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The Conservative Case for the Judiciary Accountability Act Published by - October 19, 2022 -

*Aliza Shatzman

I. INTRODUCTION

The judiciary is an unaccountable workplace where some judges abuse their positions of power, mistreat their

employees with impunity, and act as if they are answerable to no one. More judges engage in misconduct,

including gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, than the legal community cares to admit. Fueling

this injustice, the Third Branch is exempt from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the landmark

antidiscrimination law that protects employees from gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in the

workplace. This exemption distinguishes the judiciary from Congress, the Executive Branch,  and most

private businesses, whose employees are all protected by antidiscrimination laws.

This year, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees are considering a bill, the Judiciary Accountability Act

(JAA) (H.R. 4827/S. 2553), that would �nally extend Title VII protections to the judiciary. Judicial accountability

is, or should be, a bipartisan issue. Both Democratic and Republican judicial appointees mistreat their law

clerks. Furthermore, both liberal and conservative clerks experience harassment and retaliation from the most

powerful members of the legal profession—judges—with limited recourse available. Troublingly, as of August

2022, the JAA currently has only one Republican co-sponsor in the House and no Republican co-sponsors in the

Senate.

This article argues that Republican lawmakers should support the JAA because it promotes the conservative

principles of curbing government abuses of power and enforcing the rule of law. The JAA would rein in

unaccountable judges who abuse their positions of power and act as if they are above the law. Additionally, the

JAA would end the judiciary’s Title VII immunity, checking judicial behavior and holding judges to the same

standards as members of the other two branches of government—including congressmen and chief executives—

as well as employers in private businesses. Furthermore, the JAA would ensure that the next generation of

attorneys—from the most conservative to the most liberal—are not driven out of the profession due to

harassment and retaliation.

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In this article, I �rst discuss the scope of judicial misconduct, outline the Judiciary Accountability Act, and use my

personal experience with harassment and retaliation by a former DC Superior Court judge to underscore why this

legislation is so urgently necessary. Then, I explain why conservatives should support the JAA, explore

conservative arguments against the JAA, and engage with some alternatives to the JAA, concluding that the JAA

is the best path forward.

II. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT IS PERVASIVE

Misconduct is pervasive and unaddressed in the federal courts. Troublingly, judiciary leadership, including the

Judicial Conference of the United States and the Administrative O�ce of the U.S. Courts, have, until recently,

repeatedly refused to conduct a widescale workplace culture assessment, making it di�cult to measure the

scope of the problem. Judiciary leadership insists that harassment and retaliation are not pervasive problems

within the federal courts. However, judiciary employees who have experienced or witnessed mistreatment

know differently.

In 2018, U.S. Courts Administrative O�cer James Duff proudly proclaimed that, in some years, including 2016,

there were “zero” complaints �led by law clerks against judges. However, the judiciary only created a separate

“judicial employees” category for its judicial complaint data in 2019, so it would have been nearly impossible to

assess the number of complaints �led by law clerks. Furthermore, the dearth of complaints by law clerks

against judges is likely due in part to the lack of channels for reporting misconduct.

Between October 1, 2020 and September 30, 2021, there were only 11 formal complaints �led by judicial

employees against judges under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, which is the formal complaint process

for the federal judiciary. However, according to a 2021 internal D.C. Circuit survey that was leaked to The

Washington Post, �fty-seven judicial employees in that circuit experienced “problematic behavior” like gender

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discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and bullying, and an additional 134 either witnessed or heard about such

misconduct. This mismatch with Duff’s assertion suggests both that the judiciary’s records do not capture the

full scope of misconduct in the Third Branch and that the judiciary cannot be expected to adequately self-police

on these issues.

Law clerks rarely �le formal complaints against judges because they fear retaliation by the judge or

reputational harm in the legal community. While anecdotal data indicate that harassment and retaliation are

persistent problems, judges are rarely disciplined, further disincentivizing �ling complaints. The most

serious discipline judges receive are rare public reprimands. Reprimands have no tangible consequences to

judges’ lives—in contrast to the enormous life- and career-altering consequences the victims of their

mistreatment face. The threat of removal has also proven inconsequential in deterring problematic behavior by

life-tenured judges, since removal requires congressional impeachment, which rarely happens.

