are another example. Few Americans are aware of these substantial, if largely obscure, tax exemptions and therefore rarely credit public policy for serving their interests (Mettler 2011).

Th is pattern of obscure, “submerged” value creation depresses what could be an important source of public support for inclusive programs. A series of studies demonstrate that when programs deliver clear, visible, and substantial benefi ts, individuals are more knowledgeable about the programs and more motivated to support them (Mettler and Soss 2004; Pierson 2000). Andrea Campbell (2003) fi nds that Social Security both established new protections against poverty in old age and produced the higher voter turnout and political awareness that we now associate with seniors. Suzanne Mettler (2005) fi nds that the recipients of GI benefi ts similarly were more motivated and engaged in public aff airs. Another study fi nds that the personal statement of benefi ts mailed to recipients of Social Security boosts their knowledge of the program and their confi - dence in it (Cook, Jacobs, and Kim 2010). Th ese and other cases demonstrate that strategically designed government programs can generate knowledge about them and tap into the public’s opera- tional liberalism.

Today’s high distrust and low awareness of the value creation by public policy is a product of designs that, perversely, obscure benefi ts, leav- ing Americans to focus alone on the sordid stories of insider deals. Th e fi eld of public value should devote more attention to design- ing public-regarding policies that spotlight value creation.

Putting Public Values on the Agenda Public discourse about public policy and

government is too often dominated by organized interests with substantial resources and by partisan activists and their allies who are skilled at the science of framing and counterframing. Even when public-regarding values and policies are enacted (as was the case with certain aspects of Obamacare), citizens remain confused, suspi- cious, and uncertain.

Counteracting political strategies to move public opinion by exploit- ing the current information systems is daunting but not without potential. Recent research demonstrates a surprising degree of public participation in deliberation regarding public policy; two-thirds report engaging in “public talk” about public issues, and an impres- sive 25 percent attend organized forums to participate in face-to- face deliberation—a particularly time-consuming and cognitively taxing form of discursive politics (Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009).

independent and Republican voters, while GOP candidates shifted similarly to the middle.

Start Seeing Public Value Another barrier to fostering public values is that large majorities distrust government and the proposition that it creates value for them. With a few exceptions such as Social Security, Americans perceive—often accurately—the privileged access and infl uence of organized interests. Not surprisingly, two-thirds of Americans conclude that “government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves” rather than being “run for the benefi t of all the people” (as a long-standing survey question asks). Gallup surveys fi nd that two-thirds or more believe that lobbyists, major corporations, and banks and fi nancial institutions have “too much power.” Americans view government (in the abstract) as an actual threat: supermajorities single out “big government” as “the big- gest threat to the country in the future.” Th is alarming perception has increased by 11 percentage points since the fall of 2008, when Lehman Brothers collapsed and emergency steps were taken to stave off a second Great Depression. In the face of a steady stream of front-page reporting about insider deals and big government rescues of Wall Street, why would Americans trust public policy to generate value for everyday people who lack a well-resourced lobby? Moving toward the value creation that Moore recommends will be diffi cult when citizens remain deeply suspicious and even fearful of govern- ment and public policy.

Th ere is no simple answer. One step is to address the core of the public’s distrust by forming, when possible, wide coalitions of future-oriented partners to challenge the interests of the most advantaged or, at least, to strike bargains that benefi t the broad public. While the best organized are most focused on immediate threats, strategic coalitions geared to incre- mental future development that start small and accept accommodations with powerful organized groups with an eye to later expan- sion may off er opportunities. Social Security, Medicare, and certain education and job crea- tion programs followed this model of strategic political development (Derthick 1979). In the case of Obamacare, the White House was able to pass reform through Congress by cutting a series of deals with major stakeholders such as pharmaceutical manufacturers and hospitals to expand their busi- nesses and to avoid the most liberal approaches to reform—single payer and the public option—in exchange for their active support or muted opposition for legislation that increased their regulation and fi nancial costs. Th e accommodations prompted some liberals and Democrats (such as Howard Dean) to oppose the ACA legislation, but they also induced powerful stakeholders to accept reforms that would, designers of health reform believed, initiate new program- matic developments over time to curtail the profi ts and infl uence of today’s powerful stakeholders and give rise to new, broader repre- sentation of Americans. In other words, stakeholders focused in 2009–10 on the short-term impacts (new paying customers, mild fi nancial costs); strategic reformers focused on the following decades and on future expansion of cost controls and patient provisions (Jacobs and Skocpol 2012). Th e best organized received immediate special treatment, but the broad public received new coverage in

Today’s high distrust and low awareness of the value creation by public policy is a product of designs that, perversely, obscure benefi ts, leaving Americans to

focus alone on the sordid stories of insider deals.

492 Public Administration Review • July | August 2014

Promising eff orts are under way to incorporate public deliberation into government decisions making. Reforms in Chicago built citizen deliberation into previously unresponsive police and school board decision making (Fung 2004). A particularly intriguing reform has been the Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review: the conclusions from deliberations among randomly selected citizens regarding several ballot initiatives were disseminated to voters, increasing knowledge and reducing skepticism about the measures among those who read citizen reviews (Gastil and Knobloch 2010). Even if public manag- ers cannot ignore stakeholders, they can be important allies in using existing procedures for “public input” to incorporate meaningful citizen deliberation as a tool for broadening internal decision mak- ing and infusing it with consideration of diverse perspectives about what constitutes the public good and how to pursue it (Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009). In circumstances in which the exist- ing stakeholders are under stress, incorporating citizen deliberation may be able to tilt the balance of power in government decision making.

Established structures and the self-reinforcing dynamics they generate are powerful forces for sustaining many institutions and practices that reward private over public interests (Pierson 2000). Nonetheless, coalition building geared to launching and continuing public-regarding developmental paths, enhancing the visibility of value creation, and fostering wider public debate may create open- ings for improving the conditions for vibrant public life, as Dewey envisioned.

Acknowledgments I am pleased to acknowledge the research assistance of Adam Chelseth. I am grateful for the comments and suggestion of the two anonymous reviewers, as well as Michael McGuire, Barbara Crosby, and, especially, John Bryson. I alone remain responsible for the analysis.

Notes 1. Figures 1, 2, and 3 are based on a 2007 survey during the presidency of George

W. Bush, which may have triggered Republicans to boost their support for social welfare programs that they associate with the administration and prompt Democrats to oppose such programs. “Partisan cueing” is well documented (Bartels 2002; Gerber and Huber 2009, 2010), but its applicability to these data is not clear. Th e fi gures focus on general policy directions instead of specifi c proposals widely identifi ed with the Bush administration, and they present similarities (rather than divergences) among partisans, as partisan cuing often produces. Moreover, data shown here as well as prior research document that philosophical conservatism and operational liberalism are enduring patterns, not tied to one presidency (Free and Cantril 1967). In addition, the research on partisan cueing identifi es conditions that mitigate uniform, automatic responses by individuals: variations in the strength of partisan identity depress its eff ects among weak partisans (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012); partisan cue- ing is also reduced when politicians adopt positions that depart from each party’s brand, such as Republicans who strongly support Social Security and Medicare or fi scally conservative Democrats who back entitlement reductions (Arceneaux 2008).

2. Unfortunately, subgroup breakdowns were not available for the data in fi gures 5 and 6. But subgroup breakdowns of similar survey questions by CBS News and the New York Times did generally reveal a preference for reducing spending among Democrats as well as Republicans and among lower- and middle-income groups as well as the more affl uent. Th e data are available from the Roper Center.

3. In fi gure 6, DW-Nominate is the most widely used estimate of the ideological position of lawmakers in Congress. Scores can range from –1 (liberal) to 1 (con- servative) and are based on a dynamic, weighted, three-step statistical estimation procedure of all roll call votes in each Congress that were not unanimous. For more information, see Poole and Rosenthal (1997).

4. Kaiser polling can be found at http://www.kff .org/kaiserpolls/trackingpoll.cfm. 5. A fuller discussion of the challenges to the socially benefi cent account can be

found in Jacobs and Soss (2010). 6. Th e Gallup survey question is as follows: “As I read off each of the following,

please tell me whether you think it has too much power, about the right amount of power, or not enough power.”

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