Several aspects of a judicial chambers make it a uniquely dangerous workplace that is particularly conducive to

harassment. First, there is an enormous power disparity between law clerks and judges. Law clerks are typically

fresh-out-of-law-school lawyers who opt for a pay cut in order to spend one or two years learning from a judge.

Their powerful superiors either enjoy life tenure (for most federal judges) or ten- or �fteen-year terms (for Article I

judges and most state court judges). Clerks, as a result, often depend on judges for references to secure their

next jobs. In the best of circumstances, judges will be lifelong mentors, supporting the law clerks throughout

their careers. But in the worst of circumstances, a negative clerkship experience can devolve into a long-term, far-

reaching, retaliatory, and sour relationship between judge and clerk. Even a lukewarm reference can destroy a law

clerk’s career.

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Judges face no oversight in their day-to-day dealings with clerks. In the typical judicial chambers, two law

clerks, a judge, and perhaps a judicial assistant work behind closed doors for long hours under stressful

circumstances. Furthermore, the internal courthouse workplace dispute resolution plan, known as Employee

Dispute Resolution (EDR), is notoriously �awed, lacking both con�dentiality and impartiality. These troubling

features of judicial chambers are compounded by the fact that law clerks have fewer workplace protections than

employees in other industries.

III. THE JUDICIARY ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

The Judiciary Accountability Act (JAA) offers a solution to this outrageous lack of accountability in the federal

judiciary. It would extend workplace protections to judiciary employees, and it would hold judges accountable for

their poor behavior.

The JAA would �nally extend Title VII protections to judiciary employees—including law clerks and federal public

defenders —enabling them to sue their harassers and seek damages for harm done to their careers,

reputations, and future earning potential.

Additionally, the JAA would increase judicial accountability by revising the de�nition of “judicial misconduct” in

Title 28 of the U.S. Code to include discrimination and retaliation. It would also clarify that misconduct

investigations can continue even if the judge who faces misconduct allegations retires, resigns, or dies.

Additionally, the JAA would create a Commission on Judicial Integrity, which would oversee several important

initiatives, including standardizing Employee Dispute Resolution Plans, creating a con�dential reporting

system, crafting a workplace misconduct prevention policy, and administering workplace culture

assessments.

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The JAA would �nally require the judiciary to collect and report data on workplace culture, the outcomes of

judicial complaints, and diversity in hiring. These are notoriously under-scrutinized areas, and the lack of

data in these areas has enabled some judges to get away with misconduct for far too long.

IV. CASE STUDY: MY EXPERIENCE WITH HARASSMENT AND RETALIATION

Early in law school, I decided to become a homicide prosecutor—and during law school, I interned with four

different U.S. Department of Justice o�ces, all during the Trump administration, which further solidi�ed my

opinions on crime.

I decided to clerk in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“D.C. Superior Court”) for a judge more

progressive than myself. My law school had instructed me to “apply broadly”—meaning across the geographical

and political spectra—and to accept the �rst clerkship I was offered. The judge presided over felony cases,

meaning that I would get a crash course in criminal prosecution right out of law school.

Unfortunately, my clerkship destroyed my career aspirations and set me on a different path. Beginning just

weeks into my clerkship, the judge began to harass me and discriminate against me because of my gender. He

would kick me out of court, telling me that I “made him uncomfortable” and he “just felt more comfortable with”

my male co-clerk. He told me I was “aggressive” and “nasty” and that I had “personality issues.” The day I found

out that I passed the Bar Exam—an enormous day in any young attorney’s life—he called me into his chambers

and told me, “You’re bossy! And I know bossy because my wife is bossy!”

I was devastated. I cried in the courthouse bathroom at work and cried myself to sleep at night. I wished I could

be reassigned to a different judge. However, my workplace did not have an Employee Dispute Resolution Plan in

place that might have enabled me to be reassigned—it was implemented one year after my clerkship ended.

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Eventually, the judge ended my clerkship early, telling me that I “made him uncomfortable” and “lacked respect

for” him. I contacted D.C. Courts Human Resources (“HR”), but they told me there was nothing they could do

because “HR doesn’t regulate judges” and “judges and law clerks have a unique relationship.” Then they asked

me whether I knew that I was an “at-will employee.”

One year later, I was �nally back on my feet. I secured my dream job as a prosecutor in the D.C. U.S. Attorney’s

O�ce (“USAO”). I was two weeks into training when I received devastating news that altered the course of my

life. The USAO told me the judge had made negative statements about me during my background investigation,

that I “would not be able to obtain a security clearance,” and that, therefore, my job offer was being revoked. A

few days later, an interview offer for a different position with the same o�ce was also revoked, based on the

judge’s same negative reference. I was only two years out of law school, and the judge seemed to have limitless

power to ruin my reputation and destroy my career.

I was eventually able to read the outrageous and misleading reference. By then, it was too late. The damage had

been done. I was blackballed from what I thought was my dream job. I will likely never work as a federal

prosecutor.

No one—not even a Senate-con�rmed judge—should be able to mistreat their employees with impunity. However,

the judiciary is a uniquely unaccountable workplace, where those tasked with interpreting the law are not subject

to the rule of law—at least not where workplace harassment is concerned. As if mistreating one’s law clerks

during their clerkships was not terrible enough, some judges are emboldened to exert far-reaching authority over

their former clerks’ careers. There are no guardrails to prevent the type of mistreatment I experienced during my

clerkship and in the years following it. Law clerks have neither legal protections nor recourse when the most

powerful members of the profession abuse their positions of power.

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I became aware of the proposed JAA while I was engaged in the formal judicial complaint process in the summer

and fall of 2021. Since then, I have spoken with many House and Senate o�ces, both Democratic and

Republican, including those involved with drafting the JAA, to urge their bosses to support this critical legislation.

I highlighted my personal story to personalize abstract issues. My experience with harassment and retaliation by

a former D.C. Superior Court judge underscores why the JAA is so urgently needed. I wish the JAA had protected

me when I was a law clerk.

V. CONSERVATIVES SHOULD SUPPORT THE JUDICIARY ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

The JAA should receive bipartisan support. Both Democratic and Republican appointees harass their clerks,

and both liberal and conservative clerks experience mistreatment. House and Senate Republicans should

support the JAA, considering how much it aligns with conservative principles like enforcing the rule of law and

curbing government abuses of power.

The JAA would �nally extend Title VII protections to more than 31,000 federal judiciary employees. It is ba�ing

that an entire branch of the federal government is so lawless. The judiciary is distinct from Congress and the

Executive Branch, where staffers are protected by, and lawmakers are subject to, Title VII. In fact, Congress

extended additional workplace protections to more employees, including interns, in 2018. Unpaid

congressional interns are protected by Title VII, yet young attorneys working for life-tenured federal judges are

not. Conservatives should demand that the judiciary be subject to the same standards as other government

branches and most private businesses, where employees are protected by various antidiscrimination laws.

Continuing to exempt the judiciary from Title VII sends a powerful message to misbehaving judges that they are

above the laws they interpret. Subjecting judges who harass their clerks to Title VII litigation would curb

government abuses of power by judges who mistreat their clerks with impunity.

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If a law school graduate decides to work at a law �rm, on the Hill, or at the White House, they are protected under

civil rights laws. If they are mistreated by their employers, they can seek legal redress. However, if they decide

that, for their �rst job, they want to spend a year or two learning from a judge, these young lawyers may

experience harassment and retaliation with no legal recourse. Judiciary employees are not asking for special

protections. Title VII, which applies to their counterparts in similar industries, should apply to them as well.

Arguably, the judiciary needs Title VII even more than the other two branches of government, because these

powerful employers—judges—enjoy life tenure. Compared to a congressional o�ce—with about half a dozen

staffers in a House o�ce and about a dozen staffers in a Senate o�ce—a judicial chambers has a fraction of the

staff and an employer with more unchecked power. A judicial chambers is more geographically isolated and

more physically imposing than a congressional o�ce. There is nowhere for a mistreated clerk to go to escape

their harasser—no alternative supervisor to work for or to contact for assistance. Furthermore, members of

Congress are accountable to the public—the voters—through elections every two or six years. Most federal judges

have life tenure, making them effectively accountable to no one.

Judges who mistreat their clerks are committing egregious abuses of power. Judges are empowered with the

authority to make decisions every day that affect fundamental aspects of litigants’ lives—including decisions

about their liberty. And yet, those to whom we entrust the most power are immune from suit. Misbehaving judges

evade scrutiny over their mistreatment of clerks; they also avoid accountability for committing misconduct.

VI. CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION TO THE JAA

Some conservative organizations, members of Congress, and judges have voiced opposition to the JAA.

They argue that the JAA introduces intrusive regulation, particularly by imposing a centralized Commission on

Judicial Integrity; that the judiciary is a unique branch of government that can and should self-police; and

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that the JAA threatens “judicial independence.” Some Republican congressional o�ces have also questioned

whether the JAA would chill hiring and whether it would be effectively utilized. .

A. It Is Time to Centralize and Standardize the Judiciary’s Approach To Workplace Misconduct.

Some have criticized the breadth of the Commission on Judicial Integrity’s oversight mandate, arguing instead

for decentralized governance within the judiciary and claiming that each courthouse has unique needs.

However, this Commission would neither regulate judges’ day-to-day dealings with their clerks nor their rulings.

Its purpose is to oversee and administer the JAA’s programs—including the workplace misconduct prevention

policy, the standardized EDR Plan, the con�dential reporting system, the data collection initiatives, and the

workplace culture assessments.

It is time to centralize and standardize judiciary workplace policies so that every law clerk, no matter what state

and courthouse they work in, knows there are safe places for them to go to report misconduct and seek

assistance. Current judiciary policies are either nonexistent or ineffective. Judges investigate their colleagues,

both internally through EDR and through formal complaints under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act.

These policies create both the appearance of and an actual con�ict of interest. As a result, judges rarely face

discipline.

While some continue to quibble about speci�c provisions of the JAA, as it stands, law clerks lack basic

workplace protections. Nothing about the judiciary suggests that it should be uniquely exempt from civil rights

laws. Judges who enforce antidiscrimination laws should themselves be subject to them. Judiciary employees

who go to work in courthouses across the country deserve the same access to the justice system as the litigants

who appear before them.

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The judiciary is a sprawling workplace that spans hundreds of courthouses across all �fty states. Perhaps this

could cut in favor of internal self-policing at individual courthouses, especially if judges could point to unique

characteristics of their courthouses requiring special policies. However, judges in courthouses across the

country have proven themselves unable and unwilling to self-police misconduct in their ranks. As misconduct

allegations and investigations into other insular organizations like police unions and the military  have

shown, attempts to self-regulate often fail.

Some judges have privately voiced concerns about whether judicial complaints and investigations under the JAA

could be politically weaponized by an overbearing, highly partisan Congress. For example, a Democratic-

majority Congress could threaten to investigate conservative or Republican-appointed judges for misconduct if

they do not rule a certain way. However, under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, individual members of

Congress already can theoretically pressure chief judges to initiate investigations into judges, even absent a

complaint by a law clerk. Congress has not politicized this process in the more than four decades since the

policy has been in place.

Opposition to the JAA under the guise of “judicial independence” is particularly disingenuous. The JAA, which

would �nally implement basic workplace policies and create some judicial accountability, has nothing to do with

ensuring that judicial rulings are free from outside political in�uence.  What most threatens judicial

independence is when notorious harassers, including misogynistic judges, are never disciplined. What are female

litigants to think when they appear before these notoriously misbehaving judges—particularly if the judges are

presiding over Title VII cases? Judicial independence in decision-making is distinct from workplace conduct.

B. There Are No Downstream Political Implications For Extending Title VII To the Judiciary.

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Conservative congressional o�ces are willing to engage on the subjects of judicial accountability and increased

workplace protections for judiciary employees. However, some o�ces have privately raised concerns about

speci�c aspects of the bill.  In this section, I engage with two points of concern: �rst, that the JAA will either

chill hiring by judges seeking to avoid lawsuits or complaints down the road; and second, that mistreated law

clerks will not actually sue judges under Title VII.

The JAA will not chill hiring. In 1995, Congress extended Title VII to both itself and the Executive Branch. At

the time, the Judicial Conference vociferously opposed extending Title VII protections to judiciary employees, in

part because “[t]he judiciary currently provides its employees with protections similar to those enumerated in” the

statutes.  Since 1995, there has been no evidence to suggest that either branch of government’s hiring patterns

were affected by extending Title VII protections to their employees.

I have spoken with many federal and state court judges from a variety of jurisdictions about the JAA.

Anecdotally, many federal judges support the JAA or some other increased workplace protections for employees

and accountability for their colleagues. Furthermore, state court judges are already subject to Title VII or

similar state antidiscrimination laws, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983; these judges still handle their judicial tasks

effectively, hire law clerks without issue, and conduct business e�ciently. At least half a dozen federal judges

who previously served on their state benches have stated that they do not believe that they should suddenly

become exempt from antidiscrimination laws because of a change in jurisdiction; nor do they believe that

something about themselves as employers suddenly changed when they received life tenure.

Congressional o�ces have also asked whether judiciary employees, including law clerks and federal public

defenders, will actually sue their powerful superiors under the JAA. State court employees can sue judges under

Title VII and state antidiscrimination laws; yet, they rarely feel empowered to do so. Multiple congressional

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staffers even argued that suing a judge would make the judiciary employee unemployable in the legal

community.

These concerns are unwarranted. Evidence suggests the JAA will be utilized and will have a material effect on

judicial workplaces. In fact, some judiciary employees are trying to sue right now. Former North Carolina

Assistant Federal Public Defender Caryn Strickland is currently engaged in litigation against judiciary o�cials in

the Fourth Circuit for gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. Ms. Strickland can only rely on Fifth

Amendment equal protection and due process claims because federal defenders’ o�ces are also currently

exempt from Title VII.

These same arguments could have been raised against extending Title VII to the Legislative and Executive

Branches in 1995 but would have rung similarly hollow. Regardless of survivors’ appetite for litigation, they

should not be denied the right to sue their harassers. Furthermore, potential liability for employers is a strong

disincentive for harassment. Additionally, the argument about unemployability in the legal community cuts both

ways. It will be more di�cult for the former clerk to �nd a legal job after suing a judge, just as it will be more

di�cult for them to �nd a legal job after �ling a complaint against a judge. However, judiciary employees who are

driven from the profession and face �nancial hardship must be able to sue and seek damages.

Most importantly, the JAA does much more than just extend Title VII protections to judiciary employees—it

establishes courthouse workplace protections and creates judicial accountability. By requiring the judiciary to

collect and publish data, including the results of a desperately needed workplace culture assessment, the JAA

would �nally quantify the scope of the problem. No matter how many judiciary employees take advantage of

the Title VII protections, many more will utilize the workplace misconduct prevention policy, the con�dential

reporting system, and the standardized EDR Plan.  Every employee will bene�t from a publicly reported climate

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survey of the judiciary as well as data on law clerk and public defender hiring and the outcomes of judicial

complaints.

The JAA is not perfect. For example, it will not remove EDR and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act investigations

from the judiciary’s chain of command. It should. Judges should not investigate their colleagues. Additionally, the

JAA will not revise the provision in Title 28 of the U.S. Code that allows a judge to continue collecting his pension

if he retires  rather than resigns amid a misconduct investigation—collecting taxpayer dollars after committing

misconduct.  It should. However, judiciary employees cannot wait another year for urgently needed reforms.

VII. CONSERVATIVE ALTERNATIVES TO THE JAA

Some judges and conservative congressional o�ces have suggested alternatives to the JAA. The �rst is to

utilize an internal U.S. Courts Administrative O�ce (“AO”) process, rather than Title VII, to adjudicate workplace

disputes. The second is to sever the JAA—passing the Title VII protections now, while addressing the judicial

accountability, data collection, and judicial oversight provisions later, perhaps in a separate bill.  While

extending Title VII to the judiciary is better than doing nothing, both of these proposals are undesirable.

A. Current Internal Processes for Adjudicating Workplace Disputes in the Judiciary are Ineffective.

The judiciary has proven itself unable or unwilling to self-police. Congress should not give the federal judiciary

any more opportunities to offer toothless “reforms.” Following public misconduct allegations against former

Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski in 2017, the following year, the Judicial Conference of the United States,

which is the national policymaking body for the federal courts, created a Workplace Conduct Working Group to

make internal policy recommendations. The Working Group released an interim report in 2019, offering a few

hollow proposals and continuing to insist that harassment and misconduct are not pervasive within the federal

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courts. Judiciary leadership continues to tout its EDR Plan, claiming that Title VII protections are

unnecessary and duplicative. However, EDR Plans among the federal courts are notoriously ineffective.

They are not standardized among all federal courthouses; the proceedings are not con�dential; and the judges

overseeing EDR complaints are not impartial arbiters. Furthermore, in many cases, judiciary employees

attempting to utilize the EDR Plan lack basic due process rights.

On March 16, 2022, just hours before the House Judiciary Subcommittee hearing to discuss the JAA, and

after more than four years of work, the Working Group released another Report. The Report offered a few

meaningless reforms to EDR and again claimed that the judiciary is an exemplary workplace that can self-

police. Two judiciary representatives from the Working Group testi�ed at the hearing the next day, making the

same hollow claims.

Arguments about judicial independence and judicial exceptionalism are troublesome, since judges have been

notoriously unwilling to discipline their colleagues, even in the face of appalling misconduct. The judiciary has

also strenuously opposed oversight.

Under these circumstances, and based on the judiciary’s failures in the EDR context, the AO should not be

permitted to craft its own internal policy to mirror Title VII. Title VII may not be perfect, but it is better than

anything the judiciary has come up with to self-regulate. The judiciary has been trying to self-regulate for 250

years and has been unable to prevent and discipline misconduct in its ranks.

B. Every Component of the JAA Is Crucial.

Partisanship in recent years has rendered Congress unable to pass much legislation, making it imprudent to

rely on future congressional action. With the JAA �nally gaining momentum across the political spectrum, now is

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not the time for half measures. Therefore, Congress should not sever the JAA to focus on the Title VII protections

now, with the intent of passing a second bill later. Lawmakers should act swiftly and decisively to protect

judiciary employees.

Critically, the JAA as written does much more than simply extend Title VII protections. In fact, the other parts of

the bill—the workplace misconduct prevention policy, con�dential reporting system, standardized EDR Plans,

workplace culture assessment, and data collection and dissemination programs—will assist the entire judiciary

workforce and promote the judiciary’s mission. Similar legislation extending workplace protections to Congress

and the Executive Branches, such as the Congressional Accountability Act (“CAA”) and the Executive and

Presidential O�ce Accountability Act (“EPOAA”), did much more than just extend Title VII protections to those

branches. The CAA and the EPOAA, which have transformed federal workplaces in their respective branches,

achieved their success by taking a holistic approach to workplace protections, rather than just extending Title VII

to their employees.

C. Change Is Headed to the Judiciary

While these two alternatives to the JAA would not make the meaningful reforms for which I am advocating, my

conversations with conservative congressional o�ces and judges make me hopeful that the JAA can receive

bipartisan support. A wide swath of Congress, as well as a wide swath of the judiciary’s rank and �le, support

increased workplace protections for judiciary employees and increased accountability for judicial misconduct.

It is primarily the judiciary’s leadership—a powerful lobby—that aggressively opposes congressional

oversight.  However, congressional Republicans should listen to their constituents, who are a�liated with

courthouses across the country and who would bene�t immensely and immediately from the JAA.

VIII. CONCLUSION

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Many members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees were law clerks themselves. Some of their

staffers are former clerks. What would these members of Congress and staffers have done if they were harassed

at work? Would they have been driven from the profession? That would have been an enormous waste of their

training and talents.

There are federal courthouses in all �fty states, meaning the JAA touches every state. Every Senator and

nearly every House member represents constituents whose workplaces would be made safer by the JAA.

While politicians of all parties regularly defend and support judges for partisan reasons, they neglect law clerks—

the next generation of progressive and conservative thinkers and decision-makers—who are tossed aside and

driven from the profession by misbehaving judges bent on destroying their careers out of malice or

vindictiveness.

The judicial workplace should set the standard for workplace civility, safety, and accountability. Judiciary

employees—from the most left-leaning progressive to the most right-leaning conservative—cannot wait another

year for the JAA’s urgently needed reforms. Conservatives should support the JAA because it would align the

judiciary with the other branches of government and with most private employers. Every conservative should be

outraged by the lawlessness and unaccountability of our judiciary.

* Aliza Shatzman is an attorney and advocate in Washington, DC who writes and speaks about judicial

accountability. Ms. Shatzman is the President and Co-Founder of The Legal Accountability Project, a nonpro�t

aimed at ensuring that law clerks have positive clerkship experiences, while extending support and resources to

those who do not. Ms. Shatzman’s writing on this subject has previously appeared in the UCLA Journal of Gender

& Law, NYU Journal of Legislation & Public Policy, Yale Law & Policy Review, Above the Law, Law360, Ms.

Magazine, Slate, and Balls & Strikes. Ms. Shatzman earned her BA from Williams College in Williamstown,

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Massachusetts, and her JD from Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, Missouri, where she was an

Associate Editor of the Journal of Law & Policy.

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